ENTENTE   DIPLOMACY  AND 
THE  WORLD 


\ 


Books  by 

GEORGE  ABEL  SCHREINER 

The  Iron  Ration 

(La  Detresse  AUemande) 

From  Berlin  to  Bagdad 

The  Craft  Sinister 

Etc.,  etc. 

In  collaboration  with 
B.  de  Siebert 

ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY 

AND  THE  WORLD 


Harper  &  Brothers,  New  York 

John  Murray,  London 

Librairie  Hachette,  Paris 


/ 


ENTENTE   DIPLOMACY   AND 
THE  WORLD 

MATRIX  OF  THE  HISTORY  OF  EUROPE,  1909-14 

Presentation  of  the  Policies  and  Diplomatic  Practice  of  the  Russian,  British,  French, 
Italian,  Japanese,  and  Balkan,  and  the  German  and  Austro- Hungarian  Governments, 
by  means  of  the  Documents-of-State  and  Diplomatic  Correspondence  exchanged  by 
their  Foreign  Ministers  and  Representatives,  among  them  Messrs.:  Sazonoff,  Iswol- 
sky,  BenckendorfiF,  NeratoflF,  Nelidoff,  Kokowtzeff,  Poklewski-Koziel,  Krupenski, 
Tcharikoff,  Osten-Sacken,  Swerbeieflf,  De  Giers,  Hartwig  and  Schebeko;  Grey, 
Asquith,  Hardinge,  Nicolson,  Cartwright,  Lowther,  Buchanan,  O'Beirne,  Rodd, 
Goschen,  Mallet,  Bertie,  and  Crowe;  Poincar^,  Pichon,  Cruppi,  Doumergue,  Jules 
and  Paul  Cambon,  Crozier,  Barrere,  Bompard,  Viviani,  Touchard,  Caillaux,  Del- 
casse,  Pal^ologue,  and  Georges  Louis;  Tittoni,  San  Giuliano,  Giolitti,  Toretta,  Im- 
periali,  and  De  Martino;  Ito,  Katsura,  Komura,  Motono,  and  Goto;  Milovanowitch, 
Pashitch,  Guechoff,  DaneflF,  Malinoff,  Radoslavoff,  Said  Halim,  Hakki,  and  Rifaat; 
BUlow,  Bethmann-Hollweg,  Schon,  Jagow,  Wangenheim,  Metternich,  Lichnowsky, 
Kiderlen-Waechter,  Bieberstein,  and  Quadt;  Aehrenthal,  Berchtold,  Thurn,  Czapari, 
and  Giesl;  Kings  Edward  and  George,  Czar  Nicholas,  King  Victor  Emanuel, 
Emperor  William  II.,  and  Czar  Ferdinand  of  Bulgaria. 


translated  from  the  original  texts  in  his  possession 
By  B.  de  SIEBERT 

LATE  SECRETARY  OF  THE  IMPERIAL  RUSSIAN  EMBASSY  AT  LONDON 

EDITED.  ARRANGED  AND  ANNOTATED 

By  GEORGE  ABEL  SCHREINER 

AUTHOR  OF 
"the  iron  RATION,"   "FROM  BERLIN  TO  BAGDAD,"   "THE  CRAFT  SINISTER,"  ETC. 

POLITICAL  AND  WAR  CORRESPONDENT  IN  EUROPE  DURING  THE  WAR  OF  "THE  ASSOCIATED 

PRESS  OF  AMERICA" 


Zbc  Ikntcfterbocftet  press 

(G.  p.   PUTNAM'S  SONS) 

NEW  YORK  AND  LONDON 

1921 


Copjrright,  192 1 

by 
George  A.  Schreiner 


All  rights  reserved,  including  that  of  translation 
into  foreign  languages,  including  the  Scandinavian 


Printed  in  the  United  States  of  America 
from  electrotype 


TLo  m^  trienb 
FREDERICK  FRANKLIN  SCHRADER,  ESQ. 

PLAYWRIGHT,  LIBRETTIST,  CRITIC, 
AND  AUTHOR 


408405 


Tu  regere  imperio  populos  Romano,  memento. 
Hae  tibi  erunt  artes;  pasisque  imponere  morem, 
Parcere  subjectis,  et  debellare  superbos. 

— Virgil. 


NOTE 

Though  M.  B.  de  Siebert  has  requested  me  to  assign  to  him  only 
the  role  of  translator  in  the  identification  of  the  authorship  of  this 
book,  he  must,  nevertheless,  be  looked  upon  as  its  author.  To  be 
sure,  the  many  documents  here  reproduced  are  from  the  minds  of 
other  men — the  men  who  made  the  history  of  Europe  in  recent 
years — but  they  had  no  intention  whatever  of  having  any  of  them 
come  to  the  ken  of  the  public.  What  they  wrote  was  written  in 
their  capacity  as  statesmen — ministers  of  foreign  affairs  and  diplo- 
matists— and  was  by  its  very  character  destined  to  rest  forever  in 
the  secret  archives  of  governments,  more  especially  the  Imperial 
Russian  government  in  this  instance. 

It  was  left  to  M.  de  Siebert  to  take  the  steps  that  have  resulted 
in  the  publication  of  the  diplomatic  documents  and  correspondence 
herein  contained.  To  explain  why  and  how  these  steps  were  taken 
would  not  be  well,  simply  because  a  statement  in  regard  thereto 
would  prejudice  the  case  of  one  of  the  Powers  involved  in  the  truly 
stupendous  conspiracy  against  the  welfare  of  mankind  herein  laid 
bare. 

I  take  the  liberty  of  saying  that  it  took  great  courage  to  do  this. 
Men  have  earned  the  displeasure  of  powerful  governments  for 
much  less,  and  if  I  wanted  to  enter  upon  the  realm  of  general 
knowledge — upen  that  field  which  is  not  supported  by  official 
proof — I  could  say  that  M.  de  Siebert,  in  giving  these  documents  to 
the  world,  ran  the  risk  of  becoming  an  attraction  to  the  political 
assassin.  The  individuals  and  groups  who  encompassed  the  murder 
of  Jaures  and  a  number  of  other  con-conformists  are  still  in  being, 
and  the  same  can  be  said  of  those  who  decided  upon  the  death  of 
Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand  and  the  Duchess  of  Hohenberg,  to 
which  group  the  Serbian  Narodna  Odbrana  was  merely  a  tool.    But 

ix 


X  ENTENTE   DIPLOMACY   AND   THE   WORLD 

since  we  are  not  engaged  upon  a  discussion  of  matters,  which,  after 
all,  depend  to  some  extent  upon  unauthenticable  data,  no  more 
will  be  said  at  this  time  in  connection  therewith,  lest  false  impres- 
sions be  gained  and  prejudicial  opinions  formed. 

M.  de  Siebert's  own  note  in  regard  to  the  documents  reads  as 
follows : 

"The  translation  of  the  documents  is  as  faithful  as  possible  and 
has  closely  followed  the  sense  of  the  originals,  even  at  the  expense 
of  making  concessions  inimical  to  style.  In  the  event,  however,  of 
this  publication  giving  rise  to  a  discussion  throwing  doubt  upon 
the  exactness  of  the  translation,  or  insisting  upon  a  different 
interpretation  of  the  intent  and  meaning  of  any  document,  the 
original  Russian,  French  and  English  texts  of  the  separate  docu- 
ments may  be  referred  to," 

There  are  858  documents  in  this  collection — all  that  could  be 
published  at  one  time.  Great  numbers  of  telegrams  were  not  repro- 
duced, because  the  very  excellent  reports  of  Count  Benckendorff, 
to  cite  but  one  case,  condensed  them  in  such  a  manner  that  it  was 
better  to  give  the  public  these  most  comprehensive  resumes  instead 
of  the  dispatches  whose  burden  the  Russian  ambassador  at  London 
thus  concentrated  into  terse  monographs  intended  to  keep  the 
Russian  ministers  of  foreign  affairs  properly  informed. 

The  arrangement  of  the  documents  was  a  difficult  task,  since  in 
most  cases  several  situations  and  crises  were  being  dealt  with 
simultaneously,  though  not  usually  in  the  same  document.  It  was 
finally  found  that,  for  the  sake  of  clearness  and  logical  presenta- 
tion, the  documents  would  have  to  be  divided  into  three  depart- 
ments, or  books.  The  first  of  these  deals  exclusively  with 
questions  arising  from  what  may  be  called  the  "necessities  of 
empire,"  which  shaped  the  international  course  of  Russia,  Great 
Britain,  France,  the  United  States,  Japan  and  Germany.  The  book 
reveals  the  so-called  problems  of  the  Far  East  and  Near  East,  and 
then  shows  that  Italy  received  as  her  price  a  free  hand  in  North 
Africa.  Book  Two  shows  the  relations  of  the  Entente  to  Austria- 
Hungary,  and  Book  Three  presents  a  clear  picture  of  the  position 
of  Germany  throughout  the  period  covered  by  the  documents. 


NOTE  xi 

It  will  be  found  that  here  and  there  a  document  is  not  in  its 
proper  place,  chronologically.  This  concession  to  the  reader  was 
made  so  that  he  might  the  better  understand  the  situation — as  a 
matter  of  fact  the  absence  of  a  connecting  text  made  recourse  to 
this  method  necessary.  Concerning  the  deletions,  of  which  a  small 
number  will  be  found,  I  will  say,  that  the  matter  eliminated  con- 
sists of  repetitions,  irrelevancies  and  observations  foreign  to  the 
subject-matter.  The  English  style  of  orthography  has  been  adhered 
to  in  the  reproduction  of  the  documents  themselves.  In  my  own 
contribution,  American  orthography  is  employed.  In  regard  to  the 
two  dates  appearing  with  each  document,  I  must  draw  attention  to 
the  fact  that  the  first  is  the  date  of  the  Russian  calendar,  and  the 
second  that  of  the  Western  method  of  time  notation. 

While  reading,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  diplomatists 
have  ever  been  averse  to  using  "strong"  and  clear  language.  It  has 
been  held  that  when  a  diplomatist  says  "perhaps,"  he  means  no, 
and  his  "yes"  is  ordinarily  the  equivalent  of  perhaps.  His  no  is  the 
ultimatum — the  call  to  arms,  the  battle.  To  arrive  at  a  complete 
estimate  of  the  words  of  a  diplomatist  it  is  necessary,  then,  to  keep 
this  in  mind,  especially  when  dealing  with  the  substance  of  inter- 
views and  the  assurances  made  to  one  another  by  ministers  of 
foreign  affairs  and  ambassadors.  To  read  diplomatic  correspond- 
ence aright  is  quite  an  art — one  which  the  general  public  has 
neglected  entirely  too  much,  largely  because  it  never  insisted  upon 
being  made  at  least  a  partner  in  the  administration  of  its  foreign 
affairs.  Diplomatic  phraseology  is  not  unlike  the  modern  profes- 
sional Latin;  it  is  used  to  convey  more  by  implication  than  by 
direct  statement. 

For  my  own  humble  share  of  the  work,  I  will  say  that  I  have 
tried  to  facilitate  the  reading  of  the  book  by  the  employment  of 
italics  in  the  reproduction  of  such  parts  of  the  documents  as  form 
the  backbone  of  the  gripping  story  that  is  told.  I  found  it  neces- 
sary, also,  here  and  there,  to  point  in  this  manner  to  the  necessity 
of  passages  being  read  with  increased  attention  so  that  the  hidden 
meaning  or  emphasis  of  them  might  be  detected. 

The  Introductions  were  written  with  a  view  to  giving  the  reader 
a  fairly  complete  general  survey  of  the  situations  dealt  with.  The 
footnotes  have  the  same  purpose,  and  if  some  of  them  should  seem 


xii        ENTENTE   DIPLOMACY   AND   THE   WORLD 

less  sanctimonious  than  the  documents,  it  is  to  be  remembered  that 
the  instructive  quality  of  lighter  phrases  is  usually  greater  than 
that  of  long  dissertations  of  a  learned  nature.  That  treatment 
also  was  necessary  in  order  to  divest  diplomatic  correspondence  of 
the  cloak  of  governmental  infallibility  that  has  been  thrown  over 
it,  and  of  which  plain  men  and  women  have  stood  in  such  awe. 
Though  diplomacy  delights  in  being  obscurantic,  the  plain  fact  is, 
that  it  is  nothing  more  than  a  trading  in  "considerations"  and 
"compensations" — un  commerce,  as  the  French  might  express  it. 

My  own  contribution  is  designed  to  endorse  the  views  of  M.  de 
Siebert  that  diplomacy  must  be  "de-venomized"  before  mankind 
can  enter  upon  an  era  of  sane  international  relations — before  an 
armament-ridden  world  can  hope  to  be  less  often  visited  by  such 
calamities  as  the  real  authors  of  this  book  brought  on. 

It  seems  to  me  that  the  public  owes  a  debt  of  gratitude 
especially  to  one  of  these  authors:  Count  Benckendorff,  the  Rus- 
sian ambassador  at  London.  Of  the  many  contributors  there  is 
none  that  wrote  with  such  remarkable  clearness  and  comprehensive 
vision.  The  judgment  of  Count  Benckendorff  remained  good  at  all 
times,  and,  while  he  served  his  government  well  as  a  diplomatist, 
he,  nevertheless,  v/as  not  as  oblivious  of  his  duties  towards  man- 
kind as  his  colleagues  generally.  Second  to  him  is  M.  Iswolsky. 
His  communications,  too,  are  not  without  a  literary  charm,  even 
though  one  find  it  difficult  to  agree  with  his  methods  as  a  diplo- 
matist. As  much  must  be  said  for  M.  Sazonoff,  whose  letters  and 
communications,  however,  reflect  more  the  official  tenor  of  foreign 
office  correspondence. 

It  seems  to  me  that  this  acknowledgment  is  due  these  men. 
Their  writings  were  destined  to  molder  in  the  secret  archives  of 
Imperial  Russia  and  no  phrase-making  for  the  edification  of  a  read- 
ing public  had  to  be  considered.  The  result  is  that  diplomatic 
affairs,  which  usually  are  beclouded  by  the  pomposity  of  govern- 
mental verbiage,  are  in  many  instances  described  in  these  docu- 
ments with  a  directness  that  is  refreshing,  and  promotive,  there- 
fore, of  that  complete  understanding  the  public  must  have  before 
an  improvement  in  foreign  affairs  is  possible. 

There  is,  of  course,  a  great  deal  in  the  documents  that  will  make 
the  reader  smile.    Even  statesmen  and  diplomatists  are  often  but 


NOTE  xiii 

children  of  a  larger  growth,  and  that  includes  the  most  prominent 
of  them.  Shorn  of  all  its  privileges,  diplomacy  is  a  business  that 
must  make  the  gods  laugh,  and  I  am  sure  that  our  political  masters 
will  bear  with  us  plain  mortals  if  we  presume  to  share  for  a  while 
a  little  in  the  merriment  our  recent  conduct  must  have  occasioned 
in  Elysium. 


FOREWORD 

Sine  ira  et  studio. 

Some  time  ago,  a  minister  of  one  of  the  Great  Powers  of  Europe 
designated  what  he  called  the  "de-venomizing"  of  international  rela- 
tions as  the  fundamental  condition  for  the  future  peaceable  intercourse 
of  the  nations.  These  words  define  precisely  the  end  and  purpose  of  the 
present  publication.  They  also  serve  as  a  personal  justification  of  my 
resolve  to  give  publicity  to  the  documentary  material  in  my  possession. 
The  former  Russian  Government  is  buried  beneath  the  ruins  of  the 
shattered  Empire — I  have  no  other  considerations  to  take. 

The  fact  that  I  was  for  several  years  on  the  staff  of  the  Russian 
Embassy  in  London  brought  me  into  immediate  contact  with  the  most 
important  happenings  of  the  last  five  years  before  the  war.  Though 
taking  no  active  part,  yet  observing  and  endeavoring  to  analyze  what 
I  saw,  I  found  myself  face  to  face  with  events  which  could  leave  no 
doubt  in  the  judgment  of  an  unprejudiced  observer  that  Europe  was 
experiencing  one  of  the  most  critical  periods  of  its  history  and  appeared 
to  be  hastening  towards  an  inevitable  catastrophe. 

It  was  then  that  the  thought  came  to  me  to  write  a  history  of  this 
time  in  later,  more  dispassionate  and  enlightened  years.  The  original 
documents  now  published  by  me,  together  with  comprehensive  notes  re- 
garding personal  impressions,  observations  and  conversations,  were  to 
serve  as  material  for  this  work. 

To-day,  however,  I  no  longer  feel  equal  to  this  task;  I  myself  lack 
the  necessary  confidence  in  my  objectivity.  The  terrible  catastrophe, 
which  has  overtaken  us,  the  full  consequences  of  which  cannot  as  yet 
be  fully  realized,  has  shaken  every  individual  human  being  in  his  inner- 
most feelings  to  a  degree  which  makes  it  impossible  to  attain  the  neces- 
sary perspective  for  an  objective  judgment  of  all  that  we  have  lived 
through  and  suffered. 

XV 


xvi  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

I  have  therefore  given  up  my  original  plan  of  a  history  of  this  time 
and  have  limited  myself  to  a  simple  publication  of  original  documentary 
material,  omitting  all  personal  comments,  explanations  and  descriptions. 
For  this  reason  also  I  have  refrained  from  writing  a  connecting  text, 
even  though  such  might  have  facilitated  the  study  of  the  documents  for 
the  less  experienced  reader. 

The  question  of  who  is  to  blame  for  the  war  has  become  the  burning 
question  of  the  day  in  the  life  of  the  peoples.  And  it  is  right  that  this 
should  be  so.  For  until  the  question:  How  was  all  this  possible?  has 
been  answered  to  the  very  full,  the  principles  of  democratic  self-deter- 
mination and  social  justice  in  the  relations  of  the  peoples  to  one 
another  can  never  be  realized.  Neither  the  official  publications  issued 
up  to  the  present,  nor  the  memoirs  of  leading  statesmen,  interesting 
though  these  may  be  in  themselves,  can  prove  satisfactory  in  this  respect, 
— still  less  satisfactory,  to  be  sure,  are  the  despotic  judgments  which, 
flowing  so  freely  from  the  pen  of  irresponsible  politicians,  have  fdund 
a  place  in  official  documents.  And  yet  the  people  demand  ever  more 
stormily  to  know  and  to  understand,  and  their  cry  against  secret 
diplomacy  and  imperialism  becomes  ever  more  impassioned. 

This  book  is  not  intended  as  a  defense  of,  nor  as  an  accusation 
against,  individual  nations  or  political  personalities.  But  it  is  indeed  a 
ruthless  exposure  of  a  political  system  which  signifies  nothing  else  than 
a  brutal  and  purely  materialistic  striving  for  increased  power,  whereby 
every  state  has  invariably  placed  Might  before  Right. 

DE    SlEBERT. 

Switzerland,  192  L 


GENERAL  INTRODUCTION 

ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD  excluded 
from  participation  in  foreign  affairs  had  Utile  in  common  dur- 
ing the  gestative  period  of  the  Great  War.  Now  and  then,  this 
world  heard  the  rumbling  of  the  distant  drum,  contemplated  the 
imminent  catastrophe  with  perturbation,  and  then  continued  to  let 
foreign  offices  and  their  representatives  on  foreign  posts  do  as  they 
did  before.  In  the  end  the  several  national  executives  informed 
their  parliaments  that  the  fait  accompli  was  there.  It  was  then  a 
question  of  either  surrendering  national  honor,  better  defined  in 
international  law  as  "sovereignty,"  or  rush  into  the  conflict,  which, 
after  having  been  waged  by  the  foreign  offices  in  camera  as  a  game 
of  wits,  was  now  to  be  translated  upon  the  battlefield,  to  receive 
the  test  of  military  and  naval  strength. 

Of  the  real  causes  the  world  knew  nothing,  and  still  knows 
nothing  really  worth  knowing.  The  press  everywhere  had  been 
used  to  mislead  readers,  and  when  the  warring  governments  began 
to  deluge  the  world  with  "colored"  books,  most  of  us  took  their 
contents  to  be  gospel  truth ;  as  in  one  single  aspect  they  were.  The 
documents  published  were  in  themselves  exact  enough,  though 
forgeries  have  been  discovered  in  them  recently.  But  they  had 
been  culled  for  a  purpose — to  show  that  our  own  particular  govern- 
ment was  in  the  right.  To  but  a  few  it  occurred  at  the  time  that 
the  "colored"  books  were  a  wholly  one-sided  presentation  of  the 
case.  It  followed  that,  if  we  were  right,  the  others  must  be  wrong. 
Having  but  the  faintest  of  notions  concerning  diplomatic  methods, 
and  seeing  in  the  diplomatist  and  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  per- 
sons especially  anointed  by  governmental  infallibility,  we  took 
for  granted  all  things  we  could  not  understand,  and  soon  the  pas- 

xvii 


xviii        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

sions  of  war  made  it  entirely  superfluous,  when  not  risky,  to  inquire 
into  the  genesis  of  things. 

Governments  everywhere  saw  to  it  that  no  inconvenient  and 
impertinent  questions  were  asked.  The  average  citizen  stands  in 
awe  of  high  treason,  sedition  acts  and  censorship,  not  so  much  be- 
cause he  knows  that  such  measures  are  necessary,  but  for  the 
reason  that  they  are  a  force  majeure  that  brooks  no  trifling.  And 
to  inquire  into  the  causes  of  the  war  would  be  trifling,  as  the 
executive  branches  of  governments  view  it. 

In  this  frame  of  mind,  everybody  set  to  work  to  win  the  war. 
When  peace  had  been  restored,  finally,  the  public  fell  back  into  its 
errors,  and  new  sets  of  statesmen  continue  the  old  policies  of  their 
governments  and  the  ancient  methods  of  diplomacy.  In  a  little 
while  there  will  be  other  "situations,"  other  "crises,"  and  other 
wars.  Once  again  the  thoughtful  will  wonder  how  it  came  about; 
again  they  will  lack  all  data  necessary  to  arrive  at  an  understanding. 

This  process  has  been  repeated  ever  since  the  dawn  of  his- 
tory. If  proof  were  needed  to  demonstrate  that  mankind  refuses 
to  profit  by  the  experience  of  its  forebears,  this  case  would  furnish 
an  overwhelming  surfeit  of  it.  The  ancients  based  international 
conduct  entirely  upon  the  real  or  fancied  necessities  of  their  states 
and  empires,  and  we  have  made  not  the  least  improvement  upon 
that  despicable  system. 

While  it  is  true  that  the  natural  growth  of  populations  has 
led  to  wars  in  all  ages,  it  is  even  more  a  fact  that  the  rapacity  of 
mighty  governments  has  been  the  cause  of  the  majority  of  great 
wars.  Wars  as  a  natural  phenomenon,  due  to  increase  of  popula- 
tions beyond  the  means  of  sustenance,  have  never  been  as  savage 
as  those  that  were  waged  in  the  interest  of  empires  and  dynasties. 
This  seems  to  be  the  result  of  the  causal  intent  of  the  aggressor 
meeting  with  a  certain  amount  of  recognition  by  those  at  whose 
cost  the  living  conditions  of  surplus  populations  are  to  be  im- 
proved. The  operation  is  likely  to  remain  within  the  bounds  of 
the  laws  of  self-preservation,  while  the  wars  of  empires  have 
primarily  a  destructive  object. 

The  world  public  has  been  too  indulgent  with  the  claims  of 
certain  governments  that  they  had  "rights"  and  "interests"  of  the 
first  magnitude  in  territories  to  which  they  had  no  natural  claim. 


GENERAL  INTRODUCTION  xix 

It  has  been  entirely  overlooked,  for  instance,  what  role  foreign 
investments  have  played  in  modern  imperialism.  A  small  group 
invests  money  in  some  foreign  land,  for  the  sole  purpose  of  private 
gain,  and  lays  thereby,  intentionally  or  unwittingly,  the  seed  of 
diplomatic  and  armed  conflict.  The  resulting  war  is  not  fought 
with  the  money  and  blood  of  the  investors,  but  with  the  lives  and 
treasure  of  the  national  aggregate  whose  government  has  thought 
it  well  to  protect  the  speculator  and  concessionary.  For  the  sake 
of  rescuing  a  small  investment,  the  government  concerned  will 
spend  huge  sums,  throw  away  lives,  and  face  the  necessity  of  hav- 
ing to  tax  its  population  for  generations,  as  has  been  done  on  so 
colossal  a  scale  during  the  Great  War. 

In  the  end  nothing  has  been  achieved.  Militarism  may  have 
been  crushed  in  one  country,  but  to  keep  that  militarism  down  a 
similar  state  of  armed  preparedness,  and  all  it  entails,  has  been 
established  elsewhere.  Again,  the  secret  diplomacy  of  a  govern- 
ment has  been  laid  low  by  the  extirpation  of  that  government,  but, 
as  has  been  proven  in  the  last  few  months,  secret  diplomacy  is 
thereby  transplanted  only  into  other  quarters,  maybe  into  soils  and 
climes  where  this  pernicious  weed  thrives  better  than  before. 

Diplomacy  is  a  question  of  means,  naturally.  The  publication 
of  these  documents  will  make  that  point  much  clearer  than  it  has 
been  heretofore. 

The  optimistically-inclined  hold  steadfastly  to  the  view  that 
diplomacy  is  not  entirely  the  exercise  of  means  and  resources  in 
behalf  of  war.  To  some  extent  they  are  right.  But  the  pity  is  that 
the  subject  is  argued  from  false  premises.  Diplomacy  does  strive 
for  peace,  indeed,  but  it  does  that  solely  at  the  expense  of  weaker 
states  and  groups.  Diplomacy  as  we  have  adjudged  it,  and  as  now 
unmasked,  can  be  placated  into  postponing  war,  but  it  cannot  be 
induced  to  abandon  its  objective,  to  wit:  The  aggrandizement  of 
those  whom  it  represents.  From  diplomacy,  peace  may  be  had 
only  upon  unconditional  surrender,  even  if  at  first  there  be  some 
inclination  to  compromise.  One  concession  leads  to  the  other, 
and,  finally,  abject  submission  is  demanded  and  forms  the  sole 
basis  of  further  relations.  The  question  of  right  has  no  place — 
not  even  the  humblest — in  diplomacy.  Only  the  imposition  of  the 
superior  will  counts,  and  war  is  the  only  alternative. 


«  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

War,  then,  is  the  continuation  of  international  politics  by  other 
means.  When  the  diplomatist  feels  that  threats  suffice  no  longer 
to  get  him  what  he  wants,  he  hands  the  case  to  the  cabinet  and  the 
executive,  who  in  turn  delegate  further  action  to  the  general 
staffs,  acquainting  parliament  merely  with  what  has  been  done. 

Such  is  in  sum  and  substance  the  basis  of  present-day  inter- 
national relations.  Governments  are  powerful  merely  because  those 
whom  they  govern  are  great  in  numbers  and  wealth.  The  creed 
of  the  wealthy  individual  becomes  in  that  manner  the  creed  of  the 
powerful  government.  If  it  be  true  that  no  people  ever  had  a 
better  government  than  it  deserved,  it  is  just  as  true  that  no  people 
ever  had  better  foreign  relations  than  the  quality  of  its  govern- 
ment merited.  A  government  brutal  towards  the  governed  is 
bound  to  be  equally  brutal  and  cynical  toward  foreign  aggregates 
whose  misfortune  it  may  be  to  come  in  contact  with  it. 

The  Imperial  Government  of  Russia  supplied  a  telling  example 
of  this. 

There  had  been  much  friction  between  Russia  and  Great  Britain. 
Though  Russia  was  in  possession  of  one-half  of  the  European 
continent  and  a  good  third  of  the  largest  continent,  Asia,  it  seemed 
impossible  to  appease  its  appetite  for  more  territory.  There  was 
no  question  at  all  of  needing  room  for  a  surplus  population,  no 
question  at  all  of  lacking  natural  resources,  and  no  aspect  of  self- 
defense  was  involved.  For  all  that,  the  Russian  government  cast 
eyes  upon  India  and  followed  for  decades  a  policy  that  constantly 
reminded  the  British  that  the  safety  of  their  Indian  empire  was 
threatened.  The  Russian  government  could  not  have  done  any- 
thing for  the  Indian  people  which  the  British  could  not  do  better, 
and  if  the  East-Indians  had  to  be  under  foreign  domination  at  all, 
their  well-wishers  could  not  have  advised  them  to  change  masters. 
The  lot  of  the  poor  moujik  in  Russia  was  such  that  the  Indians 
themselves  should  have  had  no  doubt  as  to  that.  But  what  certain 
leaders  in  India  thought  possible  was,  that  the  fine  promises  of  the 
Russian  agents  would  be  carried  into  effect;  that  India  would  be 
made  an  independent  state.  If  argument  were  needed  to  show  that 
the  Indian  leaders  of  those  days  were  really  not  fit  to  captain  their 
people,  it  would  be  found  in  the  great  naivety  they  displayed  in  the 
belief  that  Russia  wanted  to  help  them  for  their  own  sake. 


GENERAL  INTRODUCTION  xxi 

Anglo-Russian  relations  were  bad  for  many  years  on  account  of 
the  activity  of  Russian  agents  in  India  and  Afghanistan.  Viewed 
in  the  light  of  "national  honor,"  Great  Britain  had  many  excuses  to 
discourage  the  Russians,  by  going  to  war  with  them.  But  Russia 
was  not  easily  attacked.  In  those  days,  the  Germans  were  her 
friends,  and  the  welfare  of  the  British  empire  permitted  of  no  mili- 
tary enterprise  that  contained  so  little  insurance  against  defeat  as 
this.  Since  the  Crimean  war,  conditions  had  changed  considerably. 
France  was  no  longer  to  be  depended  upon,  with  the  result  that  the 
British  government  had  to  face  a  possible  European  coalition  in 
case  she  attacked  Russia. 

The  war  between  the  Chinese  and  Japanese,  and  the  Russo- 
Japanese  war  brought  the  Far  East  upon  the  international  stage. 
The  British  were  the  first  to  realize  that  the  development  of  mod- 
ern industry  and  commerce  was  bound  to  make  the  question  of 
markets  the  predominant  issue  in  modern  foreign  relations.    The  f^S 

Anglo-Japanese  treaty  of  alliance  was  concluded,  which,  so  far  as    '^     s^^ 
others  have  been  able  to  speculate  upon  its  text,  provides  for  the   ^^^g^f^ 
defense  in  the  Far  East  of  British  and  Japanese  interests.    Russia      ' 
found  it  necessary  to  safeguard  her  position  in  Manchuria  and 
Mongolia  by  a  similar  agreement  with  Japan,  after  it  had  been 
shown  that  a  single-track  railroad  across  Siberia  did  not  suffice  to 
impose  Russian  desires  upon  Japan,  militarily. 

Out  of  this  came  a  rivalry  in  which  the  United  States  and  Ger- 
many were  on  one  side,  and  Russia,  Japan,  Great  Britain  and  France 
on  the  other,  until  the  British  government  succeeded  in  modifying 
the  position  of  the  United  States  government  sufficiently  to  make  a 
modus  vivendi  possible.  Korea  and  Southern  Manchuria  were  sur- 
rendered to  Japan,  while  Northern  Manchuria  and  Mongolia  fell 
into  the  hands  of  the  Russians,  leaving  to  Great  Britain  and  France 
the  purely  financial  and  commercial  fields,  and  to  all  others  such 
leavings  as  there  were. 

Having  agreed  upon  this,  and  having  come  to  an  understanding 
in  regard  to  a  country  in  which  neither  Russia  nor  Great  Britain 
had  even  the  smallest  financial  interest — ^Tibet,  the  governments  of 
London  and  St.  Petersburg  looked  for  another  victim. 

Persia  had  the  poorest  sort  of  government.  It  also  had  been 
unfortunate  enough  to  take  up  loans  in  foreign  countries.     Both 


xxii         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

handicaps  were  made  use  of  by  the  Russians  and  British.  In  1907 
the  two  governments  decided  upon  the  division  of  Persia  into  three 
zones.  Russian  influence  was  to  prevail  in  the  North,  and  British 
sway  in  the  South,  with  a  narrow  strip  across  the  country  to 
separate  the  two,  lest  there  be  a  renewal  of  the  border  incidents  in 
the  direction  of  India. 

It  had  been  learned  in  London  that  the  Russian  government 
was  interested  in  securing  a  port  on  the  Persian  Gulf.  That  meant 
the  building  of  a  trans-Persian  railroad,  which  would  lead  to  the 
total  annexation  of  the  country  by  Russia,  no  matter  what  name 
the  action  might  be  given.  Russia  had  been  too  unneighborly 
hitherto  to  leave  doubt  in  the  British  mind  what  that  would  mean. 
It  was  necessary,  then,  to  reach  an  understanding  with  Russia,  and 
this  was  arrived  at  over  the  prostrate  body  of  a  state  whose  people 
had  had  the  misfortune  of  having  been  ruled  too  long  by  a  vicious 
tyrant,  and  an  even  more  vicious  upper  caste. 

The  public  expressions  by  the  interested  goverrmients  had  it 
that  reforms  were  to  be  introduced  in  Persia  for  the  good  of  the 
people.  How  totally  lacking  in  sincerity  these  promises  were  was 
shown  by  the  ruthless  disregard  for  everything  Persian  that 
marked  the  conduct  of  the  invaders. 

France  participated  in  the  occupation  of  Persia  through  the 
making  of  loans — investments  that  were  profitable  not  only  in 
legitimate  returns  on  the  money  put  up,  but  also  in  the  less  legiti- 
mate field  of  international  relations.  Each  million  of  francs  in- 
vested by  the  French  in  territories  under  the  political  control  of 
Russia  and  Great  Britain  made  more  insoluble  the  "ties  of  the 
Entente,"  to  use  the  words  of  the  diplomatists.  Material  interests, 
unfortunately,  seem  to  be  the  only  cement  that  will  hold  groups 
together.  It  was  so  in  this  case.  The  more  money  democratic 
France  invested  in  countries  where  reactionary  Russia  had  political 
influence,  the  closer  the  two  countries  were  drawn  together,  much 
to  the  disgust  of  the  progressive  and  radical  elements  in  the  French 
republic. 

The  lot  of  the  Ottoman  empire  would  have  been  similar  to  that 
of  Persia,  were  it  not  that  the  control  of  the  Straits — the  Bospho- 
rous  and  Dardanelles — entered  into  the  plans  that  were  considered. 
In  and  about  Constantinople,  Russian  and  British  interests  clashed, 


GENERAL  INTRODUCTION  xxiii 

and  since  the  empire  of  the  Turks  could  not  be  further  divided 
just  then,  without  affecting  the  status  of  the  capital  and  her  water- 
ways, a  hands-off  policy  had  to  be  adopted  by  Great  Britain  and 
Russia,  on  the  basis  of  mutual  distrust. 

In  that  manner,  the  realm  of  the  Turk  was  made  neutral  terri- 
tory, leaving  it  a  comparatively  free  field  for  the  commerce  and 
enterprise  of  those  powers  against  whom  the  Entente  was  prin- 
cipally directed:  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary.  Friction  be- 
tween the  Russians  and  British  in  Persia  had  established  that  it 
would  not  be  well  to  carry  the  system  of  "political  penetration" 
into  Turkey.  Just  as  every  disturbance  in  the  Persian  provinces 
was  felt  in  Teheran,  so  would  trouble  in  the  Ottoman  provinces 
upset  things  in  Constantinople,  in  case  joint  control  of  the  empire 
was  imposed  by  Russia  and  Great  Britain.  The  Russians  might 
have  run  the  risk  but  the  British  could  not  afford  to  extend  that 
phase  of  relations  with  the  reckless  men  who  presided  over  foreign 
affairs  in  St.  Petersburg. 

The  Russians,  on  their  part,  had  to  consider  that  Great  Britain 
would  never  tolerate  their  occupation  of  the  Ottoman  capital  in 
addition  to  Russia  having  within  its  zone  of  influence,  Teheran, 
capital  of  Persia.  It  seems  that  they  had  no  doubt  as  to  this.  On 
the  other  hand,  they  could  not  consent  to  the  occupation  of  Con- 
stantinople by  the  British,  since  that  might  lead  to  the  "historic 
mission"  of  Russia  being  never  realized. 

This  being  the  aspect  of  the  case,  London  and  St.  Petersburg 
agreed  not  to  divide  the  Ottoman  empire. 

It  was  the  fashion  in  Central  Europe  at  that  time  to  speak  of 
the  Straits  question  as  a  matter  in  which  all  the  Powers  had  an 
interest.  That  they  had  an  interest  is  true  enough,  but  it  is  now 
shown  that  this  was  no  guarantee  of  their  views  being  honored. 
Whether  or  not  the  Turk  should  remain  in  Europe,  instead  of 
being  driven  to  the  interior  of  Anatolia,  was  something  that  was 
beyond  the  Central  Powers  as  soon  as  the  Entente  had  decided  to 
promote  the  interests  of  its  members  by  imposing  their  rule,  singly 
or  jointly,  upon  the  less  advanced  peoples  of  Asia  and  Africa. 
The  documents  show  definitely  that  the  status  of  Constantinople 
and  the  Straits,  and  with  this  the  future  of  the  Ottoman  empire, 
was  shaped  not  by  the  Concert  of  Europe,  but  by  the  Russian, 


xxiv        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

British  and  French  ministries  of  foreign  affairs.  Iswolsky  and 
Sazonoff  were  ever  ready  to  come  to  a  better  understanding  with 
Sir  Edward  Grey  in  regard  to  the  Straits,  but  the  British  secretary 
of  foreign  affairs  was  just  as  anxious  to  avoid  the  critical  situation 
that  would  ensue  from  an  attempt  to  replace  the  provisions  of  the 
Paris  Dardanelles  Treaty,  though  in  1908  he  gave  Iswolsky  some 
hope  that  the  matter  would  be  looked  into,  which  hope  he  extended 
to  Sazonoff  again  in  1911. 

While  the  Sultan  of  Turkey  had  at  one  time  been  overlord  over 
most  of  North  Africa,  there  remained  now  only  two  insignificant 
territories  in  which  his  word  was  law :  Cyrenaica  and  Lybia.  The 
hinterland  of  both  countries  is  desert.  It  was  decided,  therefore, 
to  leave  this  part  of  the  Turkish  domain  to  the  Italians,  though 
only  after  France  had  made  herself  master  of  Morocco  in  a  series 
of  crises  that  shook  the  peace  of  Europe  to  its  very  foundations. 

Italy  had  ceased  to  be  an  enthusiastic  member  of  the  Triple 
Alliance.  Austria-Hungary  held  territories  peopled  by  Italians,  and 
a  powerful  irredenta  movement  for  the  redemption  of  "unre- 
deemed" Italy  set  in.  Naturally,  a  great  deal  of  feeling  against 
Austria-Hungary  was  developed  by  this,  and  overcame  finally 
every  political  and  economic  consideration  which  had  induced  Signor 
Crispi  to  join  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary.  In  1902  this  led  to  the 
making  of  an  agreement  between  Italy  and  France  by  which  both 
countries  promised  one  another  not  to  make  their  joint  border 
districts  armed  camps  as  they  had  done  hitherto.  Franco-Italian 
relations  improved  rapidly  from  that  moment  on,  being  in  the 
able  hands  of  M.  Barrere,  so  far  as  French  efforts  in  Rome  were 
concerned.  Mr.  Rennel  Rodd,  the  British  ambassador  at  Rome, 
worked  earnestly  toward  the  same  end,  as  did  M.  Krupenski,  the 
Russian  ambassador,  especially  after  the  Agreement  of  Racconigi 
had  been  made,  by  which  Russia  and  Italy  undertook  to  protect  the 
status  quo  in  the  Balkans  against  further  encroachment  by  Austria- 
Hungary,  which  had  just  then  effected  the  annexation  of  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina  at  the  risk  of  a  general  war. 

Diplomacy  avails  itself  of  every  means  at  its  disposal  and  pays 
little  attention  to  logic  and  ethics.  Thus  the  fate  of  the  Christians 
in  the  Ottoman  empire  was  once  more  made  an  argument  why 
Italy  should  take  Cyrenaica  and  Lybia.     The  war  was  a  long, 


GENERAL  INTRODUCTION  xxv 

drawn-out  affair  and  when  peace  was  thought  of  finally,  Italy  faced 
a  huge  national  deficit  and  realization  that  the  Entente  wanted  her 
to  be  satisfied  with  what  she  had  taken  in  North  Africa  and  look 
for  no  more,  especially  none  of  the  islands  in  the  Aegean  which 
she  coveted ;  Turkey,  on  her  part,  was  more  bankrupt  than  before, 
and  saw  another  struggle  with  the  Balkans  approaching. 

Great  Britain  had  not  done  poorly  by  these  deals  in  Turkish 
and  Moroccan  territories.  France  had  given  her  compensations  in 
Egypt  that  made  her  mistress  of  that  country,  with  the  result  that 
when  the  French  government  decided  to  extend  its  influence  in 
Morocco,  by  the  temporary  occupation  of  the  capital,  Fez,  Sir 
Edward  Grey  was  on  the  side  of  France  and  opposed  to  the  reason- 
able claims  of  Spain  and  Germany. 

The  British  government  had  been  averse  to  entering  into  agree- 
ments with  Russia  of  so  definite  a  character  that  a  casus  foederis 
had  to  be  recognized.  In  fact.  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  kept  out  of 
such  entanglement  even  with  the  French,  so  far  as  records  go.  A 
casus  foederis  provision  was  making  hard  the  life  of  Germany, 
whom  Austria-Hungary  plunged  into  difficulties  without  number 
by  her  policy  in  the  Balkans — a  policy  that  brought  not  the  least 
benefit  to  the  Germans,  despite  the  fact  that  it  was  moral  at  least 
in  so  far  as  the  Berlin  Congress  of  1878  could  make  it  that. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  was  fully  familiar  with  the  background  of 
Germano-Austro-Hungarian  relations,  and  needed  no  other  lesson 
in  the  science  of  foreign  relations  when  it  came  to  alliances. 
But  he  was  willing  to  have  the  Entente  continue  him  in  a  position 
in  which  he  would  be  able  to  select  his  own  casus  belli,  as  in  the 
end  he  did. 

Iswolsky  and  Sazonoff,  both,  tried  several  times  to  have  the 
Anglo-Russian  understandings  in  regard  to  the  Far  East  and  Persia 
ripen  into  an  alliance.  Pichon,  Poincare  and  Doumergue  did  as 
much  in  behalf  of  France,  but  the  British  government  was  per- 
fectly satisfied  with  retaining  full  freedom  of  action,  with  its 
relations  with  Russia  and  France  as  re-insurance.  The  entire 
extent  of  that  policy  is  being  delineated  for  the  first  time  by  these 
documents. 

Germany  had  to  abstain  from  "political  penetration"  of  foreign 
lands,  because  the  world  had  been  well  divided-up  by  the  time  her 


xxvi        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

navy  became  a  factor.  She  settled  upon  a  policy  of  "peaceful 
penetration"  therefore,  the  principal  ingredient  of  which  was  trade 
on  the  basis  of  profit  and  confidence.  By  means  of  this  policy, 
she  had  invaded  the  world  market  in  a  manner  that  alarmed  not 
only  Great  Britain,  but  France  and  Russia  as  well.  While  to 
British  industry  and  trade,  German  competition  was  directly 
harmful,  in  addition  to  giving  Germany  the  means  to  develop  her 
war  fleet  and  merchant  marine,  the  French  and  Russians  had  to 
consider  that  with  increasing  wealth  Germany  might  grow  still 
more  powerful  as  a  military  antagonist,  a  fact  which  was  made 
clear  enough  when  France  and  Russia  discouraged  the  limitation 
of  German  naval  armament  lest  more  money  of  the  German  tax- 
payer should  thus  be  free  for  investment  in  the  military  establish- 
ment. 

There  is  no  need  of  anticipating  the  telling  message  of  the 
documents  by  going  into  the  minor  difficulties  that  arose  between 
Triple  Entente  and  Triple  Alliance.  They  are  dealt  with  here  by 
their  very  authors.  But  something  must  be  said  anent  the  several 
attempts  that  were  made  to  render  relations  between  the  two 
groups  less  unpleasant. 

The  documents  speak  of  the  necessity  of  preserving  the  peace  of 
Europe,  and  one  of  the  arguments  of  Sazonoff  was  that  the  per- 
fection of  a  new  triple  alliance,  between  France,  Great  Britain  and 
Russia,  would  prevent  war,  and  now  and  then  Count  Benckendorff 
permits  it  to  show  through  that  a  general  understanding  among 
the  nations  of  Europe  would  not  be  a  bad  thing. 

For  the  first  proposition  it  may  be  said  that  it  was  not  a  bad 
one,  provided  the  new  triple  alliance  had  been  formed  for  the  ex- 
press purpose  of  preserving  peace.  But  Sazonoff's  conduct  was  such 
as  to  leave  the  impression  that  he  wanted  the  alliance  only  to  pro- 
mote the  "historic  mission"  of  Russia,  which  was  Pan-Slavism 
under  Russian  domination — the  Greater  Russia.  In  her  own  inter- 
est Great  Britain  could  not  favor  the  creation  of  an  empire  the 
government  of  which  the  British  had  so  little  reason  to  trust. 
Though  French  statesmen  were  obliged  to  listen  with  more  sym- 
pathy to  the  overtures  of  Iswolsky  and  Sazonoff,  they,  too,  had 
views  of  their  own  when  it  came  to  reducing  to  hard  and  fast  terms 
the  policy  of  the  Entente.    The  Franco-Russian  alliance  was  ample 


GENERAL  INTRODUCTION  xxvii 

insurance  for  the  French,  as  against  the  Germans,  and  with  London 
the  French  foreign  office  had  understandings  that  served  every 
other  purpose,  as  the  outbreak  of  the  European  war  has  demon- 
strated. Moreover,  there  was  a  political  advantage  for  the  French 
in  the  fact  that  they  could  act  as  sponsors  for  the  Russians  in  all 
matters  of  especial  delicacy. 

Germany  was  made  to  feel  that  the  main  currents  of  Entente 
policy  were  directed  against  her.  The  documents  disclose  the  full 
extent  to  which  our  statesmen  realized  this,  and  they  present  over- 
whelming testimony  proving  that  the  Berlin  government  wanted 
to  come  to  an  understanding  with  Great  Britain  and  France — at 
least  with  Great  Britain,  if  France  could  not  be  induced  to  abandon 
the  idea  of  la  revanche.  There  was  a  strong  faction  in  Germany 
which  looked  upon  the  alliance  with  Austria-Hungary  as  a  liability 
offset  by  the  poorest  of  assets.  It  was  especially  this  group,  North- 
German  in  the  main,  which  was  eager  to  demobilize  the  forces 
that  were  conducting  the  European  war  already  in  print  and  on 
platform.  Some  headway  was  made  by  them  in  England,  but  not 
enough  to  really  change  anything,  as  Count  Benckendorff  knew 
well  enough,  though  he  lived  through  many  an  anxious  moment  as 
the  result  of  the  efforts  on  both  shores  of  the  North  Sea  to  put 
brakes  on  the  diplomatic  and  literary  promotion  of  the  great  con- 
flagration. Success  of  the  German  and  British  pacifists  would  have 
meant  a  new  political  orientation  for  Russia  and  France — 
the  end  of  the  dangerous  situation,  therefore.  Count  Benckendorff 
would  not  have  regretted  that,  if  the  liberty  may  be  taken  to  draw 
that  conclusion  from  his  correspondence,  but  to  Sazonoff,  Iswolsky, 
and  the  Grand-Ducal  war  clique  that  would  have  been  a  great 
blow.  However,  the  Russian  ambassador  at  London  knew  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  too  well  to  ever  despair  of  the  situation,  or  seeing  his 
reputation  as  "the  best  diplomatist"  in  Europe  ruined.  The  neces- 
sities of  empire  of  the  British  were  such  that  Germany  had  to  be 
reduced  to  much  lower  position  than  she  occupied.  Convinced  of 
the  imperative  qualities  of  this  fact,  Count  Benckendorff  was  able 
to  report  to  Sazonoff  that  all  would  be  well  in  the  end. 

The  reader  of  the  documents  will  be  struck  by  the  paucity  of 
information  concerning  the  activity  of  Berlin  and  Vienna.  Ger- 
many and  Austria-Hungary  had  contact  with  the  Entente  gov- 


xxviii      ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

ernments  only  to  the  extent  to  which  the  correspondence  of  the 
Entente  diplomatists  deals  with  German  and  Austro-Hungarian 
foreign  relations,  either  directly  or  indirectly.  Except  when  a  crisis 
was  on,  Berlin  and  Vienna  had  relations  with  Paris,  London  and 
Petrograd  that  were  simply  several  degrees  less  bad.  There  is 
no  other  way  of  expressing  it.  For  the  rest,  the  Berlin  and  Vienna 
governments  dealt  only  with  one  another,  very  much  as  two  parts 
of  a  besieged  fortress  might  do  that.  German  diplomacy  was 
utterly  impotent  beyond  the  very  limited  spheres  here  indicated, 
and  the  documents  explode  completely  the  many  claims  to  the 
contrary  that  have  been  set  up  by  the  friends  and  foes  of  Germany 
alike. 

Though  attention  has  been  drawn  to  certain  main  tendencies  of 
the  several  governments,  no  attempt  will  be  made  to  pass  judg- 
ment upon  particular  acts  and  men.  The  summing-up  will  be  left 
to  the  reader,  who  should  not  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  the  indi- 
viduals who  wrote  the  documents  were  intensely  national  and 
racial. 

There  is  no  nation  that  does  not  have  its  aspirations  and  ambi- 
tions, and  in  reviewing  the  conduct  of  others  that  should  be  borne 
in  mind.  Sazonoff  meant  well  by  his  empire,  Iswolsky  meant  well 
by  his  race — the  Slavs,  and  Count  Benckendorff  meant  well  by  his 
country,  Russia.  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  the  interests  of  the  British 
empire  at  heart,  as  had  Sir  Arthur  Nicolson  and  Hardinge.  Poin- 
care  meant  to  wipe  out  the  defeat  of  1870-71,  while  Pichon  was 
more  concerned  with  the  welfare  of  the  France  of  the  hour.  The 
brothers  Cambon  were  their  devoted  servants,  each  of  them  a  pa- 
triot. Tittoni  entered  into  liaison  with  Russia  and  France  with 
his  conscience  troubling  him,  because  he  felt  that  Italy  had  become 
disloyal  to  an  alliance  that  had  been  her  salvation.  Counts  Aehren- 
thai  and  Berchtold  considered  themselves  empire  builders,  but 
erred  in  believing  that  opportunity  is  a  wholly  negligible  factor 
in  that.  Milovanovitch  and  Pashitch  made  the  same  mistake,  as 
did  many  others  who  took  it  for  granted  that  before  one's  own 
national  and  racial  aspirations,  ambitions,  and  missions  those  of 
less  fortunate  peoples  must  make  room. 

It  is,  then,  not  solely  a  question  of  determining  who  was  respon- 
sible for  the  Great  War,  but  one  also  of  seeing  what  can  be  done 


GENERAL  INTRODUCTION  xxix 

in  the  interest  of  better  international  relations  in  the  future.  To 
have  the  Entente  continue  her  policies  will  not  be  well  for  man- 
kind in  general,  even  though  the  world  has  now  passed  almost 
completely  under  the  control  of  the  two  remaining  members  of 
that  combination.  To  make  the  balance  of  trade  the  governing 
factor  in  foreign  intercourse  is  dangerous  also,  because  the  result- 
ing economic  discriminations  cannot  but  breed  hatred  and  more 
war.  If  there  be  possible  such  a  thing  as  an  empire  of  human 
solidarity  and  a  balance  of  friendship  among  men,  sane  men  and 
women  must  welcome  both,  after  they  have  received,  in  these 
pages,  their  first  initiation  into  the  very  heart  of  diplomacy. 

SCHREINER. 

New  York,  July,  1921. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Documents  Nos.  Page 

Note ix 

Foreword xv 

General  Introduction xvii] 

BOOK  ONE 
THE  ENTENTE  IN  CHINA  AND  ISLAM 

I.     Russia,   Japan    and   the    United    States   in 

China          31 

Introduction 3/ 

Documents 1-52             8 

II.  Russian  and  British  Imperialism  in  Persia  44 

Introduction 44 

Documents 53-106         49 

III.  Russian  and  British  Imperialism  vs.  Shuster  107-170        95 

IV.  North  Africa,  Italy  and  the  Entente     .       .  142 

Introduction 142 

Documents 171-214       146] 

V.     The  Entente  and  the  Franco-Italian  Agree- 
ment of  1902 215-254       178 

BOOK  TWO 
THE  ENTENTE  AND  AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 

Introduction 213 

I.     The  Austro-Serbian  Crisis  and  Russia's  Pan- 
Slavism      255-306       229  >^' 

II.     Iswolsky  and  the  Forming  of  the  Balkan 

League 307-320      273 

III.  The   Russo-Austrian   Balkan   "Rapproche- 

ment"          321-355       282 

IV.  Sazonoff  and  the  Balkan  League     .       .       .     356-375       304 

xxxi 


>  Lv 


xxxii  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Documents  Nos.  Page 
Russia  and  Great  Britain  and  the   Straits 

Question 376-395       31^ 

VI.     Russia,  the  Balkan  League  and  the  Powers     396-428       339 
VII.     The  Conflict  of  Russian  and  Bulgarian  Poli- 
cies in  Turkey 429-473       360 

VIII.     Sazonoff  and  Serbia's  Port  on  the  Adriatic 

Sea 474-494       403 

IX.     Serbia  and  the  London  Ambassadorial  Con- 
ference      495-519       422 

X.     Recent   Phases   of    Russian    Policy   in   the 

Balkan 520-547       436 

BOOK  THREE 
THE  ENTENTE  AND  GERMANY 

"*.         Introduction 

"-^I.     Genesis  of  the  Anglo-Russian  Entente         .     548-553 
II.     Aftermath  of  the  Austro-Serbian  Crisis        .     554-567       484^ 
-^  III.     The  Entente  and  the  Bagdad  Railroad  Ques- 
tion       568-597       501 

'  IV.     A  New  Phase  of  International  Orientation     598-620       524 

(Effect  of  the  Potsdam  Meeting) 
^^V.     Entente  versus  Germany  in  Southwest  Asia     621-668       547 
^^-^I.     The  Entente  and  the  Moroccan  Question    .     669-710       577 
.  VII.     The  Armament  Crisis  and  the  Haldane  Mis- 
sion           711-727       613 

VIII.     Franco-Russian   Efforts   to    Perfect   Triple 

Entente 728-743       640 

IX.     Settlement  of  the  Bagdad  Railroad  Question     744-764       656 
X.     Entente  Preparations  for  the  European  War     765-780       666 
XL     The  Entente  and  the  German  Military  Mis- 
sion to  Turkey 781-836       676 

XII.     Further  Entente  Preparations  for  the  Euro- 
pean War 837-858       709 

Chronological    Order    of    Documents    and 

Index 737 


BOOK  ONE 
THE  ENTENTE  IN  CHINA  AND  ISLAM 


Entente  Diplomacy  and  the  World 

INTRODUCTION  TO  BOOK  ONE 
THE  ENTENTE  IN  CHINA  AND  ISLAM 


RUSSIA,  JAPAN  AND  THE  UNITED  STATES  IN  CHINA 
(October  1909— March  1914) 

The  several  attempts  made  by  China  and  Japan  to  come  to  a 
fairly  permanent  understanding  among  themselves  failed,  because 
the  European  Powers  opposed  a  rapprochement  between  the  two 
leading  Powers  in  the  Far  East,  and  Japan,  on  the  whole,  followed 
so  unscrupulous  and  selfish  a  policy  that  China  was  never  able  to 
trust  her  would-be  ally. 

The  United  States  found  it  necessary  to  safeguard  its  com- 
mercial interests  in  the  Far  East  against  persistent  encroach- 
ment on  the  part  of  Russia  and  Japan.  Feeling  that  the  efforts  of 
the  government  of  the  United  States  were  directed  against  them  in 
particular,  and  being  the  secret  opponents  of  the  policy  of  the 
"Open  Door,"  Russia  and  Japan  decided,  in  the  spring  of  1910,  to 
reach  a  more  definite  agreement  in  regard  to  the  question  than 
they  had  subscribed  to  in  the  past.  Russia  and  Japan  harbored 
the  intention  of  dividing  the  Far  East  among  themselves.  The 
policy  of  the  "Open  Door"  was  against  this. 

In  the  United  States  and  Germany  it  was  felt  that  the  Man- 
churian  railroads  had  to  be  protected  against  exclusive  control  by 

3 


4  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

the  Russians  and  Japanese.  The  endeavor  that  came  from  this  was 
styled  a  "notorious  American  project"  by  the  Russian  ambassador 
at  Tokio. 

Having  divided  Persia  with  Russia,  Great  Britain  was  obliged 
to  play  fast  and  loose.  The  division  of  Persia  into  a  Russian  and 
a  British  zone  of  influence  was  too  great  a  consideration  with  Sir 
Edward  Grey  to  permit  his  doing  much  in  behalf  of  the  "Open 
Door"  in  the  Far  East.  Japan  was  the  ally  of  Great  Britain,  and 
Russia  was  being  humored  in  Persia  for  the  purpose  of  diverting 
her  attention  from  India  and  keeping  in  check  the  constantly  ex- 
panding Near  East  trade  of  the  Germans.  Such  being  the  objects 
pursued.  Sir  Edward  had  to  be  cautious. 

The  alliance  with  Japan,  and  the  understanding  with  Russia 
had  another  good  effect  so  far  as  Great  Britain  was  concerned.  It 
made  it  possible  to  reduce  the  British  fleet  in  the  Asiatic  seas. 
The  units  thus  liberated  from  service  in  Chinese  waters  were 
added  to  the  British  home  fleet,  a  step  which  the  rapid  growth 
of  the  German  navy  made  necessary. 

France  had  only  financial  interests  in  the  Far  East,  but  lost 
no  opportunity  of  being  of  help  to  her  ally — Russia.  The  fate  of 
China,  therefore,  depended  upon  the  United  States  and  Germany, 
both  of  whom  stood  for  the  principle  of  the  "Open  Door,"  to  wit: 
The  right  of  all  nations  to  trade  in  the  Far  East  and  make  invest- 
ments there  on  an  economic,  instead  of  a  political,  basis.  Germany 
and  the  United  States  opposed  not  only  the  control  of  the  Far 
Eastern  railroads  by  Russia  and  Japan,  but  objected  to  the  attempts 
made  to  make  further  railroad  construction  in  the  Far  East  con- 
tingent upon  the  good  will  of  Russia  and  Japan. 

The  various  measures  proposed  by  the  United  States  and  Ger- 
many caused  Russia  and  Japan  to  make,  in  April-May  1910,  a 
treaty  relating  to  their  "interests"  in  Manchuria.  That  treaty 
was  a  public  one,  so  far  as  the  world  knew;  in  reality  the  public 
treaty  was  but  the  mask  of  the  secret  treaty  that  was  made 
simultaneously.  The  provisions  of  the  latter  were  such  that  all 
trade  in  Manchuria,  as  well  as  all  further  railroad  construction, 
would  have  passed  into  the  control  of  the  Russians  and  Japanese, 
just  as  had  been  done  by  Great  Britain  and  Russia  in  Persia  as 
the  result  of  the  Anglo-Russian  agreement  of  1907. 


RUSSIA,  JAPAN  AND  UNITED  STATES  IN  CHINA     5 

The  documents  do  not  make  it  clear  that  Sir  Edward  Grey  was 
taken  into  the  full  confidence  of  Russia  and  Japan,  but  they  do 
show  that  he  had  no  objection  to  Paragraph  2  of  the  public  treaty, 
which  was  the  blanket  warrant  for  the  plans  of  the  Russians  and 
Japanese.  France  also  had  no  objection,  and  it  was  left  to  the  United 
States  and  Germany  to  fight  the  battle  of  the  "Open  Door." 

China  had  been  greatly  alarmed  by  news  of  the  treaty,  and  Rus- 
sia and  Japan  agreed  to  impose  their  will  upon  the  Chinese  mili- 
tarily, if  necessary,  diplomacy  to  be  used  merely  as  a  threat.  In 
other  words,  the  partition  of  China,  so  far  as  Russia  and  Japan 
were  concerned,  had  been  definitely  agreed  upon. 

Since  the  United  States  government  took  most  of  the  initiatives 
in  favor  of  the  "Open  Door,"  the  thwarting  efforts  of  Russia  and 
Japan  were  directed  against  it,  of  course.  Having  ascertained  that 
Germany  also  meant  to  defend  that  principle  to  the  best  of  her 
ability,  Secretary  of  State  Knox,  in  November  1910  seems  to  have 
been  ready  to  resist  the  joint  action  of  Japan,  Russia,  France  and 
Great  Britain.  France,  interested  financially  in  Manchuria,  appears 
to  have  been  under  the  impression  that  the  United  States  wanted 
to  secure  complete  control  of  Manchuria,  though  the  evidence 
shows  that  she  was  not  convinced  of  this  and  opposed  the  "Open 
Door"  largely  because  her  ally,  Russia,  had  to  be  pleased,  and 
Germany's  trade  could  in  that  manner  be  limited,  if  not  driven 
from  the  Far  East,  which  would  have  been  the  lot  of  United  States 
commerce  also. 

Since  the  Chinese  government  saw  salvation  only  in  joining 
the  United  States  and  Germany  in  the  "Open  Door"  policy, 
Russia  and  Japan  had  to  occupy  themselves  constantly  with  the 
application  of  force,  as  in  December  of  1910,  for  instance. 

By  this  time,  Japan  had  openly  made  herself  mistress  of 
Southern  Manchuria,  with  the  result  that  Russia  saw  in  this  the 
excuse  for  attempting  the  same  in  the  northern  districts,  all  the 
more  so  since  Korea  had  been  annexed.  Fearing  that  too  much 
aggression  might  finally  drive  China  entirely  into  the  arms  of  the 
United  States  and  Germany,  Russia  and  Japan  lessened  pressure 
a  little,  but  decided  that  the  question  would  have  to  be  definitely 
disposed  of  before  the  completion  of  the  Panama  Canal  made  it 
possible  for  the  United  States  to  use  all  of  its  fleet  in  the  Pacific. 


6  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

The  attitude  of  the  British  government  remained  much  the 
same  up  to  now.  Tied  to  Russia  by  a  community  of  interests  in 
Persia  and  by  a  common  hostility  towards  Germany,  Sir  Edward 
Grey  gave  Petrograd  and  Tokio  a  free  hand. 

The  Chinese  revolution  was  used  by  Russia  and  Japan  to 
further  promote  their  interests  in  the  Far  East.  A  memorandum 
of  the  Russian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  M.  Sazonoff,  of  Janu- 
ary 23,  1912,  says  that  conditions  made  it  necessary  for  Russia 
to  strengthen  her  position  "in  the  Far  East  by  force  of  arms  and 
to  annex  diverse  Chinese  territories."  The  opposition  to  the  atti- 
tude of  the  United  States  and  Germany  was  as  great  as  ever,  be- 
cause, as  SazonofF  put  it  at  the  time,  that  attitude  was  "inimical" 
to  the  interests  of  Russia. 

Specifically,  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  at  that  time  was : 
That  China  needed  money  to  improve  and  extend  her  railroad  sys- 
tem and  develop  her  natural  resources.  The  Russian  government 
was  opposed  to  this,  knowing  well  enough  that  such  development 
would  have  put  China  not  only  in  condition  to  defend  herself,  but 
would  have  made  her  a  national  neighbor  to  be  respected,  instead 
of  exploited,  as  had  been  the  case  hitherto.  Japan's  attitude  was 
the  same. 

The  United  States  had  offered  Russia  the  chance  to  participate 
in  the  financial  reforms  and  economic  betterment  in  China.  But  that 
required  not  only  capital,  but  put  into  the  background  the  political 
and  territorial  aspirations  of  the  St.  Petersburg  government. 
Russia  was  constantly  hard  up,  and  while  she  was  able  to  reserve 
for  herself  in  Persia  a  large  number  of  railroad  and  other  develop- 
ment concessions,  she  was  not  able  to  do  so  in  China  and  Man- 
churia, because  the  United  States  meant  business  and  was  not, 
like  Great  Britain  in  Persia,  collecting  concessions  and  reserving 
special  rights  for  none  but  a  political  purpose. 

There  had  been  formed  by  that  time  a  syndicate  of  American, 
English,  French  and  German  capitalists  that  was  to  come  to  the 
assistance  of  the  "Open  Door"  principle.  France  participated  in 
that,  because  her  investments  in  the  Far  East  were  already  large 
enough  to  recommend  a  saner  policy  than  Russia  and  Japan  were 
applying.  Russia  was  asked  to  join  the  combination,  but  refused 
to  do  so,  because  her  one  vote  in  the  syndicate  could  not  accom- 


RUSSIA,  JAPAN  AND  UNITED  STATES  IN  CHINA      7 

plish  what  she  and  Japan  secretly  desired.  Sazonoff  hoped  that 
he  could  persuade  the  French  government  to  do  what  it  usually 
did — prevent  participation  of  French  capital  in  enterprises  "inimical 
to  the  Entente,"  as  the  expression  was,  but  on  this  occasion  he 
failed. 

Sazonoff  asked  Grey  to  become  active  along  the  same  lines,  and 
in  March  1912,  the  situation  had  been  sufficiently  changed  to 
enable  the  United  States  minister  at  Pekin  to  inform  the  Russian 
minister  that  "his  instructions  contained  nothing  which  could  cause 
him  to  thwart"  Russian  actions  in  Mongolia  and  Manchuria. 
"This  caused  Sir  John  Jordan  (the  British  minister  at  Pekin),  to 
inform  us  that  no  other  Power  would  attempt  to  oppose  our 
measures,"  reported  the  Russian  minister  to  China  to  his  chief. 

The  outcome  of  this  was  that  Russia  and  Japan  signed  a  secret 
convention  in  regard  to  the  Russian  and  Japanese  spheres  of  in- 
terest in  Mongolia,  the  text  of  which  was  first  submitted  to  the 
French  and  British  governments  for  their  approval,  so  that  it  was 
no  longer  a  question  in  which  Russia  and  Japan,  the  signatories, 
alone  were  involved,  but  which,  by  virtue  of  assent,  concerned 
now  the  entire  Entente.  Mongolia  was  definitely  divided  by  Russia 
and  Japan,  and  the  interests  of  neither  the  United  States  nor  Ger- 
many were  considered. 

A  puppet  state  was  set  up  in  Mongolia,  and  then  it  was  shown 
that  Great  Britain  had  gotten  her  compensations  in  Tibet,  which 
up  to  now  consisted  of  nothing  but  the  permission  of  the  Russians 
to  the  British  to  send  a  "scientific  expedition"  into  that  country. 

With  Mongolia  and  Manchuria  now  in  the  hands  of  the  Rus- 
sians and  Japanese,  the  British  wanted  freedom  of  action  in  Tibet, 
for  which  Sazonoff  demanded  British  recognition  of  Russia's  "ex- 
clusive sphere  of  influence  in  Northern  Manchuria,  Mongolia  and 
Western  China,  with  the  exception  of  Kashgar,  as  well  as  the 
undertaking  not  to  hinder  us  (Russia)  in  the  execution  of  our 
plans  in  these  territories." 

The  conditions  of  Russia  were  accepted  by  Great  Britain,  and, 
in  March  1914,  Sazonoff  was  able  to  put  the  Chinese  government 
face  to  face  with  having  to  give  the  Russians  a  number  of  railroad 
concessions,  which,  if  developed,  would  have  placed  the  whole 
of  China  at  the  mercy  of  Russia  and  Japan.    With  the  concessions 


8  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

was  to  go  the  right  to  exploit  the  natural  resources  of  China, 
which,  according  to  Sir  Edward  Grey,  was  not  a  feature  of  the  rail- 
road agreements  made  by  China  with  other  Powers  and  groups. 
The  outbreak  of  the  European  war  interrupted  the  negotiations. 


(1)  The  Russian  Minister  at  Pekin  to  M.  Iswolsky,  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs.     Telegram,  Oct.  2-15,  1909. 

The  news  of  the  arrival  of  Prince  Ito,^  on  a  visit  to  our  Minister 
of  Finance,  appears  to  have  aroused  great  disquiet  in  Government 
circles  here,  as  closer  relations  between  Russia  and  Japan  to  the  disad- 
vantage of  China  are  feared.  The  possibility  is  again  mooted  of  our 
selling  the  southern  section  of  the  Manchurian  Railway  and  sign- 
ing an  agreement  concerning  Manchuria.  It  seems  to  me  that  the 
Chinese  Government  must  fear  that  the  disapproving  attitude  of  several 
Powers,  especially  Russia,  towards  the  Chinese-Japanese  agreement, 
together  with  the  protests  of  the  foreigners  in  the  Charbin  question, 
might  lead  to  a  close  understanding  between  Russia  and  Japan  in  order 
to  protect  their  reciprocal  interests  in  Manchuria  against  China  and  the 
other  Powers.  The  distrust  of  the  Chinese  is  strengthened  appar- 
ently by  the  knowledge  that  they  have  not  fulfilled  the  obligations 
undertaken  by  them  towards  us  on  April  27,  and  they  also  evince  a 
resistance  that  might  easily  determine  us  to  secure  for  ourselves  the 
support  of  Japan  for  the  solution  of  the  pending  problems.  Should 
the  Chinese  put  any  questions  of  this  nature  to  me,  I  fully  intend 
to  give  an  evasive  reply  and  not  to  reassure  them,  as  this  may  lead 
to  their  assuming  a  more  yielding  attitude  towards  us. 

(2)  The   Russian   Ambassador   at    Tokio   to    Iswolsky.      Telegram,   Sept. 
29-Oct.  12,  1909. 

Prince  Ito  is  travelling  to  Charbin  to  confer  with  our  Minister 
of  Finance.  He  entertains  the  intention  of  giving  reassuring  ex- 
planations on  the  latest  Japanese-Chinese  treaty,  and  he  will  per- 
haps attempt  to  prepare  the  way  towards  a  closer  understanding 
for  the  protection  of  the  Russo-Japanese  interests.  He  will  also 
touch  on  the  question  of  a  definite  treaty  between  the  East  Chinese 

*  Ex-minister  of  foreign  affairs  of  Japan. 


RUSSIA,  JAPAN  AND  UNITED  STATES  IN  CHINA     9 

and  the  South  Manchurian  Railway  Companies.  Although  Ito  does 
not  belong  to  the  present  administration  and  his  mission  is  not  an 
official  one,  he  has  consulted  with  the  members  of  the  Cabinet.  In  any 
case,  the  Japanese  Government  will  use  his  very  considerable 
authority,  and  his  reputation  of  being  a  convinced  friend  of  Russia's 
— in  order  to  influence,  as  favourably  as  possible,  Russian  public 
opinion.  A  number  of  papers  are  already  pointing  out  that  a  Russo- 
Japanese-Chinese  agreement  might  possibly  be  arrived  at  on  the  Man- 
churian questions,  thus  creating  a  counterweight  against  American 
designs  in  Manchuria. 

(3)  Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Minister  at  Pekin.    Telegram,  Oct.  5-18,  1909. 

Your  telegram  of  October  2  received. 

/  share  your  opinion  that  it  will  be  advantageous  not  to  give  any 
reassuring  explanations  to  the  Chinese  on  the  occasion  of  Prince  Ito's 
journey  and  the  possibility  of  a  rapprochement  between  Russia  and 
Japan. 

(4)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Tokio  to  Iswolsky.    Telegram,  Dec.  2-15, 
1909. 

Goto^  has  promised  to  inform  me  of  Katsura's^  opinion  on  the 
proposed  action  of  Russia  and  Japan  in  Manchuria.  Personally  he 
believes  that  it  is  in  the  highest  degree  desirable  to  undertake  nothing  in 
Manchuria  without  having  previously  arrived  at  an  agreement  between 
Russia  and  Japan.  He  thereby  referred  to  our  agreement  with  China 
in  Charbin  and  to  the  Japanese-Chinese  agreement  concerning 
the  Kanto  Territory.  These  two  questions  should  only  be  jointly 
regulated.  The  solidarity  of  the  two  Powers  is  to  be  given  expres- 
sion not  only  for  China's  sake  but  also  for  that  of  the  other  Powers. 
No  doubts  can  then  be  harboured  as  to  the  ability  of  Russia  and  Japan 
independently  to  solve  the  Manchurian  question  by  mutual  arrange- 
ment.'^ The  proposed  railway  and  tariff  agreements  would  prove  to 
Europe  and  America  that  a  political  rapprochement  had  taken  place 
between  Russia  and  Japan.  He  informed  me  in  strict  confidence  that 
the  Mikado  had  expressed  the  desire  that  his  Government  should 

*  Japanese  minister  at  Pekin. 
'Prime  minister  of  Japan. 
'  Without  the  United  States. 


10  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

further  friendly  relations  with   Russia.     Prince  Ito's  journey  has 
served  to  bring  about  an  agreement  in  the  Manchurian  question. 

(5)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Dec.  7-20,  1909. 

Goto  has  communicated  to  me  the  viewpoint  of  the  Japanese 
Prime  Minister  in  the  Manchurian  question.  Katsura  believes 
that  the  political  aspect  offers  great  difficulties  and  necessitates 
careful  deliberation,  as  other  Powers  have  to  be  taken  into  consid- 
eration. He  thinks  we  ought  to  begin  with  economic  questions;, 
these  might  comprise  railway-tariff  and  telegraph  questions.  The 
political  part  would  then  refer  to  administrative  measures  in  the 
expropriated  zone,  the  two  Governments  to  come  to  a  mutual  under- 
standing before  applying  to  China  on  these  points.^  Incidentally,  Tokio 
would  be  glad  to  become  acquainted  with  our  standpoint. 

(6)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Dec.  11-24,  1909. 

Apropos  of  the  American  proposition,^  the  Minister  told  me  that  he 
considered  it  to  be  the  right  moment  for  Russia  and  Japan,  who  had 
undertaken  the  first  step  towards  an  understanding  in  1907,  now  to 
decide  on  the  second  step.  The  joint  interests  in  Manchuria  should 
serve  as  basis  for  the  future  development  of  political  relations.  He 
is  not  quite  certain  what  shape  such  an  agreement  should  take  and 
what  concrete  questions  should  be  dealt  with,  but  he  regards  it  as 
imperative  to  enter  immediately  into  an  exchange  of  opinions, 
Komura  asked  me  whether  I  had  received  instructions  referring 
hereto.  I  replied  that  I  had  not  received  any  instructions  but  that 
I  could  not  doubt  your  acquiescence. 

(7)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Washington  to  Iswolsky.    Telegram,  Dec. 
15-28,  1909. 

The  project  contained  in  the  memorandum  presented  to  you 
has  been  handed,  as  Knox  ^  informs  me,  to  Germany  and  England, 
whose  agreement  in  principle  has  been  received.  No  news  has  been 

*  Whose  territory  was  being  expropriated. 

'Neutralization  of  the  Manchurian  railroads  for  the  purpose  of  preserving 
the  principle  of  the  "Open  Door,"  viz. :  the  opportunity  of  all  to  do  business  in 
Manchuria  and  China. 

'  United  States  Secretary  of  State. 


RUSSIA,  JAPAN  AND  UNITED  STATES  IN  CHINA      11 

received  so  far  as  to  the  Japanese  attitude.  Knox's  project,  accord- 
ing to  what  he  told  me,  has  as  its  objective  the  neutralisation  of  Man- 
churia under  the  control  of  the  Great  Powers,  the  safeguarding  of 
China's  rights  in  this  country  and  the  establishment  of  a  buffer  between 
Russia  and  Japan,  in  order  to  preclude  the  possibility  of  a  conflict 
between  these  two  states. 

Japan's  attitude  in  this  question  will,  to  my  thinking,  prove 
whether  the  plans  of  this  nation  aim  at  Manchuria  or  at  the  Ussur- 
ian  territory.  The  fact  that  such  aims  exist  is  proved  to  me  by  the 
constant  development  of  the  military  land-forces  if  one  does  not 
wish  to  assume  that  Japan  is  really  and  exclusively  concerned  with 
purposes  of  defence,  in  order  to  be  in  a  position  to  defend  her  con- 
quests in  Korea  against  all  unforeseen  events. 


(8)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at   Tokio   to  Iswolsky.     Letter,  Dec.   31, 
1909-Jan.  13,  1910. 

I  have  just  had  a  talk  of  two  hours*  duration  with  Motono.^ 
We  naturally  spoke  of  the  notorious  American  project.  Komura  ^  has 
communicated  to  the  Ambassador  the  negotiations  which  are 
taking  place  between  both  States  regarding  the  project.  Motono 
is  extremely  satisfied  that  our  two  Governments  are  proceeding 
jointly  in  this  question.  He  regards  it  as  noteworthy  that  the  draft 
of  the  Japanese  answer  was  first  communicated  to  us  and  that  you 
gave  a  similar  promise  concerning  the  Russian  reply  to  be  returned 
to  the  Americans.  The  Ambassador  regards  this  mutual  trust  not 
only  as  a  sign  of  mutual  confidence  but  also  as  a  constantly  pro- 
gressing community  of  our  policy  in  Manchuria. 

As  regards  the  development  of  the  agreement  of  1907,  the  Am- 
bassador regards  the  American  proposal  as  a  clear  proof  of  the  necessity 
of  bringing  about  an  understanding  between  Russia  and  Japan  in  the 
Manchurian  question. 

On  my  pointing  out  the  difficulty  of  finding  a  formula  for  such 
a  rapprochement,  the  Ambassador  indicated  that  the  treaties  with 
China  on  the  East  Chinese  and  South  Manchurian  railways  are 
limited  as  to  time. 

*  Japanese  minister  at  St.  Petersburg. 
"Minister  of  foreign  affairs  of  Japan. 


12  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

"Does  the  Russian  Government  really  entertain  the  intention  of 
restoring  its  line  to  China  on  the  date  fixed  for  the  repurchase?" 
the  Ambassador  inquired. 

/  naturally  gave  an  evasive  reply  and  merely  called  his  attention 
to  the  fact  that  this  period  comes  into  effect  only  36  years  after  the 
beginning  of  the  exploitation  of  the  railway-line  and  that  it  was 
therefore  difficult  to  predict  such  far-off  events.  The  Ambassador's 
remark,  however,  leads  me  to  infer  that  the  intentions  cherished  by 
Japan  are  much  more  comprehensive  than  I  first  thought  fit  to  assume. 
I  do  not  believe  that  Japan's  representative  at  Petersburg,  usually 
so  cautious,  would  otherwise  have  brought  forward  this  difficult 
question,  had  he  not  been  especially  instructed  to  do  so.  Should 
the  Japanese  Government  decide  to  touch  on  this  question  in  the 
coming  negotiations,  it  would  clearly  prove  how  greatly  Japan  is 
interested  in  the  maintenance  of  the  status  quo  in  Manchuria  and 
in  our  support. 

Reverting  to  the  idea  of  a  new  political  agreement  with  us, 
Motono  emphasized  the  fact  that  the  agreement  of  1907  bore  an 
exclusively  negative  character,  whilst  the  new  treaty  must  contain 
positive  provisions.  Apparently,  he  greatly  desires  that  the  general 
outlines  of  the  forthcoming  negotiations  should  be  determined 
whilst  he  is  still  in  Japan,  i.e.  until  the  middle  of  February.  I 
should  therefore  be  greatly  obliged  to  you  for  instructions  at  your 
earliest  convenience. 

(9)  Jswolsky   to    the   Russian   Ambassador  in   London.    Telegram,  Dec. 
31.  l909'Jan.  13,  1910.    No.  2291. 

Sub.  No.  2.  I  send  you  a  short  extract  from  the  answer  we 
intend  presenting  to  the  American  Government  in  reply  to  the 
project  of  neutralisation  of  the  Manchurian  Railway.  May  I  request 
you  to  communicate  the  contents  confidentially  to  Grey  and  to  add  thai 
we  are  acting  in  agreement  zvith  Japan  in  this  matter f 

(10)  The   Same   to    the  Same.     Telegram,   Dec.   31,    1909-7a».    13,    1910. 
No.  2291. 

No.  2.  In  our  reply  to  the  American  proposal,  we  establish  the 
fact  that  the  situation  in  Manchuria  does  not  in  our  view  embody 
anything  which  could  call  into  question  China's  integrity  or  the 


RUSSIA,  JAPAN  AND  UNITED  STATES  IN  CHINA      13 

principle  of  the  Open  Door,  and  we  refuse  to  agree  to  the  American 
project  for  the  neutralisation  of  the  Manchurian  railways.  Our  atti- 
tude, on  the  one  hand,  is  based  on  the  disadvantageous  results  that 
would  ensue  for  the  railway  companies  and  the  numerous  private 
interests  involved,  whilst,  on  the  other  hand,  we  have  to  consider 
the  importance  the  line  in  question  has  for  our  East  Asiatic  com- 
munications, so  that  we  could  hardly  permit  any  alteration  of  the 
situation  to  take  place  in  these  districts.  Whilst  declaring  our- 
selves ready  in  principle  to  discuss  the  plan  of  a  railway-line  from 
Chinchow  to  Aigun,  we  request  further  information  regarding 
details.  Concerning  the  possibility  of  the  construction  of  other  railway- 
lines  m  Manchuria  by  the  international  syndicate  of  the  Chinchow- 
Aigun  Railway,  we  reserve  to  ourselves  the  right  of  examining  this 
question  from  the  standpoint  of  our  own  interests. 

(II)     The  Same  to  the  Same.  Confidential  Letter,  Dec.  31,  1909-/o».  13,  1910. 

Enclosed  you  will  find  a  resume  of  the  negotiations  on  the 
American  proposal. 

As  soon  as  the  new  American  Ambassador,  Mr.  Rockhill,  took  up 
his  new  post  at  St.  Petersburg  he  began  to  prepare  us  for  a  somewhat 
indefinite  proposal  of  united  procedure  in  the  Far  East.  In  various 
separate  conversations  he  would  point  either  to  the  Japanese- 
Chinese  agreements,  or  to  the  misunderstanding  regarding  the 
administration  of  the  expropriated  zone  of  the  Manchurian  rail- 
ways, and  he  would  attempt  to  convince  us  of  the  necessity  of 
mutual  action  on  the  part  of  Russia  and  America  in  Manchurian 
questions,  where  they  should  endeavour  to  safeguard  the  principle 
of  the  Open  Door  and  of  Chinese  independence.  Simultaneously, 
the  desire  became  noticeable  m  Japan, — although  at  that  very 
period  the  press  constantly  published  reports  of  the  aggressive  in- 
tentions of  Japan  towards  Russia, — to  arrive  at  an  understanding 
with  us  on  the  Manchurian  questions.  Concerning  the  agreement 
with  China,  the  Japanese  Ambassador  attempted  to  show  that  the  real 
objective  of  Japanese  politics  was  not  Russia,  but  China;  whilst  point- 
ing out  the  difficulties  our  policy  has  to  overcome  in  Manchuria,  he  tried 
to  convince  us  that  the  conformity  of  Russian  and  Japanese  interests  in 
China  should  be  made  evident  to  the  world  at  large.    In  the  same  man- 


14  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

ner.  Prince  Ito's  journey  had  the  purpose  of  bringing  a  whole 
series  of  questions  of  economic  nature  between  Russia  and  Japan 
towards  a  satisfactory  solution.  As  for  China,  naturally  desirous 
of  safeguarding  her  rights  of  sovereignty  in  Manchuria,  the  effort 
to  confront  Russia  and  Japan  with  the  other  Powers  interested  in 
Free  Trade  in  Manchuria  was  recognizable  in  Pekin. 

All  this  showed  plainly  enough  that  we  have  arrived  at  a 
turning-point  in  East-Asiatic  policy  and  that  the  existing  status  quo 
is  no  longer  in  accordance  with  the  interests  of  three  Powers, 
namely,  America,  Japan  and  China. 

Indeed,  should  the  American  project  be  realized,  the  entire 
political  situation  in  Manchuria  would  be  subjected  to  a  thorough 
alteration. 

Rockhill,  at  first  in  personal  discussions,  and  later  in  the  name 
of  his  Government,  developed  a  plan  which  he  termed  the  "commer- 
cial neutralisation"  of  Manchuria.  According  to  this  plan  all  the 
railways  in  Manchuria,  those  existing  as  well  as  those  planned, 
should  belong  to  China  and  at  the  same  time  be  guaranteed  by  the 
Powers,  who  would  simultaneously  grant  China  a  loan  in  order  to 
buy  up  existing  lines  and  build  new  ones.  As  our  standpoint  is 
analogous  to  that  of  Japan,  and  as  a  rejection  or  acceptance  of  the  Ameri- 
can project  would  have  influenced  our  relations  to  Japan,  the  necessity 
of  placing  ourselves  into  communication  with  the  latter  became  obvious. 
The  Emperor  ^  gave  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  instructions  to 
this  effect,  and  the  whole  question  has  been  investigated  by  a 
special  Ministerial  Council.  Hereupon,  we  placed  ourselves  in  com- 
munication with  the  Tokio  Cabinet  and  merely  informed  the  American 
Ambassador  that  the  American  proposal  would  be  considered  in  all  its 
details. 

Our  overtures  were  very  favourably  received  at  Tokio.  Komura 
found  it  possible  to  express  the  conviction  that  Japan  would  on  no 
account  permit  the  South  Manchurian  Railway  to  pass  into  foreign 
hands.  In  the  course  of  negotiations  it  was  established  that  for  some 
reason  or  other  the  incomplete  text  of  the  American  proposal  had  been 
handed  us,  as  it  is  pointed  out  in  the  proposals  submitted  at  Tokio  that 
the  Powers  willing  to  safeguard  the  commercial  neutrality  of  Manchuria 
can  join  the  American-English-Chinese  convention,  should  it  not  be 
*  Czar  Nicholas. 


RUSSIA,  JAPAN  AND  UNITED  STATES  IN  CHINA      15 

possible  to  carry  out  the  American  project  to  its  full  extent.  Later,  we 
were  also  handed  the  complete  text  by  Rockhill.  A  similar  proposal 
has  been  made  to  England,  France  and  Germany,  as  well  as  to 
Russia  and  Japan. 

Apparently,  China  has  not  definitely  agreed  to  the  building  of 
the  Chinchow-Aigun  line,  as  the  confirmation  of  the  Pekin  Govern- 
ment has  not  as  yet  been  received.  On  the  whole,  however,  the 
American  project  has  met  with  a  favourable  reception  in  China  and  the 
supposition  even  exists  that  it  was  jointly  set  up  by  America  and 
China.  As  for  the  other  Powers,  France  considers  the  American 
proposal  to  be  impracticable.  According  to  news  from  America, 
Germany  has  declared  her  agreement  in  principle,  as  has  England; 
although  up  to  the  present  she  has  given  no  support  whatsoever  to  the 
American  project.  On  our  pointing  out  that  the  participation  of  Eng- 
land would  run  counter  to  our  treaty  of  the  year  1899,  the  London 
Cabinet  replied  that  we  were  formally  in  the  right,  but  that  the  point 
in  question  did  not  deal  with  the  concession  for  a  railway  line  but  with 
the  financing  of  a  Chinese  undertaking,  and  that  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment itself  took  up  a  similar  attitude  in  its  endeavours  to  obtain 
the  co-operation  of  the  Russo-Chinese  Bank  in  the  building  of  the 
Hankow-Setchuan  Railway. 

(12)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Tokio  to  Iswolsky.     Telegram,  Feb.  23- 
March  8,  1910.  ' 

Komura  told  me  that  he  shares  our  views  as  to  the  objective  of 
the  proposed  political  understanding  between  Russia  and  Japan. 
Its  basis  must  consist  of  the  maintenance  of  the  status  quo  in  Man- 
churia, the  definite  demarcation  of  the  special  Russian  and  Japanese 
interests  and  their  protection  against  aggression  on  the  part  of  a  third 
Power.  He  is  prepared  to  enter  upon  a  discussion  of  the  details. 
He  enquired  whether  the  Russian  Government  had  authorised  me 
to  conduct  negotiations.  I  replied  that  I  had  been  empowered  to 
come  to  an  understanding  with  him  on  the  general  principles  of  the 
proposed  convention. 

(13)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  April  24-May  7,  1910. 

The  newspapers  here  are  spreading  the  report  that  the  Russo- 
Japanese  Treaty  has  been  already  signed,  or,  that  its  signing  will  take 


16  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

place  within  the  next  ten  days.  As  Komura  fears  that  a  premature 
publication  of  our  intentions  might  he  injurious,  he  zvill  have  an  official 
dementi  published  in  to-morrozi/s  newspapers.  At  the  same  time  he 
requested  me  to  inform  you  that  he  regards  an  acceleration,  if 
possible,  of  our  negotiations  to  be  desirable. 

(14)  The  Russian  Minister  at  Pekin  to  Iswolsky.    Telegram,  April  29-May 
12,  1910. 

China  is  very  much  upset  by  the  news  of  the  conclusion  of  a 
Russo-Japanese  covenant.  If  possible,  I  beg  you  to  acquaint  me 
with  details  in  order  to  be  able  to  reply  to  any  questions  put  to  me. 

(15)  Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  in  London.    Strictly  Confidential 
Letter,  June  11-24,  1910.    No.  760. 

Negotiations  have  been  taking  place  for  some  time  past  between 
the  Petersburg  and  Tokio  Cabinets  in  order  precisely  to  establish, 
and  bring  into  conformity,  their  joint  interests  in  Manchuria,  so 
that  peace  in  the  Far  East  may  be  further  secured.  An  experience 
of  three  years  has  proved  the  expediency  of  the  Russo-Japanese 
Treaty  of  July  17-30,  1907,^  and  the  two  Governments  have  now 
unanimously  recognized  that  the  above-mentioned  aim  can  be  best 
attained  by  a  further  development  of  this  treaty. 

To-day  both  Cabinets  have  come  to  a  perfect  understanding  and 
they  are  about  to  set  their  signatures  to  a  public  and  a  secret  agree- 
ment.^ The  first  promotes  closer  joint  action  between  Russia  and 
Japan  in  the  question  of  the  Manchurian  Railways  and  confirms  anew 
the  firm  resolution  of  both  Governments  to  maintain  the  status  quo 
in  these  districts.  The  Secret  Treaty  defines  more  precisely  the  two 
spheres  of  interest,  as  well  as  the  limitations  to  which  they  subject 
themselves  in  order  to  reinforce  their  mutual  relations  and  to  pre- 
serve the  position  proper  to  them  in  Manchuria  from  all  interference 
on  the  part  of  other  Powers.  The  Russian  Government  is  convinced 
that  the  two  treaties,  which  exclusively  serve  the  purpose  of  safeguard- 
ing the  peaceful  relations  with  Japan,  contain  nothing  which  could 
be  injurious  to  British  interests.  In  view  of  the  cordial  relations 
existing  between  Russia  and  England,  may  I  request  you  to  bring  the 

*  Delimitation  of  Russo-Japanese  interests  in  the  Far  East. 
'Compare  them  carefully. 


RUSSIA,  JAPAN  AND  UNITED  STATES  IN  CHINA      17 

above  to  the  knowledge  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  and  to  inform  him  con- 
fidentially of  both  projects,  whilst  at  the  same  time  expressing  the  hope 
that  he  will  regard  these  two  diplomatic  documents  as  a  new  guaran- 
tee of  peace  and  quiet  in  the  Far  East, 


(16)  Draft  of  the  Public  Treaty  between  Russia  and  Japan?- 

The  Russian  and  the  Japanese  Governments,  faithful  to  the 
principles  set  up  in  the  Treaty  of  July  17-30,  1907,  and  desirous 
of  a  further  development  of  this  Treaty  for  the  maintenance  of 
peace  in  the  Far  East,  have  decided  to  supplement  the  above 
Treaty  by  the  following  provisions: 

Article  1.  For  the  facilitation  of  traffic,  and  for  the  develop- 
ment of  international  trade,  both  parties  contract  to  support  each 
other  in  the  improvement  of  their  railroad  connections  in  Man- 
churia and  to  refrain  from  all  competition  injurious  to  these  aims.^ 

Article  2.  Each  of  the  contracting  parties  undertakes  to  main- 
tain and  observe  the  status  quo  in  Manchuria,  as  defined  in  all  the 
treaties,  conventions  and  other  agreements  that  have  hitherto  been 
concluded  between  Russia  and  Japan,  or  between  these  States  and 
China.  Copies  of  these  treaties  have  been  exchanged  between 
Russia  and  Japan. 

Article  3.  Should  the  status  quo  as  set  forth  above  be  threat- 
ened in  any  manner,  the  two  contracting  parties  shall  enter  into 
an  exchange  of  opinions  to  determine  together  the  measures  to 
be  taken  for  the  maintenance  of  the  status  quo, 

(17)  Draft  of  the  Secret  Treaty  between  Russia  and  Japan. 

To  confirm  and  further  develop  the  provisions  of  the  Secret  Treaty 
of  June  17-30,  1907,  the  Russian  and  the  Japanese  Governments  agree 
to  the  following  provisions: 

Article  1.  Russia  and  Japan  recognize,  as  the  boundary  of  their 
specific  spheres  of  interest  in  Manchuria,  the  line  of  demarcation  as 
defined  in  the  supplementary  article  to  the  Secret  Treaty  of  1907. 

*  The  text  here  given  is  not  the  original  English  text,  but  an  English  transla- 
tion of  the  original  Russian  text  of  the  Convention. 
'A  provision  the  United  States  objected  to. 


18  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

Article  2.  The  two  contracting  parties  agree  mutually  to 
recognize  their  special  interests  in  the  areas  set  forth  above.  Each 
of  them  may  also,  each  within  its  own  sphere  of  interest,  take  such 
measures  as  shall  be  deemed  necessary  for  the  maintenance  and  pro- 
tection of  these  interests. 

Article  3.  Each  party  undertakes  to  place  no  obstacle  of  any  kind 
in  the  way  of  the  confirmation  and  future  development  of  the  special 
interests  of  the  other  party  within  the  boundary-lines  of  such  spheres 
of  interest. 

Article  4,  Each  of  the  contracting  parties  undertakes  to  re- 
frain from  all  political  action  within  the  sphere  of  interest  of  the 
other  party  in  Manchuria.  Furthermore,  it  has  been  decided  that 
Russia  shall  seek  no  privileges  or  concessions  in  the  Japanese 
zone,  and  Japan  none  in  the  Russian  zone,  that  might  be  injurious 
to  the  special  interests  of  either  party,  and  that  both  Governments 
are  to  recognize  the  rights  acquired  in  their  spheres  of  interest, 
as  defined  in  Article  2  of  the  Public  Treaty  of  to-day's  date. 

Article  5.  To  ensure  the  working  of  the  mutual  stipulations, 
both  parties  will  enter  into  an  open  and  friendly  exchange  of 
opinion  on  all  matters  concerning  their  special  interests  in  Man- 
churia. In  case  these  special  interests  should  be  threatened,  the  two 
Governments  will  agree  on  the  measures  that  may  become  necessary  for 
common  action  or  mutual  support  in  order  to  protect  these  interests. 

Article  6.  The  present  Treaty  will  be  kept  strictly  secret  by 
both  Governments. 

(18)  Iswolsky  to   the  Russian  Ambassador  in  London.    Telegram,  June 
12-25,  1910.    No.  889. 

You  will  receive,  by  special  messenger,  instructions  as  to  a 
statement  to  be  made  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  concerning  a  political 
agreement  we  are  about  to  conclude  with  Japan.  May  I  request 
you  to  do  this  not  later  than  Wednesday  and  immediately  to  inform 
me  by  telegram? 

(19)  The  Russian  Ambassador  in  London  to  Iswolsky.    Telegram,  June 
15-28,  1910.    No.  157. 

Your  letter  No.  760  received.  Please,  inform  me  whether  the 
Japanese  Government  is  aware  of  our  London  declaration. 


RUSSIA,  JAPAN  AND  UNITED  STATES  IN  CHINA      19 

(20)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  June  15-28,  1910.  No.  160. 

Your  letter  No.  760  received. 

I  have  just  carried  out  the  instructions  given  me.  Grey  is  very 
much  satisfied  with  the  step  taken  by  the  Russian  Government  and  re- 
quests me  to  forward  you  his  best  thanks.^  He  has  watched  with  satis- 
faction the  development  of  good  relations  between  Russia  and  Japan 
within  the  last  three  years  and  is  extremely  satisfied  by  the  confirma- 
tion of  his  observations  as  furnished  by  me.  England's  political 
interests  in  the  Far  East  consist  in  the  maintenance  of  peace,  just 
as  her  trade  interests  are  based  on  the  principle  of  the  Open  Door. 
Grey  requested  me  to  couch  his  statements  in  the  friendliest  and 
heartiest  terms. 


(21 )    Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.     Telegram,  June  16- 
29,  1910.    No.  911. 

Your  telegram  No.  157  received.    The  declarations  to  the  British 

and  French  Governments  were  made  with  full  knowledge  of  the  Tokio 
Cabinet,  and  your  Japanese  colleague  will  have  received  the  same 
instructions  as  yourself.^ 


(22)     The  Russian  Charge  d* Affaires  at  Pekin  to  Iswolsky.     Report,  July 
1-14,  1910. 

The  only  peaceful  means  of  exercising  pressure 

on  China  at  present  is  to  lay  down  a  double  track  on  our  Siberian 
Railway.  This  measure  alone  is  feared  by  the  Chinese,  as  they  fore- 
see its  consequences,  and  that  our  relations  in  general  to  the  Chinese 
Empire  might  be  determined  thereby.  All  other  similar  measures 
which  have  been  already  taken  into  consideration  owing  to  the 
scarcely  friendly  attitude  of  the  Chinese  Government  towards  us, 
such  as  for  example  an  export  embargo  on  grain,  either  possess 
no  inherent  importance,  or  they  are  both  dangerous  and  injurious 
to  ourselves  in  regard  to  our  trade  relations  with  China. 

*  For  having  learned  the  details  of  both  treaties,  the  public  and  the  secret  one. 

'There  was  a  complete  meeting  of  minds  in  Tokio,  St.  Petersburg,  London 
and  Paris.  This  method  of  making  an  act,  or  a  series  of  actions  by  the  Entente 
group  seem  to  be  the  initiative  or  effort  of  a  single  member  of  that  group,  has 
become  known  as  the  "mechanism  of  the  Entente" — a  phrase  invented  by  Lord 
Northcliffe. 


20  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

Should  a  military  action,  in  so  far  as  it  is  prepared  and  used  with 
caution,  he  looked  upon  not  only  as  a  means  hut  as  the  aim  of  policy, 
then  a  diplomatic  action  need  he  considered  only  to  that  degree  in 
which  it  hears  the  character  of  a  direct  threat.  This  latter  measure,- 
now  that  we  have  arrived  at  a  close  understanding  with  Japan,  thanks 
to  your  efforts,  will  have  a  very  strong  moral  effect:  the  question  how- 
ever is  how  to  make  hest  use  of  it. 

Personally,  I  cannot  imagine  that  the  Chinese  should  he  so  perma- 
nently influenced  hy  a  diplomatic  action  as  to  show  sudden,  lasting  and 
unconditional  compliance.  In  practice,  therefore,  we  must  use  pressure 
in  every  individual  case.^  It  is  possible  that  concessions  may  thus 
be  attained  from  China,  but  whenever  the  Chinese  Government 
considers  our  demands  to  be  too  heavy,  or  an  encroachment  upon 
its  rights,  it  will  endeavour  to  put  up  as  prolonged  a  resistance  as 
possible  against  us.   .   .   . 

It  is  all  the  more  important  for  us  to  regard  the  Chinese  prob- 
lems from  a  correct  perspective,  since,  should  the  system  of  com- 
promises between  ourselves  and  China  be  admitted,  it  would  be 
necessary  for  us  to  alter  the  nature  of  our  policy  in  China  and  to 
take  more  and  more  economic,  and  not  territorial,  acquisitions  into 
consideration.  Hitherto,  these  latter  have,  either  directly  or  indirectly 
heen  placed  in  the  foreground  of  our  efforts.  Should  we  be  sufficiently 
powerful  economically,  it  would  be  simpler  to  direct  all  our  efforts 
to  the  conclusion  of  an  economic  treaty.  If,  however,  as  I  fear, 
we  should  by  so  doing  be  only  of  service  to  the  foreigners,  and  our- 
selves be  unable  to  secure  any  profits  from  what  we  had  achieved, 
(thus  we  have  for  instance  in  reality  been  unable  during  the  last 
thirty  years  to  profit  by  the  extraordinary  advantages  embodied 
in  the  Commercial  Treaty  of  1881)  then  there  is  in  my  opinion  no 
reason  to  depart  from  the  hasis  of  the  policy  we  have  followed  hither- 
to; that  of  territorial  acquisitions.  We  must  precisely  define  our  in- 
tentions and  determine  what  is  most  advantageous  to  us  and  easiest 
to  attain.  Perhaps  the  anticipated  conflicts,^  and  the  expiration  of  the 
Commercial  Treaty  of  the  year  1881,  will  afford  us  the  possihility  of 
again  ohtaining  possession  of  the  Hi  territory  we  ceded  in  1881. 

*  These  two  sentences  are  the  credo  of  diplomacy  and  the  reader  will  find  their 
substance  presented  a^ain  and  again  in  these  documents.  Their  quintessence  is: 
Micht  is  right. 

^Anticipated  by  Russia  and  Japan,  because  planned  by  them. 


RUSSIA,  JAPAN  AND  UNITED  STATES  IN  CHINA      21 

(23)    Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Minister  of  Finance.     Confidential  Letter, 
Nov.  6-19,  1910. 

The  telegrams  of  our  foreign  representatives  will  have  ac- 
quainted you  with  the  question  of  a  Chinese  loan.  On  November 
3  of  the  current  year,  we  received  an  enquiry  from  the  American 
Ambassador  here.  Mr.  Rockhill,  however,  confined  himself  to  in- 
forming us  that  the  Chinese  Government  intended  to  take  up  a 
loan  of  50  million  dollars  in  America  and  to  use  this  sum  for  a 
reform  of  the  currency  in  China  and  for  the  commercial  develop- 
ment of  Manchuria ;  he  spoke  at  the  time  neither  of  guarantees  of  any 
kind  nor  of  the  appointment  of  an  American  to  the  Chinese  Ministry 
of  Finance.^  Later  on,  however,  he  informed  me  that  the  American 
banking-houses  insist  upon  China's  providing  definite  guarantees  and  on 
the  appointment  of  an  American.  The  Ambassador  assured  me  that 
his  Government  would  welcome  the  participation  of  Russian  capital 
in  the  loan. 

It  may  be  inferred  from  all  this  that  the  American  Government 
desires  to  use  foreign,  not  American,  money  in  order  to  attain  a  double 
profit:  Firstly  a  commission  for  the  American  banks  and,  secondly, 
the  appointment  of  an  American  who  will  in  all  probability  attempt 
to  exert  not  only  economic  but  also  political  influence. 

The  Japanese  Ambassador  here,  who  has  arrived  at  the  same  con- 
clusion, has  openly  expressed  to  me  his  dissatisfaction  at  the  course 
the  problem  of  the  penetration  of  foreign  capital  into  China  has  taken.. 
Motono  expressed  as  his  personal  opinion  the  idea  that  Russia  and 
Japan  might  jointly  guarantee  a  loan.  I  drew  his  attention  to  the 
fact  that  it  was  most  improbable  that  the  Chinese  Government,  finding 
already  burdensome  the  Russian  and  Japanese  influence  on  all 
Chinese  affairs,  would  declare  itself  willing  to  strengthen  still  further 
its  dependence  on  Russia  and  Japan.  I  drew  his  attention  to  the  fact 
that  should  the  Americans  allude  to  the  obligation  on  the  part  of  China 
to  begin  the  currency  reform,  as  contained  in  the  Chinese-Americafi 
Treaty  of  1903,  a  sifnilar  obligation  is  embodied  in  the  agreements 
made  by  England  and  Japan  with  China  in  1902  and  1903.  These 
two  Governments  consequently  possess  full  power  to  demand  a 

*As  Russia  and  Great  Britain  had  done  in  the  case  of  Persia,  where  M. 
Bizot,  a  Frenchman,  and  Morgan  Shuster,  an  American,  acted  in  succession  as 
financial  advisers. 


22  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

share  in  the  control  of  China's  financial  affairs.  Such  a  demand  on 
the  part  of  Japan,  especially  if  England  should  follow  suit,  would 
cause  the  Chinese  and  Americans  to  renounce  their  idea  of  placing  the 
Chinese  finances  under  American  control.  Even  should  this  not  be 
the  case,  the  presence  of  a  Japanese  and  English  Financial 
Councillor  would  still  counteract  the  exclusively  political  influence 
the  Americans  are  now  apparently  striving  for  in  China. 

(24)     The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  in  London  to  Sasonoff,  Russian  Min- 
ister of  Foreign  Affairs.    Letter,  Nov.  10-23,  1910. 

The  French  Ambassador  here  has  told  me  that  during  a  conversa- 
tion with  Knox,  the  latter,  in  his  excitement,  admitted  that  the  sum 
of  50  million  dollars  would  he  in  itself  too  small  for  the  financial  re- 
form and  other  administrative  measures  in  China,  and  that  the  Ameri- 
cans in  reality  desired  to  use  this  sum  for  the  building  of  railways  and 
the  penetration  of  Manchuria.^  Knox  intends  to  set  up  resistance  in 
Manchuria,  directed  in  the  first  place  against  Russia  and  Japan,  as  well 
as  their  allies,  France  and  England. 

The  French  Government  does  not  deem  it  possible  financially  to 
support  an  enterprise  which  is  directed  against  Russia.  Cambon  ^  told 
this  to  Sir  A.  Nicolson  and  asked  him  whether  the  British  Government 
would  not  consider  it  possible  to  refrain  from  rendering  assistance  to 
the  American  endeavours  directed  against  Russia  and  Japan.  Sir  A. 
Nicolson  replied  that  Grey  would  most  probably  be  willing  to 
inquire  at  Washington  whether  the  proposed  loan  was  really 
destined  for  the  reform  of  China's  finances ;  should  this  not  be  the 
case  England  would  scarcely  participate  in  the  loan.  In  any  case, 
he  regards  exclusively  American  negotiations  with  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment as  inexpedient. 

So  far  as  Cambon  is  informed,  the  Americans  3re  pursuing 
political  ends — they  wish  to  enact  the  role  of  arbitrator  between 
China  and  the  European  Powers,  as  they  do  not  intend  to  nego- 
tiate the  fourth  part  of  the  loan,  which  falls  to  their  share,  in 
America,  but  to  distribute  it  amongst  England,  France  and 
Germany. 

*  The  poorest  sort  of  statesmanship,  if  true. 

*  Paul,  French  ambassador  at  London. 


I 


RUSSIA,  JAPAN  AND  UNITED  STATES  IN  CHINA      23 

Camhon  inclines  to  the  opinion  that  the  American  Government,  in 
its  displeasure  at  the  failure  of  its  plans  last  year,  now  seeks  to  call 
forth  new  complications  in  China,  at  the  same  time  emphasizing  its 
magnanimous  attitude  towards  that  country. 


(25)     Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  in  London.  Strictly  Confidential 
Letter.    Nov.  27'Dec.  10,  1910.    No.  1369. 

I  am  sending  you  a  copy  of  a  strictly  confidential  report  from 
our  Minister  at  Pekin,  No.  104,  in  which  the  plan  is  developed  of 
putting  pressure  upon  China  in  order  to  place  China  under  obligation 
to  leave  the  status  quo  in  Mongolia  unaltered  and  to  take  no  military 
measures  there. 

The  whole  question  is  a  very  difficult  one,  and  its  solution  in 
the  one  or  the  other  direction  will  touch  the  very  core  of  our  rela- 
tions with  China.  The  project  however  is  of  like  importance  from 
an  international  point  of  view:  its  carrying-out  depends,  as  our 
Minister  has  already  remarked,  upon  a  previous  understanding  with 
the  other  Powers,  principally  England  and  Japan. 

Before  entering  on  the  subject  in  its  entirety,  I  wish  to  know  to 
what  degree  we  shall  be  able  to  rely  on  the  support,  or,  at  least,  on  the 
concurrence  of  the  two  Powers  above  mentioned.  May  I  request  you, 
therefore,  without  giving  the  British  Government  any  information 
about  our  plan,  to  submit  to  me  your  observations  on  the  general 
development  of  British  policy  in  East  Asiatic  questions:  Can  we  rely 
in  general,  and  under  what  conditions,  on  English  support,  should  the 
plan  proposed  by  our  Minister  really  be  carried  into  effect f 

With  regard  to  the  remark  of  our  Minister  as  to  withdrawing 
our  refusal  to  permit  scientific  expeditions  to  Tibet  ^  and  rendering 
this  the  starting  point  of  our  negotiations  with  the  London  Cabi- 
net, I  should  like  to  inform  you  that  the  Russian  Government 
raises  no  objections  to  this.  Nevertheless,  I  must  ask  you  to  inform 
me  whether  it  would  not  be  best  to  wait  with  our  acquiescence  to  the 
English  proposal  until  we  have  learnt  England's  attitude  in  the  question 
I  have  raised, 

*  Sazonoff  wished  to  be  assured  as  to  the  real  nature  of  these  "scientific  expe- 
ditions" to  Tibet.  A  British  protectorate  over  Tibet  was  the  result  of  Russia's 
acquiescence. 


24  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

(26)     Protocol  of  an  Extraordinary  Meeting  of  the  Ministerial  Council  at 
St.  Petersburg.    Nov.  l9'Dec.  2,  1910. 

The  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  reports  that  the  negotiations 
on  the  renewal  of  the  Commercial  Treaty  with  China  will  probably 
cause  great  difficulties,  as  the  Chinese  Government  reveals  the 
intention  of  bringing  forward  an  entire  series  of  political  questions, 
besides  those  of  a  purely  commercial  nature.  This  has  induced  the 
Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  to  exclude  the  purely  political  prob- 
lems and  to  make  them  the  subject  of  separate  negotiations 
preceding  those  actually  concerning  the  Commercial  Treaty  itself. 
Under  these  circumstances,  ^  speedy  solution  of  the  political  prob- 
lems becomes  essential.  It  will  be  necessary  to  clothe  the  claims 
against  China  in  the  form  of  an  ultimatum,  which  in  turn  will  neces- 
sitate supporting  the  Russian  claims  by  force  of  arms.  The  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs  desires  to  learn  the  opinion  of  the  Ministerial 
Council,  whether  such  a  program  would  be  approved  from  a  military 
and  financial  point  of  view,  and  whether  the  military  measures  on  the 
Chinese  frontier  proposed  for  this  purpose  would  find  the  sanction  of 
the  Government. 

The  Prime  Minister  points  out  the  difference  prevailing  be- 
tween the  attitude  of  the  War  Ministry  and  that  of  the  Foreign 
Ministry.  Whilst  the  latter  speaks  only  of  safeguarding  our  rights 
as  stipulated  in  the  Treaty,  the  War  Minister  recommends  as  neces- 
sary on  strategic  grounds  the  annexation  of  North  Manchuria  by 
Russia.  Should  the  standpoint  of  the  War  Minister  be  accepted,  all 
preparatory  measures  for  the  annexation  of  this  country  should  be 
taken  without  further  loss  of  time.  From  a  general  point  of  view, 
such  action  does  not  meet  with  the  approval  of  the  Prime  Minister; 
should  the  Minister  of  War  be  correct  in  his  assertion  that  we  run 
a  risk  of  being  supplanted,  first  in  Manchuria,  and  later  in  the  Ussuri 
District  also,  if  we  do  not  make  use  of  the  present  favourable  moment, 
then  this  consideration  must  determine  us  to  make  all  provisions  for 
the  annexation  of  Northern  Manchuria,  as  the  possession  of  this  ter- 
ritory is  an  imperative  necessity  to  us  for  the  defence  of  our  East 
Asiatic  possessions. 

The  Minister  of  War  confirmed  the  fact  that,  according  to  his 
information,  Russia's  position  in  Manchuria  is  an  extremely  difficult 
one.    Japan  is  taking  open  measures  for  the  annexation  of  Southern 


RUSSIA,  JAPAN  AND  UNITED  STATES  IN  CHINA      25 

Manchuria.  China  has  begun  to  reorganize  her  military  forces  in 
Manchuria  with  the  intention  of  dislocating  our  railway  com- 
munications in  Manchuria  before  we  are  in  a  position  to  guard 
them  by  a  rapid  strengthening  of  our  Frontier  Corps,  stationed 
along  the  whole  line.  The  progressing  colonisation  of  Manchuria 
by  the  Chinese  likewise  follows  strategic  aims.  Under  these  cir- 
cumstances, the  concentration  of  our  army  is  only  possible  westward 
of  the  Khinganic  Hills,  from  where  our  troops  can  reach  the  theatre 
of  war  only  after  a  most  difficult  passage  of  the  range.  The  Minister 
of  War  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  present  moment  is  all  the  more 
favourable  for  us  to  take  possession  of  Manchuria  in  agreement  with 
Japan,  as  the  Japanese  are  very  evidently  preparing  the  annexation 
of  Southern  Manchuria.  Thus  an  end  would  be  put  to  the  presence 
of  Chinese  military  in  the  vicinity  of  our  railways,  and  also  to 
Chinese  colonisation.  Should  the  anexation  of  North  Manchuria 
be  impossible  at  the  present  time,  then  it  would  be  better  for 
us  voluntarily  to  withdraw  from  this  territory  before  we  are 
forced  to  do  so. 

The  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  declared  that  he  was  per- 
fectly convinced  that  the  annexation  of  Northern  Manchuria 
was  for  us  an  imperative  necessity,  but  he  regarded  the  present 
moment  as  unfavourable,  as  America,  England  and  perhaps  even  Japan 
would  oppose  our  plans  and  we  could  expect  no  support  from  any 
quarter  whatsoever.  He  did  not  regard  our  strategic  position  in  the 
Far  East  as  endangered:  an  attack  on  the  part  of  Japan  was  not  to 
be  expected,  as  we  had  just  concluded  a  political  agreement  with  this 
country,  and  Japan  was  furthermore  fully  occupied  in  the  absorption 
of  Korea.  As  for  the  Chinese  troops:  They  are  not  yet  strong 
enough  in  Manchuria,  and  financial  considerations  prevent  China 
from  undertaking  a  rapid  organisation  of  her  army.  Finally,  we 
are  separated  by  Southern  Manchuria  from  the  main  body  of 
the  Chinese  army  concentrated  in  Petchili :  the  Japanese  naturally 
would  not  permit  the  passage  of  the  Chinese  army  through  their 
sphere  of  interest.  Many  years  will  pass  before  China  could  be- 
come dangerous  to  us. 

The  Minister  of  Commerce  pointed  out  that  the  annexation  of 
Northern  Manchuria  is  connected  with  the  risk  of  a  great  war.  Rus- 
sia, at  the  present  moment,  is  however  not  prepared  for  this. 


26 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


The  Minister  of  Finance  pointed  to  the  continuous  nervoui 
ness  prevalent  in  our  East  Asiatic  borderlands.  Three  years  ago, 
the  Governor-General  of  the  Amur  Territory  pronounced  war 
with  Japan  to  be  unavoidable;  our  relations  to  this  State  are  at 
present,  however,  perfectly  normal.  One  must  take  into  con- 
sideration who  could  eventually  threaten  us  in  the  Far  East. 
The  conclusion  of  the  Treaty  of  June  21  testifies  to  our  confidence  in 
Japanese  policy,  and  we  need  not  reckon  with  a  war  with  this  country 
in  the  immediate  future.  For  the  same  reason  the  possibility  of  a 
joint  Japanese-Chinese  attack  on  us  is  also  excluded.  China  alone 
remains,  but  for  the  insignificant  Chinese  forces,  the  29,000  men 
of  the  Frontier  Corps  amply  suffice,  supported  by  the  military 
districts  of  Irkutsk  and  the  Amur  Territory,  to  protect  the  East- 
China  Railway  from  any  sudden  interruptions. 

Kokowtzeff  ^  is  all  the  more  in  agreement  with  the  standpoint 
of  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  as  it  fully  expresses  the  policy 
he  has  himself  followed  during  the  past  four  years.  We  must 
naturally  safeguard  by  all  means  in  our  power  our  covenanted 
rights  in  China.  //  necessary  we  must  resort  to  imposing  our  Con- 
sular representatives  by  force,  or  to  similar  energetic  measures. 
Experience  has  taught  us  that  China  has  always  yielded,  when 
we,  knowing  ourselves  to  be  in  the  right,  addressed  to  her  cate- 
gorical demands.  Such  policy  will  always  meet  with  the  approval 
of  public  opinion  in  Russia  and  will  call  forth  no  open  opposition 
on  the  part  of  the  other  Great  Powers.  The  violent  separation  of 
a  province  from  China  can  not  be  justified  by  legal  considera- 
tions. We  know  how  expensive  such  annexations  prove  to  be  in 
the  long  run  and  to  what  international  complications  they  lead. 
The  purpose  of  such  annexation  would  not  be  understood  in 
Russia. 

Naturally,  it  would  he  impossible  to  declare  that  Northern  Man- 
churia will  never  he  annexed  by  Russia;  political  events  in  future  might 
make  it  necessary  for  us  to  do  so,  should  the  political  situation  be 
favourable  at  the  time.  By  safeguarding  at  present  all  our  treaty 
privileges  in  Manchuria  we  can  best  prepare  for  the  possibility  just 
referred  to.     We  must  not  withdraw  from  Manchuria,   hut  attempt 


*  Russian  prime  minister. 


RUSSIA,  JAPAN  AND  UNITED  STATES  IN  CHINA      27 

to  strengthen  our  position  in  this  country  in  order  to  fulfil  our  mis- 
sion ^  there  in  the  proper  manner  at  the  given  time. 

Whilst  thus  supporting  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs*  politi- 
cal program,  Kokowtzeff  is  however  of  opinion  that  we  shall  not 
be  able  to  avoid  a  tariff  war  with  China,  as  this  country,  at  the 
revision  of  the  Petersburg  Commercial  Treaty,  will  set  up  claims 
that  are  wholly  unacceptable  to  us,  until  we  prove  to  China  that 
such  obstinacy  will  lead  to  no  results. 

The  Minister  of  Trade  reported  on  the  preparatory  work  of 
the  commission  for  the  revision  of  the  Commercial  Treaty.  This 
Commission  regards  a  tariff  war  as  possible,  if  not  probable. 
Hence  it  is  most  desirable  to  separate  all  political  questions  from 
the  rest  and  insist  on  their  speedy  settlement. 

Taking  all  these  points  into  consideration,  the  Ministerial 
Council  accepts  the  proposal  of  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
So  far  as  Northern  Manchuria  is  concerned,  the  Ministerial  Council 
regards  an  annexation  as  dangerous  at  the  present  moment,  but  is  of 
opinion  that  the  trend  of  events  may  force  Russia  to  this  step.  All 
Ministries  must  therefore  be  guided  by  the  consideration  that  our 
stipulated  privileges  in  Northern  Manchuria  must  be  maintained  in 
full  to  permit  eventually  an  annexation  at  some  future  date. 

The  Ministerial  Council  sanctions  the  measures  proposed  by  the 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  to  exert  pressure  upon  China.  In  case 
of  necessity  however  there  must  be  no  shrinking  from  forceful 
measures.  The  Ministerial  Council  furthermore  pointed  out  that 
proceedings  should  be  taken  against  the  sale  of  cheap  alcohol 
on  the  Amur,  as  this  traffic  has  a  demoralising  influence  on  the 
Russian  population. 

(27)     Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Tokio.     Telegram,  Nov.  27- 
Dec.  10,  1910.  No.  1742. 

The  next  courier  will  remit  you  the  report  of  an  Extraordinary 
Ministerial  Council  in  which  it  was  decided  to  protect  our  stipu- 
lated privileges  in  China  and  even  to  make  use  of  such  measures 
against  the  Chinese  Government  as  military  demonstrations  on 
the  frontier  and  the  enforced  instalment  of  our  consuls  in  dis- 

*  Russia  had  missions  everywhere,  despite  the  fact  that  her  moujik  population 
was  the  most  oppressed,  neglected,  exploited  and  backward  in  Europe  at  the  time. 


28 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


tricts  to  which  the  Chinese  denied  them  admittance.  Yesterday 
I  informed  the  Japanese  Ambassador  that  the  time  had  come  to  de^ 
mand  from  Japan  the  fulfilment  of  the  promises  made  us  on  the 
occasion  of  the  annexation  of  Korea.  The  Japanese  Ambassador 
assured  us  that  his  Government  recognised  our  right  to  take  all  actions 
we  deem  necessary  and  that  they  would  give  us  every  support. 
I  request  you  to  make  a  similar  verbal  statement  to  the  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs  and  to  send  me  a  telegraphic  report  on  the 
result  of  your  interview. 


(28)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Tokio  to  Sasonoff.    Telegram,  Dec.  4-17, 
1910.    No.  206. 


Your  telegram  No.  1742  received. 

On  Komura  receiving  my  communication,  he  informed  me 
that  the  Japanese  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  had  only  given 
him  a  general  outline  of  his  conversation  with  you,  without  men- 
tioning the  reply  he  made.     Komura's  standpoint  is  as  follows: 

On  the  conclusion  of  the  last  treaty  between  Russia  and 
Japan,  the  Chinese  Government  and  the  Chinese  nation  showed 
themselves  inclined  to  be  very  distrustful  of  these  two  nations. 

Powerful  pressure  exerted  by  us  on  China  might  therefore  result 
in  a  change  of  China's  policy  and  drive  this  country  into  the  arms 
of  America  and  Germany,  China's  very  weakness  is  dangerous,  and, 
although  it  is  doubtful  whether  America  and  Germany  would  con- 
clude a  political  treaty  with  China,  we  must  foresee  the  fact  that  our 
pressure  on  China  will  afford  the  two  Powers  above-mentioned  the 
possibility  of  securing  material  advantages  for  themselves  and  a  priv- 
ileged position  in  Pekin. 

Komura  therefore  hopes  that  Russia  will  bear  in  mind  the 
possibility  of  such  dangerous  results.  There  are  still  several 
questions  for  Japan  to  regulate  in  Manchuria,  but  she  is  attempting 
to  dispel  China's  distrust  and  to  be  very  moderate  in  her  transac- 
tions. As  Komura  is  convinced  of  the  solidarity  of  Russian  and 
Japanese  interests  in  the  Far  East,  he  is  desirous  of  attracting 
our  attention  to  the  fact  that  China's  present  position  necessitates 
great  patience  and  precaution  on  our  part.  Replying  to  my  ques- 
tion, whether  Russia  may  reckon  on  Japan's  support  at  Pekin, 
as   promised   by   the   Japanese    Ambassador    at    St.    Petersburg, 


I 


RUSSIA,  JAPAN  AND  UNITED  STATES  IN  CHINA      29 

Komura  said  that  Japan  was  willing,  in  principle,  to  uphold  us  in  every 
individual  case  on  our  submitting  to  her  the  details  of  the  same. 

(29)  Sasonoff  to   the  Russian  Minister  at  Pekin.    Telegram,  Dec.   10-23, 
1910.    No.  1793. 

The  present  state  of  affairs  does  not  appear  to  render  it  desirable 
to  enter  into  a  compromise  zvith  China.  May  I  request  you  to  inform 
verbally  the  Chinese  Minister  that  the  Chinese  reply  cannot  satisfy 
us  and  that  we  must  take  more  extensive  measures.  We  do  not  need, 
however,  to  reject  the  Chinese  attempts  to  meet  us  at  least  half- 
way. For  your  personal  information  I  must  add  that  we  have,  to- 
gether with  the  War  Ministry,  begun  the  concentration  of  our  troops 
in  Djarkend  and  Ussin. 

(30)  The  Russian  Minister  at  Pekin  to  Sasonoff.     Telegram,  Dec.  11-24, 
1910.    No.  645. 

The  submitting  by  us  of  details  of  contentious  questions  in 
China  to  the  Japanese  Government  would  certainly  lead  to  the 
direct  intervention  on  the  part  of  Japan  in  matters  we  have 
hitherto  preserved  from  all  foreign  interference.  I  foresee  that 
this  will  greatly  injure  our  policy  in  China. 

(31)  Sasonoff  to  the  Russian  Minister  at  Pekin.    Telegram,  Jan.  24-Feb. 
6,  1911. 

Should  China  reject  our  ultimatum,  we  intend  to  make  a  mili- 
tary demonstration  at  Hi  and  not  carry  out  the  occupation  of  the 
Uriankhai  Territory.  The  military  units  necessary  for  this  will 
only  be  available  by  the  first  of  March.  Until  then  it  does  not 
appear  desirable  to  allow  our  troops  to  advance  across  the  Chinese 
frontier  on  Hi,  as  we  have  to  take  into  consideration  the  possi- 
bility of  a  set-back  near  the  town  of  Suidun. 

We  therefore  intend  to  present  the  ultimatum  to  China  at  the  be- 
ginning  of  February,  without  setting  a  time-limit,  that  is  to  say,  be- 
fore  the  notice  of  termination  of  the  St.  Petersburg  Commercial 
Treaty  on  the  part  of  China  may  be  expected,  in  order  not  to  let  it 
appear  as  though  our  ultimatum  were  the  reply  to  China's  notification. 

Should  the  ultimatum  be  rejected,  we  shall  repeat  it  and  set 
March  1  as  the  date  of  its  fulfilment.    Should  the  Chinese  never- 


30  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

theless  give  notice  of  termination  of  the  Commercial  Treaty,  w< 
shall  oppose  its  revision  until  China  shall  agree  to  accept  our 
demands. 


(32)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sasonoff.  Telegram,  Feb.  7-20, 
1911.    No.  43. 

Public  opinion  in  England  has  hitherto  paid  little  attention 
to  our  difficulties  in  China  and  no  concern  exists  here.  Apart 
from  the  first  article  in  the  "Times,"  none  of  the  papers  have  oc- 
cupied themselves  further  with  this  topic.  An  article  in  the 
"Times"  of  to-day  expresses  the  expectation  that  the  Chinese 
reply,  in  the  form  it  was  telegraphed  to  London  by  the  British 
correspondent,  would  allow  the  hope  that  a  peaceful  adjustment 
may  be  arrived  at.    Grey  has  not  spoken  to  me  on  this  matter. 

{ZZ)    Sasonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  in  London.     Telegram,  Feb.  8- 
21,  1911.    No.  172. 

Our  Minister  at  Pekin  has  submitted  to  us  the  reply  of  the 
Chinese  Government  to  our  ultimatum.  This  reply  is  of  an  ac- 
commodating nature  and  can  be  regarded  as  satisfactory  on  the 
whole,  although  several  obscure  points  still  remain,  which  will 
form  the  subject  of  further  negotiations. 

(34)     The  Acting  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  M.  Neratoff,  to  the  Russian 
Minister  at  Pekin.    Telegram,  March  19-April  1,  1911.    No.  358. 

The  acute  conflict  between  ourselves  and  China  that  has  just 
been  settled  has  again  revived  the  question  of  the  safeguarding  of 
our  Eastern  Chinese  Railway  lines  and  of  our  position  in  Manchuria 
itself.  Although  General  Khorwat's  report  points  out  the  exaggera- 
tion of  the  fears  expressed  in  the  press  and  lays  stress  on  the  fact  that 
only  weak  Chinese  detachments  are  stationed  in  the  immediate  vicinity 
of  our  railway  lines,  yet  the  Ministry  of  War  thinks  it  necessary  to 
increase  our  troops  in  the  expropriated  zone  and  to  concentrate  power- 
ful units  in  Tsitsikar  and  Echo. 

Our  negotiations  with  the  Japanese  Government  permit  us  to  hope 
that  Japan  will  raise  no  objections  to  the  plans  of  our  Ministry  of 
War. 


RUSSIA,  JAPAN  AND  UNITED  STATES  IN  CHINA      31 

These  measures  are  to  form  the  subject  of  a  special  conference 
of  Ministers,  and  I  beg  you  to  inform  me  by  telegram  of  your  opinion. 
It  would  be  especially  desirable  for  us  to  receive  precise  information 
on  Chinese  and  above  all  Japanese  military  measures  in  Manchuria. 

(35)     Neratoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Tokio.    Telegram,  April  16-29, 
1911.    No.  518. 

I  have  pointed  out  to  the  Japanese  Ambassador  here  the  fears 
Chma's  activity  in  Manchuria  has  aroused  in  us,  especially  the 
Chinese  colonisation,  the  issuing  of  a  loan  and  the  re-inforcement 
of  the  Chinese  forces  in  this  province.  Our  military  circles  are  of 
the  opinion  that  these  latter  are  already  sufficiently  strong  to  de- 
stroy our  railway  communications.  I  asked  the  Ambassador  what 
his  Government's  standpoint  is  regarding  China's  military  meas- 
ures. 

Motono  told  me  in  reply  that  the  Chinese  troops  in  Manchuria, 
both  as  to  numbers  and  quality  constituted  no  danger.  He  thinks 
it  quite  out  of  the  question  that  the  Chinese  would  attack  either  us  or 
the  Japanese.  The  only  danger  he  can  foresee  would  come  from 
America  whose  fleet  in  the  Pacific,  on  the  completion  of  the  Panama 
Canal,  will  be  so  powerful  that  the  Japanese  fleet  might  undertake  a 
defensive  action^  but  certainly  not  attack.  The  Ambassador  believes 
that  Russia  and  Japan  will  have  to  regulate  definitely  their  position 
in  China  before  the  beginning  of  this  period.  He  is  willing  to  act 
as  mediator  to  lay  our  wishes  before  the  Japanese  Government, 
but  is  at  the  same  time  of  the  opinion  that  the  negotiations  on 
measures  to  be  taken  for  the  safeguarding  of  our  interests  in  Man- 
churia must  take  place  at  Tokio.  I  request  you  to  inform  the 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  ^  of  our  fears  regarding  the  further 
development  of  the  Chinese  Army,  and  to  ask  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment as  to  its  attitude  concerning  our  idea  of  an  agreement 
between  Russia,  Japan  and  China  for  the  exact  determination  of 
the  strength  and  distribution  of  the  Chinese  troops  in  the  district 
of  the  Manchurian  railways,  thus  further  developing  the  main- 

*  In  the  political  sense  an  attack  may  be  the  best  sort  of  "defensive  action." 
Such  was  the  claim  of  the  Japanese  after  they  had,  without  notice,  taken  the 
initiative  in  the  Russo-Japanese  war. 

'Of  Japan. 


32 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


tenance  of  the  status  quo  in  Manchuria,  as  set  forth  in  our  agre 
ment  of  June  21,  1910. 

As  my  conversations  with  the  Japanese  Ambassador  were  onl 
of  a  preparatory  nature,  I  must  beg  you  on  your  part,  to  refrain 
from  any  concrete  proposal.  Please  ascertain  in  the  first  place 
what  aims  are  pursued  in  the  instructions  that  have  been  given 
to  the  Japanese  representative,  who  has  just  returned  to  Pekin. 


(36)     The  Russian  Ambassador  in  London  to  Neratoff. 
1911. 


Letter,  July  4-17, 


I  have  just  had  a  strictly  confidential  conversation  with  Sir 
A.   Nicolson^   on   the   renewal   of   the   Anglo-Japanese   Alliance. 

/  told  him  we  were  not  surprised  at  the  altered  text  of  the  treaty,  as 
this  is  apparently  a  result  of  the  proposed  Arbitration  Treaty  with 
the  United  States.-  As  for  the  prolongation  of  the  Treaty  itself, 
Russia  was  unable  to  forget  that  the  original  Treaty  of  Alliance  repre- 
sented a  precautionary  measure  against  an  eventual  conflict  between 
Russia  and  England,^  as  Lord  Landsdowne  himself  once  admitted  in  a 
private  letter. 

Sir  Arthur  replied  that  nobody  vn  England  believed  in  the  pos- 
sibility of  a  return  to  the  former  relations  between  Russia  and  Eng- 
land, and  that  such  considerations  had  not  played  any  part  whatsoever 
in  the  renewal  of  the  Treaty  with  Japan.  The  point  in  question  was 
in  reality  a  most  delicate  one,  with  special  reference  to  the  colonies,  i.e. 
Australia.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  laws  in  the  British  colonies 
show  but  little  consideration  for  the  yellow  race,  a  lapsing  of  the 
Treaty  might  have  led  to  serious  friction,  which  would  have  meant 
continuous  disquietude  for  England,  even  if  it  did  not  embody  a 
direct  danger  of  war. 

The  Treaty  that  has  just  been  renewed  is  a  guarantee  against  all 
possible  accidental  occurrences  and  from  this  point  of  view  its  renewal 
has  met  with  lively  approval  in  England.  He  pronounces  it  to  be  a 
guarantee  against  Japan's  ill-will  caused  by  the  bad  treatment  of 
the  Japanese,  especially  in  Australia. 


*  Under-Secretary  for  foreign  affairs  of  Great  Britain. 

'Evidently  the  old  text  contained  provisions  that  were  influenced  or  made 
unnecessary  by  the  treaty  referred  to. 

*  Directed  against  Russia. 


RUSSIA,  JAPAN  AND  UNITED  STATES  IN  CHINA      33 

Sir  Arthur  added  that  another  consideration  had  been  of 
weight  also.  Since  the  coming  into  force  of  the  Anglo-Japanese 
Treaty,  England  has  been  able  considerably  to  reduce  her  naval  forces 
in  the  Far  East  and  to  strengthen  her  fleet  in  like  measure  in  European 
waters.  Through  this  England  possessed  an  important  guarantee  for 
the  maintenance  of  peace  in  the  Far  East,  and  has  been  enabled  to 
strengthen  her  naval  forces  there  where  they  might  eventually  be 
needed?- 


{217)    Neratoff  to   the  Russian  Ambassador  in  London.     Strictly   Confix 
dential  Letter,  Jan.  12-25,  1912.    No.  ZZ. 

The  change  of  Government  imminent  in  China  leads  us  to 
the  consideration  that  we  must  use  this  favourable  moment  for 
the  regulation  of  a  whole  series  of  questions  in  abeyance  between 
Russia  and  China. 

I  have  expressed  this  idea  in  a  memorandum  and  have  sub- 
mitted it  to  His  Majesty.  The  Emperor  has  been  graciously 
pleased  to  confirm  my  considerations.  In  bringing  this  to  your 
personal  knowledge,  I  nevertheless  add  that  concrete  decisions 
of  the  Russian  Government  can  only  take  place  after  we  have 
arrived  at  an  understanding  with  the  Tokio  Cabinet. 


(38)     Memorandum  by  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.    Jan.  10-23,  1912. 

The  news  received  from  Pekin  heralds  the  imminent  abdica- 
tion of  the  reigning  dynasty  and  the  transference  of  sovereignty 
to  Yuan  Shikai.  The  question  thus  arises  of  the  recognition  of 
the  new  Government  by  the  other  Powers.  Our  Charge  d' Affaires 
has  already  been  able  to  establish  the  fact  that  the  representatives 
of  the  States  chiefly  interested  in  China  deem  it  necessary 
to  render  a  recognition  of  the  Yuan  Shikai  Government  depend- 
ent on  the  safeguarding  of  the  rights  of  foreigners  in  China. 

It  is  to  be  assumed  that  Yuan  Shikai  will  be  forced  to  fulfil 
these  demands  in  one  form  or  another  as  his  Government,  which 
does  not  meet  with  approval  in  all  parts  of  China,  is  badly  in  need 

*  Against  Germany,  as  shown  in  other  documents. 

3 


34 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


of  foreign  assistance  in  the  shape  of  loans  for  the  suppression  of 
the  disturbances.  Russia  and  Japan,  as  China's  neighbours,  pos- 
sessing wider  political  interests  in  this  country  than  all  other 
Powers,  are  of  especial  importance  to  Yuan  Shikai.  Hence,  Rus- 
sia and  Japan  must  use  the  present  favourable  moment  to  fortify  their 
position  in  China  and  in  this  wise  prevent  the  Chinese  Government 
from  continually  opposing  the  political  interests  of  Russia  and  Japan 
as  has  been  the  case  during  the  past  few  years. 

It  was  this  resistance  on  China's  part  which  at  the  time  evoked 
in  the  Russian  Government  the  idea  of  strengthening  Russia's  position 
in  the  Far  East  by  force  of  arms  and  by  the  annexation  of  divers 
Chinese  territories  so  that  Russia  need  no  longer  fear  complications 
in  Eastern  Asia,  should  she  be  compelled  to  try  her  strength  else- 
where. The  separation  and  annexation  of  further  territory  was, 
however,  always  looked  upon  by  us  as  an  extreme  measure.  The 
present  moment  would  appear  to  be  the  given  one  for  the  attain- 
ment of  the  desired  result  by  diplomatic  means,  without  forcible 
annexation  of  Chinese  territories. 

The  Manchurian  question  occupies  a  first  place.  It  was  here 
in  particular  that  we  had  to  fear  China's  resistance.  We  must 
now  endeavor,  therefore,  to  protect  ourselves  against  a  hostile 
action  on  the  part  of  China  in  Manchuria.  As  our  interests  in 
Manchuria  coincide  with  those  of  Japan,  and  as  we  have  concluded 
political  agreements  with  this  country  in  1907  and  1910,  our  task 
will  be  greatly  facilitated  by  co-operation  with  Japan.  It  must 
be  taken  into  account  that  both,  Yuan  Shikai  as  well  as  the  revolu- 
tionary party  in  China,  have  indicated  their  eventual  readiness  to 
acknowledge  our  position  in  Manchuria. 

We  must  for  this  purpose  reach  an  understanding  with 
Japan  as  to  our  mutual  wishes.  We  for  our  part  must  try  to  ob- 
tain an  assurance  from  China  to  enter  into  an  agreement  with  us 
on  the  following  points: 

1.)  The  construction  of  railways  in  Manchuria  and  in  the 
adjoining  parts  of  Inner  Mongolia. 

2.)  The  strength  and  distribution  of  the  Chinese  fighting 
forces  in  Manchuria. 

3.)  An  acknowledgement  on  the  part  of  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment that  the  Eastern  Chinese  Railway  possesses  not  only  free- 


RUSSIA,  JAPAN  AND  UNITED  STATES  IN  CHINA      35 

dom  of  action  in  purely  technical  railway  questions,  but  can  also 
assume  the  entire  administration  in  the  expropriated  zone} 

These  three  points,  precisely  formulated,  must  be  placed  be- 
fore China. 

Of  these  three  points  only  the  question  of  railways  can  be  of 
direct  interest  to  the  Japanese;  China's  armaments  can  not  call 
forth  any  concern  on  their  part,^  nor  have  they  any  reasons  to  be 
dissatisfied  with  the  condition  of  affairs  in  the  expropriated  zone 
of  the  Southern  Manchurian  Railway.  It  must  be  foreseen  that 
the  Japanese  will  bring  the  recognition  of  Yuan  Shikai's  Govern- 
ment into  connection  with  the  question  of  the  term  of  lease  of 
the  Kwantung  Peninsula,  which  is  of  great  importance  to  them. 
They  will  try  to  obtain  for  themselves  a  longer  period  than  twenty- 
five  years.  Such  a  demand  does  not  run  counter  to  our  interests 
and  we  would  have  no  reason  to  oppose  it. 

Another  question  we  should  attempt  to  regulate  on  the  oc- 
casion of  the  recognition  of  the  new  Chinese  Government  is  the 
revision  of  the  St.  Petersburg  Commercial  Treaty.  Should  we 
succeed  in  retaining  the  fundamental  principles  at  the  renewal, 
which  form  the  basis  of  our  political  activity  in  Outer  China,  then 
we  should  not  only  attain  the  protection  of  our  economic  interests 
but  also  assist  the  future  development  of  the  Mongolian  question 
on  the  lines  of  Mongolia's  existence  as  an  autonomic  component 
part  of  the  Chinese  realm.  The  definite  settlement  of  this  dif- 
ficult question,  which  especially  affects  Russian  interests,  must 
be  postponed  to  a  future  date,  for  we  have  to  take  into  account  our 
political  interests  which,  in  principle,  are  directly  opposed  to  the  main- 
tenance of  China's  territorial  integrity.^  In  this  way  the  Chinese 
will  be  prevented  from  re-establishing  their  authority  over  these 
districts. 

//  we  proceed  in  agreement  with  Japan,  we  shall  be  able  to  reckon 
ail  the  sooner  upon  the  fulfilment  of  our  wishes  as  we  succeed  in  as- 
suring ourselves  of  the  support  of  our  French  ally,  just  as  England 
might  also  give  her  support  to  Japan. 

*  Government  by  railroad,  in  favor  of  Russia. 

'  Which  was  not  the  view  Russia  took  for  herself. 

'A  very  frank  statement.  Sazonoff,  though  not  in  favor  of  the  "forcible 
annexation  of  Chinese  territories,"  was  committed  to  swallowing  the  Chinese 
empire  at  one  gulp — by  diplomatic  means. 


36 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


(39)     M.  Sasonoff,  Russian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  to   the  Russian 
Ambassador  at  Paris.   Confidential  Letter,  Dec.  14-27,  1911.    No.  1331. 

During  my  last  stay  at  Paris  the  director  of  the  Banque  Indo- 
Chine  and  the  Comptoir  National  d'Escompte  pointed  to  the  desira- 
bility of  a  Russian  and  a  Japanese  financial  group  entering  the 
"Syndicate  of  Four."  Our  two  groups  would  receive  the  same 
shares  as  the  others.  The  French  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,^ 
and  the  two  directors  above-mentioned,  declared  that  we  should  thus 
have  the  main  influence  within  the  Syndicate,  as  the  Russian  group 
would  proceed  jointly  with  the  French  and  Japanese  groups,  and  fre- 
quently with  the  English  group  as  well, 

I  made  no  definite  reply  and  reserved  to  myself  the  right  of  dis- 
cussing the  question  with  our  Minister  of  Finance.  But  in  my 
conversation  with  the  French  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  I  told 
him  I  saw  little  use  in  our  joining  the  Syndicate,  as  we  would 
probably  only  be  in  solidarity  with  the  French  group,  whilst  the 
Japanese  and  English  would  frequently  act  quite  independently, 
and  the  Germans,  and  the  Americans  above  all,  take  up  an  attitude 
inimical  to  us.  I  also  believe,  although  I  did  not  tell  the  French 
Minister  so,  that  the  French  group  is  chiefly  actuated  by  a  desire  to 
achieve  financial  advantages  and  would  not  help  us  to  counteract  proj- 
ects that  might  be  disagreeable  to  us  but  which  might  promise  them 
financial  advantages.  I  furthermore  expressed  my  doubts  to  the  Minis- 
ter whether  we  and  the  Americans  could  participate  in  one  and  the  same 
financial  action  in  China,  as  the  American  banking  houses  pursue  poli- 
tical aims  in  the  Far  East  which  are  distinctly  hostile  to  us. 

The  previous  correspondence  has  acquainted  you  with  the  negative 
attitude  of  the  Russian  Government  towards  the  Anglo-French-German- 
American  Syndicate.  We  desire  to  break  up  this  Syndicate  by  urging 
the  French  group  to  withdraw,  and  we  should  only  be  willing  to  enter 
the  Syndicate  were  this  latter  so  transformed  that  a  privileged  posi- 
tion would  be  granted  us  in  the  enterprises  north  of  the  Great  Wall 
of  China.  The  proposals  made  to  me  by  the  French  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs  would  by  no  means  fulfil  these  aims,  as  we  should  not  be 
able  to  protect  our  sphere  of  influence  in  China  from  the  penetration  of 
financial  interests  inimical  to  ourselves  and  even  our  vote  would  have 
no  decisive  influence  on  the  decisions  of  the  Syndicate. 
'M.  Pichon. 


RUSSIA,  JAPAN  AND  UNITED  STATES  IN  CHINA      37 

(40)  Sazonoff,  Russian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the  Russian  Ambas- 
sador in  London.    Telegram,  March  5-18,  1912.    No.  475. 

If  we  allow  the  International  Syndicate  to  grant  China  a  loan 
even  now,  before  Yuan  Shikai's  Government  has  been  officially 
recognized  by  the  Powers,  then  the  question  of  recognition  will 
have  been  positively  decided  before  we  have  had  an  opportunity  of 
formulating  the  proposed  political  conditions.  State  interests  would 
thus  be  subordinated  to  the  private  interests  of  banking-houses. 

Such  activity  on  the  part  of  the  Syndicate  would  enable  the  Asia- 
tic realm  to  arm  itself  against  European  States.  Russia,  being 
China's  nearest  neighbour,  would  be  the  first  to  feel  this  and  hence 
would  be  forced  to  devote  her  entire  attention  to  the  Far  East. 
We  must  therefore  ask  ourselves  whether  it  would  not  be  more  ad- 
vantageous for  us  to  take  up  a  separate  attitude  in  this  question  and 
to  demand  that  China  renounce  all  financial  operations  which  we  re- 
gard as  harmful,  and  in  case  of  a  Chinese  refusal,  to  support  our  de- 
mands by  forcible  measures.  I  request  you  to  confer  with  Grey  in  this 
sense  and  to  ask  him  to  consider  whether  it  could  be  in  the  interest  of 
the  Triple  Entente  Powers,  that  Russia  should  have  to  divert  all  her 
attention  and  power  to  the  Far  East?- 

(41)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  March  9-22,  1912.    No.  508. 

/  did  not  contemplate  an  immediate  conflict  with  China  in  my  tele- 
gram No.  475.  /  simply  foresee  the  possibility  of  a  military  action,  should 
the  Chinese  Government,  whilst  paying  no  attention  to  our  pro- 
test, insist  on  the  realisation  of  a  financial  operation  proposed  to 
her  by  the  International  Syndicate.  We  do  not,  however,  refuse 
officially  to  join  the  Syndicate,  but  can  only  do  this  upon  conditions 
that  do  not  render  it  necessary  for  us  to  detract  our  attention  from  our 
interests  in  Europe  and  the  Balkans  in  order  to  concentrate  upon  the 
defence  of  our  position  in  the  Far  East.  We  are  of  the  opinion  that 
this  is  a  matter  of  common  interest  to  the  Powers  of  the  Triple  En- 
tente.^ 

*  Sazonoff  knew  the  telling  effect  this  statement  would  have  upon  Grey.  Every 
man  Russia  had  in  arms  in  the  Far  East  was  a  rifle  less  on  the  German  frontier. 

*  Participation  for  Russia  meant  an  investment  of  capital  and  Russia  had  little 
of  this,  when  her  rich  ally,  France,  had  tied  the  purse  strings,  as  she  had  in  this 
case  by  her  own  participation. 


38  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

(42)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  April  7-20,  1912.    No.  716. 

On  the  occasion  of  the  acknowledgement  by  England  of  oui 
special  interests  in  China,  Lord  Morley  set  a  limit  to  these  by  re- 
ferring to  our  interests  beyond  the  Great  Wall  which  arise  out  of 
our  treaties  with  China.  This  limitation  is  not  in  accordance 
with  our  point  of  view.  Geographical  position  and  economical  de- 
velopment draw  these  districts  more  and  more  towards  Russia;  as  a 
result  of  this  we  have  to  deal  with  particular  circumstances,  and  our 
political  interests  have  not  always  found  expression  in  our  treaties  with 
China.  May  I  request  you  to  bring  this  point  to  the  knowledge  of 
the  British  Government  in  order  to  avoid  any  misunderstanding 
with  regard  to  the  support  we  expect  from  the  London  Cabinet, 
should  we  take  part  in  the  Chinese  Reorganisation  Syndicate? 

(43)  Report  of  the  Russian  Minister  at  Pekin  to  the  Russian  Ministry  of 
Foreign  Affairs:  May  1-14,  1912.    No.  32. 

In  my  former  telegrams  I  expressed  the  opinion  that  it  would 
be  impossible  for  us  to  solve  the  Mongolian  problem  by  purely 
diplomatic  means,  and  that  we  should  have  to  give  military  emphasis 
to  our  demands. 

In  continuation  of  my  earlier  reports,  I  believe  I  may  inform 
you  to-day  that  I  have  gained  the  conviction  from  discussions  with 
my  foreign  colleagues  that  we  need  at  present  fear  no  opposition 
on  the  part  of  the  foreign  Powers,  should  we  deem  it  necessary 
to  take  the  above-mentioned  military  measures  in  Northern  Man- 
churia, Mongolia  and  in  West  China. 

Our  Charge  d' Affaires  informed  you  in  his  letter  of  March  3d  that 
the  American  Representative  categorically  declared  that  his  instructions 
contained  nothing  which  would  cause  him  to  thwart  our  actions  in 
Mongolia  and  Manchuria.  The  American  Representatvve  also  ex- 
pressed himself  in  the  same  terms  to  the  British  Minister.  This  caused 
Sir  John  Jordan  to  inform  me  that  no  other  Power  would  attempt  to 
oppose  our  measures.^ 

"You  can  now  undoubtedly  proceed  without  anxiety  in  West 
China  and  Outer  Mongolia,"  my  English  colleague  told  me,  "and 

*  There  being  no  intimation  as  to  Sir  John's  authority  for  such  a  sweeping 
statement,  it  must  be  accepted  that  he  acted  either  upon  his  own  initiative  or  upon 
instruction  from  London,  paralleling  Mr.  Rockhill's  orders  from  Washington. 


RUSSIA,  JAPAN  AND  UNITED  STATES  IN  CHINA      39 

will  only  have  to  take  Japanese  interests  and  desires  into  account 
in  Manchuria." 

This  is  also  the  opinion  of  the  majority  of  my  other  colleagues. 

(44)  Saconoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  in  London.     Telegram,  June  19- 
July  2,  1912.  No.  1233. 

Personal.    Confidential. 

The  intention  exists  of  signing  a  secret  convention  with  Japan  with 
regard  to  our  spheres  of  interest  in  Inner  Mongolia.  In  agreement 
with  the  Japanese  Government  we  communicate  the  text  of  the  pro- 
jected document  to  the  French  and  British  representatives}  The 
Japanese  Government  will  send  a  similar  note  to  Paris  and  London. 

(45)  Draft  of  the  Secret  Convention  between  Russia  and  Japan  in  regard 
to  Mongolia.^ 

In  order  to  more  exactly  determine  and  to  complete  the  pro- 
visions of  the  Secret  Treaties  of  July  17-30,  1907,  and  June  21- 
July  1,  1910,  and  to  prevent  the  possibility  of  any  misunderstanding 
with  regard  to  their  special  interests  in  Manchuria  and  Mongolia, 
the  Russian  and  the  Japanese  Governments  have  decided  to 
lengthen  the  line  of  demarcation  defined  in  the  amendment  of  the 
Treaty  of  June  17-30,  1907,  and  to  draw  up  the  confines  of  the 
spheres  of  their  special  interests  in  Inner  Mongolia.  The  follow- 
ing has  therefore  been  agreed  to : 

Article  1.  Starting  from  the  intersection  of  the  Tola-Ho  River 
and  the  122.  Meridian  east  of  Greenwich,  the  demarcation  line 
follows  the  course  of  the  Oulountchourh  and  Moushisha  Rivers 
to  the  water-shed  of  the  Moushisha  and  Haldaitai  Rivers;  from 
there  on  it  follows  the  border-lines  of  the  Hei-Loung-Chiang 
Province  and  Inner  Mongolia  to  the  most  extreme  frontier  point  of 
Inner  and  Outer  Mongolia. 

Article  2.  Inner  Mongolia  is  divided  into  two  parts:  One  to 
the  East,  the  other  one  to  the  West  of  the  Pekin  Meridian.  The 
Japanese  Government  undertakes  to  recognize  and  observe  the 
special  interests  of  Russia  in  Inner  Mongolia  to  the  West  of  the 

*  Showing  that  this  was  in  reality  an  Entente  action — the  "mechanism  of  the 
Entente"  in  operation. 

'The  text  here  given  is  not  the  original  English  text,  but  a  translation  of 
the  original  Russian  text  of  the  Convention. 


40  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

above-mentioned  Meridian;  the  Russian  Government  undertakes 
the  same  obligation  in  respect  to  the  Japanese  interests  east 
the  above-mentioned  Meridian. 

Article  3.     This  convention  will  he  kept  strictly  secret  by  the 
contracting  parties,"^ 

(46)     The  Russian  Ministry   of  Foreign  Affairs   to   the  Russian   Consul' 
General  in  Ourga,    Aug.  18-31,  1912.    No.  1694. 


ikes 

I 


The  War  Minister  considers  it  necessary  to  equip  the  Mongolians 
with  modern  rifles  on  due  payment.  In  forwarding  this  communica- 
tion to  the  Mongolian  Ministers,^  please  prevail  on  them  to  prevent 
the  purchase  of  arms  from  abroad.  Also  point  out  to  them  that  the 
Russian  rifles  are  not  to  serve  for  the  armament  of  Inner  Mongolia, 
as  this  would  be  useless,  since  the  Chinese  are  unquestionably  superior 
in  military  strength  in  this  part  of  Mongolia.  The  arms  are  for  the 
protection  of  Khalkha  and  the  adjoining  districts  of  Western 
Mongolia,  for  which  purpose  the  Mongolians  can  reckon  on  our 
support. 


(47)     The  Russian  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  to  the  Russian  Diplomatic 
Agent  in  Mongolia.    Nov.  8-21,  1913.    No.  3179. 

To  impede  so  far  as  possible  the  export  of  foreign  goods  from 
China  to  Mongolia,  we  have  ordered  our  consuls  in  this  territory  to 
refuse  permission  for  the  transport  of  goods  on  the  Caravan  Road,^ 
justifying  this  measure  by  the  statement  that  an  autonomous  Mon- 
golia has  been  created  by  the  declaration  of  October  2Z,  with  regard 
to  which  commercial  transport  could  not  yet  he  regulated. 


(48)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Tokio  to  Sazonoff.  Telegram,  Nov.  26- 
Dec.  9,  1913.    No.  200. 

In  the  course  of  a  lengthy  conversation  with  Motono,  I  came 
to  the  conclusion  that  Japan  does  not  intend  to  make  us  concrete 
proposals  concerning  China.  His  statements  imply  tltat  Russia  and 
Japan  should  make  it  perfectly  plain  to  the  Chinese  Government  and 

*  So  far  as  the  United  States  and  Germany  were  concerned. 
'  Russia  and  Japan  had  set  up  a  sham  government  in  Mongolia. 
'  Thus  closing  the  "Open  Door." 


RUSSIA,  JAPAN  AND  UNITED  STATES  IN  CHINA      41 

the  other  Powers  that  they  both  possess  special  interests  in  Manchuria 
and  Mongolia,  which  they  in  no  case  intend  to  renounce.  Motono  is 
of  the  opinion  that  we  should  mutually  oppose  the  issue  of  further 
loans,  and  in  any  case  refuse  participation  in  these  loans,  and,  if 
possible,  induce  France  to  do  the  same.  May  China  be  left  to  her 
own  devices.^  In  all  other  matters  concerning  China,  Russia  and 
Japan  must  act  conjointly  with  France  and  England,  but  the  two  first- 
named  Powers  should  arrive  at  a  closer  agreement  between  themselves 
in  order  to  be  constantly  and  fully  informed  as  to  their  mutual  in- 
tentions and  views.  Motono  does  not  believe  that  the  new  form 
of  Government  in  Pekin  will  be  of  long  duration.  Replying  to 
my  question  what  intentions  Japan  harbours  concerning  Inner 
Mongolia  and  Southern  Manchuria,  he  said  the  annexation  of 
Southern  Manchuria  would  come  about  of  its  own  accord  in  due 
course,  and  it  was  not  necessary  to  hurry  about  it;  concerning  Mongolia, 
he  does  not  believe  any  definite  plans  to  have  been  formulated  at 
Tokio.^  All  in  all,  I  thought  the  Ambassador  very  reasonable,  which 
may  perhaps  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  it  was  found  impossible 
to  carry  out  the  project  of  enlarging  the  Japanese  Army,  which  was 
a  great  blow  to  the  military  party. 

(49)    Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Minister  at  Pekin.    Telegram,  Feb.  2A'March 
9,  1914.    No.  417. 

The  British  Government  has  brought  forward  the  question  of  a 
revision  of  our  Treaty  on  Tibet  in  the  sense  of  an  abrogation  of  the 
restriction  hampering  England  and  the  granting  of  freedom  of  action 
in  those  districts.^  I  replied  that  we  were  willing  to  enter  on  an  ex- 
amination of  this  question,  but  that  we  should  have  to  demand  other 
concessions  *  in  our  favour.  I  request  you  to  telegraph  me  whether 
you  consider  it  possible  to  demand  from  England  any  kind  of  com- 
pensation in  our  sphere  of  influence.  You  must  not  overlook  the  fact 
that  England  primarily  placed  herself  on  the  basis  of  mutual  recogni- 
tion of  Russia's  preferential  position  in  Mongolia  and  England's  in 
China.     We,  however,  refused  such  a  basis  of  negotiations,  pointing 

*  China  had  shown  that  this  was  her  desire. 
"Japanese  sang  froid. 

'  Result  of  the  aforementioned  "scientific  expedition." 

*  Meaning  the  usual  Sazonovian  "compensations." 


42  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

out  that  Russia  already  possessed  freedom  of  action  in  Mongolia 
when  we  concluded  the  Tibet  Treaty  with  England  in  the  year  1907. 

(50)  The  Russian  Minister  at  Pekin   to   Sazonoff.     Telegram,  Feb.  26- 
March  11,  1914.    No.  104. 

The  only  compensation  on  the  part  of  England  in  return  for  our 
recognition  of  her  freedom  of  action  and  her  privileged  position  in 
Tibet  to  which  I  could  point  would  be  her  recognition  of  our  ex- 
clusive sphere  of  influence  in  Northern  Manchuria,  Mongolia  and 
Western  China,  with  the  exception  of  Kashgar,  as  well  as  the  under- 
taking not  to  hinder  us  in  the  execution  of  our  plans  in  these  terri- 
tories, and  herself  to  pursue  no  aims  which  we  would  have  to  regard 
as  incompatible  zvith  our  interests.^  Should  this  present  an  acceptable 
basis  of  compensation,  then  the  English  might  perhaps  enter  into  a 
similar  undertaking  with  regard  to  the  Valley  of  Jansda. 

(51)  Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Minister  at  Pekin.     Telegram,  March  1-14, 
1914.    No.  471. 

On  careful  consideration  of  our  railway  policy  in  Manchuria 
we  think  it  necessary  to  obtain  a  promise  from  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment to  grant  Russia  the  preferential  right  of  construction  on 
the  following  lines: 

1.  Blagoweschtschensk-Charbin  with  a  branch-line  to  Tsitsi- 
kar. 

2.  Charbin-Boduno. 

3.  Inganoffpo-NanTian-Mun  on  the  lower  course  of  the  Sun- 
gari. 

4.  Tsitsikar-Boduno. 

5.  Branch  lines  to  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway  at  Barga.^ 
No  decision  has  been  arrived  at  on  the  financial  means  for  the 

construction  of  these  lines,  but  this  does  not  exclude  the  possibility  of 
forming  a  separate  company  similar  to  the  companies  of  England, 
France  and  Belgium,  and  of  carrying  out  the  construction  under  the 

*  Russia  traded  territories  to  Great  Britain  to  which  she  had  no  sound 
claims  and  vice  versa — a  fair  example  of  the  usual  sort  of  international  morality 
subscribed  to  in  those  days  and  by  these  governments.    See  Persia. 

'Russia  did  not  have  the  money  to  build  these  lines,  but  wanted  to  get  the 
concessions  to  bilk  the  Americans. 


RUSSIA,  JAPAN  AND  UNITED  STATES  IN  CHINA      43 

same  conditions  as  have  of  late  prevailed  in  the  case  of  railway  con- 
struction by  foreigners  in  the  interior  of  China. 

As  the  representatives  of  the  Great  Powers  secured  for  them- 
selves, simultaneously  with  the  railway  concessions  the  right  of  ex- 
ploiting the  natural  wealth  of  China,  the  Ministerial  Council  con- 
siders it  desirable  to  demand  from  the  Chinese  Government,  as  a  mat- 
ter of  principle,  their  undertaking  to  ensure  to  the  Russian  conces- 
sionaires the  right  of  exploitation  of  the  mountain,  forest  and  other 
wealth  attaching  to  the  above  lines. 

I  request  you  to  open  negotiations  on  these  lines  with  the 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  whilst  pointing  out  to  him  that  at 
present  we  only  wish  to  obtain  a  general  undertaking  in  the  above 
sense  from  the  Chinese  Government. 

(52)     The  Russian  Minister  at  Pekin  to  Sazonoff,     Telegram,  March  3-16, 
1914.     No.  116. 

Your  telegram  No.  471  received: 

I  have  spoken  to  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  according 
to  my  instructions  on  the  question  of  our  railway  constructions 
in  Manchuria.  He  promised  to  give  me  an  answer  after  a  Cabinet 
discussion  of  the  matter;  in  the  meantime  he  restricted  himself 
to  the  remark  that  no  reference  is  made  concerning  an  exploita- 
tion of  natural  wealth  in  the  other  agreements  dealing  with  con- 
struction of  railways,  with  the  exception  of  the  Shantung  Railway 
Treaty  with  the  Germans,  who  have,  however,  now  renounced  their 
rights  in  this  respect.^ 

*  This  chapter  should  explode  the  fables  circulated  in  the  Senate  of  the  United 
States,  at  the  time  the  "League  of  Nations"  was  debated,  that  the  Germans  had 
obtained  their  concessions  in  China  in  a  manner  and  by  means  and  methods  less 
moral  than  the  righteous  governments  who  tore  peace-loving  China  asunder, 
Japan  included. 


II 


RUSSIAN  AND  BRITISH   IMPERIALISM   IN   PERSIA 
(May  1909 — ^January  1912) 

The  Anglo-Russian  convention  of  1907  divided  Persia  into 
three  zones.  The  Northern  "zone  of  influence"  fell  to  Russia,  the 
Southern  to  Great  Britain,  and  a  narrow  strip  across  central 
Persia  was  known  as  the  "neutral"  zone.  Justification  for  the  act 
was  found  by  the  British  and  Russians  in  the  fact  that  Persia 
was  almost  insolvent,  and  needed  reforms  of  a  thorough-going 
kind.  Shah  Mahmed  AH  having  squandered  the  revenues  and 
wielded  the  heavy  hand  of  despotism  besides.  What  the  Shah 
did  not  need  for  his  own  extravagant  mode  of  living,  the  Persian 
nobles  and  privileged  classes  appropriated,  the  tax-collecting  satraps 
in  the  provinces  turning  over  to  the  central  government  only  such 
moneys  as  they  were  obliged  to  surrender. 

Persia,  then,  was  occupied  by  the  British  and  Russians  for  the 
sake  of  the  Persians  themselves;  such  was  the  claim.  As  a  mat- 
ter of  fact  nothing  was  further  from  the  truth.  Russia  had  looked 
upon  Persia  with  longing  eyes  for  many  years,  the  bolder  of  her 
governing  class  hoping  that  Russia  would  get  a  "window  on 
the  open  sea"  in  the  Persian  Gulf,  with  which  port  a  trans-Persian 
railroad  was  to  connect  Russia.  Persia,  also,  was  worth  while 
as  a  territory  to  be  exploited  commercially,  and  last  but  not  least, 
possession  of  Persia  meant  a  long  step  forward  in  getting  to 
India.  Russian  leaders  were  obsessed  with  the  idea  that  they  had 
a  "mission"  in  India.  The  Greater  Russia  of  which  they  on  the 
Neva  dreamed  was  to  include  all  of  Asia,  and  at  least  all  of  the 
Slav  countries  in  the  Balkans  and  Central  Europe. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  IN  PERSIA  45 

Great  Britain,  on  the  other  hand,  found  it  necessary  to  protect 
her  Indian  empire.  Hitherto  that  had  not  always  been  easy  in 
the  direction  of  Russia. 

Relations  between  Russia  and  Great  Britain  were  chronically 
bad.  Many  critical  incidents  and  crises  came  from  this.  Along 
the  border  of  Afghanistan,  trouble  was  the  order  of  the  day, 
and  the  building  of  the  Russian  railroad  line  toward  Herat  gave 
Great  Britain  the  cue  that  Russia  meant  to  have  a  contest  for  the 
future  control  of  India.  To  avert  that  was  considered  the  first 
duty  of  every  British  citizen  even.  While  the  population  of  India 
had  no  assurance  whatever  that  a  change  of  master  would  in  this 
instance  lead  to  better  conditions,  British  statesmen  had  to  con- 
sider that  the  Russians  could  make  fine  promises,  which  later 
they  need  not  keep,  once  the  yoke  of  the  Muscovite  was  upon 
India.  Subject  races  are  all  too  prone  to  listen  to  the  words  of 
the  tempter,  especially  when  they  have  reason  to  feel  that  things 
could  not  be  much  worse,  which  in  this  case  would  not  have  been 
a  good  reason,  taking  into  account  that  the  Russian  government 
of  those  days  was  an  institution  of  indifferent  quality,  to  say  the 
least. 

Russia  and  Great  Britain  had  another  reason  for  establishing 
themselves  in  Persia.  The  policy  of  "peaceful  penetration"  of 
the  Germans,  a  trade  matter  pure  and  simple,  had  been  very  suc- 
cessful throughout  Southwest  Asia.  Getting  the  markets  of  for- 
eign countries  is  a  relatively  new  conception  of  imperialism,  and  a 
comfortable  one.  The  process  is  not  expensive ;  as  a  matter  of  fact 
it  pays  for  itself  and  entails  no  great  diplomatic  and  military  risks, 
so  long  as  the  markets  do  not  have  to  be  defended  against  poli- 
tical encroachment,  as  was  to  be  the  case  as  soon  as  Persia  had 
been  divided. 

The  German  merchant  had  made  himself  many  friends  in  South- 
west Asia.  He  sold  cheaply  and  was  accommodating  in  the  mat- 
ter of  credit.  Likewise  he  bought  much  raw  material.  There  is 
no  doubt  that  in  the  course  of  two  or  three  decades  the  commercial 
prestige  of  the  Germans  had  grown  rapidly  in  the  Near  East. 
The  beginnings  of  German  commerce  had  been  humble  enough, 
and  as  yet  German  trade  equalled  by  no  means  the  volume  of 
business  of  the  British,  Russians  and  Austrians  in  the  Levant, 


46 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


but  it  was  increasing  rapidly — so  rapidly  in  fact,  that  Germ* 
thought  it  well  to  promote  a  number  of  railroad  developments  in 
the  Ottoman  empire,  of  which  the  Bagdad  railroad  was  the  most 
extensive,  and  in  point  of  view  of  international  relations  the  bes^ 
known.  ■ 

The  occupation  of  Persia  accomplished,  the  Russians  began 
to  feel  more  at  home  there  than  was  relished  by  the  British.  The 
government  in  London  had  placed  a  small  garrison  in  its  own 
zone  of  influence  to  protect  the  British  consulates,  while  the  Rus- 
sians undertook  to  occupy  several  Persian  towns  along  the  Cas- 
pian Sea.  Several  of  the  documents  deal  with  this,  the  British 
government  finding  occasion  to  complain  whenever  the  Russian 
troops — cossacks — were  charged  with  bad  conduct,  for  which  local 
conditions  offered  ample  opportunity,  seeing  that  some  of  the  Per- 
sians resented  the  occupation  of  their  country  by  foreign  troops. 

The  German  government  had  declared  its  disinterestedness 
when  the  division  of  Persia  into  zones  of  influence  was  under- 
taken, the  understanding  being  that  acquiescence  would  result  in 
a  free  hand  in  the  Bagdad  railroad  project,  to  which  Russia  and 
Great  Britain  had  objected  hitherto. 

Persian  financial  affairs  had  been  placed  in  the  hands  of  a 
financial  adviser — a  Frenchman  by  name  of  Bizot.  The  country 
needing  money  badly,  it  was  decided  towards  the  end  of  1909  to 
float  a  loan  in  Europe.  The  French  government  permitted  the 
quotation  of  this  loan  on  the  Paris  bourse,  after  an  agreement  had 
been  reached  with  the  Russians  and  British  that  seven  other 
Frenchmen  should  be  employed  in  the  administration  of  Persian 
finances.  Naturally,  the  French  investors  felt  that  this  would 
be  necessary.  The  Russian  and  British  governments  had  no  reason 
to  object,  seeing  that  they  were  the  political  masters  in  their 
zones  and  were  tied  to  France  the  one  by  a  definite  alliance,  the 
other  by  an  entente  just  as  efficacious.  But  the  German  govern- 
ment raised  objection,  on  the  ground  that,  placing  Persia's  finan- 
cial administration  entirely  in  the  hands  of  Frenchmen,  was  bound 
to  react  detrimentally  upon  German  and  other  foreign,  non- 
Entente,  commerce  and  interests. 

Germany  had  recognized  the  privileged  position  of  Russia  and 
Great  Britain  in  Persia,  but  was  not  willing  to  have  Persia  lose  the 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  IN  PERSIA  47 

last  vestige  of  sovereignty,  since  that  meant  that  German  trade 
might  be  entirely  excluded  from  the  kingdom,  considerable  dis- 
placement to  her  disadvantage  having  already  taken  place.  Nego- 
tiations resulted,  finally,  in  a  compromise  to  the  effect  that  the 
financial  administration  of  Persia  should  be  placed  in  the  hands  of 
nationals  of  neutral  states. 

The  subject  being  open  to  discussion  now,  feeling  went  so  far 
as  to  cause  the  British  to  veto  the  suggestion  that  Belgians  be  em- 
ployed— even  German  Swiss  were  not  thought  acceptable.  In  the 
end  the  United  States  State  Department  was  asked  whether  it 
would  have  objection  to  an  American  citizen  taking  the  office.  At 
first  the  Russians  did  not  object,  though  before  long  Sir  Edward 
Grey  had  to  advise  the  Russian  government  to  be  moderate  in  its 
objections  to  the  American  financial  counselor,  Mr.  Morgan 
Shuster. 

The  Persian  people  had  meanwhile  overthrown  the  old  govern- 
ment, had  established  a  parliament,  and  put  a  son  of  the  Shah  on 
the  throne ;  the  affairs  of  the  country  to  be  looked  after  by  a  regent 
until  such  time  that  the  boy  should  be  able  to  take  the  reins  of 
government  in  his  own  hands.  The  parliament  began  to  oppose  the 
plans  of  the  Russians  systematically,  and  had  occasion,  therefore, 
to  take  the  side  of  Mr.  Shuster,  who  seems  to  have  had  the  interests 
of  Persia  at  heart,  though  the  Russians  feared  that  he,  being  pro- 
British,  engaged  in  activities  designed  to  advance  the  cause  of 
Great  Britain  in  Persia  to  the  detriment  of  Russian  aspirations. 

For  a  while,  Mr.  Shuster  enjoyed  the  backing  of  the  British, 
but  Russian  pressure  was  such  that  Sir  Edward  Grey,  who  saw  inl 
Persia  the  very  pivot  of  the  Entente,  withdrew  his  support  from  the 
American  financial  adviser.  Sir  Edward  had  already  placated  the 
Russians  in  the  controversy  that  arose  when  Mr.  Shuster  asked 
the  military  attache  of  the  British  legation  at  Teheran,  Major 
Stokes,  to  take  in  hand  the  organization  of  a  sort  of  excise  police, 
without  which  it  would  have  been  difficult  to  collect  the  revenues 
that  were  needed  to  rehabilitate  the  Persian  state  financially. 
Grey  made  it  impossible  for  Major  Stokes  to  take  the  commission 
by  inducing  the  military  not  to  accept  his  resignation  from  the 
British  service.  In  the  end  Swedish  officers  undertook  the  organi- 
zation of  the  excise  police. 


48  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

Mr.  Shuster  passed  under  the  impression  that  the  Russians 
were  doing  everything  possible  to  make  his  work  as  difficult  as 
possible,  and  he  had  in  the  Persian  parliament  a  body  that  thought 
as  he  did.  There  was  much  friction,  and  the  Russian  government 
availed  itself  of  a  trivial  incident  to  force  the  issue.  It  sent  an  ulti- 
matum to  the  Persian  parliament  in  which  the  resignation  of  Mr. 
Shuster  was  demanded.  The  Persian  cabinet  and  parliament  re- 
jected the  demands  made  by  Sazonoff,  with  the  result  that  the 
Russians  threw  more  troops  into  Persia  and  had  several  con- 
tingents advance  upon  the  capital.  Ultimately  the  Persian  gov- 
ernment and  parliament  decided  that  the  dismissal  of  the  American 
financial  adviser  was  to  be  preferred  to  the  further  reduction  of 
Persian  sovereignty,  though  before  this  took  place  thousands  of 
Persians  had  been  butchered  by  the  Russians  with  a  callousness 
and  brutality  of  which  the  telegrams  of  the  Russian  vice-roy  in 
the  Caucasus  are  a  good  illustration.  This  punishment  was  visited 
upon  the  Persians,  despite  the  fact  that  Count  Benckendorff,  the 
Russian  ambassador  at  London,  had  to  go  on  record  as  follows: 

"This  is  all  the  more  deplorable  as  it  was  a  question  of  the 
peaceful  local  population  which  on  the  whole  had  behaved  with 
civility  towards  Russia." 

It  seems  that  in  the  operations  against  the  Persian  Fidais, 
guerillas  opposed  to  the  Russian  invasion,  no  distinction  was 
drawn,  as  is  shown  by  the  anxiety  expressed  by  Mr.  Barclay,  at 
that  time  the  British  minister  at  Teheran. 

Though  British  public  opinion  condemned  the  conduct  of  the 
Russians,  the  British  government  stood  idly  by.  Sir  Edward  Grey 
was  so  concerned  with  the  fate  of  the  Entente,  with  the  two  other 
members  of  which  he  had  no  definite  agreements  on  paper,  that 
he  condoned  everything  the  Russians  did,  even  though  the  British 
House  of  Commons  grew  very  tired  of  his  complacency  toward  a 
government  that  was  putting  Great  Britain  into  one  embarrass- 
ment after  another. 

The  British  public  could  not  understand  why  Grey  should 
constantly  espouse  the  cause  of  France  and  Russia  when,  seem- 
ingly, British  interests  were  not  directly  involved.  The  situation 
was  such  by  the  time  Mr.  Shuster  left  Persia  that  it  would  have 
taken  but  little  effort  to  persuade  British  public  opinion  into  a 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  IN  PERSIA  49 

rapprochement  with  Germany,  as  Count  Benckendorff,  Russia's 
able  representative  in  London,  had  cause  to  fear.  The  documents 
show  that  Grey  had  a  reason  of  his  own  "to  remain  in  the  camp  of 
the  Franco-Russian  alliance. 


(53)     Count  Benckendorff,  Russian  Ambassador  in  London,  to  M.  Iswolsky, 
Russian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.     Letter,  May  9-22,  1909. 

The  information  I  receive  from  all  available  sources  as  to  the 
internal  state  of  affairs  in  Persia  is  not  sufficiently  exhaustive  to 
permit  me  to  utter  any  positive  opinion  as  to  how  long  our  troops 
will  continue  to  remain  on  Persian  territory.^  Still,  the  said  in- 
formation is  fully  adequate  to  call  your  attention  to  the  serious 
political  side  of  this  question.  There  can  be  no  doubt  but  that  the  ap- 
pearance of  our  armed  forces  at  Tabriz  at  the  very  moment  de- 
sired, and  this  neither  too  early,  nor  too  late,  has  not  only  accom- 
plished its  end,  namely  to  re-establish  order  and  safety  in  the 
town,  but  that  thereby  also  our  prestige  has  been  increased  and 
the  last  doubts  as  to  our  real  intentions  been  dispelled,  as  the  ad- 
vice which,  conjointly  with  England,  we  have  given  to  the  Shah, 
has  thereby  been  strengthened. 

However,  I  fear  and  believe  that  this  good  impression  will  he  im- 
paired if  our  troops  are  left  in  Persia  longer  than  is  absolutely 
necessary.  In  the  country  itself  any  further  measures  taken  by  us 
would  be  looked  upon  with  suspicion  by  all  political  parties,  and 
this  suspicion  would  weaken  our  moral  influence,  and  we  should 
find  ourselves  in  a  very  involved  position;  Any  vigorous  measure 
taken  to  maintain  order,  which  would  be  entirely  justified  where- 
ever  our  interests  are  at  stake,  would,  if  continued  for  any  time 
longer  than  absolutely  required,  greatly  hinder  the  task  which, 
even  more  than  England,  we  have  set  ourselves  to  accomplish — 
namely  to  pacify  the  country  and  to  re-establish  a  normal  state  of  af- 
fairs at  Teheran. 

*The  Anglo-Russian  Convention  of  1907,  the  project  of  which  forms  first 
document  of  Book  Three,  divided  Persia  into  a  Russian  and  an  English  zone  of 
influence  and  a  neutral  zone. 


50  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


n 


It  is  obvious  that  the  presence  of  our  troops  in  Teheran  is 
bound  to  create  an  anti-European  feeling,  the  development  of 
which  might  unfavourably  affect  our  diplomatic  action.  The 
whole  appears  to  me  to  be  a  question  of  keeping  a  true  measure^ 
A  Russian  military  expedition  in  the  north  and  a  British  in  the  south, 
confined  both  locally  and  in  point  of  time,  would  certainly  prove  useful. 
The  conditions  under  which  England  has  had  to  act  at  Bushir 
are  obviously  much  easier,  still  the  order  to  withdraw  has  been  al- 
ready given,  as  Sir  Charles  Hardinge^  told  me.  To  recapitulate: 
My  idea  is  that  our  troops  ought  to  be  left  at  Tabriz  only  for  the 
length  of  time  they  are  actually  required  on  the  spot,  and,  for  the  rest, 
to  remain  strictly  true  to  the  principle  which  we  have  followed  up  to 
the  present,  to  intervene  with  an  armed  force  only  where  this  is  ab- 
solutely necessary, 

I  do  not  know  whether  the  moment  has  already  arrived,  but 
it  seems  to  me  that  a  sudden  and  complete  evacuation  might  have 
unfavourable  consequences.  The  best  way  to  create  a  favourable 
impression  in  Persia,  and  to  allay  all  suspicions  as  to  our  further  in- 
tentions, would  be,  in  my  opinion,  if  a  small  part  of  our  troops  were 
withdrawn  as  soon  as  the  necessary  order  had  been  re-established, 
and  only  a  part  left  behind  until  a  local  government  had  been 
formed;  this  detachment  would  then  have  the  character  of  a  mere 
guard  to  maintain  law  and  order.  The  complete  evacuation  would 
then  have  to  follow  as  soon  as  possible,  and  were  it  but  to  show 
that  Russia  and  England  are  acting  in  full  accord;  a  fact  which  I 
deem  absolutely  necessary  in  order  to  conduct  the  negotiations 
to  a  good  end,  which  pursue  no  other  object  than  to  re-establish  order 
in  Persia  and  to  maintain  Anglo-Russian  co-operation. 


(54)     The  Russian  Ambassador  in  London  to  Iswolsky.    Telegram,  May  21- 
June  3,  1909.    No.  77. 

Hardinge  is  very  much  disturbed  by  the  sharp  measures  taken  by 
us  at  Tabriz;  as  for  example,  the  destruction  of  dwellings.  He  is  ex- 
pecting questions  in  Parliament  which  might  prove  very  awkward  for 
the  Government. 


^  British  under-secretary  for  foreign  affairs. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  IN  PERSIA  51 

(55)     Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  in  London.    May  23-June  5,  1909. 
No.  969. 

Nicolson,  the  British  Ambassador,^  has  confidentially  communi- 
cated to  me  the  contents  of  two  telegrams  received  from  Grey. 
The  Minister  draws  attention  to  the  concern  caused  in  London  by 
actions  which  our  troops  are  said  to  have  committed  in  Tabriz.  He 
fears  that  the  political  understanding,  so  happily  established  between 
the  tivo  Governments,  might  suffer  in  consequence  and  that  the  British 
authorities  might  be  obliged  to  proceed  against  the  Shah  if  the  Rus- 
sian military  authorities  were  to  take  sides  against  the  Nationalists? 
He  deems  it  desirable  to  have  the  instructions  given  to  the  Russian 
general  repeated.  It  might  even  be  expedient  to  withdraw  a  part  of  the 
Russian  troops  from  Tabriz.  Grey  is  prompted  by  the  wish  to  main- 
tain the  closest  co-operation  with  Russia  in  all  Persian  questions.  He 
knows  well  that  this  is  likewise  the  desire  of  the  Russian  Government.  He 
would  sincerely  regret  if  he  were  unable  to  reply  to  any  questions  that 
might  possibly  be  put  to  him  in  the  House  to  the  effect  that  the  Rus- 
sian general  had  exceeded  his  instructions,  and  if  he  would  have  to 
admit  that  the  two  Governments  are  no  longer  acting  in  concert. 
He  trusts  that  the  detailed  reports  which  the  two  Legations  ^  have 
called  for  from  Tabriz  will  serve  to  clear  up  the  situation. 

I  have  not  failed  to  give  to  the  Ambassador  explanations  of  a 
reassuring  character.  The  Russian  troops  are  taking  no  sides 
against  the  Nationalists.  An  incident  has  taken  place,  it  is  true;  but 
there  is  no  need  to  exaggerate  its  importance.  It  is  true  that  the  Rus- 
sian general  has  considered  it  as  his  duty  to  resort  to  vigorous  measures 
to  put  down  deeds  of  violence,  of  pillaging,  and  of  provocation  of  our 
troops.^  A  special  Cabinet  meeting  will  take  place  on  Sunday 
night  when  this  incident  will  be  discussed,  prompted  by  the  de- 
sire to  avoid  a  misunderstanding  with  England.  //  necessary,  the 
orders  sent  to  General  Snarski  will  be  repeated.^  1  myself  am  of  the 
opinion,  and  I  shall  endeavour  to  have  it  accepted  by  the 
Cabinet,  that  the  number  of  our  troops  might  be  reduced  as  soon 

'At  Petrograd. 

*The  intention  was  to  keep  this  thoroughly  corrupt  monarch  in  power, 
although  the  people  had  risen  against  him.  The  partition  of  Persia  into  a  Rus- 
sian and  a  British  sphere  had  been  effected  with  the  connivance  of  the  Shah. 

'  The  British  and  Russian  Legations  at  Teheran. 

*  Further  on  it  is  shown  that  the  Persians  were  a  peaceful  people. 

'  Commanding  officer  of  the  Cossacks  who  were  involved. 


52  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

as  the  new  Persian  Governor-General,  recommended  by  Russu 
and  England,  has  been  appointed  for  Tabriz  in  the  place  of  the 
present  incapable  Vice-Governor,  and  as  soon  as  the  former  will 
have  had  the  possibility  of  taking  such  measures  as  to  guarantee 
the  personal  safety  of  the  Russian  subjects  and  of  the  other 
foreigners. 

As  regards  the  "Bast"  of  Sattar  and  Baghir  at  the  Turkish 
Consulate,  this  has  nothing  to  do  with  our  troops.  The  voluntary 
departure  of  these  two  persons  would  contribute  a  great  deal 
towards  the  re-establishment  of  order.  I  am  pleased  to  hear  that 
Grey  is  convinced  that  the  Russian  Government  is  desirous  of  main- 
taining a  good  understanding  with  England  in  all  Persian  questions. 

(56)     The  Russian  Ambassador  in  London  to  Iswolsky.    Letter,  May  25- 
June  7,  1909. 

The  moment  I  entered  today.  Grey  at  once  took  up  the  Persian 
question.  He  told  me  that  he  had  received  telegrams  from  Nicol- 
son  reporting  the  substance  of  the  interview  with  Your  Excellency 
— I  assume  it  is  the  same  interview  the  contents  of  which  you 
communicated  to  me  by  wire. 

Sir  Edward  told  me  that  he  wished  to  have  it  clearly  understood 
that  if  the  prolonged  presence  of  our  troops  in  Tabriz  disturbed  him, 
this  did  not  mean  tliat  the  British  Government  feared  any  strengthen- 
ing of  our  influence  in  North  Persia.  This  natural  influence  had 
been  taken  for  granted  in  the  Convention;  it  had  already  pre- 
viously existed,  and  England  was  far  from  offering  any  opposition 
thereto.  He  told  me  that  he  had  been  obliged  to  consider  recent 
events  mainly  from  a  parliamentary  point  of  view ;  i.e.  that  it  was 
important  for  him  to  be  able  to  make  definite  statements  in  reply 
to  any  definite  questions  that  might  be  put  to  him  in  the  House; 
that  he  must  be  able  to  state  that  not  only  the  methods  of  Russian  di- 
plomacy— with  regard  to  which  of  course  no  doubt  exists — but  also 
the  measures  taken  by  our  troops  corresponded  exactly  to  the  pro- 
gram agreed  upon  by  both  Governments,  and  that  consequently  both 
Governments  acted  in  complete  unison. 

This  was  the  case  when  the  Russian  troops  entered  Persian  terri- 
tory in  order  to  prevent  a  massacre  of  Europeans.'^  But,  he  added, 
'A  mere  pretext. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  IN  PERSIA  53 

his  position  would  be  rendered  very  difficult  if  the  Russian  force 
would  remain  on  the  spot  after  order  had  been  again  established, 
and  that,  since  such  a  contingency  had  not  been  provided  for  by 
our  Convention,  he  could  make  no  statement  to  the  contrary  and 
declare  that  the  permanent  Russian  occupation  was  the  result  of 
an  agreement. 

/  replied  that  the  recent  incidents  did  not  appear  to  me  to  be  suf- 
ficiently cleared  up,  and  that  I  trusted  the  reports  drawn  up  by  the 
two  Consuls  at  Tabriz  would  throw  fresh  light  upon  the  matter} 
Sir  Edward  mentioned  no  details,  and  I  thought  it  best  to  do  likewise. 
However,  I  added,  that  it  was  with  regret  that  the  fact  must  be  es- 
tablished that  Turkish  diplomacy  had  played  a  hand  in  this  matter. 
This  was  not  denied  by  Sir  Edward;  still  he  added  that  it  would  be 
far  easier  to  demand  of  Turkey  not  to  interfere  in  matters  relating 
to  Persia  after  our  troops  had  been  withdrawn, 

(57)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  June  17-30,  1909.    No.  114. 

Grey  told  me  today  that  he  entirely  understood  to  what  extent 
the  general  situation  had  been  complicated  by  the  threatening  action 
of  the  Bakhtiari,^  and  that  it  was  not  his  intention  to  discuss  the  pos- 
sibility of  an  armed  intervention  on  the  part  of  Russia  at  Teheran; 
he  merely  wished  to  direct  our  attention  to  the  fact  that  if  our 
troops  succeeded  in  re-establishing  order  at  Teheran,  the  last  rem- 
nant of  prestige  still  enjoyed  by  the  Persian  Government  was 
bound  to  vanish  even  after  the  introduction  of  reforms,  since  all  the 
disaffected  elements  in  the  country  would  maintain  that  the  Shah 
was  but  a  tool  in  the  hands  of  foreigners.  The  result  would  be  that 
troubles  would  not  cease,  while  in  the  provinces  the  independence 
of  local  districts  might  possibly  be  proclaimed  which,  of  course, 
would  be  extraordinarily  harmful  to  the  interests  of  the  two 
Powers. 

I  replied  with  two  arguments : 

1.)     The  position  of  the  Shah  would  have  to  be  considered  in 

a  different  light  now  that  he  had  accepted  the   advice   of   our 

Representatives,  than  at  the  time  when  he  refused  to  follow  our 

advice  or  did  not  fulfil  his  obligations ; 

*  The  excesses  of  the  Russian  troops. 

'  Persian  insurgents  opposed  to  Russian  occupation. 


54  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

2.)  That  Russia,  being  a  neighbouring  state,  was  under  special 
obligations. 

In  response  to  the  first  argument,  Grey  replied  that  all  faith 
in  the  Shah  had  already  been  shaken,  since  it  was  known  that  he 
had  decided  upon  reforms  only  in  consequence  of  the  pressure  which 
we  had  brought  to  bear  upon  htm,^  and  that  the  presence  of  foreign 
troops  would  undermine  the  remainder  of  his  prestige. 

As  regarded  our  peculiar  position  as  a  neighbouring  state,  he  did 
not  deny  the  importance  of  this  argument;  however,  he  trusted 
that  the  presence  of  our  troops  at  Tabriz  would  suffice  to  main- 
tain order  north  of  Teheran,  while  at  Teheran  itself  the  brigade 
of  Cossacks  ought  to  be  an  adequate  defence  against  the  Bakhti- 
ari.  He  repeated  that  he  was  only  communicating  his  personal 
opinions.  However,  I  believe  that  the  possibility  of  an  occupation 
of  Teheran  is  causing  him  much  greater  anxiety  than  he  wished  to 
admit  to  me} 

(58)    Iswolsky  to   the  Russian  Ambassador  in  London.     Telegram,  June 
l9'July  2,  1909.    No.  1149. 

The  British  Charge  d' Affaires  ^  has  communicated  to  me  the 
contents  of  a  telegram  from  Grey  in  which  expression  is  given  to 
the  uneasiness  created  by  the  sending  of  Russian  troops  to  Persia. 
He  is  of  Barclay's  *  opinion  that  these  troops  might  arouse  an  anti- 
Russian,  and  even  an  anti-European  movement,  and  that  the  Persian 
brigade  of  cossacks  commanded  by  Russian  officers,  is  adequate  to 
maintain  order  at  Teheran.  He  also  hints  as  to  how  dangerous  it 
would  be  for  us  to  assist  the  Shah  with  an  armed  force,  as  this  would 
direct  popular  resentment  against  Russia  and  might  induce  the  latter 
to  send  a  still  larger  number  of  troops  to  Persia.  This  would  neces- 
sarily oblige  England  to  abandon  the  policy  of  maintaining  an  under- 
standing with  Russia  in  Persia.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  allow  events 
to  take  their  course  and  confine  ourselves  to  the  protection  of  the 
life  of  the  Shah  whenever  this  may  become  necessary,  Russia  might  at 
a  later  date  take  up  a  more  favourable  position  in  Persia.    My  reply 

*A  contradiction. 

'Since  that  might  have  led  to  what  Grey  wished  to  prevent — the  annexation 
of  Northern  Persia  by  Russia. 
•  O'Beirne. 
•British  minister  at  Teheran. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  IN  PERSIA  55 

to  O'Beirne  was  that  we  have  not  the  least  intention  of  supporting 
the  Shah  by  force  of  arms,  nor  that  we  were  in  any  way  inclined  to 
interfere  in  the  internal  affairs  of  Persia} 

On  the  other  hand,  we  had  received  disquieting  news  from 
Teheran,  and  feared  that  the  attack  contemplated  by  the  Bakhti- 
ari  and  the  Kaswin  revolutionaries  upon  Teheran  would  doubt- 
less lead  to  serious  disturbances,  which  the  brigade  of  cossacks, 
at  present  extremely  weakened,  would  prove  entirely  unequal  to 
deal  with  and  that,  as  a  result,  the  safety  of  the  foreign  Legations, 
as  well  as  the  lives  of  the  Russian  and  other  foreign  subjects, 
and  all  foreign  enterprises,  were  exposed  to  a  great  peril.  In 
view  of  these  circumstances,  we  deemed  it  our  duty  to  consider 
measures  of  protection,  and  that  we  would  assume  a  grave  re- 
sponsibility if  we  fail  to  do  so. 

In  conclusion  I  gave  the  Charge  d* Affaires  the  assurance  that 
the  sending  of  our  troops  in  the  direction  of  Resht-Kaswin  was 
only  taking  place  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  our  interests, 
and  not  in  order  to  lend  aid  to  the  Shah,  whose  fate  most  probably 
will  have  been  decided  before  our  troops  reach  their  point  of  destina- 
tion. 

(59)     The  Russian  Ambassador  in  London  to  Iswolsky.     Telegram,  June 
20-Juiy  3,  1909.    No.  125. 

Your  telegram  No.  1145  received. 

The  extract  which  Grey  communicated  to  me  does  not  con- 
tain the  phrase ;  'Uo  abandon  the  policy  of  maintaining  an  understand- 
ing with  Russia  in  Persia/' 

The  words  quoted  are: 

.  .  .  "in  this  case  it  will  be  impossible  for  us  to  maintain  that 
the  policy  of  non-intervention  can  be  kept  up,  and  the  entire 
trend  of  the  policy  pursued  with  regard  to  Persia  will  have  to  be 
seriously  changed." 

The  meaning  of  this  sentence  is  not  quite  clear;  I  have  carefully 
abstained  from  reverting  to  it  in  the  course  of  yesterday's  interview. 
However,  the  whole  character  of  the  conversation  causes  me  to  be- 
lieve thai  the  interpretation  which  the  British  Charge  d' Affaires  gave 
to  the  phrase  was  somewhat  premature. 

*  Which  statement  was  at  variance  with  the  fact 


56 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


(60)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  June  SO-July  13,  1909.    No.  146. 

No.  1.  Grey  has  received  two  telegrams  from  the  British 
Minister  at  Teheran.  The  first  contains  the  information  that  Te- 
heran has  been  occupied  by  the  Fidais  ^  and  that  order  in  the  town 
has  been  hardly  disturbed,  while  expressing  the  apprehension  that 
Sablin,  our  Charge  d' Affaires,  is  thinking  of  calling  in  Russian 
cavalry.  Grey  wired  to  O'Beirne,  and  showed  me  the  telegram. 
He  is  extremely  alarmed  and  says  that  the  appearance  of  Russian 
troops  in  Teheran  would  in  any  case  be  looked  upon  as  an  armed 
intervention  in  favour  of  the  Shah,  while  it  is  just  the  general  mis- 
trust of  the  Shah  which  has  given  rise  to  the  present  occurrences. 
The  result  would  be  that  the  Shah  would  be  saved  solely  by  our  troops. 

Grey  is  of  the  opinion  that  this  would  mean  the  beginning 
of  the  general  breakdown  of  the  country  with  all  its  consequences. 
He  asked  mrC  whether  it  was  true  that  we  were  about  to  land  further 
troops  in  Persia.  He  fears  that  such  a  strong  Russian  army  would 
inflame  the  feelings  of  the  Moslims,  which,  as  it  is,  are  already  greatly 
excited.  I  replied  that,  according  to  my  view,  Sablin  was  only  calling 
in  Russian  cavalry  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  the  Legations  and 
the  European  institutions,  and  by  no  means  for  the  purpose  of  pro- 
tecting the  Shah's  Government. 

After  I  left,  Grey  received  another  telegram  which  he  sent 
me,  accompanied  by  a  note,  the  substance  of  which  I  am  wiring 
you  sub  2.  This  telegram  gives  some  details,  expresses  no  fear 
for  the  safety  of  the  foreigners,  states  that  no  plundering  took 
place  and  that  Sablin*s  fears  were  now  allayed. 

Grey  says  that  he  thinks  that  we  have  now  reached  the  critical 
moment  and  that  the  future  of  the  country,  and  the  part  we  are 
going  to  play  in  it,  will  depend  on  it.  The  situation  seems  to  me  to 
be  sufficiently  grave  to  induce  me  again  to  repeat  the  assurance  that 
our  troops  will  refrain  from  all  intervention,  and  will  merely  confine 
themselves  to  protecting  the  Legations  and  the  Europeans,  and  that 
the  num>ber  of  the  troops  ordered  to  Teheran  will  not  exceed  the 
number  absolutely  required.  The  fact  is  that  we  must  clearly  state 
the  task  of  our  troops  and  under  what  conditions  they  will  be  re- 
called.   This  is  a  point  which,  to  my  mind,  must  still  be  cleared  up  as 


*  Persian  revolutionary  forces. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  IN  PERSIA  57 

otherwise  all  faith — 1  do  not  wish  to  say,  in  our  Government,  but  at 
least  in  the  efficiency  of  our  policy  and  its  results — zvill  be  undermined. 
Grey  repeated  that  any  reinforcement  of  the  guards  for  the 
Legations  and  Consulates  were  entirely  justified.  /,  too,  believe 
that  we  are  approaching  the  critical  stage  and  that  any  intervention 
which  might  be  considered  as  taking  place  in  favour  of  the  Shah, 
would  burden  us  with  a  grave  responsibility. 

(61)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  June  SO-July  13,  1909.    No.  147. 

No.  2.    Enclosed  the  text  of  the  accompanying  note ; 

This  telegram  has  been  received  from  Barclay  since  last  I  saw 
you.  He  confirms  what  I  said.  I  feel  more  than  ever  that  the 
present  moment  is  the  critical  hour  for  Persia.  Moderation  and 
patience  are  certainly  required  in  order  to  giwe  the  rival  parties 
in  the  country  the  possibility  of  determining  for  themselves  the 
course  matters  are  to  take,  and  also  in  order  to  enable  a  re- 
establishment  of  normal  conditions  in  Persia,  in  which  case  the 
Russian  prestige  in  North  Persia  will  not  have  been  impaired, 
and  this  without  any  further  responsibilities  and  sacrifices  having 
been  assumed,  and  without  causing  the  collapse  of  Persia.  For 
any  interference  m  the  internal  quarrel  of  the  political  parties 
at  this  moment  must  bring  about  the  collapse  of  Persia. 

(62)  The  British  Ambassador  at   Constantinople   to   the  British  Foreign 
Office.    Telegram,  July  1-14,  1909. 

The  British  Consul-General  at  Bagdad  wires  me  that  he  had 
today  received  the  Mullah,  Mohammed-Khorassani,  the  son-in- 
law  of  Seyid  Abdullah,  and  Bebihany,  as  representatives  of  the 
Ulema.  They  are  prepared  to  promise  that  as  soon  as  the  Russian 
troops  are  recalled  from  Persia,  they  will  be  able  to  restore  order 
in  the  country,  and  they  implore  that  England  should  exert  all  her  in- 
fluence to  effect  this  end.  They  maintain  that  the  Russian  troops  are 
supporting  the  reactionary  party  ^  and  are  ill-treating  the  people,  who 
now,  owing  to  these  measures,  have  been  so  excited  they  are  no  longer 
amenable  to  friendly  counsels.    The  public  prayers  at  Kerbela  and 

*  The  party  of  the  Shah  who  had  surrendered  the  Persian  people  to  the  banks 
of  Paris  and  the  government  of  Russia  in  order  to  obtain  the  means  he  needed 
to  continue  his  riotous  living  and  prodigality. 


58  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

Nejaf  have  been  interrupted,  and  at  all  religious  ceremonies  an 
extraordinary  excitement  is  making  itself  felt.  Ulemas  have 
talked  about  going  to  Persia  in  order  to  call  upon  the  people  to 
revolt;  however  up  to  now  this  has  not  been  done.  As  far  as  I 
can  judge  from  here,  the  situation  is  becoming  critical,  and  a  solution 
will  only  he  found  after  the  Russian  troops  have  been  withdrawn. 

(63)     The  Russian  Ambassador  in  London  to  Iswolsky.    Letter,  July  7-20, 
1909. 

The  telegrams  of  the  "Times"  on  Saturday  morning  brought 
the  news  of  the  sudden  and  peaceful  solution  of  the  crisis  at  Te- 
heran. Your  Excellency's  telegrams  reached  me  yesterday  after- 
noon, after  Grey  and  Hardinge  had  already  left  town.  I  had  to 
do  the  same,  by  the  way,  in  order  to  spend  the  Sunday  in  the 
country,  at  Lord  Clarendon's  where  I  was  to  meet  the  King.'^ 

My  first  impressions  were  naturally  influenced  by  the  words 
of  the  King.  His  Majesty  said  to  me  that  things  could  not  have 
developed  more  auspiciously,  and  that  he  hoped  the  Valiagd 
would  be  proclaimed  Shah,  as  we  had  agreed  he  should,  and  that 
this  would  be  also  the  most  natural  course.  The  King  expressed 
the  hope  that  the  change  of  Government  would  take  place  as 
peaceably  as  possible. 

I  saw  Grey  yesterday.  He  told  me  that  he  was  satisfied.  So 
far  everything  was  going  well;  it  had  been  impossible  to  establish 
anything  of  a  lasting  nature  during  the  reign  of  the  deposed  Shah; 
he  had  forfeited  everybody's  confidence,  and  not  without  cause.  Sir 
Edward  told  me  that  he  appreciated  the  moderation  and  the  fore- 
thought exercised  by  the  Russian  Government  in  the  question  of  our 
troops;  he  knew  well  what  a  powerful  pressure  had  been  exerted 
at  Teheran  on  Sablin,  and  he  spoke  of  him  in  a  most  appreciative 
manner. 

"I  repeat,"  he  said,  "that  it  is  contrary  to  our  own  interests  if 
Russia  becomes  unpopular  in  North  Persia.  But  she  would  in 
any  case  have  become  so  had  her  prestige  merely  reposed  on  the 
force  of  arms,  which  would  have  been  very  dangerous." 

Sir  Edward  trusts  that  the  Shah  will  soon  have  crossed  the 
Russian  frontier,   even  if  persuasion  were   to   be  employed   to  ob- 

*  Edward  VII  of  England. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  IN  PERSIA  59 

tain  this  end;  he  thinks  that  the  presence  of  the  deposed  Shah 
will  merely  serve  to  disturb  everybody  and  call  forth  fresh  in- 
trigues which  are  always  very  dangerous  at  the  beginning  of  a 
new  reign.   .  .   . 

In  conclusion  Grey  repeated  that  he  noted  to  his  great  satis- 
faction that  the  solution  of  the  crisis,  provided  the  situation  were 
not  to  alter,  had  shown  to  the  whole  world  and  particularly  to 
certain  political  circles  in  London,  that  our  co-operation  in  Persia 
had  proven  effective  and  that  the  Anglo-Russian  Convention  had 
emerged  decidedly  strengthened  from  this  crisis.  The  joint  ef- 
forts made  by  both  Governments,  and  the  skill  displayed  by  both  our 
Representatives  at  Teheran,  he  added,  have  cut  the  ground  from  under 
those  people's  feet  who  again  began  to  attack  our  Convention  under  the 
pretence  that  the  Anglo-Russian  Convention  was  not  compatible  with 
British  interests;  an  exceedingly  small,  but  very  noisy,  group. 

I  replied  that  it  were  high  time  to  destroy  the  legend  of  Russia  har- 
boring any  idea  of  annexation,  and  to  understand  that  all  serious  minds 
in  Russia  reject  such  plans. 

(64)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Letter,  Aug.  3-16,  1909. 

Your  Excellency  is  already  informed  of  the  satisfactory  results 
of  the  conversations  which  M.  Iswolsky  has  had  with  the  British 
Ministers  during  Their  Majesties*  visit  to  Cowes. 

Apart  from  questions  of  a  more  general  nature,  a  fundamental 
understanding  concerning  the  Cretan  question  and  the  relations 
to  Turkey  has  been  easily  established.  In  this  present  letter  I  shall 
merely  confine  myself  to  communicate  some  details  with  regard  to 
Persian  affairs. 

With  reference  to  this  point  there  also  reigned  a  complete  agree- 
ment on  principle.  However,  it  was  a  question  of  solving  the  rather 
difficult  problem  under  what  conditions  our  troops  would  be  recalled.  In 
order  to  accelerate  this  measure,  the  London  Cabinet  brought  for- 
ward arguments  the  importance  of  which  could  not  be  denied,  how- 
ever, it  did  not  show  the  same  determination  as  on  former  occasions. 
Public  opinion  in  England  began  to  fear  that,  notwithstanding  good  in- 
tentions on  the  part  of  the  Russian  Government,  the  temporary  presence 
of  Russian  troops  might  actually  lead  to  the  permanent  occupation  of 


60  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

Persia,  which  might  have  re-opened  the  question  of  strategic  security 
of  the  Indian  frontier  and  would  have  paralyzed  the  effect  of  the 
Convention?  The  presence  of  our  troops  might  have  caused  the 
outbreak  of  a  spiritual  movement  far  beyond  the  regions  where  our 
troops  were  stationed,  a  movement  which  would  have  spread 
throughout  the  Orient,  and  chiefly  throughout  Turkey,  and  which 
would  have  threatened  both  our  own  as  well  as  British  interests. 
Besides,  this  would  have  produced  acts  of  animosity  against  Russia  in 
Persia  itself,  which  in  turn  would  have  led  to  further  suppressive 
measures  on  our  part. 

Without  denying  the  justification  of  these  considerations,  our 
Minister  succeeded  in  bringing  the  logical  proof  that  even  if  we 
were  now  able  to  withdraw  our  troops  they  would  perhaps  have 
to  enter  Persia  a  second  time,  and  that  a  second  withdrawal  would 
prove  much  more  difficult  than  the  first.  Grey  has,  by  the  way, 
admitted  that  any  fears  entertained  on  the  part  of  England  had 
been  disarmed  by  the  proof  of  disinterestedness  which  we  had 
given  by  keeping  our  troops  outside  of  the  gates  of  Teheran  during 
the  change  of  government.  This  part  of  the  conversation,  at  which 
Asquith,^  Sir  A.  Nicolson,  and  I  were  present,  was,  so  to  speak, 
merely  the  prelude  to  the  drawing  up  of  the  joint  program  to  be 
followed  by  us  in  the  future.  Grey  began  by  pointing  out  that 
Great  Britain,  naturally,  laid  weight  upon  preserving  her  prestige 
within  her  sphere  of  influence,  but  that  she  was  far  from  wishing 
that  the  Russian  influence  in  the  North  should  be  in  any  way  im- 
paired by  present  events;  that  it  was  in  England*s  own  interest 
that  the  Russian  prestige  which  had  always  existed,  even  before 
the  Convention  had  been  concluded,  be  maintained,  and  that,  con- 
sequently, the  Russian  Government  might  count  upon  Great  Britain's 
assistance  in  all  questions  in  which  Russian  interests  were  at  stake. 

Sir  Edward  cited  three  examples:  He  admits  that  the  foreign 
officers  in  Persian  service  can  only  he  Russians;  that  the  Russian 
governor  of  the  young  Shah  must  not  he  replaced  hy  an  Englishman, 
neither  hy  Lindley,  nor  any  one  else;  that  England  is  prepared  to  assist 
us  to  halk  Zilli's  intentions  to  take  possession  of  the  throne.     When 

*  Which  was  to  occupy  Russia  in  Persia  instead  of  Great  Britain's  Indian 
Empire. 

"British  prime  minister. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  IN  PERSIA  61 

Iswolsky  pointed  to  the  anomaly  of  a  Caucasian  revolutionary,  who 
was  a  Russian  subject,  acting  as  chief  of  the  Persian  police,  Grey  fully 
agreed. 

Various  questions  were  dealt  with,  inter  alia,  that  of  the  nation- 
ality of  the  financial  advisers  and  of  the  customs  officials.  However, 
the  solution  of  this  intricate  question  was  reserved  to  a  later  date 
after  considerations  of  a  more  negative  nature  had  shown  that  our 
views  were  in  complete  agreement. 

As  regards  the  administration  of  the  customs.  Grey  thought  it  would 
he  simplest  if  the  mortgaged  custom  house  offices  in  the  North  were 
placed  under  Russians,  and  those  in  the  South  under  Englishmen.  But 
he  subsequently  himself  raised  the  objection  that  such  a  scheme  would 
look  too  much  like  a  partition  of  Persia. 


(65)     Iswolsky   to   the  Russian  Ambassador  in  London.     Telegram,  Jan. 
8-21,  1910.    No.  3S. 

The  German  Ambassador^  informed  me  in  the  name  of  his 
Government  that  the  German  Legation  at  Teheran  had  learned 
that  Russia  and  England  had  resolved  to  admit  only  French  subjects, 
besides  Russian  and  British  subjects,  to  the  Persian  service  as  advisers. 
Count  Pourtalcs  has  been  instructed  to  declare  that  the  German  Gov- 
ernment was  fully  prepared  to  acknowledge  the  privileged  position  of 
Russia  and  England  in  Persia,  but  that,  on  the  other  hand,  it  would 
have  to  insist  that  no  privileged  position  were  granted  to  the  nationals 
of  a  third  Power  to  the  prejudice  of  German  nationals.'^ 

I  replied  that  I  would  make  the  necessary  investigations  and 
would  then  give  him  an  exact  reply.  The  fact  is  that  I  deem  it 
proper  before  discussing  the  matter  any  further  with  Pourtales 
to  secure  absolute  unanimity  with  the  London  Cabinet,  to  which 
probably  a  similar  question  will  have  been  addressed,  and  I  re- 
quest you  to  ask  Grey  what  answer  we  ought  to  give  to  the  Ger- 
man Government. 

For  our  part,  we  consider  it  necessary  to  reply  as  follows: 

*  Count  Pourtales,  at  St.  Petersburg. 

'The  objection  of  the  German  government  was  based  on  the  fear  that  abso- 
lute control  of  the  finances  of  Persia,  revenues  and  expenditures  alike,  by  France, 
Russia  and  Great  Britain  would  lead  to  the  exclusion  from  Persian  markets  of 
German  merchandise,  as  was  the  intention — proven  hereinafter. 


62  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

"The  German  inquiry  has  probably  been  occasioned  by  the 
fact  that  the  Persian  Government  is  thinking  of  appointing  some 
Frenchmen  as  assistants  to  Bizot.^  This  question  was  raised  al- 
ready in  January  last  year,  when  the  Persian  Government,  without 
the  knowledge  of  Russia  and  England,  addressed  itself  directly 
to  the  French  Government  with  the  request  to  invite  some  French- 
men to  come  over  to  Persia  to  act  as  assistants  to  the  above- 
mentioned  financial  adviser.  Upon  inquiry  on  the  part  of  the 
French  Government,  Russia  and  England  replied  that  they  had 
no  objection  to  this  request  on  the  part  of  the  Persian  Govern- 
ment, since  it  was  but  natural  that  Bizot  should  prefer  his  own 
countrymen. 

"Probably  the  same  measure  is  now  being  considered.  It  is  not 
a  question  of  the  appointment  of  any  other  foreigners  and  there 
has  never  been  any  question  of  an  agreement  between  Russia  and 
England,  such  as  Count  Pourtales  appeared  to  have  in  mind,  to 
permit  only  the  appointment  of  Frenchmen  as  advisers. 

''We  are  pleased  to  learn  that  the  political  precedence  of  Russia 
and  England  in  Persia  is  acknowledged  by  the  German  Government, 
and  we  can  only  declare  that  when  it  comes  to  a  question  of  appoint- 
ing other  than  British  or  Russian  nationals  to  official  positions  in 
Persia,  we  have  no  intention  to  grant  any  privileges  whatsoever  to 
the  nationals  of  any  third  Power,  Having  regard  for  the  fact  that  the 
appointment  of  advisers  is  a  political  question,  since  it  relates  to  the 
administrative  organisation  of  Persia,  and  as  moreover  Russia  and 
England  are  the  sole  creditors  of  Persia  and  this  to  a  considerable  ex- 
tent, both  these  Powers  have  the  absolute  right  to  demand  that  the 
Persian  Government  shall  appoint  foreign  advisers  only  upon  a  previ- 
ous understanding  having  been  arrived  at  with  Russia  and  England.'' 

Kindly  let  me  know  Grey's  reply. 

(66)     The  Russian  Ambassador  in  London  to  Iswolsky.     Telegram,  Jan. 
13-26,  1910.    No.  6. 

Your  telegram  No.  38  received. 

In  reply  to  my  communication.  Grey  handed  me  the  following 
memorandum : 

*The  intention  was  to  place  the  control  of  Persia's  finances  entirely  in  the 
hands  of  a  French-managed  sort  of  super-ministry. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  IN  PERSIA  63 

"It  is  true  that  the  request  to  nominate  advisers  was  addressed 
directly  by  the  Persian  Government  to  the  French  Government 
in  January  1909,  and  that  both  Powers  (i.e.  Russia  and  England) 
confined  themselves  to  simply  informing  the  French  Government 
that  they  would  raise  no  objections.  It  would  however  he  diffi- 
cult to  maintain  as  is  stated  in  the  Russian  draft,  that  the  question 
of  the  appointment  of  other  foreigners  had  not  been  raised,  for  one  of 
the  terms  of  the  10  million- francs  loan  expressly  provides  that  the 
Persian  Government  shall  immediately  request  the  French  Government 
to  appoint  seven  additional  officials.^ 

The  German  Government  would  doubtless  hear  of  these  appoint- 
ments, as  also  of  the  pressure  brought  to  hear  upon  Persia  on  this 
occasion  by  the  two  Governments,  and  Germany  would,  as  a  result, 
have  cause  to  complain  that  the  assurances  given  her  had  not  been 
kept," 

Grey  therefore  submits  to  Your  Excellency  the  following  draft 
for  a  reply: 

''The  Russian  Government  is  gratified  to  learn  that  Germany  ac^ 
knowledges  the  privileged  position  of  Russia  and  Great  Britain  in 
Persia. 

"Russia  assumes  that  the  inquiry  made  by  the  German  Gov- 
ernment refers  to  the  appointment  of  a  French  treasurer-general 
and  an  inspector  of  finances,  which  took  place  in  1909.  The  Rus- 
sian Government  desires  to  point  out  that  these  appointments  on 
the  part  of  the  Persian  Government  were  made  upon  the  recom- 
mendation of  Bizot,  the  financial  adviser,  and  that  they  were 
merely  confirmed  by  Russia  and  Great  Britain.  It  is  only  natural 
that  Bizot  should  give  the  preference  to  French  collaborators,  but 
there  does  not  exist  any  understanding  between  Russia  and  Great 
Britain  with  regard  to  any  restriction  in  the  appointment  of  foreign 
advisers  whenever  these  happen  to  be  neither  Russians  nor  Englishmen. 
The  right  of  the  Persian  Government  to  appoint  whomsoever  it  pleases 
to  offices  in  its  own  administration  is  of  course  undeniable,  but  Rus- 
sia and  England,  being  neighbours  of  Persia,  and  also  being  her  credi- 

'The  loan  was  being  raised  in  France  and  constituted  the  share  of  France 
in  the  further  economic  exploitation  of  a  people  reduced  to  beggary  by  their 
extravagant  government.  The  loan  was  secured  by  Persian  revenues,  and  made 
France  an  interested  party  to  Russo-British  action  in  Persia. 


64  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

tors,  have  special  interests  which  give  them  the  right  to  demand  that 
appointments  of  the  said  character  be  first  submitted  to  their  approval." 
Grey  adds  that  he  had  not  yet  received  any  similar  inquiry  on 
the  part  of  the  German  Government ;  should  however  such  an  in- 
quiry be  made  he  will  reply  in  accordance  with  the  above,  pro- 
vided it  meets  with  your  approval. 

(67)  Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  in  London.    Telegram,  Jan.  18- 
31,  1910.    No.  98. 

Your  telegram  No.  6  received. 

No.  1.  Grey's  draft  makes  no  mention  of  the  very  important  point 
of  the  political  nature  of  the  post  of  a  foreign  adviser.  We  attach 
much  particular  importance  to  this  point,  because  the  German  Gov- 
ernment expressly  declared  that  the  objects  which  it  pursues  in  Per- 
sia are  of  a  merely  economic  and  not  of  a  political  nature.^  Besides, 
this  draft  does  not  lay  sufficient  stress  on  the  difference  existing 
between  officials  at  the  head  of  various  departments — and  this  is 
obviously,  what  the  Germans  appear  to  understand  by  the  term 
"adviser" — and  the  seven  Frenchmen  who  are  now  to  be  appointed 
as  Bizot's  assistants.  We  have  consequently  made  some  altera- 
tions in  the  text  proposed  by  Grey. 

You  will  receive  our  counter-draft  sub  No.  2. 

(68)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Jan.  18-31,  1910.    No.  99. 

No.  2. 

^'The  Russian  Government  is  pleased  to  learn  that  Germany 
acknowledges  the  special^  position  held  by  Russia  and  Great  Britain 
in  Persia.  It  assumes  that  the  German  Government  has  in  mind 
the  intended  appointment  of  seven  Frenchmen  to  act  as  assistants 
to  Bizot. 

"With  regard  to  this  point  it  must  be  borne  in  mind,  that  in 
January  1909,  the  Persian  Government,  acting  on  Bizot's  advice 
addressed  itself  directly  to  the  French  Government  in  order  to 
request  that  two  Frenchmen  be  appointed  to  act  as  assistants 
to  the  financial  adviser,  and  that  Russia  and  England,  being  com- 
municated with  by  France,  gave  their  consent,  as  it  appeared  but 

*  In  this  case  the  same  thing  under  two  different  labels. 

'Grey's  "privileged"  position  was  not  strong  enough  for  Iswolsky. 


I 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  IN  PERSIA  65 

natural  that  Bizot  should  prefer  to  have  his  own  countrymen  to 
act  as  his  collaborators.  The  question  at  present  is  to  increase 
the  number  of  the  assistants  to  the  financial  adviser  to  seven. 

"As  regards  the  principle  of  appointing  foreigners  as  advisers 
to  the  various  administrative  departments,  it  may  be  said  that 
this  point  has  not  yet  been  raised.  In  any  case,  however,  no  un- 
derstanding has  yet  been  arrived  at  between  Russia  and  Great  Britain 
in  which  the  appointment  of  foreigners,  other  than  Russian  and  Eng- 
lish subjects,  is  in  any  way  restricted.  The  right  of  the  Persian 
Government  to  select  for  itself  the  persons  it  intends  to  appoint, 
is  undeniable;  however  it  must  be  considered  that  the  question  of 
these  advisers  is  an  entirely  political  one,  since  it  relates  directly  to 
the  administrative  organisation  of  Persia,  and  that  Russia  and  Eng- 
land, being  neighbouring  States  and  chief  creditors  of  Persia,  possess 
special  rights  which  entitle  them  to  demand  that  appointments  of  such 
a  character  be  first  submitted  to  them  for  their  approval/' 

(69)     The  Russian  Ambassador  in  London  to  Iswolsky.     Letter,  Jan.  20- 
Feb.  2,  1910. 

Grey  being  absent,  I  have  sent  him  a  memorandum  containing 
the  reply  which,  according  to  your  telegram  No.  98,  you  intend 
to  give  to  Count  Pourtales.  Sir  Charles  Hardinge  was,  by  the 
way,  rather  disconcerted  by  the  step  taken  by  Germany,  and  he 
has  subsequently  told  me  that  the  reply  drawn  up  by  you  appears 
to  him  personally  to  be  very  opportune. 

When  I  saw  Grey,  he  practically  said  the  same  thing ;  however 
he  added  that,  even  though  the  statement  made  by  Count  Pourtales 
were  perfectly  gratifying,  inasmuch  as  it  expressed  the  acknowledge- 
ment of  the  special  interests  which  Russia  and  Great  Britain  possessed 
in  Persia,  the  question  on  the  other  hand  was  being  shifted  on  to  a 
peculiarly  delicate  ground  which  made  argumentation  rather  difficult. 
He  thinks  rather  rightly  considered  the  words  used  by  the  Ger- 
man Ambassador  mean:  "We  acknowledge  the  privileged  position 
enjoyed  by  the  Russians  and  British,  but  as  soon  as  other  nationals 
enter  into  question  they  must  all  be  treated  equally." 

This  principle,  Sir  Edward  maintains,  may  be  easily  defended  be- 
cause it  is  not  unjustified,  and  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  difficult  to  as- 
sail,  though  the  negotiations  relating   to   the  loan   and  even   to   the 


66  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

advance  payment  of  400,000i  stlg.  prove  that  we  are  unable  to  uphold 
this  principle} 

At  the  same  time  he  handed  me  a  counter-draft,  remarking  that 
it  appeared  to  him  safer  not  to  pretend  that  the  question  of  the  appoint- 
ment of  new  foreign  officials  had  not  already  been  raised. 

(70)     Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  in  London.     Letter,  Feb.  25- 
March  10,  1910. 

From  the  enclosed  copy  of  a  telegram  received  from  our  Minis- 
ter  at  Teheran  you  will  learn  that  the  appointment  of  seven  French- 
men to  offices  in  the  Persian  Ministry  of  Finance  is  troubling  the 
German  Minister  at  Teheran  who  looks  upon  this  step  on  the 
part  of  the  Persian  Government  as  incompatible  with  German  in- 
terests. From  another,  very  secret  source,  I  learn  that  Count 
Quadt  considers  this  appointment  as  a  direct  threat  to  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  ''open  door,"  to  the  prejudice  of  Germany  and  of 
all  other  nations  engaged  in  commerce  with  Persia,  and  that  he, 
moreover,  considers  some  other  conditions,  which  we  and  Eng- 
land have  put  to  the  Persian  Government  in  connection  with  the 
advance  payment  of  10  million  francs,  as  a  violation  of  Persia's  in- 
dependence  and  this  without  offering  any  compensations  in  favour  of 
Germany. 

He  has  consequently  advised  the  Berlin  Cabinet  to  demand  of 
us  and  of  England  that  our  conditions  of  controlling  the  Persian 
finances  be  cancelled,  and  that  the  contents  of  all  our  other  condi- 
tions be  communicated  by  us.  I  have  to  remark  in  this  connection 
that  since  we  have  given  Count  Pourtales  the  reply  revised  in 
accordance  with  my  telegram  No.  99,  no  further  communication 
has  been  received  from  the  Berlin  Cabinet. 

If  such  further  communication  should  still  come,  I  have  the 
intention  to  repeat  the  reply  already  given  and  in  addition  to  point 
out  that  even  now  other  foreigners,  besides  Frenchmen,  had  been 
appointed  to  Persia,  as  for  example  Belgians,  who  have  charge 
of  the  entire  administration  of  the  customs;  and  I  shall  categori- 
cally deny  that  we  were  at  any  time  disposed  to  infringe  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  "open  door"  in  Persia. 

*The  principle,  though  not  "unjustified"  and  "difficult  to  assail"  could  not  be 
upheld  because  of  an  advance  payment  of  £400,000. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  IN  PERSIA  67 

If,  hereupon,  the  German  Government  should  mention  the 
other  conditions  in  connection  with  the  advance,  I  have  no  objec- 
tion to  inform  the  German  Government  confidentially  of  their  na- 
ture; but  I  shall  lay  stress  on  their  political  nature  and  maintain  that 
they  were  never  intended  to  be  in  any  way  prejudicial  to  the  economic 
interests  of  the  other  Powers  in  Persia,  which,  in  their  turn,  could  not 
but  acknowledge  the  peculiar  position  and  the  special  privileges  due 
to  Russia  and  England  in  that  country. 

It  appears  to  me  however  necessary  to  arrive  first  of  all  at  an 
understanding  with  England,  and  I,  therefore,  request  you  to 
make  the  contents  of  this  letter  the  subject  of  a  conversation  with 
Sir  Edward  Grey. 

(71)     The  Russian  Ambassador  in  London  to  Iswolsky,     Telegram,  March 
2-15,  1910.    No.  51. 

Your  letter  No.  171  received. 

Its  contents  have  already  been  discussed  by  wire,  and  I  shall 
therefore  confine  myself  to  recapitulate  Grey's  views  briefly: 

He  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  negotiations  relating  to  the  loan  should 
be  concluded  with  all  speed  in  order  to  prevent  any  interference  on 
the  part  of  Germany.^  He  believes  that  our  arguments  in  favour  of 
the  appointment  of  Frenchmen  lack  a  solid  foundation,  since  the  ap- 
pointment neither  of  British  nor  of  Russian  subjects  was  con- 
templated. 

Grey  accordingly  believes  that  any  such  condition  should  be 
dropped.  Bizot  might  choose  his  collaborators  from  among  the  na- 
tionals of  other  countries,  which  are  not  Great  Powers.  Grey  fears 
very  much  that  the  arrival  of  Russian  reinforcements  in  Persia  will 
create  an  impression  extremely  unfavourable  to  the  conclusion  of  the 
loan.  He  repeated  that  he  saw  no  other  solution  but  that  we  recall 
our  Kaswin  division,  since  Teheran  is  not  at  all  threatened. 

As  to  the  question  of  communicating  the  terms  of  the  loan 
to  Germany,  Grey  would  like  to  think  it  over  till  to-morrow.  He 
says  that,  personally,  he  also  did  not  mind  if  Germany  came  to 
know  these  terms,  but  he  fears  that  Germany  wants  to  be  informed 
of  these  terms  through  the  usual  diplomatic  channel  in  order  to 

*  The  intention  was  to  place  Germany  before  a  fait  accompli. 


68  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


I 


raise  other  points,  such,  for  example,  as  the  question  of  the  rail- 
ways. The  manner  in  which  the  question  has  been  put  actually 
troubles  Grey  more  than  the  matter  itself.  Grey  informed  me  of 
a  step  made  by  the  German  Ambassador  here.  Details  will  fol- 
low by  letter. 

(72)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  March  3-16,  1910.    No.  52. 

Continuation  of  my  telegram  No.  51. 

From  the  standpoint  of  principle,  Grey  has  no  objections  to 
offer  against  the  terms  of  the  Persian  loan  being  confidentially 
communicated  to  the  Berlin  Cabinet.  In  his  opinion,  however, 
such  a  communication  contains  a  certain  danger.  Such  an  in- 
quiry on  the  part  of  Germany  seems  to  indicate  that  the  Berlin 
Cabinet  has  the  intention  of  raising  objections  to  one  or  the  other 
term  of  the  loan,  of  which  it  has  probably  already  been  informed 
by  the  Persian  Government,  and  that  this  step  signifies  only  the 
beginning  of  further  developments.  He  considers  as  very  likely 
that  the  German  Government  will  open  the  question  of  railway 
constructions  in  Persia,  and  Grey  deems  this  question  to  be 
eminently  important  with  regard  to  our  Convention.  Grey  asked 
me  to  submit  to  you  all  these  considerations. 

(73)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Letter,  March  3-16,  1910. 

Grey  gave  me  the  following  details  about  his  conversation 
with  the  German  Ambassador,  Count  Metternich. 

The  language  used  by  Metternich  was  of  a  far  more  hesi- 
tating nature,  than  that  of  Count  Pourtales  seems  to  have  been. 
Speaking  in  the  name  of  his  Government,  Count  Pourtales  pri- 
marily declared  that  Persia  owed  Germany  10,000  pounds  sterling 
and  that  it  would  be  no  more  than  right  if  the  advance  payment 
were  employed  to  settle  this  debt.  In  this  connection,  he  referred  to 
the  fact  that  the  British  Government  was  making  payments  to 
Persia,  and  that  in  this  way  England  was  getting  back  the  sums 
due  her,  whereas  Germany  disposed  of  no  such  means. 

Grey  replied  that  the  Ambassador  was  mistaken.    England  was 
making  no  payments  whatsoever  to  Persia,  and  the  amount  due 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  IN  PERSIA  69 

her,^  and  even  the  interest  thereon,  were  in  no  way  affected  by 
the  grant  of  an  advance,  since  the  latter  was  intended  to  serve 
exclusively  to  cover  the  most  pressing  needs  of  the  Persian  ad- 
ministration;  this  might  be  perhaps  the  case  in  the  event  of  a 
bigger  loan,  but  it  was  not  the  case  at  present. 

Thereupon,  Metternich  mentioned  the  circumstance  that  the  grant 
of  an  advance  would  lead  to  the  appointment  of  foreigners,  and  that 
in  such  a  contingency,  Germany,  by  virtue  of  the  principle  of  main- 
taining the  ''open  door,"  could  not  permit  German  nationals  to  be 
over-looked. 

Grey  answered  that  in  reality  it  was  not  a  question  of  ap- 
pointing new  foreign  officials,  who  were  already  employed  in 
Persia,  but  that  it  was  merely  a  question  of  providing  some  as- 
sistants for  Bizot,  who,  of  course  would  be  French,  like  himself. 

MetternicWs  answer  was  that  it  was  just  this  very  appointment 
of  Frenchmen  which  the  German  Government  had  in  mind  since  by 
such  means  the  Persian  finances  were  coming  under  exclusive  French 
control. 

This  led  Grey  to  say  that  in  any  case  the  principle  of  the  "open 
door"  did  not  appear  to  him  to  be  in  any  way  infringed. 

Grey  then  communicated  to  me  the  personal  considerations 
which  formed  the  subject  of  my  telegram  of  yesterday.  He 
thinks  we  should  no  longer  insist  on  this  particular  condition.  If  it 
were  a  case  of  Russian  or  British  subjects  we  would  stand  on  safe 
ground.  The  political  situation  and  British  capital  would  justify  our 
claiming  this  privilege.  But  things  are  different  seeing  that  it  is  a 
question  of  Frenchmen,  a  selection  which  actually  excludes  the  Ger- 
mans, who  are  therefore  not  being  treated  in  the  same  way  as  other 
nationals.     Grey  does  not  think  that  our  arguments  are  plausible. 

In  his  opinion,  the  situation  at  Teheran  may  become  critical, 
and  it  is  therefore  necessary  to  bring  the  negotiations  with  re- 
spect to  the  loan  to  as  speedy  a  conclusion  as  possible.  What  he 
considers  to  be  the  main  obstacle  is  the  presence  of  our  troops  at  Kas- 
win.  At  least  it  appears  to  him  doubtful  whether  the  negotiations 
will  lead  to  any  result  while  our  troops  remain  there  without  their 
presence  being  in  any  way  warranted  by  the  prospect  of  an  outbreak 

*  England. 


70  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


I 


of  disturbances  either  at  Kaswin  or  at  Teheran.^  I  said  in  reply 
that  it  would  prove  difficult  to  raise  this  question  while  the  nego- 
tiations were  in  progress.  Sir  Edward  admitted  this;  still  he  thougJit 
this  might  be  done  by  a  certain  ''dexterity''  at  Teheran:  our  joint  in- 
terests were  after  all  more  important  than  everything  else, 

(74)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Letter,  March  3-16,  1910. 

In  the  course  of  yesterday*s  confidential  conversation  with 
Grey,  I  told  him  that  you  thought  it  probable  that  the  German 
Government  would  express  a  desire  of  being  informed  of  the 
stipulations  which  Russia  and  England  had  made  in  granting  a 
loan.  Sir  Edward  replied,  somewhat  hesitatingly,  that  he  had 
on  the  whole  no  objections  to  offer,  but  that  he  would  think  the 
matter  over,  and  he  asked  me  to  call  upon  him  again  to-day.  He 
has  just  now  declared  to  me  that,  on  principle,  he  had  no  objec- 
tion, since  he  deemed  it  more  than  probable  that  Germany  had  already 
been  informed  of  the  terms  by  the  Persians. 

But  it  is  this  very  assumption  which  calls  forth  the  following 
considerations. 

If  Germany  already  knows  the  terms,  then  it  is  now  obviously 
prompted  by  the  desire  to  raise  objections  against  the  one  or  the 
other  of  the  conditions,  and,  to  this  end,  it  must  be  informed  of 
them  through  the  official  channel.  This  is  presumably  the  inten- 
tion of  Germany,  and  the  condition  against  which  Germany  will 
protest  is,  as  Grey  believes,  probably  the  question  of  the  con- 
struction of  railways  in  Persia. 

"You  will  concede  the  huge  importance  of  this  point,"  said 
the  Minister,  "we  have  devoted  so  much  care  to  the  conclusion 
of  our  Conventions  in  order  to  safeguard  our  own  interests  and 
not  those  of  Germany;  German  railway  lines  in  Persia  would 
render  the  value  of  our  Convention  questionable." 

Sir  Edward  made  no  further  comment,  but  the  meaning  of 
his  words  is  perfectly  clear.  This  was,  moreover,  confirmed  by 
Hardinge  whom  I  called  upon  after  leaving  Grey. 

*Grey  did  not  like  the  political  aspect  of  the  presence  of  Russian  troops  in 
Persia.  The  British  parliament  wanted  to  know  what  they  were  there  for,  since 
Persia  was  quiet. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  IN  PERSIA  71 

Sir  Charles  said : 

"I  think  it  is  very  dangerous." 

Before  I  left  his  room,  Sir  Edward  said  that  he  must  repeat  that 
it  was  urgently  necessary  to  bring  the  negotiations  at  Teheran  to  as 
quick  a  conclusion  as  possible.  According  to  the  information  he  had 
received  our  troops,  which  were  advancing  on  Tabriz,  had  already 
returned  to  Jul  fa.  But  the  perilous  point  is  Kaswin  upon  which  the 
success  of  our  negotiations  depends. 


(75)     Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  in  London.     Telegram,  March 
3-16,  1910.    No.  339. 

I  am  wiring  you  the  text  of  a  Memorandum  received  from 
Germany,  and  I  request  you  to  ask  Grey  whether  a  similar  step 
has  been  taken  in  London.  We,  for  our  part,  consider  the  Ger- 
man communication  rather  an  attempt  to  induce  us  to  renew  ne- 
gotiations relative  to  the  Bagdad  Railway,  than  a  serious  attempt 
on  the  part  of  the  German  Government  to  intervene  in  the  Per- 
sian question.  Nevertheless,  we  shall  have  to  give  the  Berlin 
Cabinet  further  explanations  relative  to  the  appointment  of  the 
seven  Frenchmen. 

We  propose,  in  addition  to  the  arguments  enumerated  in  my 
letter  No.  171,  to  point  out  that  the  stipulation  made  by  us  in 
connection  with  the  loan  was  prompted  more  with  a  view  to  the 
number  of  the  European  assistants  than  to  their  particular  na- 
tionality, and  that  Frenchmen  appeared  to  be  more  suitable 
simply  because  they  were  Bizot's  countrymen.  //  we  should  sub- 
sequently be  compelled  to  yield  to  Germany  in  this  respect,  the 
French  would  have  to  be  replaced  by  Belgians,  Swiss,  or  the  subjects 
of  some  other  neutral  country. 

As  regards  the  Bagdad  Railway,  it  is  our  intention  to  answer 
the  Berlin  Cabinet  that  we  are  prepared  to  discuss  this  question  to- 
gether with  England  and  France,  but  that  we  also  did  not  reject  the 
possibility  of  entering  into  direct  negotiations  with  Germany.^ 


*  Hitherto,  Iswolsky  had  insisted  that  all  questions  concerning  the  Bagdad 
railroad  could  only  be  discussed  by  the  "Four"  Powers  together,  to  wit :  Russia, 
France,  Great  Britain,  and  Germany.  To  have  his  way  in  Persia,  he  was  willing 
to  use  a  little  bait,  which  presently  he  withdrew  again. 


72  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

{76)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  March  3-16,  1910.    No.  340. 

The  following  is  the  text  of  the  Memorandum  submitted  to 
me  by  Pourtales: 

"The  reserve  which  Germany  has  of  late  observed  in  Persia  must 
not  he  understood  as  though  the  German  Government  had  ceased  to 
regard  Persia  as  an  independent  country,  where  Germany  has  the 
right  to  look  to  her  own  interests  without  previously  asking  the  per- 
mission of  other  Powers.  The  Russian  Government  had  at  the 
time  made  Germany  the  proposal  to  conclude  an  agreement  with 
her  on  the  Persian  question  and  the  Bagdad  Railway.  Germany 
was  prepared  to  enter  upon  an  exchange  of  views.  However,  since 
the  end  of  1907  the  Russian  Government  has  taken  no  further  steps 
in  this  matter.  On  the  contrary,  it  has  on  several  occasions  acted 
in  a  manner  that  showed  that  it  did  not  pay  sufficient  heed  to 
German  interests. 

The  appointment  of  seven  Frenchmen  to  act  as  Bizot's  assistants 
appears  to  he  one  of  the  chief  conditions  for  the  granting  of  the  loan.^ 
If  this  condition  were  complied  with,  Germany  would  thereby 
be  excluded  from  one  of  the  most  important  departments  of  the 
internal  administration  of  Persia,  while  France  would  be  ad- 
mitted thereto;  a  fact  which  would  certainly  cause  surprise  in 
Germany.  The  Persian  Government  for  its  part  would  certainly 
be  willing  to  appoint  various  German  officials. 

As  concerns  the  Bagdad  Railway,  the  Russian  Government 
still  seems  to  maintain  the  view  that  the  negotiations  must  be 
carried  on  between  all  four  Powers,  a  proposition  which  Germany 
has  declared  herself  unahle  to  accept  on  principle.  This  attitude  on 
the  part  of  Russia  does  not  appear  to  show  the  friendly  disposition 
which  Germany  was  led  to  expect,  having  herself  displayed  such  a 
disinterested  reserve  in  Persia.  The  German  Government  fe<ds  hound 
to  state  that  this  reserve  cannot  go  to  the  extent  of  rendering  it  im- 
possible for  German  commercial  and  financial  circles  to  find  a  field  of 
activity  in  Persia.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  the  German  Govern- 
ment has  consented  to  a  representative  of  the  Deutsche  Bank, 


*As  it  was,  because  the  French  government  and  banks  insisted  upon  that, 
and  not  without  good  reason,  since  the  financial  administration  of  Persia  could 
not  be  left  in  the  hands  of  Russian  officials — notoriously  corrupt  and  dishonest. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  IN  PERSIA  73 

Said  Ruete,  going  to  Persia,  who  will  at  an  early  date  proceed 
from  Persia  to  Bagdad  by  way  of  Khanekin. 

(77)  The  Russian  Ambassador  in  London  to  Iswolsky.     Telegram,  March 
548,  1910.    No.  54. 

Your  telegram  No.  339  received.     No.  1. 

Have  made  a  corresponding  communication  to  Grey  yester- 
day. There  is  a  great  difference  between  Pourtales*  and  Metter- 
nich's  declarations.  Sub.  No.  2,  I  am  forwarding  the  text  of  a 
Memorandum  containing  the  reply  whch  Grey  intends  to  make. 
In  response  to  a  question  from  me,  Grey  stated  that  he  did  not  he- 
lieve  that  it  was  Germany's  intention  to  resume  the  Bagdad  Railway 
negotiations  with  us.    He  thinks  the  whole  affair  resembles  Morocco.^ 

However,  he  relies  on  the  self-possession  and  moderation  of 
Bethmann-HoUweg.  Still  he  fears  German  plans  with  regard  to 
railways  in  Persia,  and  he  repeated  that  it  was  his  opinion  that  in 
this  question  Russia  and  England  must  remain  particularly  firm. 

Grey  informed  me  that  the  Bagdad  negotiations,  which  had 
been  carried  on  between  English  and  German  financiers,  had  led 
to  no  results.  With  regard  to  this  question,  the  Memorandum 
contains  the  following  sentence: 

"Grey  has  nothing  to  remark  except  that  the  reply  proposed 
by  you  coincides  with  the  attitude  the  London  Cabinet  intended 
to  assume  towards  Russia  and  France  while  the  negotiations  be- 
tween Cassel  and  Gwinner  were  taking  place." 

This  means  that  England  meant  to  reserve  to  herself  the  right  to 
negotiate  with  Germany,  but  to  conclude  nothing  without  informing 
France  and  Russia.^ 

(78)  The  V  ume  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  March  5-18,  1910.  No.  55. 

No.  2.    Contents  of  the  Memorandum  mentioned  in  No.  1 : 
Grey  deems  it  expedient  to  refer  to  the  first  reply,  still  he 
thinks  that  the  statement,  that  we  had  rather  the  number  of  the 

*  Showing  Sir  Edward's  bias,  because  no  step  permitting  that  inference  had 
been  taken  by  Germany,  who  had  admitted  the  "privileged"  position  in  Persia 
of  Great  Britain  and  Russia. 

'For  full  exposition  of  this  case  see  diplomatic  correspondence  on  Bagdad 
railroad  and  branches. 


74 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


employees  than  their  nationality  in  view,  might  give  Germany  the 
opportunity  of  demanding  the  appointment  of  German  officials. 
Grey  thinks  that  regret  might  be  expressed  that  the  explanations 
previously  given  had  not  proved  sufficient  and  then  it  might  be 
added  that  in  1909  the  Persian  Government  had  addressed  itself 
directly  to  France. 

It  might  further  be  added  that  it  seems  only  natural  that  Bizot 
should  give  preference  to  Frenchmen,  but  that  neither  England 
nor  France  considered  the  appointment  of  assistants  as  absolutely 
necessary. 

As  regards  the  fact,  to  which  the  German  Government  had 
referred,  that  German  interests  were  being  infringed,  and  that 
Russia  tried  to  exclude  German  financial  and  commercial  interests 
from  Persia,  and  finally,  as  concerns  the  railway.  Grey  is  of 
opinion  that  it  will  be  best  to  wait  till  the  Persian  finances  have 
been  put  in  order,  upon  which  the  maintenance  of  the  political 
and  economic  independence  of  Persia,  as  also  of  the  principle  of 
the  "open  door"  will  depend  and  from  which,  consequently,  Ger- 
man as  well  as  all  other  foreign  trade  would  only  benefit. 

On  the  other  hand,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  Germany  recognized 
the  privileged  position  enjoyed  by  the  two  neighbouring  Powers,  the 
conclusion  might  be  drawn  that  these  Powers  have  suffered  more  in 
consequence  of  the  disorders  than  the  others,  and  that  for  this  reason 
they  must  assist  Persia  in  reforming  her  finances,  since  this  is  the 
basis  of  all  other  reforms.^  Grey  attaches  weight  to  the  fact  that 
Belgians  are  employed  in  the  customs  administration;  this  might 
perhaps  induce  Germany  to  withdraw  her  objections,  and  the 
appointment  of  subjects  of  a  neutral  state  might  then  perhaps 
prove  a  good  solution  of  the  difficulty. 

Grey  would  like  to  have  your  reply  as  early  as  possible  in  order 
to  draw  up  a  corresponding  reply  to  Metternich. 


(79)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  March  5-18,  1910.    No.  56. 

No.  3.  Hardinge  told  me  confidentially  yesterday  that  it  might 
be  expedient  to  convey  to  the  Persian  Government  the  information 
that  some  compliance  would  be  shown  in  the  matter  of  the  appoint- 

*  Meaning  that  if  expedient  this  was  to  be  so  construed. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  IN  PERSIA  75 

ment  of  Frenchmen,  if  a  request  to  this  effect  be  made  by  the  Persian 
Government. 

(80)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  March  7-20,  1910.    No.  57. 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  Bizot  suggests  in  his  reform  proposals 
that  the  office  of  a  special  Financial  Adviser  be  abolished,  as  soon 
as  the  three  counselors  and  the  four  French  assistants  will  have 
been  appointed,  Grey  thinks  that  his  words  "it  is  but  natural  that 
Bizot  should  give  Frenchmen  the  preference,"  ought  to  be  amended 
as  follows:  "Bizot  being  the  author  of  the  project  of  the  financial 
reform,  it  is  but  natural  that  he  should  desire  to  entrust  the  execu- 
tion of  this  reform  to  Frenchmen." 

(81)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  March  8-21,  1910.    No.  62. 

After  Grey  had  concluded  his  statement  to  Metternich,  the 
Ambassador  told  him  that  the  Berlin  Cabinet  saw  itself  obliged  to 
raise  objections  to  the  following  conditions  which,  according  to 
German  information,  had  been  put  in  the  course  of  the  negotia- 
tions relating  to  the  loan : 

(1)  That  within  the  Russian  zone  no  concessions  should  be 
granted  to  foreigners,  but  only  to  Russians,  and  that  the  same 
stipulation  had  been  made  with  regard  to  the  British  sphere  of 
influence. 

Grey  intends  to  reply  to-morrow  that  no  such  condition  has 
been  put. 

(2)  The  stipulation  in  connection  with  Lake  Urmiah. 

Grey  will  reply  that,  this  being  a  matter  which  concerns  Rus- 
sian interests,  he  could  return  no  reply. 

(3)  The  stipulation  concerning  the  construction  of  railways 
within  the  two  spheres  of  influence. 

Grey  will  uphold  the  principle  of  the  political  interests  of  neigh- 
bouring States  and  will  refer  to  the  impossibility  of  granting  con- 
cessions to  foreign  companies  which  might  prove  dangerous  to 
either  Russia  or  England  from  a  strategical  point  of  view. 

(4)  The  stipulation  which  provides  that  no  concessions  shall 
be  granted  to  Persians  unless  they  prove  that  the  capital  involved 
is  not  derived  from  any  foreign  source. 


76  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

Grey  intends  to  reply  that  a  stipulation  in  this  form  has  not 
been  proposed,  but  that  of  course  Russia  and  England  were  obliged 
to  devise  measures  to  prevent  the  grant  of  concessions  to  Persians 
which  might  embody  the  same  drawbacks  as  the  grant  of  railway 
concessions.^ 

In  the  course  of  an  interview  with  Hardinge,  /  noticed  that  this 
new  step  of  the  Berlin  Cabinet  has  caused  much  displeasure  here, 

(82)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  March  8-21,  1910.    No,  63. 

Continuation  of  my  telegram  No.  62. 

Grey  informs  me  this  evening  by  letter  that  Mettemich  had 
given  him  to  understand  that  the  German  Government  was  of  the 
opinion  that  the  terms  of  the  Persian  loan  were  of  a  nature  to  exclude 
foreign  trade  and  to  render  Persia's  independence  illusory;  the  Ambas- 
sador had  however  not  stated  the  terms  properly. 

Grey  intends  to  answer  to-morrow ;  and  he  informed  me  of  his 
intention  to  communicate  the  actual  terms  to  Metternich.  As  I 
know  your  point  of  view,  I  am  raising  no  objection.  Grey  intends 
to  tell  Metternich  that  the  object  of  the  conditions  imposed  by  us 
was  not  necessarily  to  exclude  foreign  capital  from  railway  con- 
struction in  Persia,  but  that  Russia  and  England  must  insist  on 
this  condition  in  order  to  prevent  the  possibility  of  the  construc- 
tion of  a  railway  line  which  would  threaten  their  frontiers  ^  and 
which  stood  under  foreign  control. 

Grey  considers  the  communication  of  the  actual  terms  as  neces- 
sary in  order  to  be  able  to  reply  to  the  objections  concerning  the  grant 
of  concessions  to  Persian  subjects,  and  of  the  privileges  enjoyed  by 
Russia  and  England  within  their  respective  spheres  of  influence. 

(83)  Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  ChargS  d' Affaires  in  London.     Telegram, 
March  9-22,  1910.    No.  372. 

The  German  Ambassador  has  told  me  that  according  to  infor- 
mations received  by  the  German  Government,^  Russia  and  England 

^  Meaning  that  even  Persians  themselves  could  not  get  concessions  in  their 
own  country,  in  spite  of  which  Great  Britain  and  Russia  insisted  upon  parading 
the  fiction  of  Persian  sovereignty. 

*A  mere  pretext  advanced  by  Great  Britain  and  Russia  to  get  Persia's  eco- 
nomic system  into  their  absolute  control. 

'  From  the  Persians. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  IN  PERSIA  77 

have  made  the  following  stipulations  in  the  course  of  the  negotia- 
tions relating  to  the  loan : 

No  railways  were  to  be  allowed  to  he  constructed  without  their  consent. 

The  grant  to  Russia  of  a  monopoly  relating  to  navigation  on  Lake 
Urmiah. 

The  grant  of  a  monopoly  in  connection  with  all  commercial  and 
industrial  concessions  in  favour  of  Russia  and  England,  to  the  exclu- 
sion of  foreign  enterprises. 

Should  this  information  prove  correct,  the  German  Government 
would  have  to  regard  them  cls  incompatible  with  the  principle  of  the 
economic  equality  of  all  nations,  a  principle  recognised  by  the  Anglo- 
Russian  Convention,  and  the  infringement  of  which  would  be  tanta- 
mount to  the  violation  of  Persia's  independence. 

I  replied  to  the  Ambassador  that  these  informations  were  not 
based  on  actual  facts.  The  conditions  put  by  Russia  and  England 
fully  maintain  the  principle  of  the  economic  equality  of  all  Powers, 
and  the  two  States  have  never  entertained  the  idea  of  excluding 
anybody  from  all  commercial  and  industrial  enterprises. 

As  to  railways  and  other  enterprises,  embodying  a  political 
feature  and  liable  to  possess  a  strategic  importance  for  Russia, 
we  have  always  declared  that  we  could  never  consent  to  such  con- 
cessions being  granted  to  foreigners.  In  this  spirit  we  began  nego- 
tiations with  Germany  in  1907,  which  were  then  temporarily  interrupted, 
and  which  we  are  now  ready  to  resume. 

Pourtales  appeared  to  be  satisfied  with  these  explanations,  and  once 
again  confirmed  that  Germany  recognised  the  privileged  position  held 
by  Russia  and  England  in  Persia,  and  that  she  merely  desired  to  safe- 
guard the  liberty  of  German  commercial  enterprises,  that,  moreover, 
she  did  not  contemplate  constructing  any  railway  lines  in  Persia.^ 

I  request  you  to  seize  the  first  opportunity  to  inform  Grey  ver- 
bally of  the  above  and  to  communicate  to  me  his  impression. 

(84)     Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  in  London.     Telegram,  March 
10-23,  1910.    No.  380. 

The  reply  which  we  have  given  to  Germany  corresponds  in  its 
main  lines  to  that  given  by  England.     Nicolson  writes  me  today 

*  Germany  followed  throughout  Southwest  Asia  a  policy  known  as  ''peace- 
ful penetration,"  of  which  trading  was  the  principal  desideratun- 


78 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


that  the  London  Cabinet  had  no  objections  to  offer  if  we  inform 
Pourtales  that  in  all  matters  concerning  the  Anglo-Russian  Con- 
vention we  deemed  it  necessary  first  to  communicate  with  the  Brit- 
ish Government ;  Nicolson  added  that  in  this  we  could  rely  on  the 
absolute  support  of  the  London  Cabinet.  We  shall  avail  ourselves 
of  this  suggestion,  if  the  Berlin  Cabinet  should  approach  us  again. 

(85)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  March  11-24,  1910.    No.  383. 

IVe  have  learned  from  a  particularly  secret  source  that  the  Persian 
Parliament  has  asked  Quadt  ^  whether  Germany,  on  the  ground  of  the 
treaty  concluded  between  Persia  and  Germany,  would  m>ake  represen- 
tations to  Russia  in  connection  with  the  loan  and  as  to  the  withdrawal 
of  Persian  troops  from  Persia.  We  have  given  the  Persians  to  under- 
stand that  any  interference  on  the  part  of  a  third  Power  in  our  rela- 
tions with  Persia  would  only  tend  to  render  the  situation  worse  and 
might  induce  us  not  to  recall  our  troops. 


(86)  The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  in  London  to  Iswolsky.     Telegram, 
March  11-24,  1910.    No.  65. 

Your  telegram  No.  383  received. 

Similar  advices  have  been  received  here.  Hardinge  is  of  the  opinion 
that  Germany  will  be  unable  to  invoke  the  German-Persian  Treaty  of 
1873  since  this  provides  for  an  intervention  only  in  the  case  of  the 
probability  of  an  armed  conflict  with  another  Power. 

(87)  Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  in  London.     Telegram,  March 
13-26,  1910.    No.  406. 

Our  protest  against  the  conclusion  of  a  Persian  loan  outside  of 
Russia  and  England  having  met  with  an  unfavourable  reply  from 
Persia,  the  British  Government  suggests  that  a  statement  be  drawn  up 
of  all  outstanding  debts  and  to  declare  to  Persia  that  we  do  not  only 
intend  to  insist  on  the  settlement  of  these  claims  but  also  of  all  other 
advances  made  should  Persia  persist  in  her  intention  to  mortgage  the 
revenues  of  the  country  as  security  for  a  loan  to  be  granted  by  a  third 
Power.^ 

*  Carman  minister  at  Teheran. 

'The  Persian  government  was  considering  such  a  loan  in  Germany,  and  made 
later  the  attempt  to  raise  a  loan  independently  in  Paris. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  IN  PERSIA  79 

In  our  opinion  we  must  try  to  avoid  making  any  such  declaration 
as  we  might  be  accused  of  wishing  to  prevent  Persia  from  obtain- 
ing credit  in  other  countries,  and  we  have  proposed  to  the  British 
Ambassador  to  declare  to  the  Persian  Government  the  following: 

Russia  and  Great  Britain  are  prepared  to  acknowledge  Persia's 
right  to  conclude  loans  in  other  countries,  however,  only  under  the 
following  conditions: 

First,  the  customs  and  other  revenues,  which  constitute  the 
security  for  the  Russian  and  British  loans  must  not  be  mortgaged ; 

Secondly,  all  previous  financial  obligations  toward  Russia  and 
England  must,  together  with  the  arrears  of  interest,  be  exactly  de- 
termined and  the  source  of  revenue  indicated  which  is  to  serve  for 
the  settlement  of  our  outstanding  claims; 

Thirdly,  no  concessions  can  be  granted  to  other  foreigners  within 
the  Russian  and  British  spheres  of  influence  possessing  a  political  or 
strategic  significance,  such  as  ways  of  communication,  telegraphs,  navi- 
gation on  Lake  Urmiah,  and  the  like?- 

(88)     The  Russian  Minister  at   Teheran   to   Iswolsky.     Telegram,  March 
10-23,  1910. 

Should  we  relinquish  our  demand  as  to  the  appointment  of 
Frenchmen  to  the  Persian  Department  of  Finance,  this  would 
render  the  collaboration  of  the  financial  adviser  with  the  rest  of 
the  experts,  belonging  to  other  nationalities,  extremely  difficult. 
The  Imperial  Russian  Government  alone  is  in  a  position  to  judge 
whether  Germany,  having  now  attained  her  aim,  will  not  make  use 
of  other  pretexts  in  order  to  exert  pressure  on  the  co-operation  of 
England  and  Russia  in  Persia.  If  such  a  possibility  exists,  it  would 
perhaps  be  better  if  we  were  now  to  insist  on  the  appointment  of 
the  Frenchmen.  In  any  case,  it  would  appear  to  me  that  an  eventual 
relinquishment  of  our  demand  must  be  represented  as  a  concession  to 
Persia  and  not  to  Germany.  At  the  same  time,  we  should  have  to 
establish  the  principle  that  either  only  Russian  or  British  subjects, 
or  else  the  subjects  of  minor  Powers,  may  be  appointed  as  Foreign 
Advisers  or  to  other  offices. 

'  So  that  no  loans  with  concessions  as  security  could  be  made,  since  anything 
may  be  given  "political  or  strategic  significance." 


80  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

(89)  Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.     Telegram.  April 

3-16,  1910.    No.  492. 

I  am  wiring  to  our  Minister  at  Teheran  as  follows : 

No.  1.  Sub  No.  2, 1  am  sending  you  an  extract  from  a  Memoran- 
dum submitted  by  the  British  Ambassador  in  connection  with  the 
German  claims  in  Persia.  We,  too,  have  received  the  proposal  made 
by  the  Berlin  Cabinet  to  resume  the  negotiations  of  1907,  and  the 
German  Ambassador  has  given  us  to  understand  that  besides  the 
English  and  the  Russian  zone  of  influence  in  Persia,  there  also 
exists  a  neutral  zone,  open  to  all  the  other  Powers. 

The  conditions  put  forward  by  Germany  appear  to  us  in  some 
respect  as  unacceptable  and  for  this  reason  we  must  reckon  with  the 
possibility  that  we  shall  have  to  exert  a  strong  pressure  on  Persia  in 
order  to  prevent  that  any  concessions,  which  seem  to  us  objectionable 
be  granted  to  foreigners.^  After  we  have  secured  this  aim,  we  shall  be 
able  to  come  to  an  understanding  with  the  Berlin  Cabinet;  such  an 
understanding  seems  to  us  of  course  to  he  desirable.  If  the  final 
confirmation  of  concessions  rests  with  the  Regent,  he  might  be  told 
that  any  grant  of  concessions  to  foreigners,  without  Russia  and  Great 
Britain  having  been  previously  consulted,  will  be  regarded  by  us  as  an 
act  of  hostility,  and  will  have  the  most  serious  consequences  for  Per  si 
At  the  same  time,  we  are  instructing  Benckendorff  to  induce  the  Lon 
don  Cabinet  to  act  in  concert  with  us  in  this  matter.  As  regards  the 
coercive  measures  which,  in  case  of  necessity,  we  should  have  to  employ 
against  Persia,  these  will  form  the  subject  of  a  special  conference  to 
be  held  in  the  course  of  the  next  few  days,  and  it  will  then  be  necessary 
to  come  to  an  agreement  with  London  on  this  subject. 

Please  wire  urgently  which  measures  you  suggest.^ 

(90)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  April  3-16,  1910.    No.  493. 

I  telegraph  to  Teheran  sub  No.  2 : 

The  German  Chancellor  made  to  the  British  Ambassador  at  Ber- 
lin the  following  statement  regarding  the  German  claims  in  Persia : 

*  A  naive  distinction ;  presumably  the  Russians  and  British  in  Persia  were  no 
longer  foreigners  by  virtue  of  the  preposterous  conduct  of  their  governments. 

Benckendorff's  advice  would  have  been  based  on  Great  Britain's  attitude^, 
of  course,   for  otherwise  the   Russian   minister  at   Teheran,   Poklewski-Koziel,| 
would  have  been  a  more  competent  authority,  since  the  Cossacks  stood  under  hil 
command. 


.1 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  IN  PERSIA  81 

The  whole  question  ought  to  form  part  of  a  general  political 
convention  to  be  concluded  between  Germany  and  Great  Britain. 
Russia  and  England  are  to  acknowledge  the  principle  of  the  "open 
door."  In  return  for  Germany's  waiving  any  claims  to  railway,  tele- 
graph, and  similar  concessions  within  the  British  sphere  of  influence, 
England  shall  grant  Germany  a  proportionate  share  in  the  supply  of 
materials  and  the  like}  In  case  of  Persian  loans,  Germany  expects? 
to  receive  the  same  share  as  third  Powers:  the  same  refers  to  the  ap- 
pointment of  foreigners.  Germany  renounces  all  similar  concessions 
in  the  Russian  sphere  of  influence;  on  the  other  hand,  Russia  shall 
grant  Germany  equality  of  rights  in  all  commercial  questions  and  shall 
undertake  to  connect  her  railways  in  Northern  Persia  with  the  Bagdad 
Railway  line,  not  to  interfere  with  international  traffic  on  this  line  and 
to  facilitate  the  connection  of  the  German  line  with  Teheran. 

Bethmann-Hollweg  pointed  to  the  obstacles  raised  to  foreign  com- 
merce by  the  prohibition  of  transit  traffic  through  the  Caucasus,  and 
added  that,  after  the  Russian  railway  lines  had  been  constructed  in 
Northern  Persia,  and  as  long  as  Russia  should  maintain  her  refusal  to 
allow  the  construction  of  a  railway  line  between  Teheran  and  Khanekin, 
Russia  would  secure  for  herself  a  monopoly  of  trade  in  Northern  Per- 
sia, which  would  hardly  be  in  the  interests  of  British  trade.^ 

J(91)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  April  3-16,  1910.    No.  494. 

I  refer  to  my  telegrams  Nos.  1  and  2  sent  to  Teheran. 

It  is  obvious  from  Bethmann-HoUweg's  communication  that 
Germany  is  resolved  to  claim  a  position  in  Persia  which  would 
run  counter  to  Russian  and  British  interests  in  that  country. 
The  hope  of  being  able  to  arrive  at  an  understanding  with  Germany  by 
making  concessions  in  the  matter  of  the  Bagdad  question,  can  evidently 
not  be  realised.^ 

In  these  circumstances  there  seems  only  one  solution  possible, 
namely  to  bring  strong  pressure  on  Persia  in  order  to  prevent  her  from 

*  Used  in  their  construction. 

'This  document  is  q^iven  here  for  the  sake  of  continuity,  though  more  prop- 
erly it  belongs  to  the  Bagdad  railroad  series.  It  will  be  well  to  bear  its  contents 
in  mind. 

'Owing  to  the  principles  involved,  abandonment  of  which  would  have  led 
to  the  final  partition  of  Persia. 


82  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

granting  concessions  to  the  Germans  which  would  he  incompatible 
with  our  interests.  Russia  and  England  must  therefore  not  hesitate 
to  employ  extreme  measures,  and  we  suggest  that  an  exchange  of 
views  as  to  the  nature  of  these  measures  he  hegun.  For  the  present 
the  Representatives  of  the  two  Governments  might  make  to  the 
Persian  Regent  the  statement  mentioned  in  my  telegram  to  Teheran. 

This  does  not,  of  course,  exclude  the  possibility  of  arriving  at 
an  acceptable  understanding  with  Berlin,  which  will  be  all  the 
easier  the  less  chance  the  Berlin  Cabinet  will  have  to  conclude  a 
direct  agreement  with  the  Persian  Government. 

We  are  considering  at  the  moment  how  we  are  to  reply  to  the 
German  proposals  and  we  shall  not  fail  to  communicate  first  with 
the  London  Cabinet. 

(92)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  April  10-23,  1910.    No.  531. 

Our  Minister  at  Teheran  telegraphed  on  April  6-19  as  follows : 

No.  175. 

I  am  of  opinion  that  before  taking  any  further  steps,  we  should 
await  the  outcome  of  the  Ministerial  crisis.^  Should  a  Cabinet  be 
formed  of  radical  elements,  in  whom  Russia  and  England  could 
have  no  confidence,  and  which  is  likely  to  conduct  negotiations 
incompatible  with  the  demands  embodied  in  our  last  joint  Note, 
we  should  have  to  declare  to  the  Persian  Government  that  Russia  and 
England  will  stop  at  nothing  in  order  to  force  the  Persians  to  make 
their  policy  agree  with  the  demands  of  the  said  Note. 

It  will  be  more  advantageous  for  us  to  keep  to  this  joint  Note, 
since  it  completely  protects  our  interests  and  makes  no  mention  of 
Germany.  //  we  take  such  a  step,  we  must  he  prepared,  if  necessary, 
to  draw  the  final  consequences,  as  the  very  slightest  sign  of  yielding  on 
our  part  would  shake  our  prestige  in  Persia  for  a  long  time  to  come. 

The  following  are  the  coercive  measures  that  might  be  em- 
ployed against  Persia: 

(1)  The  refusal  on  the  part  of  the  two  Legations  to  have  any 
intercourse  with  the  Cabinet  which  does  not  inspire  us  with 
confidence.^ 

*The  Persian. 

*One  of  the  complaints  of  the  Persians  was  that  the  Russian  and  British 
ministers  at  Teheran  usurped  the  authority  of  the  Persian  government. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  IN  PERSIA  83 

(2)  A  declaration  that  our  troops  would  not  be  withdrawn 
from  Persia,  but  that  on  the  contrary  they  would  be  increased  to 
their  normal  effective  strength. 

(3)  The  demand  of  immediate  payment  of  the  Persian  debts, 
followed  by  the  occupation  of  the  Custom  Houses. 

(4)  The  threat  that  troops  will  occupy  Teheran. 

The  latter  measure  would  not  be  desirable  and  might  lead  to  dis- 
turbances, but  I  believe  the  threat  alone  will  be  sufficient  and  that  it 
need  not  be  carried  into  effect. 


(93)     The  Russian  Ambassador  in  London  to  Iswolsky.     Letter,  April  13- 
26,  1910. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  being  absent,  I  sent  Hardinge  yesterday  a 
translation  of  your  telegram  No.  531.  The  Under-Secretary  of 
State  told  me  that  he  would  immediately  communicate  it  to  the 
Minister.  He  mentioned  that  he  shared  Poklewski's  opinion  com- 
pletely that,  above  all  things,  we  should  await  the  outcome  of  the 
Persian  Ministerial  crisis,  and  that  we  should  not  be  in  haste  to  take 
steps  which,  if  the  present  Ministry  zvere  able  to  remain  in  power, 
might  undermine  the  authority  of  the  Ministers  favourable  to  us  and 
result  in  a  fresh  crisis. 

No  additional  advices  have  been  received  here  on  this  sub- 
ject. 

As  concerns  the  matter  itself  and  the  measures  contemplated, 
Sir  Charles  expressed  no  opinion  and  will  leave  this  to  Grey. 
However,  he  seemed  to  me  to  be  more  optimistic  than  last  time  I 
saw  him  and  appears  to  consider  a  discussion  of  such  measures  as 
premature.  I  know,  however,  that  should  need  arise,  he  will  ap- 
prove of  energetic  measures  being  taken;  the  last  time,  however, 
he  expressed  his  personal  opinion  that  it  should  be  stated  at 
Teheran  that  any  action  on  the  part  of  the  Persian  Government  in- 
jurious to  the  interests  of  the  two  Powers  would  be  considered  by  the 
latter  as  an  act  of  hostility  and  would  have  the  worst  consequences  for 
Persia,  without,  however,  adding  any  definite  threats.  He  was  con- 
fident that  this  would  prove  sufficient  without  obliging  us  to  com- 
mit ourselves  from  the  very  outset  by  an  announcement  of  coer- 
cive measures. 


84 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


/  think  myself  that  we  ought  to  consider  the  matter  very  carefully, 
in  particular  as  concerns  the  extreme  measure  to  he  resorted  to,  namely 
that  of  a  possible  occupation  of  Teheran. 

I  have  not  the  least  doubt  that  this  last-mentioned  measure 
would  completely  change  the  character  of  the  military  measures 
resorted  to  so  far.  ^. 

The  occupation  of  Tabriz  and  Kaswin  was  merely  an  inter-  i| 
vention,  not  an  interference,  and  had  the  nature   of   assistance 
given  to  the  Persian  Government  to  maintain  order. 

To  occupy  Teheran,  and  to  force  the  Persian  Government  to 
grant  us  what  it  refuses  to  concede  through  diplomatic  channels, 
is  nothing  less  than  an  act  of  war  which  would  result  in  a  change  of 
the  Ministry  and  in  the  formation  of  a  Government  which  we 
should  have  to  force  upon  the  country;  such  a  Government  would, 
in  the  present  circumstances,  be  able  to  maintain  itself  in  power  only 
as  long  as  the  occupation  lasted.  This  new  Government,  moreover, 
would  have  to  accept  terms  which  would  be  the  result  of  a  direct 
interference  and  which  would  have  been  embodied  in  a  diplomatic 
document  bearing  the  character  of  an  enforced  Treaty.  This,  to 
my  mind,  is  the  most  important  consideration.  Such  a  fact  would 
he  hound  to  produce  a  decided  protest  on  the  part  of  third  Powers. 
We  are  warned  that  this  third  Power  will  he  Germany,  which  will  take 
up  the  theory  of  the  "Open  Door"  as  though  nothing  had  happened. 

The  conflict  would  thus  change  its  character  and  from  a  Russo- 
Persian  question,  become  a  general  European  one. 


(94)     The  Russian  Minister  at  Teheran  to  Iswolsky.    Telegram,  April  1-14, 
1910. 

I  have  today  received  a  complaint  from  Schunemann.  The 
Board  controlling  the  high-road  Julfa-Tabriz  refuses  to  allow  a 
locomobile  bought  by  him  to  pass  through,  pretending  it  was  too 
heavy.  Schunemann  points  to  the  fact  that  engines  bought  by  the 
Board  and  by  a  Persian  subject  are  much  heavier.  /  do  not  con- 
sider it  desirable  to  raise  so  openly  artificial  obstacles  to  German  im- 
ports into  Persia.^ 


*  A   case   of   discrimination,     Non-Entente   commerce    was    being   hampered 
throughout  Persia  in  this  manner. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  IN  PERSIA  85 

(95)  Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.     Telegram,  April 
29'May  12,  1910.    No.  631. 

Nicolson  communicates  to  me  the  draft  of  the  Joint  Note  to 
be  addressed  by  us  to  the  Persian  Government.  The  draft  has 
been  drawn  up  by  the  British  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Teheran.  The 
British  Ambassador  informs  me  that  Grey  does  not  agree  to  its 
last  part  and  suggests  the  following  alteration : 

"In  view  of  the  difficulty  of  enumerating  the  particular  conces- 
sions which  might  be  opposed  to  their  political  or  strategic  in- 
terests, the  two  Governments  expect  that  the  Persian  Government 
will  communicate  with  Russia  and  England  before  granting  to 
any  foreigner  concessions  of  any  kind  whatsoever  relating  to  rail- 
ways, roads,  telegraphs,  or  the  construction  of  harbours  in  order 
to  determine  how  the  political  and  strategic  interests  of  these  two 
Powers  may  be  adequately  protected." 

I  share  Grey*s  views  as  regards  the  last  part  of  the  Teheran 
draft.  So  far,  however,  as  the  first  part  is  concerned,  /  would  con- 
sider it  more  prudent  to  leave  out  the  words  proposed  by  Grey,  namely 
''railways,  roads,  telegraphs  or  harbour  constructions''  for  there  might 
be  also  other  concessions  damaging  to  us.^  But  we  might  add  to  the 
contemplated  declaration  the  following: 

^'Should  the  Persian  Government  not  comply  with  the  request  of 
the  two  Powers,  the  latter  will  resort  to  such  measures  as  they  may 
deem  necessary  for  the  protection  of  their  interests." 

(96)  The  Russian  Minister  at  Teheran  to  Iswolsky.    Telegram,  April  12-25, 
1910. 

The  French  Minister  is  informed  by  his  Government  that  a 
certain  Cohen  has  arrived  at  Paris  coming  from  Teheran,  who 

has  secured  from  one  of  the  Persian  Ministers  the  option  for  the  con- 
clusion of  a  loan  of  200  million  francs,  with  the  customs  and  telegraph 
revenues  as  security.  The  object  of  the  loan  is  to  enable  Persia  to 
pay  her  debt  to  the  Governments  of  Russia  and  Great  Britain  and  to 
the  two  Teheran  banks. 

There  are  four  large  French  banks  interested  in  this  financial 
operation;  among  others,  the  Credit  Lyonnais  and  the  Banque  de 
Paris.     On  May  7   a  special  Persian  Commission  is  coming  to 

*  A  sort  of  blanket  warrant  was  desired. 


86  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

Paris  for  the  negotiations;  the  option  to  run  four  months  from 
the  date  of  the  arrival  of  the  said  Commission  at  Paris.  Cohen 
had  come  to  Teheran  together  with  the  jeweler  who  was  to  value  the 
Persian  crown  jewels;  Cohen  introduced  himself  as  his  companion  ^ 
and  told  the  French  Minister  here  nothing  of  the  real  object  of 
his  visit.  In  reply  to  my  French  colleague's  question  as  to  how  ^. 
the  Russian  Government  would  regard  such  a  project,  /  answered  l| 
ihat  the  payment  of  the  sums  due  us  was  by  no  means  compatible 
with  our  interests,  since  this  would  open  the  door  for  the  political  in- 
fluence of  foreigners  in  this  country. ^  For  the  same  reason,  we  could 
also  not  allow  foreign  control  of  any  Persian  revenues  within 
our  sphere  of  influence. 

(97)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Iswolsky.    Telegram,  April  15- 
28,  1910.    No.  25. 

On  his  return  from  Teheran,  Cohen  has  given  nobody  any 
detailed  information,  but  has  merely  requested  the  support  of  the 
French  Government.  This  has  been  refused,  and  he  has  been  told 
that  only  such  financial  operations  would  be  allowed  to  be  carried 
through  here  which  had  first  been  submitted  to  the  consideration  of 
Great  Britain  and  Russia.  All  others  would  be  refused  quotation  on 
the  Exchange.^  Besides,  hardly  any  of  the  leading  banks  are  parti- 
cipating in  this  international  syndicate. 

The  Foreign  Minister  gave  me  the  assurance  that  in  all  Persian 
affairs  France  would  permit  of  nothing  being  undertaken  which  could 
be  disagreeable  to  Russia  and  England,  The  financial  circles  have 
been  duly  informed  of  this. 

(98)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Iswolsky.     Telegram,  April 
30-May  13,  1910.    No.  102. 

Your  telegram  No.  631  received.    Personal. 
Hardinge's  first  impression  is  that  the  wording  proposed  by 
you,  which  does  not  mention  what  particular  concessions  are  being 

*  The  jeweler's. 

'  Since  this  would  have  given  the  Persians  the  right  to  insist  that  Russian 
military  occupation  be  ended,  and  that  Persia  be  once  more  regarded  as  a  truly 
sovereign  state,  which  was  the  aim  of  the  Young  Persians. 

'  Control  of  French  finances  in  regard  to  foreign  investments  was  a  very 
effective  means  of  the  French  government  in  the  manipulation  of  international 
relations. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  IN  PERSIA  87 

referred  to,  is  a  very  radical  measure  and  will  hardly  be  accepted 
by  the  Persian  Government.  He  thinks  moreover  that  the  final  threat 
is  very  strong.  1  believe  a  more  moderate  wording  will  be  proposed 
to  you.    This  is  not  yet  an  official  English  reply. 


(99)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  May  5-18,  1910.    No.  104. 

Nicolson  will  inform  you  of  what  Grey  told  Metternich.^  He 
told  him  that  since  the  Persian  Government  had  asked  for  explana- 
tions in  connection  with  the  last  Note,  such  explanations  must  now 
be  given.  Speaking  to  the  Ambassador,  Grey  did  not  disguise  the 
fact  that  if  the  Persian  Government  brings  Russia  and  England  face  to 
face  with  the  ''fait  accompli"  of  a  railway  concession  possessing  a 
strategic  political  character  having  been  granted,  both  Powers  would 
be  obliged  to  resort  to  strong  measures  against  Persia. 

Grey  stated  that  he  had  not  the  least  intention  of  interfering 
with  any  GTerman  concessions  which  were  not  of  a  political  or 
strategic  nature,^  For  this  reason,  a  German  protest  could  only  be 
raised  if  a  justifiable  application  for  the  grant  of  a  concession  to 
Germans  had  been  refused  by  Persia.  Grey  added  that  an  Anglo- 
German  agreement  with  respect  to  Persia  could  only  be  concluded 
in  connection  with  the  Bagdad  Railway. 


(100)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  May  8-21,  1910.    No.  109. 

With  regard  to  your  conversation  with  Pourtales,^  Grey  tells  me 
that  your  words  and  his  agree,  with  the  sole  exception  that  you 
emphasized  that  we  would  not  demand  a  reply  from  the  Persian 
Government,  which  he  did  not  mention.  As  regards  our  future 
negotiations  with  Germany,  Grey  asked  whether  apart  from  Persia 
they  would  also  refer  to  the  Bagdad  Railway. 

I  replied  that  I  did  not  know,  since  the  main  object  pursued  by 
us  during  the  former  negotiations  was  to  secure  our  position  in  Persia. 
Grey  remarked  that  it  would  be  difficult  to  exclude  the  Bagdad 

*  German  ambassador  at  London. 

'The  difficulty  was  that  it  was  hard  to  convince  the  British  and  Russians 
that  anything  had  not  a  "political  and  strategic  nature." 

*  German  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg. 


88  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

question,  since  the  branch-line  from  Khanekin  must  also  be  con- 
sidered. 

I  asked  him  of  what  modus  procedendi  he  thought;  he  replied 
that  Germany  was  adverse  to  negotiations  between  four  Powers 
at  once  and  that  he  therefore  believed  that  the  three  interested  Powers 
should  negotiate  separately,  hut  should  keep  each  other  mutually  in-  d 
formed  as  to  the  course  the  negotiations  were  taking;  in  any  case  ■ 
the  conclusion  of  the  negotiations  would  have  to  take  place  between 
the  four  Powers} 

(101)     Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  in  London.     Telegram.  May 
9-22,  1910.    No.  695. 

Before  giving  Poklewski  instructions,  /  should  like  to  know 
what  Grey  thinks  of  the  recent  statement  made  by  Schon  ^  to  our  Ber- 
lin Ambassador,  which  contains  the  formal  assurance  that  Germany 
had  never  attempted  to  secure  concessions  in  Persia  which  might  prove 
objectionable  to  Russia  and  England,  and  that,  moreover,  she  had  also 
no  intention  of  doing  so  in  the  future.  On  the  other  hand,  Schon  in- 
sists that  the  joint  Anglo-Russian  step  at  Teheran  be  postponed 
in  order  to  arrive  at  a  friendly  solution. 

Please  ask  Grey,  whether  he  thinks  that  the  last  proposition 
need  not  be  considered,  though  this  would  give  the  Berlin  Cabinet 
an  obvious  occasion  to  show  itself  unyielding  in  the  course  of  the 
subsequent  negotiations,  or  whether  Schon's  suggestion  should 
be  followed.  In  the  first  case,  it  would  have  to  be  remembered 
what  an  impression  such  a  postponement  would  produce  at  Te- 
heran. It  seems  to  me  that  in  the  given  circumstances  our  Repre- 
sentatives at  Teheran  might  confine  themselves  to  informing  the 
Persian  Government  that  they  do  not  expect  a  reply  to  their  Note 
for  the  present;  but  if  the  Persian  Government  were  to  put  Russia 
and  England  face  to  face  with  a  "fait  accompli"  incompatible  with 
their  political  and  strategic  interests,  this  would  be  regarded  as  an  un- 
friendly act  on  the  part  of  Persia  and  might  induce  the  two  Powers 
to  resort  to  the  measures  required  to  protect  their  interests.^ 

*  As  BenckendorflF  says  further  on :   Germany  always  had  to  deal  with  groups 
— the  Entente — in  her  endeavors  beyond  her  own  frontiers. 
'German  secretary  of  state  for  foreign  affairs. 
'Brute  force. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  IN  PERSIA  89 

(102)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Iswolsky.     Telegram,  May 
11-24,  1910.    No.  113. 

Strictly  confidential. 

Paul  Cambon  has  informed  me  of  a  conversation  which  had 
taken  place  last  week  between  Pichon,  Grey  and  himself.  Among 
other  things,  Grey  reported  his  conversation  with  Metternich. 
This  report  fully  coincides  with  what  we  know  about  it  from  the 
English  communications.  However,  there  is  a  passage  which 
Grey  did  not  mention  to  us,  and  Cambon  has  asked  me  to  make 
no  use  of  it  for  the  present;  I  therefore  earnestly  request  you  to 
pay  due  regard  to  this  request  of  my  French  colleague. 

Metternich  proposed  to  the  London  Cabinet  a  political  agree- 
ment in  connection  with  Persia,  and  added  that  if  the  same  were 
to  be  concluded  there  would  be  an  end  to  the  difficulties  in  the 
Bagdad  Railway  question.  Grey  replied  that  England  had  con- 
cluded a  political  Entente  with  Russia  with  regard  to  Persia, 
and  that  consequently  it  could  not  conclude  another  agreement 
with  any  other  Power;  in  this  case,  England  was  bound  to  Russia 
just  as  to  France  in  the  Morocco  question} 

I  can  only  consider  Grey*s  reserve  toward  us  as  due  to  an  ex- 
cessive feeling  of  discretion.  This  would  explain  his  words  that 
the  London  Cabinet  cannot  regard  the  German  proposal  as  con- 
stituting a  basis  for  negotiations,  a  sentence  which  at  the  time  did 
not  seem  quite  clear  to  you.  This  would  also  explain  Sir  Edward 
Grey*s  words  as  to  the  impossibility  of  separating  the  negotiations 
relative  to  Persia  from  those  connected  with  the  Bagdad  Railway. 
And  finally  it  explains  Grey's  opinion  that  negotiations  zvith  Ger- 
many in  connection  with  Persia  would  have  to  he  conducted  by  Rus- 
sia and  England  in  commons 

(103)  Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.     Telegram,  May 

13-26,  1910.    No.  717. 

I  am  telegraphing  to  our  Ambassador  at  Berlin  as  follows: 

The  British  Charge  d' Affaires  has  communicated  to  me  the  contents 
of  a  telegram  received  from  Berlin  to  the  effect  that  Schon  has  stated 

*And  yet  Grey  had  pleaded  a  great  "disinterestedness"  in  Moroccan  matters 
that  led  to  war  almost  on  two  occasions. 

*So  that  Grey  might  force  through  his  claims  on  the  Bagdad-Basra-Koweit 
sector. 


90  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

to  the  British  Charge  d' Affaires  that  the  German  Representative  in 
London  had  received  instructions  not  to  refer  any  more  to  the  Persian 
question,  as,  owing  to  the  explanation  which  the  German  Government 
had  received,  this  question  had  lost  its  acute  character.  I  for  my  part 
can  confirm  that  since  my  last  conversation  with  Count  Pourtales, 
he  has  not  reverted  to  the  Persian  question  again  and  has  in  fact 
shown  himself  more  yielding.^ 


(104)     The  Russian  Ambassador  in  London  to  Iswolsky.    Letter,  May  18- 
31,  1910. 

Hardinge  has  read  to  me  the  report  of  the  British  Charge 
d*Affaires  at  Berlin  concerning  his  recent  conversation  with 
Schon. 

The  German  Minister  first  said  that  he  had  instructed  Count 
Metternich  not  to  refer  again  for  the  present  to  the  Persian  ques- 
tion, and  he  explained  this  by  saying  that  there  had  been  a  mis- 
understanding between  Germany,  Russia  and  England  in  connec- 
tion with  this  matter.  He  thereupon  gave  an  account  of  the 
course  of  the  latest  negotiations.  He  said  that  at  first  they  had  be- 
lieved at  St.  Petersburg  that  Germany  had  the  intention  of  nego- 
tiating with  Persia  in  order  to  secure  various  special  advantages, 
as  also  for  the  purpose  of  concluding  a  loan.  This  misunderstand- 
ing was  soon  cleared  up.  Thereupon,  Germany  had  received  in- 
formation of  a  nature  to  create  the  impression  that  Russia  and 
England,  by  exerting  pressure  on  Persia,  laid  claim  to  privileges 
which  would  have  been  found  hardly  compatible  with  the  rights 
enjoyed  by  Germany.  The  frank  explanations  given  by  both 
sides  had,  however,  also  removed  this  difficulty. 

There  remained  only  the  one  consideration  that  Germany  had 
expressed:  the  desire  that  England  and  Russia  should  not  resort 
to  measures  with  regard  to  Persia  which  might  be  liable  to  dis- 
turb public  opinion  in  Germany.  Schon  added  that  in  certain  circles 
he  had  been  accused  of  having  wished  to  create  difficulties  in  Persia 
similar  to  those  that  had  subsequently  led  to  the  Conference  of  Alge- 
ciras.    Nothing  had  been  further  from  his  mind.  .  .  . 

*The  German  government  retreated  in  the  interest  of  its  plans  of  railroad 
construction  and  commercial  development  in  Turkey-in-Asia. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  IN  PERSIA  91 

The  British  Charge  d*Affaires  looks  upon  this  conversation  as 
indicative  of  a  distinct  change  of  attitiide  on  the  part  of  the  Ber- 
lin Cabinet.  He  thinks  that  one  of  the  reasons  for  this  must  be  sought 
in  the  visit  which  Emperor  William  paid  to  London,  and  that  the  im- 
pressions which  he  had  there  received  had  had  a  decided  influence  on 
the  attitude  of  the  Berlin  Cabinet.  He  also  believes  that  the  lack 
of  support  on  the  part  of  the  Vienna  Cabinet  had  contributed  its 
share  to  this  attitude  of  the  Berlin  Government. 

If  the  views  of  the  British  Charge  d' Affaires  should  be  cor- 
roborated by  subsequent  events,  I  cannot  but  believe  that  the  Ber- 
lin Cabinet  has  been  chiefly  influenced  by  the  fact  that  Russia 
and  England,  while  not  refusing  to  give  Germany  those  explana- 
tions which  she  had  a  right  to  demand,  have  yielded  only  formally 
without  relinquishing  the  least  part  of  the  political  rights  to  which, 
in  view  of  their  geographical  position  and  the  interests  at  stake,  they 
are  entitled  to  lay  claim. 

(105)  Extract  from  a  Report  submitted  by  M.  Sasonoff,  Russian  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the  Czar  concerning  his  Visit  to  Balmoral  in 
October  1912. 

With  regard  to  the  neutral  zone,  I  said  that  sooner 

or  later  we  should  probably  be  obliged  to  revise  our  mutual  atti- 
tude towards  it  with  the  view  of  annulling  it  entirely,^  since  in  the 
present  state  of  affairs,  access  to  this  neutral  one  is  open  to  every- 
body, so  that  it  was  not  protected  against  the  designs  of  third  parties. 
Of  course,  we  should  have  to  endeavour  to  secure  the  consent  of 
Persia  to  any  such  revision,  since  a  revision  without  such  consent 
would  have  no  practical  significance.  Grey  agreed  to  this  on  prin- 
ciple. At  the  same  time  he  suggested  that  an  attempt  should  be  made 
to  render  once  for  all  impossible  undesirable  German  designs  on  the 
neutral  zone  by  Russia  securing  from  the  Persian  Government  the 
option  for  the  construction  of  the  railway  line  from  Teheran  to  Ispa- 
han, and  England  and  Russia  jointly  for  the  section  from  Ispahan 
to  Mohammera.^  It  is  understood  that  the  securing  of  these  options 
shall  oblige  neither  the  one  nor  the  other  Power  to  actually  carry  out 
the  enterprise  in  question,  but  that  the  object  shall  chiefly  be  to  drive 

*  Persia  was  to  be  annexed  entirely. 

'The  quickest  way  to  securing  an  immediate  lien  upon  the  neutral  zone. 


92  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

Germany  out  of  the  neutral  zone  where,  after  the  conclusion  of  such 
a  Convention,  there  would  not  remain  a  single  concession  which  the 
Germans  would  find  tempting} 

I  replied  that  I  was  prepared  to  instruct  our  Minister  at  Teheran 
to  try  and  obtain  such  an  option  from  Persia  by  all  means  in  his 
power,  if  it  were  at  all  possible  to  secure  an  option  from  the  Persian 
Government  which  would  actually  render  vain  any  efforts  which  other 
Powers  might  make  in  the  neutral  zone;  a  fact  of  which  I  was  not 
entirely  convinced.^ 

(106)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sasonoff,  Russian  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs.    Extract  from  Personal  Letter,  Aug.  4-17,  1910. 

.  .  .  There  is  danger  that  England  and  Russia  may  be  forced 
by  the  course  events  are  taking  to  do  the  very  thing  in  Persia  which 
at  bottom  they  wish  to  avoid.  In  this  respect  I  deem  it  my  duty  to 
inform  you  candidly  of  the  point  of  view  taken  by  the  British 
Government. 

Just  as  with  us,  there  is  a  certain  disappointment  noticeable 
here  with  regard  to  the  course  matters  are  taking  at  Teheran ;  this 
disappointment  is  intensified  by  the  absolute  lack  of  capable  per- 
sons in  Persia,  and  the  hopelessness  of  seeing  normal  conditions 
re-established,  though  I  think  that  the  present  Persian  Ministry  is 
looked  upon  as  being  more  efficient  than  its  predecessor.^ 

Still,  the  two  Representatives  at  Teheran  foresee  that,  sooner  or 
later,  the  possibility  of  an  intervention  will  arise,  which  might  even 
lead  to  a  partition  of  Persia  or  at  least  to  a  sort  of  condominium. 
Such  a  conclusion  the  British  Government  will  most  emphatically 
resist.* 

For  one  thing,  England  desires  no  more  annexations ;  ^  she  knows 
from  experience  how  a  Government  may  be  forced  to  resort  to 
such  a  measure.  She  does  not  wish  to  occupy  Persia,  because  she 
is  convinced  that  this  cannot  be  done  without  a  war.    And  then  I 

'  And  yet  Grey  complained  constantly  that  the  Germans  doubted  him. 

'Not  convinced  that  the  Persian  government  would  in  this  manner  abdicate. 

'  Efficiency   was   being   measured   in   terms   of   compliance   to    Russo-Britisl 
dictation. 

*  Its  primary  purpose  in  Persia  being  to  fetter  Russian  enterprise  which 
the  past  had  been  directed  against  Afghanistan,  to  wit :    India. 

'Not  in  keeping  with  later  facts. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  IN  PERSIA  93 

should  like  to  direct  your  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  English 
viewpoint  is  of  a  negative  nature.  England  has  not  so  much  an 
interest  in  what  is  going  on  in  Persia  as  that  she  wants  to  prevent  any 
other  Power  (excepting  herself  and  Russia)  from  playing  a  part  in  that 
country.  This  refers  in  the  first  place  to  Germany  and  to  Turkey,  for 
political  reasons,  be  it  understood.  And  this  is  why  England  has 
been  so  cautious  whenever  it  was  a  question  of  protecting  her  com- 
mercial interests. 

However,  in  this  respect  she  has  had  to  change  her  views  of  late. 
The  disturbances  in  Southern  Persia  are  much  more  serious  than 
was  at  first  believed;  the  dissatisfaction  in  English  commercial 
circles  is  constantly  growing,  and  the  Government  dares  not  expose 
itself  to  being  charged  in  Parliament  with  having  done  less  for 
the  protection  of  British  interests  in  the  South,  than  Russia  has 
been  doing  in  the  North;  this  is  the  explanation  for  the  landing  of 
troops  in  the  South. ^ 

But  this  very  fact  again  is  regarded  by  the  British  Government 
as  a  perilous  beginning,  and  for  this  very  reason  England  has 
always  been  adverse  to  a  military  occupation.  Her  political  in- 
terests do  not  coincide  with  her  commercial  interests.  In  the  eyes  of 
the  British  Government,  the  former  constitute  the  decisive  factor. 
What  the  British  Government  fears  most  is  the  necessity  of  fol- 
lowing our  lead,  or  rather,  that  proposed  by  our  representatives 
at  Teheran.  But  this  must  by  no  means  lead  to  the  conclusion  that 
England  would  be  altogether  adverse  to  supporting  the  mainte- 
nance of  order  in  Persia;  she  is  only  unwilling  to  resort  to  means 
which  would  be  apt  to  inflame  oriental  fanaticism  against  either  her- 
self or  Russia.^ 

As  far  as  I  have  been  able  to  judge  the  English  viewpoint,  what 
people  fear  most  here  is  that  by  exerting  a  pressure  on  Persia, 
that  country  might  be  forced  to  appeal  to  other  Powers  for  assist- 
ance, in  other  words,  to  Germany  and  Turkey.  I  need  not  enter 
upon  the  question  in  which  direction  our  political  interests  tend, 
but  I  cannot  help  stating  that  what  is  true  with  regard  to  England, 
is  still  more  with  reference  to  us.  Northern  Persia  is  another  Man- 
churia,^ and  cannot  be  incorporated  by  us  without  a  war — and  what  a 

*  British  troops.  '  The  ire  of  her  vast  Moslem  population  in  the  colonies. 

'As  Russia  viewed  it. 


94  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

war!  !  !  If  I  enter  into  this  question  thus  at  length,  it  is  only  because 
I  consider  the  present  hour  to  be  full  of  peril.  A  military  interven- 
tion on  our  part  would  necessarily  entail  a  similar  measure  on  the 
part  of  England;  we  could  not  expect  that  she  should  keep  aloof, 
and  from  that  moment  on  the  condominium,  with  all  the  peril  it 
would  entail,  would  begin. 

Permit  me  to  repeat  what  I  already  wrote  to  you:  Owing  to 
the  fact  that  we  have  made  the  occupation  of  Kaswin  the  subject 
matter  of  negotiations  with  the  Persian  Government,  the  numerous 
political  schemers  at  Teheran  have  secured  a  weapon  dangerous 
for  us;  for  these  people  cannot  fail  to  understand  that  the  occu- 
pation of  Kaswin  cannot  but  further  their  cause.  It  is  to  their  in- 
terest that  the  savage  and  blind  fanaticism  of  the  masses  against  us 
shall  continue  to  increase.  The  Persian  Government  thereby  obtains 
an  argument  which  it  can  use  at  one  moment  in  the  Persian  Par- 
liament and  the  next  moment  with  the  other  Powers.  And  if  in 
reply  we  should  say  that  the  presence  of  Russian  troops  only 
serves  to  maintain  general  order  and  security,  the  Persian  Govern 
ment  is  now  in  the  position  to  respond  that  this  is  not  true,  becau 
Russia  is  making  use  of  the  negotiations  concerning  the  withdrawal 
the  troops  in  order  to  secure  further  advantages  for  herself. 

The  intention  of  appointing  subjects  of  the  great  Powers  to 
positions  in  the  Persian  service  is  a  clear  proof  of  the  extent  to 
which  Persia  is  already  directing  her  gaze  abroad.  Italy  may 
perhaps  refuse.  This  country  is  not  fond  of  direct  conflicts.  But 
can  the  same  be  said  of  all  the  Powers?  Before  resolving  upon 
the  one  or  the  other  measure,  one  must  consider  whether  the  trend 
of  affairs  will  not  lead  us  to  a  direct  and  thorough-going  interfer- 
ence in  Persian  matters. 


•n-     i 

1 


Ill 

RUSSIAN  AND  BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  VS. 
MORGAN  SHUSTER 

(August  1910 — ^January  1912) 

(107)  The  Russian  Minister  at  Teheran  to  Sazonoff.    Telegram,  Aug.  5-18, 
1910. 

The  Persian  Government  has  introduced  a  Bill  into  Parliament 
relating  to  the  appointment  of  foreigners,  without  having  previously 
communicated  with  the  two  Legations}  Without  exerting  strong 
pressure  it  will  be  impossible  to  obtain  a  withdrawal  of  the  Bill. 
As  our  main  object  is  to  prevent  the  appointment  of  German  or 
Austrian  instructors  in  the  Persian  army,  it  might  possibly  prove 
sufficient  to  declare  that  the  appointment  of  subjects  of  a  great 
Power  as  instructors,  might  induce  Russia  and  England  to  place 
some  of  their  own  subjects  in  Persian  services. 

(108)  The  Same  to  the  Same.     Telegram,  Aug.  24-Sept.  6,  1910. 

In  the  course  of  a  few  days  Parliament  will  decide  on  the  ques- 
tion relative  to  the  appointment  of  foreigners.  It  is  believed  that 
either  Swiss  or  Americans  will  be  appointed  to  posts  in  the  Ministry  of 
Finance.  Parliament  is  averse  to  the  appointment  of  Belgians.  As 
regards  the  Swiss,  the  British  Minister,  speaking  in  the  name  of  his 
Government,  has  expressed  the  hope  that  they  will  not  belong  to  the 
German-Swiss  Cantons,  as  they  would  otherwise  enjoy  the  protection 
of  the  German  Legation.  The  Americans  appear  to  have  the  biggest 
chances,  they  being  now  all  the  more  popular  since  the  American 
Minister  here  has  refused  to  sig^  the  Note  of  Protest  jointly  sub- 

*  Which  was  its  right,  under  the  principle  of  sovereignty. 

95 


96  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

mitted  by  the  diplomatic  corps  relating  to  the  monopoly  of  trade 
in  hides. 

(109)  Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Minister  at  Teheran.     Telegram,  Aug.  26- 

Sept.  8,  1910. 

We  believe  that  in  itself  the  appointment  of  Americans  as  finan- 
cial Advisers  will  not  in  any  way  endanger  our  interests ;  however, 
the  mere  fact  that  subjects  of  a  great  Power  are  being  appointed  proves 
that  the  Persians  do  not  desire  to  follow  the  advice  given  by  Russia 
and  England.  Besides,  the  appointment  of  Americans  constitutes 
a  precedent  in  view  of  which  it  will  prove  hard  to  prevent  the  ap- 
pointment of  the  subjects  of  other  great  Powers,  and  hence  an 
enlargement  of  the  sphere  of  influence  of  these  latter.  I  have 
spoken  to  0*Beirne  in  respect  to  this  point. 

(110)  The  Russian  Minister  at  Teheran  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram,  Aug.  28- 
Sept.  10,  1910.    No.  564. 

I  concur  with  your  views  that  the  appointment  of  Americans 
will  not  impair  our  interests,  but  doubt  whether  this  might  be  con- 
strued as  a  case  in  precedent  since  the  United  States  are  not  a 
European  Great  Power,  and  since  they  pursue  no  political  aims  in 
Persia.  Still,  it  cannot  be  denied  that  the  Persian  Government  has 
not  followed  our  advice  in  this  regard.  However,  without  resorting 
to  extreme  measures,  we  shall  be  unable  to  cause  the  decision  arrived 
at  to  be  cancelled.  If  our  two  Governments  desire  to  avoid  this  it 
would  be  best  to  disregard  the  question  entirely  so  far  as  the  P< 
sian  Government  is  concerned,  and  to  address  ourselves  to  tl 
Governments  of  those  countries  from  among  the  subjects  of  whi< 
the  Persian  Government  desires  to  obtain  its  foreign  advisei 
To  constantly  tender  advice  to  this  Government  which  is  never  fc 
lowed,^  only  lessens  our  prestige. 

(111)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at   Washington   to   Sazonoff.     Telegram, 

Sept.  20-Oct.  3,  1910. 

I  have  received  a  Memorial  from  the  Department  of  State, 
translation  of  which  reads  as  follows : 

*  Such  methods  contributed  constantly  toward  making  international  affairs 
long  crisis.    Governments  friendly  disposed  toward  Russia  would  have  respect*  _ 
its  wishes,  while  governments  with  threatened  commercial  interests  in  Persia  would 
have  been  obliged  to  answer  the  Russians  in  a  manner  that  would  have  given  offense. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  VS.  SHUSTER        97 

"The  Department  of  State  duly  appreciates  the  statements  made  by 
the  Russian  and  British  Governments  that  the  United  States  had  no 
special  interests  in  Persia.  In  reply  to  an  inquiry,  Great  Britain 
has  caused  the  Federal  Government  to  be  informed,  through  the 
American  Embassy  in  London,  that  "Both  Governments  had  agreed 
not  to  raise  at  all  this  question  in  Persia." 

"Up  to  the  present,  the  Department  of  State  has  received  no 
inquiry  on  the  part  of  Persia  with  regard  to  the  appointment  of 
American  Advisers,  and  the  Department  is  not  awaiting  any  such 
step.  Consequently  no  cause  exists  for  taking  any  measures  in 
this  connection." 

(112)  Sasonoff  to  the  Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  in  London.     Telegram. 
Sept.  13-26,  1910.    No.  1420. 

I  have  recently  told  the  British  Charge  d' Affaires  that  in  view 
of  the  disinclination  shown  by  the  Persians  to  comply  with  our 
just  demands,^  and  the  impossibility  of  settling  even  unimportant 
current  questions,  /  anticipate  that  we  shall  have  to  exert  pressure 
upon  Persia;  and  I  have  asked  him  whether  the  London  Cabinet  were 
of  the  same  opinion. 

O'Beime  has  asked  Grey,  and  then  told  me  that  the  latter  was 
rather  adverse  to  any  project  of  exerting  joint  pressure.  I  replied 
in  return  that  I  shall  not  insist  on  maintaining  my  view  in  ordei 
not  to  disturb  the  existing  understanding  in  Persian  affairs,  but 
that  I  shall  probably  be  compelled  to  resort  to  coercive  measures  on  my 
own  account;  thus  for  example  we  should  refuse  to  make  an  excep- 
tion to  the  general  rule  forbidding  any  transit  trade  through  the  Cau- 
casus in  favour  of  Persians,^  and  the  like. 

(113)  The  Russian  Charge  d*Affaires  in  London  to  Sasonoff.     Telegram, 
Sept.  15-28,  1910.    No.  242. 

Your  telegram  No.  1420  received. 

In  consideration  of  the  fact  that  it  will  be  most  undesirable  to  allow 
anything  to  interfere  with  the  Anglo-Russian  agreement  in  Persia, 
Grey  wired  to  the  British  Minister  at  Teheran,  instructing  him  to  sup-* 
port  his  Russian  colleague  in  the  negotiations  with  the  Persian  Govern- 

*  Popular  resentment  of  the  Persians  against  the  division  of  their  country. 
'  Embargo  used  to  make  the  Persians  amenable  to  Russian  wishes. 


98  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

ment,  on  the  understanding,  however,  that  our  troops  shall  be  recalled 
in  the  near  future.  As  England  will,  in  consequence,  most  probably 
resort  to  stronger  measures  in  Persia,  she  will  in  turn  have  to  rein- 
force the  number  of  the  troops  she  is  maintaining  as  a  guard  in  South- 
ern Persia. 


(114)     Sasonoff   to    the   Russian   Minister   at    Teheran.      Telegram,   Sept. 
16-29,  1910. 

The  British  Charge  d' Affaires  told  me  yesterday  that  Grey 
could  admit  of  no  differences  of  opinion  in  Persian  matters,  and 
that  he  intended  to  adhere  strictly  to  the  terms  of  our  understand- 
ing. He  is  prepared  to  exercise  joint  pressure  on  the  Persians  and  he 
expects  that  we,  for  our  part,  will  support  him  in  the  question  of  pro- 
tecting the  South-Persian  roads.^ 


(115)     The  Russian  Minister  at  Teheran  to  Sasonoff.     Telegram,  Sept.  18- 
Oct.  1,  1910. 

The  British  Minister  has  received  categorical  instructions  to  sup- 
port our  demands.  Grey  adds  that  the  solidarity  of  the  two  Lega- 
tions was  far  more  important  than  any  considerations  relating  to 
the  maintaining  in  office  of  the  present  Persian  Ministry. 


(116)     Sasonoff  to  the  Russian  Minister  at  Teheran.     Very  Secret  Letter, 
Sept.  25-Oct.  8.  1910.    No.  884. 

As  you  already  know  we  have  succeeded  in  inducing  the  London 
Cabinet  to  consent  to  joint  pressure  being  exerted  on  the  Persian  Gov- 
ernment in  order  to  oblige  this  latter  to  accept  the  terms  subject  to 
which  we  are  prepared  to  withdraw  our  troops  from  Kaswin,  and  in 
order  also  to  settle  as  quickly  as  possible  the  question  of  the  con- 
version and  unification  of  the  sums  owed  to  our  Bank. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  has  sent  the  necessary  instructions  to  the 
British  Minister  at  Teheran  and  has  pointed  out  the  necessity  of 

*  Grey's  and  Sazonoff 's  mind  were  about  to  meet  on  a  plane  that  was  to  be 
created  by  situations  and  contingencies  as  they  developed.  Neither  the  Rus- 
sian nor  the  British  diplomatists  seemed  to  realize  that  such  was  the  ultimate! 
hope,  if  not  plan,  of  both  men. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  VS.  SHUSTER        99 

conforming  to  the  spirit  of  the  Anglo-Russian  Convention,  and  of 
allowing  no  differences  of  opinion  to  prevail  in  connection  with 
questions  of  a  fundamental  nature  touching  the  policy  to  be  pur- 
sued in  Persia. 

Considerations,  which  are  based  on  a  firm  foundation,  prompt  me 
to  say  that  the  London  Cabinet  looks  upon  the  Anglo-Russian  Con- 
vention of  1907  as  being  important  for  the  Asiatic  interests  of  England; 
but  that  this  Convention  possesses  a  still  greater  importance  for  Eng- 
land from  the  viewpoint  of  the  policy  which  is  being  pursued  by 
England  in  Europe}  For  this  reason  we  need  entertain  no  doubts 
but  that  political  circles  in  England  are  actually  desirous  of  adher- 
ing strictly  to  the  terms  of  the  Anglo-Russian  Convention. 

These  considerations  are  of  great  moment  for  us,  as  we  may  rest 
assured  that  the  English,  engaged  in  the  pursuit  of  political  aims  of  vital 
importance  in  Europe,  may,  in  case  of  necessity,  be  prepared  to  sacri- 
fice certain  interests  in  Asia  in  order  to  keep  a  Convention  alive  which 
is  of  such  importance  to  them.  This  is  a  circumstance  which  we  can, 
of  course,  exploit  for  ourselves,  as,  for  instance,  in  Persian  affairs^ 

For  the  present  we  must  wait  and  see  the  results  of  the  joint 
steps  which  you  and  your  British  colleague  are  to  undertake.  If 
the  Persians  accept  our  terms,  we  shall  withdraw  our  troops  from 
Persia.  Perhaps  this  will  at  last  produce  a  fundamental  change 
in  Persian  policy,  and  we  shall  then  be  able  to  settle  under  normal 
conditions  the  large  number  of  unsettled  questions,  that  have 
heaped  up  in  the  course  of  the  last  few  years.  I  must,  however, 
confess  that  I  have  little  hope  that  the  Persians  will  prove  com- 
pliant seeing  that  they  have  obviously  lost  the  ability  of  adapting  them- 
selves to  the  altered  political  situation.^  If,  notwithstanding,  we  do 
make  a  last  attempt,  it  is  mainly  prompted  by  the  wish  to  put  an 
end  to  an  unnatural  state  of  affairs  which  compels  us  to  keep  our 
troops  in  Persia,  without  any  advantage  whatsoever,  and  also  be- 
cause we  would  exhaust  all  possible  means  of  arriving  at  a  peace- 
able solution  of  the  question  before  resorting  to  stronger  measures. 

In  no  case,  however,  can  we  allow  things  to  go  on  in  the  way 

*  The  reduction  of  Germany. 

'Which  Russia  did — not  only  in  Persia  but  also  in  China,  as  shown  by  the 
documents. 

'  To  wit :   Resented  still  the  occupation  and  proposed  partition  of  the  country. 


\ 


100         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

they  have  done  up  to  the  present.  We  can  no  longer  permit  a  state 
of  affairs  to  continue  in  which  not  only  the  interests  but  also  the  au- 
thority and  the  prestige  of  Russia,  are  hound  to  suffer.  For  this 
reason  we  shall  have  to  adopt  coercive  measures,  as  already  stated 
in  my  telegram  No.  1420,  if  this  our  last  attempt  should  prove 
futile. 

To  repeat,  I  do  not  think  matters  will  pass  off  without  our  having 
been  obliged  to  exert  pressure  on  the  Persian  Government.  In  any 
case,  the  exact  plan  to  be  followed  in  carrying  these  measures  into 
effect  must  be  worked  out  in  order  to  be  able,  if  necessary,  to  em- 
ploy it  at  once.  In  this  connection,  we  must  in  the  first  place 
keep  in  view  the  fact  that  these  measures  are  not  intended  to  ob- 
tain satisfaction  in  certain  concrete  questions,  but  that  they  are 
rather  intended  to  convince  the  Persians  that  our  wishes  must  not 
be  constantly  opposed  and  that  they  must  give  up  their  demonstrative, 
unfriendly  policy  toward  Russia}  For  this  reason  these  measures 
must  by  no  means  assume  the  character  of  our  wishing  to  arrive  at  an 
understanding  with  the  Persians.  We  must  not  begin  to  bargain 
with  them,  but  we  must  convince  them  that  we  do  not  intend  to 
resume  friendly  relations  with  Persia  merely  on  this  or  that  con- 
cession being  granted,  but  only  when  their  entire  policy  towards 
us  has  undergone  a  radical  change. 

I  am  also  proceeding  from  the  consideration  that  Persia  needs 
us  much  more  than  we  do  Persia;  and  we  command  sufficient 
means  of  making  this  plain  to  them.  My  idea  is  that  we  might  for 
this  purpose  resort  to  a  system  of  petty  annoyances,^  such,  for  in- 
stance, as  refusing  to  grant  their  constant  requests  for  the  import, 
free  of  duty,  of  various  objects  intended  for  the  Court  and  the 
Government;  by  systematically  refusing  to  grant  recognition  to  newly 
appointed  Persian  Consuls;  by  conferring  no  more  Russian  distinc- 
tions upon  Persian  officials;  by  insisting,  more  strongly  than  up  to 
the  present,  that  the  Persian  Minister  here  shall  pay  the  rent  for 
the  Legation  and  for  the  disbursements  in  respect  of  telegrams,^ 
by   refusing    to    issue   permits    for    the    import    of    hides,    and    the 


*  Because  the  Persians  were  opposed  to  becoming  a  Russian  colony. 
'Sazonoflf  in  the  role  of  "agent  provocateur.*' 
'  A  fine  state  of  affairs,  to  be  sure. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  VS.  SHUSTER      101 

like,  into  Russia.  After  this,  one  might  proceed  to  more  weighty 
measures,  such  as  refusing  to  grant  Persia  the  right  to  purchase  or 
transport  arms  and  ammunition,  both  of  such  importance  for  Persia; 
creating  difficulties  in  the  import  of  Persian  products  into  Russia  on 
the  pretense  of  their  violating  sanitary  regulations ;  sending  small 
detachments  of  troops  for  the  protection  of  landed  property  belong- 
ing to  our  subjects  in  Persia;  arranging  with  our  Ministry  of  Finance 
to  grant  no  loans  or  allow  any  other  financial  operations,  an  inhibition 
which  will  be  most  keenly  felt  by  the  Persians;  this  last,  however, 
not  to  interfere  with  payments  required  for  the  upkeep  of  the  cossack 
brigade  which  must  not  be  weakened^  but  rather  strengthened} 

Finally,  if  all  these  measures  should  prove  vain,  we  might 
then  resort  to  the  extreme  measures  proposed  by  you  in  your 
telegram  No.  177,  namely,  of  refusing  to  keep  up  any  diplomatic 
relations  with  the  Ministry;  of  stating  that  our  troops,  far  from  be- 
ing recalled,  would  be  reinforced;  of  demanding  the  payment  of  the 
debts;  of  occupying  the  custom  houses,  and  finally  threatening  to  enter 
Teheran.  It  will,  naturally,  be  desirable  to  avoid,  if  possible,  the 
adoption  of  such  extreme  measures.  I  share  your  view,  however, 
that  things  will  not  come  to  such  an  extremity,  and  that  the  op- 
position of  the  Persians  will  be  broken  before  we  have  exhausted 
this  entire  series  of  coercive  measures. 

The  measures  which  I  propose  are,  of  course,  merely  by  way  of 
example  and  I  leave  it  entirely  to  you  to  devise  the  exact  plan,  since  you 
are  far  more  familiar  with  the  local  conditions.'^  Let  us  therefore 
have  your  views  as  soon  as  possible,  and,  if  need  be,  by  telegram, 
should  you  believe  the  moment  for  employing  these  coercive 
measures  to  be  approaching.  Nor  must  the  fact  be  lost  sight 
of  that  some  of  the  measures  proposed  will  take  some  time  to 
carry  through,  since  it  will  be  necessary  to  this  end  to  communi- 
cate with  the  different  departments  concerned.  I  would  also  ask 
you  to  abstain  from  employing  measures  apt  to  interfere  with 
our  trade  relations  with  Persia,  and  if  possible  also  from  such 
as  would  chiefly  fall  hard  upon  the  poorer  sections  of  the  Per- 
sian populations,  as  for  example,  the  labourers  coming  periodically 

*And  such  a  mind  groomed  the  foreign  relations  and  affairs  of  a  mighty 
empire. 

'*  Mere  hints  as  to  how  far  one  might  go. 


ENTkNTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


over  to  Russia;  since  it  would  be  unjust  to  make  such  people] 
suffer  for  the  misdemeanours  of  the  Persian  Government,^  It  is 
this  consideration  which  has  also  induced  me  to  refrain  from 
coercive  measures  which  in  themselves  would  prove  very  effec- 
tive, such  as  the  re-introduction  of  passport-fees  in  favour  of  the 
Red  Cross,  and  the  refusal  to  vise  Persian  passports. 

We  could,  of  course,  count  upon  quicker  results  if  the  pressure 
to  be  exerted  on  Persia  were  brought  to  bear  upon  her  not  only 
by  us,  but  also  by  England.  However,  I  see  no  prospect  in  the 
present  situation  of  affairs  of  inducing  England  to  take  part  in  the  sys- 
tem of  coercive  measures  contemplated  by  us.  On  the  other  hand, 
I  am  convinced  that  the  present  action  of  the  Persians  is  not  only 
affecting  our  interests  but  those  of  the  English  as  well,  since  it 
is  estranging  Persia  from  us  and  furthering  the  introduction  of 
German  influences;  a  fact  as  little  compatible  with  our  own,  as 
with  British  interests.  Should  you  succeed  in  convincing  the 
British  Minister  at  Teheran  of  this,  then  his  reports  to  London 
might  perhaps  induce  Grey  to  join  us.  However,  this  is  a  mere 
idea  on  my  part,  and  I  do  not  know  whether  you  can  carry  it  out. 

But,  of  course,  I  do  not  deem  it  necessary  that  you  inform  your 
British  colleague  of  all  the  details  of  our  plan,  still  less  that  you  de- 
vise details  together  with  him,  since  this  would  undoubtedly  increase 
his  opposition  to  our  system.^ 


I 


(117) 


The  Russian  Minister  at  Teheran  to  Sazonoff. 
26,  1910. 


Telegram,  Oct, 


Your  letter  No.  884  received. 

The  steps  taken  by  me  so  far,  in  which  I  was  supported  by 
the  British  Minister,  have  as  yet  yielded  no  results.  The  ministry 
made  me  a  proposal  yesterday,  which  in  fact,  means  a  step  forward, 
but  which,  nevertheless,  is  not  acceptable,  so  that  I  have  refused 
to  submit  it  to  you,  although  of  course  I  shall  do  so  by  post. 

In  any  case,  political  circles  here  appear  to  comprehend  the 
necessity  of  establishing  normal  relations  with  us,  all  the  more. 


*  An  admission  that  the  excesses  of  his  troops  in  Persia  were  not  always 
justified. 

'Barclay  opposed  the  Russian  minister  at  Teheran  almost  constantly. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  VS.  SHUSTER      103 

as  disturbances  are  breaking  out  in  all  parts  of  the  country,  and 
it  is  believed  that  these  disturbances  are  being  supported  by  us. 
I  have  more  gratifying  news  to  report  as  to  the  negotiations  in 
connection  with  the  conversion,^  the  hopes  entertained  of  an  early 
resignation  of  the  Ministry,  and  the  anticipated  arrival  of  the 
Regent. 

In  order  to  force  the  Persian  Government  to  yield  to  our  wishes, 
I  deem  it  necessary  to  insist  on  my  present  demands,  and  at  the 
same  time  to  abstain  from  discussing  all  other  current  questions. 
The  coercive  measures  (1st  and  2nd  category)  which  you  propose, 
are  not  of  a  nature  to  at  once  produce  a  strong  effect  since  a  sea- 
sonable opportunity  must  be  waited  for  until  they  can  be  employed. 
It  will  however  prove  expedient  to  refuse  the  Persians  the  transit  of 
all  objects  including  arms  and  ammunition;  furthermore,  we  should 
not  only  refuse  the  recognition  of  the  Persian  Consuls,  but  also  of 
all  Governors  and  other  officials  who  are  not  agreeable  to  us;  we 
should  demand  payment  from  the  Persian  Legation  at  St.  Petersburg ; 
assume  a  neutral  attitude  in  the  conflict  between  the  Government 
and  the  revolutionaries,  and  finally  grant  no  financial  aid  whatso- 
ever to  Persia. 

Finally,  we  might  completely  ignore  Mukhbir,^  and  I  could, 
in  certain  cases,  act  perfectly  independently  in  order  to  secure 
redress  for  any  rights  of  Russian  subjects  that  had  been  violated. 
The  measures  with  regard  to  the  hides  would  not  be  desirable, 
since  the  effect  would  be  felt  by  Persian  merchants,  and  not  by  the 
Government ;  any  reprisals  on  the  Persian  import  to  Russia  would 
likewise  only  cause  damage  to  our  trade.^  Should  our  relations  to 
Persia  come  to  a  crisis,  and  should  the  Government  of  the  Shah 
persist  in  infringing  our  rights,  the  most  effective  means  to  bring 
home  to  the  great  mass  of  the  population  the  state  of  affairs  that 
had  been  created,  would  be  to  entirely  close  our  frontiers.  The 
extreme  measures  indicated  by  you  would  then  follow  as  a  logi- 
cal sequence.  My  personal  opinion,  however,  is  that  the  Persians 
will  yield  before  this  point  has  been  reached,  and  the  arrival  of 

*  Of  certain  loans  and  bond  issues. 
'  Persian  minister  of  foreign  affairs. 

'Showing  that  Poklewski-Koziel  was  a  better  statesman  than  Sazonoff,  his 
superior. 


104 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


the  Regent  as  early  as  possible  would  certainly  go  far  to  relieve 
the  situation. 


(118)     Sasonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.    Telegram,  Jan.  15- 
28,  1911,    No.  62. 

The  appointment  of  American  experts  is  contrary  to  our  Con- 
vention with  England  to  the  effect  that  the  Persian  Government  was 
not  to  appoint  any  subjects  of  Great  Powers,^  this  again  would  give 
Germany  the  possibility  of  insisting  on  the  appointment  of  German 
experts.  The  French  Ambassador,  who  is  very  much  disturbed  by 
this  fact,  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  German  Government  will  certainly 
avail  itself  of  the  opportunity  which  thus  offers  itself.  I  would  ask 
you  to  ascertain  as  soon  as  possible  to  what  extent  the  Americans  are 
entitled  to  maintain  that  England  is  raising  no  objection  to  the  ap- 
pointment of  Americans. 


I 


(119) 


The  Russian  Ambassador  in  London  to  Sasonoff.    Telegram,  Jan,  19- 
Feb.  1,  1911.    No.  13. 


i 


Your  telegram  No.  62  received. 

Grey  writes  me  privately  that  when  the  Russian  and  British  Gov- 
ernment discussed  this  question  last  September  they  had  agreed  that 
the  appointment  of  Americans  should  raise  no  difficulties,  the  United 
States  not  being  a  Great  Power  in  Europe,  and  as  a  result  of  this  de- 
cision the  Ministers  at  Teheran  had  made  a  corresponding  communica- 
tion to  the  Persian  Government  on  Sept.  29. 

//  you  do  so  desire,  Grey  is  prepared  to  make  official  inquiries  as 
to  whether  the  United  States  intends  to  insist  on  this  point.  Grey 
however  believes  it  will  be  difficult  to  alter  the  attitude  taken  up  last 
September.  He  does  not  believe  that  the  Persians  will  appoint 
any  other  foreigners  except  Americans,  */  Russia  and  England 
should  declare  that  in  such  a  case  they  zvill  have  to  insist  on  the  ap- 
pointment of  Russians  and  Englishmen.^  Buchanan  has  orders  to 
talk  to  you  about  this  matter.  He  himself  was  on  leave  in  Septem- 
ber and  knows  nothing  of  these  negotiations. 

'  On  September  8th,  1910,  Sazonoflf  was  not  entirely  of  that  opinion. 

'To  which  the  Persians  objected,  because  employing  Russians  and  English- 
men appeared  dangerous,  placing  Persia  more  and  more  under  the  control  of  the 
two  imperial  governments. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  VS.  SHUSTER      105 

(120)  Neratoff,  Acting  Russian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the  Russian 

Ambassador  at  London.     Telegram,  June  2S-July  11,  1911. 

Our  minister  at  Teheran  wires  sub  No.  1524  as  follows: 
It  turns  out  that  one  of  the  new  Americans  is  to  be  an  officer 
who  is  intended  to  organise  a  special  military  police  to  act  as  tax 
collectors  in  the  service  of  the  Treasurer-General.  The  British 
Minister  has  communicated  to  me  as  a  secret  that  Shuster  ^  had 
offered  the  post  to  Stokes  who  is  leaving  his  post  as  Military 
Attache  to  the  British  Legation  at  Teheran  next  October.  The 
letter  points  to  the  fact  that  Stokes*  field  of  activity  will  lie  mainly, 
though  not  exclusively  in  Southern  Persia. 

I  beg  to  point  out  that  this  appointment  of  Stokes  would  run 
counter  to  the  principle  that  only  the  subjects  of  minor  Powers 
shall  be  allowed  to  accept  such  posts.  Besides,  it  seems  to  me  that 
we  could  only  approve  of  the  appointment  of  Stokes  provided  a  Rus- 
sian officer  were  to  be  appointed  to  fulfil  a  similar  function  within 
our  sphere  of  influence,  or  if  the  organisation  of  the  Persian  forces 
were  entrusted  to  us.  However,  I  think  this  latter  will  be  scarcely 
possible  while  the  present  Parliament  lasts. 

(121)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  July  4-17,  1911.    No.  903. 

The  appointment  of  Stokes  would  have  an  unfavourable  effect  on 
public  opinion  in  Russia,^  and  would  cause  rumours  to  arise  as  to 
differences  of  opinion  between  Russia  and  England  in  regard  to 
Persia.  Please  ask  the  London  Cabinet  whether  it  would  not  care 
to  exert  a  pressure  on  Stokes  in  order  to  induce  him  to  refuse  the 
post  offered  him.  We  fear  that  otherwise  we  should  be  under  the 
necessity  of  demanding  compensations,  such  for  example,  as  the  re- 
organisation of  the  Persian  forces  by  Russian  officers. 

(122)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Neratoff.     Telegram,  July 
4-17,  1911.    No.  149. 

The  Stokes  incident  is  very  much  regretted  here  and  it  is 
feared  that  complications  will  arise,  the  more  so  as,  when  Stokes 
actually  takes  his  discharge,  it  will  prove  difficult  to  exert  any  in- 

*  Morgan  Shuster,  United  States  citizen;  financial  adviser  of  the  Persian 
government. 

'  Public  opinion  in  Russia  was  moulded  by  a  governmentally  controlled  press. 
The  manner  of  control  is  indicated  in  these  documents. 


106 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


fluence  on  him,  and  Shuster  also  appears  to  have  a  character  hard 
to  deal  with. 


(123)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London   to   the  Russian   Minister  at 
Teheran.     Telegram,  July  4-17,  1911.    No.  150. 


Confidential.  Nicolson  informs  me  in  confidence  that  ther 
is  a  possibility  of  Stokes  and  even  Shuster  resigning.  Great  im 
portance  is  attached  to  the  incident  here. 


1 


(124) 


The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Neratoff. 
13-26,  1911.    No.  160. 


Telegram,  July 


1 


Grey  told  me  to-day,  Stokes  had  been  asked  to  quit  the  Eng- 
lish service.  He  thinks  this  was  sufficiently  plain.  Grey  does  not 
wish  to  take  any  further  steps,  as  this  might  cause  Shuster  to  re- 
sign, and  he  might  then  be  accused  of  having  put  obstacles  in  the 
way  of  the  financial  reorganisation  of  Persia  as  he  otherwise  looks 
upon  Shuster  as  the  proper  person.  However,  Grey  also  appre- 
ciates your  point  of  view,  and  has  no  objection  to  offer  if  we  were 
to  demand  compensation  and  were  to  refer  to  the  fact  that  Stokes 
is  an  Englishman.  Grey  will  not  oppose  this  point  of  view  at 
Teheran,  which  would  prove  that  both  Governments  are  acti 
in  concert. 


(125)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Aug.  4-17,  1911.    No.  189. 


Grey  has  asked  me  to  call  upon  him.  He  told  me  that 
could  not  but  gather  from  the  advices  which  he  had  received  from 
St.  Petersburg,  that  you  did  not  entirely  do  justice  to  the  efforts 
he  had  made.  Stokes  has  been  refused  his  discharge  until  the  en- 
tire incident  is  settled.^  It  thus  follows  that  the  personal  interests 
of  Stokes  play  no  part  in  influencing  Grey's  attitude;  he,  Grey, 
had  found  the  Persian  reply  inadequate,  and  had  at  once  informed 
Shuster  that  a  subject  of  a  minor  Power  would  have  to  be  ap- 
pointed in  place  of  Stokes;  he  had  seconded  all  our  protests  at  Te- 
heran.^ 

*  To  wit :  He  was  being  retained  in  the  British  military  service  and  prevente 
from  entering  the  Persian  fiscal  police  service. 

*  His  real  reason  being  that  this  made  it  impossible  for  the  Russian  goveri 
ment  to  claim  "compensations,"  such  as  putting  the  Persian  army  under  a  Ri 
sian  officer. 


] 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  VS.  SHUSTER      107 

Grey  reminded  me  of  the  public  statements  he  had  made  in 
Parliament,  and  he  added  that  he  had  hoped  they  would  have  made 
a  better  impression  in  Russia.  /  replied  that  I  had  received  a  tele- 
gram from  you  asking  me  again  to  point  out  to  him  the  extreme 
gravity  of  the  situation.  I  added  that  it  appeared  that  the  British 
Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  had  failed  to  inform  you  of  the 
fact  that  the  Persian  reply  had  been  regarded  as  inadequate  in 
London,  and  of  the  steps  since  then  undertaken  as  to  Shuster. 
Finally,  Grey  said  that  he  might  be  accused  in  Parliament  of  con- 
cerning himself  more  with  Russian  interests  in  the  North,  than 
with  the  British  in  the  South,  where  the  situation  is  constantly 
growing  worse.  For  this  reason  he  now  asked  you  to  take  the 
initiative  and  he,  for  his  part,  would  support  you  at  Teheran. 

(126)  Neratoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.     Telegram,  Aug. 

6-19,  1911.    No.  1101. 

We  learn  that  the  British  Minister  at  Teheran  has  received 
instructions  to  communicate  to  the  Persian  Government  that  if 
it  insists  on  the  appointment  of  Stokes,  the  British  Government  will  re- 
fuse to  permit  this  officer  to  resign  from  the  English  service.  This 
communication  will  dispose  of  the  whole  question,  and  I  see  in 
this  decision  of  Grey's  another  proof  of  the  unanimity  of  our 
action  in  Persia. 

(127)  The  Russian  Minister  at  Teheran  to  Neratoff.    Telegram,  Aug.  9-22, 
1911.    No.  703. 

Shuster  called  on  me  yesterday  and  informed  me  that  in  view 
of  the  recent  steps  undertaken  by  the  two  Governments  in  the 
Stokes  affair,  there  was  nothing  left  for  him  to  do  but  to  publish  a 
statement  explaining  the  reasons  which  paralyse  his  activity  in  Persia. 
The  main  reason  is  the  change  of  attitude  taken  up  by  England, 
which  has  taken  place  as  a  result  of  our  influence;  and  this  circum- 
stance prompts  him  to  hand  in  his  resignation. 

Returning  to  the  Stokes  affair,  he  declared  that  there  was  no 
person  in  Persia  really  fit  to  undertake  the  reorganisation  of  the 
financial  gendarmerie  since  even  the  Swedish  officers  who  have 
just  arrived,  declare  that  they  would  hardly  be  able  to  do  any 


108 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


useful  work  before  the  lapse  of  a  year,  being,  as  they  are,  un- 
familiar with  the  local  conditions  and  the  language.  Yet  every 
delay  in  the  collection  of  the  customs  threatens  complete  ruin  to 
Persia,  and  will  make  it  impossible  even  to  commence  any  finan- 
cial reforms. 

Shuster  points  to  the  fact  that  any  exercise  of  generosity  in 
this  question  could  only  serve  to  heighten  Russia's  prestige  and 
he,  for  his  part,  was  prepared  to  engage  himself  that  Stokes  will 
only  remain  six  months  at  Teheran  and  will  then  be  sent  to  the 
South,  while  the  control  of  the  gendarmerie  in  Northern  Persia 
will  be  handed  over  to  the  charge  of  officers  belonging  to  one  of 
the  smaller  Powers,  or  even  to  Russia,  provided  the  Russian  Gov- 
ernment should  so  desire.  In  view  of  the  suspicion  harboured 
by  the  Persians,  it  was  difficult  for  him  (Shuster)  to  enter  upon 
a  formal  engagement  in  this  respect,  but  he  cherishes  the  hope 
of  finally  obtaining  even  this  from  the  Persians.  He  mentioned 
the  negotiations  he  had  entered  into  with  the  house  of  Seligmann, 
and  he  declared  himself  ready  to  hasten  the  conclusion  of  the  con- 
version-loan with  all  means  at  his  disposal,  on  the  condition 
that  the  Persian  Government  were  to  dispose  of  a  million  Pounds 
sterling. 

In  conclusion,  Shtister  assured  me  that  in  his  future  activity  in 
Persia  he  would  duly  consider  the  interests  of  both  Russia  and  Eng- 
land, and  he  begged  me  to  bring  this  to  the  knowledge  of  the  Rus- 
sian Government.  I  promised  to  do  so,  but  extended  no  hopes  as  to  his 
proposal  meeting  with  complete  approval. 

I  must  confess  that  I  have  been  impressed  by  the  conversa- 
tion with  Shuster;  there  certainly  can  be  no  doubt  that  Shuster*s 
resignation  would  cause  many  difficulties  to  the  British  Govern- 
ment, both  in  the  English,  and  particularly,  in  the  American  press. 
Perhaps  our  Government  will  consider  it  possible  to  accept  Shuster's 
proposal^  seeing  that  we  have  obtained  full  satisfaction  in  the  Stokes 
affair.  Should  this  be  the  case,  we  might  ask  Shuster  to  give  us  his 
written  promise  that  he  will  fulfil  the  conditions  relating  to  Stokes 
and  the  conclusion  of  the  loan.  Besides,  it  would  be  preferable  to 
allow  Stokes  to  remain  in  the  British  service,  in  order  to  enable 
the  British  Government  likewise  to  exercise  an  influence  upon  his 
actions  in  the  future. 


I 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  VS.  SHUSTER      109 

(128)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Neratoff.     Telegram,  Aug. 
10-23,  1911.    No.  193. 

During  the  negotiations  as  to  Stokes,  both  Grey  and  Nicolson 
have  repeatedly  expressed  their  anxiety  that  the  possibility  of  Shuster's 
resignation  would  once  again  render  questionable  any  serious  reform 
of  Persian  finances;  this  in  itself  would  be  very  regrettable,  and 
would  call  forth  strong  opposition.  I  believe  that  it  will  be  to  our 
interest  duly  to  consider  this  fact,  now  that  our  point  of  view  has 
in  principle  found  recognition,  and  that  the  statements  made  by 
Shuster  to  our  Minister  prove  that  his  attitude  is  changing  and  that 
he  now  appeals  to  us  as  a  last  resort.  Should  Your  Excellency  share 
my  views,  then,  it  would  appear  to  me  desirable  to  arrive  at  a 
decision  relating  to  this  as  speedily  as  possible,  in  order  to  confer 
upon  it  the  character  of  a  generous  concession  granted  in  the  interest 
of  Persia,^  and  before  an  agitation  sets  in  here  and  at  Teheran. 

(129)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Letter,  Oct.  7-20,  1911. 

I  have  forwarded  to  you  an  article  published  in  the  "Times" 
relating  to  the  public  accusations  made  by  Shuster.  The  latter 
alleges  that  Russia  and  England  are  violating  the  independence  and 
integrity  of  Persia.^  The  proof  for  this  allegation  he  sees  in  the 
breaking-off  of  his  negotiations  with  our  Minister  in  connection 
with  the  organisation  of  a  special  gendarmerie  and  the  temporary 
part  which  he  had  destined  for  Major  Stokes.  The  "Times"  denies 
these  charges,  both  in  regard  to  Russia  and  England.^  Whilst  Sir 
Arthur  Nicolson  told  me  with  great  concern  that  he  had  received 
bad  news  from  Persia,  he  made  no  allusion  to  this  matter,  with 
respect  to  which  I  have  no  other  information  but  that  published 
in  the  **Times."  Nicolson  spoke  only  of  the  possibility  of  a  Minis- 
terial crisis,  the  probability  of  the  formation  of  a  radical  national- 
ist Cabinet  and  the  resignation  of  the  Persian  Regent. 

I  should  not  deem  it  necessary  to  point  to  the  connection  exist- 
ing between  these  two  events,  were  it  not  that  I  believe  the  article 
in  the  ''Times" — which  is  clearly  written  with  the  view  of  avoiding 

^Mr.  Shuster  enjoyed  the  confidence  of  the  Persian  Parliament. 
'  No  allegation  at  all  was  necessary,  as  is  shown  herein. 
■  The  "Times"  could  not  be  expected  to  do  anything  else. 


no 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


difficulties  between  Russia  and  England  and  to  prepare  the  English 
public — plainly  reproduces  the  view  taken  of  the  whole  matter  in  Eng- 
land and  makes  only  an  indirect  allusion  to  the  extremely  difficult  posi- 
tion in  which  Grey  will  find  himself  when  Parliament  reopens. 

It  cannot  be  disputed  that  the  British  Government,  from  the 
beginning,  attached  too  little  weight  to  the  importance  of  the 
Stokes  affair.  Still,  it  must  be  considered  that  as  soon  as  its  atten- 
tion was  directed  to  the  significance  of  the  matter,  Grey  at  once 
drew  the  necessary  conclusions.  He  even  went  so  far  as  to  employ  a 
means — namely  the  refusal  to  grant  Stokes  his  discharge — the  legality 
of  which  may  be  challenged.  I  do  not  doubt  but  that,  in  so  acting,  he  Bl 
was  prompted  by  the  desire  strictly  to  maintain  our  entente  in  Persia,  ■ 
whereby  he  can  scarcely  have  had  any  illusions  as  to  the  difficulties 
which  would  thereby  result  for  himself.  For  I  believe  that  he  per- 
sonally considered  acceptable  the  proposal  made  by  our  Minister  at 
Teheran. 

For,  putting  aside  the  question  of  the  Anglo-Russian  Conven- 
tion, he  must  needs  bear  in  mind  the  impossible  conditions  in  Per- 
sia, which  damage  British  interests  in  the  South,  much  more  than 
ours  in  the  North. 

In  this  respect  it  is  easy  to  attack  Grey  in  Parliament  where  Shuster's 
accusations  have  found  a  much  louder  echo  than  is  desirable  for  us. 

English  public  opinion  will  see  in  the  present  conditions  in  Per- 
sia the  commencement  of  an  armed  intervention  which,  even  if 
unintentional,  has,  nevertheless,  actually  become  necessary,  and  to 
which  England  is  decidedly  averse. 

I  do  not  wish  to  mention  again  the  considerations  which  I  tried 
to  emphasize  in  my  previous  reports.  The  capital  and  the  Persian 
seat  of  Government  are  situated  within  our  zone.  /  mean  that  for 
this  reason  we  are  not  entitled  to  insist  that  the  actions  of  the  Persian 
Government  mainly  concern  Russia.^  This  would  be  tantamount  to  a 
Russian  protectorate,  with  merely  a  certain  sphere  of  influence  being 
conceded  to  British  interests  in  the  South,  analogous  to  what  is  taking 
place  in  Morocco  between  France  and  Spain.^    There  exists  quite  a 


I 
I 


*  A  hint  to  Neratoff . 

*An  endorsement  of  the  position  assumed  in  this  matter  by  Germany  and 
Spain,  who  objected  to  this  very  thing,  but  were  overruled  by  France,  who  im- 
posed the  protectorate,  with  the  aid  of  Great  Britain  and  Russia. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  VS.  SHUSTER      111 

series  of  questions  which  touch  Persia  as  a  whole  and  which 
equally  interest  both  our  Governments,  and  with  respect  to 
which  an  understanding  must  be  arrived  at.  The  maintenance  of 
public  order  and  of  finances  may  be  numbered  among  these  ques- 
tions. 

/  confess  that  I  only  see  the  possibility  of  compromises  when  it  is 
a  question  of  keeping  up  such  a  difficult  state  of  affairs.  Compromises 
at  first  between  England  and  Russia,  and  subsequently  between 
these  two  Powers  and  Persia.  This,  to  my  mind,  is,  if  not  the 
literal  wording,  but  the  inner  meaning  of  the  Anglo-Russian  Con- 
vention. Otherwise,  this  latter  could  not  be  applied,  just  as  every 
international  agreement  is  difficult  to  apply  if  it  does  not  contain 
within  itself  the  possibility  of  compromise.  By  compromises  I 
understand  ways  and  means  of  getting  out  of  a  difficulty  by  making 
concessions  of  the  kind  which  our  Prime  Minister  has  made  in  the 
matter  of  the  Seligmann  loan.^ 

It  seems  to  me  urgent  that  a  similar  solution  be  found  to  enable 
a  gendarmerie  to  be  organised  in  Persia.  //  /  persist  in  these  con- 
siderations, I  do  so  exclusively  because  I  fear  that  our  two  Govern- 
ments will  be  accused  of  being  unable  to  arrive  at  an  understanding  in 
order  to  put  an  end  to  the  state  of  anarchy  in  Persia,  and  of  failing  to 
attempt  any  effective  steps  to  this  end.  I  fear  that  this  accusation  will 
assume  a  more  and  more  substantial  shape  and  will  be  mainly  directed 
against  Russia.^ 

This  would  be  the  beginning  of  immense  and  serious  difficul- 
ties at  the  very  moment  when  everything  leads  me  to  believe  that 
a  close  understanding  with  England  is  more  important  and  more 
necessary  for  us  than  ever. 

P.  S.  This  letter  was  already  written  when  the  annexed  letter 
from  Lynch  appeared  in  this  morning's  issue  of  the  "Times." 
This  member  of  parliament,  who  is  a  member  of  the  Persian  Com- 
mittee, has  no  great  influence.  However,  the  conclusion  of  the  letter 
reaches  the  kernel  of  the  whole  difficulty  of  maintaining  the  Anglo- 
Russian  Entente  in  the  event  of  a  partition  of  Persia.  This  is  a  point 
fraught  with  a  great  deal  of  danger  and  there  is  but  one  means  of 

*  Engineered  by  Mr.  Shuster.  ,  ,       ,  r  t^      • 

'Which  state  of  anarchy  was  being  promoted  by  the  acts  of  Russian  troops 
in  the  furtherance  of  Russian  designs  in  Persia,  as  shown  herein. 


112         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

facing  it,  namely,  by  coming  to  an  understanding  with  the  British 
Government  for  the  purpose  of  re-estabUshing  order  and  a  certain 
degree  of  prosperity  in  Persia} 


(130)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Oct.  11-24,  1911.    No.  246. 


'tain  HI 


Grey  asked  me  to  call  on  him.  He  first  told  me  that  Major  Stokes 
has  been  definitely  refused  permission  to  quit  the  service,  so  that  this 
whole  matter  was  now  settled.  Thereupon  Grey  went  on  to  say  that 
he  had  been  very  much  disturbed  to  learn  from  O'Beirne  ^  that  Rus- 
sia reckoned  with  the  possibility  of  a  military  expedition  or  the  occu- 
pation of  Northern  Persia.  He  explained  to  me  the  extraordinary 
and  momentous  consequence  of  such  a  step:  Persians  independence 
would  be  violated;  the  Anglo-Russian  Convention  would  become  void, 
and  the  necessity  of  its  revision  under  excessively  difficult  circum- 
stances would  have  to  be  taken  into  consideration.  He  pointed  out 
that  whatever  Shuster's  attitude  might  be,  it  had  so  far  been 
merely  a  question  of  certain  tendencies  and  not  of  measures  al- 
ready adopted,  such,  for  example,  as  concessions,  running  counter 
to  our  interests,  or  loans.  Shuster  had  actually  done  nothing  to  war- 
rant the  necessity  of  a  military  expedition.  As  regards  the  reigning 
anarchy,  he  thought  conditions  in  the  South  were  much  worse  than  in9\ 
the  North,  where  we  command  a  far  more  numerous  force  than  the 
couple  of  hundred  English  that  had  been  sent  to  Ispahan,  Shiraz  and 
Bushir.  Besides  this.  Grey  has  informed  the  Persian  Government 
that  if  the  latter  were  able  to  effectively  provide  for  the  protection 
of  the  lines  of  communication  in  the  South,  the  British  troops  ^^ 
would  only  be  employed  as  a  consular  guard.  SI 

Grey  then  added  his  personal  opinion  that  it  would  be  impossible  > 
for  Shuster  to  remain.  He  was  not  equal  to  the  situation.  He  (Grey) 
as  yet  knew  of  the  charges  brought  forward  by  Shuster  against 
the  two  Governments  only  what  was  published  in  the  newspapers. 
He  deems  it  beneath  the  dignity  of  the  two  Governments  to  reply 
to  these  charges  officially,  and  he  intends  to  maintain  this  view 
most  energetically  in  Parliament. 

*A  certain  degree  only,  while  Mr.  Shuster  wanted  to  make  Persia  a  solvent 
state. 

"British  char^;c  d'affaires  at  St.  Petersburg. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  VS.  SHUSTER       113 
(131)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Extract  from  a  Letter,  Oct.  11-24,  1911. 

...  Sir  Edward  thereupon  told  me  that  one  should  not  enter- 
tain any  illusion  as  to  the  fact  that  a  fresh  military  occupation  of 
Persia  would  violate  the  principle  of  the  integrity  and  independ- 
ence of  that  country,  and  that  the  Anglo-Russian  Convention, 
being  based  on  this  principle,  would  hence  become  void.  Sir  Ed- 
ward insisted  in  an  absolutely  friendly  but  urgent  manner  upon 
the  fact  that  he  hoped  that  the  Russian  Government  would  take 
the  serious  consequences  into  consideration,  and  he  once  again 
mentioned  the  circumstance  that  Shuster,  though  he  had  evinced  anti- 
Russian  feelings,  had  so  far  not  undertaken  anything  positive  against 
Russia. 

He  then  said  to  me; 

"If  the  Convention  should  become  void,  you  may  yourself 
judge  of  the  consequences.  No  other  solution  would  remain  than 
to  proceed  to  a  revision  of  the  Convention,  but  under  peculiarly 
difficult  circumstances,  and  on  a  basis  which  it  would  be  harder 
than  ever  to  discover." 

I  found  Grey  convinced  of  the  necessity  of  maintaining  our 
Convention  as  it  is,  but  he  opposes  every  step  which  would  put  Per- 
sia's independence  in  question England's  projects  in  Southern 

Persia  are  actually  most  intimately  connected  with  the  extremely 
intricate  problem  of  the  whole  Bagdad  line.  For  this  reason,  I 
beg  to  repeat  that  if  we  adhere  to  the  wording  of  the  Anglo- 
Russian  Convention  down  to  the  very  last  consequences,  the 
Anglo-Russian  Convention  which  is  already  obliged  at  every  step 
to  overcome  the  ill-will  and  the  incapacity  of  the  Persians,  will  be 
most  difficult  to  carry  into  execution,  and  that  for  this  very  reason 
we  shall  have  to  resort  to  compromises  and  to  the  expression  of  mutual 
good  faith.  Above  all,  the  fact  must  not  be  lost  sight  of  that  if  the 
effect  of  the  Russian  understanding  with  England  is  to-day  constantly 
tending  to  expand,  Persia  remains  the  basis  of  our  understanding  with 
England.^    This  is  a  circumstance  of  the  very  greatest  importance. 

*A  vicarious  sacrifice.  The  many  allusions  of  this  nature  found  in  the  docu- 
ments refer  to  the  main  considerations  Russia  and  Great  Britain  saw  in  the  Anglo- 
Russian  Convention.  Both  governments  recognized  in  the  agreement  regarding 
Persia  the  basis  for  joint  action  against  Germany.  Their  diplomatists  express 
themselves  elsewhere  herein  to  the  effect  that  such  a  vehicle  of  contact  was 
necessary  to  keep  up  the  relations  needed  for  the  final  objective. 


114 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


(132)     Neratoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.    Telegram,  Oct.  26- 
Nov.  8,  1911.    No.  1730. 

I  am  telegraphing  to  our  Minister  at  Teheran  as  follows: 
In  connection  with  the  "Shoa-Es-Saltaneh"  incident,^  the  Per- 
sian Charge  d' Affaires  has  asked  us  to  be  satisfied  with  the  mili- 
tary police  being  replaced  by  Cossacks,  and  not  to  insist  on  an 
apology  for  the  insults  offered  to  the  consular  officers.  He  asked 
that  this  request  be  submitted  to  the  Czar.  We  have  told  the  Per- 
sian Representative  in  reply  that  the  Czar  had  already  given  his  orders 
and  that  the  Russian  Government  insists  on  all  its  demands  being  com- 
plied with.  Persia  should  therefore  hasten  to  comply  with  the  de- 
mands made  in  order  to  prevent  further  consequences.  As  regards 
the  offering  of  apologies,  these  were  to  be  made  in  respect  of  acts 
committed  personally  by  the  military  police  against  consular  offi- 
cers, so  that  our  demand  could  not  be  humiliating  for  the  Per- 
sian Government. 


(133)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Oct.  26-Nov.  8,  1911.    No.  1732. 

Your  telegram  received. 

We  are  convinced  that,  under  similar  circumstances,  the  British 
Government  would  never  allow  the  action  of  a  British  official  to 
be  made  the  subject  of  an  inquiry  in  which  Persians  would  be 
allowed  to  take  part.  We,  for  our  part,  are  of  the  opinion  that  we 
alone  are  entitled  to  form  a  judgment  with  regard  to  an  action  com- 
mitted by  our  official.  The  measures  mentioned  by  the  English 
press  have  not  yet  been  taken  into  consideration ;  should  however, 
the  Persian  Government  persist  in  remaining  obstinate,  we  must 
find  a  means  to  protect  our  interests.  The  expeditions  to  Ghilan 
and  Talysh  had  already  been  contemplated  before  this  incident  oc- 
curred, since  the  state  of  affairs  in  these  districts  is  extremely 
unsafe  and  is  seriously  damaging  our  interests,  and  since  the 
Persian  Government  appears  to  be  unable  to  restore  order  there. 

This  measure  is,  however,  intended  to  have  the  character  of  a 
punitive  expedition,^  and  not  that  of  a  permanent  occupation. 


*  See  Neratoff's  No.  1798.     (Document  No.  135.) 

'It  was  the  many  "punitive  expeditions"  undertaken  by  Russian  troops 
kept  the  British  public  and  press  exercised  and  which  worried  Grey. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  VS.  SHUSTER      115 

(134)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Neratoff.     Telegram,  Oct. 
29'Nov.  11,  1911.    No.  278. 

Personal.  I  should  be  wanting  in  necessary  frankness  if  I 
were  to  refrain  from  expressing  how  disagreeably  I  was  affected 
by  your  telegram  No.  1732  as  it  contained  an  indirect  criticism  of 
myself.  Permit  me  to  remark  the  following:  It  will  be  impos- 
sible to  maintain  that  two  Great  Powers,  such  as  Russia  and  Eng- 
land, uniting  themselves  in  a  country  such  as  Persia  for  a  joint 
action,  will  be  able  to  do  this  without  certain  difficulties  arising 
in  the  course  of  execution.  This  is  what  renders  so  difficult 
our  joint  activity  in  Persia,  though  that  activity  forms  the  basis 
of  our  understanding.  What  is  primarily  necessary  is  mutual  sup- 
port; however.  Northern  Persia,  with  the  capital,  is  more  liable  to 
lead  to  incidents  than  the  South.  We  therefore  are  more  often 
obliged  to  address  ourselves  to  England,  than  the  latter  to  us. 
This  to  a  certain  extent  always  impairs  the  interests  of  England. 

I  admit  that  this  mutual  support,  which  is  necessary,  less  for 
the  solution  of  the  questions  themselves,  than  on  account  of  the 
impression  in  Persia,  will  only  be  possible  through  constant  ex- 
change of  views  as  to  the  incidents  that  may  occur.  In  the  con- 
trary case,  the  aforementioned  difference  in  the  situation  of  the 
two  countries  will  jeopardize  the  principle  of  co-operation.  If 
ever  our  co-operation  with  England  should  come  to  an  end,  the 
consequences  would  be  of  a  serious  nature.  You  will  thus  under- 
stand what  responsibility  would  in  such  an  event  fall  on  my 
shoulders,  and  I  must  therefore  always  convey  my  opinions  with 
absolute  frankness  to  the  Ministry.  It  is  true.  Grey  has  repeatedly 
assured  me  that  he  would  not  sacrifice  the  principle  of  the  en- 
tente to  the  difficulties  existing  in  Persia.  This  has  been  Grey*s 
line  of  conduct  in  difficult  circumstances,  notably  when  he  had  to 
take  action  against  British  subjects,  the  most  thankless  task  for  a 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  But  Grey  is  not  the  sole  master  of 
events,  and  it  is  upon  this  point  of  view  that  I  have  to  base  my 
reports.  You  will  please  excuse  the  length  of  this  personal  tele- 
gram, but  I  deem  it  absolutely  necessary  to  make  this  explana- 
tion.^ 

*  Neratoff  was  under-secretary  of  foreign  affairs  and  a  troublesome  statesman, 
as  these  documents  show. 


116  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

(135)    Neratoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.     Telegram,  Nov. 
3-16,  1911.    No.  1798. 

I  would  request  you  to  communicate  to  the  London  Cabinet 
the  following: 

The  attitude  assumed  of  late  towards  us  by  the  Persian  Gov- 
ernment has,  as  is  well  known,  been  anything  but  friendly,  and 
the  responsibility  for  this  fact  falls  mainly  upon  the  financial  ad- 
viser, Morgan  Shuster,  who  from  the  moment  of  his  arrival  in 
Persia,  disregarded  Russian  interests. 

This  foreigner  has  found  strong  support  both  in  Parliament  as 
among  the  Persian  nationalists,  so  that  the  Teheran  Cabinet  did  not 
possess  the  necessary  authority  over  him.  An  incident  has  recently 
occurred  at  Teheran,  on  the  occasion  when  the  Persian  Government 
expressed  its  intention  to  confiscate  the  estates  of  the  partisans  of  the 
former  Shah,  amongst  others,  also  of  the  Shoa-Es-Saltaneh,  in  whose 
estate  Russian  interests  were  involved.  Shuster  received  instructions 
to  carry  these  measures  into  effect,  and  also  in  this  case  failed 
not  to  assume  a  provocative  attitude.  The  gendarmerie  under  his 
orders  have  not  only  forcibly  seised  the  estate  of  the  Prince,  and  this 
before  the  negotiations  between  Shuster's  representatives  and 
our  Consul-General  had  come  to  a  conclusion,  and  after  they  had 
driven  the  Cossacks  belonging  to  the  Persian  Brigade  out  of  the 
Shoa's  house,  but  they,  moreover,  aimed  their  rifles  at  employees 
of  the  Consul-General  and  threatened  to  shoot. 

Contrary  to  all  tradition,  the  Persian  Government  has  on  its 
part  by  means  of  two  Notes  demanded  that  our  Consul-Genered 
be  recalled.  We  look  upon  such  an  action  as  incompatible  with  the 
dignity  and  the  interests  of  Russia,  and  we  have  instructed  our  Minis- 
ter to  return  the  said  two  Notes  to  the  Persian  Government  and  to 
demand  verbally: 

(1)  That  the  gendarmerie  in  the  house  belonging  to  the  Shoa 
be  replaced  by  Cossacks  until  the  Russian  interests  involved  in 
the  Shoa's  estate  have  been  determined,  and  (2)  that  the  Persian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  express  his  regret  at  the  action  com- 
mitted by  the  military  police. 

Contrary  to  all  expectation,  the  Persian  Government  has  seen  fit 
to  reject  these  moderate  demands.  We  have  thereupon  instructed 
our  Minister  to  repeat  his  demands  in  writing  and  to  add  that,  in 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  VS.  SHUSTER       117 

the  event  of  a  refusal,  he  would  break  off  his  relations  with  the 
Persian  Government  and  that  we  reserved  to  ourselves  the  right 
of  adopting  whatever  measures  we  deemed  necessary. 

As  we  have  so  far  received  no  reply,  our  Minister  will  now 
break  off  his  relations  with  the  Persian  Government.  Besides  this, 
the  Russian  Government  has  decided  to  order  a  Russian  division,  com- 
posed of  different  arms  of  the  service,  to  advance  on  Kaswin^  and  it 
is  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  Minister  to  cause  the  said  division  to 
proceed  on  to  Teheran,  should  he  think  this  necessary,  in  order  forcibly 
to  expel  the  Persian  gendarmerie  from  the  Shoa's  estate.  This  measure 
is  naturally  only  of  temporary  character,  and  as  soon  as  the  in- 
cident shall  have  been  closed  and  we  have  secured  the  necessary 
guarantees  that  the  attitude  of  the  Persian  Government  will  in 
future  be  correct,  our  troops  will  be  recalled. 

From  the  telegraphic  reports  of  the  statements  made  by  Grey 
in  Parliament  we  are  gratified  to  observe  that  he  takes  a  correct 
view  of  the  situation,  and  we,  on  our  part,  are  convinced  that  the 
step  we  have  taken  does  not  run  counter  to  the  principles  of  our 
understanding  with  England;  now  as  formerly  we  intend  to  act 
in  full  concert  with  England  in  the  Persian  question. 

(136)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov,  4-17,  1911.   No.  1810. 

Buchanan,^  who  has  just  returned  to  St.  Petersburg,  has  fully 
explained  to  me  the  point  of  view  taken  by  Grey,  pointing  out  that 
his  words  only  referred  to  the  period  up  to  our  decision  to  cause 
our  troops  to  enter  Persian  territory.  Grey  considers  our  demands 
but  natural;  however,  in  our  place  he  would  have  contented  himself 
with  some  other  measure,  such  as,  for  instance,  the  occupation  of  the 
Persian  custom  houses.  He  looks  upon  the  sending  of  troops  as  a 
perilous  measure  both,  as  regards  Persian  affairs  per  se,  as  also 
with  respect  to  its  reaction  on  the  Anglo-Russian  agreement. 
Grey  has  instructed  Buchanan  to  tell  me  and  Kokowtzeff  ^  that  he 
attached  great  importance  to  maintaining  good  relations  with  us, 
and  that  he  had  defended  our  point  of  view  not  only  in  Persia,  hut 
also  in  England.    He  laid  stress  upon  the  point  that  there  did  not  exist 

^  Sir  George,  British  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg. 
'Russian  minister  of  state. 


118  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

o  single  world  question  in  which  Russia  and  England  did  not  act  hand 
in  hand. 

It  would,  therefore,  be  most  regrettable  if  a  misunderstanding 
were  to  arise  on  account  of  Persia.  Public  opinion  is  extremely 
sensitive  in  Persian  questions  and  the  British  Government  must 
take  this  fact  into  account.  The  sending  of  Russian  troops  to 
Persia  had  disturbed  people's  minds  in  England,  all  the  more 
as  our  action  happened  to  coincide  with  the  presence  of  King 
George  in  India,  where  the  Moslem  element  might  find  itself  dis- 
posed to  give  expression  to  its  dissatisfaction  with  the  under- 
standing existing  with  Russia,  in  a  manner  disagreeable  both  to 
England  and  to  the  Monarch.  Grey  therefore  trusts  that  we  will 
show  moderation. 

Speaking  personally,  Buchanan  added  that  in  the  last  days  the 
situation  had  changed.  The  fact  of  our  troops  having  been  sent 
forward  raises  the  question  as  to  what  our  next  step  will  be.  He 
asked  me  what  our  intentions  were  relative  to  the  remaining  of 
our  troops  in  Persia;  what  view  we  had  taken  with  regard  to  the 
Convention  with  England,  and  what  effect  the  present  occurrences 
would  have  on  the  administration  of  Persia,  while  at  the  same 
time  expressing  the  hope  that  we  would  still  wait  before  permit- 
ting our  troops  to  enter  Teheran  in  order  to  give  the  Persians 
time  to  reflect  and  to  fulfil  our  conditions.  Then,  referring  to  the 
sympathy  which  the  present  Regent  enjoyed  in  England,  he  added 
that  the  return  of  the  former  Shah,  Muhamed  Ali^  would  create 
decided  opposition  in  England,  and  that  the  British  Government 
could  not  recognise  any  such  restoration,  the  more  so  as  it  would 
be  the  result  of  a  military  intervention. 

In  conclusion,  he  referred  to  the  behaviour  of  our  Consul-General 
and  his  men,  and  expressed  doubt  as  to  whether  their  conduct  could 
be  justified. 

In  reply,  I  told  the  Ambassador  that  we,  for  our  part,  highly 
appreciated  the  maintaining  of  good  relations  with  England.  The 
question  as  to  what  measures  should  be  adopted  had  been  sub- 
mitted to  mature  consideration.  The  occupation  of  the  custom 
houses  would  have  produced  no  effect.  The  revenues  coming  from 
the  Customs  in  any  case  flow  into  our  treasury,  and  the  Persian  Gov- 
*  Russia's  creature. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  VS.  SHUSTER      119 

ernment  would  have  regarded  such  a  step  as  symptomatic  of  a  certain 
hesitation,  whereas  we  believe  that  a  strong  blow  must  be  dealt  in  order 
to  create  the  impression  desired.  However  this  may  be,  our  troops 
have  received  orders  to  enter  Kaswin,  and  our  next  steps  will  depend 
on  the  course  events  may  take.  The  Persians  will  have  time  for 
reflection  before  our  troops  enter  Teheran.  One  must  reckon  with 
the  fact  that  public  opinion  in  our  own  country  has  long  ago  be- 
gun to  complain  of  the  vacillating  attitude  assumed  by  the  Rus- 
sian Government  and  has  demanded  that  stronger  measures  should 
be  adopted.  Our  agreement  with  England  will  of  course  remain 
in  force,  and  we  shall  endeavour  in  the  further  course  of  events 
to  avoid  everything  and  anything  that  might  be  apt  to  place  the 
British  Government  in  a  difficult  position. 

As  regards  Persians  future:  The  principle  of  the  independence 
and  integrity  of  that  country  will  form  the  basis  of  our  policy.  We 
shall  be  pleased  to  support  the  present  Regent,  provided  he  proves  more 
energetic  in  the  future  and  if  there  be  a  possibility  of  his  securing  a 
greater  share  in  the  government  of  the  country.  The  longer  our  troops 
have  to  remain  in  Persia,  the  higher  of  course  will  be  our  demands. 
Nor  do  we  wish  to  exclude  the  possibility  that  we  might  have  to  in' 
sist  on  the  dismissal  of  Shuster,  although  we  admit  that,  he  being  a 
foreigner,  we  are  not  in  the  position  to  employ  towards  him  the  means 
otherwise  customary  in  Persia.^ 

In  reply  to  Buchanan*s  question  whether  we  could  not  make 
the  Persians  understand  that  by  complying  with  our  demands  they 
might  prevent  the  arrival  of  our  troops  on  Persian  territory,  I 
replied  that  this  was  obvious,  and  that  any  further  explanations 
on  our  part  would  merely  create  an  impression  of  weakness.  We 
could  only  allow  the  Persians  to  take  the  initiative  in  this  direction, 
in  which  case  we  should  not  be  wanting  in  generosity. 

As  concerned  the  conduct  of  our  officials  in  the  Shoa  incident, 
I  explained  to  Buchanan  that  our  Counsul-General  had,  through- 
out, acted  only  in  accordance  with  our  rights  and  the  customs  of 
the  country,  with  which  he,  owing  to  his  many  years*  activity  in 
Persia,  was  well  familiar.  A  similar  incident  took  place  last  sum- 
mer and  caused  no  complications  whatsoever.  If  perhaps  one  of 
the  Consul-General's  subordinates  had  shown  too  much  zeal,  then 

*  The  "means  otherwise  customary  in  Persia"  were  political  assassination. 


120  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

this  may  result  in  his  being  reprimanded  in  a  disciplinary  way, 
but  it  does  not  in  any  way  affect  the  international  character  of 
the  incident.  /  added  that  Brliish  subordinates  had  also  sometimes 
failed  to  properly  attend  to  their  duties,  as  for  example,  Major  Stokes. 

I  admitted  Grey*s  obliging  attitude  towards  us  in  all  Persian 
questions;  however,  I  reminded  the  Ambassador  that  we,  too,  had 
tacitly  admitted  actions  on  the  part  of  England  which  did  not  cor- 
respond to  our  interests,  such,  for  example,  as  the  appointment 
of  a  financial  agent  at  Ispahan. 

Finally  what  concerned  the  restoration  of  Muhamed  Ali,  we 
had  not  thought  of  such  an  eventuality  when  adopting  military 
measures. 

When  acquainting  Grey  with  the  above  facts,  I  would  request 
you  to  repeat  that  we,  on  our  part,  entertain  the  cordial  desire  to  main- 
tain good  relations  with  him} 

(137)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Neratoff.     Telegram,  Nov. 
5-18,  1911.    No.  280. 

Owing  to  a  slight  indisposition,  I  have  been  unable  to  go  to 
the  Foreign  Office.  Nicolson  called  on  me,  and  confidentially  in- 
formed me  of  a  long  telegram  received  from  Buchanan,  relating 
to  the  recent  and  important  conversation  which  he  had  with  you. 

Nicolson  made  no  comment  except  to  give  the  assurance  that  the 
Cabinet  would  do  all  in  its  power  to  maintain  the  entente  with  us,  to 
which  it  attached  more  importance  than  ever. 

He  explained  to  me  the  difficult  position  of  Grey  with  regard 
to  Parliament,  since  he  would  have  to  defend  the  attitude  he  had 
taken  up  in  Persia  and  elsewhere.  /  believe  that  the  difficulty  re- 
sides in  the  fact  that  Grey  finds  himself  unable  to  grasp  all  the  pos- 
sible consequences  of  the  events  now  taking  place  in  Persia  and  to 
fully  answer  for  them.  On  the  other  hand,  the  opposition  which 
Grey  has  to  encounter  in  Parliament  is  chiefly  based  on  the  un- 
certainty as  to  what  will  be  the  final  results  of  the  Anglo-Russian 
policy  in  Persia. 

This  opposition  is  doubtless  on  the  increase.  A  Russian  pro- 
tectorate will  no  more  be  admitted,  than  would  a  restoration  of  Mu- 

*  A  diplomatic  reminder  that  these  relations  could  also  assume  a  totally  dif- 
ferent character,  and  that  Russia  would  brook  no  further  interference. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  VS.  SHUSTER       121 

hamed  All's  Government.  Should  the  latter  succeed  in  re-mounting 
the  throne,  or  should  the  number  of  his  partisans  increase  while 
our  troops  occupy  the  country,  then  these  two  occurrences  would 
be  brought  into  connection,  and  would  prove  right  all  those  who 
maintained  that  this  is  what  the  Russian  Government  had  had  in 
mind  all  along,  and  was  now  about  to  carry  into  practical  effect. 
All  faith  in  the  Anglo-Russian  Convention  would  he  destroyed.  In 
fact,  the  Convention  itself  could  not  survive  this. 

Grey  and  Nicolson  appreciate  that  the  chief  difficulty  at  the 
moment  is  Shuster.  The  London  Cabinet  would  have  no  objection  if 
he  were  to  disappear  altogether.^  But  the  question  is,  how  is  he  to 
be  removed,  since,  so  long  as  our  troops  remain  in  Persia,  there 
is  no  Government  left  at  Teheran  whose  authority  will  be  recog- 
nised by  the  Parliament,  as  this  latter  alone  appears  to  possess 
the  authority  and  is,  moreover,  lending  Shuster  its  full  support. 
It  would  appear  to  me  to  be  advisable  for  you  to  communicate  your 
views  in  this  matter  to  Grey,  so  that  the  two  Governments  might 
be  able  to  act  in  concert.  Grey  is  to  speak  in  Parliament  on 
Thursday. 

(138)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London   to   the  Russian  Minister  at 

Teheran.    Telegram,  Nov.  6-19,  1911.    No.  281. 

Personal.  Current  opinion  here  is  that  the  real  object  of  our 
action  is  to  secure  Shuster's  dismissal.  No  regret  would  be  felt  here 
if  he  were  to  go,  and  no  objections  would  be  raised.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  restoration  of  Muhamed  Ali  will  never  be  countenanced, 
it  being  on  the  contrary  desired  that  the  present  Regent  remain 
at  the  head  of  the  State. 

(139)  Neratoff  to  the  Russian  Minister  at  Teheran.     Telegram,  Nov.  7-20, 

1911.    No.  833. 

We  entirely  share  your  view  that  you  should  only  receive  the 
Foreign  Minister  provided  he  informs  you  that  the  Persian  Gov- 
ernment is  prepared  to  comply  with  our  demands.  Still  it  is  de- 
sirable to  make  the  Persians  understand  without  delay,  in  one  way 
or  the  other,  that  we  shall  no  longer  be  satisfied  with  a  mere  fulfil- 

*  Disappear— a  rather  unfortunate  phrase  from  the  pen  of  a  diplomatist  whose 
government  was  never  particular  as  to  what  means  it  employed. 


122  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD  H 

ment  of  our  former  demands,  but  that  we  have  the  intention  of  raising 
some  other  questions  the  settlement  of  which  we  now  esteem  neces- 
sary in  order  to  prevent  the  possibility  of  constant  friction  in  future 
and  in  order  to  form  a  basis  for  permanent  friendly  relations.  We 
have  already  informed  the  London  Cabinet  that  the  withdrawal  of 
our  troops  would  depend  upon  guarantees  being  received  that  the 
behaviour  of  the  Persians  towards  us  in  future  would  be  such  as  we 
are  entitled  to  expect} 

London,  by  the  way,  shares  our  views  as  regards  the  desirability  of 
securing  Shuster's  dismissal. 

As  concerns  the  other  guarantees,  we  deem  it  expedient,  apart 
from  those  already  proposed,  to  open  the  question  of  the  further 
development  of  the  Persian  army,  which,  within  our  zone,  would 
have  to  be  subjected  to  our  control.  In  order,  however,  not  to  broach 
this  delicate  question  at  once  and  to  its  full  extent  and  thereby  to 
expose  ourselves  to  the  charge  of  having  claimed  the  re-organisa- 
tion of  the  entire  Persian  army,  which,  in  case  of  need  would,  of 
course,  have  to  be  employed  in  Southern  Persia,  we  prefer  for  the 
present  to  merely  insist  on  the  formation  of  a  special  division  for 
Azerbeidjan,  similar  to  the  already  existing  cossack  brigade,  in 
connection  with  which  we  might  point  out  that  in  this  event  our 
division  could  be  withdrawn  from  Tabriz,  which  of  course  would 
be  highly  desirable  to  the  Persian  Government.  Besides,  we  might 
touch  upon  the  question  of  an  extension  of  the  concessions  granted 
to  the  Julfa-Tabriz  and  the  Enseli-Teheran  Companies,  with  a 
view  that  both  these  Companies  be  granted  the  option  of  railway 
constructions  within  their  respective  sphere  of  influence. 

(140)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Neratoff.     Telegram,  Nov. 
8-21,  1911.    No.  283. 

The  Persian  Minister  informed  Grey  yesterday  that  his  Govern- 
ment was  prepared  to  comply  with  the  two  demands  made  by  the 
Russian  Government,  namely  the  offering  of  a  suitable  apology 
and  the  substitution  of  the  military  police  by  cossacks,  provided 
the  Russian  troops  would  then  be  withdrawn.  Grey  replied  that 
he  approved  of  the  attitude  assumed  by  the  Persian  Government, 
but  that  he  could  not  undertake  to  intervene  on  behalf  of  Persia 

*As  conquerors. 


I 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  VS.  SHUSTER      123 

at  St.  Petersburg.  Grey  desires  to  know  whether  you  wish  to  be 
officially  informed  of  this  step  on  the  part  of  Persia,  which  of 
course  would  mean  that  a  favourable  reply  would  have  to  be  given 
to  the  Persian  proposal,  and  an  end  put  to  the  whole  incident. 

(141)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov,  8-21,  1911.    No.  284. 

The  statement  alluded  to  in  my  telegram  No.  283  was  made 
to  the  Councillor  of  our  Embassy.  I  myself  am  as  yet  unable  to 
leave  my  house,  and  have  not  seen  Grey.  Nevertheless  I  should 
like  to  inform  you  of  the  following.  The  Persian  step,  though 
belated,  nevertheless  constitutes  the  initiative  of  which  you  spoke 
to  Buchanan. 

I  myself  have  repeatedly  pointed  out  to  Grey  and  Nicolson  the 
fact  that  the  demands  made  by  public  opinion  in  Russia  were  con- 
stantly increasing.  They  have  not  denied  this.  Their  point  of 
view  with  regard  to  Shuster  has  already  changed,  but  there  exists 
a  difference  in  the  expression  of  public  opinion  in  both  countries. 
In  England  it  may  find  expression  in  a  vote  of  Parliament.  Grey  is 
sure  of  a  majority.  But  if  it  were  to  suffer  too  large  a  diminution 
it  might  do  great  damage.  The  debate  will  take  place  next  Mon- 
day.   It  will  be  more  lively  and  prove  longer  than  usual. 

As  regards  the  Persian  questions.  Grey  will  be  assailed  by  the 
usual  group,  which  possesses  no  great  importance.  Yet  it  will  cost 
Grey  some  trouble  to  justify  our  present  military  expedition,  since  no 
proof  has  been  brought  forward  to  show  that  we  were  wholly  in  the 
right  in  the  incident  which  provoked  military  measures  on  our  part.'*- 
I  say  this,  because  I  do  not  believe  that  Grey  has  evidence  to  show 
that  the  Persians  are  wholly  at  fault. 

I  myself  do  not  possess  the  possibility  of  forcing  him  to  accept 
our  point  of  view.  This  circumstance  will  influence  the  debate  and 
will  also  arouse  those  members  of  Parliament  who,  as  a  rule,  do 
not  trouble  about  Persian  questions.  My  opinion  is  that  this  side 
of  the  question  ought  not  to  be  lost  sight  of  by  the  Russian  Gov- 
ernment, and  this  for  political  reasons  of  a  general  kind.  Grey  will 
be  attacked  this  time  not  only  on  account  of  the  Persian  question,  but 
also  on  account  of  his  attitude  in  the  Moroccan  affair  and  on  account  of 

*The  Shoa-es-Saltaneh  incident. 


124         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

his  too  friendly  attitude  toward  Italy  in  Tripoli.^  This  may  influence 
the  vote.  Should  it  be  possible  to  dispose  of  the  present  incident,  then 
Grey  would  be  in  a  position  to  support  us  all  the  more  energetically  in 
the  "Shuster''  affair, 

(142)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Neratoff.     Telegram,  Nov. 
10-23,  1911.    No.  286. 

I  deem  it  necessary  to  give  you  an  exact  description  of  the 
situation  here.  It  is  becoming  more  and  more  evident  that  next  Mon- 
day, Grey  will  be  attacked  much  more  severely  in  the  Persian  question 
than  could  be  at  first  foreseen.  The  attacks  will  be  founded  on  the  fact 
that  the  Persian  Government  had  declared  itself  prepared  to  satisfy  the 
terms  of  our  Ultimatum.  Grey  has  no  other  possibility  than  to  com- 
pletely justify  our  action.  He  has  firmly  decided  to  do  so  now, 
but  he  will  be  unable  to  declare  himself  as  being  in  accord  with  us  as 
to  using  a  military  occupation  for  the  purpose  of  making  fresh  demands 
on  Persia,  The  entire  incident  and  the  ultimatum  are  represented  as 
being  but  a  pretext  advanced  by  us,  and  Grey  will  be  charged  with  hav- 
ing permitted  himself  to  be  carried  by  us  far  beyond  the  bounds  of  our 
former  declarations. 

In  order  to  secure  for  ourselves  the  further  support  of  Grey  in 
the  Shuster  question,  we  must  therefore  afford  him  the  possi- 
bility of  justifying  his  policy  before  Parliament.  I  see  no  other 
way  to  accomplish  this  than  by  withdrawing  our  troops  as  soon 
as  satisfaction  has  been  given  us ;  of  course,  it  would  stand  to  reason 
that  Persia  should  have  to  bear  the  responsibility  if  our  troops  were 
obliged  to  enter  the  country  a  second  time.  A  speedy  decision  on  the 
part  of  the  Imperial  Government  will  be  all  the  more  necessary  since  the 
debate  next  Monday  will  be  of  the  greatest  political  significance  for  the 
entente. 

(143)  Neratoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.     Telegram,  Nov. 

10-23,  1911.    No.  1861. 

We  learn  that  Shuster  has  caused  a  pamphlet  to   be  distributed 
among  the  population  containing  a  violent  attack  upon  us.    We  are  of   ■I 
the  opinion  that  such  an  act  on  the  part  of  a  foreigner  in  Persian 

*  The  moderate  element  in  Great  Britain  had  recognized  in  Grey's  attitude  an 
imminent  danger  to  the  general  peace. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  VS.  SHUSTER       125 

service, — an  action  plainly  directed  against  us — conjointly  with  the 
fact  that  the  Persian  Government  has  obliged  us  to  resort  to  such 
a  grave  step  as  the  sending  of  an  armed  force,  creates  a  situation 
of  such  a  nature  that  we  are  obliged  to  make  new  demands,  and  that 
until  these  are  complied  with,  our  troops  cannot  be  recalled. 

A  statement  of  Shuster*s  mode  of  action  will  be  submitted  by 
me  at  the  Ministerial  Council,  and  I  assume  that  it  will  be  decided 
to  insist  on  the  removal  of  this  foreigner  and  his  creatures,  and  that 
if  these  demands  are  not  complied  with,  we  shall  be  obliged  to  resort  to 
forcible  measures,  without,  of  course,  wishing  thereby  to  separate  our- 
selves from  England. 

Our  Minister  at  Teheran  has  not  yet  received  any  instruction 
in  this  respect.  However,  I  consider  it  necessary  that  you  speak 
to  Grey  about  this  at  once. 

(144)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Neratoff.     Telegram,  Nov. 
10-23,  1911.    No.  2^7. 

Your  telegram  No.  1861  received. 

In  the  reply  given  to  Buchanan,  Grey  repeats  his  resolve  to  sup- 
port us  if  we  should  demand  Shuster's  dismissal.  He  believes  how- 
ever, that  this  question  must  form  the  subject  of  new,  energetic 
steps  to  be  undertaken  jointly  by  the  two  Legations  when  direct 
intercourse  between  our  Minister  and  the  Persian  Government  will 
again  have  been  resumed.  He  insists  on  the  necessity  of  arresting 
the  further  advance  of  our  troops,  when  the  Persian  Government  will 
have  complied  with  our  first  demands,  which  we  declared  to  be  merely 
a  support  of  the  military  demonstration. 

(145)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  11-24,  1911.    No.  288. 

I  learn  from  a  reliable  source  that  there  exists  the  serious  pos- 
sibility of  an  English  ministerial  crisis.  It  will  probably  not  break 
out  on  Monday,  but  on  the  day  when  our  troops  enter  Teheran. 
This  would  entail  Grey's  resignation,  who  would  be  abandoned  by  sev- 
eral of  his  colleagues. 

As  concerns  the  general  trend  of  his  policy.  Grey  is  sure  to  have 
Parliament  on  his  side,  though  not  as  regards  the  Persian  ques- 
tion. What  he  stands  in  need  of  is  a  good  argument  based  on  a 
joint  diplomatic  action  agreed  upon  between  us  and  having  clearly 


126  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

defined  aims.  For  this  reason,  Grey  insists  that  the  Shoa  incident 
be  dealt  with  independently  of  the  Shuster  affair,  and  that  the 
latter  shall  not  be  made  a  pretext  for  our  military  expedition.^ 


4 

'Jinn  •^■1 


(146)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  11-24,  1911.    No.  289. 

/  learn  from  the  same  source  that  the  Persian  Parliament 
Shuster  principally  desire  to  break  the  Anglo-Russian  understanding; 
for  this  reason  they  do  not  fear  the  Russian  occupation  of  Teheran. 
As  our  entry  into  Teheran  would  in  fact  lead  to  the  formation  of 
a  new  government,  which  would  have  to  be  upheld  by  force  of 
arms,  the  occupation  of  Persia  would  necessarily  have  to  be  a  last- 
ing one  in  order  to  maintain  the  conditions  imposed  by  us.  Those 
English  circles  who  are  opposed  to  an  Entente  with  us  would  join 
forces  with  the  Persian  Parliament,  and  this  would  lead  very  shortly 
to  a  rupture  between  ourselves  and  England. 


(147)    Neratoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.     Telegram,  Nov. 
13-26,1911.    ATo.  1877. 


] 


I  telegraph  to  our  Minister  at  Teheran : 

^'The  British  Ambassador  informed  me  yesterday  that  Grey  recog- 
nizes our  right  to  put  further  demands  to  Persia  ^  and  is  of  the  opinion 
that  several  of  these  could  be  supported  by  the  British  Legation  at 
Teheran.  He  considers  it  desirable  that  we  resume  our  diplomatic 
relations  with  Persia  and  hold  back  our  troops  in  Resht.  M^ 

"I  told  the  Ambassador  that  in  view  of  the  fulfilment  of  our"' 
first  demands  by  the  Persians,  you  had  already  established  rela- 
tions with  the  Persian  Foreign  Minister  and  that  the  program  of 
our  new  claims  would  be  set  up  by  the  Ministerial  Council.  You, 
together  with  the  British  Minister,  would  then  be  able  to  decide  how 
far  the  British  Legation  could  support  us." 

"For  your  personal  information :  We  have  by  no  means  the  inten^ 
tion  of  rendering  the  demands  we  shall  lay  before  the  Persians  de- 
pendent on  the  approval  of  the  British  Minister.^    As  to  your  relations 

*  Which  leaves  the  impression  that  Sir  Edward  depended  upon  Russian  actiomBI 
to  remain  in  office.  ^Bl 

'Though  Grey  had  to  fear  trouble  in  Parliament,  his  own,  and  the  invisible 
British  government's,  secret  policy  urged  him  to  make  further  concessions  to 
the  Russians,  who  had  tasted  blood  now. 

'  Double-crossing  the  British. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  VS.  SHUSTER      127 

to  the  Persian  Foreign  Minister,  these  should,  as  we  are  about  to 
formulate  new  demands,  hear  a  purely  business  character  and  not  imply 
the  re-establishment  of  normal  relations."  ^ 

(148)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  13-26,  1911.    No.  1881. 

The  Ministerial  Council  based  its  findings  on  the  consideration 
that  our  conflict  with  Persia  has  been  called  forth  by  incorrect 
actions  on  the  part  of  the  Persian  Government  and  its  agents  in 
one  special  case,  that  therefore  the  new  demands  now  formulated 
by  us  should  not  exceed  the  limits  of  the  incident,  and  that  this 
standpoint  alone  would  be  comprehensible  to  public  opinion  both 
in  Russia  and  abroad. 

Hence  we  do  not  intend  to  formulate  claims  irrelevant  to  the 
incident  and  therefore  demand  from  the  Persian  Government : 

1.  The  dismissal  of  Shuster  and  Lecoffre.  The  position  of  the 
other  officials  appointed  by  Shuster  is  embodied  in  point  2. 

2.  The  assurance  of  the  Persian  Government  that  they  will  not 
appoint  foreigners  without  having  previously  obtained  the  ap- 
proval of  the  Russian  and  English  Legations  at  Teheran. 

3.  The  costs  of  the  expedition  to  be  borne  by  the  Persian  Govern- 
ment. The  sum  total  and  method  of  payment  will  be  decided  upon 
later.^ 

Whilst  formulating  these  claims  in  writing,  you  will  point  in 
your  note  to  the  fact  that  we  are  forced  to  take  this  step  in  order 
to  obtain  satisfaction  for  the  military  expedition  forced  upon  us  ^  and 
for  the  provocative  actions  committed  by  Shuster;  that  we  most 
earnestly  desire  to  remove  the  causes  that  have  hitherto  led  to 
conflicts  in  order  to  establish  in  future  friendly  relations  between 
both  Governments  and  to  bring  to  a  solution  the  many  problems 
still  pending. 

Will  you  furthermore  add  that  we  expect  the  fulfilment  of  our 
claims  within  48  hours,  during  which  period  our  troops  would  be  held 
hack  in  Resht.    Should,  at  the  expiration  of  this  period,  no  answer 

*  The  "new  demands"  were  of  a  sweeping  nature. 

'The  best  method  for  keeping  a  country  in  ^'peonage"  with  a  view  towards 
annexing  it  completely,  because  uUimately  the  invader  could  use  the  plea  of 
national  insolvency. 

'An  example  of  diplomatic  "nerve." 


128  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

have  been  received,  or  should  such  answer  be  of  an  unsatisfactory 
nature,  then  our  troops  would  advance,  this  inter  alia  naturally  in- 
creasing the  costs  the  Persian  Government  must  repay. 

(149)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  16-29,  1911.    No.  1901. 

The  Emperor  has  graciously  confirmed  the  instructions  forwarded 
to  our  Minister  at  Teheran.  The  latter  has  been  instructed  to  hand  the 
Note  in  question  to  the  Persian  Government. 

(150)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Neratoff.     Telegram,  Nov. 

l^'Dec.  1,  1911.    No.  302. 

Grey  sends  me  a  short  autographic  letter,  which  I  translate 
verbatim : 

"I  am  very  glad  that  Mr.  Neratoff  approves  of  my  speech  in 
Parliament.^  At  the  same  time,  I  feel  greatly  alarmed  by  the  further* 
development  of  affairs  in  Persia.  It  appears  that  still  further  demands 
are  in  question.  Should  Russia  be  driven  to  use  force  in  order  to  com- 
pel the  acceptance  of  the  three  demands  just  presented — then  this  would 
be  a  great  misfortune'* 

(151)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  19-Dec.  2,  1911.    No.  305. 

I  am  reporting  to  you  in  a  separate  telegram  my  conversation 
today  with  Grey.  At  present  I  only  wish  to  draw  your  special 
attention  to  the  general  inferences  drawn  by  Grey. 

Should  the  unity  of  our  action  in  Persia  come  to  an  end,  this  would 
necessarily  mean  the  disruption  of  the  Entente.  It  would  result, — 
in  a  far  shorter  period  than  generally  believed, — in  a  new  orienta- 
tion of  English  politics,  with  respect  to  which  he  made  no  further 
statements. 

This  event  would  take  place  on  the  day  on  which  he  would 
have  to  declare  in  Parliament  that  a  complete  understanding  no 
longer  existed  between  England  and  Russia.  In  such  a  case  he 
would  tender  his  resignation,  because,  as  he  said,  it  would  not  be  in 
accordance  with  the  interests  of  England  were  he  to  conduct  a  policy 
differing  from  that  which  he  has  upheld  hitherto  with  all  the  means  at 
his  disposal,  since  he  is  a  confirmed  adherent  of  such  a  policy.^ 

*Thc  speech  Sir  Edward  Grey  himself  had  been  afraid  of. 
'Which  culminated  in  August  1914. 


I 
I 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  VS.  SHUSTER      129 

/  believe  this  would  portray  the  general  feeli/ng  here,  which  is 
astounded  at  the  rapidity  of  our  decisions.  This  haste  seems  to  pre- 
clude the  possibility  of  a  satisfactory  solution  and  must  lead  to  results 
to  which  one  could  not  reconcile  oneself  here.  I  have  never  seen  Grey 
so  alarmed,  and  Cambon  ^  confirmed  this  impression  to  me. 

The  Italian  Ambassador  asked  me  whether  I  thought  Grey*s 
resignation  within  possibility.  Grey  has  only  spoken  to  me,  not 
even  to  Cambon. 


(152)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  19-Dec.  2,  1911.    No.  307. 

Appended  the  translation  of  the  summary  of  our  conversation 
of  to-day,  as  forwarded  by  Grey  to  the  British  Ambassador  at 
Petersburg : 

I  spoke  very  seriously  to  Benckendorff  to-day  on  the  disquiet- 
ing situation  in  Persia.  I  told  him  it  was  regrettable  that  the  Rus- 
sian ultimatum  based  itself  on  the  question  of  the  property  of  the 
Shoa-Es-Saltaneh.  This  entire  question  was  somewhat  trivial  and 
the  Russian  standpoint  not  wholly  justifiable,^ 

Furthermore,  it  was  regrettable  that  after  Russia  had  declared, 
— we  have  in  fact  received  a  formal  assurance  on  this  point  from 
Kokowtzeff — that  the  Russian  troops  would  be  withdrawn  as  soon 
as  the  two  demands  referring  to  the  incident  be  fulfilled,  and  after 
the  British  Minister^  had  prevailed  on  the  Persian  Government 
to  accept  these  conditions,  the  Russian  troops  had  not  been  with- 
drawn; on  the  contrary  new  demands  had  been  formulated.  It  is 
true  that  the  conditions  were  accepted  by  Persia  with  a  few  days* 
delay;  nevertheless,  the  circumstances  under  which  Russia  has  acted 
have  not  been  very  happy. 

Three  new  demands  have  been  presented.  With  regard  to  the 
two  first  I  have  no  objections  to  raise. 

Shuster  did  not  follow  the  advice  we  gave  him;  he  has  brought 
us  into  a  very  difficult  position,  and  we  shall  have  to  come  to  some 
agreement  with  the  Persian  Government  on  the  question  of  the 

*  Paul,  French  ambassador  at  London. 
'  Merely  a  club  to  use  on  the  Persians. 

^Mr.  Barclay,  at  Teheran,  who  was  being  double-crossed  by  Poklewski- 
Koziel. 


130  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

foreign  councillors  in  order  to  obviate  again  being  placed  in  such 
a  position 

I  regret  that  an  indemnity  has  been  demanded.  English  trade 
has  suffered  more  than  the  Russian.  I  even  believe  that  Russian 
trade  in  the  North  has  gained  as  a  consequence  of  the  fact  that 
English  interests  have  suffered  in  the  South.  Money  is  necessary 
in  order  to  re-establish  order  in  the  South,  and  the  Russian  de- 
mands for  reimbursement  would  be  regarded  here  as  an  injury  to 
British  interests.  As  the  claim  has  been  put  forward,  the  Persian 
Government  must  agree  to  it,  but  I  trust  that  payment  will  not 
be  insisted  on  by  Russia  or  will  be  made  later  in  one  or  the  other 
form  by  means  of  compensation. 

I  directed  the  Ambassador's  most  serious  attention  to  the  fact 
that  the  Russian  troops  should  occupy  Teheran  only  in  case  of 
the  most  extreme  necessity  and  that  no  further  more  stringent 
claims  should  be  presented  without  having  first  communicated 
with  us.  /  fear  that  the  Petersburg  Cabinet  does  not  sufficiently  take 
into  account  how  unexpectedly  the  Persian  Question,  if  it  be  not  prop- 
erly handled,  may  bring  about  a  discussion  of  foreign  policy  as  a  whole. 
If  demands  be  made  which  we  cannot  declare  to  be  covered  by  the 
Anglo-Russian  Convention,  then  the  Persian  Question  would  be  lost 
sight  of,  and  the  question  of  foreign  policy  in  general,  Russia's  as  well 
as  England's,  would  take  its  place.  This  would  be  regrettable  and  I 
am  in  the  greatest  anxiety.'^ 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Russian  Government  will  confine 
itself  to  its  present  demands  and  only  proceed  to  Teheran  in  case 
of  extreme  necessity,  then  I  hope  to  be  able  to  overcome  the  present 
difficulties.  We  could  perhaps  form  a  Persian  Government  which 
would  recognize  the  necessity  of  taking  Russia's  interest  into  ac- 
count, instead  of  continually  setting  up  opposition.  We  should  be 
ready  to  support  such  a  Government  by  the  appointment  of  foreign 
advisers,  and  the  granting  of  a  loan  through  Seligmann  or  some  other 
bankers."^  The  situation  in  Persia  would  be  better  than  it  has  been 
hitherto. 

But  at  the  moment  we  still  have  great  difficulties  to  overcome 

*A  damning  mea  culpa — Grey's  confession  that  he  was  shaping  Great  Britain's 
policy  in  a  manner  contrary  to  what  the  public  really  wanted. 

"  The  group  favored  by  Mr.  Shuster.  ^*» 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  VS.  SHUSTER      131 

and  /  am  afraid  the  Russian  Government  does  not  consider  how  great 
are  the  stakes,  and  what  great  efforts  we  must  make  in  order  to  avoid 
a  separation  in  our  policy. 


(153)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Letter,  Nov.  2UDec.  4,  1911. 

It  is  not  easy  to  give  you  a  complete  picture  of  the  situation  in 
London.  Sir  Edward  Grey's  speech,  in  which  he  summarised  with 
the  lucidity  peculiar  to  his  eloquence  the  entire  political  situation 
resulting  from  the  most  recent  events  in  Europe  and  in  Persia, 
has  made  a  great  impression. 

On  the  whole  he  met  with  the  support  of  the  Majority  in  the 
country  and  the  press  takes  his  part  almost  unanimously.  The  leading 
newspapers  contain  not  a  single  attack. 

Even  during  the  sitting,  however,  it  was  impossible  not  to  draw 
the  conclusion  that  the  Minister's  speech  met  with  the  unconditional 
approval  only  of  the  Conservative  opposition,  whilst  the  impression  on 
the  Ministerial  benches  was  by  no  means  uniform.^ 

The  Liberal  Party  has  always  shown  the  tendency  to  favour  a  rap- 
prochement between  England  and  Germany.  In  these  circles  it  was 
considered  that  Sir  Edward  Grey's  speech  took  their  wishes  too 
little  into  account,  and  an  opposition  against  Grey  is  arising  in 
these  quarters,  which  is  for  the  moment  difficult  to  define,  but 
which,  nevertheless,  exists  in  fact  and  is  developing. 

Grey's  authority  in  Parliament  is  so  great  that  this  opposition 
would  not  constitute  a  danger  did  not  the  Persian  question  come 
into  consideration. 

The  small  fraction  of  the  ultra-Radical  party  specially  interested 
in  Persian  questions  has  been  driven  to  extremes  by  Grey's  state- 
ments on  the  Russian  standpoint  in  Persia.  This  part  of  Grey's 
speech  made  in  fact  a  deep  impression. 

It  had  indeed  been  assumed  that  he  would  place  himself  on  our 
side,  but  it  was  not  expected  that  he  would  attempt  to  explain  the  Rus- 
sian standpoint.^ 


*Such  negativizing  grammar  is  characteristic  of  diplomatic  correspondence, 
beir  ^  a  sort  of  "hog-Latin"  of  the  craft. 
'  Anything  to  save  the  Entente. 


132 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


Since  this  speech,  Grey  is  being  continually  attacked  by  mem- 
bers of  Parliament  whose  votes  are  essential  to  the  present  Cabinet. 
This  numerically  weak,  but  most  vigorous,  opposition  is  reinforced 
by  the  more  moderate  and  at  the  same  time  more  dangerous  attacks 
of  such  members  of  Parliament — ^not  all  of  whom  belong  to  the 
Liberal  Party — who  reproach  him  with  taking  up  a  too  negative  atti- 
tude towards  Germany. 

In  reality  Grey,  as  he  stated  in  his  speech,  is  not  against  an  im- 
provement in  the  relations  with  Germany.  This  even  appears  de- 
sirable to  him.  But  he  does  not  wish  to  sacrifice  to  it  the  two  Ententes, 
and  he  is  convinced  that  a  serious  rapprochement  with  Germany  is 
only  possible  on  this  condition} 

As  he  told  me  in  confidence  yesterday,  he  stands  and  falls  with 
this  policy.  For  this  reason,  he  said,  Russia's  policy  towards  England 
must  be  quite  transparent.  He  added  that  should  our  understanding 
survive  the  present  crisis,  England  would  regard  it  as  a  triumph 
of  our  united  Persian  policy  and  this  would  lead  to  the  strengthen- 
ing of  the  relations  between  the  two  countries. 

But  to  silence  the  opposition  it  does  not  suffice  to  be  able  to 
give  an  explanation  of  Russian  policy  from  day  to  day. 

In  the  course  of  our  conversation  we  referred  to  numerous 
details,  and  Grey's  confidential  report  to  Buchanan  contains  a 
short  survey  of  the  entire  political  situation. 

The  idea  that  the  Russian  Government  desires  to  violate  the 
integrity  or  the  independence  of  Persia — however  little  real  im- 
portance these  terms  may  possess  so  far  as  the  two  Powers  are  con- 
cerned ^ — is  not  credited  by  Sir  Edward  Grey.  Yet  this  is  assur- 
edly the  point  from  which  the  opposition  starts. 

Grey  has  repeatedly  pointed  to  the  fact  that  the  continuous  in- 
creasing of  our  demands  tends  to  strengthen  the  opposition.  He 
is  fully  aware  that  his  resignation  would  undoubtedly  lead  to  a  thorough 
change  of  English  policy.^ 

In  order  to  be  able  to  maintain  the  Entente  with  England  we, 
in  my  opinion,  must  inform  the  British  Government  that  we  shall 


'Showing  Grey's  insincerity,  since  he  knew  all  too  well  that  this  was  quite 
impossible. 

'A  frank  admission. 

•  An  understanding  with  Germany,  as  shown  by  these  documents. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  VS.  SHUSTER      133 

at  Teheran  strictly  adhere  to  the  agreements  contained  in  the 
Anglo-Russian  Convention  and  that  the  integrity  and  inde- 
pendence of  Persia,  as  understood  by  the  two  Powers,^  will  not  be 
violated.  Otherwise  it  is  certain  that  Grey  will  have  to  resign, 
whatever  he  may  say  or  do. 

If  we  were  only  to  lose  in  him  a  statesman  of  great  merit, 
then  this  consideration  would  perhaps  have  to  be  subordinated 
to  the  interests  of  Russia,  and  could  not  influence  the  decisions 
of  the  Imperial  Government.  But  I  think  I  must  once  more  reiterate 
that  Grey's  retirement  would  involve  the  complete  re-orientation  of 
English  policy. 

No  doubts  can  be  harboured  as  to  what  would  then  follow. 
Just  at  this  moment  a  gradual  rapprochement  with  Germany  is  in 
preparation.  This  may  be  but  a  partial  one  at  the  beginning,  but  later 
on  it  is  sure  to  become  general  and  to  exclude  everything  else.  At 
least,  this  is  my  firm  conviction,  in  spite  of  all  signs  to  the  contrary, 
since  it  is  undeniable  that  bitter  feeling  still  prevails  in  London  as  well 
as  at  Berlin.  I  believe,  however,  that  once  Russia  is  separated  from 
England,  the  present  state  of  affairs  will  soon  undergo  a  change.  It 
is  obvious  that,  to  all  those  desiring  a  rupture  of  the  Anglo-Russian 
Entente,  the  whole  Shuster  affair  presents  a  very  efficacious  lever. 


(154)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  22'Dec.  5,  1911.    No.  313. 

Nicolson  informs  me  that  Major  Stokes  will  obey  repeated  orders 
and  return  to  England.^    He  will  leave  Persia  in  ten  days. 


(155)     The  Russian  Minister  at  Teheran  to  Neratoff.    Telegram,  Nov.  17- 
30,  1911.    No.  1173. 

After  long  secret  conferences  with  the  Ministerial  Council,  the  Per- 
sian Parliament  voted  in  open  session  on  the  answer  to  our  ultimatum 
and  decided  by  an  overwhelming  Majority  to  reject  our  demands.^ 

^The  Persian  and  Entente  views  on  integrity  and  independence  did  not 
coincide,  however. 

*  The  price  paid  to  Russia  by  Grey. 

'Which  included  the  demand  for  Mr.  Shuster's  dismissal  from  the  Persian 
service. 


134  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

(156)  Neratoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.    Telegram,  Nov.  18- 

Dec.  1,  1911.    No.  1923. 

We  have  instructed  our  Minister  at  Teheran  to  propose  to  the  com- 
mander of  our  Expeditionary  Corps  to  advance  in  the  direction  of 
Kaswin,  calculating  to  leave  Resht  not  earlier  than  to-morrow  after- 
noon, as  I  promised  Buchanan.'^ 

(157)  The  Russian  Minister  at  Teheran  to  Neratoff.     Telegram,  Nov.  20- 
Dec.  3,  1911.    No.  1938. 

The  British  Minister  has  informed  the  Persians,  in  the  name 
of  the  London  Cabinet,  that  both  Governments  are  debating  on 
the  situation  at  Teheran,  but  that  no  hopes  should  be  entertained  at 
Teheran  of  any  one  of  the  Russian  demands  being  withdrawn.  The 
non-fulfilment  of  the  Russian  ultimatum  would  have  as  a  consequence 
the  advance  of  our  troops.  This  statement  has  re-established  in  the 
eyes  of  the  Persians  and  the  English  here  the  solidarity  of  both 
Governments  as  to  which  divers  doubts  were  raised  here  after  our 
last  ultimatum. 

(158)  Neratoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.    Telegram,  Nov.  21- 

Dec.  4,  1911.    No.  1951. 

We  can  not  quite  understand  for  what  reason  Grey  is  alarmed  by 
our  actions  in  Persia,  as  these  are  not  contrary  to  our  agreement  with 
England.  We  have  no  intention  of  insisting  on  the  immediate  indemni- 
fication of  our  expenses.  We  have  pointed  out  that  this  question  will 
form  the  subject  of  further  discussions. 

Our  troops  will  probably  be  concentrated  at  Kaswin  on  No- 
vember 30,  and  the  Commanding  General  will  await  further  in- 
structions there.  At  the  same  time  I  pointed  out  to  Buchanan  that 
the  troops'  remaining  in  Kaswin  would  depend  on  the  further  develop- 
ment of  affairs;  an  acceleration  of  our  entry  into  Teheran  may  pos- 
sibly become  necessary. 

As  for  new  demands,  should  such  be  rendered  imperative  in  conse- 
quence of,  for  instance,  armed  resistance  and  bloodshed,  then  they  will 
refer  solely  to  specifically  Russian  interests  in  our  zone,  i.  e.,  railways 

*  Despite  the  pleas   of   Sir   Edward   Grey,  who  hated   Germany  more  than 
normally  he  despised  Russia. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  VS.  SHUSTER       135 

m  Northern  Persia,  the  organisation  of  an  armed  troop  in  Tabriz  under 

Russian  control,  to  allow  us  to  recall  our  military  there,  etc.  etc. 

It  is  understood  that  we  shall  present  no  claims  of  a  general 

political  nature  without  a  previous  understanding  with  England. 

(159)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Neratoff.     Telegram,  Nov. 
25-Dec.  8,  1911.    No.  315. 

The  British  Minister  telegraphs  from  Teheran  that  he  feels 
justified  in  assuming  that  the  Persian  Government  will  fulfil  our 
demands.  The  discussion  between  the  Persian  Minister  here  and 
Grey  discloses  that  the  demand,  that  the  nomination  of  foreign 
councilors  be  subjected  to  the  previous  approval  of  Russia  and 
England,  arouses  the  strongest  opposition.  Grey  thinks  a  form 
which  is  less  wounding  to  Persian  self-respect  should  be  found  for 
this  demand.  This  concession,  naturally,  could  only  he  made  after  the 
fulfilment  of  the  demand  of  Shuster*s  withdrawal. 

(160)  Neratoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.      Telegram,  Nov. 
27-Dec.  10,  1911.    No.  2009. 

Your  telegram  315  received. 

We  have  already  forwarded  instructions  to  our  Minister  to  find 
for  Point  2  of  our  ultimatum  a  form  less  wounding  to  the  self- 
respect  of  the  Persians  and  to  replace  the  words  "without  the 
previous  approval  of  the  two  Legations"  by  "without  a  previous 
understanding  with  the  two  Legations." 

(161)  Sasonoff,  the  Russian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the  Russian 

Ambassador  in  London.     Telegram,  Dec.  9-22,  1911.    No.  2109. 

I  telegraphed  to  our  Minister  at  Teheran: 

The  Persian  Charge  d* Affaires  has  to-day  informed  us  that 
his  Government  accepts  all  our  demands,  Point  2  being  replied  to 
in  the  wording  permitted  by  us. 

The  Persian  Representative  at  the  same  time  expressed  the 
hope  that  our  troops  would  be  immediately  withdrawn  from  Kas- 
win.  We  informed  him  that  we  gladly  acknowledge  his  statement 
and  that  our  troops  will  be  withdrawn,  but  that  we  hope  that  our 
demands  will  be  fulfilled  de  facto  by  that  time  and  Shuster  removed. 
At  the  same  time,  we  expected  that  the  resumption  of  friendly 


136  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

relations  between  Russia  and  Persia  would  lead  to  the  readiness 
of  the  Persian  Government  to  regulate  on  a  diplomatic  basis  a 
whole  series  of  questions  which  had  met  with  no  solution  in  the 
course  of  the  last  few  years  and  which  have  no  connection  whatso- 
ever with  the  incident  just  brought  to  a  happy  conclusion. 

The  Charge  d'Affaires  then  informed  us  that  encounters  with 
our  troops  had  taken  place  in  Resht  and  Tabriz,  the  blame  resting 
with  the  Russians.  We  answered  him  that  according  to  our  informa- 
tion the  Persians  had  attacked,  and  that  we  were  not  as  yet  in  possession 
of  any  information,  but  that  in  any  event  the  future  action  of  our  troops 
in  both  these  towns  was  not  dependent  on  the  orders  of  the  central 
institutions  but  on  those  of  the  military  officers  in  command} 


(162)     The  Russian  Viceroy  in  the  Caucasus  to  the  Foreign  Minister.    Tele- 
gram, Dec.  10-23.  1911.    No.  7637. 

Up  to  the  present  day  I  have  issued  no  orders  regarding  the 
actions  of  our  troops  in  Persia.  The  commanding  officers  of  the 
separate  units  have  acted  in  agreement  with  our  Consuls.  I  con- 
sider however  that  such  a  state  of  affairs,  under  the  present  acute 
conditions,  is  improper  and  cannot  be  maintained.  The  commanding 
officers  must  be  given  instructions  exactly  circumscribing  the  object 
of  the  expedition  and  granting  them  entire  freedom  of  action  in  its 
attainment.  In  my  opinion  these  instructions  should  be:  Advance  on 
Teheran  without  halt,  occupy  the  town  and  place  yourself  at  the  dis- 
posal of  our  minister  there.  March  the  entire  route  to  Teheran  and 
leave  the  necessary  relays  at  Enseli,  Resht  and  Kaswin;  take  energetic 
measures  against  refusal  to  work,  boycott  and  robbery;  the  Fidais  must 
be  taken  prisoners;  should  they  resist,  they  must  be  destroyed.^  The 
opinions  of  the  Consuls  can  be  taken  into  consideration,  but  the  com- 
manding officers  must  act  independently  and  only  take  into  account 
the  orders  of  the  minister.^ 

The  lengthy  stay  of  our  troops  at  Kaswin  has  proved  to  the  revolu- 
tionaries that  a  certain  foreign  influence  is  restricting  our  freedom  of 

*  Which  means  that  these  officers  had  carte  blanche,  a  state  of  affairs  that 
could  only  lead  to  complication  and  provocation. 

"An  example  of  what  the  Persians  had  opposed  in  a  feeble  way. 
•At  Teheran. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  VS.  SHUSTER      137 

action.     This  has  heightened  the  courage  of  the  Fidais  and  led  to 
fights  with  our  detachment  in  Tabriz. 

(163)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Dec.  11-24,  1911.    No.  7785. 

The  attacks  on  our  troops  and  the  mutilation  of  our  wounded  ^ 
rendered  energetic  reprisals  necessary,  and  I  consider  it  desirable  to 
instruct  General  Woropanoff  to  blow  up  the  Tabriz  Citadel  and  to 
establish  military  tribunals  to  mete  out  justice  ^  to  all  the  originators  of 
the  attack  as  well  as  to  those  who  mutilated  our  wounded,  and  finally 
to  all  such  Russian  subjects  as  fled  to  Persia  and  participated  in  the 
attacks  on  our  troops.  The  verdicts  must  be  carried  out  at  once. 
Furthermore,  a  considerable  compensation  must  be  demanded  from  the 
population  of  Tabriz  for  the  families  of  the  killed  and  wounded.^ 
Similar  measures  are  to  be  taken  in  Enseli  and  Resht,  and  in  other 
Persian  towns  in  which  encounters  have  taken  place. 

(164)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Dec.  11-24,  1911.    No.  7726. 

All  culprits  should  be  dealt  with  by  the  court  martials  on  the  spot 
in  Persia  and  not  sent  to  Russia  to  the  Caucasian  prisons,  as  these 
are  overcrowded;  the  trials  would  be  long  drawn  out  and  the  punish- 
ment would  not  be  severe  enough  in  proportion  to  the  transgressions.^ 

(165)  The  Russian  Ambassador  in  London  to  Sasonoff.     Telegram,  Dec. 
19,  1911-/an.  1.  1912.    No.  337. 

Mallet,^  and  various  editors  of  the  leading  English  papers  favour- 
ing the  Entente,  such  as  the  ''Times,"  have  told  me  that  they  regret 
suppression  of  the  disturbances  in  Persia.  This  is  all  the  more  de- 
plorable as  it  was  a  question  of  the  peaceful  local  population  which  on 
the  whole  had  behaved  with  civility  towards  Russia. 

I  told  Mallet  in  reply,  I  was  convinced  that  the  military  commanders 
had  orders  to  avoid  every  unjust  measure,  and  that  the  influence  of 
the  viceroy  ^  and  the  consuls  was  exercised  to  the  same  effect;    that 

*A  charge  incident  to  all  campaigns  of  that  nature. 

'The  firing  squad. 

"  Who  died  for  the  cause  of  imperialism— Russia's  "historic  mission." 

*  Meaning  death  by  court  martial. 

'  Attached  to  British  foreign  office,  and  later  British  ambassador  to  Turkey. 

•The  quality  of  whose  mercy  we  see  described  in  his  own  telegrams. 


138 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


the  government  could  not  be  held  responsible  for  the  articles  of  the 
"Novoe  Vremia,"  ^  but  that  I  was  perfectly  willing  to  place  these 
considerations  before  you  in  order  to  avoid  a  press  campaign. 

(166)  The  Same  to  the  Same.   Telegram,  Dec.  21,  1911-/a».  3,  1912.  No.  341. 

Mallet  has  shown  me  in  confidence  a  telegram  from  the  British 
Minister   at  Teheran  on  the   execution   of   the   Sikat   Ul   Islam. 

Barclay  expresses  his  dismay.  This  priest  was  the  object  of  special 
veneration  in  a  great  part  of  Persia.  His  execution  was  nothing  less 
than  a  catastrophe  and  the  consequences  could  not  be  foreseen.  He 
believes  the  fall  of  the  Persian  Cabinet  possible.  The  news  has 
been  published  here  to-day. 

The  "Times"  devotes  a  leader  to  the  situation  at  Tabriz.  On 
the  whole,  the  article  is  favourable  to  us,  with  the  exception  of  this 
execution.  I  fear  a  very  unfavourable  impression  on  public  opinion 
here.    A  revival  of  religious  fanaticism  is  feared  above  everything.^ 

(167)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Dec.  23,  1911-/o».  5,  1912.    No.  343. 

The  execution  of  the  Sikat  must  be  regarded  from  two  viewpoints.^ 
First,  the  choice  of  the  day.  The  date  chosen  seems  to  me  to 
have  been  a  regrettable  error  on  the  part  of  our  officials.  The 
measures  we  took  had  the  sole  purpose  of  punishing  in  an  ex- 
emplary manner  the  originators  of  the  disturbances.  Should 
priests  be  among  these,  then  a  religious  fete-day  should  obviously 
not  have  been  chosen  for  their  punishment,  in  order  clearly  to  show 
that  such  punishment  has  nothing  to  do  with  religious  sentiment  and 
the  Islamic  religion.  By  carrying  out  this  execution  on  the  very 
day  of  religious  prayers,  the  entire  affair  has  taken  an  anti-Islamic 
character. 

The  second  point  to  be  considered  is  that  the  impression  called 
forth  by  the  execution  of  the  Sikat  is  so  extraordinarily  strong  that 
the  Russian  Government  should  put  a  stop  to  all  further  executions. 


I 


*  Semi-official  newspaper  of  the  Russian  government;    organ  of  the  Grand- 
Ducal  war  clique  and  Sazonoff. 

'Objection  to  the  treatment  of  the  Persians  by  the  Moslems  within  and  with- 
out the  British  empire. 

*  From  the  angle  of  scientific  hypothesis  and  Russian  imperialism. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  VS.  SHUSTER       139 

(168)    The  Same  to  the  Same.  Telegram,  Dec.  24,  1911-/o«.  6,  1912.  No.  346. 

....  The  events  cannot  but  create  the  impression  that  our 
entire  policy  in  Persia  seems  to  fluctuate  between  two  poles: 
The  one,  the  secret  current,  always  appears  to  carry  away  with  it 
the  other,  which  forms  our  official  program.  This  opinion  gains 
strength  continuously.  It  is  extraordinarily  harmful  to  the  authority 
and  weight  of  the  official  statements  made  by  our  Government.^  I 
should  reproach  myself  were  I  not  to  attract  your  attention  to  this 
danger. 


(169)     Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Minister  at  Teheran.    Telegram,  Jan.  5-18, 
1912.    No.  38. 

We  learn  with  pleasure  that  the  Persian  Government  intends  taking 
energetic  measures  against  the  Democrats.  We  are  convinced  that 
order  can  be  re-established  throughout  the  country  only  by  such  means. 
Pray  inform  the  Cabinet  that  our  full  support  could  be  relied  on  in  this 
question.^ 


(170)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sazonoff.    Extract  from  a 
Personal  Letter,  Jan.  15-28,  1912. 

....  Up  to  the  present  I  have  made  no  use  of  the  final  sen- 
tence in  your  telegram  No.  13:  "We  are  now  making  a  new  de- 
cisive effort  to  establish  friendly  relations  with  the  Persian  Gov- 
ernment, and  should  it  again  prove  itself  unworthy  of  our  con- 
fidence, then  we  shall  have  to  enter  into  a  serious  exchange  of 
opinions  with  the  London  Cabinet  on  the  existing  situation." 

Such  deductions  seem  to  me  premature.  If  I  were  to  lay  them 
before  the  London  Cabinet,  the  latter  might  assume  that  we  our- 
selves had  no  confidence  in  the  success  of  our  present  endeavours 
and  were  already  thinking  more  of  their  eventual  results.  What  would 
follow  could  only  be  a  more  or  less  open  partition  of  Persia.^  This 
would  mean  the  collapse  of  Grey's  policy,  in  the  name  of  which  he 
has  hitherto  silenced  all  opponents  of  the  Entente.    It  is  obvious  that 

*The  acts  of  Russia  in  Persia  were  revealing  what  the  words  of   Count 
Benckendorff  endeavored  to  hide. 

'  The  Persian  Democrats  insisted  upon  the  country's  autonomy. 
'  The  complete  partition  Sazonoff  had  in  view. 


140 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


I 


we  must  attempt  to  create  a  new  situation  at  Teheran,  but  I  would 
rather  not  speak  of  a  decisive  attempt — this  sounds  too  much  like 
a  final  attempt. 

We  have  already  attained  concrete  results: 

Shuster  has  vanished  and  the  Persian  Government  is  dissolved. 

The  new  spirit  needs  time  to  take  root. 

It  will  not  be  difficult  for  me  to  impress  Grey  in  view  of  our 
conciliatory  attitude:  the  abdication  of  Muhamed  All  and  the 
Persian  Loan.  i 

What  I  wish  to  avoid  is  rendering  our  Entente  with  England,  Bl 
our  relations  to  this  country,  dependent  on  the  attitude  of  the 
Persian  Government  and,  by  so  doing,  presenting,  as  I  may  say, 
the  Persian  Government  with  the  key  to  Anglo-Russian  relations. 
The  belief  that  a  joint  discussion  of  an  absolutely  new  program 
could  lead  to  any  result  appears  to  me  illusory.  Neither  Grey  nor 
the  present  Government  could  permit  the  partition  or  a  joint  protec- 
torate over  Persia}  Not  only  the  Liberal  but  the  whole  Conserva- 
tive Party  in  England  as  well  would  oppose  this. 

I  believe  that  the  Conservatives,  even  if  they  could,  will  avoid 
bringing  about  the  fall  of  the  Government  on  a  question  of  for-  ^i 
eign  policy.  SI 

They  prefer  coming  into  office  without  having  bound  them- 
selves in  any  one  question.  Nor  do  I  believe  that  Grey  will  have 
to  retire,  unless,  of  course,  some  unforeseen  event  should  take 
place.  But  on  the  other  hand,  a  foreign  Minister  cannot  remain 
at  his  post  for  any  length  of  time  after  being  attacked  by  his  own 
party  and  supported  only  by  the  opposition.  This  would  necessarily 
he  the  case  once  we  declare  that  we  must  take  further  measures  in 
Persia. 

We  must  not  conceal  from  ourselves  the  fact  that  the  opposition 
is  growing  in  England.^  The  Persian  question  looms  largest  in  the 
public  eye;  but  it  is  not  the  only  one.  In  reality,  the  relations 
to  Germany  are  most  prominent;  they  are  deemed  too  strained  and 
Grey  is  held  responsible, — in  my  opinion  wrongly  so.  Bonar  Law 
only  devoted  a  few  words  to  foreign  policy  in  his  speech.     He  con- 


*  Desired  by  Russia. 

'Opposition  to   Grey's   secret  understanding   with   Russia,   the   existence 
which  could  not  longer  be  denied. 


RUSSO-BRITISH  IMPERIALISM  VS.  SHUSTER       141 

eluded  however,  with  the  statement  that  Grey's  policy  logically  must 
lead  to  the  result  that  the  whole  ill-will  in  Germany  recoiled  upon  Eng- 
land.  This  is  the  principal  theme  of  the  opposition,  however  much 
it  may  be  denied. 

If  the  attacks  of  the  Persian  Committee  alone  came  into 
question,  the  matter  would  not  be  dangerous.  But  Grey  is  being 
reproached  with  having  settled  the  affairs  for  a  none-too-grateful  France 
and  with  now  defending  the  interests  of  Italy  and  Russia. 

France  and  Italy  now  belong  to  past  history,  but  the  Persian  prob- 
lem is  of  the  present  and  the  opposition  will  endeavour  to  prove  that 
Grey  is  neglecting  England's  interests  in  South  Persia  and  India  in 
favour  of  Russia.^ 

Nicolson  told  me  the  British  Viceroy  in  India  had  written  to 
say  that  events  in  Persia  had  echoed  far  and  wide  among  the 
Mohammedan  population. 

The  German  Ambassador  has  just  been  to  see  me. 

^'Public  opinion  in  England  begins  to  veer  round  to  us  again"  he 
told  me. 

This  is  true.  One  should  only  try  to  prevent  it  sheering  away 
from  us  in  a  like  measure.  And  yet  this  is  the  case.  This  develop- 
ment can  still  be  stopped,  but  it  can  also  make  very  rapid  progress,  as 
Grey  himself  told  me  some  weeks  ago.  Grey  was  very  grave  on  that 
occasion. 

I  am  loathe  again  and  again  to  play  the  part  of  Cassandra,  but 
whose  duty  but  mine  would  it  be  to  write  and  inform  you  of  what 
I  foresee  and  what  I  observe? 

The  relations  between  the  two  Governments  are  not  clouded, 
as  no  misunderstanding  exists.  The  British  Government  knows 
the  state  of  affairs.  But  this  is  not  the  case  with  the  relations  to  each 
other  of  public  opinion  in  the  two  countries.  And  yet  these  will  de- 
cide the  further  development  of  affairs. 

"■  To  realize  his  pet  scheme :  The  destruction  of  Germany,  as  is  shown  by  the 
documents. 


IV 


NORTH  AFRICA,  ITALY  AND  THE  ENTENTE 
(June  1909— July  1914) 

In  the  summer  of  1909,  the  political  constellation  in  Europe  was 
the  following:  France  and  Russia  were  allies;  France  and  Great 
Britain  were  linked  together  in  the  entente  cordiale;  France  had 
an  agreement  with  Italy  which  enabled  both  countries  to  desist 
from  concentrating  troops  on  their  mutual  frontier ;  Russia  was  on 
the  best  terms  with  Great  Britain,  and  Germany,  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Italy  formed  the  Triple  Alliance,  a  combination 
which  had  weathered  many  a  storm — solely  because  Germany  re- 
mained loyal  to  Austria-Hungary  under  all  circumstances,  and 
was  able  to  keep  up  appearances  well  with  Italy. 

Russia  was  working  feverishly  in  the  Balkans  to  get  the  Slav 
states  to  agree  a  little  oftener  with  one  another,  and  form  of  them 
a  combination  that  would  foster  the  interests  of  Pan-Slavism,  to 
which  policy  both,  Iswolsky  and  Sazonoff,  were  committed.  Since 
the  aspirations  of  the  Balkan  states  could  only  be  realized  by 
driving  the  Turk  still  more  eastward,  the  Ottoman  government 
had  to  fear  that  before  long  it  would  have  another  war  on  its 
hands.  Thus  it  came  that  at  times  it  would  listen  even  to  Rus- 
sian advances,  though  fully  conscious  of  the  fact  that  there  was  no 
friendship  behind  them.  Imperial  Russia,  while  doing  her  best  to 
weld  together  into  a  homogeneous  mass  the  Slavs  of  the  Balkans, 
was  not  minded  to  have  all  of  Turkey-in-Europe  fall  into  their 
hands.  Thrace  at  least  was  to  be  Russian,  ultimately,  by  virtue 
of  its  being  the  immediate  neighborhood  of  Constantinople,  which 
city,  known  affectionately  to  all  Russians  as  Czarigrad — emperor 

142 


NORTH  AFRICA,  ITALY  AND  THE  ENTENTE        143 

city— was  to  be  the  real  capital  of  Russia  in  the  future.  From 
the  cupola  of  the  Hagia  Sofia  in  Stamboul  was  to  shine  re- 
splendent once  more  the  Greek  cross.  The  Turk  was  to  be  driven 
unto  the  Anatolian  high-plateau,  and  Old  Byzantium  and  her 
waterways,  the  Bosphorus  and  Dardanelles,  were  to  be  Russian. 
Such  was  the  "historic  mission"  of  Russia  of  which  we  hear  so 
much  in  the  documents. 

Austria-Hungary  had  long  been  a  thorn  in  the  side  of  Russia. 
During  the  Bosnian  crisis,  Germany  had  stood  by  her  ally,  while 
Italy  had  been  lukewarm,  though  not  yet  ready  to  violate  the  con- 
tract she  had  signed  in  the  treaty  of  the  Triple  Alliance.  By  the 
terms  of  that  treaty,  Italy  was  obliged  to  come  to  the  assistance 
of  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  in  case  the  casus  foederis  en- 
sued, while  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  were  obliged  to  do 
as  much  for  the  Italians. 

There  had  been  much  enmity  between  the  French  and  Italians. 
Italy  had  not  yet  forgotten  the  conduct  of  the  French  zouaves. 
But  M.  Barrere,  the  French  ambassador  to  Rome,  was  an  able 
man.  The  result  was  that,  in  1902,  an  agreement  was  reached 
between  the  governments  of  France  and  Italy,  which  resulted  in 
a  decided  lessening  of  the  tension  and  made  the  Italo-French  border 
less  of  a  permanent  military  camp. 

Russia  also  wanted  to  contribute  her  share  toward  weaning 
Italy  away  from  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary,  and  in  the  sum- 
mer of  1909,  the  King  of  Italy  and  Czar  Nicholas  came  together 
and  made  what  has  become  known  as  the  Agreement  of  Rac- 
conigi,  according  to  whose  terms,  so  far  as  known,  both  govern- 
ments guaranteed  to  one  another  the  status  quo  in  the  Balkans. 

It  was  shown  later  that  Italy  had  a  similar  agreement  with  the 
Austro-Hungarian  government,  which  was  quite  in  keeping  with 
the  notions  of  international  honesty  the  Italians  had  and  as  this 
honesty  is  depicted  in  the  diplomatic  correspondence  here  sub- 
mitted. 

News  that  Russia  and  Italy  had  reached  an  agreement 
caused  considerable  disquietude  in  Berlin  and  Vienna,  and  re- 
newed in  Germany  the  agitation  for  a  new  foreign  policy,  in  which 
Austria-Hungary  would  not  figure  as  the  principal  ally.  It  was 
felt  that  Italy  had  some  just  grievances  against  the  Vienna  gov- 


144  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

ernment  and  that  for  this  reason  it  was  expecting  too  much 
Italy  to  be  a  loyal  member  of  the  Triple  Alliance.  Moreover,  it 
was  evident  that,  militarily,  Austria-Hungary  was  more  of  a  lia- 
bility to  Germany  than  an  asset.  While  her  own  Slav  elements 
could  not  be  relied  upon,  Austria-Hungary  seemed  bent  upon  in- 
corporating other  Slavs  in  the  Balkans,  weakening  herself  in.-fl| 
ternally  thereby,  and  drawing  upon  herself  the  illwill  of  the 
Russians.  The  other  side  argued  that  Austria-Hungary  was  the 
only  available  ally,  and  was  still  better  than  Italy  because  that 
country,  having  a  long  and  vulnerable  coastline,  could  be  reduced 
to  impotency  by  the  fleets  of  Great  Britain  and  France  in  little 
time.  Besides,  Austria-Hungary  was  stronger  in  the  economic 
sense,  and  the  ties  of  race  between  the  Germans  and  the  German- 
Austrians  also  contributed  to  continuing  the  alliance.  The  policy 
of  Prince  Bismarck  and  Emperor  William  I,  which  was  for  an 
entente  with  Russia,  had  been  ignored  by  Emperor  William  II, 
and  could  not  be  upheld  anyway  so  long  as  Russian  Pan-Slavism 
and  Austro-Hungarian  imperialism  remained  in  hostile  contact. 
Then,  too,  there  was  no  other  state  to  select  for  an  ally,  so  long 
as  Alsace-Lorraine  remained  an  issue  with  the  French,  and  Ger-  < 
man  foreign  trade  continued  to  be  an  irritant  to  Great  Britain,      fll 

The  Agreement  of  Racconigi  was  regarded  throughout  Europe 
as  an  event  of  the  greatest  significance.  It  signalled  a  new  era  in 
international  relations. 

Naturally,  Italy  wanted  a  compensation  for  entering  upon 
a  common  policy  with  Russia  in  the  Balkans.  That  common 
policy  was  to  prevent  further  growth  of  Austria-Hungary  in  the 
peninsula.  But  that  was  barely  a  consideration  for  the  Entente 
as  a  whole.  The  documents  show  that  the  Agreement  of  Rac- 
conigi was  the  first  decisive  step  to  get  Italy  into  the  camp  of  the 
French,  Russians  and  British.  The  intention  was  to  make  Italy 
more  than  a  mere  "dead  weight"  in  the  Triple  Alliance,  as  she 
had  been  since  1902,  if  not  before. 

Though  Signor  Tittoni,  then  Italian  minister  of  foreign  affairs, 
was  smitten  by  pangs  of  conscience  shortly  afterwards,  he  got 
used  to  the  idea  of  Italy  being  a  potential  ally  of  Russia,  France 
and  Great  Britain.  Moreover,  there  was  a  compensation  that  was 
worth  while.     Italy  was  promised  non-interference  in  her  plan 


NORTH  AFRICA,  ITALY  AND  THE  ENTENTE        145 

to  take  the  last  of  the  Ottoman  territories  in  North  Africa  as  her 
own. 

It  was  a  season  for  such  things.  Out  in  the  Far  East,  Russia 
and  Japan  were  dividing  Manchuria  and  Mongolia  among  them- 
selves with  the  consent  of  Great  Britain  and  France,  and  later 
the  United  States.  It  was  to  be  China's  turn  as  soon  as  the  neces- 
sary political  and  military  preliminaries  had  been  achieved.  Great 
Britain  was  about  to  extend  her  Indian  empire  into  Tibet.  Persia 
had  been  divided  into  "zones  of  influence'*  by  Russia  and  Great 
Britain,  and  France,  after  ceding  to  Great  Britain  the  last  of  her 
rights  in  Egypt,  had  been  given  a  free  hand  in  Morocco  to  the 
detriment  of  Spain,  Germany  and  the  smaller  Powers.  Already 
Sazonoff  had  decided  that  the  Slavs  of  the  Balkans  were  to  take 
from  the  Turk  all  they  could,  bringing  their  booty  as  heirloom 
to  the  Great  Pan-Slav  realm  that  was  to  be  fashioned,  and,  as  he 
viewed  it,  the  achievement  of  Russia's  "historic  mission"  in  Thrace, 
Constantinople  and  Asia  Minor  was  not  far  off.  To  Italy,  then, 
was  given  what  could  be  spared,  and  that  was  a  narrow  fringe  of 
habitable  land  along  the  Mediterranean. 

On  September  27,  1911,  Italy  was  ready  to  gather  the  price, 
and  though  the  Ottoman  government  did  everything  possible  to 
avert  war,  it  did  not  succeed,  because  the  cards  were  once  more 
stacked  against  the  Turk. 

There  was  intermittent  warfare  for  a  year  almost,  and  then 
both  belligerents  desisted  because  the  money  gave  out,  and  the 
Balkan  League  was  ready  to  descend  upon  the  Turks,  while  Italy 
had  been  made  to  realize  that,  while  there  was  no  objection  to 
her  taking  Cyrenaica  and  Lybia,  there  was  an  end  to  Entente 
munificence  in  regard  to  the  Turkish  islands  in  the  Mediterranean 
which  Italy  proposed  occupying.  The  Entente  did  not  intend 
having  Italy  become  a  first  class  power  in  the  Mediterranean,  by 
holding  naval  bases  in  the  eastern  reaches  of  that  sea. 

Meanwhile,  the  Entente  had  gained  what  it  wanted.  On  March 
25th,  1912  already,  the  Russian  ambassador  at  Rome  was  able  to 
report  to  Sazonoff  that: 

"Owing  to  the  Re-Insurance  Treaties,  which  are  known  to  you. 
in  the  event  of  a  conflict  between  the  hostile  camps  of  Europe, 
Germany  can  no  longer  absolutely  count  on  Italy." 


146 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


Tittoni,  who  was  later  ambassador  to  France,  was  not  always 
sure  that  Italy  had  taken  the  proper  course,  and  caused  both,  the 
Italian  and  French  governments,  many  an  uneasy  moment.  He 
resented  that,  despite  the  good  turns  Italy  had  done  France,  the 
standing  of  the  Italians  with  the  French  was  no  better  than  it 
had  been  in  the  past,  insisting  that  his  country  should  be  looked 
upon  as  an  equal  among  nations. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  Italy  owed  her  rise  to  the  Triple  Alli- 
ance, and  the  saner  of  her  statesmen  were  not  always  sure  of  the 
ground  upon  which  the  politicians  and  diplomatists  had  set  the 
country's  feet. 

The  chapter  on  this  subject  may  be  looked  upon  as  the  most 
complete  illustration  of  what  modern  diplomacy  is.  It  removes 
all  doubt  as  to  what  the  intentions  of  France,  Russia  and  Great 
Britain  were,  and  throws  a  strong  light  on  the  methods  adopted 
for  reaching  the  objective.  International  machination  is  pictured 
in  it  so  lucidly  and  completely  as  to  make  the  least  exercise  of 
one's  imagination  superfluous. 


(171) 


The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Rome  to  the  Russian  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  M.  Iswolsky.    Letter,  June  9-22,  1909. 


Since  the  departure  of  our  ambassador,  I  have  not  had  the  op- 
portunity of  speaking  to  Tittoni,^  who  has  been  engaged  the  entire 
time  in  Parliament.  On  the  other  hand,  I  have  talked  with  Bol- 
lati  2  on  various  subjects,  in  regard  to  which  I  feel  obliged  to  make 
a  report,  even  though  the  events  discussed  belong  already  to  the 
past. 

First  of  all,  I  must  convey  to  you  Tittoni*s  regret  at  not  having 
seen  you  in  Venice  whither  he  assumed  you  were  coming  after 
your  stay  in  Munich.  As  he  was  in  Milan,  he  made  all  his  plans  to 
meet  you  quite  privately  in  Venice,  as  otherwise  the  press  would  have 
made  use  of  your  meeting  for  making  all  sorts  of  comments. 

I  received  no  further  indication  as  to  what  he  wished  to  discuss 
with  you.  I  believe,  however,  that  I  am  not  mistaken  in  thinking  it 


*  Italian  minister  of  foreign  affairs. 
'Italian  under-secretary  for  foreign  affairs. 


NORTH  AFRICA,  ITALY  AND  THE  ENTENTE        147 

related  to  his  negotiations  with  Aehrenthal  in  regard  to  Article 
29  ^  of  the  Berlhi  Treaty  and  your  assurances  in  this  connection. 

/  do  not  doubt  hut  that  Tittoni  would  have  given  you  exact  details 
concerning  the  last  meeting  of  the  King  of  Italy  and  the  King  of  Eng- 
land at  Bajd.  As  Sir  Rennel  Rodd  ^  himself  told  me,  the  agreement 
was  that  no  political  questions  should  be  discussed  during  the 
course  of  this  meeting.  King  Edward  decided  otherwise  and  had  two 
conversations,  one  with  King  Victor  Emanuel,  the  other  with  Tittoni, 
discussing  with  both  of  them  the  same  subject,  namely,  the  balance  of 
power  in  the  Adriatic  and  the  attitude  of  Italy  in  the  event  of  an 
Anglo-German  war.^ 

The  British  Ambassador  assured  me  that  neither  the  king  nor 
Tittoni  had  given  any  answer  to  the  questions  put  to  them,  but 
that  the  conversation  had  evidently  made  a  deep  impression  on  them 
both.  King  Victor  Emanuel  made  no  secret  of  this  fact,  when  he  spoke 
to  Sir  Rennel  in  the  Quirinal  eight  days  after  the  departure  of  King 
Edward.  Sir  Rennel,  for  his  part,  was  astonished  that  the  King  had  not 
taken  advantage  of  this  opportunity  in  order  to  express  such  doubts  as 
might  have  arisen  in  his  mind  during  the  meeting  at  Bajd  and  to  enter 
into  an  exchange  of  views.  As  to  the  impression  made  upon  Tittoni, 
the  French  Ambassador  told  me  yesterday,  the  minister  seemed  to  be, 
above  all,  astonished  that  King  Edward  had  spoken  of  the  probability 
of  an  approaching  conflict  between  England  and  Germany,  a  probability 
which  Tittoni  hitherto  had  regarded  as  a  purely  theoretical  question,  and 
which  now  suddenly  loomed  up  before  him  as  an  immediate  danger. 
Towards  Barrere,^  he  had  refrained  from  all  comment,  giving  him,  how- 
ever, to  understand  how  difficult  it  would  be  for  Italy  to  participate  in  a 
conflict,  as  she  would  not  be  able  to  remain  a  mere  onlooker. 

If  Tittoni  entertained  such  doubts  a  month  ago,  they  seem  to  be 
renewed  now  upon  receipt  of  the  news  that  the  Czar  of  Russia  and 
the  German  Emperor  will  meet  in  Finnish  waters,  for  in  the  ab- 
sence of  Barrere  he  asked  Legrand,  whether  the  Paris  Cabinet  did 
not  fear  that  Russian  policy  was  entering  upon  a  new  course. 
Legrand  replied  with  a  mere  negative. 

*  Aftermath  of  the  Bosnian  Crisis  1908-9. 
'British  ambassador  at  Rome. 

'  Pet  enterprise  of  King  Edward  VII. 

*  French  ambassador  at  Rome. 


148  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

I  did  not  speak  to  BoUati  of  all  these  details.  We  concluded  our 
conversation  with  such  words  as  these: 

"We  are  in  constant  contact  with  the  English,  mainly  in  respect  to 
the  negotiations  regarding  Article  29  of  the  Berlin  Treaty;  this  is  the 
situation  at  present,  and  after  Bajd  we  shall  talk  to  you  as  before."  ^ 
This  statement  differs  decidedly  from  Sir  Rennel  Rodd's  descrip- 
tion; still,  I  have  no  reason  to  doubt  the  sincerity  of  the  latter. 

(172)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna  to  Iswolsky.    Report,  Oct.  14-27, 
1909. 

The  meeting  between  our  Czar  and  the  King  of  Italy ,2  and  the 
fact  that  His  Majesty  took  a  roundabout  way  in  order  to  avoid  Austro- 
Hungarian  territory,  has  aroused  much  ill-feeling  here.  The  Gov- 
ernment, however,  actuated  by  a  spirit  of  amour  propre,  has  not 
given  utterance  to  its  disappointment,  and  has  used  its  influence 
with  the  press,  which  has  shown  more  moderation  and  tact  respect- 
ing the  meeting  of  the  Monarchs  than  might  have  been  expected. 
Notwithstanding,  the  feeling  of  wounded  pride  is  clearly  percep- 
tible in  conversation  with  political  leaders  and  representatives  of 
the  press. 

The  semi-official  organs,  with  the  "Fremdenblatt"  at  their 
head,  declare  that  the  incident  has  no  political  significance ;  others, 
more  or  less  under  the  control  of  the  Foreign  Office,  emphasize,  in 
fact,  that  the  incident  is  a  favorable  one,  as  a  rapprochement  be- 
tween Russia  and  Italy  would  mean  a  diplomatic  guarantee  for  the 
preservation  of  the  general  peace. 

(173)  The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  in  London  to  Iswolsky.     Very  Con- 
fidential Letter,  Oct.  U-27,  1909. 

The  Under-Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs  ^  has  spoken  to  me  of  the 
intense  satisfaction  with  which  the  news  of  our  Czar's  visit  in  Rac- 
conigi  was  received  by  the  government  and  public  opinion  in  England, 
This  trip  was  most  opportune  and  of  great  importance  not  only  to  Rus- 
sia, England  and  France,  but  even  more  so  to  Italy,  as  the  relations  be- 

*  Enigma. 

"At  Racconigi,  where  a  secret  understanding  concerning  the  Balkans  was 
reached. 

^  Sir  Charles  Hardinge. 


NORTH  AFRICA,  ITALY  AND  THE  ENTENTE        149 

tween  Italy  and  Austria  were  becoming  visibly  strained.  An  additional 
proof  of  the  clouding  of  relations  between  Austria  and  Italy  is  believed 
here  to  be  manifested  by  the  recall  of  the  Austrian  Ambassador,  Count 
LUtsow,^  whose  political  views  are  supposedly  not  in  accord  with  those 
of  Aehrenthal, 

Details  in  regard  to  the  meeting  in  Racconigi  are  of  course  not 
yet  known  in  London,  but  judging  from  the  enthusiastic  press  re- 
ports, it  is  believed  that  a  favorable  result  can  be  reckoned  with. 

Hardinge  has  stated  to  me  that  he  shares  the  opinion  of  a  part  of 
the  European  press  regarding  the  strange  position  which  Italy  has  as- 
sumed in  respect  to  the  grouping  of  the  Powers.  Chiefly  in  the  event 
of  complications  in  the  Near  East,  Italy  would  either  have  to  be  untrue 
to  her  ally  or  act  counter  to  her  own  national  interests.  These  words 
confirm  the  deep  impression  made  on  government  circles  here  by  the 
meeting  at  Racconigi;  they  seem  to  incline  to  the  belief  that  Italy  in 
the  future  will  stand  closer  to  the  Entente  than  to  the  Triple  Alliance. 

(174)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Berlin  to  Iswolsky.    Repori,  Oct.  16-29, 
1909. 

The  judgment  of  the  Russian  and  Italian  press,  interpreting  the 
meeting  at  Racconigi  to  be  a  manifestation  directed  against  the  Triple 
Alliance,  especially  against  Austria,  have  not  passed  unnoticed  here. 
Notwithstanding,  both  Government  and  official  press  have  up  to 
now  maintained  a  quiet  and  moderate  tone. 

Baron  Schon  ^  declares  that  the  Berlin  Cabinet  feels  no  uneasi- 
ness in  regard  to  the  Russo-Italian  friendship.  The  speeches  as 
well  as  all  the  details  of  the  visit  at  Racconigi  reinforce  this  view 
of  his.  The  "Cologne  Gazette"  expressed  itself  in  like  fashion, 
showing  however  some  slight  irrita'tion  at  the  Italian  press,  which, 
it  declares,  has  written  much  about  this  visit  that  might  have  bet- 
ter been  left  unwritten. 

But  in  spite  of  all  these  assurances  a  certain  amount  of  uneasiness 
seems  to  prevail  in  government  circles  in  Germany,  as  it  is  not  known 
how  these  new  Russo-Italian  relations  will  react  on  Italy^s  position  in 
the  Triple  Alliance  and  on  the  general  course  of  European  policies. 

*From  Rome. 

'German  secretary  of  state  of  foreign  affairs. 


150  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

(175)  The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  in  London  to  Iswolsky.     Telegram, 
Oct.  17-30,  1909.    No.  213. 

The  Serbian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Milovanovitch,  has 
just  called  on  me.  He  counts  with  certainty  on  the  visit  at  Racconigi 
having  favorable  results  for  Serbia.^  He  obtained  the  same  impression 
from  his  conversations  with  Grey  and  Hardinge,  of  which  I  wrote  you 
in  my  letter  of  October  14,  respecting  the  future  attitude  of  Italy  towards 
the  Triple  Alliance.  Milovanovitch  doubts  whether  Austria-Hungary 
will  resolve  on  any  new  step  to  diminish  the  significance  of  the  meeting 
at  Racconigi,  as  Grey  seems  to  fear. 

(176)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Oct.  30-Nov.  12,  1909.    No.  218. 

In  the  Foreign  Office  here  reports  have  been  received  from  Rome, 
according  to  which  Tittoni  intends  to  propose  to  all  the  great  Powers 
that  they  sign  a  formal  declaralfion  regarding  the  preservation  of  the 
status  quo  in  the  Balkans.^  In  reply  to  Hardinge's  question  as  to 
whether  such  a  project  had  been  discussed  at  Racconigi,  I  stated  on 
the  strength  of  your  letter  of  October  22  to  our  Ambassador  at  Berlin 
that,  undoubtedly,  the  principle  mentioned  had  been  agreed  upon,  but 
that  I  had  heard  nothing  of  the  project  of  a  declaration.  Hardinge 
added  that  such  a  step  would  be  regarded  here  as  untimely,  useless  and 
even  provocative. 

(177)  Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  in  London.     Telegram, 

Nov.  1-14,  1909.    No.  1946. 

Your  telegram  received.  You  may  state  categorically  that  there 
was  no  suggestion  of  such  a  step  at  Racconigi;  we  consider  it,  for  our 
part,  as  thoroughly  inopportune.^ 

(178)  Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Berlin.    Confidential  Letter, 

Oct.  22-Nov.  4.  1909. 

The  meeting  of  our  Czar  with  the  King  of  Italy  at  Racconigi  has 
given  rise  to  various  comments,  some  of  which  are  calculated  to  mis- 
represent the  character  of  the  meeting  and  to  arouse  suspicion  concern- 

*A  correct  conclusion,  as  shown  by  the  document. 
"Tittoni's  conscience  was  not  easy. 
'But  Iswolsky's  conscience  was  easy. 


NORTH  AFRICA,  ITALY  AND  THE  ENTENTE        151 

ing  our  policy.  I  think  it  useful  to  inform  you  of  certain  details 
which  you  may  make  use  of  in  your  conversations  with  Herr  von 
Bethmann  Hollweg  and  Baron  Schon. 

It  is  well  known  that  His  Majesty's  journey  was  in  answer  to 
the  visit  made  by  the  King  of  Italy  to  Peterhof  in  1902.  Neverthe- 
less, it  is  clear  that  the  meeting  at  Racconigi  was  not  merely  a  ques- 
tion of  etiquette,  and  that  under  present  circumstances  it  becomes 
tinged  with  an  important  political  significance.  This  significance  is  al- 
ready to  he  seen  in  the  exchange  of  speeches  and  the  official  declaration 
which,  with  the  consent  of  Tittoni,  I  have  had  published  in  the  press. 
The  Czar  of  Russia  and  the  King  of  Italy  not  only  solemnly  de- 
clared their  personal  friendship,  but  also  the  complete  harmony  of 
views  and  interests  existing  between  their  respective  governments. 
The  declaration  in  the  press  completes  and  supplements  this  idea 
by  stating  that  Russia  and  Italy  have  the  same  object  in  view  in  their 
Balkan  policy,  namely,  the  strengthening  of  the  political  status  quo  of 
Turkey  ^  as  well  as  the  independence  and  the  normal  and  peaceful  de- 
velopment of  the  Balkan  States. 

Serious  and  moderate  European  press  organs  have  not  hesitated 
to  admit  that  the  Russo-Italian  rapprochement,  according  to  this 
presentation,  can  in  no  way  be  disquieting,  and  must  be  regarded 
as  a  further  guarantee  for  the  preservation  of  peace.  Unfortunately, 
a  few  less  moderate  papers  attempt  to  see  in  this  rapprochement  some- 
thing directed  against  Austria-Hungary  or  even  against  the  entire 
Triple  Alliance.^ 

Such  an  interpretation  must  be  categorically  rejected. 

The  idea  of  a  community  of  views  and  interests  between  Rus- 
sia and  Italy  in  Balkan  questions  is  not  new.  Two  years  ago,  Tit- 
toni and  I  in  political  speeches  which  we  delivered,  gave  expres- 
sion to  this  idea  and  nobody  at  the  time  thought  of  considering 
such  a  viewpoint  as  incompatible  with  the  obligations  Russia  and 
Italy  owe  to  their  Allies.  In  fact,  there  could  be  but  one  single 
instance  where  Russia  and  Italy  might  find  themselves  at  variance 
with  a  third  Power:  namely,  in  the  event  that  endeavours  should 
be  made  to  oppose  them  in  the  two  principles  they  have  jointly 

*  Another  "significant"  phrase  since  Italy  upset  that  status  quo  by  her  descent 
upon  Tripoli,  which  was  her  price  for  joining  Russia  in  the  Balkans. 
'As  it  was. 


152  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

agreed  upon — the  strengthening  of  the  present  political  status  quo  in 
Turkey  and  the  normal  and  peaceful  development  of  the  Balkan  States. 

These  two  points,  however,  constitute  an  important  part  of  the 
common  political  programme  of  all  the  Powers,  and  we  are  con- 
vinced that  Germany  and  Austria  are  prepared,  like  Russia  and 
Italy,  to  support  this  principle  with  every  means  in  their  power. 

In  fact,  in  contending  that  our  rapprochement  with  Italy  is  not 
directed  in  any  way  against  Germany  or  Austria-Hungary,  I  am 
not  fully  expressing  the  thoughts  of  the  St.  Petersburg  Cabinet. 
I  go  further  and  unhesitatingly  declare  that,  in  our  opinion,  every 
attempt  to  overthrow  the  system  of  alliances  on  which  the  peace 
of  Europe  has  been  based  for  so  long,  must  mean  a  grave  menace 
to  this  peace. 

This  conviction  I  have  expressed  to  the  German  Im- 
perial Chancellor  and  to  Baron  Schon,  and  I  cannot  emphasize  this 
point  too  strongly.  But  I  am  also  thoroughly  convinced  that  the 
system  in  question  should  not  prevent  us  from  maintaining  the  most 
friendly  relations  with  the  Powers  of  the  Triple  Alliance.  We  con- 
firm with  satisfaction  that  the  two  meetings  between  our  Czar  and 
Emperor  William  assisted  in  removing  all  misunderstandings  exist- 
ing between  us  and  Germany.  Unfortunately,  we  are  not  able  to  say 
the  same  of  Austria-Hungary,  for  it  is  not  we  who  have  disturbed 
these  relations.  If  we  take  advantage  of  the  opportunity  offered  us 
today  to  draw  nearer  to  Italy,  we  feel  that,  in  doing  so,  we  are 
assisting  the  cause  of  peace  and  general  harmony,  and  we  are  of  the 
firm  conviction  that  this  will  also  be  the  view  of  the  Berlin  Cabinet. 

I  should  like  to  add  a  few  words:  The  route  of  the  Czar's 
journey  has  been  much  discussed.  It  is  true,  his  Majesty  wished 
to  avoid  Austro-Hungarian  territory.  You  will  not  be  surprised  at 
this,  when  I  tell  you  that  up  to  now  Austria-Hungary  has  made  no  at- 
tempt to  diminish  the  impression  created  by  her  policy  towards  Rus- 
sia during  the  last  crisis. 


(179)     Iswolsky  to  the  Representatives  of  Russia  at  Sofia,  Belgrade  and 
Cettinje.    Instructions,  Oct.  22-Nov.  4,  1909. 

The  meeting  of  our  Czar  with  the  King  of  Italy  has  attracted 
the  attention  of  the  political  world,  as  it  is  regarded  as  a  signifi- 


I 


NORTH  AFRICA,  ITALY  AND  THE  ENTENTE        153 

cant  incident,  especially  in  view  of  the  relations  existing  between 
the  Governments  of  Europe  as  determined  by  their  policy  of  the 
last  few  years. 

As  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  Balkan  States  will  regard  this 
meeting  as  an  important  factor  in  the  further  development  of  Bal- 
kan policy,  I  consider  it  necessary  to  send  you  a  few  explanatory 
instructions. 

The  Czar  deemed  it  necessary  last  autumn  to  carry  out  his  in- 
tention of  paying  a  visit  to  the  Italian  court  in  return  for  the  visit 
made  by  King  Victor  Emanuel  several  years  ago  ^  at  Peterhof,  The 
bonds  of  sincere  friendship  uniting  the  two  courts  have  found 
clear  expression  in  the  reception  accorded  our  Czar.  From  the  text 
of  the  speeches  exchanged  at  Racconigi  you  will  see  that  stress 
was  laid  by  the  king  of  Italy  as  well  as  the  czar  on  the  ever- 
increasing  close  relations  between  the  two  countries,  whilst  at 
the  same  time  attention  was  drawn  to  the  mutual  endeavours  to 
preserve  the  general  peace. 

This  fundamental  idea,  when  applied  to  Balkan  questions,  will 
serve  you  as  a  guide  in  all  your  conversations  with  local  political 
leaders.  In  this  connection  you  will  bear  in  mind  that  at  the  con- 
ferences at  Racconigi  on  Balkan  questions,  Russia,  as  well  as  Italy, 
emphatically  declared  that  they  regarded  it  as  absolutely  necessary  to 
protect  the  present  status  quo  in  Turkey^  and  the  independence  and 
the  normal,  peaceful  development  of  the  other  Balkan  States.  Both 
Governments  will  devote  all  their  efforts  to  the  attainment  of 
this  object. 

You  are,  no  doubt  fully  conscious  of  the  importance  of  this 
declaration.  The  Balkan  States  must  be  convinced  that  a  violation 
of  the  present  political  situation  in  the  Balkans  will  meet  with 
neither  the  consent  nor  the  support  of  Russia  or  Italy,  but  that 
at  the  same  time  the  policy  of  the  two  Great  Powers  is  directed 
towards  safeguarding  the  future  destiny  of  the  Balkan  States  and 
their  independent  existence.  This  naturally  can  only  strengthen 
the  Balkan  States  in  the  consciousness  that  they  are  secure  against 

*  Usually  such  visits  are  returned  much  sooner.  Relations  between  the  Rus- 
sian and  Italian  courts  were  not  very  cordial,  owing  to  French  intrigues  and 
Russian  resentment  of  Italy's  adherence  to  the  Triple  Alliance. 

'The  "terrible"  Turk  had  his  protectors. 


154  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

all  foreign  attacks,  and  that  they  may  concentrate  their  energies 
upon  the  peaceful  development  of  their  national  life. 

As  the  protector  of  all  Slav  Interests  in  the  Balkans,  Russia  has 
constantly  striven  to  arouse  in  the  Balkan  peoples  the  consciousness 
that  they  must  unite  as  closely  as  possible  for  the  sake  of  the  common 
good}  This  will  also  be  our  endeavour  in  the  future ;  which,  how- 
ever, can  be  fully  achieved  only  if  the  Balkan  States  themselves 
assist  us  in  the  endeavour,  and,  for  this  reason,  it  is  with  the 
greatest  satisfaction  that  we  welcome  every  proof  of  growing  ac- 
cord among  them.  These  endeavours  have  been  directly  favoured 
by  the  meeting  at  Racconigi  and  this  will  contribute  to  the  further 
development  of  the  fundamental  principle  of  our  policy  in  the  Near 
East.    This  principle  may  be  briefly  summed  up: 

''The  Balkan  for  the  Balkan  States." 


(180)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  to  Iswolsky.     Report, 
Oct.  24'Nov.  6.  1909. 


4 


The  meeting  of  our  Czar  with  the  King  of  Italy  was  at  first 
regarded  by  the  Turkish  Government  and  by  public  opinion  as  an 
auspicious  event  for  Turkey.  The  official  paper,  "Tanin,"  having 
ascertained  that  the  basis  of  the  understanding  between  Russia  and 
Italy  was  the  maintenance  of  the  status  quo  in  the  Balkans,  published 
an  article  on  October  19  expressing  the  opinion  that  in  this  case 
Turkey  might  view  the  meeting  as  an  important  event. 

This  view  is  absolutely  in  accordance  with  the  statement  made 
by  the  Italian  ambassador  here  on  behalf  of  Tittoni;  it  also  ac- 
cords with  what  I  have  heard  in  my  conversations  with  Turkish 
political  leaders.  In  a  conversation  with  the  grand  vizier,  he  told 
me,  with  evident  satisfaction,  that  the  meeting  at  Racconigi  was  a 
significant  victory  won  by  Russian  diplomacy  over  Austria-Hungary. 

Other  views,  however,  are  now  being  heard.  From  some  con- 
fidential source,  probably  an  Austro-Hungarian  one,  the  Turkish 
Government  has  learned  that  at  Racconigi  the  eventuality,  that  it  might 
not  be  possible  to  nvaintain  the  status  quo  in  the  Balkans,^  was  also 
discussed,  and,  that  in  this  case,  Russia  and  Italy  had  promised  each 
other  compensations  at  the  expense  of  Turkey.    It  is  also  said  that 

*  Pan-Slav  ideal. 
'Which  was  the  case. 


NORTH  AFRICA,  ITALY  AND  THE  ENTENTE        155 

Crete  was  discussed  at  Racconigi  in  a  sense  unfavorable  to  Turkey. 
The  simultaneous  visit  of  the  King  of  Bulgaria  to  Serbia  and  the 
rumours  in  regard  to  the  non-renewal  of  the  Triple  Alliance  have  but 

increased  this  uneasiness In  my  opinion  we  should 

give  the  grand  vizier  here  certain  information  concerning  the  nego- 
tiations at  Racconigi  and  try  to  persuade  him  that  the  word  "com- 
pensation" was  not  uttered  at  Racconigi  and  that  no  resolutions 
of  any  kind  were  adopted  unfavorable  to  Turkey.  Also,  it  seems  to 
me  that  certain  confidential  statements  made  to  the  Turkish  ambas- 
sadors at  Rome  and  at  St.  Petersburg  would  produce  a  favorable  im- 
pression here.^  The  Italian  Ambassador  is  of  the  opinion  that  such 
statements  would  create  all  the  more  a  desirable  effect  if  they  were 
delivered  through  the  instrumentality  of  the  London  Cabinet.  I  agree 
absolutely  with  this  opinion. 

(181)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Rome  to  Iswolsky.     Letter,  Oct.  25- 
Nov.  7,  1909. 

I  do  not  wish  to  leave  Rome  without  informing  you  of  various 
impressions  made  on  me  since  my  return  here.  True,  they  are 
only  in  the  nature  of  intimations,  but  still  they  may  help  to  give 
you  an  idea  of  the  state  of  feeling  in  various  circles  here.  The 
very  favourable  impression  made  by  the  visit  of  our  czar  to  Italy 
continues  to  exert  its  influence.  This  impression  has  far  exceeded 
the  expectations  and,  I  might  say,  the  hope,  of  Tittoni.  In  the 
political  world,  delight  over  the  rapprochement  with  Russia  is 
emphasized  again  and  again.  Direct  contact  between  Russia  and 
Italy  is  now  desired  here,  without  the  mediation  of  France,  which  was 
regarded  formerly  as  an  important  factor. 

When  the  French  fleet  arrived  at  Naples,  the  Italian  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  felt  a  certain  uneasiness,  for  fear  that  the  coincidence 
of  the  two  events  might  create  an  unfavourable  impression  in  Germany 
and  Austria-Hungary.  As  Tittoni  wishes  to  avoid  arousing  the  sus- 
picion of  these  two  Powers,  he  instructed  the  representatives  of  the 
press  to  refrain  from  all  comment  on  the  presence  of  the  French  fleet. 
It  appears  that  similar  instructions  were  given  to  the  representatives 
of  the  foreign  press  at  Rome.     The  Italian  newspapers  followed 

*What   guarantee  would   there   have   been   that   these   "certain   confidential 
statements"  represented  fact  and  not  fiction? 


156  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

these  instructions,  giving  but  very  brief  reports  of  the  festivities 
in  Naples. 

(182)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Letter,  April  13-26,  1910. 

Our  ministry  has  forwarded  to  me  the  communications  made" 
to  us  by  Germany  and  Austria  in  regard  to  the  Persian  question. 
As  a  certain  difference  in  the  attitude  of  the  Italian  ambassador  at  St. 
Petersburg  and  the  Italian  charge  d'affaires  in  London  has  become 
apparent,  I  have  asked  Bollati  which  of  the  two  Italian  representatives 
has  given  expression  to  the  real  opinion  of  his  Government.  Bollati 
most  decisively  denies  that  the  Italian  representatives  have  been 
instructed  to  make  any  statement  to  us  in  respect  of  the  Persian 
loan;  they  are  merely  to  keep  the  Italian  Government  advised  as 
to  the  conditions  of  the  proposed  financial  operation 

It  was  a  mere  coincidence  that  the  inquiry  of  the  Italian 
charge  d'affaires  in  London  occurred  simultaneously  with  the  com- 
munication of  the  German  and  Austrian  ambassadors,  and  the 
Italian  Government  insists  that  we  should  not  view  this  coincidence 
as  an  arrangement  agreed  on  by  the  members  of  the  Triple  Alliance. 
The  sphere  of  action  of  the  Triple  Alliance  is,  geographically, 
clearly  defined.  As  Bollati  said  to  me,  during  the  visit  here  of  the 
German  Imperial  Chancellor,  Persia  and  the  Persian  loan  were 
in  no  way  discussed.  I  believe,  Bollati's  statement  may  be  con- 
sidered all  the  more  satisfactory,  as  it  refers  to  a  question  which 
arose  previous  to  San  Giuliano*s  ^  accession  to  office.  Neverthe- 
less, the  British  ambassador  considered  it  necessary  to  revert  to 
the  Persian  question  in  his  first  interview  with  the  new  minister. 
San  Giuliano  declared  emphatically  that  Italy  was  bound  by  the  Triple 
Alliance  Treaty  only  in  absolutely  and  definitely  fixed  questions,  possess- 
ing in  every  other  respect  unconditional  freedom  of  action,  whereby  she 
would  exclusively  take  into  consideration  her  own  national  interests. 

(183)  The    Russian    Charge    d' Affaires    at    Rome    to    Iswolsky.     Letter, 
Aug.  25-Sept.  7.  1910. 

San  Giuliano  has  just  returned  from  Austria  after  visiting 
first   Salzburg,   then   Ischl,   according   to   programme.     He   was 

*  Italian  minister  of  foreign  affairs. 


NORTH  AFRICA,  ITALY  AND  THE  ENTENTE        157 

thoroughly  satisfied  with  the  reception  accorded  him  and  he  has 
received  the  most  favourable  impression  of  his  journey.  So  far 
as  political  results  are  concerned,  the  Minister  says,  they  fully 
come  up  to  his  expectations.  He  was  able  to  convince  himself  that 
the  Vienna  Cabinet  is  sincere  and  has  but  the  one  object  in  view — 
that  of  maintaining  peace  and  the  present  situation  in  the  Balkans. 
It  could  not  be  otherwise  just  now,  as  the  interests  of  each  indi- 
vidual Power  will  be  best  protected  by  the  present  condition  in  the 
Balkans,  and  only  in  this  way  can  the  new  regime  in  Turkey  be 
developed.  In  reply  to  my  remark  that  the  "Journal  des  Debats"  ^  has 
wittily  characterized  Austria's  sympathies  for  the  Balkan  States  as  "ex- 
tending to  the  point  of  annexation,"  the  Minister  said,  he  entertained 
no  fears  for  the  immediate  future,  and  remote  events  would  not  yet  be 
discussed. 

(184)  Iswolsky,  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris,  to  the  Acting  Russian  Miu' 
ister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  M.  Neratoff.     Telegram,  July  9-22,  1911. 

Personal.  I  see  from  your  telegram,  No.  921,  that  an  exchange 
of  views  between  us  and  Austria-Hungary  regarding  Albania  has 
begun.  I  direct  your  special  attention  to  my  confidential  letter 
treating  of  my  interview  with  the  Italian  ambassador  here,  which 
you  will  receive  tomorrow.  This  letter  will  recall  to  you  that  Tittoni 
and  I  mutually  pledged  ourselves  at  Racconigi  not  to  conclude  any  new 
agreement  regarding  Albania  without  first  coming  to  an  understanding 
with  each  other.  I  beg  you  to  send  me  instructions,  in  case  the 
Italian  ambassador  should  address  to  me  a  new  inquiry. 

(185)  Neratoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  in  London.    Telegram,  Oct.  25- 

Nov.  7,  1911.    No.  1724. 

I  am  telegraphing  to  Constantinople. 

The  Italian  Ambassador  here  has  asked  me  how  we  stand  in 
regard  to  the  statements  made  in  the  "Reichspost"  concerning  the 
agreements  reached  at  Racconigi.  As  it  is  possible  that  you  will 
be  asked  questions  in  this  connection,  I  am  advising  you  of  the 
purport  of  my  answer  to  the  Italian  Ambassador: 

/  see  no  reason  for  denying  that  in  the  course  of  the  discussion  at 

*  Of  Paris. 


158 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


Racconigi  regarding  the  general  European  situation  we  also  discussed 
the  question  of  the  Turkish  Straits  and  of  Italy's-  special  interests  in 
Tripoli — a  question  of  interest  to  us,  as  is  generally  known  even  to 
the  Turks.  There  is  no  occasion,  however,  to  attach  to  this  exchange 
of  views  the  character  of  an  intentional,  aggressive  convention  directed 
against  Turkey.  I  beg  you  to  use  the  above  as  a  guide,  as  the  object 
of  the  "Reichspost"  is  probably  to  arouse  mistrust  against  us  in  Turkey.^ 


(186)     Neratoff  to  the  Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Rome.    Strictly  CoH' 
fidential  Letter,  Aug.  13-26,  1911.    No.  550. 

The  Italian  Ambassador  has  informed  me  in  confidence  of  his 
Government's  intention  to  put  an  end  to  the  continual  unpleasantnesses 
which  are  being  provoked  by  Turkey  at  Tripoli.  In  consideration  there-  - 
of,  and  chiefly  under' pressure  of  public  opinion,  it  was  San  Giuliano's  fli 
intention  to  take  the  strongest  possible  measures,  in  order  to  re-establish 
normal  conditions  at  Tripoli  and  to  force  Turkey  into  a  proper  regard 
for  Italian  interests,^ 

On  my  inquiring  in  what  manner  the  Italian  Government  pro- 
posed to  attain  this  object  and  whether  it  did  not  apprehend  the 
resistance  of  the  Sublime  Porte,  Melegari^  said  everything  had  been 
considered  and  Italy  was  prepared  for  all  contingencies. 

In  the  course  of  the  conversation  I  learned  that  France  and  Eng- 
land, as  well  as  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  are  not  only  informed 
of  Italy's  intentions,  but  that  they  are  not  raising  any  objections  to  them. 

In  bringing  the  above  to  your  notice,  I  request  you  to  thank 
the  Italian  Government  for  this  information,  and  to  give  them  to 
understand  that  the  fact  of  Melegari*s  not  having  mentioned  to 
us  any  new  agreements  between  Italy  and  Austria-Hungary,  re- 
garding the  Balkan  question,  leads  us  to  presume  that  the  Tri- 
politan  question  will  entail  no  change  in  the  present  situation. 


*  The  Turkish  government  was  to  believe  that  the  Italo-Russian  discussions 
on  "the  question  of  the  Turkish  Straits  and  of  Italy's  special  interests  in  Tripoli" 
had  been  in  a  sense  favorable  to  Turkey,  which  was  not  the  fact,  as  brought  out 
by  the  Vienna  "Reichspost"  at  the  time  and  shown  in  these  documents. 

'  The  Agreement  of  Racconigi  was  supposed  to  guarantee  the  status  quo  of 
Turkey  in  regard  to  her  European  provinces.  It  was  entered  into  by  Russia 
and  Italy  to  checkmate  Austria-Hungary,  Russia  being  moved  by  her  Pan-Slav 
ideals  and  Italy  by  her  designs  upon  the  Adriatic  littoral. 

'  Italian  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg. 


NORTH  AFRICA,  ITALY  AND  THE  ENTENTE        159 

(187)  The  Russian  Charge  d'Aff aires  at  Rome  to  Neratoff.     Confidential 
Letter,  Aug.  30-Sept.  12,  1911. 

Toretta  ^  informed  me,  in  confidence,  that  Aehren- 

thal  had  received  the  Duke  of  Avarna's^  communication  and  that  no 
negotiations  whatever  had  taken  place  on  the  subject.  Further- 
more, I  heard  that  Italy  is  treating  the  Tripolitan  question  quite 
separately,  and  purposely  does  not  bring  it  into  connection  with 
the  general  political  situation;  Italy's  freedom  of  action  is,  there- 
fore, unhampered  by  conditions  of  any  kind  or  obligations  what- 
soever. This  is  Italy's  position  towards  all  Powers,  especially 
towards  Austria-Hungary.  Toretta  added,  still  more  confiden- 
tially, that  the  Roman  Cabinet  had  resolved  upon  the  final  settle- 
ment of  the  Tripolitan  question  at  the  present  moment,  for  the 
reason  that  it  wants  the  African  question  settled  before  a  change  in 
the  present  situation  in  the  Balkans  takes  place,  in  order  later  on  to 
be  able  to  protect  the  Italian  interests  beyond  the  Adriatic  Sea. 

"May  I,"  I  asked,  "conclude  from  your  words  that  you  will 
openly  inform  us  of  your  further  intentions  when  their  time 
comes?" 

He  replied  that  what  I  had  just  heard  was  a  short  resume  of 
his  conversations  with  the  Minister:  In  considering  the  Tripolitan 
and  Balkan  questions,  Italy  would  never  lose  sight  of  her  arrange- 
ments and  agreements  with  Russia. 

(188)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Aug.  SUSept.  13,  1911.    No.  843. 

Yesterday  San  Giuliano  confirmed  Toretta's  statements  which 
I  reported  in  my  letter  of  the  30th  inst.,  and  categorically  declared 
that  the  Tripolitan  question  would  be  settled  independently  of  all 
others.    The  minister  did  not  enter  upon  any  further  details. 

(189)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Neratoff.    Letter,  Sept.  13-26, 
1911. 

I  have  often  spoken  to  Tittoni  about  Tripoli,  because  his  view 
is  of  all  the  greater  interest  since  he  is  thoroughly  versed  in  Italian 
politics  and  exerts  an  undeniable  influence  on  King  Victor  Eman- 
uel.   He  told  me  that,  personally,  he  did  not  consider  the  unrol- 

*  Italian  under-secretary  for  foreign  affairs. 
'Italian  ambassador  at  Vienna. 


160  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

ling  of  this  question  opportune,  but  he  believed  that 
government  was  forced  by  pressure  of  public  opinion  to  take  active 
measures.  On  my  asking  him  what  the  attitude  of  Italy's  two  allies 
would  be,  Tittoni  replied  that — as  he  had  already  told  me  in  confidence 
three  years  ago  at  Racconigi — the  documents  of  the  Triple  Alliance 
contained  a  special  provision,  or  rather  a  special  supplement,  by  which 
Germany  and  Austria  were  obliged  to  allow  Italy  a  free  hand  in 
Tripoli.  This  provision  was  exacted  by  Italy  on  the  occasion  of  the 
last  renewal  of  the  Triple  Alliance.^  Italy  will,  therefore,  encounter 
no  resistance  in  that  quarter.  With  regard  to  Austria  in  particular, 
Tittoni  did  not  believe  that  she  could  demand  any  compensation, 
e.  g.  in  The  Albanian  question,  because  there  existed  a  special  agree- 
ment between  Italy  and  Austria  with  regard  to  Albania  which  did  not 
touch  upon  the  Tripolitan  question.  ^ 

I,  on  my  part,  did  not  conceal  from  Tittoni  my  apprehension 
that  military  measures  by  Italy  in  Tripoli  would  react  upon  the 
general  situation  in  the  Near  East.  It  was  especially  to  be  feared 
that  the  present  regime  at  Constantinople  would  not  be  able  to 
hold  out,  and  that  one  or  the  other  of  the  Balkan  States  would  in- 
tervene— a  contingency  which  might  lead  to  a  new  forward  step 
on  the  part  of  Austria-Hungary.  Tittoni  replied,  the  Young  Turk 
regime  had  proved  itself  to  be  so  inadequate  that  its  disappearance 
would  hardly  be  regretted,  morever,  it  would  probably  disappear 
even  without  Tripoli. 

As  regards  the  Balkan  States,  Serbia  is  interested  in  supporting 
Turkey;  Montenegro  would  always  be  held  in  check;  there  only 
remains,  therefore,  Bulgaria.  He  knew,  however,  that  Roumania 
had  undertaken  not  to  allow  a  Bulgarian  attack  on  Turkey.  Be- 
sides, he  added,  the  Italian  fleet  is  strong  enough  to  prevent  the 
dispatch  of  Turkish  troops  to  Tripoli.  Therefore,  Turkey  will  not 
be  weakened  in  her  military  position  in  the  Balkans,  and  no  change 
in  the  general  situation  will  take  place  in  that  respect.  Finally, 
as  regards  Austria,  she  will  hardly  take  action  independently,  and 
an  advance  from  that  quarter  could  only  take  place  in  connection 
with  general  events  in  the  Balkans.  Tittoni,  therefore,  considers 
it  desirable  that,  under  the  prevailing  conditions,  a  continual  ex- 

'  'A  veritable  labyrinth  of  diplomatic  deception  and  double-dealing. 


NORTH  AFRICA,  ITALY  AND  THE  ENTENTE        161 

change  of  views  should  take  place  between  Rome,  St.  Petersburg, 
and  Vienna,  since  that  was  the  only  way  of  avoiding  an  unforeseen 
action  on  the  part  of  Austria.  ^ 

(190)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Letter.  Sept.  14-27,  1911. 

The  letter  previous  to  this  was  already  written,  when  I  learnt  from 
Tittoni  that  the  Italian  charge  d'affaires  at  Constantinople  ^  had  been 
instructed  to  inform  Turkey  that  Italy  was  obliged  to  proceed  with  the 
occupation  of  Tripoli,  and  that  a  reply  from  the  Constantinople  Govern- 
ment was  expected  within  24  hours.  At  the  same  time  Tittoni  admitted, 
in  contradiction  of  his  former  statements,  that  the  king  and  Giolitti^ 
had  asked  him  for  his  opinion  prior  to  their  having  arrived  at  a  decision 
in  this  matter,  and  that  he,  Tittoni,  had,  after  careful  consideration, 
given  his  consent  to  this  step.  According  to  his  words,  Italy's  step  is 
the  direct  and  inevitable  outcome  of  Kiderlen's  policy.  If  Germany,  in 
renouncing  the  Algeciras  Act,  has  hastened  the  declaration  of  the 
French  protectorate  over  Morocco,  and  in  doing  so  demanded  compen- 
sations for  herself,  there  was  nothing  left  to  Italy  but  to  put  the  claims 
to  Tripoli  which  she  had  reserved  for  herself,  into  effect  at  this  juncture, 
because  she  could  not  but  fear  that  Italy's  claims  might  at  some  future 
time,  and  on  the  occasion  of  an  eventual  change  in  the  French  Govern- 
ment, be  forgotten  or,  possibly,  declared  void. 

During  my  conversation  with  Tittoni  I  took  the  opportunity  of  re- 
minding him  of  the  conditions  on  which  we,  on  our  part,  have  promised 
to  acknowledge  Italy's  freedom  of  action  in  Tripoli.  I  asked  him,  on 
my  own  personal  responsibility,  whether  he  did  not  think  that  Italy, 
which  at  the  present  moment  is  proceeding  to  execute  her  program  at 
Tripoli,  should  now  give  us  guarantees  that  in  future  she  will  not  for- 
get to  fulfil  the  parallel  obligations  undertaken  by  her  in  respect  of  our 
claims  to  the  Turkish  straits.'*'  Tittoni  answered  in  the  affirmative,  and 
remarked  it  would  be  an  easy  matter  to  lay  down  the  respective  obli- 
gations in  a  suitable  formula. 

*  Tittoni  would  seem  to  be  a  graduate  of  the  Machiavellian  school. 

'The  chef  de  wujto^i— ambassador  or  minister— is  never  there  when  this 
ticklish  business  has  to  be  taken  in  hand.  The  charge  d'affaires  has  the  advan- 
tage of  not  being  responsible  for  some  of  the  "assurances"  made  immediately 
before  by  his  chief. 

'  Italian  prime  minister. 

*  Reciprocity  at  the  cost  of  an  innocent  third  party. 
11 


162 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


(191) 


Neratoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London. 
Oct.  1,  1911.    No.  1357. 


Telegram,  Sept.  18- 


I  am  telegraphing  to  Rome. 

"The  Turkish  Ambassador  here  has  communicated  to  me  his 
Government's  request  that  we  should  try  and  induce  Italy  to  accept 
the  Turkish  proposals  which  had  been  submitted  in  reply  to  the 
Italian  ultimatum.  /  replied  that  only  the  position  created  by  the  dec- 
laration of  war,  i.e.,  the  occupation  of  Tripoli,  could  form  the  basis 
of  eventual  negotiations  between  the  two  belligerents.  If  a  formula 
should  be  found  at  Constantinople  which  allows  for  this  contingency, 
we  are  ready  to  arrange  an  exchange  of  views,  as  well  as  to  discuss 
any  measure  likely  to  confine  the  conflict  to  Tripoli,  Such  a  program 
also  corresponds  with  the  interests  of  Turkey,  and  the  endeavours 
of  the  Powers  will  apparently  be  directed  towards  this  object.  We 
are  convinced  that  this  is  in  the  interests  also  of  Italy." 


(192)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Rome  to  Neratoff. 
30,  1911. 


Telegram,  Sept.  17- 


I 


While  up  to  the  moment  of  the  occupation  of  Tripoli  by  the 
Italians  the  slightest  allusion  to  mediation  must  evoke  a  categori- 
cal rejection  here  and  can  only  draw  upon  us  Italy's  displeasure, 
it  appears  to  me  that  the  offer  of  our  good  services  after  Italy 
has  settled  in  North  Africa  is  quite  feasible.  It  is  desirable  that  our 
friendly  steps  in  that  direction  should  anticipate  any  German  proposals, 
in  order  to  prevent  her  from  profiting  by  this  good  opportunity  of 
strengthening  her  influence  in  Constantinople,  Please  send  instruc- 
tions. 


(193) 


The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Neratoff. 
Oct.  8,  1911. 


Telegram,  Sept.  25- 


The  French  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  wholly  agrees  with 
you  that  mediation  will  be  impossible  until  the  necessity  of  assum- 
ing the  standpoint  of  the  Italian  ultimatum  will  have  been  recog- 
nised at  Constantinople,  i.e.  until  Turkey  accepts  in  principle  the  oc- 
cupation of  Tripoli."^  On  the  other  hand,  he  does  not  consider  it  to 
be  to  the  interests  of  Russia,  France  and  England  to  leave  the  role  of 


i 


*  A  cold-blooded  way  diplomatists  have. 


NORTH  AFRICA,  ITALY  AND  THE  ENTENTE        163 

mediator  to  Germany,  and  he  thinks  the  three  Entente  Powers  should 
profit  hy  the  first  opportunity  of  jointly  appearing  in  this  role} 
From  M.  Bompard*s  ^  reports,  however,  it  is  evident  that  our  am- 
bassador has  one-sidedly  proposed  peace  negotiations,  at  the  same 
time  keeping  in  view  the  possibility  of  maintaining  Turkish  garri- 
sons at  Tripoli.  At  Paris  the  conviction  prevails  that  Italy  will 
unconditionally  refuse  such  a  proposal.  The  French  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  proposes  that  the  Russian,  French  and  English  ambas- 
sadors at  Constantinople  be  instructed  always  to  consult  together  and 
not  to  undertake  any  steps  without  a  prior  agreement.  Please  send  in- 
structions so  that  I  can  give  M.  de  Selves  a  reply. 


(194)     Neratoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Rome.    Telegram,  Oct.  9-22, 
1911.    No.  1557. 

The  German  charge  d'affaires  has  communicated  to  me  the 
purport  of  a  telegram  of  the  German  Ambassador  at  Constantinople 
to  Kiderlen,^  in  which  Baron  Marschall,*  evidently  in  full  agree- 
ment with  Pallavicini,^  expresses  himself  very  pessimistically  with 
regard  to  the  internal  position  of  Turkey  and  predicts  an  inevitable 
war  in  the  Balkans,  "if  the  Italo-Turkish  war  should  continue  to 
last  for  some  months  or  weeks."  To  my  question  who  would  be- 
gin the  war  in  the  Balkans,  since  Italy  had  promised  not  to  under- 
take any  war-like  action  in  the  Peninsula,  Lucius  replied.  Said 
Pasha's  Government  would  hardly  be  able  to  prevent  the  Italians 
being  expelled  from  Turkey,  and  that  would  make  it  imperative  for 
the  Italians  either  to  attack  Albania  or  to  occupy  one  of  the  islands  in 
the  Archipelago.  The  Italian  Ambassador  informed  me  that  his  gov- 
ernment  had  received  disquieting  news  from  the  Slav  Balkan  States,  and 
he  pointed  out  that  counsels  of  moderation  would  seem  to  be  opportune. 

On  my  inquiring  in  what  manner  Italy  would  reply  to  the  ex- 
pulsion of  the  Italians,  he  answered,  giving  it  as  his  personal  opin- 
ion, that  Italy  would  probably  confine  herself  to  occupying  one  of 
the  Islands,  but  that  she  was  already  prepared  to  conclude  peace 

*With  the  cards  all  stacked  against  Turkey. 

'  French  ambassador  at  Constantinople. 

'  Kiderlen-Wachter,  German  secretary  of  state  of  foreign  affairs. 

*von  Bieberstein,  German  ambassador  at  Constantinople. 

^  Austro-Hungarian  ambassador  at  Constantinople. 


164 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


conditional  on  a  religious  bond  being  set  up  between  Tripoli  and 
the  Caliphate,  and  a  material  compensation  of  Turkey.  MelegarVs 
statement,  coupled  with  MarschalVs  apprehensions,  does  not  let  the  oc- 
cupation of  an  island  appear  out  of  the  question,^  and  we  must  carefully 
watch  Turkey's  further  steps,  in  order  to  restrain  her  from  any  provoca- 
tion such  as  the  expulsion  of  the  Italians  would  constitute. 


(195) 


The  Russian  Ambassador  in  London  to  Neratoff. 
Nov.  6,  1911. 


Letter,  Oct.  24- 


Some  time  ago,  I  drew  your  attention  to  the  public  feeling  in 
England  aroused  by  Italy's  sudden  decision  to  occupy  Tripoli. 

This  feeling,  as  well  as  the  press  comment  were  on  the  whole  not  fav- 
ourable to  Italy.  The  most  important  newspapers,  with  the  "Times" 
at  their  head,  saw  in  the  Italian  action  a  misuse  of  brute  force,  and 
pointed  out — and  that  not  without  an  ironical  touch — that  the  Italian 
complaints  of  the  Turkish  administration  had  matured  at  the  right  mo- 
ment in  the  midst  of  the  Morocco  crisis.^ 

Public  opinion  went  further  still  than  the  newspapers,  and  this  ten- 
dency has  been  apparent  all  through. 

The  political  tendencies  of  the  government,  however,  and  of  the 
most  influential  circles,  have  moved  rather  in  an  opposite  direction. 
Turkey  and  the  Young  Turk  Party  have  lost  their  former  popular- 
ity in  England,  and  the  Government  is  anxious  not  to  put  any  obstacles 
in  the  way  of  good  relations  with  Italy  in  the  future.^ 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  first  criticisms  which  were  derogatory 
of  the  Italian  action,  rather  than  friendly  to  Turkey,  soon  calmed 
down  in  the  press.  But  since  last  week  the  original  feeling  has 
been  re-awakened;  it  is  founded  on  newspaper  reports  of  so-called 
atrocities  said  to  have  been  perpetrated  by  the  Italians  during  the  fighting 
of  late.  Even  supposing  the  newspaper  reports  to  be  exaggerated — as 
I  would  gladly  assume — this  is  a  question  which  always  arouses  the 
English  people.  One  need  only  recall  what  an  important  role  the  "Bul- 
garian atrocities"  played  on  the  occasion  of  the  persecution  of  Chris- 
tians by  the  Turks  prior  to  our  last  Balkan  war. 


I 


*  Which  the  Powers  wanted  to  forestall. 
'When  Germany  could  not  protest.    The  time  was  chosen  in  collusion  with 
the  French  government. 

'  The  price  was  Italy's  desertion  of  her  allies. 


NORTH  AFRICA,  ITALY  AND  THE  ENTENTE        165 

When  the  truth  comes  to  be  recognised,  the  excitement  of  public 
opinion  will  surely  also  be  allayed.  Today  I  submit  to  you  a  state- 
ment which  the  Italian  ambassador  here  has  seen  fit  to  publish  in 
perhaps  none  too  happy  a  manner,  and  at  the  same  time  a  "decla- 
ration of  war"  on  the  part  of  the  **Times"  correspondent  at  Malta. 
This  correspondent  had  left  Tripoli  because  the  Italian  authorities  had 
censored  his  reports  too  strictly,  I  think  the  Italian  Government  has 
gone  too  far  in  its  endeavours  to  restrict  the  liberty  of  the  press. 
Correspondents  may,  no  doubt,  become  dangerous  in  times  of  war. 
But  absolute  silence  is  equally  harmful.  The  Turks  will  discover 
in  all  these  rumours  a  new  source  of  resistance  and  the  rumours  of 
Italian  defeats  will,  without  doubt,  contribute  towards  this.  Thus 
Italy*s  task,  especially  in  the  East,  will  not  be  made  easier,  the  less 
so  since  this  task  is  far  more  difficult  than  was  originally  supposed 
in  Rome.  ^ 

(196)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Neratoff.     Telegram,  Oct.  19- 
Nov.  1,  1911..  No.  158. 

According  to  Tittoni,  Italy  is  sure  of  France's  full  and  uncondi- 
tional support;  whereas  England's  sympathies  are  oscillating  between 
Italy  and  Turkey.  He  believes  it  to  be  to  the  interest  of  the  re-establish- 
ment of  peace  that  Constantinople  be  given  to  understand,  by  Russia, 
France  and  England  conjointly,  that  they  see  no  other  expedient  but  the 
annexation.  At  his  urgent  request  that  I  should  communicate  this 
to  you,  I  declared  myself  ready  to  do  so,  adding,  however,  that  I 
did  not  think  you  would  make  up  your  mind  thus  to  take  an  initia- 
tive at  the  present  moment. 

(197)  Neratoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris.     Telegram,  Oct.  22- 

Nov.  4,  1911. 

All  reports  from  Rome  tend  to  show  that  Italy  has  decided  to 
carry  her  warlike  measures  into  the  Red  Sea  and  the  Aegaean ;  this, 
perhaps,  explains  why  Italy  wishes  us,  France,  and  England,  to  un- 
dertake more  energetic  steps  at  Constantinople.  But  it  must  not  be 
forgotten  that  such  a  step  by  the  said  three  Powers  would  greatly  bene- 

*  Under  the  able  leadership  of  Enver  Pasha,  the  Turks,  though  cut  off  from 
their  bases  in  Europe  and  Asia  Minor,  put  up  a  heroic  defense,  obliging  the 
Italians  to  stay  near  the  coast  under  the  protection  of  their  men-of-war. 


166  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

fit  Germany  and  Austria,  because  the  feeling  of  disappointment  and  in- 
dignation in  Turkey  would  go  against  the  Entente  Powers.  Are  we  not 
to  gather  from  Tittoni's  words  that  Italy  wishes  to  conclude  peace 
as  quickly  as  possible?  And,  in  such  a  case,  could  we  perhaps,  find  out 
from  Tittoni  what  agreements  Italy  would  be  prepared  to  enter  into  to 
attain  this  object f  Such  a  settlement  of  the  question  might  be  success- 
fully attempted  by  the  three  Entente  Powers,  ^ 

(198)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Rome  to  Sazonoff.     Confidential  Letter, 
March  12-25,  1912. 

I  have  frequently  called  attention  of  late  to  the  dissatisfaction 
prevailing  here  with  regard  to  France.  The  incidents  of  the  "Car- 
tage" and  the  "Manuba"  ^  together  with  a  number  of  speeches  in 
the  French  chamber,  have  excited  public  opinion  here  to  a  most  ex- 
traordinary degree.  The  highflown  tone  adopted  by  the  French  press 
in  regard  to  Italy  gives  particular  offence.  The  present  war  has 
greatly  increased  the  feeling  of  national  consciousness  among  the 
Italians,  and,  as  they  say,  they  do  not  intend  to  allow  any  foreign 
tutelage. 

Unfortunately,  the  French  press  seems  to  pour  oil  into  the 
flames.  As  the  French  ambassador  here  told  me,  the  press  is  under 
the  control  of  the  French  insurance  companies  who  have  invested  nearly 
300  millions  in  life  insurance  here  and  fear  the  loss  they  would  suffer, 
if  a  state  monopoly  for  life  insurance  should  be  introduced  in  Italy. 
The  German  Ambassador  very  skilfully  takes  advantage  of  the 
mistakes  made  by  the  rivals  of  his  country  and  has  commissioned 
the  German  journalist,  Muhling,  to  influence  the  German  press  in 
favour  of  Italy. 

In  the  Foreign  office  they  realize  that  the  strained  relations  be- 
tween Italy  and  the  neighbouring  Republic  exert  an  unfavourable 
influence  on  the  international  position  of  the  kingdom,  as  Italy  is 
thus  placed  entirely  at  the  mercy  of  her  allies.     Even  the  sup- 

*  In  other  words,  would  Italy  completely  abandon  her  allies,  Germany  and 
Austria-Hungary  and  thus  open  the  door  to  the  general  war  that  was  to  make 
Russia  supreme  in  all  lands  inhabited  by  Slavs,  and  then  allow  her  to  fulfil  her 
"historic  mission"  at  Constantinople,  in  the  straits  and  in  Southwest  Asia? 

*  Occasioned  by  Italian  efforts  to  put  an  end  to  the  smuggling  of  arms  and 
ammunition  into  Tripoli  through  Tunis,  a  French  colony  adjoining  the  invaded 
territory. 


I 


NORTH  AFRICA,  ITALY  AND  THE  ENTENTE        167 

porters  of  the  Triple  Alliance  realize  this.  Italy's  actual  needs  point 
in  the  direction  of  the  three  Entente  Powers,  as  this  political  combina- 
tion has  greater  possibilities  of  satisfying  Italian  interests.  Italy's  de- 
pendence on  France  and  England  has  been  only  increased  by  her  estab- 
lishing herself  in  Lybia.  Wedged  in  between  the  two  Powers  on  the 
North  African  coast,  Italy  is  more  than  ever  in  need  of  open  and 
friendly  relations  with  them.  The  extension  of  her  sea  coast  will  permit 
her  to  disregard  the  strong  Anglo-French  forces  in  the  Mediterranean 
less  than  ever.  ^  The  hope  of  being  able  to  offer  opposition  with 
her  own  fleet,  perhaps  in  conjunction  with  Austria,  would  lead  to 
a  severe  disappointment.  The  solidarity,  or  at  least  the  similarity 
of  Italian  endeavours  with  those  of  the  Entente  Powers  in  the 
Balkans,  cannot  be  denied  by  even  the  most  ardent  supporter  of 
the  Triple  Alliance. 

Events,  however,  have  so  shaped  themselves  that  one  can  see 
here  no  way  out  of  the  present  situation.  In  the  Foreign  Office 
they  expressed  to  me  the  hope  that  after  you  have  succeeded  in 
reconciling  Italy  and  Turkey,  you  will  seek  to  improve  re- 
lations between  the  two  Latin  nations,  for,  as  they  said  to  me, 
''the  way  from  Rome  to  Paris  leads  via  St,  Petersburg"^ 


(199)     The  Russian  Ambassador  in  London  to  Sasonoff.    Telegram,  April 
17-30,  1912.    No.  111. 

The  Italian  ambassador  called  on  me  yesterday  and  told  me,  he 
had  found  Grey  very  much  worried  over  the  events  at  Constanti- 
nople, and  especially  so  on  account  of  the  long  duration  of  the  war. 
Grey  said  he  considered  an  exchange  of  views  between  the  Powers 
to  be  imperative,  in  order  to  undertake  a  new  step  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible. I  believe  Imperiali  ^  wants  peace  more  than  ever,  and  per- 
sonally he  thinks  that  the  religious  supremacy  of  the  Sultan  *  might 
possibly  be  admitted. 

*This  probably  was  realized  in  Paris,  London  and  St.  Petersburg,  before 
Italy  was  given  a  free  hand  in  North  Africa. 

^It  is  shown  elsewhere  herein  that  the  way  from  St.  Petersburg  to  London 
led  through  Paris — the  "mechanism  of  the  Entente." 

'  Italian  ambassador  at  London. 

*Over  the  Mussulmans  in  the  parts  of  North  Africa  annexed  by  Italy— a 
function  of  the  Caliphate. 


168         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

(200)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  April  17-30,  1912.    No.  112. 

After  I  had  learnt  from  the  newspapers  that  the  Turkish  govern- 
ment refuses  to  open  the  straits,^  I  drew  Grey's  particular  attention 
to  what  this  refusal  meant  to  Russia.  I  told  him  the  Russian 
government  could  not  permit  the  present  state  of  affairs  to  con- 
tinue; public  opinion  in  Russia  would  not  concern  itself  with  the 
responsibility  of  Turkey  or  Italy,  nor  with  any  treaty  rights,  but 
would  simply  and  unanimously  demand  that  the  straits  be  re-opened 
to  Russian  trade,  and  the  government  would  certainly  have  to  yield. 
I  further  said  that  at  the  present  moment,  it  was  not  so  much  the  ques- 
tion of  right  or  wrong,  but  we  had  to  deal  with  facts,  and  that  a  further 
development  of  the  disputed  point  might  assume  unexpected  proportions. 
Grey  told  me  in  reply  that  he  had  just  been  receiving  a  deputation 
of  English  merchants;  something  like  a  million  tons  of  wheat  in 
English  ships  were  being  detained,  and  he  quite  agreed  with  me 
that  the  situation  was  untenable.  He  told  me  he  would  telegraph 
to  Lowther  ^  to  demand  the  immediate  opening  of  the  straits  for 
15  days.  I  replied,  this  was  merely  a  provisional  measure.  He 
answered  that  then  we  would  in  any  case  have  15  days  for  nego- 
tiations ;  that  this  period  seemed  acceptable  to  Italy  also ;  and  that  by 
this  means  we  were  forestalling  the  danger  of  an  immediate  war. 
Neither  of  the  two  Governments  could  then  complain  of  the  rights 
of  the  belligerents  having  been  violated,  and  by  this  means,  neu- 
trality would  be  maintained.  Grey  told  me  he  was  considering  a 
parallel  step  at  Rome  to  demand  that  during  these  15  days  the  Italian 
fleet  refrain  from  any  kind  of  attack.  But  he  had  not  as  yet  decided 
upon  this  step.  I  replied  that  Russia  was  as  anxious  to  preserve 
peace  as  England  was;  that  I  could  not  say  what  impression  the 
instructions  given  to  Lowther  would  make  at  St.  Petersburg,  and 
I  did  not  know  whether  our  ambassador  would  be  instructed  to 
support  this  step. 


*  Turkey  had  the  riRht  to  prevent  foreign  shipping  from  navigating  the  Dar- 
danelles and  Bosphorus.  The  particulars  of  this  condition  will  be  learned  from 
the  documents  following.  Russia  had  made  many  attempts  to  place  herself  in 
control  of  the  straits,  the  first  dating  back  to  860  and  1048  A.  D.  Peter  the  Great 
also  essayed  this,  and  possession  of  the  straits  was  one  of  the  motives  of  Czar 
Alexander  II  when  he  undertook  the  liberation  of  the  Balkan  Slavs. 

"  British  ambassador  at  Constantinople. 


NORTH  AFRICA,  ITALY  AND  THE  ENTENTE        169 

(201)  Sasonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.     Telegram,  April 

IS-May  1,  1912.    No.  790. 

The  British  Ambassador  has  asked  me  whether  we  intend  applying  to 
Italy  to  obtain  from  her  a  promise  not  to  undertake  any  warlike  actions 
against  the  Dardanelles,  during  a  certain  period  at  least,  so  that  the 
neutral  ships  could  pass  the  straits  during  such  period.  In  reply  I  told 
the  ambassador  I  could  not  consent  to  such  a  step  at  Rome,  because  I 
knew  from  official  information  that  Italy  would  positively  refuse  to  make 
such  a  promise.  The  proposed  step  would,  therefore,  be  a  failure 
from  the  outset  and  would  not  bring  about  a  solution  of  the  existing 
difficulties. 

(202)  The  Russian  Ambassador  in  London  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram,  April 

\9'May  2,  1912.    No.  115. 

Nicolson  tells  me  that  Lowther  has  telegraphed  that  the  Turkish 
Government  proposed  to  open  the  Dardanelles  as  soon  as  the  mines  had 
been  removed,  but  reserved  to  herself  the  right  again  to  close  the  straits 
in  case  of  military  exigencies  arising.  Grey  has  enquired  how  long  it 
would  take  for  the  mines  to  be  removed. 

(203)  The  Same  to  the  Same.   Telegram,  April  \9-May  2,  1912.    No.  116. 

After  Nicolson  ^  had  given  me  the  information  contained  in  my 
telegram  No.  115  he  added,  as  a  personal  observation,  that  it  would 
be  difficult  to  decide  at  what  moment  a  military  exigency  might 
arise,  because  Turkey  had  no  outpost  vessels  at  her  disposal. 

He  also  reminded  me  of  the  fact  that  the  English  standpoint  regarding 
the  straits-agreement  was  not  wholly  identical  with  ours.  To  this  last 
remark  I  replied,  likewise  personally,  that  we  do  not  dispute  Turkey's 
absolute  right  to  close  the  straits  ^;  this  right  seems  to  be  tacitly  conceded, 
only  in  case,  however,  of  an  absolute  exigency  arising,  and  on  con- 
dition that  a  free  passage  is  allowed  as  soon  as  the  danger  is  averted. 
Nicolson  told  me  that  the  possibility  of  a  new  advance  of  the  Italian 
fleet  would  cause  grave  difficulties;  if,  for  instance,  Italy  were  to  oc- 
cupy Mytilene  it  would  be  difficult  to  maintain  that  no  danger 

*  British  under-secretary  for  foreign  affairs. 

'  Established  by  many  general  and  private  treaties  and  sanctioned  by  the  prin- 
ciple of  "territorial  waters." 


170  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

threatened  Turkey.    Nicolson  asked  me  to  consider  this  conversa- 
tion as  personal. 

(204)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sazonoff.    Letter,  April  26- 
May  9,  1912. 

I  think  my  telegram  in  which  I  reported  to  you  on  the  attitude 
of  the  French  Government  in  the  matter  of  the  closing  of  the 
Dardanelles,  requires  supplementing  by  a  few  details.  I  have  had 
several  conversations  with  M.  Poincare  ^  on  this  matter,  before,  as 
well  as  after  the  decision  of  the  Sublime  Porte  to  open  the  Straits 
to  international  trade.  From  these  conversations  I  have  gained  the 
clear  impression  that  Poincare  has,  on  the  one  hand,  done  every- 
thing to  carry  through  an  actual  settlement  of  this  question  in  our 
favour,  but  that,  on  the  other  hand,  he  is  not  wholly  convinced  of  the 
justification  of  the  legal  thesis  set  up  by  us,  vis:  That  Turkey  is  bound 
to  allow  neutral  shipping  to  pass  the  Straits  in  times  of  war  as  well  as 
in  peace.  Poincare  did  not  conceal  from  me  that,  in  his  conversa- 
tions with  the  Turkish  ambassador  and  in  his  instructions  to  Bom- 
pard  ^  stress  has  been  laid  on  the  side  of  practical  necessity,  not  on 
the  legal  side  of  the  question.  He  also  admitted  to  me  that,  after  a 
careful  study  of  the  texts,  he  inclines  towards  denying  the  legal 
justifications ;  but  he  had  not  been  content  with  a  personal  study 
of  this  important  question,  and  had  intended  to  submit  it  to  the  con- 
sideration  of  experts  in  international  law,  when  the  news  arrived  that 
the  Porte  had  decided  to  accede  to  our  demand.^ 

Poincare  does  not  wish  to  deny  that  the  Straits  are  in  a  peculiar 
position  on  account  of  the  existing  treaties,  and  that  there  devolves 
upon  Turkey  a  certain  obligation  in  favour  of  international  trade. 
But,  since  no  actual  regulations  exist  regarding  the  internationalizing  of 
the  Straits  as,  for  instance,  in  the  case  of  the  Suez  Canal,  the  Turkish 
Government  can  hardly  be  denied  the  right  of  adopting  the  necessary 
defensive  measure  in  case  of  an  immediate  military  danger.  On  my  re- 
marking that  the  defence  of  the  Dardanelles  was,  in  our  opinion, 
possible  also  without  their  being  completely  closed,  he  replied  that 

*  French  minister  of  foreign  affairs. 

'  French  ambassador  at  Constantinople. 

•  In  other  words,  Russia  violated  international  law  and  a  number  of  treaties 

to  which  she  was  signatory,  the  Turks  yielding  to  force  majeure. 


NORTH  AFRICA,  ITALY  AND  THE  ENTENTE        171 

he  shared  my  view,  but  here  again  we  had  to  deal  with  a  fact  and 
not  a  question  of  legal  right. 

In  the  further  course  of  conversation,  Poincare  suggested,  casu- 
ally, so  to  speak,  an  idea  to  which  I  wish  to  draw  your  special  at- 
tention, viz. ;  That,  if  our  view  that  Turkey  was  bound  to  keep  the 
Straits  open  to  neutral  trade  in  war  time  as  well  as  in  peace  should 
prevail,  it  would,  in  the  end,  lead  to  a  formal  neutralisation  of  the 
Straits,  the  more  so  since  such  a  standpoint  would  be  in  accord  with  the 
general  evolution  of  modern  international  law.  We  should,  in  his  opin- 
ion, not  lose  sight  of  this  fact,  so  as  not  to  get  into  a  conflict  ourselves 
with  our  own  political  interests  and  aspirations 


(205)  The  Russian  Ambassador  in  London  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram,  May 
2-15,  1912.    No.  126. 

Grey  told  me  confidentially  that  he  had  good  reasons  to  believe 
that  Italy  was  desirous  of  peace  and  that  she  was  prepared,  not  only 
to  acknowledge  the  religious  supremacy  of  the  Caliph,  ^  but  also  to 
settle  an  annuity  upon  the  Sheik-ul-Islam,  ^  as  an  outward  expres- 
sion of  this  supremacy.  Grey  added,  however,  that  he  did  not 
wish  to  take  the  initiative  as  to  any  new  proposal.  He  considers 
the  above  concession  to  be  inadequate,^  but  he  wished  to  inform  you  of 
it,  so  that  you  could  make  use  of  this  circumstance  whenever  the 
Powers  would  find  it  feasible  to  renew  their  efforts  at  bringing 
about  peace. 

(206)  The  Russian  Charge   d'Affaires  at  Rome  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram, 
April  2S-May  11,  1912.    No.  58. 

In  the  course  of  a  long  conversation,  the  French  Ambassador 
here  pointed  out  that  the  Entente  Powers  must  seriously  consider 
the  question  of  mediation,  in  order  to  forestall  Germany  and  Aus- 
tria who  are  trying  to  find  a  suitable  formula.  M.  Barrere  did  not 
conceal  from  me  that  his  Government  was  very  much  worried  over  the 

*The  Sultan  of  Turkey  in  his  so-called  spiritual  capacity;  not  very  dis- 
similar to  the  office  of  the  Pope. 

'Administrative  or  temporal  head  of  the  Moslem  world,  residing  at  Con- 
stantinople. 

'Because  the  British  government  and  public  did  not  relish  the  Italian  raid 
upon  Tripoli  and  Lybia :  Firstly,  because  the  enterprise  caused  much  unrest  in 
Islam ;  secondly,  Italy  was  now  a  political  neighbor  of  Egypt. 


172         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

spirit  prevailing  among  the  Mohammedan  subjects   of  France,   and 
wanted  the  war  to  end  as  soon  as  possible. 


(207)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Confidential  Letter,  May  8-21,  1912. 

The  cooling  of  relations  between  Italy  and  France  is  a  very  deplor- 
able affair  in  view  of  our  interests.  Since  the  incidents  of  the  "Manuba" 
and  "Carthage"  these  relations  have  become  visibly  worse.  In  the 
Foreign  Office  they  told  me  that  the  Italian  Government  was  fully  justi- 
fied in  complaining  of  France  who  has  taken  no  measures  to  prevent 
the  transport  of  war  contraband  through  Tunis  to  Tripoli. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  French  ambassador  ^  here  has  spoken  very 
slightingly  of  the  policy  pursued  by  the  present  Italian  Cabinet,  espe- 
cially in  regard  to  the  occupation  of  the  Aegaean  Islands  by  Italy.  It  is 
his  opinion  that  this  occupation  can  only  be  permitted  as  a  temporary 
measure,  and  that  permanent  seizure  would  run  directly  counter  to  the 
interests  of  France  in  the  Mediterranean.  For  years  the  French  Re- 
public has  made  the  greatest  endeavours  to  preserve  and  insure  its  inter- 
ests in  this  sea.  These  words  have  direct  reference  to  the  Agreement 
concluded  in  1902  between  France  and  Italy,  ^  the  text  of  which  has 
never  been  communicated  to  us,  the  substance  of  which,  however,  we 
know,  because  Barrkre  considered  it  necessary  at  the  time  to  advise  our 
ambassador,  Nelidoff,  of  the  conclusion  of  this  Treaty.  Barrere  has 
now  likewise  spoken  to  me  of  the  Agreement  of  1902,  and  I  con- 
clude from  his  words  that  the  ten-years  duration  of  this  Treaty 
has  induced  the  French  ambassador  to  propose  to  the  Italian  gov- 
ernment that  a  declaration  be  made  through  an  exchange  of  Notes 
to  the  effect  that  this  Treaty  remain  in  force.  Evidently  the  Italian 
government  has  raised  no  formal  protest  against  the  renewal  of  the 
Treaty,  but  has  laid  down  certain  conditions  which  seem  to  excite 
the  ambassador  very  much.  He  no  longer  conceals  his  displeasure 
at  the  activities  of  Tittoni,  the  Italian  ambassador  at  Paris,  because 
Tittoni,  it  is  said,  does  not  consider  the  present  moment  desirable 
for  the  renewal  of  the  Treaty  of  1902  in  its  present  form  and  con- 
text. 

*  Barrere. 

'The  treaty  which  led  to  a  military  understanding  concerning  the  Franco- 
Italian  border. 


NORTH  AFRICA,  ITALY  AND  THE  ENTENTE        173 

In  addition,  Italian  public  opinion  accuses  a  French  financial  group 
of  wishing  to  grant  a  considerable  loan  to  Turkey  to  be  guaranteed  by 
the  harbour  tolls  of  Smyrna  and  Beirut.  If  this  rumour  should  prove 
true,  it  would  be  regarded  as  a  violation  of  neutrality.  ^  All  the  forego- 
ing circumstances  create  an  atmosphere  which  Germany  and  Aus- 
tria could  easily  use  to  their  advantage,  and  this  possibility  alarms 
the  French  ambassador  here  above  everything  else. 


(208)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sasonoff.     Telegram,  May  S- 
18,  1912.    No.  74. 

The  press  today  is  still  occupying  itself  with  yesterday's  incident.^ 

The  more  important  organs  which  receive  their  information  from 
the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  such  as  the  Temps,  Journal  des  Debats, 
Matin,  etc.,  retain  their  composure  and  limit  themselves  to  the  publica- 
tion of  dementis.  Several  newspapers,  chiefly  of  an  extreme  or  op- 
position tendency  which  have  always  been  hostile  to  Russia,  are 
repeating  their  attacks  on  Russia  and  on  me  personally. 

The  effort  is  clearly  visible  to  give  the  incident  a  political  character 
and  to  explain  our  dissatisfaction  with  Georges  Louis,  the  French  Am- 
bassador in  St.  Petersburg,^  by  the  assumption,  that  Russia  apparently 
wishes  to  pursue  an  aggressive  policy  towards  Turkey  and  that  she  has 
in  this  encountered  resistance  on  the  part  of  the  French  ambassador. 
It  is  known  that  several  papers,  which  are  writing  in  this  vein,  receive 
subsidies  from  the  Turkish  Embassy  which  distributes  considerable  sums 
among  the  local  press.^  I  am  taking  measures  to  re-establish  the  truth 
in  the  newspapers,  but  as  I  have  no  funds  at  my  disposal  this  is  very 
difficult. 

*  Negotiations  for  this  purpose  were  in  progress,  but  had  been  initiated  by- 
Turkey  before  the  outbreak  of  the  Italo-Turkish  war.  They  were  incident  to  the 
development  of  the  French  railroads  in  Syria. 

'The  French  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  was  alleged  to  have  said  that 
Russia  favored  the  occupation  by  Italy  of  a  number  of  Turkish  islands  in  the 
Aegaean  Sea,  which  was  contrary  to  what  the  French  public  wanted. 

M.  Louis  had  his  own  views  on  Franco-Russian  relations,  being  a  very  sane 
and  temperate  man,  whom  Poincare  hated  cordially  but  could  not  remove  from 
his  post  because  he  enjoyed  the  confidence  of  the  French  public.  The  day  fol- 
lowing Poincare's  installation  as  president  of  the  Republic,  Georges  Louis  was 
recalled  and  from  then  on  Sazonoff  and  Iswolsky  controlled  the  situation. 

*  See  footnote  1  on  page  175.  While  it  is  a  well-known  fact  that  newspapers 
everywhere  are  prone  to  serve  the  purposes  of  diplomatists,  it  was  hardly 
proper  for  M.  Iswolsky  to  throw  stones. 


174         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

(209)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Letter,  May  10-23,  1912. 

In  my  telegram  of  yesterday,  which  refers  to  Samos,  I  reported 
to  you  that  people  here  are  much  concerned  on  account  of  the 
Italian  occupation  of  so  many  islands  in  the  Aegaean  Sea.  At  the 
beginning  of  the  war,  Poincare  always  called  such  an  occupation 
a  suitable  means  of  bringing  pressure  to  bear  upon  Turkey. 
Lately,  however,  Poincare  seems  to  have  changed  his  opinion  owing  to 
the  impression  made  upon  him  by  the  Italian  operations  in  the  archi- 
pelago and,  perhaps,  under  the  influence  of  London.  He  admits  the  oc- 
cupation of  the  islands  to  be  a  means  of  forcing  Turkey  to  yield, 
but,  on  the  other  hand,  he  fears  that,  even  if  Italy  has  no  intention 
of  settling  there  for  good,  the  question  of  their  autonomy  and  the 
protection  of  the  local  population  against  Turkish  cruelties  will 
be  raised  when  the  islands  are  restored  to  Turkey.  Tittoni  has,  as 
I  know,  assured  Poincare  that  Italy  had  no  intention  whatever  of 
settling  on  the  islands,  he  did  not  deny,  however,  that  the  Italian  gov- 
ernment proposed  to  introduce  various  reforms,  and  improvements  into 
these  islands,  and  that  such  a  course  would,  in  fact,  be  liable  to  bring 
under  discussion  the  question  of  the  future  fate  of  the  population  under 
Turkish  rule,  ^ 

Yesterday,  Poincare  informed  me  that  the  idea  of  a  conference 
occupied  the  minds  of  Rome  as  well  as  of  Constantinople.  On  the 
Turkish  side  they  seem  to  be  afraid  that  at  such  a  conference  other 
questions  beside  that  of  Tripoli  might  be  discussed.  Personally, 
Poincare  believes  it  will  be  possible  that  certain  promises  are  made 
to  Turkey  in  that  respect.  On  this  occasion  he  again  expressed 
the  thought  that,  should  the  Tripolitan  question  be  submitted  to  a 
Conference,  then  France  would  be  much  less  bound  by  any  obliga- 
tions of  neutrality  and  that  she  would  most  decidedly  support  the 
Italian  claims,  in  accordance  with  the  agreement  of  1902. 

I  enclose  two  articles  from  the  "Temps"  which  confirm  what  I 
said  above.  The  writer  of  these  articles  is  the  well-known  Tardieu 
who,  under  Pichon,  had  for  some  time  fallen  out  with  the  French 
Foreign  Office,  but  who  has  now  gotten  again  into  contact  with 
them  and  whose  articles  represent  Poincare's  views.  During  the  in- 
cident with  the  French  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  Georges  Louis, 

*The  thin  edge  of  the  wedge  of  annexation. 


NORTH  AFRICA,  ITALY  AND  THE  ENTENTE        175 

he  hastened  to  put  his  pen  at  my  disposal}  In  both  articles  Poincare's 
fears  regarding  the  occupation  of  the  islands  by  Italy,  as  well  as 
his  idea  of  the  conditions  that  should  govern  a  conference,  are 
plainly  expressed 

(210)     The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Rome  to  Sasonoff.     Telegram, 
May  15-28,  1912.    No.  69. 

The  Foreign  Minister  told  me  that  at  the  present  moment  Italy 
had  no  intention  of  occupying  Mytilene,  but  that  she  could  not  bifid 
herself  for  the  future,  especially  if  the  war  were  to  last  still  longer. 
I  asked  the  minister  to  give  me  the  distinct  promise  that  we  should  be 
notified  in  time  in  case  the  Italian  general  staff  Were  to  consider  it 
necessary  to  undertake  operations  against  this  island.  San  Giuliano 
gave  me  this  promise. 


(211)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  May  15-28,  1912.    No.  70. 

The  Foreign  Minister  has  positively  assured  me  that  he  did  not  in- 
struct Tittoni  ^  to  talk  about  a  conference  with  Poincare.  If  the  Roman 
Cabinet  had  decided  upon  such  a  step  we  should  have  been  in- 
formed of  it  first.  If  Tittoni  has  spoken  about  it  to  Poincare,  he 
has  but  expressed  his  personal  opinion.  He  believes  France  herself 
has  raised  this  question.  Furthermore,  the  minister  has  informed 
the  Italian  representatives  abroad  by  telegram  that  Italy  had  not 
suggested  a  conference,  either  directly  or  indirectly.  Italy  could  only 
participate  in  such  a  conference  if  its  programme  was  settled  beforehand. 


(212)     Sasonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.     Telegram,  May 
16-29, 1912.    No.  1013. 

I  hear  from  a  perfectly  reliable  source  that  Sir  R.  Rodd,^  after 
having  talked  with  Grey,  told  Imperiali  *  that  the  British  Govern- 
ment would  take  no  initiative  towards  ending  the  war,  but  that  it 
was  strongly  inclined  to  come  to  an  understanding  with  Germany  if 

*  That  is  to  say :  Tardieu,  intimate  of  Poincare,  filled  the  office  of  press  agent. 
'Italian  ambassador  at  Paris,  after  retiring   from  the  post  of  minister  of 

foreign  affairs, 

'  Sir  Rennel  Rodd,  British  ambassador  at  Rome. 

*  Italian  ambassador  at  London. 


176  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

such  a  step  were  to  be  originated  by  Berlin.    Please  find  out  in  strict- 
est confidence  whether  this  information  is  correct. 

(213)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sasonoff.     Telegram ,  May 
17-30,  1912.    No.  143. 

Your  telegram  1013  received. 

I  shall  try  to  obtain  the  desired  information.  My  impression  is 
this:  Grey  wishes  more  and  more  that  peace  be  concluded  soon. 
But,  as  he  has  already  told  me,  he  does  not  wish  to  take  the  ini- 
tiative. On  the  other  hand,  it  is  generally  assumed  here  that  Baron 
Marschall  will  raise  this  question  and,  perhaps,  propose  a  basis 
for  the  negotiations.  Grey  told  Rodd,  perhaps,  that  he  will  not  take 
the  initiative  to  discuss  this  question  with  the  German  ambassador, 
but  that  he  will  gladly  receive  any  possible  notification  from  the  lat- 
ter. I  believe,  the  go-between  of  whom  Rodd  made  use  has  at- 
tached greater  importance  to  Grey's  words  than  they  really  pos- 
sessed. Among  British  ambassadors,  Rodd  is  not  one  of  those  who 
possess  influence.  In  my  opinion  we  must  expect  that  the  Ber- 
lin Cabinet  will  mention  this  matter  and,  perhaps,  take  an  ini- 
tiative. As  you  know.  Grey  told  me  he  doubted  the  practicability 
of  a  conference,  because  it  would  be  difficult  to  limit  its  program. 

(214)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sasonoff.    Telegram,  May  17- 
30,  1912.    No.  90. 

Poincare  told  me  that  from  Barrere's  telegrams  and  Tittoni's 
words  one  could  gather  that,  while  the  Italian  government  does  not 
express  itself  in  favour  of  a  conference,  yet  it  does  not  exclude  the 
possibility  of  one.  Bompard  telegraphs  from  Constantinople  that  the 
Turkish  Ministerial  Council  has  decided  to  give  its  consent  to  a  con- 
ference only  if  its  result  is  settled  beforehand;  Turkey  will  demand  that 
Cyrenaica  be  restored  to  her  and  will  admit  only  a  civil  protectorate  of 
Italy  over  Tripoli. 

Poincare  thinks  that  under  these  circumstances  one  could  not 
make  a  formal  proposal.  Nevertheless,  in  his  opinion  Russia,  France, 
and  England  should  discuss  this  question  among  themselves,  so  as  to 
come  to  an  understanding  on  all  details  and  to  be  prepared  to  come  for- 
ward with  their  proposal  of  a  conference  at  the  opportune  moment, 
because  he  is  afraid  that  Emperor  William  will  unexpectedly  take  such 


NORTH  AFRICA,  ITALY  AND  THE  ENTENTE        177 

an  initiative.  Personally  he  thinks  that  the  programme  of  the  con- 
ference would  have  to  be  confined  to  the  Italo-Turkish  conflict  and 
that  even  the  question  of  the  islands  should  be  eliminated. 

He  admits  the  dangerous  features  of  calling  a  conference,^  but  sees 
no  other  way  out  of  it.  He  is  very  much  troubled  lest  Italy  should 
before  long  occupy  Mytilene  and  Chios,  whereby  the  whole  situa- 
tion would  be  aggravated  and  Turkey  would  be  induced  to  close 
the  Dardanelles  again.  He,  therefore,  told  Tittoni  Italy  should  in 
such  case  declare  to  the  Powers,  of  her  own  accord,  that  she  in- 
tended no  action  against  the  Dardanelles,  in  order  thus  to  deprive 
Turkey  of  any  excuse  for  closing  the  straits. 

*  Such  conferences  were  always  dangerous. 

12 


THE  ENTENTE  AND  THE  FRANCO-ITALIAN 
AGREEMENT  OF  1902 

(May  1912— July  1914) 

(215)     Sasonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris.     Confidential  Letter, 
May  17-30,  1912. 

The  increasing  coolness  in  Franco-Italian  relations,  which  has  be- 
come noticeable  of  late,  cannot  be  of  indifference  to  us.  As  you  well 
know,  we  do  not  consider  it  expedient  to  work  directly  towards  a  for- 
mal withdrawal  on  the  part  of  Italy  from,  the  Triple  Alliance,  but  whilst 
allowing  the  present  condition  of  things  to  remain  outwardly  as  before, 
we  consider  it  in  reality  most  desirable  to  strengthen  in  every  way  pos- 
sible the  relations  of  the  kingdom  to  us  and  to  France. 

Since  we  ourselves  occupy  for  the  moment  an  especially 
favourable  position  in  this  respect,  we  are,  of  course,  prepared  to 
embrace  this  favourable  situation,  in  order,  if  France  should  so 
desire,  to  lend  her  active  support  in  the  adjustment  of  her  diffi- 
culties with  Italy.  One  of  these  difficulties  is  evidently  what  shall 
be  the  future  fate  of  the  Franco-Italian  Agreement  of  1902. 

This  Agreement  has  never  been  communicated  to  us,  but  so  far 
as  we  know,  it  referred,  mainly,  to  a  demarcation  of  French  and  Italian 
interests  in  the  Mediterranean  and  for  this  reason  we  should  think  that 
it  would  be  without  a  time-limit.  It  may  be  possible,  however,  that 
this  Agreement  contains  other  provisions  which  have  a  time-limit, 
and  that  this  is  the  reason  why  after  ten  years'  duration,  the  ques- 
tion of  renewing  the  agreement  is  being  raised.  So  far  as  we 
know,  the  French  wish  the  renewal  of  the  agreement,  whereas 
the  Italians,  doubtless  under  the  influence  of  their  ambassador  at 

178 


FRANCO-ITALIAN  AGREEMENT  OF  1902  179 

Paris  who  advocates  freedom  of  action,  are  in  no  hurry  to  enter  into 
new  obligations  until  the  present  tangled  political  situation  is 
cleared  up. 

In  England  they  are  beginning  to  he  uneasy,  as  they  fear  there, 
that  in  the  event  of  a  disagreement  between  Italy  and  France,  Italy  will 
again  become  more  closely  associated  with  the  Triple  Alliance.  In  this 
case,  Tripoli  might  in  Italian  hands  become  a  convenient  naval  base  of 
operations  for  the  Triple  Alliance  in  the  Mediterranean. 

I  therefore  request  you  confidentially,  to  investigate  the  data 
I  have  just  given  you  and  to  discover,  if  possible,  whether  there  is 
any  truth  in  the  rumours  about  the  renewal  of  the  Agreement  of 
1902,  what  its  provisions  are,  and  what  the  attitude  of  the  French 
Government  is  in  the  matter.  Finally,  we  should  also  like  to  know 
whether  France  requires  our  mediation  for  the  improvement  of 
her  relations  with  Italy. 

(216)     The  Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Rome  to  Sazonoff.    Letter,  May  22- 
lune  4,  1912. 

A  certain  improvement  seems  to  have  taken  place  of  late  in 
Franco-Italian  relations.  San  Giuliano  and  Barrere  informed  me 
almost  simultaneously  that  Tittoni  had  had  an  exhaustive  con- 
versation with  Poincare.  I  welcomed  this  information  and  ex- 
pressed the  hope  that  further  friction  and  misunderstandings 
between  the  two  states  would  be  avoided  in  the  future,  as  they 
were  harmful  to  the  interests  of  us  all. 

Here  in  the  Foreign  Office  this  new  turn  in  affairs  seems  to  be 
regarded  as  something  of  an  Italian  victory  and  it  is  believed  that 
misunderstandings  are  now  at  an  end  for  all  time.  The  calmer, 
more  farseeing  French  ambassador^  is  of  a  different  opinion  and 
places  no  special  confidence  in  the  exchange  of  views  between  Tit- 
toni and  Poincare.  He  looks  at  this  incident  from  the  viewpoint 
of  practical  politics,  and  told  me  he  would  not  be  satisfied  until 
the  Agreement  of  1902  had  been  extended  without  limitations  of 
any  kind.  The  delay  in  the  renewal  he  ascribes  to  the  nervousness 
of  public  opinion,  the  result  of  which  is,  that  the  Italian  govern- 
ment gropes  blindly  in  all  directions,  seeking  to  find  a  way  out 
of  its  present  difficult  position. 

*M.  Barrere,  a  diplomatic  master  mind. 


180         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

Then  Barrkre  also  sees  a  further  obstacle  in  the  way  of  the  re- 
newal of  the  former  confidential  relations  between  France  and  Italy  in 
the  personality  of  Tittoni,  the  present  ambassador  at  Paris,  who  has 
compromised  himself  through  petty  political  intrigues. 

I  am  not  able  to  judge  whether  this  opinion  is  the  personal 
view  of  Barrere  or  whether  it  reflects  the  standpoint  of  the  French 
Government.  I  only  know  on  very  good  authority  that  in  his 
conversations  with  Giuliano  he  has  quite  strongly  hinted  at  the 
unpopularity  of  Tittoni.^  Barrere  has  frankly  stated  to  me  that 
not  until  Tittoni  has  been  recalled,  can  the  former  cordial  relations 
between  the  two  governments  be  restored. 

(217)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sasonoff.    Confidential  Letter, 
May  2Wune  6,  1912. 

After  the  receipt  of  your  confidential  letter  of  May  17-30,  I 
induced  Poincare  to  discuss  Franco-Italian  relations  with  me.  I 
tried  to  discover  whether  the  rumour  is  true  that  the  Agreement 
of  1902  has  expired  and  that  difficulties  have  arisen  between  France 
and  Italy  in  regard  to  the  renewal  of  this  agreement.  /  pointed  out 
how  contrary  to  the  interests  of  the  three  Entente  Powers  it  would  be 
for  a  coolness  to  arise  in  the  relations  between  France  and  Italy  and 
for  Italy  to  return  to  the  Triple  Alliance.  I  also  intimated  that  we 
would  be  ready  to  offer  our  friendly  services  to  France. 

Poincare  declared  emphatically  that  the  Agreement  of  1902  had  no 
time-limit.  If  the  exact  text  of  this  agreement  had  not  been  com- 
municated to  us,  it  was  only  because  France  could  not  do  so  with- 
out the  consent  of  Italy.  But  the  contents  of  the  agreement  were 
familiar  to  us.  It  contains  a  demarcation  of  French  and  Italian  in- 
terests in  the  Mediterranean.  The  nature  of  the  Agreement  precludes 
a  time-limit.  Furthermore,  a  practical  result  of  this  agreement  is  an 
abandonment  of  the  concentration  of  the  French  and  Italian  armies 
on  the  Franco-Italian  frontier.^  Should  Italy  on  any  occasion  wish  to 
bring  about  a  change  in  the  existing  situation,  it  would  be  regarded  as 
an  unfriendly  act  on  the  part  of  Italy  towards  France.  But  fortunately 
there  is  no  question  of  this. 

*  Tittoni  was,  in  the  main,  in  favor  of  Italy  adhering  to  the  Triple  Alliance. 
'  A  very  important  admission  to  make. 


FRANCO-ITALIAN  AGREEMENT  OF  1902  181 

Proceeding  then  to  the  general  character  of  the  present  rela- 
tions between  Italy  and  France,  Poincare  emphasized  most  de- 
cidedly the  fact  that  neither  government  had  allowed  itself  to  be 
influenced  by  public  opinion^  and  that  recent  events  had  in  no 
way  disturbed  the  friendly  relations  existing  between  them.  Barrere 
had  lately  received  assurances  to  this  effect  from  the  Italian  Govern- 
ment. The  same  was  true  of  the  French  Government,  and  even 
though  France,  bound  by  obligations  of  neutrality,  might  not  al- 
ways be  in  a  position  to  give  expression  to  her  friendly  feelings 
towards  Italy,  she  would  not  fail  to  give  her  energetic  support  as 
soon  as  the  Peace  Conference  met. 

"Moreover,"  he  continued,  "I  have  reason  to  believe  that  Italy  is 
fully  convinced  of  France's  friendship,  and  that  just  now  the  Italian 
government  look  on  Russia  and  France  as  their  best  friends  and  expect 
help  from  them  much  sooner  than  from  their  allies." 

As  to  the  question  of  Italy's  formal  withdrawal  from  the  Triple 
Alliance,  Poincare  entirely  agrees  with  you  that  there  is  no  reason  to 
work  for  such  an  end,  as  it  could  only  bring  about  dangerous  entangle- 
ments. The  best  zvould  be  to  maintain  the  present  situation,  for  Italy 
is  a  restraining  element  in  the  Triple  Alliance.  Still  France  must  not 
forget  that  Italy  belongs  to  the  political  combination  opposed  to 
us.  For  this  reason  the  French  government  must  take  care  that 
Italy  does  not  obtain  supremacy  in  the  Mediterranean.  With  the 
present  relative  strength  of  the  fleets  a  mere  mobilization  of  the 
French  naval  forces  would  make  impossible  any  hostile  attempt 
on  the  part  of  Italy. 

''You  may  rest  assured,"  he  said  to  me  with  special  emphasis,  ''that 
France  is  fully  determined  also  in  future  to  maintain  her  ascendency 
over  Italy  in  the  Mediterranean.^'  These  statements  of  Poincare  do 
not  altogether  coincide  with  the  information  sent  us  by  our  charge 
d'affaires  at  Rome.  But  I  have  no  reason  to  doubt  Poincare*s  sin- 
cerity, for,  although  he  is  often  unnecessarily  abrupt  and  blunt, 
he  has  never  given  me  occasion  to  question  his  sincerity.  Besides, 
it  seems  to  me  that  of  late  there  has  been  a  decided  improvement 
in  the  relations  between  the  two  Governments  and  between  Poin- 
care and  Tittoni  personally. 

*  Which  is  generally  the  case. 


182  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

(218)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Letter,  July  5-18,  1912. 

In  the  course  of  a  conversation  with  Paleologue,^  I  asked  him 
whether  the  rumour  appearing  in  an  English  Paper  were  true  as 
to  negotiations  between  France,  England  and  Italy  in  regard  to 
an  agreement  respecting  the  Mediterranean.  He  declared  that  the 
rumour  was  without  the  slightest  foundation.  A  chance  conversa- 
tion between  Cambon  and  Grey  had  probably  given  rise  to  these 
conjectures.  In  reply  to  Cambon's  question  as  to  what  the  British 
Government  thought  of  the  new  situation  which  might  arise  from 
the  Turco-Italian  War,  Grey  said  that  he  had  not  given  the  ques- 
tion serious  attention,  that  it  might  attain  significance  in  the  future, 
and  that  it  would  probably  have  to  be  seriously  considered. 

Cambon's  report  on  this  conversation  was  communicated  in 
the  usual  way  to  the  French  Ambassadors  and  in  this  connection 
a  purely  academic  exchange  of  views  resulted  between  Cambon, 
Barrere  and  Bompard.  The  French  Foreign  Office  shares  Grey's 
view  that  it  would  be  premature  to  approach  this  question  before 
the  end  of  the  war.  In  regard  to  Italy,  Palcologue  assured  me  once 
again  that  the  Franco-Italian  Agreement  was  without  time-limit  and 
that  there  was  no  reason  for  renewal  or  modification.  He  said  to  me 
that  substantially  the  agreement  was  based  on  the  following 
mutual  declaration: 

"Italy  has  no  objections  to  the  French  action  in  Morocco,  just  as 
France  has  no  objections  to  the  Italian  action  in  Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica.^ 
The  agreement  contains  no  other  provisions  worth  mentioning.^  It 
does  not  even  provide  that  France  and  Italy  must  mutually  support 
each  other  in  the  attainment  of  their  object.*  The  polemics  called 
forth  by  the  English  newspapers  cannot  but  be  unpleasant  to  the 
French  government,  as  it  creates  ill-feeling  among  the  Triple  Alli- 
ance and  might  result  in  the  latter  bringing  pressure  to  bear  on 
Italy. 

*  Then  tinder-secretary  of  the  French  foreign  office. 

'Which  influenced  the  Morocco  affair,  since  Germany  took  it  for  granted 
that  there  was  some  harmony  between  Italian,  German  and  Austro-Hungarian 
interests  in  the  Mediterranean. 

"Poincare  admitted  to  Iswolsky  that  "a  practical  result  of  this  agreement 
is  an  abandonment  of  the  concentration  of  the  French  and  Italian  armies  on  the 
Franco-Italian  frontier."  ,  .  ,   ,     , 

*Paleologue  had  hardly  the  authority  to  admit  more  than  his  chief  had 
intimated. 


I 
I 
I 


FRANCO-ITALIAN  AGREEMENT  OF  1902  183 

(219)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sa::onoff.   Telegram.  Max  18- 
31,  1912.     No.  144.  V  y        ,        y 

The  Ambassadors  of  Italy  and  Turkey  have  never  indicated  to  me 
any  wish  of  their  Governments  to  convoke  a  conference.^ 

(220)  The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Rome  to  Sasonoff.     Teleqram 
May  18-31,  1912. 

Barrere  did  not  deny  that  the  idea  of  a  conference  emanated  from 
France  herself.  In  his  opinion  it  is  in  the  interests  of  France  and 
Russia  that  the  war  should  be  terminated  as  soon  as  possible.  In 
consequence  of  mediation  having  failed,  nothing  but  a  conference 
can  serve  as  a  substitute.  It  is  then  absolutely  necessary  that  the 
Entente  Powers  induce  Italy  and  Turkey  to  participate  in  the  con- 
ference, and  this  should  not  be  difficult,  if  the  principle  is  estab- 
lished that  the  political  status  of  Tripoli  will  not  be  discussed. 
Once  the  Italian  and  Turkish  consent  will  have  been  obtained, 
an  armistice  will  have  to  be  proposed ;  this  will  make  peace  easier. 
Italy's  sovereignty  in  Tripoli  need  not  he  mentioned  at  all,  just  as  the 
Porte  has  not  yet  acknowledged  the  sovereignty  of  France  in  Algiers} 

(221)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sasonoff.     Letter,  May  24- 
June  6,  1912. 

As  I  have  already  reported  to  you  by  telegram,  Georges  Louis  has 
reported  here  that  you  do  not  agree  with  the  idea  of  a  conference. 
This  has  probably  made  an  unfavourable  impression  upon  Poincare. 
I,  therefore,  made  every  effort  to  explain  your  standpoint  to  him. 
In  doing  so  I  specially  pointed  out  that  you  were  afraid  that  yet 
other  questions  might  be  raised  at  the  conference,  and  informed 
him  that  you  have  declared  to  the  Turkish  Ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
burg that  Russia  in  no  way  intended  to  profit  by  present  circumstances 
and  raise  the  question  of  the  Straits. 

As  regards  this  last  point,  I  wish  to  inform  you  of  what  the 
French  Ambassador  in  London,  who  had  come  over  to  Paris  for  a 
few  days,  told  me. 

Paul  Cambon  believes  that  the  conference,  when  once  it  meets, 

*  For  the  purpose  of  ending  the  Italo-Turkish  war. 

'  Despite  which  France  asserted  her  own  sovereignty  over  the  territory.  Such 
are  the  legal  forms  of  international  morality ! 


184         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

will  certainly  have  to  concern  itself,  with  the  general  position  of 
things  in  the  Balkans.  In  this  case  France  and  England  should  not 
only  not  oppose  the  discussion  of  the  question  of  the  straits  hut  should, 
in  their  own  interests,  bring  this  question  up  to  he  discussed  and  set- 
tled in  favour  of  Russia.  Cambon  bases  this  opinion  on  his  belief 
that  only  in  this  way  can  the  balance  of  power  in  the  Mediterranean 
be  re-established  which,  as  a  result  of  this  war,  will  be  shifted  in  favour 
of  Italy  and,  therefore,  of  the  Triple  Alliance.  Cambon  has  explained 
this  view  to  Poincare  who,  however,  does  not  seem  to  be  sharing 
the  French  ambassador's  opinion,  as  he  still  thinks  the  conference 
should  concern  itself  only  with  the  Turkish-Italian  conflict.  On 
this  occasion,  however,  Poincare  told  me  that  from  the  standpoint 
of  general  policy  and  in  consideration  of  the  new  state  of  affairs 
in  the  Mediterranean,  he  considers  it  highly  desirable  that  France  and 
England  open  the  exit  from  the  Black  Sea  for  the  Russian  naval  forces, 
and  that  he  was  ready  to  support  us  to  the  utmost  of  his  ability  in  the 
settlement  of  this  question.'^ 

You  know  already  that  Poincare  makes  no  secret  of  his  concern 
at  the  Italian  operations  in  the  Aegaean  Sea.  In  spite  of  Tittoni's 
declarations,  that  Italy  had  no  intention  of  definitely  settling  on  those 
islands,  he  fears  that  public  opinion  in  Italy  will  not  allow  the  islands 
to  be  restored  to  Turkey.  The  possibility  of  Mytilene,  Lemnos  and 
Chios  being  occupied  is  likewise  worrying  him.  According  to  his 
informations  Germany  and  Austria  also  oppose  such  an  occupation, 
and  this  is  somewhat  of  a  relief  to  him. 


(222)  Sasonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.     Telegram,  May 
27'June  9,  1912. 

Poincare  proposes  that  Russia,  France  and  England  should  agree 
on  a  joint  action  for  the  purpose  of  terminating  the  Italo-Turkish  war, 
1  replied  that  I  agreed  with  this  idea. 

(223)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sasonoff.     Telegram,  May 
2S-Iune  10,  1912.    No.  158. 

Your  telegram  of  May  27th  received. 

Have  communicated  its  contents  to  Grey.     Cambon  has  in- 

*  Which  he  failed  to  do  when  the  time  came,  as  the  documents  show. 


FRANCO-ITALIAN  AGREEMENT  OF  1902  185 

structions  to  make  a  similar  declaration  here.  Grey  replied  that 
he  agreed  if  it  was  intended  to  enter  upon  an  exchange  of  opinions 
for  the  purpose  of  jointly  considering  the  question.  He  thinks, 
however,  that  any  action  aiming  at  the  termination  of  the  war 
should  be  undertaken  by  all  five  Powers,  as  an  action  of  three 
Powers  alone  would  result  in  the  disadvantage  of  a  grouping  of 
the  Powers,  the  three  allied  Powers^  and  the  two  Powers  of  the 
Triple  Alliance^;  this  could  only  serve  to  tighten  the  bonds  between 
Italy  and  Germany  and  Austria. 

(224)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  May  2S-June  10,  1912.    No.  159. 

After  I  had  spoken  to  Grey,  I  continued  the  conversation  con- 
fidentially with  Nicolson.  He  spoke  to  the  same  effect  as  Grey. 
In  his  opinion  it  is  important  that,  if  Germany, — be  it  through 
Emperor  William  or  through  Baron  Marschall — makes  proposals, 
the  Russian  and  English  governments  should  answer  that  they 
wish  to  consult  with  one  another  and  with  France  before  giving 
a  reply.  I  asked  him  why  he  thought  that  proposals  would  be 
made  by  Germany.  He  replied  that  it  was  most  probable  anyway, 
and  that  one  should,  therefore,  consider  such  a  probability.  There- 
upon we  came  to  discuss  the  questions  that  might  be  raised  on 
the  occasion  of  the  conclusion  of  peace.  He  mentioned  the  dif- 
ficult question  of  the  islands  being  restored  to  Turkey,  and  of  the 
straits.  As  regards  the  latter  he  declared  that  England  would  remain 
faithful  to  the  promise  given  by  Grey  in  1908.^  /  told  him  I  did  not 
know  that  the  Russian  Government  would  put  this  question  up  for  dis- 
cussion, but  that  I  thought  that  the  question  of  the  closing  of  the 
straits  for  neutral  trade,  by  means  of  a  barrier  of  mines  during  war- 
times, would  have  to  be  settled.*    Nicolson  shared  this  view, 

(225)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  May  29-June  11,  1912.    No.  160. 
Confidential.    Cambon  has  confidentially  communicated  to  me 

a  few  particulars  concerning  his  conversation  of  yesterday  with 

^  Great  Britain,  France  and  Russia. 

'  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary. 

'The  promise  made  by  Grey  was  that  he  would  be  in  favor  of  a  general 
review  of  the  status  of  the  straits. 

*  Which  was  an  essential  part  of  the  Turkish  defense  scheme,  since  otherwise 
the  hostile  fleet,  after  silencing  the  Turkish  batteries  along  the  straits,  could  steam 
to  the  very  capital  of  the  empire. 


186         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

Grey  on  the  subject  of  Poincare's  proposal,  which  Grey  had  not 
mentioned  to  me.  Among  others,  a  so-called  "Protocole  de  Desin- 
teressement"  ^  was  mentioned.  Grey  raised  some  objections  to 
this,  declaring  Russia  to  be  the  Power  most  interested;  it  was  highly 
improbable  that  any  Power  was  thinking  of  any  acquisition  of 
territory;  one  could  not,  however,  expect  Russia  to  bind  herself 
beforehand  not  to  put  any  question  up  for  discussion  as,  for  in- 
stance, that  of  the  closing  of  the  Straits  to  neutral  trade  during 
wartimes,  or  even  the  question  of  the  Straits  themselves,  with  re- 
gard to  which  the  London  Cabinet  had  undertaken  certain  obliga- 
tions in  1908  by  which  it  still  considered  itself  bound  at  the  present 
moment.  Grey's  second  objection  is  the  one  already  mentioned 
by  me. 

Cambon  told  me  he  shared  Grey's  view  and  would  support  it 
before  Poincare.  He  thinks  that  the  change  in  England  in  Italy's 
favour  was  plainly  evident;  in  France  also  such  a  change  was 
making  itself  felt;  it  was  extremely  important  to  prevent  any  step 
undertaken  by  the  three  Entente  Powers  resulting  in  a  rapprochement 
of  Italy  to  the  Triple  Alliance,"^  especially  when  the  object  was  to 
extend  the  influence  of  the  Triple  Alliance  to  the  Mediterranean; 
this  question  was  of  special  interest  not  only  to  France  and  Eng- 
land but,  he  supposed,  to  Russia  also ;  and,  finally,  it  was  very  de- 
sirable to  allow  Russia  to  exert  an  influence  in  questions  concern- 
ing the  Mediterranean.  Cambon  personally  thinks  France  and  Italy 
should  come  to  an  understanding  on  this  last  question,  which  would 
become  impossible  if  the  influence  of  the  Triple  Alliance  were  ex- 
tended to  the  Mediterranean. 

(226)    Sasonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris.     Telegram,  May  31- 
June  13,  1912. 

I  hasten  to  communicate  to  you  a  few  points  for  considera- 
tion regarding  the  proposal  which  the  French  Ambassador  sub- 
mitted to  me.  We  consider  the  formula  proposed  by  Poincare 
acceptable  with  the  exception  of  the  words:  "The  Powers  must, 
above  all, confirm  in  writing  their  disinterestedness." 

*A  preliminary  statement  of  disinterestedness. 

'Though  Italy  was  a  member  of  the  Triple  Alliance  her  loyalty  to  her  allies 
was  such  that  a  "rapprochement"  had  to  be  spoken  of. 


FRANCO-ITALIAN  AGREEMENT  OF  1902  187 

This  is  hardly  practicable  and  might  be  interpreted  by  Germany 
and  Austria  as  an  offensive  distrust  of  them.  Altogether  we  find 
that  Russia,  France,  and  England  must,  of  course,  act  together,  but 
that  they  should  not  emphasise  their  separation  from  the  other  Powers, 
since  we  shall  have  to  apply  to  them  for  their  co-operation. 

(227)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram,  June  1- 
14,  1912.    No.  102. 

In  order  to  void  any  misunderstandings,  I  think  I  ought  to 

state    that    Poincare   has    expressed   no    anxiety    concerning    the 

stability  of  the  Russo-French  relations  of  whose  firmness  he  is 

convinced,  hut  he  only  dreads  the  impression  which  the  impending 

meeting  of  the  monarchs  of  Russia  and  Germany  may  make  on  public 

opinion  in  France;  he  also  fears  that  Germany  will  try  to  utilize  this 

impression  to  her  own  advantage.    Above  all,  he  fears  an  unexpected 

move  of  Emperor  William's  in  the  question  of  Tripoli  with  the  object 

of  restoring  peace.     The  best  means  of  preventing  this  he  sees  in  a 

prior  understanding  between  Russia,  France  and  England.     In  this 

connection,  he  attaches  special  importance  to  the  condition  that 

the  possibility  of  extending  the  program  of  the  conference  should 

be  precluded  beforehand.    For  that  reason  your  objections  to  the 

words  in  question  have  made  an  extremely  unpleasant  impression 

here.     If  you  should  consider  these  words  unacceptable,  perhaps 

you  will  propose  another  wording  while  adhering  to  Poincare's 

principal  idea.    Your  view  that  the  divergence  of  the  three  Entente 

Powers  from  the  two  others  should  not  be  emphasised  is  also 

shared  by  Poincare.    This  has  been  clearly  expressed  by  the  inspired 

article  in  to-day's  "Temps." 

(228)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sazanoff.     Telegram,  June 
4-17,  1912.    No.  174. 

Your  standpoint  agrees  with  that  of  Grey.  As  Marschall  will 
arrive  here  on  Tuesday  or  Wednesday,  please  inform  me  whether 
you  agree  with  the  answer  which  Grey  proposes  to  give  to  a  pos- 
sible German  proposal : 

'^Before  a  decision  is  come  to,  we  must  consult  the  other  Powers 
so  that  an  agreement  is  established  between  the  five  Powers  for  the 
purpose  of  taking  joint  action."  ^ 

*  Exclusive  of  Italy  and  Turkey,  who  wished  to  end  their  war. 


188         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

(229)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram,  June  4- 
17,  1912.    No.  107. 

The  London  Cabinet  has  already  accepted  the  formula  pro-  fl 
posed  by  Poincare  with  a  few  unimportant  modifications.    Poincare 
approves  of  these  and  now  proposes  the  following  final  text : 

"The  Governments  of  France,  Russia  and  England  are  agreed 
as  to  the  conditions  under  which  they  can,  at  the  opportune 
moment,  take  effective  action  in  favour  of  the  conclusion  of  peace 
between  Italy  and  Turkey,  and  it  is  their  opinion  that  a  friendly 
intervention  of  the  Powers  can  only  be  successful  if  this  inter- 
vention is  concerned  with  that  issue  only  which  has  caused  the 
present  conflict.  The  mediating  Powers  should,  therefore,  con- 
firm in  writing  their  disinterestedness  before  they  enter  upon  the  de- 
liberations. Furthermore,  the  three  governments  express  the  opinion 
that,  in  order  to  reach  a  peaceable  aim,  the  five  Powers  must  come 
to  a  mutual  understanding  before  a  common  step  is  undertaken/'  ^ 


(230)     Sasonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris.     Telegram,  June  5- 
18,  1912.    No.  1146. 

The  French  Ambassador  has  communicated  Poincare's  new 
formula  to  me.  /  replied  that  still  I  could  not  accept  the  words  which 
refer  to  the  disinterestedness.  Russia  has  already  proved  by  her 
actions  that  she  does  not  intend  to  make  use  of  the  present  war  for 
the  attainment  of  any  selfish  aims,  but  the  signing  of  an  international 
act  would  be  construed  by  public  opinion  in  Russia  as  well  as  in  the 
Slav  states  as  meaning,  that  for  the  future  Russia  was  abandoning  her 
Balkan  policy  which  is  centuries  old.^  Besides,  I  do  not  understand 
why  the  French  Foreign  minister  thinks  that  such  an  action  is 
going  to  facilitate  the  conclusion  of  peace.  It  seems  to  me,  on 
the  contrary,  that  by  such  a  step  the  Powers  will  be  split  into  two 
opposite  groups,  whereas  it  is  absolutely  desirable  that  all  the  five 
Powers  should  participate  in  the  reconciliation  of  Italy  with 
Turkey. 

^  A  question  of  three  powers  agreeing  beforehand  what  they  wanted  to  present 
to  two  powers,  concerning  two  belligerents.  Such  was  generally  the  nature  of 
these  conferences. 

'  Sazonoff 's  logic  is  not  quite  sound,  or  his  statement  not  clear ;  either  that 
or  he  couples  Pan-Slavism  and  Russia's  "historic  mission"  to  some  possible 
development  in  the  Straits  after  his  having  surrendered  his  "freedom  of  action." 


FRANCO-ITALIAN  AGREEMENT  OF  1902  189 

(231)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  June  10-23,  1912.    No,  1177. 

I  have  just  worked  out  the  following  modification  of  Poincare's 
formula  together  with  the  French  Ambassador  here:  the  first 
paragraph  to  remain  unchanged;  the  second  to  receive  the  follow- 
ing wording : 

"are  of  opinion  that  the  Powers  which  have  in  view  nothing 

but  the  general  interests  of  Europe  and  are  exclusively  filled  with  the 
desire  to  re-establish  peace,  declare  their  readiness  to  undertake  a 
friendly  intervention  the  exclusive  subject  of  which  is  the  issue  which 
has  caused  the  present  conflict.'^ 

The  third  paragraph  remains  unchanged.  Georges  Louis  hopes 
that  his  Government  will  accept  this  wording. 


(232)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram,  June 
11-24,  1912.    No.  176. 

Grey  accepts  the  modifications  proposed  by  you.  It  is  useless, 
in  his  opinion,  to  make  the  formula  the  subject  of  a  formal  ex- 
change of  notes.  It  is  sufficient,  if  the  three  Cabinets  accept  it 
verbally.  Grey  expressed  himself  especially  against  any  publication, 
because  by  this  agreement  between  the  three  becoming  known  the  de- 
sired action  of  the  five  Powers  might  be  jeopardized. 


{2Z2>)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    letter,  June  11-24,  1912. 

Grey  immediately  told  me  he  raised  no  objections 

to  your  wording.    As  regards  the  words  " are  of  opinion 

that  the  Powers "he  assumes  that  the  five  Powers  are 

meant  here.    I  replied  that  I  too  shared  this  view He  told 

me  it  was  to  our  common  interest  that  the  joint  action  should  pro- 
ceed from  all  five  Powers ;  that  was  the  aim  we  had  in  sight ;  under 
these  conditions  an  inopportune  publication  of  the  agreement  en- 
tered into  by  the  three  Powers  would  only  tend  to  oppose  one 
group  of  Powers  to  the  other  from  the  very  beginning,  which 
would  lead  to  an  opposite  result.  I  replied  that  personally  I  be- 
lieved the  Russian  Government  shared  this  view. 

In  pointing  out  that  in  his  opinion  it  was  unnecessary  to  exchange 
formal  notes  Grey  was  probably  guided  by  the  consideration  tJmt  of- 


190         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

ficial  notes  always  cause  difficulties  in  England  on  account  of  their 
publication  in  the  Blue  Book} 

In  course  of  the  conversation.  Sir  Edward  referred  to  the 
French  clause  with  reference  to  disinterestedness.  He  said  he 
had  considered  himself  bound  to  object  to  it;  Russia  was  in  pos- 
session of  an  English  declaration  with  regard  to  the  straits;  at  that 
time  this  declaration  referred  to  the  future,  when  circumstances  would 
have  changed.  Sir  Edward  added  that  today  circumstances  had  changed 
and  that,  therefore,  he  did  not  wish  to  agree  to  a  formula  by  which 
we  should  have  been  bound.  Sir  Edward  said  he  did  not  want  to  ex- 
press the  wish  that  Russia  should  put  this  matter  up  for  discussion, 
he  did  not  wish  to  induce  us  thereto,  but  neither  would  he  put  any  dif- 
ficulties into  the  way  if  we  intended  to  do  so.^ 

(234)     The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Berlin  to  Sazonoff.    Report,  June 
30-July  13,  1912.    No.  34. 

The  newspapers  lately  published  a  short  notice  according  to 
which  the  termination  of  the  Italo-Turkish  war  might  be  expected 
in  the  near  future.  I  enquired  of  the  Acting  Secretary  of  State 
to  what  extent  these  rumours  were  founded  on  facts. 

Zimmermann  replied  it  would  be  premature  to  talk  of  an  early 
conclusion  of  peace,  but,  according  to  informations  to  hand,  the 
two  belligerents  were  endeavouring  in  an  unofficial  way  to  enter  upon 
direct  negotiations  with  each  other;  this  mutual  desire  to  come  to  an 
understanding  was  in  itself  a  reassuring  symptom.^  On  my  enquiring 
who  the  men  were  who  were  commissioned  with  such  an  exchange 
of  views,  Zimmerman  only  told  me  that  they  were  probably  bankers 
and  financiers,  as,  for  instance,  Volpi  on  the  Italian  side,  who  had 
recently  even  com£  to  Constantinople.^ 

Zimmermann  could  or  would  not  give  me  any  further  details. 
/  only  wish  to  add  that  his  words  plainly  showed  that  he  prefers  a 
"direct  exchange  of  views  between  the  belligerents"  to  a  proposal  to 
mediate  from  any  third  Power. ^ 

*  Proof  positive  of  what  value  the  British  "Blue  Books"  are. 

'The  documents  prove  thJit  Grey  had  no  intention  doing  that.  He  remained 
as  averse  as  ever  to  re-opening  the  Straits  Question  with  Russia. 

*  The  Entente  had  decided  that  this  was  not  to  be. 
*Both  belligerents  were  financially  exhausted. 
'A  sane  policy  to  which  Germany  clung  tenaciously. 


FRANCO-ITALIAN  AGREEMENT  OF  1902  191 

(235)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  to  Sasonoff.     Telegram, 
Aug.  5-18,  1912.    No.  583. 

Personal.  The  communication  of  the  Ottom^cm  Agency  ^  respect- 
ing the  resumption  of  peace  negotiations  has  been  formulated  with  the 
consent  of  the  Italian  government  by  Noradungian,  and  by  Nogara, 
an  engineer.  At  the  request  of  Turkey,  the  Italians  have  suspended 
warlike  measures  in  the  Aegaean  Sea  during  the  negotiations.  If  these 
should  not  have  lead  to  any  result  in  about  10  days,  the  Italians 
will  inform  the  Great  Powers  of  the  conditions  they  offered  to 
Turkey.  If  the  Great  Powers  then  refuse  to  persuade  Turkey  to 
accept  the  Italian  conditions,  the  war  will  take  its  course,  in  which 
case  Italy  will  not  put  up  with  further  restrictions  of  any  kind  what- 
soever. I  gained  this  information  from  an  Italian  source,  and  for 
that  reason  request  you  to  keep  the  above  strictly  secret. 

(236)  The  Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  London  to  Sasonoff.     Telegram, 
Aug.  20-Sept.  2.  1912.    No.  222. 

Grey  thinks  that  the  idea  of  a  conference  which  Buchanan  tele- 
graphs about  is  inopportune  at  this  moment  before  the  termination  of 
the  war,  and  that  it  might  have  unpleasant  consequences  at  Constanti- 
nople, because  an  interference  on  the  part  of  Europe  is  already  being 
discounted  by  the  political  parties  there. 

Grey  considers  a  conference  to  be  feasible  only  if  complete 
agreement  prevails  among  all  Powers,  and  especially  between  Rus- 
sia and  Austria,  as  to  the  program  and  the  aims  of  the  conference, 
as  otherwise  the  conference  would  only  render  the  mutual  rela- 
tions of  the  Powers  yet  more  strained. 

Turkey  and  Italy  are  evidently  averse  to  the  idea  of  a  conference: 
Turkey,  because  she  is  afraid  she  will  be  ousted  from  the  Balkans  alto- 
gether; Italy,  because  she  evidently  wishes  alone  to  decide  the  fate  of 
the  islands  occupied  by  her,  an  occupation  which,  by  the  way,  is  con- 
sidered inadmissible  here. 

(237)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Rome  to  Sasonoff.    Telegram,  Sept.  7- 
20,  1912.    No.  90. 

The  Foreign  Minister  told  me  that  the  peace  negotiations  were 
taking  a  favourable  course  and  that  the  friendly  advice  of  one  or 

*  Semi-official  news  agency  of  the  Turkish  government. 


192 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


more  Powers  at  Constantinople  might  lead  to  their  immediate 
conclusion.      The    Italian    delegates   have    been    instructed    once 
more  to  declare  categorically  that  Italy  could  make  no  conces 
sions  in  the  question  of  sovereignty. 


(23S)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sazonoff.    Telegram,  Oct.  !■ 
14,  1912.    No.  262. 


The  Italian  ambassador  here  has  enquired  whether  the  Powers 
would  recognize  the  annexation  of  Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica  as  soon  as 
the  Turks  had  evacuated  these  territories.  Nicolson  confidentially 
informed  me  that  Grey  had  not  yet  given  a  definitive  answer,  be- 
cause he  considered  it  necessary  first  to  obtain  the  consent  of  the 
Prime  Minister.  In  consideration  of  the  extreme  importance  of 
concluding  peace  as  soon  as  possible,  Nicolson  believes  that  Eng- 
land will  give  her  consent,  but  with  certain  reservations  in  respect  of 
trade  privileges,  as  in  Tunis  and  Morocco,  and  that,  furthermore, 
a  declaration  will  be  made  that  the  question  of  the  islands  in  the 
Aegaean  Sea  will  be  decided  by  the  Powers. 


I 


(239) 


The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Rome  to  Sazonoff. 
March  12-25.  1912. 


Confidential  Letter, 


Your  constant  efforts  to  put  an  end  to  the  Turco-Italian  conflict 
have  been  fully  appreciated  here  and  I  note  the  endeavours  of  the  Italian 
Government  to  restore  the  closest  possible  relations  with  us,  as  was  the 
case  in  1908  and  again  last  autumn.  You  know  what  overtures  were 
made  in  that  direction  to  my  predecessor  just  prior  to  his  death.  At 
that  time  the  reason  for  the  Italian  attempts  at  a  rapprochement  was  to 
be  found  in  the  ill-feeling  created  in  Rome  by  the  annexation  of  Bosnia. 
Last  autumn  the  Italians  were  dissatisfied  with  Austria  because  she 
tried  to  reduce  her  military  measures  in  the  Adriatic  and  the  Ionian 
Sea.  In  the  present  case  it  is  not  the  result  of  dissatisfaction  of 
any  kind,  but  the  desire  to  demonstrate  to  us  that  a  feeling  of 
gratitude  has  brought  the  Italians  to  the  consciousness  that  our 
aims  and  endeavours  have  much  in  common. 

The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  has  informed  me  that  the  Italian 
representatives  in  Pekin  and  Teheran  have  been  authorized  to  uphold 
our  Legations,  not  only  in  official  actions,  but  in  every  possible  way.  He 
emphasised  in  this  connection  that  he  had  selected  these  two  cities  be- 


I 


FRANCO-ITALIAN  AGREEMENT  OF  1902  193 

cause  our  attention  for  the  moment  was  being  engrossed  by  Chinese  and 
Persian  questions.  In  a  whole  series  of  conversations,  he  has  tried  to 
convince  me  that  the  Italian  Government  is  prepared  to  comply  as  far 
as  possible  with  your  wishes  and  that  it  is  attempting  to  harmonize  the 
general  direction  of  the  foreign  policy  of  the  two  states  wherever  they 
are  not  already  bound  by  existing  treaties.  In  China  and  Persia,  I  have 
been  told  confidentially,  Italy  possesses  complete  freedom  of  action. 
Although  I  do  not  wish  to  attach  exaggerated  importance  to  these 
statements,  I  consider  it  necessary  to  advise  you  of  them.  We  do 
not  know  what  conditions  are  to  be  submitted  to  Italy  on  the  re- 
newal of  the  Triple  Alliance  in  1914.  Owing  to  the  Reinsurance 
Treaties,  which  are  known  to  you,  in  the  event  of  a  conflict  between  the 
two  hostile  camps  of  Europe,  Germany  can  no  longer  absolutely  count 
on  Italy;  must  we  not  then  assume  that  she  will  try  to  obtain  com- 
pensations in  other  countries,  where  she  has  had  only  subordinate 
interests  up  to  now?  The  present  feeling  in  the  Italian  ministry 
will  enable  us  to  derive  advantage  from  Italian  sympathies,  if  this 
be  in  accord  with  your  plans  and  calculations. 


(240)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  June  7-20,  1912. 

I  presented  my  credentials  to  the  king  today  and  he  accorded 
me  a  very  warm  welcome.  The  king  went  on  to  speak  of  political 
questions  and  expressed  pleasure  at  the  admirable  relations  existing 
between  Russia  and  Italy ;  only,  he  regretted  that  the  friendly  rela- 
tions which  had  formerly  existed  between  Italy  and  France  should 
have  suffered  severely  in  consequence  of  the  lack  of  good  will  on 
the  part  of  public  opinion  in  France.  Nevertheless,  the  king  admit- 
ted that  in  this  respect  a  certain  improvement  had  now  set  in.  Sev- 
eral times  he  laid  stress  on  the  great  patriotism  shown  by  all  parties 
in  Italy  since  the  outbreak  of  the  war ;  this  circumstance  would  per- 
mit the  government  without  hesitation  to  carry  out  the  work  al- 
ready begun. 


(241)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Confidential  Letter.    7wn^  5-18,  1912. 

San  Giuliano  has  just  been  to  see  me.    In  the  course  of  an  hour's 
conversation,  I  told  the  Minister  that  I  had  heard  he  intended  to 


194         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

continue  the  exchange  of  views  with  us  along  the  lines  indicated  by 
the  obligations  assumed  at  Racconigi.  The  Minister  replied,  in 
view  of  the  excellent  relations  existing  between  Russia  and  Italy, 
he  would  always  be  ready  to  enter  upon  an  exchange  of  opinions, 
but  that  up  to  the  present  he  had  not  entertained  such  an  idea. 
"But,"  said  he,  "I  am  always  glad  to  talk  to  you." 
I  let  the  subject  drop  here,  merely  adding  that,  if  he  had  any 
communication  to  make  to  us,  he  could  choose  no  better  interme- 
diary than  Torretta,  who  enjoys  complete  confidence  in  St.  Peters- 
burg as  well  as  Rome.  As  for  the  Triple  Alliance,  the  renewal  of 
which  the  minister  regards  as  very  probable,  I  said  that  we  consid- 
ered Italy's  remaining  in  the  Triple  Alliance  an  earnest  guar- 
antee for  Peace — only  under  the  condition,  however,  that  the  obliga- 
tions thus  assumed  by  Italy  would  not  be  directed  against  us,  as 
was  probably  formerly  the  case.  The  minister  replied,  he  had  never 
heard  that  Italy  had  ever  entered  with  anyone  into  an  alliance  directed 
against  Russia,  and  he  gave  me  his  word  of  honour  that  in  any  case  no 
clause  existed  either  in  the  provisions  of  the  Triple  Alliance  or  in  any 
special  agreement  between  Austria  and  Italy  which  was  directed  against 
us,  these  Treaties  relating  merely  to  the  preservation  of  the  status  quo. 
He  could  not  show  me  these  documents,  the  cabinets  having  mu- 
tually engaged  to  keep  them  secret — personally,  he  regretted  this,  as 
the  publication  of  the  documents  would  help  in  reassuring  the  public 
mind  and  in  preserving  peace?- 

(242)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Report,  June  l9'July  2,  1912.    No.  19. 

Since  I  wrote  you  last  I  have  had  frequent  opportunity  of  talk- 
ing with  Giolitti,  the  premier,  and  with  San  Giuliano,  the  minister 
for  foreign  affairs.  Both  Ministers  repeatedly  laid  stress  upon  the 
patriotic  revival  which  has  taken  hold  of  all  classes  of  the  popula- 
tion and  which  would  not  allow  the  Government  to  conclude  peace  with 
Turkey  under  other  conditions  than  the  recognition  of  Italy's  com- 
plete and  unconditional  sovereignty  in  Lybia.  Both  Ministers  re- 
peatedly expressed  their  sympathies  for  Russia  who  alone  had 
shown  a  desire  to  come  to  Italy's  assistance.    I  took  advantage  of 

*  If  the  Italian  minister  of  foreign  affairs  spoke  the  truth,  we  must  assume 
that  the  treaty  of  the  Triple  Alliance  was  a  very  innocuous  document. 


FRANCO-ITALIAN  AGREEMENT  OF  1902  195 

this  opportunity  to  remind  the  two  ministers  that  we  had  disinter- 
estedly kept  our  promises,  but  that  Italy  had  up  to  now  availed  her- 
self of  no  opportunity  of  rendering  us  a  similar  service. 

"We  have  no  secrets  before  you;  and  yet,  not  only  do  we  not  know 
the  Triple  Alliance  Treaty,  hut  not  even  the  Franco-Italian  Agreement 
of  1902  nor  the  Austro-Italian  Agreement  in  regard  to  Albania.  In 
fact,  we  are  not  even  sure  whether  Italy  will  renew  her  treaty  with 
France" 

Both  replied  that  the  Agreement  of  1902  did  not  need  to  be  renewed; 
it  had  no  time-limit  and  could,  as  stated  in  the  treaty,  expire  only  in 
case  very  considerable  changes  were  made  in  the  documents  of  the  Triple 
Alliance,  and  then  only  after  the  French  government  will  have  been  offi- 
cially advised  by  the  Italian  government  to  that  effect.  Consequently, 
there  could  be  no  question  of  a  renewal  of  the  Agreement  of  1902,  and 
France,  who  was  very  well  aware  of  this,  need  entertain  no  fears. 

As  to  the  agreement  with  Austria,  Giolitti  told  me  he  could  not 
recall  the  exact  text  and  did  not  know  whether  Italy  and  Austria 
had  engaged  to  keep  this  agreement  secret.  Unless  such  a  stipula- 
tion had  been  made,  I  should  be  informed  of  the  text.  In  any  case 
this  agreement  was  nothing  more  than  an  "acte  de  desinteressement" 
and  had  no  secret  object  in  view.    San  Giuliano  told  me  directly: 

"We  are  bound  to  secrecy  and  we  would  be  breaking  our  word  if 
we  submitted  the  text  to  you.  I  regret  exceedingly  that  I  am  not  able  to 
do  so,  for  it  is  an  agreement  which  guarantees  the  maintenance  of  the 
status  quo  in  Albania  and  proves  our  mutual  disinterestedness.  The 
treaty  contains  nothing  else  and,  apart  from  the  punctuation  marks,  is 
known  to  the  whole  world.  We  do  not  need  Albania,"  continued  the 
Minister,  "and  if  she  were  offered  to  us  as  a  gift,  we  would  refuse  it. 
We  merely  wish  to  be  united  with  Italians  who  do  not  as  yet  belong 
within  the  confines  of  the  kingdom;  and  then  we  wish  colonial  aquisi- 
tions;  an  extension  of  our  state  at  the  expense  of  other  nations  is  not 
in  the  least  desirable  to  us."  ^ 

(243)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Letter,  June  29-July  11,  1912. 

The  reception  accorded  me  by  all  classes  here,  beginning  with 
the  king,  right  down  to  the  humblest  citizen,  by  both  the  govern- 

*And  yet  Italy  was  waging  a  war  for  the  remainder  of  Turkish  territory  in 
North  Africa. 


196         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

ment  and  the  press,  has  not  only  exceeded  all  my  expectations  but 
even  inspires  me  with  a  certain  amount  of  awe.  Although  they 
tell  me,  they  are  pleased  with  my  return  to  Italy,  I  know  very  well, 
these  demonstrations  are  due  to  Russia's  friendly  policy  in  the 
Turco-Italian  conflict.  Italy,  easily  influenced,  is  sincerely  grateful 
to  us  and  expects  other  services  from  us  as  well.  For  example,  the 
Italians  hope  that  my  appointment  to  Rome  signifies  a  new  attempt 
on  the  part  of  Russia  to  bring  about  peace  with  Turkey.  They  ex- 
pect the  impossible  of  us  and  of  me  personally.  Every  political 
event  in  Europe  is  connected  by  public  opinion  here  with  the  war. 
They  are  convinced  that  at  the  approaching  meeting  between  the 
monarchs  of  Russia  and  Germany,  our  czar  will  try  to  convince 
the  German  sovereign  of  the  necessity  of  bringing  pressure  to  bear 
on  Turkey.  Each  day  they  attach  more  and  more  importance  to 
the  occupied  Aegaean  Islands;  the  Italian  press,  and  perhaps  the 
government  as  well,  already  regard  it  as  impossible  to  restore  the 
Sporades  unconditionally  to  Turkey;  they  call  to  mind  the  various 
firmans,  beginning  with  the  year  1552  and  coming  down  to  June 
23,  1908,  which  have  provided  a  certain  autonomy  for  these  islands. 
Even  if  Italy  should  return  these  islands  to  Turkey,  all  these  rights 
would  have  to  be  guaranteed. 

They  are  also  setting  their  hopes  upon  the  effect  of  the  mutinies 
in  the  Turkish  army,  which  are  said  to  have  assumed  very  consid- 
erable proportions.  From  all  these  facts,  I  draw  the  conclusion  that 
the  Italians  wish  peace,  even  though  they  are  not  willing  to  admit 
it. 

(244)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Confidential  Report,  July  17-30,  1912. 

I  took  advantage  of  San  Giuliano's  short  stay  in  Rome  to  a 
vise  him  that  "the  Russian  Government  wishes  to  enter  into  an  ex- 
change of  views  with  the  Rome  cabinet  in  regard  to  Balkan  questions 
and  that  it  calls  the  attention  of  the  cabinet  to  the  hostile  feeling  in 
Montenegro."  I  told  the  Minister  confidentially,  we  had  certain  in- 
formation to  the  effect  that  the  Montenegrin  government  is  of  the 
opinion  that  it  will  be  difficult  for  it  under  prevailing  political  condi- 
tions to  keep  the  peace  with  Turkey.  I  added  that  in  our  opinion, 
Italy  might  indicate  to  the  Montenegrin  government  how  undesir- 
able entanglements  of  any  kind  in  the  Balkans  would  be.    Finally, 


FRANCO-ITALIAN  AGREEMENT  OF  1902  197 

I  added,  that  according  to  information  we  had  received,  Austria- 
Hungary  had  also  advised  moderation  in  Cettinje. 

San  Giuliano  replied  that  he  would  immediately  telegraph  to  Cet- 
tinje in  the  sense  desired.  Moreover,  he  had  always  warned  King 
Nicolas  against  rash  steps.  He  did  not  particularly  believe  in  the 
warlike  intentions  of  the  king.  Only  once,  during  the  annexation 
crisis,  had  he  feared  some  desperate  step,  but  at  that  time 
the  king  had  come  to  a  direct  understanding  with  Austria-Hungary  on  a 
financial  basis 

/  rejoined  that  warlike  sentiment  was  increasing  not  only  in  Monte- 
negro but  also  in  Serbia  and  Bulgaria,  and  that  the  temptation  to  take  ad- 
vantage of  the  present  difficulties  and  the  weakness  of  the  Turkish 
Empire  was  great,  and  that  only  joint  pressure  from  the  Powers 
could  prevent  a  conflagration  on  the  Balkan  peninsula.  The  Minis- 
ter replied  that  he  must  count  on  Italy's  pacifying  influence  upon 
the  Balkan  States. 

In  respect  of  our  wish  to  remain  in  close  touch  with  the  Rome 
cabinet,  he  said  to  me : 

''You  may  assure  your  minister  that  I  share  his  wish  and  shall  fulfill 
itr 

(245)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Confidential  Letter,  July  SUAug.  13,  1912. 
No.  3. 

In  the  course  of  this  conversation  Contarini  ^  declared  that  the 
Franco-Italian  Agreement  of  1902  was  in  no  way  at  variance  with 
the  Triple  Alliance  Treaty,  but  that  the  notes  exchanged  in  1902  be- 
tween Italy  and  France,  contained  a  clause  which  stipulated  that  all 
questions  at  issue  betzveen  Italy  and  France  pertaining  to  the  Mediter- 
ranean should  be  settled  not  by  arms  but  by  means  of  diplomacy. 

"This  editing"  said  Contarini  to  me,  ''might  permit  perhaps  persons 
who  do  not  express  themselves  very  clearly,  to  speak  of  an  engage- 
ment on  Italy's  part  not  to  wage  war  with  France" 

(246)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Confidential  Letter,  July  Z\-Aug.  13,  1912. 

Our  ambassador  at  Paris  reports  in  his  interesting  letter  of  July 
5-18,  that  the  rumours  of  negotiations  between  France,  England  and 

*  Secretary  in  the  Italian  ministry  of  foreign  affairs. 


198         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

Italy  in  regard  to  Mediterranean  questions  are  entirely  without  foun- 
dation. The  same  assurance  has  been  given  me  in  the  Foreign  Office 
here,  whereby,  however,  fears  were  expressed  that  negotiations 
were  taking  place  between  France  and  England,  directed  among 
other  things  at  curtailing  Italy's  freedom  of  action  in  the  Aegaean 
Sea.  Bollati  directly  asked  the  French  charge  d'affaires  in  regard 
to  this  matter.  Laroche  denied  any  such  negotiations ;  there  is  no 
doubt,  however,  that  the  Italian  government  do  not  reckon  with  a  disin- 
terested attitude  on  the  part  of  England  and  France  in  regard  to  the 
Mediterranean  question.  Germany  and  Austria  probably  know  of 
Italy's  suspicions  and  will  undoubtedly  take  advantage  of  this  con- 
tingency. 

Laroche  told  me,  the  German  and  Austrian  representatives  in 
Paris  had,  on  behalf  of  their  Governments,  put  questions  in  regard 
to  the  two  following  points : 

1.  As  to  an  agreement  among  the  three  Entente  Powers  respect- 
ing the  Turco-Italian  War  and  the  situation  in  Turkey  as  a  whole. 

2.  As  to  the  Franco-Russian  Naval  Convention. 

In  reply  to  the  first  question  they  were  told  "that  an  exchange 
of  views  had  taken  place  between  the  three  Entente  Powers  in 
regard  to  Balkan  questions,  but  that  there  was  no  question  of  a 
special  Agreement."  In  respect  to  the  Naval  Convention,  Paleo- 
logue  answered  evasively,  stating  in  vague  and  general  terms  that 
the  present  relation  of  the  land  and  sea  forces  of  the  allied  states 
made  necessary  a  personal  exchange  of  views  between  the  leading 
statesmen,  especially  when  they  meet. 

I  cannot  refrain  from  remarking  that  the  significance  of  the 
Italian  obligations  to  France  has  been  constantly  exaggerated,  a  fact 
mainly  due  to  the  lively  imagination  of  my  French  colleague  here, 
although  I  would  do  full  justice  to  his  great  ability  and  to  his  successful 
activity.  Our  Councilor  of  embassy  showed  me  a  letter  from  our  former 
Ambassador,  Muravieff,  {November  11-24,  1908)  in  which  it  was  di- 
rectly declared  that  Italy  had  pledged  herself  ''First,  in  case  of  a  war 
between  France  and  other  unnamed  powers,  to  remain  neutral,  if 
France  mere  attacked,  and  secondly,  to  remain  neutral,  if  France  found 
herself  compelled  to  declare  war  on  a  third  power  in  order  to  preserve 
her  honour  and  dignity."  I  do  not  believe  such  a  document  exists. 
It  would  directly  contradict  the  provisions  of  the  Triple  Alliance  and  be 


FRANCO-ITALIAN  AGREEMENT  OF  1902  199 

at  variance  with  the  general  character  of  Italian  policy.  I  do  not  wish, 
however,  in  the  very  least  to  maintain  that  Italy  has  not  verbally  made 
very  reassuring  declarations  to  France,  and  it  is  indeed  possible  that  the 
leaders  of  Italian  policy  have  given  the  French  ambassador  and  his  gov- 
ernment to  understand,  that  they  may  reckon  with  Italian  neutrality  in 
the  event  of  an  unprovoked  attack  by  Germany  on  France,  especially 
as  it  would  be  very  detrimental  to  Italian  interests  were  France  to  be 
weakened  anew. 

Not  only  at  present,  but  during  my  activity  as  councilor  to  the 
Embassy,  I  noticed  that  whenever  it  appeared  as  if  Italy  were  will- 
ing to  approach  the  one  or  the  other  Power,  she  always  receded  as 
soon  as  some  definite  agreement  was  spoken  of.  For  instance  after 
my  arrival  in  Rome,  I  have  frequently  had  reason  to  believe  that  the 
Italian  government  wished  to  extend  the  understanding  arrived  at 
in  Racconigi.  This,  however,  has  not  proved  to  be  the  case,  up  to 
now,  and  I  must  perforce  content  myself  with  the  platonic  amiabil- 
ity of  the  leading  statesmen  here.  I  have  not  even  succeeded  in 
learning  the  text  of  the  Austro-Italian  Agreement  regarding  Al- 
bania or  the  Franco-Italian  Convention  of  1902.  To  be  sure,  even 
our  ally,  the  French  government  has  confined  itself  to  communicating 
only  the  general  contents  of  this  agreement  to  our  ambassador. 


(247)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sasonoff.     Telegram,  Oct.  27- 
Nov.  9,  1912.    No.  351. 

Continuation  of  my  telegrams  No.  349  and  350. 

In  the  course  of  the  conversation,  Poincare  touched  upon  the  question 
as  to  what  attitude  Italy  would  adopt  in  the  event  of  an  Austro-Serbian 
conflict  and  asked  me  if  I  could  inform  him  of  the  exact  contents  of 
our  Agreements  with  Italy.  I  replied,  I  could  only  tell  him  in  general 
outline  that  it  had  been  decided  in  Racconigi  that  both  Russia  and 
Italy  would  oppose  the  expansion  of  a  third  Power  in  the  Balkans, 
but  that  only  diplomatic  steps  had  been  contemplated  in  this 
connection  and  no  obligations  had  been  undertaken  respecting 
an  active  intervention.  For  my  part,  I  mentioned  the  fact  that  neither 
did  we  know  the  exact  contents  of  the  agreements  existing  between 
France  and  Italy.  Poincare  hastened  to  say  that  the  time  had  come 
when  both  Allies  should  inform  each  other  with  absolute  candour  in 


200         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

regard  to  their  relations  with  Italy;  Italy  was  destined  to  play  an  im- 
portant part  in  the  events  of  the  moment  and  this  part  must  be  clearly 
defined  in  advance.  ^  He  added,  if  you  shared  his  views,  Italy  might 
be  asked  and  her  consent  obtained. 

(248)  The  Russian  ChargS  d'Affaires  at  Rome  to  Sazonoff.    Confidential 
Letter,  May  22'June  4,  1912. 

....  Contarini,  with  whom  I  have  frequently  spoken  in  the  Italian 
Foreign  Office  on  the  subject  of  Italy's  relations  to  Austria,  regretted 
that  he  could  not  give  me  the  exact  text  of  the  Austro-Italian  Agree- 
ment respecting  Albania;  he  apprized  me  however  in  general  outlines 
of  this  document  which  has  not  been  made  known  to  any  other  Power 
and  with  which  we,  too,  were  absolutely  unacquainted.  The  contents 
are  as  follows: 

1.  Mutual  recognition  of  the  interests  of  Austria  and  of  Italy  in 
Albania. 

2.  Mutual  obligation  to  maintain  the  existing  status  quo  in  Albania. 

3.  Mutual  obligation  to  oppose  annexation  plans  of  any  other 
Power. 

4.  Mutual  obligation,  in  the  event  of  the  liquidation  of  the  Turkish 
Empire,  to  raise  no  objections  to  the  formation  of  an  autonomous 
Albanian  State. ^ 

(249)  Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Rome.    Confidential  Letter, 

Oct.  18-31,  1912.    No.  676. 

On  behalf  of  his  government,  the  Italian  charge  d'affaires  here 
informed  me  of  the  exchange  of  views  between  San  Giuliano  and 
Berchtold  in  San  Rossore. 

The  Italian  Minister  was  able  to  convince  himself  of  the  peace- 
ful attitude  of  the  Vienna  Cabinet  in  regard  to  the  present  Bal- 
kan crisis. 

Both  Ministers  resolved  to  renew  the  Triple  Alliance  without  altera- 
tions of  any  kind. 

*In  the  diplomatic  sense  this  was  cither  a  sweeping  assertion  or  a  dangerous 
admission. 

'The  provision  of  Paragraph  No.  3  was  in  all  respects  similar  to  the  provi- 
sions in  the  Agreement  of  Racconigi,  by  which  Italy  promised  Russia  the  same 
attitude  in  regard  to  another  Power — Austria-Hungary  in  this  instance.  Italy 
was  playing  both  ends  against  the  middle. 


FRANCO-ITALIAN  AGREEMENT  OF  1902  201 

In  the  Albanian  question,  they  also  resolved  to  adhere  to  the 
former  Agreement,  namely  recognize  their  mutual  interests  and 
for  both  Italy  and  Austria  to  forego  separate  measures  in  this  ques- 
tion. 

I  expressed  my  satisfaction  to  the  Italian  charge  d'affaires  as 
to  this  information. 

In  regard  to  Albania,  I  consider  it  necessary  to  tell  you,  that 
I  heard  from  a  very  well-informed  source  that  Berchtold  intended  to 
propose  to  San  Giuliano  that  Austria  and  Italy  come  to  an  agreement 
concerning  a  demarcation  of  their  spheres  of  interests  in  Albania  and 
that  they  draw  up  a  common  programme  of  reform} 

From  another,  very  secret  source,  I  have  learned,  that  the  British 
ambassador  at  Vienna  gained  the  impression  from  a  conversation  with 
Berchtold  that  the  Austrian  minister  does  not  reject  the  idea  of  the 
formation  of  a  larger  or  smaller  autonomous  Albanian  State  under 
Turkish  sovereignty.^  In  this  connection  Berchtold  declared  that,  when 
the  war  was  over^  an  extension  of  territory  might  be  granted  to  both 
Greece  and  Montenegro  at  the  expense  of  Albania, 

Berchtold  replied  evasively  to  the  question  as  to  whether  Aus- 
tria would  agree  to  the  annexation  of  Scutari  and  to  a  union  of 
the  Sandjak  with  an  autonomous  Albania. 

Although  I  tell  you  the  foregoing  merely  for  the  sake  of  your 
information,  /  should  like  to  add  that  it  would  be  very  desirable  for  us, 
without  sacrificing  the  secret  character  of  this  information,  to  learn  more 
in  regard  to  the  true  character  of  the  relations  between  Vienna  and 
Rome  respecting  the  present  Balkan  crisis  and  the  Albanian  question. 


(250)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sazonoff.    Letter,  Nov.  7-20, 
1913. 

Pichon  did  not  deny  that  Barrere,  the  French  Ambassador 

at  Rome,  has  been  called  to  Paris  by  him  in  order  to  discuss  the 
situation  existing  between  France  and  Italy,  and  France's  further 
policy  towards  this  country.     /  know  that  in  the  French  Foreign 

*  Evidently  a  diplomatic  rumor. 

'Which  idea  Austro-Hungary  and  Italy  defended  valiantly  against  Serbia, 
Montenegro,  Greece  and  Russia. 
'  The  late  Balkan  war. 


202         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

Office  one  has  seriously  considered  whether  the  moment  had  not  come  to 
demand  a  categorical  answer  from  Italy,  as  to  whether  the  provisions  of 
the  Triple  Alliance  in  its  newest  form  are  compatible  with  the  special 
agreements  between  France  and  Italy.  I  have  reason  to  believe  that 
Barrere,  although  not  denying  Italy's  deflection  towards  the  Triple 
Alliance,  wishes  to  exercise  a  quieting  influence  on  the  French 
government;  he  believes  that  in  a  short  while  the  present  cabinet 
will  resign  and  be  replaced  by  a  new  government,  which  need  not 
be  so  under  the  influence  of  Berlin  and  Vienna. 

In  reply  to  my  questions  as  to  how  he  explained  the  contradic- 
tion that  Italy,  on  the  one  hand,  wished  to  conduct  negotiations 
with  France  in  regard  to  a  new  agreement  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
had  changed  her  policy  so  completely,  Pichon  said  that  this  contradic- 
tion was  absolutely  incomprehensible  to  him,  and  could  only  be  explained 
by  the  traditional  duplicity  in  Italian  diplomacy. 

'*In  any  case/'  he  added,  ''we  shall  not  depart  from  our  waiting 
attitude.'' 

As  I  have  no  direct  information  respecting  Italian  policy,  I 
cannot  of  course  judge  as  to  the  impartial  accuracy  of  the  views 
of  Pichon  and  his  colleagues ;  I  know  that  our  ambassador  at  Rome, 
who  is  for  the  moment  in  Paris,  makes  excuses  for  the  Rome  cabi- 
net, defending  their  policy  by  explaining  that  Italy  fears  Austria 
and  considers  it  necessary  to  act  jointly  with  her,  in  order  to  pre- 
vent dangerous  separate  action  on  the  part  of  Austria  in  the  Bal- 
kans. Be  that  as  it  may,  /  must  direct  your  serious  attention  to  the 
unsatisfactory  relations  existing  between  France  and  Italy,  This  cir- 
cumstance is  of  great  importance  to  us.  It  is  a  further  factor  contrib- 
uting to  the  instability  of  the  general  European  situation  and  may  lead 
to  entanglements;  in  addition,  the  French  government  might  be  induced 
to  seek  a  rapprochement  with  Austria  as  the  secret  rival  of  Italy.^ 
You  know  the  attempts  made  by  Austria  to  gain  the  good-will  of  the 
French  Government  and,  still  more,  that  of  French  financial  circles. 
These  attempts  are  being  continually  renewed  and  it  is  to  be  feared 
that  they  might  now  find  more  favourable  soil. 

P.  S.  At  my  last  meeting  with  Pichon  I  found  him  much  more 
optimistic  in  respect  to  Italy. 

*  A  case  of  diplomatic  vertigo. 


FRANCO-ITALIAN  AGREEMENT  OF  1902  203 

"Barrere  is  of  the  opinion/'  he  said,  ''that  with  patience  and  sangfroid 
we  shall  he  able  to  overcome  the  present  tendency" 
I  share  this  hope. 


(251)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Letter,  Nov.  21'Dec.  4,  1913. 

I  have  taken  advantage  of  the  visit  here  of  our  ambassador  to 
the  Quirinal  to  advise  him  of  the  contents  of  my  letter  of  November 
7-20.  As  you  know,  A.  N.  Krupensky  denies  the  correctness  of 
the  French  judgment  in  regard  to  Italy's  foreign  policy;  more  es- 
pecially, he  will  not  admit  that  at  the  recent  renewal  of  the  Triple 
Alliance  any  amendments  were  made  or  supplements  added  per- 
taining to  the  balance  of  power  in  the  Mediterranean.  A.  N. 
Krupensky  has  written  a  report  stating  his  standpoint,  which  I 
enclose;  in  this  report  he  calls  attention  to  the  categorical  state- 
ments made  by  Giolitti  and  San  Giuliano,  to  the  effect  that  the 
treaty  in  question  has  been  renewed  without  amendments  of  any 
kind — punctuation  marks  included — and  that  all  rumours  to  the 
contrary  are  without  foundation. 

During  one  of  my  last  conversations  with  Pichon,  I  tjold  him 
of  the  opinion  held  by  our  ambassador.  Pichon  replied  that  equally 
categorical  statements  had  been  made  to  the  French  ambassador 
by  the  Italian  ministers. 

''Nevertheless/'  added  Pichon,  "we  have  positive  information,  not 
from  Italian  hut  from  German  sources,  that  at  the  renewal  of  the 
Triple  Alliance/ a  special  protocol  or  a  special  naval  convention  per- 
taining to  the  Mediterranean  was  signed/' 

From  Pichon's  words,  I  was  not  able  to  obtain  a  very  clear 
idea,  what  source  of  information  it  was  to  which  he  referred,  and 
/  must  assume  that  it  is  again  a  question  of  that  "secret  sort  of  informa- 
tion" which  the  French  government  claims  to  have  at  its  disposal  and 
of  which  I  have  already  spoken  in  my  letters.  Be  that  as  it  may, 
there  is  no  doubt  in  my  mind  that  Pichon  is  firmly  convinced  of 
the  existence  of  a  special  convention  in  regard  to  the  Mediterra- 
nean between  Italy,  Germany  and  Austria ;  this  fact  is  in  itself  im- 
portant, for  it  will  exercise  decisive  influence  on  the  attitude  of 
France  towards  Italian  policy. 

In  the  course  of  the  conversation,  Pichon  admitted  that  the 


204         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

tone  of  the  Italian  press  had  improved  of  late  and  that  the  Italian 
government  was  desirous  of  creating  more  friendly  relations  with 
France. 

(252)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Rome  to  Sazonoff.    Letter,  April  8-21, 
1914. 

The  French  ambassador  at  Rome  has  been  suffering,  as  you 
know,  for  more  than  a  year  from  the  results  of  an  automobile  ac- 
cident which  caused  a  concussion  of  the  brain  and  has  resulted  in 
a  considerable  diminution  of  his  capacity  for  work.  In  conse- 
quence, he  devotes  much  less  time  to  business  than  formerly  and 
sees  the  Italian  Foreign  Minister  much  less  frequently;  he  has 
often  asked  me,  therefore,  to  keep  him  informed  of  everything 
San  Giuliano  may  have  said  to  me  in  regard  to  Franco-Italian  re- 
lations. 

I  gave  you  at  the  time  a  detailed  account  of  my  conversations 
with  the  Italian  minister  and,  following  the  request  of  San  Giuli- 
ano himself,  I  also  informed  Barrere  of  these  conversations. 

On  the  day  of  his  departure  for  Paris,  Barrere  tried  to  speak 
to  me ;  not  finding  me  at  home,  however,  we  arranged  by  telephone 
to  meet  at  the  station.  Here  the  French  ambassador  asked  me  to 
repeat  to  him  once  more  all  that  San  Giuliano  had  said  to  me,  as 
his  memory  was  failing  him.  We  only  had  a  few  moments  before 
the  departure  of  the  train,  and  as  it  was  hard  to  make  clear  such 
an  important  question  is  so  brief  a  space  of  time,  I  thought  it  wiser 
to  forward  a  short  confidential  memorandum  to  Barrere  at  Viareg- 
gio  where  he  was  to  remain  for  a  few  days.  I  am  enclosing  you  a 
copy  of  the  short  memorandum. 

Enclosure  to  the  above  Letter  of  April  8-21,  1914. 

San  Giuliano  has  stated  to  the  Russian  ambassador  that  the 
French  government  proposes  to  apply  the  most-favored  nation 
clause  not  only  to  economic  questions  but  to  all  political  questions 
as  well.  The  Rome  cabinet  raises  no  objections,  under  the  condi- 
tion, however,  of  absolute  reciprocity.  This  does  not  seem  to  be 
the  intention,  however,  of  the  French  government,  for  the  Paris 
cabinet  appeals  to  this  formula  every  time  the  application  of  it  is 
favourable  to  France,  and  rejects  it  whenever  it  could  be  of  service  to 
Italy, 


\ 


FRANCO-ITALIAN  AGREEMENT  OF  1902  205 

Animated  by  a  desire  to  restore  confidential  relations  between 
France  and  Italy,  San  Giuliano  is  doing  all  in  his  power  to  attain 
this  end.  On  account  of  his  political  convictions,  as  well  as  his 
friendship  for  Barrere,  whose  position  he  wishes  to  strengthen, 
the  Italian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  is  willing  to  comply  with 
any  just  wishes  on  the  part  of  France  and  even  to  make  certain 
concessions  to  her  which  would  facilitate  a  rapprochement  between 
the  two  governments  and  the  two  countries.  But  he  reproaches 
France  with  having  forgotten  that  Italy  of  today  is  no  more  that  of 
fifty  years  ago.  Half  a  century  ago,  when  France  was  a  very  great 
Power  and  Italy  almost  a  quantite  negligeahle,  Paris  was  accustomed 
to  look  on  Italy  as  not  being  entitled  to  equal  rights.  Today  the  King- 
dom occupies  a  very  different  position  in  the  world  ^  and  plays  a  very 
different  role  in  the  Mediterranean.  This  fact  alone  is  sufficient 
to  diminish  the  disparity  between  the  two  countries  and  to  allow 
Italy  to  speak  with  France  on  terms  of  equality.  San  Giuliano 
maintains  that  French  public  opinion  does  not  yet  realize  this,  and 
that  until  it  does,  all  the  sincere  endeavours  on  the  part  of  the 
Italian  government,  to  restore  cordial  relations  with  France,  will 
remain  without  result. 

But  the  minister  is  convinced  that  the  day  France  realizes  the 
fact  that  the  Great  Power,  Italy,  has  ceased  to  occupy  a  position 
subordinate  to  France,  the  obstacles  in  the  way  of  a  rapprochement 
between  the  two  nations  will  be  removed.  As  fair  as  the  questions 
still  pending  are  concerned — the  jurisdiction  in  Tunis  and  the  capit- 
ulations in  Morocco^the  first  has  been  almost  settled,  and  the 
second,  although  quite  difficult,  has  also  taken  a  favourable  turn. 

Taking  advantage  of  this  opportunity,  the  Russian  ambassador, 
although  he  is  naturally  not  authorized  to  enter  more  closely  into 
the  considerations  cited  by  San  Giuliano,  called  the  attention  of  the 
Italian  minister  to  the  fact  that  if  the  same  confidence  is  not  shown 
towards  Italy  by  France  as  in  former  days,  the  reason  for  this  is, 
that  the  Paris  cabinet  suspects  that  changes  have  been  made  in  the 
Triple  Alliance  Treaty  or  that  new  provisions  are  contained  in  it  directed 
against  France  and  her  position  in  the  Mediterranean.  The  minister 
replied,  he  had  stated  in  parliament  and  to  Barrere  personally  (Tit- 

*  Gained  under  the  aegis  of  the  Triple  Alliance  and  the  great  statesmanship 
of  Signer  Crispi. 


206         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

toni  had  also  been  authorized  to  make  the  same   statement  in 
Paris)   that  the  Triple  Alliance  had  been  renewed  without  so  much 
as  a  comma  being  altered.     No  supplementary  provisions  had  been 
agreed  on  by  Italy  and  her  Allies,  and  the  agreements  between 
France  and  Italy  were  still  valid.     The  minister  added  that  French 
suspicion  was  based  on  certain  proofs  which  France  believed  to  have      j 
in  her  possession.    These  so-called  proofs,  however,  could  not  be  any-^m 
thing  but  mere  common  forgeries.    If  these  statements  were  not  suf-      " 
ficient,  and  if  the  French  government  so  desired,  the  minister  was 
willing  to  repeat  them  in  parliament  and  to  have  an  interpellation 
made  for  this  purpose. 

In  reply,  the  Russian  ambassador  merely  stated  that  all  this 
was  probably  known  in  Paris,  but  that  the  statements  of  the  Italian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  were  not  considered  categorical 
enough. 


(253)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Confidential  Report,  Feb.  11-24,  1914. 


J 


At  a  social  gathering  I  had  the  opportunity  of  holding  a  very 
interesting  conversation  with  De  Martino,  the  secretary  general 
of  the  Foreign  Office.  We  discussed  Italy's  policy  towards 
Austria  and  Russia.  1  did  not  conceal  from  him  the  fact  that,  since 
my  return  to  Italy,  my  personal  views  had  unfortunately  under- 
gone a  change  quite  different  from  what  I  would  have  wished. 
On  my  arrival,  I  had  hoped  that,  in  the  question  of  a  rapprochement 
between  Russia  and  Italy,  the  first  step  would  have  been  taken 
and  that  there  would  be  nothing  for  me  to  do  but  to  continue 
in  the  way  laid  down  in  1908.  The  understanding  reached  at 
Racconigi,  in  respect  to  Russia's  attitude  in  the  event  of  war  be- 
tween Italy  and  Turkey,  was  favourably  received  and  I  was  en- 
couraged in  my  hopes  by  various  expressions  of  public  opinion. 

But  my  expectations  were  not  fulfilled.  In  almost  no  questions 
of  a  political  nature  had  Italy  espoused  the  cause  of  Russia;  on 
the  contrary,  she  had  constantly  given  support  to  Austria.  This 
of  course  had  not  remained  unnoticed  in  St.  Petersburg,  where 
quite  rightly  one  had  expected  a  markedly  friendly  attitude  to- 
wards us,  especially  in  cases  where  Italian  interests  were  not 
directly  involved. 


FRANCO-ITALIAN  AGREEMENT  OF  1902  207 

Martino  replied  that,  to  the  great  regret  of  the  Rome  cabinet 
also,  a  change  had  indeed  been  observed  in  the  relations  between 
Russia  and  Italy.  This,  however,  could  only  be  a  temporary 
phenomenon.  He  pointed  to  the  relations  existing  between  Italy 
and  England  and  said  he  did  not  doubt — this  conviction  is  also  shared 
by  San  Giuliano — that  if  the  questions  of  the  Albanian  frontier  and  the 
Albanian  loan  were  once  adjusted,  a  still  closer  rapprochement  between 
Italy  and  Russia  would  take  place,  especially  in  case  of  war. 

"We  could  not,"  continued  Jilartino,  "leave  Valona  and  the 
Straits  of  Corfu  to  Greece.  Though  against  our  wish,  and  very 
unwillingly,  we  had  to  proceed  jointly  with  Austria,  not  only  on 
account  of  our  Alliance,  but,  first  and  foremost,  because  Italy  could 
not  possibly  allow  Austria  complete  freedom  of  action.  Our  object 
was  to  exercise  a  restraining  influence  on  Austria-Hungary  and 
thus  avoid  a  war  which  would  have  been  a  great  menace  to  us, 
independently  of  whether  we  had  to  take  part  in  it  or  not.  Our 
war  with  Turkey,  and  the  questions  arising  out  of  it,  occupied  our 
entire  attention,  the  more  so  since  we  knew  that  Austria  would 
determine  on  war  if  her  wishes  in  regard  to  the  frontier  of  Mon- 
tenegro, Albania  and  Serbia  were  not  fulfilled.  Our  entire  policy 
was  directed  towards  exercising  a  restraining  influence  on  Aus- 
tria and  thus  avoiding  a  war. 

"But  you  know  that  in  many  questions  we  do  not  agree  with 
Austria.  We  wished  an  internationalisation  of  Albania.  The 
same  is  also  the  case  today,  and  I  repeat,  after  the  Albanian  ques- 
tion has  been  definitively  settled,  our  relations  with  Russia  will 
assume  another  character." 

In  reply  to  my  remark,  that  I  must  reproach  myself  for  having 
pointed  out  to  Italy  the  course  she  pursued  at  Racconigi,  he  said, 
there  was  no  reason  for  me  to  make  excuses  for  myself,  it  was  not 
I,  but  conditions,  that  were  responsible ;  Italy  had  not  really  altered 
her  policy  at  all ;  she  wished,  as  sincerely  as  ever  a  rapprochement 
with  us;  like  San  Giuliano  he  could  only  repeat,  that,  after  the 
solution  of  the  Albanian  question,  a  closer  co-operation  between 
Russia  and  Italy  in  all  political  questions  would  result  as  a  mat- 
ter of  course. 

De  Martino,  an  extremely  prudent  man,  talks  but  little  as  a 
rule,  and  generally  I  have  been  able  to  learn  more  from  San  Giuli- 


208         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

ano  about  Italian  policy  than  from  him.  I  was  all  the  more  as- 
tonished at  his  talkativeness  on  this  occasion,  and  I  believe  for 
this  reason  that  I  must  inform  Your  Excellency  of  the  substance 
of  our  conversation. 


(254)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sasonoff.    Letter,  June  19-July 
2,  1914. 


I 


Tittoni,  the  Italian  Ambassador  here,  whom  I  have  seen  but 
seldom  in  the  course  of  the  last  year,  has  called  on  me  and  made 
the  following  statement: 

As  a  participant  in  the  Russo-Italian  Agreement  of  1909  in 
Racconigi,  he,  Tittoni,  was  convinced  of  the  necessity  of  Italy's 
remaining  in  the  Triple  Alliance,  but  at  the  same  time  he  was 
convinced  that  this  was  no  obstacle  to  close  relations  between 
Italy  and  Russia.  For  this  reason  he  had  not  always  been  able,  on 
the  occasion  of  the  last  complications  in  the  Balkans,  to  agree 
with  the  policy  of  San  Giuliano,  as  the  minister's  policy  had  become 
all  too  Austro-German  in  its  orientation.  I 

Tittoni  was  convinced  that  Italy  had  acted  rightly  in  agreeing 
to  the  formation  of  an  independent  Albania,  as  Austria  could  only 
be  restrained  in  this  way  from  an  active  advance  against  Belgrade 
and  Saloniki;  but  in  the  present  phase  she  was  not  justified  in 
identifying  Italian  interests  in  Albania  with  those  of  Austria- 
Hungary.  Tittoni  believes  that  in  Albanian  questions,  the  Italian 
Government  should,  on  the  one  hand,  endeavour  to  obtain  an  in- 
ternationalization and,  on  the  other  hand,  seek  as  many  points  of 
contact  as  possible  with  Russia.  During  his  last  stay  in  Rome, 
Tittoni  had  the  opportunity  of  expressing  this  view  to  the  new 
premier,  Salandra,  his  close  friend  and  political  partisan,  and  he 
discovered  that  the  premier  fully  shares  his  view. 

Tittoni  has  been  considering  what  points  of  contact  might  be 
found  between  Russia  and  Italy  in  the  Albanian  question  and  has 
come  to  the  realization  that  the  Adriatic  railway  is  such  a  point 
of  contact.  This  question,  settled  in  principle  at  the  London  Con- 
ference, has  been  forgotten  in  the  midst  of  the  confusion  in  Albania. 
Tittoni  believes  Russia  and  Italy  might  make  the  first  new  move 
and  in  this  way  emphasize  their  solidarity  in  Albanian  ques- 
tions.   This  is  Tittoni*s  personal  idea,  which  he  has  not  yet  brought 


FRANCO-ITALIAN  AGREEMENT  OF  1902  209 

up  for  discussion  in  Rome;  if  it  should  be  approved,  however,  in 
St.  Petersburg,  he  has  no  doubt  but  that  Salandra  would  be  glad 
to  give  his  approval. 

In  my  answer,  I  was  extremely  cautious — intentionally — and 
gave  no  expression  of  opinion  in  regard  to  Italy's  policy  or  as  to 
the  acceptabilty  of  his  proposal.  I  confined  myself  to  promising 
him  that  I  would  advise  you  of  the  above. 


14 


^ 


BOOK  TWO 
THE  ENTENTE  AND  AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 


211 


INTRODUCTION  TO  BOOK  TWO 

THE  ENTENTE  AND  AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 
(November  1908— June  1914) 

The  Berlin  Conference  of  1878  sowed  the  seeds  of  more  wars 
than  any  other  similar  event,  though  it  was  called  for  the  purpose 
of  regulating,  by  the  means  of  peace,  the  affairs  of  the  Balkan 
peoples  as  much  as  possible.  The  conference  did  a  great  deal  of 
good,  but  it  also  left  ample  room  for  future  difficulties — left  that 
room,  because  the  governments  participating  did  not  have  the  cour- 
age to  go  to  the  core  of  things. 

To  Austria-Hungary  was  left  the  civil  administration  of  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina,  and  the  right  to  occupy  later  on  the  Sandjak  of 
Novi-Bazar.  In  1908  the  Vienna  government  was  ready  to  make 
the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  complete,  eliminating 
what  few  traces  of  Turkish  sovereignty  there  still  attached  to 
these  "crownlands,"  by  an  agreement  with  the  Sultan  of  Turkey, 
Abdul  Hamid,  who  like  his  fellow  monarch  in  Persia,  had  done 
little  besides  running  his  country  into  the  ground. 

Before  taking  the  final  step  in  the  annexation,  the  Vienna  gov- 
ernment decided  to  sound  the  Powers  as  to  their  attitude.  Berlin 
was  willing.  The  British  government,  being  not  unfriendly  to 
Austria-Hungary,  also  had  no  objection,  and  in  France  it  was  felt 
that  the  Balkan  was  too  far  away  to  be  a  problem. 

But  there  was  Russia.  Count  Aehrenthal,  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  minister  of  foreign  affairs  and  minister  of  the  imperial  court, 
decided  to  sound  M.  Iswolsky,  the  Russian  minister  of  foreign 
affairs,  who  was  then  on  his  way  to  his  villa  on  Lake  Tegern. 

213 


214         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

Aehrenthal  was  a  shrewd  and  enterprising  man.  He  asked  Count 
Berchtold,  then  Austro-Hungarian  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg, 
and  also  on  his  summer  vacation,  to  invite  M.  Iswolsky  to  his 
hunting  lodge  in  Buchlau,  Bohemia. 

Everything  possible  was  done  to  entertain  the  distinguished 
guest,  and  at  the  proper  moment  Counts  Aehrenthal  and  Berchtold 
took  the  Russian  minister  of  foreign  affairs  into  their  confidence. 
They  told  the  astounded  Russian  that  they  wanted  to  annex  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina  as  a  matter  of  making  the  last  days  of  Emperor 
Francis  Joseph  a  little  brighter  than  they  were.  M.  Iswolsky  did 
not  know  what  to  make  of  all  this,  but  gave  his  consent,  feeling 
that  one  of  these  days  Austria-Hungary  would  avail  herself  of  her 
privileged  position  in  the  two  Turkish  provinces  anyway  and  carry 
into  effect  what  the  Berlin  Conference  had  promised  her. 

Later,  M.  Iswolsky  began  to  think  this  thing  over.  At  St. 
Petersburg  he  was  taken  to  task  by  the  Grand-Ducal  war  party, 
and  being  a  Pan-Slav  by  conviction,  and  a  man  of  much  influence 
in  Paris  and  London,  he  decided  to  bring  the  annexation  of  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina  to  the  attention  of  the  Powers  in  such  a  manner 
that  he  might  be  able  to  fish  in  troubled  waters. 

The  Russian  government  had  no  idea  of  annexing  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina  itself.  But  it  had  taken  to  its  heart  the  Slav  king- 
dom of  Serbia,  and  looked  upon  it  as  its  special  protege.  For  some 
years,  the  Russian  fiscus  had  paid  an  annual  subsidy  to  King  Peter, 
so  that  he  might  maintain  a  court,  which  the  revenues  of  the  neg- 
lected country  could  hardly  do,  especially  since  Austria-Hungary 
had  for  some  years  waged  a  tariff  war  upon  it.  Serbia,  then,  set 
up  a  claim  for  compensations,  though  at  first  her  government  was 
inclined  to  demand  that  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  be  given  complete 
political  independence.  To  either  demand  Austria-Hungary  turned 
a  ^eaf  ear. 

M.  Iswolsky  had  considerable  trouble  getting  Sir  Edward  Grey 
sufficiently  interested  in  the  claims  of  the  Serbian  government. 
That  institution  was  not  in  high  favor  at  the  Court  of  St.  James. 
The  British  government  had  been  the  very  last  to  recognize  King 
Peter,  upon  whom  popular  opinion  placed  a  goodly  share  of  re- 
sponsibility for  the  assassination  of  King  Alexander  and  Queen 
Draga.     Moreover,  the  Karageorgewitch  family  enjoyed  not  the 


^'/ 


S^m^^^^        w  iPMif?t. 


THE  ENTENTE  AND  AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  215 

best  of  reputations,  due  mainly  to  the  fact  that  the  original  Black 
George,  a  Bosnian  gypsy,  had  made  war  as  hard  upon  the  Slav 
peasants  as  upon  the  Turkish  begs  and  military  and  police  forces. 
The  Obrenowitches  were  considered  more  eligible  as  members  of 
Europe's  royal  society,  even  though  they  were  not  beyond  criticism. 

In  the  end.  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  to  listen  to  M.  Iswolsky. 
Once  more  the  Entente  was  at  stake.  Out  in  Persia  close  liaison 
had  been  taken  with  the  Russians,  and,  when  all  failed,  the  Rus- 
sian government  managed  to  launch  a  few  rumors  that  alleged 
Russia's  intention  to  return  to  the  policy  of  yore  in  regard  to 
India.  Thus,  the  British  government  was  induced  to  favor  M. 
Iswolsky's  idea  as  to  the  calling  of  a  conference  by  all  the  Powers 
to  which  Austria-Hungary  was  to  submit  her  case  in  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina  regardless  of  the  agreement  reached  with  the  Sultan 
of  Turkey,  who  was  the  most  interested  party,  seeing  that  he  sur- 
rendered the  last  vestige  of  right  he  had  in  the  two  provinces. 

Count  Aehrenthal  would  not  listen  to  the  proposal,  and  Berlin 
supported  him  in  that,  though  not  as  effectually  as  was  expected 
in  Vienna.  The  French  government  was  willing  enough  to  please 
the  Russian  government,  but  in  those  days  of  the  internationale 
and  M.  Juares  that  was  not  easy.  France  had  some  sore  eco- 
nomic problems  on  her  hands,  and  the  French  public  could  not 
be  converted  to  the  view  that  an  interest  of  the  Republic  was  be- 
ing jeopardized  by  not  getting  mixed  up  in  an  affair  that  did  not 
directly  concern  it.  The  French  people,  by  and  large,  were  rather 
Austrophile  in  those  days. 

M.  Iswolsky  set  every  lever  in  motion  to  have  the  conference. 
It  was  a  difficult  situation  to  handle.  With  London  and  Paris  averse 
to  making  an  issue  of  what  had  been  taken  for  granted  since  1878, 
he  had  to  keep  things  moving  rapidly.  Meanwhile,  the  Serbs  were 
hampering  him  not  a  little.  Knowing  that  the  big  brother  in  the 
North  was  committed  to  the  aggrandizement  of  Serbia,  they 
clamored  for  the  immediate  realization  of  their  wishes— did  that 
to  such  an  extent  that  M.  Iswolsky  had  to  counsel  restraint  re- 
peatedly. 

The  German  government  suggested  that  the  difficulty  be  set- 
tled by  an  exchange  of  notes.  At  first  none  would  listen  to  this, 
but  in  the  end  the  suggestion  was  adopted,  M.  Iswolsky  being  the 


I 


216         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

first  to  do  that,  to  the  surprise  of  Paris,  if  not  that  of  London. 
The  case  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  remained  in  status  quo,  and 
when  the  smoke  had  cleared  it  was  found  that,  unbeknown  to  any 
part  of  the  European  public,  a  war  had  been  very  near  at  hand. 
Had  it  not  been  that  the  French  government  had  little  time  for 
any  but  domestic  affairs,  Europe  would  have  gone  to  war  over  a 
question  that  interested  none  but  Serbia  and  Austro-Hungary, 
and,  through  Serbia,  Russia,  the  government  of  which  had  set  it- 
self up  as  the  protector  of  all  the  Slavs. 

Much  has  been  said  of  the  Balkan  as  the  breeder  of  troubles — 
the  cradle  of  war  clouds.  The  Bosnian  crisis  affords  an  ample  il- 
lustration of  the  manner  in  which  the  peninsula  kept  all  of  Europe 
anxious  and  disturbed. 

It  was  not  the  state  of  Serbia,  any  more  than  Bulgaria,  that  up- 
set periodically  the  security  of  Europe.  It  was  Russian  ambition, 
Pan-Slavism  and  the  "historic  mission"  of  the  Muscovite  which  was 
responsible.  Serbia  was  used  as  the  political  irritant  ever  since 
Austro-Hungarian  influence  waned  in  the  little  kingdom,  and  M. 
Hartwig,  the  Russian  minister  at  Belgrade,  had  ever  the  power 
and  enterprise  to  create  a  situation. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  government  did  little  enough  to  allevi- 
iate  this  condition.  For  the  sake  of  argument  it  considered  itself 
as  much  of  a  Slav  state  as  Russia,  and  as  such  it  would  put  up 
claims  similar  to  those  Iswolsky  and  Sazonoff  presented.  It  had 
as  a  background  for  this  the  fact  that  proportionately  the  Dual 
Monarchy  was  the  habitat  of  as  many  Slavs  as  could  be  found  in 
the  Russian  empire,  taking  into  account  that  the  Poles  and  Ukrai- 
nians were  kept  under  Russian  rule  by  coercion  and  force. 
The  real  difference  was,  that  while  the  Balkan  policy  of  Russia 
was  Pan-Slav  and  imperialistic  in  behalf  of  Russia's  interest 
and  "historic  mission,'*  the  policy  of  Austria-Hungary  was 
calculated  to  promote  the  aggrandizement  of  the  Hapsburg 
empire. 

Though  the  Austro-Hungarians  and  Serbs  had  been  friendly 
neighbors  for  twenty-five  years,  while  Serbia  was  ruled  by  the 
Obrenowitches,  Iswolsky  succeeded  in  making  the  people  of  the 
Balkan  and  the  world  believe  that  Austria-Hungary  had  made 
the  incorporation  of  all  the  Slavs  in  the  peninsula  the  major  part 


THE  ENTENTE  AND  AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  217 

of  her  foreign  program,  ignoring  entirely  that  in  Vienna  and  Buda- 
pest they  feared  that  the  further  incorporation  of  Slavs  would 
upset  the  fine  balance  that  had  to  be  maintained  to  avoid  reaching 
the  maximum  of  friction  which  even  then  threatened  to  split  the 
monarchy  into  at  least  two  parts — the  Austrian  and  the  Hungarian. 
So  grave  and  pressing  was  this  situation  that  Archduke  Francis 
Ferdinand,  the  heir  presumptive,  devised  a  political  program  which 
was  to  make  a  triunism  of  the  dual  monarchy,  with  the  Slavs 
forming  the  third  entity.  Iswolsky  was  not  ignorant  of  these  facts 
and  feared  them,  but  it  served  his  purpose  to  ignore  them.  The 
thing  he  was  constantly  afraid  of  was  that  autonomy  for  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Slavs  would  remove  them  from  reach  of  the 
Russians  and  strengthen  the  Danube  State.  In  Paris  and  London, 
where  more  attention  was  given  to  the  political  actualities  behind 
the  Bosnio-Herzegovinian  question,  these  things  were  given  a 
certain  amount  of  recognition,  and  when  finally  it  had  been  decided 
to  order  the  preliminaries  of  a  mobilization,  it  was  not  a  question 
of  preventing  the  annexation  of  the  two  provinces,  but  one  of  test- 
ing the  strength  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  whose  solidarity  had  been 
demonstrated. 

Defeated  in  this  move,  Iswolsky  set  to  work  to  effect  better 
relations  between  the  Balkan  states.  Serbia  was  now  completely 
in  his  hands.  The  Russians  slighted  no  opportunity  letting  the 
Serbs  feel  that,  without  the  intervention  of  the  "father  of  Slavs" 
at  St.  Petersburg,  they  would  soon  pass  under  the  dominion  of  the 
Hapsburgs.  Serbia  was  willing  to  negotiate  directly  with  the 
Austro-Hungarian  government,  but  Iswolsky  found  means  and 
arguments  that  prevented  this  in  all  questions  of  importance.  The 
Serbian  government  thus  fell  completely  under  the  sway  of  the 
Russian  foreign  office. 

The  Bulgarians  had  been  less  tractable,  despite  the  fact  that 
relatively  they  owed  more  to  Russia  than  did  Serbia.  Bulgaria 
had  been  made  an  autonomous  principality  by  Czar  Alexander  II, 
and  though  the  equestrian  statue  of  the  Czar  Oswohoditel  looked 
into  the  Sobranje  at  Sofia,  as  a  reminder  of  what  Russia  had  done 
for  the  Bulgars,  this  people  began  to  feel  independent  of  Russia, 
all  the  more  so  after  the  Austro-Hungarian  government  had 
induced    the    Sultan    of    Turkey    to    relinquish    the    last    shred 


218         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

of  suzerainty  over  Bulgaria.  Nor  were  they  fooled  by  the 
inuendos  of  Iswolsky  and  Sazonoff  that  Russia  had  much  to  do 
with  making  Bulgaria  really  a  recognized  nation  among  the 
nations. 

The  Pan-Slavs  of  Russia  wanted  to  combine  the  Balkans  into 
a  single  political  group,  and  they  set  out  to  do  it.  Before  long, 
they  had  effected  a  rapprochement  between  the  Serbs,  Monte- 
negrins and  Bulgars,  and  presently  the  Greek  government  was 
ready  to  join  the  Balkan  League.  By  those  who  formed  the  league, 
it  was  understood,  naturally,  that  it  was  directed  against  Turkey, 
though  that  was  not  the  immediate  plan  of  Russia.  To  that  extent, 
the  combination  had  gotten  out  of  the  hands  of  Sazonoff,  who  by 
then  had  succeeded  Iswolsky  to  the  office  of  Russian  minister  of 
foreign  affairs. 

Meanwhile,  efforts  had  been  made  by  the  Austro-Hungarian 
and  Russian  governments  to  reach  an  understanding  on  the  Bal- 
kan question,  to  at  least  the  extent  of  restoring  normal  diplomatic 
relations,  which  the  Bosnian  crisis  had  all  but  severed.  The  at- 
\  tempt  was  made  to  find  a  modus  operandi  for  the  preservation  of  the 
status  quo  in  the  peninsula.  But  these  efforts  were  of  little  avail. 
Lacking  sincerity,  the  negotiations  were  mere  matters  of  form. 
Russia  had  made  the  Agreement  of  Racconigi  with  Italy,  and 
Italy  had  come  to  an  understanding  with  Austria-Hungary.  The 
Agreement  of  Racconigi  was  to  prevent  the  Austro-Hungarians 
gaining  more  territory  in  the  Balkan,  and  the  Italo-Austro- 
Hungarian  understanding  was  directed  against  Russia,  though 
primarily  it  guaranteed  the  interests  of  Italy  along  the  eastern 
shore  of  the  Adriatic,  more  especially  on  the  cost  of  Albania.  Italy 
had  hopes  and  missions  of  her  own  in  that  part  of  the  peninsula 
and  did  not  want  to  see  them  frustrated  by  the  annexation  of 
Albania  by  Serbia,  Montenegro  and  Greece.  While  one  of  the 
understandings  of  Italy  was  anti-Austrian  and  pro-Russian,  the 
other  was  anti-Russian  and  in  a  sense  pro-Austrian. 

Intrigue  was  carried  further,  however.  While  effecting  the 
Balkan  League,  the  Balkan  Slavs,  especially  the  Bulgarian  gov- 
ernment, gave  the  Turks  to  understand  that  a  rapprochement  was 
desirable,  and  while  promoting  Pan-Slavism  in  the  Balkan  as  a 
force  against  Pan-Islamism,  of  which  latter  there  was  no  question 


4 


THE  ENTENTE  AND  AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  219 

at  all  except  as  a  political  argument,  the  Russian  government  also 
tried  to  get  on  a  friendly  basis  with  the  Turks.  Not  satisfied  even 
with  that,  Sazonoff  did  his  best  in  London  to  get  Sir  Edward 
Grey's  consent  to  a  revision  of  the  Straits  question  in  favor  of  Rus- 
sia— a  revision  which  could  be  carried  out  only  at  the  expense 
of  the  Turk,  against  whom  all  Europe  was  using  pro-Christian 
arguments  that  were  devoid  of  real  interest  in  the  Christian  ele- 
ments in  the  Ottoman  empire. 

Diplomatic  daring  and  double-dealing  went  even  further  when 
Italy  had  occupied  Cyrenaica  and  Lybia  and  cast  longing  eyes  upon 
certain  islands  in  the  Aegean  Sea,  among  others,  Mytilene. 
Though  the  Agreement  of  Racconigi  caused  the  Italians  to  believe 
that  Russia  would  look  favourably  upon  Italian  occupation  of 
some  of  these  islands,  Sazonoff  was  among  the  first  to  discourage 
this  plan  in  London  and  Paris.  It  was  a  season  of  diplomatic 
malfeasance,  and  every  wire  that  was  pulled  had  but  the  one  end, 
to  wit:  The  preservation  and  further  cementing  of  the  Entente. 
The  main  political  objective  of  Russia,  France  and  Great  Britain 
was  the  reduction  of  Germany,  a  country  which  stood  aloof,  unless 
required  by  treaty  obligations  to  come  to  the  assistance  of  Austria- 
Hungary,  or  when  her  commercial  interests  in  Southwest  Asia 
dictated  action. 

International  finance  played  a  great  role  in  these  machinations. 
For  instance,  when  Bulgaria  required  money  for  the  construction 
of  a  railroad  that  was  urgently  needed,  the  French  government 
insisted  that  the  loan  could  be  quoted  on  the  French  bourses  only 
if  Bulgaria  promised  that  henceforth  her  foreign  policy  would  be 
favorable  to  the  Entente.  The  promise  was  made  and  the  money/ 
obtained,  with  Russian  diplomatists  acting  as  go-betweens.  Toifkey, 
chronically  hard-up  as  she  was,  had  to  attach  to  every  foreign  loan 
conipensations  which  made  further  inroads  not  only  upon  her 
sovereignty  but  also  upon  the  economic  system  of  the  country. 
France  played  the  principal  part  in  this,  because  her  banks  and 
population  seemed  to  produce  ready  money  at  a  truly  phenomenal 
rate.  The  fact  that  no  foreign  loan  could  be  floated  in  France 
without  the  consent  of  the  government,  made  every  advance  of 
capital  a  purely  political  question.  If  Russia  did  not  want  to  have^ 
a  loan  made  to  a  state  or  group,  her  ambassador  at  Paris  had  but 


220         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

to  say  the  word.  The  British  government  followed  a  similar 
financial  policy,  though  in  London  the  control  was  not  as  ab- 
solute as  at  Paris. 

In  October  of  1911,  Sazonoff  re-opened  in  London  the  question 
of  the  Bosphorus  and  Dardanelles.  Russia  wanted  a  "window  up- 
on the  open  sea."  Nearly  all  of  the  Russian  ports  in  the  Baltic 
were  ice-locked  for  some  weeks  each  winter,  and  that  sea,  more- 
over, was  easily  made  a  mare  clausum  by  the  ever-growing  German 
fleet. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Baltic  was  a  very  poor  Russian  naval 
base,  a  condition  which  was  of  great  advantage  to  the  British. 
The  Russians  wanted  a  great  navy,  but  there  were  few  people 
who  could  see  the  necessity  for  this.  Claiming  one-half  of  the  con- 
tinent of  Europe  as  her  realm,  and  having  in  Asia  an  empire  of 
magnificent  dimensions  and  incalculable  wealth,  having  not  even 
the  money  to  develop  her  resources  in  Europe,  and  being  not 
obliged  to  protect  a  foreign  commerce  overseas,  Russia  had  no  legi- 
timate excuse  to  want  a  great  navy.  ^1 

British  statesmen  felt  that  the  building  of  a  powerful  Russian  "^ 
war  fleet  was  directed  at  England.    There  was  India.     Whatever 
Russia  did  was  thought  a  measure  directed  against  the  British  In- 
dian empire.    The  "former  relations"  of  Russia  to  Great  Britain, 
I  of  which  there  is  considerable  mention  in  these  documents,  refer 
!  to' the  hostile  contact  Great  Britain  and  Russia  had  had  along  the 
'4  frontiers  of  Northern  India.     In  London,  then,  the  belief  was  in- 
1 1  gVained,  and  not  without  justification,  that  the  development  of  the 
11  Russian  war  fleet  was  a  measure  inimical  to   British   interests. 
'    With  Germany  building  a  large  fleet,  Russia  had  to  be  discouraged 
from  doing  the  same  thing,  if  Great  Britain  was  not  to  be  rendered 
insolvent  as  the  result  of  further  appropriations  for  naval  armament 
to  meet  the  naval  programs  of  Germany  and  Russia.    It  was  neces- 
sary, then,  that  London  improve  its  relations  with  St.  Petersburg 
more  and  more,  while  listening  with  sympathy  to  Russia's  claim 
for  an  "open  window."  There  was  no  assurance  that  the  German  and 
Russian  navies  would  never  act  in  concert  against  Great  Britain. 

On  October  18th,  1908,  Sir  Edward  Grey  sent  a  memorandum 
to  the  Russian  foreign  office  in  which  he  expressed  a  willingness 
to  have  the  Powers  discuss  the  Straits  question.  Exactly  three  years 


THE  ENTENTE  AND  AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  221 

later,  Sazonoff — a  most  restless  diplomatist — reminded  him  of  that, 
after  having  obtained  an  encouraging  opinion  from  M.  Pichon, 
the  French  minister  of  foreign  affairs.  To  get  the  project  flatly 
on  the  table,  Sazonoff  had  broached  the  matter  to  the  Turkish 
government,  without  getting  very  far,  however.  The  Turk  had 
come  to  learn  what  the  fine  words  of  Russian  and  European 
diplomatists  meant,  and  was  wary. 

Sazonoff's  proposition  was  new  in  some  respects.  Hereto- 
fore, the  men-of-war  of  the  states  bordering  upon  the  Black  Sea 
had  been  permitted  to  navigate  the  Bosphorus,  Sea  of  Marmara 
and  the  Dardanelles  only  with  the  express  permission  of  the  Turk- 
ish government,  and  with  Turkish  officials  and  pilots  aboard.  The 
Russian  government  wished  to  change  that,  and  proposed  in  Lon- 
don that  Sir  Edward  Grey  use  his  efforts  to  obtain  for  Russia  the 
consent  of  the  Turks  and  the  other  Powers  to  permit  Russian  men- 
of-war  to  navigate  the  Straits  and  the  intervening  sea  at  will,  in 
both  directions,  though  without  stoppage. 

Sir  Edward  Grey,  ever  ready  to  please  the  Russians,  listened 
to  the  proposal,  but  said  that  his  action  in  the  matter  would  be  in 
the  sense  of  the  memorandum  of  1908,  to  which  sanction  had  been 
given  by  the  British  cabinet.    But  there  his  interest  ended. 

To  give  the  Russians  the  rights  they  wanted  in  the  straits  was 
a  matter  that  had  to  be  well  considered.  Russia  would  not  always 
be  a  member  of  the  Entente,  and  the  speeches  in  the  British  parlia- 
ment of  the  period  leave  no  doubt  in  regard  to  the  fears  of  the 
political  opponents  of  Grey — that  Russia  might  and  would  cease 
to  be  a  friend  of  England's  shortly  after  she  had  obtained  the  privi- 
lege of  taking  her  war  fleet  in  and  out  of  the  Black  Sea  at  will. 

It  jvas^argued  that  this  would  prove  a  fatal  condition  so  far 
a^jtibe  British  empire  was  concerned.  The  Russian  Black  Sea 
fleet  at  that  monTSHf  was  ho  danger,  to  be  sure,  but  the  size  and 
equipment  of  that  fleet  were  the  result  of  its  being  compelled  to 
confine  its  radius  to  the  Black  Sea — a  relatively  small  body  of 
water,  on  the  shores  of  which  dwelt  peoples  that  had  no  intention 
of  measuring  their  strength  with  the  Russians.  Opening  the  high 
seas  to  this  fleet  would  have  been  the  incentive  to  make  it  what 
Russet  wanted  it  to  be — the  first  navy  in  the  Mediterranean. 
Though  the  British  base  at  Gibraltar  might  have  been  the  means 


Il 


222         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

of  preventing  the  Russian  fleet  from  attacking  the  British  home 
fleet  and  ports,  there  was  the  fact  that  a  large  Russian  navy  was 
a  menace  to  the  Suez  Canal — Great  Britain's  highway  to  India, 
East  Africa,  the  Far  East,  and  Australia.  Moreover,  it  was  feared 
in  Great  Britain  that  with  the  Sea  of  Marmara  the  magnificent 
naval  base  of  the  Russians  in  the  Mediterranean,  the  Russian  Baltic 
fleet  would  also  be  developed,  rendering  Gibraltar  absolutely  use- 
less in  that  event. 

Sazonoff  tried  to  get  the  Austro-Hungarian  government  in- 
\  terested  in  his  plan  regarding  the  Straits,  using  the  theory  that  for 
freedom  of  action  in  the  Western  Balkan,  Vienna  ought  to  give 
St.  Petersburg  freedom  of  action  at  the  Straits,  which  latter  was 
to  be  made  a  condition  of  the  proposed  Russo-Turkish  agreement. 
Germany  also  was  approached,  so  that  the  action  constituted  really 
a  basis  upon  which  Berlin,  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg  could  meet — 
to  the  detriment  of  Great  Britain. 

The  outbreak  of  the  Balkan  war  in  1912  put  an  end  to  this 
endeavor.  f  I 

The  Balkan  League  was  now  ready  to  settle  issues  and  scores™' 
with  the  Turk.  The  war  in  Tripoli  had  further  weakened  the  mili- 
tary and  financial  resources  of  the  Ottoman  government,  upon 
which  excessive  demands  had  been  made  for  many  years  by  other 
wars  and  the  policing  of  a  vast  empire  composed  of  peoples  that 
had  little  regard  for  one  another.  The  Albanians  rose  in  revolt, 
after  getting  the  arms  for  this  from  the  Montenegrins,  and  a  border 
incident,  produced  for  the  purpose,  as  is  the  time-honored  practice 
in  the  Balkan,  furnished  the  necessary  pretext  for  the  Balkan  Allies 
to  attack  the  Turks. 

With  the  exception  of  Essad  Pasha,  the  heroic  defender  of 
Yanina,  the  Turkish  commanders  made  a  poor  job  of  the  work  be- 
fore them,  though  it  must  be  said  that  they  were  badly  handicapped 
by  their  lines  of  communication  with  the  Turkish  bases  being  cut 
by  the  Bulgars  and  Greeks  immediately. 

Within  a  few  days,  the  last  of  Turkish  authority  had  vanished 
from  the  Balkan;  Adrianople  was  besieged  by  the  Bulgarians,  and 
Bulgar  divisions  penetrated  Thrace  as  far  as  the  Sea  of  Marmara, 
north  of  the  fortifications  of  Bulair  on  Gallipoli. 

The  Balkan  Allies  were  now  ready  to  divide  the  booty  in  ter- 


THE  ENTENTE  AND  AUSTRIA-HUNGARY         223 

ritory.  The  secret  agreement  they  had  among  themselves  is  here 
reproduced  and  shows  that  even  Albania  was  to  be  divided  among 
Serbia,  Montenegro  and  Greece.  Out  of  this  came  another  pos- 
sibility of  a  general  European  war. 

The  question  which  Sazonoff  had  to  take  in  hand  immediately 
was  the  preventing  of  Constantinople  falling  into  the  hands  of  the 
Bulgars.  The  Balkan  Allies  had  shown  that  they  had  aspirations 
of  their  own.  Once  upon  a  time,  the  Serbian  empire  had  comprised 
virtually  all  of  the  Balkan.  The  Bulgarian  empire  had  been  of 
like  extent,  and  the  Greeks  had  not  yet  forgotten  the  glory  of 
Alexander  of  Macedonia. 

These  aspirations  were  not  compatible  with  Russia's  "historic 
mission." 

That  mission  was  to  make  Constantinople  the  capital  of  the 
Greater  Russia  of  the  Pan-Slavs  and  Muscovite  imperialists. 
Though  the  humble  peasant  might  not  know  of  what  country  Rome 
was  the  capital,  he  did  know  that  the  Czarigrad  on  the  Golden 
Horn — the  city  of  Emperor  Constantine,  was  the  treasure  of  Heaven 
upon  Earth,  because  it  was  to  him  a  holy  place  in  which  his  re- 
ligion had  been  modified  into  the  form  he  knew.  In  Constanti- 
nople dwelt  the  Patriarch  of  the  Greek  Orthodox  faith,  and  in  the 
course  of  time  the  oppressed  Russian  peasant  had  come  to  believe 
that  his  own  emancipation  could  come  only  with  the  realization 
of  that  Greater  Russia  that  was  to  have  its  official  residence  in  the 
Czarigrad.  The  thing  amounted  to  a  superstition,  and  as  such 
received  all  the  encouragement  possible  from  the  Russian  clergy. 

Sazonoff  was  willing  to  have  the  Greater  Bulgaria  extend  south- 
easterly as  far  as  the  Enos-Midia  line,  with  the  Maritza  river 
forming  the  boundary  as  far  as  Adrianople.  But  that  city  itself 
was  to  be  Russian  in  the  end,  for  which  reason  Sazonoff  insisted 
upon  the  withdrawal  of  the  Bulgarian  garrison  after  the  fortress 
had  been  reduced  by  an  arduous  and  expensive  siege.  It  was  from 
this  position  that  the  Russian  minister  of  foreign  affairs  conducted 
the  case. 

The  British  public  was  anti-Turk  and  pro-Bulgarian  during  the  \ 
Balkan  war,  caring  little  for  Serbia  and  Greece.    Had  it  been  pos-  I 
sible  to  place  the  Bulgarians  into  Constantinople  this  would  have 
been  done,  but  Sazonoff,  well  informed  as  he  was  by  Benckendorff, 


224         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


I 


knew  how  to  counteract  that  plan.  He  let  it  be  understood  that 
the  occupation  of  Constantinople  by  the  Bulgars  would  lead  to  the 
appearance  before  the  city  of  the  Russian  Black  Sea  fleet.  Such 
a  complication  had  to  be  avoided  by  London  and  Paris,  and  after 
lengthy  negotiations  it  was  decided  to  permit  the  division,  by  the 
Balkan  Allies,  of  the  territories  they  had  occupied,  and  to  allow 
the  Sultan-Calipha  to  remain  at  Constantinople — all  this  in  the  j 
interest  of  the  political  orientation  known  as  the  Entente.  fll 

There  were  men  in  the  British  government  who  would  have  ' 
preferred  seeing  the  Bulgars  master  of  Constantinople  and  the 
Straits.  As  a  serious,  hard-working,  and  thrifty  people,  the  Bul- 
garians could  have  held  the  city  and  waterways  much  better  than 
the  Turks,  and  if  too  much  opposition  to  this  scheme  had  been 
encountered  there  was  always  Sir  Edward  Grey's  scheme  to  "in- 
ternationalize" Constantinople  and  the  adjacent  territory  and  the 
Straits.  In  the  interest  of  the  mighty  empire  which  Grey  repre- 
sented much  double-dealing  had  to  be  done,  and  the  documents 
show  that  Sir  Edward  was  an  adept  at  this. 

In  the  end,  Sazonoff  decided  that  it  would  be  best  to  preserve 
the  status  quo  along  the  Straits,  in  the  hope  that  ultimately  he 
might  maneuver  for  a  thorough  revision  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris, 
which  was  still  the  matrix  of  all  agreements  reached  by  the  Con- 
cert of  Europe  in  regard  to  the  Bosphorus  and  Dardanelles.  He 
had  in  this  the  sympathy  of  the  French  government  which  had 
to  protect  the  money  of  its  citizens  that  had  been  loaned  to  the 
Turkish  government  or  invested  otherwise  in  the  Ottoman  empire. 

Presently,  the  Balkan  crisis  passed  into  a  new  phase — a  very 
critical  one,  so  far  as  the  peace  of  Europe  was  involved.  On  No- 
vember 5th,  1912,  the  Austro-Hungarian  ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
burg informed  Sazonoff  that  the  Vienna  government  had  renounced 
"all  idea  of  territorial  compensations  in  its  favour."  This  renounce- 
ment covered  specifically  the  Austro-Hungarian  claims  to  the 
Sandjak  of  Novi-Bazar.  The  territory  was  thereupon  divided  be- 
tween Serbia  and  Montenegro.  The  Austro-Hungarian  govern- 
ment, in  other  words,  had  no  desire  becoming  embroiled  in  the 
ominous  political  chaos  that  was  the  Balkan  just  then.  The  only 
claim  it  set  up  was  perfectly  logical  and  justifiable.  It  wanted 
some  assurance  that  the  annexation  by  Serbia  and  Greece  of  Old 


THE  ENTENTE  AND  AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  225 

Serbia  and  Macedonia  was  not  to  interfere  with  the  transit  of 
Austrian  goods  to  the  Aegean  Sea  and  adjacent  territories. 

The  Serbian  government  had  often  complained  that  the  lack  v 
of  a  "window  upon  the  sea"  was  a  great  detriment  to  the  develop-  * 
ment  and  economic  independence  of  Serbia.  In  the  light  of  tariff 
discriminations  practised  by  Austria-Hungary,  especially  in  the 
years  1905-6,  that  complaint  was  justified.  There  was  a  market  for 
the  food  products  of  Serbia,  but  so  far  their  export  depended  en- 
tirely upon  the  railroads,  if  not  upon  the  markets,  of  the  Dual 
Monarchy,  and  experience  had  shown  what  this  might  lead  to. 
The  economic  depression  which  seized  Serbia  in  1906  could  not 
have  returned  as  soon  as  Serbia  was  able,  as  the  result  of  the 
Balkan  war,  to  get  free  access  to  a  seaport  on  the  Adriatic. 

Serbia  was  anxious  to  get  such  a  port,  and  Sazonoff  became 
the  most  ardent  promoter  of  the  idea.  Such  a  port  could  be  had 
only  in  Albania,  however,  and  the  Albanians  had  been  among 
those  who  had  fought  hardest  for  their  independence  of  the  Turk, 
despite  the  fact  that  they  were  Mohammedans  mostly.  Moreover, 
Austria-Hungary  and  Italy  had  reached  an  understanding  whereby 
Albania  was  to  be  set  up  as  an  autonomous  state  when  the  moment 
came.  That  moment  had  come,  but  it  brought  with  it  desires  of 
the  Serbs  and  Russians  that  were  at  variance  with  Albanian  au- 
tonomy. 

The  difficulties  were  not  insurmountable.  Serbia  and  Albania 
could  have  built  a  railroad  to  the  coast,  established  a  port  at  a  half- 
dozen  different  sites,  and  then  reached  an  agreement  as  to  exports 
and  imports  through  the  port  and  over  the  railroad  line.  That 
was  the  view  taken  in  Vienna,  Berlin,  Rome,  Paris  and  London. 
But  it  was  not  the  view  of  Sazonoff  and  the  Serbian  government. 
Albania  could  be  established,  but  enough  of  her  territory  would 
have  to  be  surrendered  to  Serbia  to  make  possible  the  building  of 
a  port  on  the  Adriatic  in  which  Serbia  was  to  be  the  political  and 
military  master. 

Sazonoff  exerted  pressure  in  Rome,  London  and  Paris.  Rome 
would  not  entertain  his  proposals  favorably,  because  she  hoped 
that  the  new  Albanian  state,  being  in  reality  little  more  than  the 
hinterland  of  the  Italian  cities  along  the  coast,  would  become  a 
sort  of  Italian  sphere  of  influence,  which  would  have  been  hard 

IS 


226         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


I 


to  avoid  as  a  matter  of  fact.  Paris  remained  indifferent  so  far  as 
public  opinion  went,  and  public  opinion  had  to  be  minded  by  the 
French  government  in  those  days.  London,  on  the  other  hand, 
had  a  number  of  special  points  to  be  considered. 

While  Serbia  might  have  gotten  an  outlet  to  the  sea  in  that 
y/?  manner,  Sir  Edward  Grey  and  the  parliament  had  to  reckon  with 
the  most  imminent  possibility  of  this  Serbian  seaport  becoming 
^i^^^  little  more  than  the  Russian  naval  base  in  the  Mediterranean. 
Sazonoff  was  not  in  ignorance  of  the  British  view,  which  was  also 
the  Austro-Hungarian  view  to  some  extent.  Though  he  dwelled 
eloquently  on  the  proposition  that  a  Serbian  war  fleet  need  not 
cause  uneasiness  in  Vienna,  he  was  never  able  to  disguise  his 
arriere-pensee.  A  Russian  naval  base  in  the  Mediterranean  was  far 
from  being  as  desirable  as  free  navigation  of  the  Straits,  but  it 
was  much  more  than  Sazonoff  had  reason  to  expect  in  the  near 
and  distant  future.  Before  Russia  could  make  the  Sea  of  Marmara 
her  naval  base,  the  entire  political  structure  of  Europe  would 
have  to  be  changed ;  that  would  take  a  general  war  the  outcome  of 
which  could  not  yet  be  foreseen.  At  any  rate.  Great  Britain  had 
to  go  down  in  complete  defeat,  before  Russia  could  realize  her 
"historic  mission."  WX 

The  Serbian  government  was  willing — as  it  always  was — to  '■ 
risk  all.  Its  charge  d'affaires  at  Berlin  was  instructed  to  ask  the 
very  foolish  question  of  the  German  secretary  of  state  for  foreign 
affairs,  whether  a  war  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Serbia  would 
be  considered  the  casus  foederis,  obliging  Germany  to  come  to  the 
assistance  of  Austria-Hungary.  He  was  given  an  affirmative 
answer.  This  step  was  taken  after  Sazonoff  had  contemplated  joint 
'  action  by  Russia,  France  and  Great  Britain,  and  had  been  given 
some  encouragement  by  M.  Poincare,  then  French  minister  of 
foreign  affairs. 

Throughout  the  month  of  November,  Europe  continued  on  the 
verge  of  war.  Sazonoff  was  using  the  expedient  of  charging  that 
Vienna's  attitude  toward  the  Serbian  port  question  was  based 
upon  her  desires  to  grow  at  the  expense  of  the  Balkans,  though 
Austria-Hungary  had  plainly  demonstrated  her  territorial  disinter- 
estedness by  surrendering  to  the  Serbs  and  Montenegrins  what 
she  could  have  kept,  i.e.:  The  Sandjak  of  Novi-Bazar.  Sazo- 
noff and  Poincare  both  knew  that  this  was  a  willful  misrepresenta- 


THE  ENTENTE  AND  AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  227 

tion  of  the  fact,  but  labored  for  war  nevertheless  in  the  hope  that 
the  final  reckoning  with  Germany  might  be  brought  about.  Sir 
Edward  Grey  also  knew  the  facts  in  the  case,  but  worked 
for  peace,  because  he  felt  that  the  fatal  hour  was  not  yet 
come. 

War  was  narrowly  averted,  and  then  Sazonoff  again  turned 
to  the  Straits  question.  There  was  now  the  opportunity  of  his 
bringing  the  matter  to  the  attention  of  the  London  Ambassadorial 
Conference.  But  Sazonoff  was  soon  not  very  eager  to  do  that, 
because,  as  he  expessed  it  in  a  letter  to  Iswolsky,  now  Russian 
ambassador  at  Paris : 

"We  must  beware  of  agreeing  to  the  establishment  of  any  re- 
strictive guarantees  which  might  in  future  form  a  hindrance  to  a 
final  solution  in  accordance  with  our  interests." 

Meanwhile,  the  Powers  had  decided  to  go  once  more  into  the 
details  of  Turkey's  financial  status,  now  largely  in  the  hands  of 
an  international  board,  known  as  the  Administration  of  the  Turk- 
ish Public  Debt.  It  was  proposed  to  limit  Turkish  armaments  so 
that  there. would  be  a  larger  surplus  for  the  civil  administration 
of  the  country.  To  this  Russia  objected,  because  Sazonoff  and  his 
ambassadors  feared  that  reducing  Turkish  armament  might  ex- 
pose the  country  to  attack — especially  Constantinople — ^by  the  Bul- 
gars,  and  as  M.  TcharikofF,  the  Russian  ambassador  at  Constanti- 
nople, put  it  in  a*~perfectly'fraiilf  and  brutal  way; 

*Tir"i50  fdi  as  Ttirkey  is  not  a  large  market  for  the  sale  of  our 
goods,  we  are  not  at  all  interested  in  her  regeneration." 

Such  indeed  was  the  general  attitude  of  Europe  towards  Tur- 
key, though  it  was  left  to  M.  Tcharikoff  to  express  it  in  this  telling 
epigram. 

The  London  Ambassadorial  Conference  did  little  beyond  estab- 
lishing all  the  more  that  a  general  European  War  was  merely  a 
question  of  months.  The  apiration  of  Serbia  for  a  port  on  the 
Adriatic  Sea  was  defeated,  and  it  was  decided  to  give  Albania  the 
smallest  extent  possible,  so  that  Russia's  friends,  Serbia,  Monte- 
negro and  Greece  might  benefit  all  they  could. 

The  Peace  Treaty  of  Bucharest,  of  July  28th,  1913,  settled  the 
Balkan  War,  and  its  aftermath,  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  war,  to  the 
entire  satisfaction  of  Serbia  and  Greece.  Bulgaria's  interests  were 
ignored  by  Sazonoff,  with  the  result  that  she  had  to  relinquish 


228         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

all  claim  upon  Adrianople,  and  Further  Thrace,  upon  most  of 
Macedonia,  and  lost  a  part  of  the  Dobrudja — Silistria,  the  surrender 
of  which  to  Rumania,  Sazonoff  had  suggested  as  compensation  for 
her  non-interference  in  the  Balkan  war.  All  Bulgaria  was  in  a 
rage,  and  cast  to  the  winds  all  Pan-Slavism. 

Sazonoff  was  nothing  if  not  resourceful.  He  promptly  engi- 
neered for  a  better  understanding  with  Rumania,  and  was  success- 
ful. The  operation  was  not  difficult,  since  Rumania  had  been 
given  by  him  what  was  undoubtedly  the  best  agricultural  district 
of  Bulgaria.  Moreover,  Sazonoff  had  an  able  lieutenant  at  Bu- 
charest, M.  Poklewski-Koziel,  the  man  who  had  done  such  excel- 
lent work  at  Teheran. 

Though  feeling  ran  higher  in  Bulgaria  than  it  had  run  in  years, 
the  Russian  minister  of  foreign  affairs  had  not  given  up  hope. 
Bulgaria  needed  money,  and  needed  it  badly.  There  was  just  one 
place  where  money  could  be  raised — that  was  France,  and  in 
France  they  now  loaned  money  only  to  those  who  had  Sazonoff's 
endorsement.  Besides,  he  worked  for  the  amalgamation  of  Mon- 
tenegro and  Serbia — a  sort  of  federation  that  would  have  given 
the  new  dual-monarchy  the  same  foreign  policy,  and  the  same  j 
army  under  the  guidance  of  King  Peter.  mi 

Sazonoff  waited  until  he  could  tell  the  French  government  that  ' 
Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  would  finance  Bulgaria  if  the 
French  did  not  come  to  her  assistance.  Since  the  Bulgarian  cabi- 
net, headed  by  Dr.  Radoslavoff,  was  openly  anti-Russian  and  pro- 
German,  Sazonoff  devised  a  plan  whereby  the  first  payments  of  the 
loan  were  to  be  made  to  Czar  Ferdinand  in  person,  his  hope  being 
that  this  would  end  the  Radoslavoff  regime  quickly. 

One  of  the  last  documents  of  this  series  has  the  following 
ominous  sentence. 

"As  to  the  definite  request,  that  the  King  should  pledge  himself 
to  form  a  new  Cabinet,  we  might  suggest  this  later  on,  when 
Bulgaria,  after  having  received  a  considerable  advance,  will  no 
longer  be  in  a  position  to  disengage  herself  in  a  financial  way,  and 
only  in  case  the  King  will  not  have  the  opportunity  before  the 
end  of  the  year,  that  is  to  say  before  the  issue  of  the  loan,  to  place 
the  government  in  the  hands  of  other  ministers." 


THE  AUSTRO-SERBIAN  CRISIS  AND  RUSSIA'S 
PAN-SLAVISM 

(November  1908— April  1909) 

(255)     Iswolsky,  Russian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  to  Nelidoff,  Russian 
Ambassador  at  Paris.    Letter,  Oct.  23-Nov.  5,  1908. 

I  am  sending  you  through  the  courier  a  copy  of  my  letter  to 
our  Ambassador  at  Berlin  regarding  our  relations  with  Germany. 
I  am  sure  you  will  not  fail  to  recognize  the  great  significance  of 
this  letter.  It  is  perfectly  clear  from  all  my  conversations  in  Ber- 
lin that  a  radical  change  has  taken  place  in  the  general  European 
situation. 

Under  the  influence  of  political,  one  might  even  say  historical 
and  inevitable,  necessities  the  Powers  have  divided  themselves  in 
two  different  groups:  on  the  one  side  we  find  Germany  and  Aus- 
tria-Hungary— on  the  other  side  Russia,  France  and  England; 
Italy,  bound  by  the  Triple  Alliance  but  nevertheless  feeling  herself 
at  the  same  time  drawn  towards  France  and  ourselves,  appears  to 
hesitate;  Turkey  will  place  herself  on  the  side  of  those  who  shall 
know  how  to  support  her  new  regime  and  show  her  a  disinterested 
friendship. 

This  new  situation  certainly  offers  us  great  advantages  in 
strength  and  security,  but  it  also  embodies  great  dangers.  Em- 
peror William,  alarmed  by  the  feeling  of  isolation,  or  as  he  is  accus- 
tomed to  say,  of  "encirclement,"  is  growing  more  and  more  nervous 
and  impatient,  as  appears  from  his  last  English  interview.^ 

*The  famous  interview  with  Dr.  Dillon  of  the  London  Daily  Telegraph. 

229 


230         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

The  latent  cleavage  between  the  two  groups  of  Powers  is  fi- 
nally emphazised  most  particularly  by  the  adventurous  policy  of 
Baron  Aehrenthal.  Under  these  conditions  the  journey  of  Em- 
peror William  to  Austria  has  caused  great  misgivings  among  us.  It 
is  assured  that  the  military  party  in  Vienna  is  very  warlike  and 
is  agitating  for  an  attack  on  Serbia;  the  heir  to  the  Throne  is  at 
the  head  of  this  party,  but  the  old  Emperor  is  opposed  to  all  such 
attempts.  Is  it  not  to  be  feared  that  Emperor  William  will  support 
the  military  power? 

In  the  midst  of  all  these  dangers  I  am  working  on  the  solution 
of  the  Bosnian  Crisis.  My  task  is  rendered  particularly  difficult  by 
the  fermentation  of  public  opinion  and  of  the  press ;  the  causes  of 
this  fermentation  are  many  and  complicated;  considerations  of  in- 
ternal policy  play  an  important  part  and  if  this  movement  be  at- 
tentively examined,  one  arrives  at  the  conclusion  that,  properly 
speaking,  Russia  is  at  present  not  in  a  warlike  mood  and,  though 
people  like  to  create  difficulties  for  their  Government  in  questions 
of  foreign  politics,  they  are,  nevertheless,  not  at  all  disposed  to 
wage  war  out  of  love  for  Serbia.  But  people  in  Russia  do  not 
realize  that  this  noisy  movement  might  call  forth  illusions  in  Serbia 
and  Montenegro  and  might  precipitate  these  two  countries  in  an 
adventure  in  which  they  would  remain  isolated  and  in  which  they 
could  not  count  upon  Russia's  material  support.  I  also  believe  that 
Belgrade  and  Cettinje  are  beginning  to  realize  this;  Khomiakoff's 
telegram  has  contributed  to  this  knowledge. 

In  spite  of  the  fact  that  we  firmly  hope  to  arrive  at  a  peaceful 
solution,  we  must,  nevertheless,  foresee  the  possibility  of  sudden 
complications,  and  it  is  my  urgent  endeavour  to  arrive  at  the  clear- 
est possible  survey  of  the  play  and  interplay  of  the  political  forces 
at  the  present  period.  We  know  the  treaty  of  alliance  of  1879 
between  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  very  well  in  all  its  bru- 
tality, a  treaty  which  at  present  appears  not  only  to  have  been  re- 
inforced in  a  defensive  sense  but  which  also  seems  to  have  been 
given  an  offensive  tendency  as  regards  the  Balkans. 

But  what  is  the  exact  content  of  the  remaining  agreements 
which  constitute  the  Triple  Alliance?  /  find  no  connected  documents 
in  my  archives,  oral  tradition  has  ceased  with  the  death  of  Count  Lambs- 
dorff.    It  is  certain  that  Paris  is  better  informed  in  this  connection 


THE  BOSNIAN  CRISIS  AND  PAN-SLAVISM  231 

and  you  yourself  are  in  possession  of  very  special  knowledge.  Your 
correspondence  from  Rome  during  the  years  1898-1902  contains 
valuable  references  to  new  agreements  between  France  and  Italy, 
which  appreciably  influence  the  articles  of  the  Treaty  of  the  Triple 
Alliance;  but  since  then  other  changes  have  taken  place  in  the 
European  situation — ^first  of  all  the  rapprochement  between  Eng- 
land and  France,  a  circumstance  which  must  necessarily  open  up 
new  points  of  view. 

I  should  very  much  like  to  learn  your  opinion  on  all  these  im- 
portant questions.  Above  all  I  should  like  to  know  how  you,  with 
your  great  experience  in  European  politics,  judge  of  the  possibili- 
ties which  might  result  from  the  present  crisis.  It  seems  to  me  that 
the  danger  of  a  Turkish-Bulgarian  conflict  is  thank  God  obviated. 
There  remains  the  danger  of  an  Austrian-Serbian  conflict,  the  most 
dangerous  of  all.  We  are  doing  and  we  shall  do  all  that  lies  in  our 
power  to  prevent  such  a  conflict,  hut  should  it  break  out,  the  possibility 
of  a  general  war  would  become  at  the  same  moment  most  imminent, 

(256)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Iswolsky.    Telegram,  Jan.  15- 
28,  1909. 

Grey  informs  me  that  he  has  declared  to  Cambon  that  he  wishes 
to  inform  the  French  Government  that  the  London  Cabinet  has 
promised  the  Russian  Government  its  diplomatic  support  in  the 
question  of  the  compensation  of  Serbia  and  Montenegro.  ^  Grey 
tells  me  he  has  taken  this  step  in  order  to  clear  the  situation  of  every 
misunderstanding ;  the  difficulties  which  have  arisen  during  the  set- 
tlement of  the  questions  pending  between  Austria,  Turkey  and 
Bulgaria,  prove,  however,  that  the  Serbian  demands  must  be  limited 
as  much  as  possible  in  the  interests  of  Peace. 

(257)  Communication  of  the  French  Embassy  at  St.  Petersburg  to  the  Im- 
perial  Russian  Government.    Feb.  13-26,  1909. 

The  long  duration  of  the  Austrian-Serbian  Crisis  and  the  un- 
certainty of  the  final  intentions  of  Austria-Hungary  and  Russia,  oc- 
casion general  disquiet  throughout  Europe. 

This  condition  of  things  must  attract  the  attention  of  the  French 
Government  in  the  highest  degree.     The  feeling  of  France  for 

*  Hitherto  the  British  Government  had  not  been  in  favor  of  such  cornpensa- 
tion.    It  always  remained  lukewarm  to  these  claims  of  Belgrade  and  Cettinje. 


232         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


I 


Russia,  her  adherence  to  the  insoluble  alliance  which  unites  the 
two  countries  and  the  responsibility  which  France  assumes  under 
these  circumstances,  make  it  her  duty  to  enter  upon  an  exchange 
of  opinion  with  the  Russian  Government  without  delay  in  order  to 
examine  with  it  that  line  of  policy,  which,  with  due  consideration 
of  the  higher  interests  of  both  countries,  must  be  maintained. 
The  Russian  Government  will  surely  agree  with  the  French  Government 
that  both  must  do  everything  possible  to  prevent  the  danger  of  an  armed 
conflict  in  a  question  in  which  the  vital  interests  of  Russia  are  not  in- 
volved. French  public  opinion  would  be  unable  to  comprehend  that 
such  a  question  could  lead  to  a  war  in  which  the  French  and  the  Rus- 
sian army  would  have  to  participate. 

Since  the  conclusion  of  the  Alliance  both  Governments  and  both 
countries  have  always  shown  themselves  prepared  to  fulfil  their 
mutual  obligations,  as  soon  as  their  vital  interests  were  threatened. 
On  the  contrary,  however,  (sic)  in  all  other  incidents  of  interna- 
tional activity  they  have  always  endeavoured  to  unite  their  efforts 
in  the  interests  of  Peace  and  of  reconciliation.  Such  is  the  case 
today  and  this  too  was  the  idea  of  the  Russian  Ministry  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  when  it  publicly  declared  last  October  that  Russia,  what- 
ever may  be  her  feelings  regarding  the  causes  of  the  present  crisis, 
could  not  see  in  them  a  casus  belli.  Since  then  we  have  not  ceased 
to  seek  in  common  for  means  of  settling  the  crisis  to  the  utmost 
satisfaction  of  the  Balkan  States,  since  these  States  are  assured  of 
the  sympathies  of  Russia  as  well  as  of  France. 

All  steps  taken  in  the  interest  of  Bulgaria  which  the  Russian 
Government  persuaded  us  to  participate  in,  have  been  supported  by 
us  in  a  most  effective  manner. 

In  connection  with  the  Serbian  demands — which,  as  is  generally  rec- 
ognised, are  difficult  to  justify — we  have  expressed  our  doubt  as  to 
whether  it  be  possible  to  realise  them.  But  we  have  joined  with  the 
Russian  Government  in  demanding  that  the  question  be  submitted 
to  a  conference.  This  is  in  reality  the  only  difficulty  for  which  another 
solution  must  be  found  than  that  which  the  Belgrade  Cabinet  de- 
mands   with    regard    to    its    claims    for    territorial    compensations.  ^ 

*The  French  Government  was  not  in  favor  at  that  time  having  the  Serbian 
claims  submitted  to  a  conference  of  all  the  Powers,  a  point  upon  which  Iswolsky 
insisted  in  the  hope  that  it  would  lead  (a)  to  compensation  for  Serbia  and  Monte- 
negro (b)  to  independence  for  Bosnia-Herzegovina. 


THE  BOSNIAN  CRISIS  AND  PAN-SLAVISM  233 

The  moment  has  therefore  arrived  for  Russia  and  France  to  ex- 
amine this  question  in  common.  We  beg  the  Russian  Government 
to  communicate  its  opinion  to  us,  in  the  firm  conviction  that  the 
general  discussion  of  the  question  by  both  Governments  would 
permit  the  present  crisis  to  be  solved  under  conditions  which  would 
be  equally  satisfactory  to  France  and  to  Russia. 

(258)  The  Russian  Chargi  d'Affaires  at  London  to  Iswolsky.     Telegram, 
Feb.  11-24,  1909. 

It  appears  to  me  that  the  British  Government  is  clearly  aware 
of  the  seriousness  of  the  situation.  This  impression  is  confirmed  by 
all  information  which  it  receives  from  official  and  from  private  re- 
sources. In  spite  of  the  urgent  desire  to  help  Serbia,  one  is  clearly 
aware  here  that  the  efforts  of  the  Powers  must  be  chiefly  directed  to 
preserve  Serbia  from  annihilation,  but  that  it  would  be  impossible  to 
obtain,  without  war,  from  Austria  other  than  economic  concessions  for 
Serbia.  Hardinge  today  communicated  to  me  his  personal  opinion,  that 
the  general  situation  would  be  under  less  tension  if  Russia  would  de- 
clare in  Belgrade  that  Serbia  must  count  neither  upon  territorial 
concessions  nor  upon  full  autonomy  for  Bosnia  and  the  Herzegovina. 
Since  Austria  precisely  fears  that  Russia,  and  possibly  certain  other 
Powers,  might  support  the  impossible  Serbian  demands,  a  step  of 
this  nature,  undertaken  by  Russia  at  Belgrade,  would  do  a  great 
deal  to  pacify  the  Vienna  Cabinet  and  thereby  increase  the  possibil- 
ity of  a  peaceable  solution.  It  has  been  observed  here  that  the  Russian 
Government  has  not  yet  replied  to  the  English  enquiry,  as  to  with  which 
concessions  Serbia,  in  Russia's  opinion,  ought  to  content  herself. 

(259)  The  Same  to  the  Same.  Telegram,  Feb.  14-27,  1909. 

Great  disquietude  prevails  here,  because  the  negotiations  be- 
tween the  Powers  for  the  prevention  of  an  Austro-Serbian  conflict 
make  no  progress.  In  England  at  present  special  importance  is  at- 
tached to  the  question  of  territorial  concessions  in  favour  of  Serbia  in 
the  firm  conviction  that  adhering  to  such  a  demand  must  inevitably 
lead  to  war.  Here  one  would  really  feel  disposed  to  support  every 
proposal  which  might  facilitate  a  final  understanding  between  Aus- 
tria and  Serbia,  but  with  the  provision  that  the  Powers  that  would 
act  in  common  must  be  perfectly  clear  concerning  the  fact  that 


234         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

Austria  cannot  be  expected  to  make  territorial  concessions.  According 
to  English  reports,  the  new  Serbian  Cabinet  seems  to  recognize  clearly 
that  the  Serbian  demands  cannot  be  realized,  and  seems  prepared  to 
accede  to  the  representations  of  the  Powers, 

(260)    Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris.    Telegram,  Feb.  14-27, 
1909.    No.  250. 

The  communication  which  the  French  Embassy  has  made  to 
me  has  made  a  painful  impression  upon  us, — a  fact  which  I  did  not 
conceal  from  Admiral  Touchard.  ^  Actuated  by  the  most  peaceable 
intentions,  we  had  declared  ourselves  prepared  to  adopt  the  proce- 
dure proposed  by  Cambon,  i.e. — to  demand  friendly  declarations  at 
Belgrade  and  to  forward  these  to  Vienna.  But  Kiderlen's  proposal, 
apparently  inspired  at  Vienna  and  approved  by  Pichon,  ^  has  quite 
a  different  meaning.  Its  purpose  is  directed  towards  substituting  a 
direct  agreement  between  Vienna  and  Belgrade  to  the  common  ac- 
tion of  the  Powers,  after  the  model  of  the  Austrian-Turkish 
settlement.  The  tone  of  the  officially-inspired  press  in  Austria 
leaves  no  doubt  of  this.  But  this  is  equivalent  to  deliver- 
ing Serbia  up  to  the  mercy  of  an  Austria  armed  to  the  teeth. 
A  step  of  that  sort,  if  undertaken  at  Belgrade,  would  call  forth  univer- 
sal indignation  in  Russia,  nor  would  it  prevent  a  conflict. 

No  Serbian  Government  could  agree  to  this.  It  must  be  em- 
phasized that  the  idea  of  a  direct  agreement  between  Austria  and 
Serbia  is  quite  new  and  contrary  to  everything  which  up  to  the 
present  has  been  agreed  to  by  the  Powers.^  The  compensations 
which  ought  to  be  conceded  to  Serbia  and  Montenegro,  constitute 
point  7  of  the  Conference  program.  Austria  has  declared  herself 
agreeable  to  discuss  this  point  with  the  Powers  with  the  only  reser- 
vation, that  these  concessions  were  to  be  of  a  purely  economic 
nature. 

In  order  that  all  suspicion  might  be  avoided,  that  Serbia  was 
being  encouraged  by  Russia  to  make  impossible  demands  and  there- 
by make  a  peaceable  solution  of  the  crisis  impossible,  we  have  just 
telegraphed  to  Serbia  and  recommended  to  the  Serbian  Govern- 

*  French  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg. 
'  France  and  Germany  acted  in  common  in  this  matter. 

'  This  is  not  true,  since  Paris,  London  and  Berlin  were  on  record  as  favoring 
direct  action  between  Vienna  and  Belgrade. 


1 


THE  BOSNIAN  CRISIS  AND  PAN-SLAVISM  235 

ment  to  relinquish  all  territorial  claims,  to  rely  upon  the  decision  of 
the  Powers  in  the  regulation  of  all  outstanding  questions  and  to 
avoid  everything  which  might  be  construed  as  a  provocation  of 
Austria-Hungary.  It  appears  to  us  that  if  one  is  able  to  obtain  a 
declaration  of  this  sort  from  the  Serbian  Government,  the  Powers 
should  bring  it  to  the  notice  of  the  Vienna  Cabinet  and  request 
the  latter  to  communicate  its  own  intentions. 

Under  No.  2,  I  am  communicating  to  you  the  complete  text  of 
my  telegram  to  our  Minister  in  Belgrade  and  I  beg  you  to  submit 
the  same  to  Pichon  and  to  inform  me  of  the  opinion  of  the  French 
Government. 

(261)     Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Minister  at  Belgrade.    Telegram,  Feb.  14-27, 
1909.    No.  251. 

No.  2.  In  reply  to  the  two  communications  which  were  sent  us 
by  the  Serbian  Minister  on  February  10  and  13,  I  beg  to  acquaint 
the  Royal  Government  with  the  following : 

We  hear  with  satisfaction  that  the  Serbian  Government  remains 
true  to  its  resolution  not  to  depart  from  the  peaceful  standpoint  it 
has  assumed,  to  avoid  everything  that  might  lead  to  an  armed  con- 
flict between  Serbia  and  Austria  and  to  carry  out  no  military  meas- 
ures at  the  frontier.  We  are  convinced  that  the  vital  interest  of 
Serbia,  for  whom  we  have  always  felt  the  greatest  sympathy, 
necessarily  imposes  upon  her  this  line  of  policy,  which  is  also  the 
only  one  which  does  justice  to  the  general  situation  at  the  moment. 

JVe  have  been  able  to  convince  ourselves  through  various  sources 
that  the  Powers  are  not  disposed  to  support  the  idea  of  a  territorial 
aggrandisement  of  Serbia.  The  Royal  Government  must  deduce  from 
this  that  all  efforts  to  move  the  Powers  to  support  such  demands  would 
remain  futile  and  that  Serbia  can  be  assured  of  the  sympathies  of  the 
Powers  only  if  she  refrains  from  insisting  upon  demands  which  must 
lead  to  an  armed  conflict  with  Austria.  We  deem  it  necessary  to  warn 
the  Royal  Government  against  adopting  any  attitude  which  might 
expose  it  to  such  a  danger.  We  hope  that  Serbia,  as  she  has  just 
declared,  will  remain  true  to  her  commitments  to  follow  the  advice 
of  the  great  Powers.  At  the  same  time,  we  believe  that  the  Serbian 
Government  must,  under  the  prevailing  circumstances,  clearly  de- 
clare to  these  Powers,  that  it  does  not  insist  on  its  territorial  de- 


236         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

mands  and  that  it  will  rely  upon  the  decision  of  the  Powers  in  all 
pending   questions.     These   could  then  devote   all  their   efforts 
towards  protecting  Serbian  interests. 
A  copy  has  been  forwarded  to  Cettinje. 

(262)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Feb.  14-27,  1909. 

It  is  scarcely  to  be  assumed  that  the  Bosnian-Herzegovinian 
question  will  be  solved  in  the  near  future;  our  standpoint  is  the 
same  as  before :  expression  has  been  given  to  it  in  our  circular  of 
December  9th ;  a  general  unanimity  of  all  Powers  at  the  Conference 
is  scarcely  possible ;  the  annexation  will  not  be  formally  sanctioned ; 
Pashitch*s  wish  will  be  fulfilled.  As  to  the  railway  through  Turk- 
ish territory,  we  shall  energetically  insist  upon  this  in  our  nego- 
tiations with  Turkey. 

(263)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Iswolsky.    Telegram,  Feb.  15-28, 
1909.    No.  40. 

With  regard  to  Kiderlen's  proposal,  a  misunderstanding  has 
arisen.  Pichon  has  neither  accepted  nor  recommended  this  propo- 
sal. He  has  simply  communicated  it  to  London  and  St.  Peters- 
burg in  order  to  ascertain  the  opinion  of  both  Cabinets.  But  he 
himself  found  the  form  and  manner  of  the  procedure  unacceptable, 
especially  the  proposed  tete-a-tete  between  Austria  and  Serbia.  A 
new  text  containing  representations  to  he  made  at  Belgrade  has  just 
been  received  here  from  Berlin.  I  will  send  it  to  you  as  soon  as  I 
have  received  it  from  Pichon  with  such  alterations  as  he  may  con- 
sider necessary  to  introduce,  in  case  the  results  of  your  direct  ac- 
tion in  Belgrade  which  he  fully  approves,  should  not  make  a  col- 
lective action  there  superfluous. 

(264)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Feb.  15-28,  1909.    No.  41. 

Continuation  of  my  telegram  No.  40.  Enclosed  find  the  pro- 
jected note  to  be  handed  at  Belgrade,  according  to  the  plan  pro- 
posed at  Berlin: 

"Resultant  upon  an  understanding,  dated  February  26th,  1909, 
His  Majesty  the  Sultan  has  given  his  consent  that  henceforth  Bos- 
nia and  the  Herzegovina  shall  form  an  integral  part  of  the  territory 


K 


I 


THE  BOSNIAN  CRISIS  AND  PAN-SLAVISM  237 

of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy,  and  His  Majesty,  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Emperor,  has  renounced  to  the  military  occupation  of 
the  Sandjak  of  Novi-Bazar  to  which  he  was  entitled  by  the  Berlin 
Congress. 

"The  Governments  of  England,  France,  Italy  and  Russia  call 
the  attention  of  the  Serbian  Government  to  the  new  situation, 
which  results  from  this  agreement  between  the  interested  Powers 
and  they  venture  to  hope  that  the  Serbian/Government,  relinquish- 
ing all  territorial  aspirations  beyond  the  frontiers  of  the  Kingdom 
will  refrain  from  all  actions  which  might  disturb  the  quiet  of  the 
neighbouring  monarchy,  'and  for  which  the  full  responsibility  would 
revert  upon  Serbia/  and  that  Serbia  will  adopt  a  line  of  action  which 
will  help  her  to  acquire  those  economic  advantages  which  Austria 
'upon  the  basis  of  a  direct  agreement  between  the  two  Powers' 
is  prepared  to  grant  her." 

If,  in  spite  of  your  direct  action  in  Belgrade,  a  collective  action 
of  the  Great  Powers  should  be  necessary  there,  Pichon  believes 
that  the  text  which  has  just  been  communicated  contains  the  ele- 
ments of  an  agreement,  subject  to  the  provision  that  the  two 
phrases  quoted  in  inverted  commas,  be  omitted.  This,  moreover, 
is  rather  his  personal  opinion,  and  he  is  at  the  same  time  addressing 
himself  to  the  Cabinets  of  London  and  Rome. 

(265)    Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Embassy  at  London.     Telegram,  Feb.  17- 
March  2,  1909.    No.  265. 

I  refer  to  the  telegrams  of  our  Ambassador  at  Paris,  No.  40  and 
41.  The  text  proposed  at  Berlin  calls  forth  serious  objections  even 
with  the  omissions  proposed  by  Pichon;  the  text  apparently  has 
been  drawn  up  at  Vienna,  and  the  entire  first  part  of  it  reveals  the 
intentions  of  Austria-Hungary  to  have  the  Austro-Turkish  protocol 
accepted  as  the  definite  regulation  of  the  question  of  annexation.  In 
no  case  can  we  agree  to  this  manoeuvre. 

We  are  of  the  opinion  that  this  protocol  can  acquire  an  interna- 
tional significance  only  after  it  has  been  sanctioned  by  the  Confer- 
ence, and  we  see  no  reason  to  refer  to  this  protocol  in  the  note 
which  has  been  proposed. 

We  regard  as  equally  unacceptable  the  sentence  "relinquishing 
all  territorial  aspirations  beyond  the  frontiers  of  the  kingdom."  No 


238         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

country,  however  small  and  weak  it  may  be,  can  make  such  a 
general  declaration. 

The  Cabinets  of  London  and  Paris  must  also  understand  that 
making  an  Austro-German  project  the  basis  of  the  discussion — 
however  cleverly  this  project  may  have  been  conceived — will 
seriously  affect  the  possibility  of  reconciliation. 

This  will  make  it  necessary  for  us  to  propose  a  counter-project 
on  our  part,  which  might  have  been  avoided  if  Jules  Camhon  had  not 
shown  such  great  haste  in  taking  up  the  project  of  Baron  Schon.  ^ 
We  do  not  as  yet  know  the  result  of  our  last  step  at  Belgrade  and  we 
cannot  as  yet  judge  if  a  further  action  of  the  Powers  will  still  be 
necessary;  for  this  reason  we  refrain  at  present  from  formulating 
our  counter-project.  The  French  Ambassador  has  assured  me  that 
Prince  Bulow  had  declared  to  Cambon  that  if  the  action  at  Bel- 
grade was  successful,  the  Berlin  Cabinet  would  join  the  other  Pow- 
ers in  order  to  act  in  common  at  Vienna.  I  have  not  seen  such  a 
declaration  in  the  diplomatic  correspondence  up  to  date,  and  I 
would  gladly  be  assured  that  this  is  in  reality  the  case. 

(266)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Iswolsky.    Letter,  Feb.  \S-March 
3,  1909. 

Admiral  Touchard  has  communicated  to  Pichon  the  comment 
which  you  have  made  upon  the  lukewarmness  of  French  diplomacy, 
especially  of  the  French  ambassadors  at  Vienna  and  at  Berlin,  con- 
cerning the  manner  in  which  they  have  supported  the  standpoint 
assumed  by  the  Russian  Government. 

Pichon,  very  much  upset  by  these  reproaches,  emphasized  to  me 
the  loyalty  and  absolute  frankness  which  he  has  always  observed 
in  his  policy  towards  Russia  and  he  hastens  to  justify  the  action  of 
the  French  representatives  accused  by  Your  Excellency.  As  he 
assures  me,  they  have  followed  the  instructions  sent  them;  these 
instructions  coincide  exactly  with  our  intentions  and  if  Crozier, 
dazzled  perhaps  by  the  brilliance  of  Vienna  society,  in  which  he 
wishes  to  create  a  good  position  for  himself,  has  proved  a  bit  less 
energetic  in  form  than  he  should  possibly  have  been,  the  same  can- 
not be  said  of  Jules  Cambon.    He  has  not  ceased  to  let  the  Berlin  Cabi- 

*  German  state  secretary  of  foreign  affairs. 


I 


I 


THE  BOSNIAN  CRISIS  AND  PAN-SLAVISM  239 

net  thoroughly  understand  that  France  follows  the  policy  of  the  Russian 
Government  in  this  crisis  in  all  points,  and  that  it  will  uphold  in  the 
most  loyal  manner  the  treaty  of  alliance  which  hinds  her  to  Russia. 
Of  this  he  has  been  able  to  convince  Prince  Bulow  so  well,  that  the 
Chancellor  in  a  recent  conversation,  in  which  possible  eventualities 
were  discussed,  remarked  to  Jules  Cambon: 

"You  will  place  yourself  at  the  side  of  Russia,  just  as  we  will 
place  ourselves  at  the  side  of  Austria."  ^ 

But  it  is  clear  that  the  German,  as  well  as  the  Austrian,  press  has 
a  great  interest  in  thickening  the  colour  and,  by  referring  to  the 
somewhat  less  strained  relations  between  French  diplomacy  and  the 
political  circles  of  Berlin  and  Vienna,  to  make  others  believe  that 
France  is  gradually  separating  herself  from  her  allies  and  friends 
and  drawing  closer  to  the  Triple  Alliance. 

On  this  occasion  Pichon  gave  me  the  most  decisive  assurances 
respecting  the  attitude  of  France  in  case  the  present  crisis  should 
force  us  to  intervene  actively  in  the  Austro-Serbian  conflict. 

"We  shall  loyally  fulfil  the  obligations  of  our  alliance,"  the  Min- 
ister remarked  to  me,  "and  so  long  as  I  remain  at  this  post,  this 
policy  shall  be  followed.  But  as  this  creates  an  extraordinarily 
serious  situation  for  the  two  countries,  neither  of  which  wishes 
war,  I  have  considered  it  my  duty  to  seek  for  means  by  which  this 
danger  may  be  forestalled,  and  not  to  have  recourse  to  extreme 
decisions." 

He  repeated  to  me,  basing  his  statements  upon  all  the  informa- 
tion which  is  at  his  service,  that  it  is  chiefly  the  territorial  claims  of 
Serbia,  to  which  she  considers  herself  entitled,  which  arouse  excite- 
ment in  Austria,  as  well  as  the  impatience  of  the  Vienna  Cabinet. 

Milovanovitch  ^  has  conceded  here  that  Austria  would  never 
consent  to  such  demands ;  not  a  single  one  of  the  Great  Powers  showed 
any  disposition  to  support  them.  It  was  therefore  futile  and  danger- 
ous for  Serbia  to  insist  upon  them,  whilst  voluntary  relinquish- 
ment on  her  part  would  have  given  the  Powers  the  possibility  of 
defending  all  the  more  energetically  the  economical  interests  of  the 
Kingdom.  He  believed  that  a  step  undertaken  by  Russia  in  this 
sense  would  be  less  painful  for  the  Serbians  and  would  have  had 

*  Poor  statesmanship,  if  true. 

'  Serbian  premier  and  minister  of  foreign  affairs. 


240         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

more  prospect  of  success  than  a  collective  action  of  the  Cabinets. 
This  was  the  purport  of  the  communication  which  the  French  Am- 
bassador had  to  make  to  Your  Excellency.^ 

In  reference  to  the  proposals  of  Cambon  and  Kiderlen,  the 
Minister  has  neither  accepted  nor  recommended  them ;  he  found  the 
latter  in  particular  very  little  acceptable  for  us  and  forwarded  them 
to  St.  Petersburg  and  London  merely  to  learn  the  opinion  of  the 
cabinets  and  without  assuming  any  responsibility  himself. 

These,  Your  Excellency,  are  the  declarations  and  the  assurances 
which  Pichon  gave  me  in  the  successive  conversations  I  had  with 
him  during  the  latter  part  of  last  week. 

I  have  no  reason  to  doubt  that  he  is  thoroughly  sincere  in  de- 
claring to  me  that  the  French  Government  was  firmly  determined 
to  fulfil  in  the  most  exact  manner  the  duties  imposed  upon  it  by 
our  Treaty  of  Alliance.  I  hear  that  other  members  of  the  Cabinet 
have  expressed  the  same  sentiments  and  emphasized  that  if  France 
should  act  otherwise  and  did  not  fulfil  her  obligations  she  would 
condemn  herself  morally,  and  in  case  the  war  should  be  victorious 
for  Russia  she  would,  in  a  material  sense,  find  herself  isolated  and 
dishonoured  in  Europe,  whereas  in  the  other  case  she  would  be 
delivered  up  to  Germany's  mercy — for  if  France  should  fail  Russia, 
this  would  mean,  as  far  as  the  English  are  concerned,  the  end  of 
the  Franco-English  Entente  forever. 

In  communicating  all  this  to  you,  I  must  nevertheless  emphasize 
that  the  possibility  of  a  war  is  contemplated  with  very  mixed  feelings 
by  the  press  and  the  public  here.  According  to  its  very  nature,  the 
democratic  Republic  is  opposed  to  war.  Anti-militarism  and  social- 
ism have  in  this  connection  made  great  progress,  but  it  is  chiefly 
tendencies  and  considerations  of  a  mercantile  nature  among  the 
French  public  and  its  anxiety  for  the  preservation  of  its  extraordi- 
nary wealth,  which  serve  to  develop  ultra-pacifistic  tendencies  here. 
Should  France  be  attacked,  or  should  her  direct  and  easily  compre- 
hensible interests  be  involved,  the  nation  would  act.  But  the  man- 
ner in  which  the  question  is  now  presented  by  the  press — and 
a  great  portion  of  the  press  headed  by  "Le  Temps,"  has  been  won 
over  by  Austria — "to  entangle  Europe  in  a  war  for  the  sake  of  a  strip 

*The  French  Government  was  not  convinced  that  joint  action  by  the  Powers 
was  desirable. 


THE  BOSNIAN  CRISIS  AND  PAN-SLAVISM  241 

of  territory  to  which  Serbia  has  absolutely  no  right" — such  a  policy 
would  be  criminal  insanity  in  the  eyes  of  the  French. 

Your  courageous  step  at  Belgrade,  with  which  all  the  world  here 
agrees,  serves  to  forestall  this  danger,  and  if,  after  an  answer  has 
been  received  from  Belgrade,  the  new  excessive  Austrian  demands 
are  no  longer  maintained,  one  may  justly  hope  that  the  crisis  will  re- 
ceive a  peaceful  solution.  But  apparently  an  energetic  action  of  the 
Powers  will  also  be  necessary  at  Vienna,  and  Pichon,  as  I  tele- 
graphed you  yesterday,  is  fully  agreed  to  come  to  an  understanding 
with  us  and  the  English  as  to  the  form  and  the  eventual  conse- 
quences of  this  step.  He  is  prepared  to  attempt  inducing  the  other 
Powers  to  take  part.  Hence  one  expects  further  news  from  Belgrade 
with  redoubled  interest  here,  as  well  as  the  decisions  of  the  Rus- 
sian government  which  will  determine  the  further  dirction  of  the 
diplomatic  action  of  the  Cabinets. 

The  French  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  and,  in  his  opinion,  also 
his  London  colleague,  ^  personally  believe  that  the  Conference 
should  be  called  together  as  soon  as  possible.  Since  the  agreement 
between  Bulgaria  and  Turkey  will  soon  be  concluded  under  the 
aegis  of  Russia,  Pichon  hopes  that  the  invitation  to  the  Conference 
may  also  be  sent  in  the  near  future  to  the  Powers. 

How  will  this  invitation  be  received  at  Vienna  and  Berlin? 
This  is  a  question  which  will  very  likely  lead  to  difficult  negotia- 
tions, for  up  to  the  present  a  thorough  disinclination  prevailed  in 
those  quarters  against  a  Conference,  unless  the  latter  were  limited 
to  registering  the  agreements  which  have  taken  place  between  the 
interested  parties. 

(267)     The  Russian  Minister  at  Belgrade  to  Iswolsky.    Telegram,  Feb.  17- 
March  2,  1909. 

I  have  spoken  to  Milovanovitch  in  the  sense  of  your  telegram. 
The  advice  which  we  have  given  the  Royal  Government  will  be  dis- 
cussed at  a  Ministerial  Council  and  the  decision  will  be  communi- 
cated to-morrow.  From  my  conversation  with  the  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs  I  have  received  the  impression  that  the  Government  is 
yielding. 

Milovanovitch  will  very  likely  apprise  me  in  his  answer,  in  so 
*  Sir  Edward  Grey. 


242         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

far  as  I  am  able  to  judge  up  to  the  present,  that  Serbia  has  not  the        ■ 
intention  of  making  any  categorical  demands  of  a  territorial  or  eco-  ■I 
nomic  nature,  so  that  it  is,  consequently,  not  at  all  necessary  to  re-  ^^ 
linquish  the  first.    Serbia  places  her  fate  entirely  in  the  hands  of 
the  Great  Powers,  as  she  accepts  their  decision  in  advance,  leaving 
it  to  them  to  decide  whether  the  Serbo-Bosnian  question  should  be 
settled  at  once  or  whether  this  settlement  should  be  postponed  to  a 
more  favourable  point  of  time.    To  take  up  direct  negotiations  with 
Austria  at  this  early  date,  he  does  not  consider  advisable.    Accord- 
ing to  instructions  received,  the  representatives  of  France,  England 
and  Italy  have  communicated  to  Milovanovitch,  after  my  visit  to 
him,  that  their  governments  share  the  Russian  point  of  view. 

(268)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Feb.  IS-March  3,  1909. 

1.  Milovanovitch  succeeded  only  with  the  greatest  difficulty 
persuading  his  colleagues  to  accept  the  standpoint  expressed  in  my 
telegram  of  yesterday.    The  text  of  the  answer  of  the  Royal  Gov- 
ernment to  the  Russian  communication  regarding  the  necessity  of  Al 
Serbia  relinquishing  territorial  compensations  is  contained  in  my        ' 
telegram  No.  2.    If  Your  Excellency  deem  that  this  reply  is  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  present  situation  Milovanovitch  would  issue  a  fll 
circular  note  to  the  Great  Powers  upon  the  basis  of  this  text,  where- 
by  he  would  refer  to  the  friendly  representations  of  the  Russian 
Government.  SI 

After  my  colleagues' had  examined  the  proposal  of  the  Serbian  ^^ 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  they  found  this  answer  acceptable,  ^j 
although  they  foresee,  and  not  without  reason,  that  Austria-  fll 
Hungary,  which  desires  to  enter  into  direct  negotiations  with  ^^ 
Serbia,  will  be  extraordinarily  dissatisfied  with  this  reply. 

In  handing  over  the  reply,  Milovanovitch  begged  me  to  communi- 
cate to  Your  Excellency  that  his  government,  in  determining  upon 
a  renunciation  of  such  serious  moment  to  Serbia,  was  endeavouring 
to  meet  our  wishes,  but  that  he  did  not  give  up  the  hope  that  Russia 
on  her  part  would  fulfil  those  obligations  which  she  had  already  pre- 
viously assumed,  and  that  she  has  not  the  intention  of  setting  her  sig- 
nature under  the  annexation}    The  tone  of  the  press  with  regard  to 

*  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  by  Austria-Hungary. 


THE  BOSNIAN  CRISIS  AND  PAN-SLAVISM  243 

Austria  has  become  considerably  more  moderate.    The  dissatisfac- 
tion is  directed  chiefly  against  us. 

(269)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Feb.  18-March  3,  1909. 

No.  2.  Text  of  the  Serbian  reply: 

"Proceeding  from  the  assumption  that  the  relation  of  Serbia  to 
Austria-Hungary  after  the  proclamation  of  the  annexation  of  Bosnia 
and  the  Herzegovina  has  remained  in  a  legal  sense  normal,  the 
Royal  Government  has  absolutely  no  intention  of  provoking  a  war 
with  the  neighbouring  monarchy,  and  in  no  sense  wishes  to  modify 
the  legal  relations  between  the  two  Powers  and  their  attitude  of 
correct  neighbourliness.  Nor  does  it  in  any  sense  demand  from 
Austria-Hungary  any  compensation  as  a  consequence  of  the  Bosnio- 
Herzegovinian  question,  neither  of  a  territorial  nor  political  nor  eco- 
nomic nature.  In  so  far  as  the  Bosnio-Herzegovinian  question  is  con- 
sidered to  he  an  internal  Austro-Hungarian  or  an  Austro-Turkish  ques- 
tion, Serbia  refrains  from  all  interference.  Serbia  has  lifted  her  voice 
and  has  established  her  standpoint  only  for  the  time  when,  and  only 
in  so  far  as,  this  question  assumes  a  European  character.^  Conse- 
quently, if  the  signatory  powers  of  the  Berlin  Treaty  concede  that 
the  Bosnio-Herzegovinian  question  has  been  solved  by  the  Austro- 
Turkish  agreement,  or  if  the  signatory  powers  should  for  any  other 
reason  not  wish  to  express  their  opinion  at  this  moment,  Serbia  also, 
following  their  example,  will  refrain  from  all  discussion  in  the  fu- 
ture. If,  on  the  contrary,  the  Powers  should  proceed  to  examine 
the  questions  which  are  connected  with  the  recognition  I  of  the  an- 
nexation and  the  new  form  of  Article  25  of  the  Berlin  Treaty,  Serbia 
will  submit  her  standpoint  to  them  as  to  a  competent  tribunal,  and 
will  entrust  wholly  and  without  reserve  her  fate  to  their  high 
sense  of  justice. 

"As  to  Serbia's  military  measures,  these  have  no  connection 
with  the  Bosnio-Herzegovinian  crisis,  but  are  based  on  general 
necessities,  which  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  they  have  been  taken 
in  accordance  with  a  law  enacted  before  the  proclamation  of  annexa- 
tion.   As  to  the  measures  concerning  the  preparation  of  mobilisa- 

*To  make  it  that  was  Iswolsky's  intention — fully  known  to  the  Serbian  gov- 
ernment. 


244         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

tion  and  the  securing  of  our  frontier  with  Austria-Hungary,  Serbia 
is  prepared,  even  though  her  armaments  are  of  an  eminently  de- 
fensive character  and  are  limited  to  the  utmost  minimum,  \to  in- 
terrupt and  to  cancel  them,  if  Austria-Hungary  on  her  part  is  pre- 
pared to  restore  the  normal  military  situation  on  her  Serbian  fron- 
tier or  if  the  Powers  will  guarantee  us  that  Austria-Hungary  will 
not  attack  us." 

(270)     Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Embassy  at  London.     Telegram,  Feb.  20- 
March  5,  1909.    No.  288. 

I  refer  to  the  two  telegrams  of  our  Belgrade  Minister,  dated 
Feb.  8.  The  answer  of  the  Belgrade  Cabinet  appears  to  us,  apart 
from  certain  errors  of  form,  to  deserve  the  full  approval  of  the 
Powers.  We  find  that  the  Belgrade  Government  is  very  wise  and  cor- 
rect  in  giving  up  the  demand  for  any  kind  of  territorial,  political  or 
economic  compensations  from  Austria-Hungary  as  a  consequence  of 
the  annexation,  and  in  relying  in  this  matter  upon  the  decision  of  the 
Powers.  We  likewise  approve  the  intention  of  the  Serbian  Govern- 
ment to  direct  a  circular  note  couched  in  this  spirit  to  the  Powers. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  has  just 
declared  to  us  that  it  had  never  cherished  the  intention  of  asking 
a  mediation  of  the  Powers  between  Serbia  and  itself,  nor  would  it 
in  the  future  agree  to  such  a  mediation ;  it  is  in  consequence  most 
likely  that,  if  the  Serbian  circular  note  is  directed  only  to  certain 
Powers  and  they  should  make  the  attempt  to  bring  it  to  the  notice 
of  the  Vienna  Cabinet,  the  latter  will  refuse  to  accept  the  com- 
munication and  will  demand  that  a  direct  request  be  made  by 
Serbia. 

We  believe  that  the  best  means  of  obviating  this  difficulty 
would  be  this :  that  Serbia  should  direct  her  circular  note  to  all  the 
signatory  powers  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  including  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Turkey.  In  this  event  it  would  be  necessary  to  make 
changes  in  the  text  of  the  Serbian  note  in  order  to  make  it  more 
acceptable  to  the  Vienna  cabinet.  From  our  point  of  view,  Serbia 
must  first  of  all  omit  the  whole  last  portion  referring  to  the  Serbian 
armaments,  inasmuch  as  this  question  has  up  to  the  present  not 
been  broached  in  the  course  of  negotiations  between  the  Powers 
nor  been  touched  upon  by  Austria-Hungary  herself. 


THE  BOSNIAN  CRISIS  AND  PAN-SLAVISM  245 

(271)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Feb.  20-March  5,  1909.    No.  292, 

Continuation  of  my  telegram  of  today  No.  288. 

We  should  like  to  submit  to  the  Serbian  Government,  with 
reference  to  the  editing  of  the  projected  Circular  Note,  the  follow- 
ing observations : 

It  would  seem  to  us  that  the  first  two  sentences  of  the  Serbian 
note  need  not  be  altered.  The  third,  fourth,  fifth  and  sixth  sen- 
tences are,  in  our  opinion,  dangerous  and  might  make  the  calling 
together  of  a  conference  still  more  difficult.  A  statement  might  be 
substituted  for  them  to  the  effect,  that  Serbia  will  refrain  from  all 
interference  in  a  question,  the  solution  of  which  lies  in  the  hands 
of  the  signatory  powers  of  the  Berlin  Treaty,  in  whose  sense  of  jus- 
tice Serbia  has  full  confidence. 

The  close  of  the  Serbian  text  which  refers  to  the  armaments 
would  have  to  be  completely  omitted.  If  the  Serbian  Government 
should  nevertheless,  insist  upon  this  question  this  part  of  the  cir- 
cular note  would  have  to  be  so  worded  that  Austria-Hungary  and 
the  guarantee  of  the  Powers  are  not  mentioned.  I  beg  you  to  call 
the  attention  of  the  minister  of  foreign  affairs  to  the  foregoing  and 
to  ask  his  opinion. 

(272)  The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  London  to  Iswolsky.     Telegram, 
Feb.  21'March  6,  1909. 

Grey  is  completely  in  agreement  with  the  abbreviated  form 
which  you  have  proposed  for  a  Serbian  circular  note  to  all  the 
Powers.  In  this  sense  he  has  already  telegraphed  to  Nicolson.^ 
On  the  other  hand.  Grey  and  Pichon  will  in  the  near  future  com- 
municate to  the  Russian  government  what  steps  in  their  opinion 
should  be  undertaken  at  Vienna  in  order  to  accelerate  the  calling 
of  the  conference. 

(273)  Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Minister  at  Belgrade.     Telegram,  Feb.  22- 
March  7,  1909.    No.  301. 

After  taking  into  account  the  different  considerations  which 
must  determine  the  contents  of  the  Serbian  circular  note  we  be- 
lieve that  the  note  must  read  as  follows  after  it  has  been  definitely 
edited : 

*  British  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg. 


246         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

"Proceeding  from  the  assumption  that  the  relations  of  Serbia 
with  Austria-Hungary,  after  the  proclamation  of  the  annexation 
of  Bosnia  and  the  Herzegovina,  have  from  a  legal  point  of  view 
remained  normal,  the  Royal  Government  in  no  wise  cherishes  the 
intention  of  provoking  a  war  with  the  neighbouring  monarchy, 
nor  has  it  any  desire  to  alter  these  legal  relations,  being  determined 
to  fulfil  its  obligations  of  friendly  neighbourliness  towards  Austria- 
Hungary.  Refraining  from  every  interference  in  a  question  the 
solution  of  which  rests  in  the  hands  of  the  Signatory  Powers  of  the 
Berlin  Treaty,^  in  whose  sense  of  justice  she  has  full  confidence, 
Serbia  likewise  demands  no  kind  of  compensation  from  Austria- 
Hungary  as  a  consequence  of  the  Bosnio-Herzegovinian  question, 
be  it  of  a  territorial,  political  or  economic  nature,  and  is  ready  now, 
as  heretofore,  to  examine  with  the  Vienna  Cabinet  those  questions 
which  relate  to  the  economic  relations  between  the  two  countries." 

At  the  same  time,  please  give  Milovanovitch  to  understand  that 
in  view  of  the  relaxation  of  tension  which  seems  to  be  taking  place 
in  the  general  situation,  one  is  justified  in  the  assumption  that  the 
Vienna  cabinet  will  refrain  from  demanding  from  Serbia  an  expla- 
nation of  the  armaments  and  that  consequently  any  mention  of  this 
matter  in  the  Serbian  circular  note  would  seem  untimely  and  even 
dangerous.  //  however  such  a  demand  be  made  by  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  government,  the  Royal  government  might,  by  referring  to 
the  circular  note  aforementioned,  inform  Russia  and  the  other  Powers 
of  this  step  and  ask  them  for  new  advice.  It  is  self-understood  that 
the  circular  note  must  be  directed  to  all  signatory  powers,  includ- 
ing Austria. 

I  beg  you  to  bring  the  above  to  the  knowledge  of  the  Serbian 
Government  and  to  inform  us  of  its  decision.  According  to  our 
information  Count  Forgach  ^  has  been  instructed  to  negotiate  with 
the  Serbian  government  regarding  a  commercial  treaty.  On  this 
occasion  Aehrenthal  stated  that  he  had  no  intention  of  humiliating 
Serbia  and  the  Forgach  mission  will  in  no  sense  bear  the  character 
of  an  ultimatum.  On  the  other  hand  it  is  desirable  that  Serbia  should 

*  So  far  only  Iswolsky  viewed  it  as  absolutely  necessary  that  a  conference  of 
the  signatories  settle  the  question,  which  at  that  moment  was  one  that  concerned 
only  Turkey  and  Austria-Hungary  both  of  which  were  in  accord  and  had  com- 
plied with  the  Berlin  Treaty  of  1878. 

*  Austro-Hungarian  minister  at  Belgrade. 


I 


THE  BOSNIAN  CRISIS  AND  PAN-SLAVISM  247 

not  hesitate  so  much  since  the  expiration  of  the  commercial  treaty 
renders  a  provisional  extension  necessary ;  as  to  the  economic 
negotiations  between  both  countries,  these  might  be  postponed  to  a 
later  date.  Aehrenthal  added  that  he  did  not  wish  in  any  way  to 
exert  pressure  upon  the  Serbian  government  in  this  question.  In 
view  of  this  assurance  we  hope  that  the  Serbian  government  will 
not  decline  the  overtures  of  the  Austrian  representative  and  that  in 
the  course  of  these  negotiations  it  will  place  itself  on  the  ground 
of  normal  commercial  relations  between  Austria-Hungary  and 
Serbia. 

(274)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Feb.  22-March  7,  1909.    No.  302. 

I  refer  to  my  telegrams  Nos.  288  and  292. 

In  order  to  avoid  the  appearance  that  Serbia  wishes  to  escape 
from  direct  negotiations  with  Austria-Hungary  with  regard  to 
questions  which  usually  form  the  object  of  negotiations  between 
two  neighbouring  states,  it  would  be  desirable  to  add  to  the  second 
sentence  of  the  Serbian  Note,  which  ends  with  the  words  "political 
or  economic,"  the  words  "while  the  Government  is  prepared  now  as 
heretofore  to  discuss  with  the  Vienna  Cabinet  those  questions 
which  refer  to  the  economic  relations  between  both  States."  The 
Serbian  Government  would  thereby  give  Europe  a  new  proof  of 
its  friendly  intentions.  It  seems  to  us  very  important  that  Milo- 
vanovitch  should  accept  this  proposal,  chiefly  in  view  of  the  arrival 
of  Forgach  ,who,  as  the  press  informs  us,  is  instructed  to  begin  ne- 
gotiations with  the  Belgrade  cabinet. 

Please  communicate  this  to  Milovanovitch.  As  to  our  other 
observations  we  shall  communicate  them  to  you  shortly. 

(275)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Feb.  23'March  8,  1909. 

Please  persuade   Milovanovitch  to  accept  the   Russian  draft. 

Serbia  need  not  hesitate  to  declare  that  she  does  not  wish  to  interfere 
with  the  question  of  annexation.  Legally,  this  is  the  only  invul- 
nerable standpoint  and  it  does  not  mean  that  Serbia  thereby  loses 
the  right,  when  the  proper  time  shall  have  arrived,  of  acquainting 
the  Powers  with  her  wishes.  We,  on  our  part,  can  only  repeat  that 
the  act  of  annexation  will  in  the  last  resort  not  receive  our  signature. 


248         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

(276)  The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Cettinje  to  Iswolsky.     Telegram, 
Feb.  13-26,  1909. 

Measures  have  been  taken  to  immediately  discuss  with  Serbia  a  com- 
mon  plan  of  campaign;  either  a  proposal  or  some  competent  personality 
will  be  sent  to  Belgrade, 

(277)  Iswolsky  to   the  Russian  Minister  at  Bucharest.     Letter,  Feb.  24- 
March  9,  1909. 

The  Roumanian  Minister  has  given  me  reassuring  declara- 
tions regarding  the  neutral  attitude  of  Roumania  in  case  of  a  conflict 
between  Serbia  and  Austria.  This  question  is  to  be  mentioned  by  you 
on  some  suitable  occasion  in  order  that  an  official  declaration  bearing 
on  this  point  might  be  obtained  by  us  on  which  we  could  base  ourselves 
in  future  in  case  of  necessity 

(278)  Iwolsky  to  the  Russian  Embassy  at  London.     Telegram,  Feb.  26- 

March  11,  1909.    No.  318. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  ambassador  has  handed  me  the  text  of 
the  Austrian-Turkish  agreement  as  well  as  the  copy  of  a  note  of 
Aehrenthal.  I  have  the  intention  to  confirm  the  receipt  of  these 
two  documents  and  to  remind  on  this  occasion  the  Vienna  cabinet, 
that,  in  our  opinion,  a  direct  understanding  between  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Turkey  does  not  exclude  the  necessity  of  submitting 
the  Bosnio-Herzegovinian  question  to  a  conference  of  the  signatory 
powers  of  the  Berlin  treaty,  and  to  add  that,  in  consequence,  we 
were  prepared  to  begin  now  negotiations  with  Austria  and  the 
other  signatory  powers  for  the  meeting  of  a  Conference  which 
would  have  to  examine  the  Bosnio-Herzegovinian  question  as  well 
as  the  other  points  of  the  program,  which  has  already  been  accepted 
by  all  cabinets.  Please  communicate  this  to  the  London  cabinet 
and  inform  me  whether  it  is  prepared  to  give  Vienna  an  analogous 
answer. 

(279)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Feb.  26-March  11,  1909.    No.  319. 

The  Serbian  circular  note  which  was  handed  to  me  today  by 
the  Serbian  minister,  is,  despite  some  editorial  details  which  have 
been  added  contrary  to  our  advice,  as  a  whole  satisfactory,  as  it 


THE  BOSNIAN  CRISIS  AND  PAN-SLAVISM  249 

should  be  to  every  unprejudiced  person.  Unfortunately,  we  have 
ground  for  assuming  that  this  is  not  the  view  of  the  Vienna  cabinet. 
As  I  have  been  told  by  the  Austro -Hungarian  ambassador,  his 
government  would  insist  upon  another  formula  which  will  mention 
the  Austro-Turkish  protocol  and  which  will  recognize  the  annexa- 
tion as  a  fait  accompli  which  cannot  further  be  called  in  question. 
Such  a  demand  on  the  part  of  the  Vienna  cabinet  leaves  little  hope 
for  a  friendly  understanding,  for  it  appears  doubtful  whether  a 
government  could  be  found  in  Serbia  which  would  give  its  con- 
sent to  this.  We  on  our  part  have  done  everything  possible  to 
persuade  Serbia  to  moderation.  It  seems  to  us  urgently  necessary 
now  that  the  cabinets  of  Paris,  London  and  Rome  should  bring 
their  entire  influence  to  bear  at  Vienna  and  Berlin  in  order  to  move 
Aehrenthal  to  a  more  conciliatory  attitude. 

(280)  The  Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  London  to  Iswolsky.     Telegram, 
Feb.  27-March  12,  1909. 

Your  telegram  No.  319  received. 

Grey  is  of  opinion  that  one  could  not  demand  from  Serbia  that 
she  should  recognize  the  annexation  before  the  signatory  powers 
of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  had  discussed  this  question  at  the  confer- 
ence. He  also  thinks  that  the  last  Serbian  circular  note,  especially 
if  Serbia  should  give  her  early  consent  to  enter  into  direct  negotia- 
tions with  Austria  regarding  the  commercial  treaty,  should  satisfy 
the  Vienna  cabinet.  If  Mensdorff  ^  here  should  speak  in  the  same 
sense  as  Berchtold  ^  to  you.  Grey  will  express  to  him  his  opinion 
in  categorical  form  and  add  that  if  Austria  should  still  be  dissatisfied 
with  Serbia,  this  would  merely  mean  that  Austria  could  really  not 
be  satisfied  at  all.  If  such  a  conversation  should  take  place.  Grey 
will  at  once  inform  the  British  Ambassadors  at  Vienna,  Berlin, 
Paris,  Rome  and  St.  Petersburg. 

(281)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Feb.  TZ-March  13,  1909. 

Supplementary  to  my  telegram  of  yesterday.  Yesterday  the 
Austrian  ambassador  communicated  to  Grey  in  a  conciliatory  form 

*  Austro-Hungarian  ambassador  at  London. 

'  Austro-Hungarian  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg. 


250         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

Aehrenthal's  comments  regarding  the  text  of  the  Serbian  circular 
note,  and  since  the  recall  of  the  circular  note  is  not  demanded  by- 
Austria,  and,  as  it  is  also  regarded  as  a  further  step  towards  the 
peaceful  regulation  of  Austrian-Serbian  relations,  Grey's  reply  took 
a  much  more  conciliatory  form.  Mensdorff  insisted  that  if  Serbia 
should  leave  the  question  of  the  annexation  to  the  decision  of  the 
Powers  this  would  be  contrary  to  her  own  declarations,  that  the 
annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  does  not  alter  the  legal 
relations  of  Serbia  to  Austria. 

The  Vienna  cabinet  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  agreements  of 
Turkey  with  Austria  and  Bulgaria,  finally  settle  the  positive  ques- 
tion of  the  violation  of  the  Berlin  Treaty  and  that  only  the  formal 
sanction  of  the  modifications  which  have  already  taken  place  is 
left  to  the  signatory  powers. 

Grey  disagreed  in  principle  with  this  opinion  and  justified  the 
standpoint  of  the  Serbian  circular  note,  as  expressed  in  my  tele- 
gram of  yesterday.  Furthermore,  the  Austrian  ambassador  laid 
particular  stress  on  the  form  of  the  answer,  which  Serbia  has  to 
give  to  the  proposal  of  direct  negotiations  regarding  the  commer- 
cial treaty  and  added  that  Austria  could  not  content  herself  with 
the  promise  of  Serbia  to  "continue"  friendly  and  neighbourly  rela- 
tions with  Austria,  since  the  Vienna  cabinet  is  dissatisfied  with  the 
present  relations  and  wishes  to  alter  them. 

During  the  conversation,  Mensdorff  did  not  once  allude  to  the 
fact  that  Austria  will  demand  from  Serbia  a  formal  recognition  of 
the  annexation.  Therefore,  Grey  believes  that  if  Mensdorff  was 
not  specially  instructed  to  moderate  the  form  of  yesterday's  com- 
munication to  the  British  government,  Austria-Hungary  will  con- 
tent herself  with  a  favourable  answer  to  Forgach's  proposals  if  a 
general  explanation  be  added  to  this  answer  to  the  effect  that 
Serbia  wishes  to  maintain  good  and  neighbourly  relations  with 
Austria.  Mensdorff  has  indicated  that  the  Serbian  government 
might  come  to  an  understanding  with  the  Austrian  minister  at  Bel- 
grade as  to  the  wording  of  this  answer  and  Grey  sees  no  obstacle 
to  accept  this  proposal.  Serbia  ought,  however,  to  refuse  deci- 
sively the  recognition  of  the  annexation  should  this  be  demanded 
of  her  on  this  occasion.^ 

^  Such  was  the  thought  back  of  the  term  "  legal  relations." 


THE  BOSNIAN  CRISIS  AND  PAN-SLAVISM  251 

(282)  Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Embassy  at  London.    Telegram,  March  2- 

15,  1909.    No,  ZZ7. 

In  answer  to  the  communication  of  the  Vienna  Cabinet  which 
accompanied  the  Austrian-Turkish  protocol,  I  today  handed  Berch- 
told  a  note  in  which  I  confirm  the  receipt  of  the  two  documents 
and  then  express  myself  as  follows : 

"In  recalling  to  Your  Excellency  the  exchange  of  opinion  which 
took  place  in  November  and  December  of  last  year  between  the 
cabinets  of  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg,  and  with  special  reference 
to  the  communications  of  November  9th  and  December  6th,  the 
undersigned  regards  it  as  his  duty  to  confirm  once  more  the  fact 
that,  according  to  the  view  of  the  Imperial  Russian  Government, 
a  direct  understanding  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Turkey 
does  not  exclude  the  necessity  of  submitting  the  question  of  Bosnia 
and  the  Herzegovina  to  a  conference  of  the  signatory  powers  of 
the  Berlin  Treaty.  The  Russian  Government  is  therefore  prepared 
to  come  to  an  agreement  with  Austria-Hungary  and  the  other 
signatory  powers  in  order  to  bring  about  the  definite  meeting  of 
the  conference,  which  would  have  to  occupy  itself  with  the  Bosnio- 
Herzegovinian  question  as  well  as  with  the  other  points  of  the 
program  accepted  by  all  Powers." 

Please  bring  the  contents  of  this  communication  to  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  British  Government. 

(283)  The  Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  London  to  Iswolsky.     Telegram, 
March  3-16,  1909. 

Grey  regrets  extraordinarily  that  the  Serbian  Government  in 
its  answer  to  the  Vienna  Cabinet  has  not  paid  sufficient  attention 
to  the  advice  of  Russia  and  the  other  Powers  and  has  failed  to 
place  itself  in  a  favourable  diplomatic  position,  which  might  have 
deprived  Austria  of  every  pretext  for  manifesting  displeasure. 
We  have  no  news  here  regarding  the  further  intentions  of  Aus- 
tria. The  last  reports  of  the  British  ambassador  at  Vienna  refer 
to  a  conciliatory  mood  on  the  part  of  Aehrenthal,  and  Cartwright 
even  believes  that  Austria,  before  she  takes  extreme  measures 
against  Serbia,  will  address  another  communication  to  the  Powers. 
Grey  believes  it  is  rather  probable  that  the  Serbian  Government, 
out  of  considerations  of  internal  policy,  will  yield  only  to  energetic 


252         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

pressure  from  the  Powers.  The  British  Government  will,  if  neces- 
sary, take  part  in  exerting  this  pressure  and  at  all  events  will  support 
by  every  possible  means  every  Russian  initiative  at  Belgrade,  which 
would  be  intended  to  persuade  the  Serbian  Government  to  return  an 
answer  in  accordance  with  the  wishes  of  the  Vienna  Cabinet.^  Grey, 
however,  believes  that  this  answer  must  confine  itself  to  assur- 
ances of  readiness  for  peace,  to  the  desire  for  friendly  and  neigh- 
bourly relations,  and  to  the  willingness  to  discuss,  by  means  of 
direct  negotiations,  all  questions  of  a  purely  economic  nature  affect- 
ing the  interests  of  both  States. 

(284)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Confidential  Letter,  March  4-17,  1909. 

The  standpoint  of  the  British  Government  regarding  the  vari- 
ous phases  of  the  Serbian-Austrian  crisis,  will  be  familiar  to  Your 
Excellency  from  my  telegrams  during  the  last  two  weeks  and  from 
the  conversations  with  Sir  A.  Nicolson,  and  I  therefore  touch  on 
this  question  only  in  briefest  form. 

Everyone  was  convinced  here  that  the  Serbian  circular  note, 
couched  in  the  spirit  of  advice  given  by  the  Russian  Government, 
would  achieve  its  purpose.  But  the  dry  and  negative  form  which 
the  Belgrade  Cabinet  gave  this  diplomatic  document  has  not  made 
a  favourable  impression  on  the  British  Government.  In  considera- 
tion however  of  the  fact  that  the  Circular  Note  contains  valuable 
and  peaceful  declarations,  Grey  had  hoped  that  the  editorial  mis- 
takes of  the  Serbian  note  would  be  made  good  by  new  assurances 
on  the  part  of  Serbia.  These  should  have  been  to  the  effect  that 
Serbia  wishes  to  maintain  friendly  and  neighbourly  relations  with 
Austria.  Such  an  opportunity  was  offered  when  Serbia  had  to 
answer  the  Austrian  proposal  for  direct  negotiation  regarding  the 
commercial  treaty.  After  his  conversation  with  Mensdorff,  con- 
cerning which  I  reported  to  Your  Excellency  at  the  time,  Grey 
was  of  the  impression  that  such  a  procedure  on  the  part  of  Serbia 
would  have  satisfied  the  Vienna  cabinet  and  considerably  strength- 
ened Serbia's  international  position.  In  this  way,  Serbia  might 
have  been  able,  under  the  protection  of  the  Powers,  not  to  recog- 

*  This  incessant  veering  around  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  was  often  the  despair  of 
Iswolsky  and  his  successor,  Sazonoff. 


THE  BOSNIAN  CRISIS  AND  PAN-SLAVISM  253 

nize  the  annexation  and  at  the  same  time  obviate  the  danger  of 
being  forced  to  consider  further  demands  on  the  part  of  Austria. 

Unfortunately  the  Serbian  Government  has  not  justified  these 
hopes.  After  Milovanovitch  had  entered  upon  an  exchange  of 
views  with  Forgach  regarding  the  editing  of  the  Serbian  answer, 
he  suddenly  sent  this  answer  to  Vienna,  ignoring  the  Austrian 
minister  in  Belgrade  and,  moreover,  communicated  the  contents 
of  this  answer  to  the  press,  before  it  had  become  known  to  the 
Vienna  cabinet.  Quite  apart  from  this,  the  answer  in  itself  was 
tactless:  instead  of  friendly  assurances — the  repetition  of  the  ex- 
pressions of  the  circular  note  which  had  displeased  Vienna, — and 
instead  of  a  short  exposition  of  Serbia's  wishes  regarding  the  com- 
mercial treaty,  the  Vienna  cabinet  is  given  a  lengthy  lecture  as 
to  how  this  question  is  to  be  treated  in  the  two  Parliaments  of 
the  Danube  Monarchy. 

The  British  Government  is  fully  aware  of  the  fact  that  Austria 
might  have  displayed  more  friendliness  and  conciliatoriness  to- 
wards Serbia.  But  it  is  equally  well  known  here  that  in  order  to 
settle  a  conflict  between  two  States  so  different  in  size  and  power, 
the  weaker  must  show  more  good  will  than  Serbia  has  up  to  now 
been  inclined  to  do. 

Although  Sir  Edward  Grey  is  at  present  preoccupied  as  to  the 
future,  I  cannot  say  that  he  has  given  up  the  hope  of  a  peaceful 
solution  of  the  Austrian-Serbian  conflict.  In  his  opinion,  the  future 
depends  entirely  upon  whether  Austria  wishes  war  or  peace,  and 
he  sees  absolutely  no  reason  for  believing  that  Austria  desires  an  armed 
conflict.  Apart  from  the  fact  that  it  is  impossible  to  foresee  with 
certainty  how  many  States  would  be  drawn  into  this  war,  a  war 
with  Serbia  alone  is  not  intended  by  Aehrenthal,  since  even  such 
a  war  would  demand  considerable  human  and  material  sacrifices.^ 

The  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna  has  also  of  late  more  than 
once  mentioned  a  more  conciliatory  feeling  in  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  ministry  for  foreign  affairs,  and  Grey  therefore  hopes 
that  Austria  will  not  immediately  adopt  radical  measures  towards 
Serbia.  He  believes  that  the  Vienna  cabinet  will  now  request 
declarations   either   from   the   Powers   or   from    Serbia,   but   not 

*  Rather  obscure.    Was  it  the  intention  to  imply  that  Austria-Hungary  would 
call  upon  Germany's  army  to  help  her  overcome  the  Serbians? 


254         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


I 


in  the  form  of  an  ultimatum,  and  this  will  not  only  give  the  Bel- 
grade cabinet  the  possibility  for  quiet  reflection,  but  will  also  per- 
mit the  Powers  who  are  friendly  disposed  towards  Serbia,  to  exert^j 
a  moderating  influence  upon  her.    Should  this  hope  be  confirmed,^! 
the  British  government  expects  Russia  to  continue  her  magnani- 
mous efforts  in  Belgrade  in  favour  of  general  peace,  in  which  she 
may   always    count   upon   the    support   of   the    London    cabinet. 
Lately  Grey  has  become  more  and  more  convinced  that  King  Petef^U 
and  the  Serbian  Government,  out  of  fear  of  domestic  disturbances,      ' 
will  not  act  on  friendly  advice,  but  wish  to  show  that  they  have  been 
forced  into   this  yielding  attitude   by   the  energetic  pressure   of   the 
Powers.    In  the  interests  of  peace,  the  British  government  would  be 
prepared  to  take  part  in  such  an  action,  but  naturally  on  condition  that 
this  would  be  approved  by  Russia.^ 

(285)     Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Embassies  at  London  and  Paris.    Telegram, 
March  4-17,  1909.    No.  356. 

The  German  Ambassador  here  has  just  undertaken  a  confiden- 
tial demarche,  instructed  by  Prince  Biilow,  a  step  w*hich  for  the 
first  time  since  the  outbreak  of  the  crisis  appears  to  point  to  the 
wish  of  the  Berlin  cabinet  to  find  a  means  of  relieving  the  situation 
of  its  tension.  Count  Pourtales  stated  to  me  that  the  German  gov- 
ernment was  prepared  to  sound  the  Vienna  cabinet  in  order  to 
learn  whether  it  was  disposed  to  communicate  the  agreement  with 
Turkey  to  the  Powers  and  to  submit  the  alteration  of  Article  25 
of  the  Berlin  Treaty  for  their  formal  sanction.  This  sanction 
might  take  place  by  way  of  an  exchange  of  notes.  If  the  cabinet 
of  St.  Petersburg  agrees  to  this  point  of  view,  the  German  govern- 
ment, alone  or  together  with  Russia,  would  request  the  other 
Powers  to  accept  this  procedure,  which  does  justice  to  the  prin- 
ciple of  European  sanction  which  Russia  upholds,  and  which  would 
at  the  same  time  permit  the  latter  to  speak  energetically  at  Bel- 
grade. 

I  thanked  Count  Pourtales  for  this  friendly  communication, 
and  limited  myself  to  remarking  that  at  first  glance  the  German 
proposal  seemed  to  exclude  a  conference  and  gave  Austria  the 

*  Meaning  that  Grey  was  willing  to  play  with  dynamite  to  save  King  Peter's 
face. 


THE  BOSNIAN  CRISIS  AND  PAN-SLAVISM  255 

possibility,  once  the  annexation  has  been  recognized  by  the  Powers, 
to  evade  a  solution  of  the  other  points  of  the  programme  and  to 
get  Serbia  into  her  power.  I  added,  however,  that  I  recognized 
the  conciliatory  spirit  of  Count  Pourtales'  communication  and  that 
I  would  give  full  consideration  to  the  proposal.  It  seems  to  me 
that  this  effort  of  Germany  to  bring  about  a  relaxation  of  the  ten- 
sion, must  be  encouraged  and  her  proposal  might  be  adopted  on 
principle  with  the  provision  that  the  form  of  the  Austrian  action 
must  be  precisely  established  and,  furthermore,  guarantees  for  the 
meeting  of  the  conference  be  demanded.  Please  communicate  the 
foregoing  confidentially  to  the  minister  of  foreign  affairs  and 
should  he  share  my  point  of  view  /  will  prepare  the  draft  of  an 
answer  in  this  sense  and  communicate  it  to  the  Cabinets  of  Paris  and 
London  before  I  send  it  to  Berlin} 

(286)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  March  4-17,  1909.    No.  364. 

No.  1.  Sub  No.  2  I  am  sending  you  the  draft  of  my  answer  to 
the  Berlin  Cabinet.  Ask  the  minister  of  foreign  affairs  if  he 
agrees. 

(287)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  March  4-17,  1909.    No.  365. 

No.  2.  Herewith  the  draft  mentioned  in  my  telegram  No.  1: 
"The  Russian  Government  has  not  failed  to  examine  carefully 
the  confidential  communication  of  the  Berlin  cabinet,  the  friendly 
spirit  of  which  is  thoroughly  appreciated.  The  Berlin  cabinet  is 
aware  of  all  the  efforts  which  Russia  has  made  in  order  to  exer- 
cise a  moderating  influence  upon  the  Serbian  government.  If  the 
counsels  of  the  Imperial  government  have  not  been  followed  in 
all  particulars  at  Belgrade,  they  have  still  not  remained  without 
effect  and  the  Imperial  cabinet  is  ready  to  continue  to  act  in  the 
same  spirit. 

"Unfortunately,  the  Vienna  cabinet  is  very  little  disposed  to 
acknowledge  the  good  will,  which  Serbia,  in  spite  of  manifold 
difficulties,  has  displayed  and  makes  greater  and  greater  demands. 
According  to  the  last  advices  which  have  been  received  from  Vienna, 

*  Though  the  demarche  was  undertaken  by  the  German  Government,  Iswolsky, 
rather  than  advise  the  German  government  to  get  in  touch  with  Paris  and  Lon- 
don, decided  upon  a  measure  calculated  to  keep  the  crisis  in  his  hands  entirely. 


256         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


4 


it  must  be  feared  that  war  has  been  finally  resolved  upon  there? 
However  that  may  be,  the  Russian  government  has  neglected 
nothing  from  the  very  beginning  of  the  crisis  in  order  to  arrive 
at  a  peaceful  solution  of  the  questions  in  dispute.  It  will  for  this 
reason  likewise  accept  the  present  proposals  of  the  Berlin  cabinet, 
and  if  Austria  undertakes  an  action  in  the  sense  mentioned  by  the 
German  government,  that  is  to  say,  if  she  should  ask  the  Powers 
for  a  formal  sanction  of  the  alteration  of  Article  25  of  the  Berlin 
Treaty  by  way  of  an  exchange  of  notes,  the  Russian  government 
will  on  its  part  consider  it  a  duty  to  meet  this  procedure  with  the 
sincere  wish  to  find  in  it  the  elements  of  a  solution  which  would 
be  equally  satisfying  to  all  the  signatory  powers  of  the  Berl 
Treaty." 


(288)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  March  4-17,  1909.    No.  363. 


1 


We  learn  that  the  Serbian  reply  to  the  communication  of  Count 
Forgach  has  not  been  recognized  as  satisfactory  at  Vienna.  With- 
out wishing  to  enter  into  any  examination  of  the  details  of  the 
Serbian  answer  we  have  to  point  out  that  it  has  been  drafted  with- 
out our  participation,  and  that  it  is  in  no  sense  in  accordance  with 
the  counsels  which  were  given  in  Belgrade;  it  appears,  however, 
that  the  Vienna  cabinet  has  the  intention  of  continuing  the  nego- 
tiations with  Belgrade  and  it  may  be  expected  that  Forgach  will 
send  a  new  communication  to  the  Serbian  government. 

We  have  the  intention  of  bringing  our  entire  influence  to  bear 
on  this  case,  in  order  to  facilitate  an  agreement  between  the  Serbian 
government  and  the  Austrian  minister  on  the  text  of  the  Serbian 
reply,  which  would  be  equally  satisfying  to  both  parties,  and  we 
hope  that  the  government,  to  which  you  are  accredited,  will  sup- 
port our  action  in  the  interests  of  universal  peace. 

(289)     The  Russian  Minister  at  Belgrade  to  Iswolsky.     Telegram,  March 
4-17,  1909. 

The  situation  grows  more  acute.  The  news  which  reaches  us 
here,  regarding  increased  military  preparations  on  the  part  of  Aus- 
tria might  induce  Serbia  to  adopt  similar  measures.   In  any  event 

*Not  the  case.     Austria-Hungary   was  willing  to  continue  negotiations,  as 
shown  in  No.  288. 


THE  BOSNIAN  CRISIS  AND  PAN-SLAVISM  257 

these  would  be  regarded  by  Austria  as  a  provocation.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  Royal  government,  in  view  of  declarations  made  by  Aehr- 
enthal  and  Forgach,  is  convinced  that  Austria  in  her  next  communi- 
cation will  openly  demand  that  Serbia  should  first  of  all  declare  the 
Bosnio-Herzegovinian  question  as  settled  upon  the  basis  of  the 
Austrian-Turkish  protocol,  so  as  to  facilitate  her  participation  in 
the  conference.  Serbia  will  very  likely  reply  as  before,  and  then 
the  conflict  would  be  inevitable.  Simitch^  believes  that  the  only 
way  out  of  this  critical  situation  would  consist  in  the  Great  Powers 
hindering  Austria  in  one  way  or  another  from  negotiating  directly 
with  Serbia.  The  minister  believes  that  this  might,  for  instance, 
be  achieved  at  Belgrade  by  proposing  to  the  Belgrade  cabinet  that 
Serbia  should  disarm.  The  Government  would  unconditionally 
yield  to  this  request  and  would  in  this  wise  place  Austria  in  an 
extremely  difficult  situation  with  respect  to  Europe. 

Remarkable  as  this  opinion  of  the  minister  may  appear  I  never- 
theless consider  it  my  duty  to  communicate  it  to  you. 

(290)    Iswolsky  to   the  Russian  Minister  at  Belgrade.     Telegram,  March 
4-17,  1909. 

The  answer  of  the  Serbian  government  to  Forgach's  communi- 
cation has  given  no  satisfaction  at  Vienna.  The  other  Powers  are 
also  of  the  opinion  that  the  answer  is  not  in  accordance  with  present 
conditions.  It  is  to  be  expected  that  Austria  will  now  make  still 
more  energetic  demands  on  Serbia.  We  are  surprised  that  the  Bel- 
grade cabinet  though  it  has  apparently,  in  principle,  seen  the  neces- 
sity of  yielding  to  Austria,  should  not  have  followed  our  advice 
to  come  to  an  understanding  with  Forgach  as  to  the  final  reply 
which  would  have  satisfied  Austria.  One  should  not  forget  that 
with  each  new  demand  the  Vienna  cabinet  will  increase  its  claims 
and  thus  our  task  of  helping  Serbia  to  the  best  of  our  ability  in 
the  diplomatic  negotiations  with  the  Powers,  is  rendered  extra- 
ordinarily difficult. 

As  we  have  already  stated  the  Serbian  answer  given  under 
pressure  of  coercion,  cannot  decide  the  ultimate  fate  of  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina,  even  though  the  Serbian  reply  should  contain  a  cate- 
gorical renouncement  of  these  provinces.     This  question  has  to 

*  Serbian  minister  at  Vienna. 


258 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


be  settled  exclusively  by  the  Powers  and  their  point  of  view  does 
not  depend  upon  the  standpoint  of  the  Serbian  government,  but  is 
based,  as  is  well  known  at  Belgrade,  on  questions  of  law  and  the 
necessity  of  arriving  at  an  agreement  between  the  Powers.  Please, 
communicate  this  to  the  Serbian  government  and  express  the  ex- 
pectation that  these  considerations  will  be  given  attention  in  the 
drafting  of  the  answer,  since  Forgach  will  very  likely  make  a  new 
communication  in  the  near  future. 


(291) 


The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  London  to  Iswolsky. 
March  6-19.  1909.    No.  7. 


Telegram, 


The  British  ambassador  in  St.  Petersburg  has  been  instructed 
to  communicate  to  you  the  considerations  of  his  government  re- 
garding the  German  proposal  and  our  answer.  The  general  im- 
pression is  that  the  proposal  has  been,  apparently,  inspired  at 
Vienna  and  that  its  purpose  is  to  render  a  conference  unneces- 
sary. Since  the  conference  is  likewise  not  mentioned  in  the 
draft  of  our  answer,  the  acceptance  of  the  German  proposal 
would  therefore  lead  to  the  conference  being  superseded  by 
an  exchange  of  notes.  England's  chief  reason  for  expressing  her- 
self in  favour  of  a  conference  is  due  to  Russian  wishes;  if  the 
Russian  Government  now  considers  it  possible  to  give  up  this  idea, 
the  British  Government  is  also  prepared  to  be  satisfied  with  an 
exchange  of  notes  regarding  the  following  questions:  Bosnia,  the  Herze- 
govina, Turkey,  Bulgaria  and  the  abolishing  of  Article  29  of  the  Ber- 
lin Treaty  which  refers  to  Montenegro.  Grey  is  also  of  the  opinion 
that  the  Russian  government  would  have  to  postpone  the  answer 
to  the  German  proposal  until  the  present  Austrian-Serbian  crisis 
had  found  a  solution.  Hardinge  ^  observed  to  me  that  the  words 
contained  in  your  answer  to  the  effect  that  it  was  to  be  feared  Vienna 
had  finally  determined  upon  war,  are  hardly  in  accordance  with  the 
present  situation. 


(292)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  March  9-22,  1909.    No.  10. 

Aehrenthal  has  communicated  to  the  British  ambassador  at 
Vienna  the  draft  of  a  Serbian  note  which  would  satisfy  Austria. 

*  British  under-secretary  for  foreign  affairs. 


THE  BOSNIAN  CRISIS  AND  PAN-SLAVISM  259 

It  is  first  of  all  demanded  that  Serbia  should  admit  that  the 
annexation  of  Bosnia  had  not  infringed  Serbian  rights  and  that  she' 
should  promise  that  in  the  future  she  would  give  up  her  policy  of 
opposition  and  of  protest  regarding  the  annexation. 

Grey  has  informed  Vienna  that  such  a  demand  would  be  humili- 
ating for  Serbia  and  would  mean  an  apology  for  her  former  conduct. 
Aehrenthal  insisted  upon  his  point  of  view,  but  let  it  be  understood 
that  Austria  would  accept  the  British  proposal,^  if  the  Powers,  even 
though  singly  and  in  a  non-official  form,  give  their  assent  to  the 
annexation. 

In  the  assumption  that  this  last  question  must  not  be  brought 
into  connection  with  the  Austrian-Serbian  conflict.  Grey  has  the  in- 
tention, if  the  situation  should  not  be  changed  by  to-morrow,  of 
communicating  a  note  to  Aehrenthal.  Cartwright  ^  will  be  instruct- 
ed to  declare  that  this  is  the  last  attempt  of  the  Powers  to  reconcile 
Austria  with  Serbia  )and  he  will  point  to  the  responsibility  which 
would  devolve  upon  Austria  if  she  should  decline  such  extensive 
guarantees  of  the  conciliatory  intentions  of  Serbia.  If  Aehrenthal  i 
accepts  the  English  proposal,  the  representatives  of  the  other  Pow-  | 
ers  would  have  to  give  their  consent. 

Hardinge  consulted  the  French  Ambassador  and  me  at  the  same 
time  today,  and  we  both  ventured  to  express  the  opinion  that  the 
English  note  contains  nothing  which  is  contrary  to  the  view  of  our^ 
governments.  Hardinge  and  Cambon  ^  both  declared  that  all  ex- 
cessive demands  on  the  part  of  Aehrenthal  must  be  met  with  firm- 
ness. 

(293)     Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Embassies  at  Paris  and  London.    Telegram, 
March  10-23,  1909. 

The  German  ambassador  has  made  me  the  following  verbal  and 
confidential  communication : 

"The  German  government  has  learned  with  pleasure,  that  the 
Russian  Government  appreciates  the  friendly  feeling  which  has  in- 
spired the  German  initiative  and  that  the  other  Cabinets  seem  dis- 
posed to  adhere  to  the  German  proposal.  The  German  Govern- 
ment is  now  prepared  to  approach  the  Vienna  Cabinet  with  the 

*  British  ambassador  at  Vienna. 

*  Paul ,  French  ambassador  at  London. 


260         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

suggestion  that  the  other  Powers  should  be  requested,  under  refer- 
ence to  the  notification  of  the  Austro-Turkish  agreement,  to  give 
their  formal  assent  to  the  abolition  of  Art.  25  of  the  Treaty  of  Ber- 
lin. But  before  it  undertakes  this  step  at  Vienna,  it  should  like  to 
Jiave  the  assurance,  that  the  Cabinet  of  St.  Petersburg  is  firmly  re- 
solved to  accede  to  the  Austrian  demand  and  to  give  its  uncondi- 
tional formal  assent  to  the  abolition  of  Art.  25." 

By  order  of  the  Czar  I  have  returned  to  Count  Pourtales  the 
following  verbal  and  confidential  reply : 

"The  German  Government  has  informed  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment that  it  is  prepared  to  propose  to  Austria-Hungary  to  request 
the  Powers  under  reference  to  the  notification  of  the  Austro-Turk- 
ish agreement,  to  give  their  formal  assent  to  the  abolition  of  Art. 
25  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin.  The  Russian  Government  does  not 
hesitate  to  declare  that,  if  the  Vienna  Cabinet  applies  with  such  a 
request  to  the  Powers,  Russia  will  not  fail  to  give  its  unconditional 
formal  assent.  By  giving  this  new  proof  of  our  desire  to  settle  the 
present  difficulties,  we  hope  that  the  Berlin  Cabinet  will  bring  its 
whole  influence  to  bear  upon  the  Vienna  Cabinet  in  order  to  induce 
it  to  accept  the  English  proposal  and  to  arrive  at  an  understanding 
between  Austria-Hungary  and  Serbia." 

(294)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  March  10-23,  1909.    No.  409. 

Count  Pourtales  has  added  to  the  communication  contained  in 
the  previous  telegram  that  a  negative  or  even  an  evasive  answer  on 
our  part  would  lead  to  the  result  that  Germany  "would  allow  things 
to  take  their  own  course  and  hold  us  responsible  for  the  conse- 
quences" ;  at  the  same  time  he  gave  me  to  understand  that  the  suc- 
cess of  the  British  step  at  Vienna  depends  exclusively  upon  our 
acceptance  of  Billow's  proposal. 

We  have  to  deal  apparently  with  an  action  which  permits  of  no 
contradiction,  which  has  been  agreed  upon  between  Vienna  and 
Berlin  and  which  is  to  place  us  before  the  following  alternatives: 
an  immediate  regulation  of  the  question  of  annexation  by  an  ex- 
change of  notes,  or  the  invasion  of  Serbia.  In  view  of  the  great 
danger  which  an  Austrian-Serbian  conflict  would  mean  for  us  as 
well  as  for  general  peace,  and  in  order  to  protect  Serbia,  we  have  no 
other  choice  than  to  accept  the  German  proposal. 


I 


I 


THE  BOSNIAN  CRISIS  AND  PAN-SLAVISM  261 

I  have  consequently,  with  the  assent  of  the  czar,  declared  to  the 
German  ambassadoc^that  if  the  Vienna  cabinet  undertakes  the  step 
mentioned  in  the  German  communication,  the  Russian  government 
will  answer  by  an  unconditional  acceptance  of  the  proposal.  I  have 
added  that  in  giving  this  new  proof  of  our  desire  to  settle  the  crisis, 
we  hope  that  the  Berlin  cabinet  will  bring  its  entire  influence  to 
bear  upon  Vienna  in  favour  of  the  British  initiative.  In  com- 
municating the  above  to  the  minister  of  foreign  affairs  I  request  you 
to  lay  special  stress  on  the  great  sacrifice  which  we  are  making  for 
the  cause  of  peace ;  the  cabinets  of  Berlin  and  Vienna  wish  evident- 
ly to  avoid  a  conference.  Although  we  refrain  from  mentioning  the 
conference  at  this  moment,  we  have  by  no  means  the  intention  of  giving 
it  up,  and  we  are  of  opinion  that  the  exchange  of  notes  proposed  at 
Berlin  does  not  exclude  such  a  possibility. 

(295)     The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Berlin  to  Iswolsky.     Telegram, 
March  11-24,  1909.    No.  22. 

The  answer  which  Your  Excellency  yesterday  gave  to  Count 
Pourtales  has  caused  the  greatest  satisfaction  in  the  Wilhelmstrasse. 
Kiderlen  ^  regards  it  as  the  first  step  towards  a  peaceful  solution  of 
the  crisis.  Berlin  has  notified  the  cabinets  of  Paris,  London  and 
Rome  that  the  German  government  has  inquired  of  Russia  how  she 
would  receive  an  Austrian  inquiry  relating  to  the  recognition  of 
the  Austro-Turkish  agreement,  and  the  alteration  of  Article  25 
of  the  Berlin  Treaty.  As  a  favourable  answer  has  been  received 
from  St.  Petersburg,  the  German  government  would  be  glad  to 
know  how  an  analogous  inquiry  of  the  Vienna  cabinet  would  be 
received  in  London,  Paris  and  Rome.  Kiderlen  is  of  the  opinion  that 
such  a  solution  does  not  preclude  the  possibility  of  calling  together  the 
conference  and  that  the  latter,  apart  from  sanctioning  the  abolishing  of 
Article  2S,  would  also  have  to  concern  itself  with  the  Bulgarian  and 
Montenegrin  questions 

Kiderlen  called  my  attention  to  an  article  in  the  "Koelnische 
Zeitung"  which  is  to  appear  this  evening  and  the  tone  of  which, 
as  I  understand,  differs  considerably  from  that  which  has  been 
adopted  recently  towards  us  even  by  the  official  press.^    This  turn 

*  Kiderlen-Waechter,  German  state  secretary  of  foreign  affairs. 
'Which  article  was  accepted  by  the  public  as  bona  fide,  no  doubt. 


262         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

for  the  better  is  apparently  the  result  of  your  negotiations  with 
Pourtales.  The  article  in  question  in  no  wise  touches  upon  the  pre- 
liminary negotiations,  which  Kiderlen  does  not  wish  to  be  men- 
tioned by  the  press. 

(296)  Iswolsky  to   the  Russian   Charge   d'Affaires  at  Berlin.     Telegram, 
March  13-26,  1909.    No.  425. 

Communicated  by  the  French  Embassy  in  St.  Petersburg,  M. 
Pichon  telegraphs : 

"Radolin  ^  has  communicated  to  me  the  decision  reached  by  the 
Russian  government  to  accept,  unconditionally,  the  abolishing  of 
Article  25.  He  asked  me  if  we  were  prepared  to  return  to  an  Aus- 
trian inquiry  a  similar  answer ;  he  added  that  the  German  govern- 
ment regards  the  decision  of  the  Russian  minister  of  foreign  af- 
fairs as  an  important  step  towards  a  peaceful  solution  of  the  crisis, 
and  he  believes  that  the  proposed  procedure  will  most  effectually 
support  the  steps  intended  to  be  taken  in  Belgrade.  I  replied  that 
we  did  not  hesitate  to  declare  that  if  Austria  should  request  us  to 
give  our  unconditional  assent,  as  Russia  has  done,  we  would  re- 
turn an  affirmative  answer,  but  since  this  reply  is  due  to  our  de- 
sire to  preserve  the  higher  interests  of  general  peace,  we  would 
earnestly  beg  the  Austrian  government  to  make  this  inquiry  only 
after  the  negotiations,  which  are  at  present  under  way  at  Vienna 
for  the  settlement  of  the  conflict  with  Serbia,  have  proved  success- 
ful. So  far  as  we  are  aware,  the  draft  of  the  Serbian  note,  which 
was  prepared  by  the  Austrian  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  has  been 
accepted  by  M.  Iswolsky  with  very  slight  alterations.  Therefore 
only  a  short  postponement  is  demanded  and  we  would  be  pleased 
to  obtain  this  concession  from  the  Austrian  government." 

(297)  The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Berlin  to  Iswolsky.     Telegram, 
March  13-26,  1909.    No.  24. 

The  answer  as  to  how  the  Austrian  inquiry  proposed  by  Ger- 
many would  be  received  in  London,  Paris  and  Rome  has  reached 
Berlin.  The  reply  from  Rome  is  regarded  here  as  satisfactory. 
That  from  Paris  is  less  so,  but  does  not  exclude  the  possibility  of  a 
consent.  The  answer  from  London  has  disappointed  the  Wilhelm- 
*  German  ambassador  at  Paris. 


THE  BOSNIAN  CRISIS  AND  PAN-SLAVISM  263 

strasse.  It  is  assumed  that  the  German  ambassadors  at  Paris  and 
London  have  not  expressed  with  sufficient  clearness  the  idea  on 
which  the  German  proposal  is  based,  namely  that  the  recognition 
of  the  annexation  by  the  Powers  would  facilitate  their  common  ac- 
tion at  Belgrade.  Explanatory  instructions  have  been  sent  to  Rad- 
olin  and  Metternich.^  Baron  Schon  did  not  conceal  from  me  his 
disappointment  that  the  German  action  had  no  success  in  Lon- 
don, since  Grey  insists  that  the  action  of  the  Powers  at  Belgrade 
must  precede  the  recognition  of  the  Austro-Turkish  convention. 

(298)  IswoJsky   to    the  Russian   Charge   d'Affaires  at   Berlin.     Telegram, 

March  13-26,  1909.    No.  429. 

I  am  sending  you  the  text  of  the  replies  of  the  cabinets  of  Paris 
and  London  to  the  German  proposal.  We  deduce  from  them  that 
England  and  France  accept  Billow's  draft  with  a  few  reservations 
which,  however,  do  not  affect  the  substance  of  the  matter.  Since 
the  reports  concerning  warlike  preparations  on  the  part  of  Austria 
are  as  disquieting  now  as  before,  it  seems  necessary  to  us  to  bring 
the  negotiations  which  are  now  taking  place  at  Vienna  regarding  | 
the  form  of  the  Serbian  declaration,  to  as  speedy  a  conclusion  as  * 
possible.  We  hope  that  Aehrenthal  will  accept  the  slight  altera- 
tions which  merely  concern  the  form.  I  have  telegraphed  to  Vi- 
enna that  we  are  prepared  to  accept  the  draft  upon  which  Aehren- 
thal will  agree  with  Cartwright.  Please  request  Baron  Schon  to 
use  his  influence  at  Vienna  so  that  the  two  pending  questions,  i.e. 
the  Serbian  declaration  and  Article  25  of  the  Berlin  Treaty,  may  be 
settled  as  quickly  as  possible.  In  order  to  inform  public  opinion, 
we  have  published  a  communique  without,  however,  mentioning  the 
negotiations  with  Count  Pourtales,  as  desired  by  Kiderlen. 

(299)  The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  London  to  Iswolsky.     Telegram, 
March  14-27,  1909.    No.  19. 

Very  confidential. 

Cartwright  wired  yesterday  that  Aehrenthal  most  earnestly  re- 
quested the  British  government  to  refrain  from  all  objections  to 
his  text  of  the  Serbian  note,  since  he  had  already  received  the  as- 
surance from  you  that  Russia  would  accept  every  text  which  was 
*  German  ambassador  at  London. 


264         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

agreed  upon  between  Vienna  and  London.  This  assurance  of  Aeh- 
renthal  has  made  an  extraordinarily  unpleasant  impression  here. 
Hardinge  believes  that  if  this  declaration  be  correct,  the  British  en- 
deavours to  obtain  a  more  favourable  text  of  the  proposed  Serbian 
note  must  prove  from  the  very  beginning  unsuccessful.  I  said 
that  nothing  of  the  kind  was  known  to  me  and  that  I  had  merely  to 
communicate  the  instructions  given  to  our  charge  d'affaires  at 
Vienna  regarding  the  final  editing  of  the  note. 

(300)  Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.    Telegram,  March 
22-April  4,  1909.    No.  503. 

It  appears  to  me  that  the  affirmative  answer  to  the  Austrian  en- 
quiry regarding  Article  25  of  the  Berlin  Treaty  must  be  given  by 
each  of  the  Powers  individually,  in  consequence  of  which  we  have 
the  intention  of  handing  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  the 
following  reply: 

**The  undersigned  has  the  honour  of  informing  His  Excellency 
Count  Berchtold,  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador,  in  answer  to  the 
note  of  March  21,  April  3d  of  this  year,  that  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment gives  its  assent  to  the  abolition  of  Article  25  of  the  Berlin 
Treaty."  ^ 

Please  telegraph  if  the  British  Government  shares  our  view. 

(301)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Iswolsky.    Telegram,  March 
24-April  6,  1909.    No.  30. 

Personal  and  very  confidential. 
/  I  notice  that  English  public  opinion  expresses  certain  fears  with 
regard  to  the  future  development  of  Russian  policy  towards  Eng- 
land, and  this  fear  seems  also  to  prevail  in  certain  Government  cir- 
cles. Yesterday  I  made  use  of  a  favourable  opportunity  which  was 
offered  to  me  as  a  consequence  of  the  friendly  disposition  shown 
me  by  Grey  to  tell  him  confidentially  and  in  my  own  name,  that 
whilst  admitting  that  the  rumours  current  among  the  public  and  in 
the  newspapers  regarding  the  nature  of  the  German  action  at  St. 
Petersburg  might  be  exaggerated,  nevertheless  everything,  which  I 

*  This  step  terminated  the  crisis.    Documents  recently  published  show  that  the 
solution  was  due  to  Emperors  Nicholas  and  William  II. 


THE  BOSNIAN  CRISIS  AND  PAN-SLAVISM  265 

knew  about  the  German  step  made  me  firmly  believe  that  the  lat- 
ter represented  a  method  which  Russia  was  not  likely  to  forget,^ 
and  that  if  there  had  been  any  indirect  intention  of  sowing  discord 
between  Russia  on  the  one  hand  and  France  and  England  on  the 
other,  this  purpose  would  certainly  not  be  achieved.  I  added  that, 
without  wishing  to  judge  of  questions  beyond  my  sphere  of  com- 
petency, the  newspaper  reports  about  the  possibility  of  your  retire- 
ment are  in  my  personal  opinion  devoid  of  any  foundation. 

(302)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Iswolsky.    Report,  March  19- 
April  1,  1909.    No.  28. 

The  strike  of  the  telegraphists,  quite  apart  from  the  disturbances 
of  daily  life  in  France,  has  also  had  an  extraordinarily  unfavour- 
able influence  upon  the  pending  political  negotiations.  Your  Excel- 
lency's telegram  of  March  4,  '17,  which  contained  Billow's  pro- 
posal and  formed  the  basis  for  our  subsequent  recognition  of  the 
annexation,  was  received  by  me  only  after  the  lapse  of  a  week,  to- 
gether with  several  other  telegrams  of  March  3rd,  4th  and  8th. 
I  have  received  only  one  telegram  punctually,  without  number, 
containing  the  draft  of  your  reply  to  Billow's  proposal. 
/  at  once  communicated  the  contents  to  the  minister  of  foreign  affairs, 
but  the  whole  affair,  and  the  decision  which  it  was  necessary  to  reach, 
were  so  important  that  M.  Pichon,  who  had  received  no  communication 
either  from  Berlin  or  from  St.  Petersburg,  could  express  no  definite 
opinion  without  previous  knowledge  of  the  details.  In  spite  of  this,  I 
at  once  telegraphed  that  M.  Pichon  was  perfectly  in  accordance  with 
your  views  about  Billow's  proposal.^  After  the  telegraphic  communi- 
cations had  been  restored,  the  whole  question,  under  the  pressure  of 
the  German  government,  had  assumed  a  direction  which  was  not 
to  be  altered. 

Though  your  decision  to  recognize  the  Austro-Turkish  agreement 
by  an  exchange  of  notes  differs  from  the  understanding  arrived  at  be- 
tween Russia,  England  and  France  to  discuss  this  question  at  a  con- 

*The  method  consisted  of  Germany  taking  the  lead  in  a  movement  that  re- 
sulted in  the  abolition  of  Art.  25  of  the  Berlin  Treaty  by  means  of  an  exchange  of 
notes  between  the  signatory  powers  instead  of  the  conference  proposed  by  Iswol- 
sky and  poorly  supported  in  London  and  Paris. 

*  The  observation  may  be  permitted  that  Nelidoff  went  a  little  too  far  in  thus 
usurping  the  office  of  the  French  minister  of  foreign  affairs. 


266         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

ference,  the  French  government  was  on  the  whole  satisfied,  since  your 
decision  contributed  to  the  peaceful  solution  of  a  crisis  which  threatened 
to  lead  to  an  armed  conflict,  the  cause  for  which,  as  I  have  already 
reported  to  you,  found  no  echo  in  the  French  population. 

The  magnitude  of  our  sacrifice  has  been  perfectly  well  under- 
stood here,  and  public  opinion  is  grateful  to  you  for  the  courageous 
determination  to  secure  the  preservation  of  European  peace  at  this 
high  price.  Nevertheless,  the  Foreign  Office  here  was  unpleasantly 
affected  by  the  fact  that  the  Russian  government,  which  had  hitherto 
acted  in  accordance  with  London  and  Paris,  had  not  also  made  its 
agreement  dependent  upon  that  of  the  other  Powers,  and  that  the 
recognition  of  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  was  not  conditioned  by 
the  assent  of  Austria  to  the  proposals  made  by  the  three  Powers 
respecting  Serbia.  In  this  wise  the  danger  of  a  conflict  continued 
to  persist  and  only  in  consequence  of  the  determination  of  the 

,  English  government  has  the  Vienna  cabinet  conceded  the  pre- 

I  ceding  solution  of  the  Austrian-Serbian  conflict. 

All  these  circumstances,  which  have  found  a  lively  echo  in  the 
press,  were  bound  to  influence  the  general  verdict  regarding  our 
method  of  negotiation  in  an  unfavourable  sense.  In  connection 
with  this,  German  and  Austrian  journals  have  emphasized  the  suc- 
cess of  Austrian  diplomacy  and  the  predominant  position  of  the 
Dual  Monarchy  in  the  Balkans.  In  consequence  of  this,  public 
opinion  in  France  as  well  as  in  England,  demands  more  and  more 
a  still  greater  rapprochement  between  Russia,  France  and  Eng- 
land as  they  have  already  acted  in  common  during  the  Austrian- 
Serbian  conflict.  ^  Foreseeing  the  further  development  of  the  Eu- 
ropean situation  many  newspapers  come  to  the  conclusion  that  pre- 
cisely as  Germany  and  Austria  have  now  achieved  a  brilliant  vic- 
tory, so  must  the  two  Western  Powers,  together  with  Russia,  now  pay 
their  attention  to  the  systematic  development  of  their  forces  in  order  to 
be  able,  once  they  are  in  a  position  not  to  fear  a  challenge  of  the  Triple- 
Alliance — and  in  this  case  Italy  would  separate  herself  from  the  Triple- 
Alliance — to  set  up  on  their  part  demands  which  would  restore  the 
political  balance  which  has  now  been  displaced  in  favour  of  Germany 
and  Austria. 

^  Public  opinion  in  France  and  Great  Britain  was  well  satisfied  with  the  solution 
reached,  so  that  M.  Nelidoff  must  have  mistaken  his  own,  for  public,  opinion. 


THE  BOSNIAN  CRISIS  AND  PAN-SLAVISM  267 

The  experience  of  the  last  five  years  has  shown  us  that  a  policy 
of  this  sort  need  not  necessarily  lead  to  war.  During  the  Morocco 
crisis  the  close  unity  of  the  Dual  Alliance  in  conjunction  with 
England,  brought  the  German  attempts  to  a  standstill.  Also  in  the 
present  instance  the  supremacy  of  the  one  side  has  been  attained 
without  the  shedding  of  blood.  It  is  merely  necessary  to  establish 
a  close  agreement  between  the  Powers,  and  to  be  firmly  determined 
not  to  admit  further  provocations  on  the  part  of  the  Triple  Alliance, 
disposing  at  the  same  time  of  sufficiently  strong  forces  which  would 
enable  us  to  offer  resistance. 

This  is  the  direction  which  the  Paris  and  also,  apparently,  the 
London  cabinet  wish  to  give  to  their  policy  in  the  firm  conviction 
that  Russian  policy  is  also  directed  towards  this  end,  since  the 
shifting  of  the  European  balance  of  power  closely  concerns  Russia. 

Public  opinion  in  France  is  fully  in  agreement  with  such  a  plan 
and  will  support  the  Government,  even  though  there  exists  the 
wish  to  live  in  peace  with  Germany  and  to  develop  their  mutual 
commercial  and  financial  relations. 

(303)     The  Same  to   the  Same.     Confidential  Report,  March   \9'April   1, 
1909.    No.  30. 

" The  movement  of  the  Central  European  States  towards 

the  Mediterranean  is  contrary  not  only  to  our  own  intentions  but 
also  to  the  interests  of  our  allies  and  friends,  the  French  and  the 
English.  The  latter  in  particular  are  concerned  with  protecting 
the  road  from  the  Suez  Canal  to  India  and  deem  it  necessary  to 
oppose  every  effort  to  interfere  with  this  way.  For  instance  the 
convention  concluded  with  Spain  last  year,  about  the  maintaining 
of  the  status  quo  in  Spanish  waters,  had  its  origin  in  the  reports 
which  reached  London  to  the  effect  that  Germany  intended  to 
purchase  one  of  the  Spanish  islands  in  the  Mediterranean  in  order 
to  build  a  coaling  station  there.  It  would  also  be  unpleasant  for 
France  if  German  naval  forces  were  to  appear  in  the  vicinity  of  her 
coast.  In  view  of  Germany's  position  at  Constantinople,  the  pres- 
ence of  the  German  fleet  in  the  Mediterranean  would  be  just  as 
dangerous  to  Russia,  as  was  the  predominant  position  which  England 
occupied  in  Turkey,  until  the  agreement  which  you  have  concluded 
with    London    eliminated    the    causes    of    possible   conflicts    between 


268         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

Russia  and  England.  ^  All  these  circumstances  show  how  necessary  it 
is  for  us  to  bind  ourselves  still  more  closely  to  France  and  England  in 
order  to  oppose  in  common  the  further  penetration  of  Germany  and 
Austria  in  the  Balkans. 

Such  an  opposition  need  not,  under  all  circumstances,  lead  to  an 
armed  conflict  with  the  Triple  Alliance.  Just  as  Austria,  supported 
by  Germany,  concentrated  her  fighting  forces  and  threatened  Serbia 
without  listening  to  the  just  demands  of  Europe,  so  might  we, 
too,  in  agreement  with  France  and  England,  after  our  military 
strength  will  have  been  re-established,  force  Austria-Hungary  in  a 
favourable  moment  to  give  up  her  Balkan  plans  and  to  restore  to 
the  now/  subjugated  Serbians  their  freedom  of  action.  ^  The  ex- 
perience of  the  last  crisis  has  proved  that  if  military  measures  are  al- 
ready prepared  i/n  times  of  peace,  diplomatic  questions  may  all  the 
easier  he  solved  by  threats  and  the  exercise  of  strong  pressure.  The 
art  of  diplomacy  consists  of  selecting  the  favourable  moment  and  of 
utilising  a  favourable  general  situation,  so  that  conscious  of  one's 
own  strength,  one  may  hold  out  to  the  end.  Thus  we  shall  undoubt- 
edly be  able  to  weaken  the  unfavourable  impression  which  the 
failure  of  our  policy  has  now  produced  and  in  this  way  we  will 
gradually  succeed  in  liberating  the  kindred  Balkan  States  from  the 
Austro-German  influence. 

At  the  present  critical  moment  I  consider  it  my  duty  to  point  to  the 
tendency  of  our  policy  which,  according  to  my  firm  conviction,  is  alone 
in  accordance  with  our  own  interests,  and  which  will  be  as  well  sup- 
ported by  the  French  as,  I  believe,  by  the  British  Government. 

(304)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Confidential  Letter,  March  19'April  \,  1909.' 

The  press  has  violently  attacked  the  government  during  the 
last  few  days ;  France  is  accused  of  not  having  fulfilled  her  obliga- 
tions towards  Russia  and  to  have  in  this  wise  forced  the  latter  to 
yield  to  the  demands  of  the  Vienna  cabinet,  which  was  supported 
by  Germany.  M.  Pichon  considers  these  accusations  as  wholly  un- 
founded and  has  issued  a  dementi  of  them  through  Havas,  empha- 

*  Refers  to  Anglo-Russian  convention  re^rding  Persia. 

'  Serbia's  freedom  of  action  was  not  limited,  except  in  the  Pan-Slav  sense. 

'Both  letters,  Nos.  303  and  304  were  written  on  March  19-April  1,  1909. 


THE  BOSNIAN  CRISIS  AND  PAN-SLAVISM  269 

sizing  in  this  that  France  as  well  as  England  had,  in  conjunction 
with  Russia,  followed  the  policy  determined  upon  from  the  begin- 
ning. The  Temps  has  further  developed  this  thought  in  the  en- 
closed leading  article.  As  I  have  already  informed  Your  Excellency 
at  the  time,  the  French  Government  had  not  confined  itself  entirely  to 
diplomatic  measures.  The  French  ambassador  at  Berlin  had  called* 
the  attention  of  M.  Pichon  to  the  fact,  that  Germany  and  Austria 
proceeded  in  so  decisive  a  manner,  because  they  were  convinced 
that  Russia  would  under  no  circumstance  determine  upon  a  war, 
and  that  in  all  probability  England  and  France  would  refrain  from  i 
participating  in  a  war,  even  if  Russia  should  be  drawn  into  it. 

Jules  Cambon  added  that  it  would  he  necessary  to  take  some  kind  of 
military  measures  which  would  shozv  that  France  is  resolved  to  fulfil 
her  treaty  of  alliance  with  Russia.  In  addition  he  indicated  the  un- 
favourable impression  which  had  been  produced  through  the  ut- 
terance of  an  English  Minister  to  the  effect  that  England  had  no 
intention  of  waging  war  on  account  of  Serbia.  These  advices  were 
received  here  at  the  outbreak  of  the  telegraphers'  strike  and  were 
at  once  given  to  the  prime  minister  and  also  sent  to  London  by  a 
special  courier. 

In  consequence  of  this,  orders  were  immediately  given  here  to  grant 
no  -permits  for  furlough  in  the  Eastern  Army  Corps,  and  various  troop- 
movements  and  other  measures  as  preliminaries  to  the  mobilisation 
were  carried  out. 

These  advices  were  also  followed  in  London,  and  it  was  agreed  with 
the  French  government  to  assemble  a  squadron  which  was  to  con- 
centrate at  Malta.  The  British  Admiralty  also  adopted  other  measures.^ 
In  the  meantime,  however,  the  telegraphic  agencies  have  informed  s 
all  Europe  of  a  secret  session  of  the  Ministerial  Council  at  Tsarskoe 
Selo  at  which  the  Ministers  of  Finance,  Commerce  and  War  had 
shown  that  it  would  be  impossible  for  Russia  to  wage  war. 

A  public  exposure  of  this  kind  of  our  weakness  has  made  a 
most  painful  impression  upon  our  friends  and  must  encourage  our 
opponents  to  present  the  most  impossible  demands  to  Russia  in 
the  firm  conviction  that  we  shall  yield.     The  cabinets  of  Paris  and 

*  M.  NelidoflF  strays  a  great  deal  between  fact  and  fancy  in  these  three  letters. 
Is  one  to  infer  that  he  had  to  inform  his  government  by  slow  mail  of  the 
measures  of  mobilization  adopted  by  the  French  and  British  governments? 


270         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

London  have  concluded  from  this  that  Russia,  France  and  England 
must  pay  more  attention  than  ever  to  action  in  common  and  must  at 
the  same  time  proceed  to  the  necessary  military  measures  in  order  to 
convince  their  opponents  that  they  are  dealing  with  a  political  combina- 
tion which  knows  how  to  make  itself  respected  and  to  carry  through  its 
demands. 

Only  thus  will  it  be  possible  to  restore  the  European  balance  of 
power  which  has  been  disturbed  in  favour  of  the  Triple  Alliance, 
and  only  in  this  manner  will  Russia  be  able  to  win  back  her  influ- 
ence with  the  Balkan  States,  which  she  has  temporarily  lost. 
LAnd  finally  only  in  this  manner  will  Russia  he  able  to  fulfil  that  great 
historic  mission  to  which  she  has  been  predestined  by  Providence. 

(305)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Iswolsky.     Telegram,  March 
26-April  8,  1909. 

Personal  and  strictly  confidential. 

Hardinge  has  shown  me  in  confidence  a  telegram  from  the  Brit- 
ish ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  which  reports  the  conversation 
with  you.  The  impression  made  is  a  very  deep  one.  Your  intention 
to  resign  is  extremely  regretted,  as  well  as  the  doubts  which  you 
have  expressed  regarding  the  further  designs  of  English  policy.  In 
this  connection  I  can  bear  witness  that  English  policy  has  never 
had  a  more  decisive  and  clearer  basis.  This  is  shown  not  only  by 
the  government  but  also  by  the  population. 

The  incident  of  which  you  speak  and  in  course  of  which  the  British 
government  may  perhaps  have  acted  with  too  little  circumspection,  can 
surely  in  no  case  be  regarded  as  a  sign  of  a  change  of  policy.  The 
thought  by  which  Grey  was  dominated  was  surely  not  that  of  withdraw- 
ing the  Montenegrin  question  from  the  decisions  of  the  Powers.  Since 
Italy,  conjointly  with  England,  was  the  only  Power,  which  set  up  defi- 
nite conditions  with  regard  to  Montenegro,  ^  Grey  acted  in  common  with 
Italy.  This  may  have  been  a  lack  of  circumspection,  but  I  believe 
one  ought  hot  on  this  account  to  forget  the  very  energetic  support 
which  England  has  always  given  us  in  difficult  circumstances.  I 
am  telegraphing  you  this  with  the  intention  of  correcting  your  last 

*  Montenegro,  never  too  tractable  with  the  Russian  government,  was  leaning 
towards  Italy,  owing  to  family  ties,  the  Queen  of  Italy  being  a  daughter  of  the 
King  of  Montenegro. 


THE  BOSNIAN  CRISIS  AND  PAN-SLAVISM  271 

impression  regarding  English  policy.     According  to  my  point  of 
view  this  can  in  no  case  furnish  a  reason  for  your  resignation. 

In  this  incident,  I  can  discern  no  real  divergence  of  principle. 
Moreover,  English  support  in  Cettinje  has  already  ceased,  which  in 
my  opinion  reduces  the  incident  again  to  its  proper  proportions.  To 
conclude,  I  can  do  nothing  else  than  to  implore  you  once  more  to 
examine  closely  your  conclusions  and  decisions.  For  these  might 
lead  to  extremely  unfortunate  consequences  for  our  political  situa- 
tion. 

(306)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Iswolsky.    Report,  April  2-15, 
1909. 

The  danger  of  an  armed  encounter  in  consequence  of  the  an- 
nexation of  Bosnia  and  the  declaration  of  Bulgaria's  independence 
seems  to  be  obviated.  The  principal  international  problems  ren- 
dered acute  by  the  one-sided  action  of  the  Vienna  cabinet  and  the 
Bulgarian  government  appear  to  be  settled.  There  remains  only 
the  fulfilment  of  diplomatic  formalities,  which  will  hardly  lead  to 
serious  complications.  The  general  nervousness  that  has  influenced 
the  course  of  events  in  Europe  has  given  place  to  a  feeling  of  de- 
cided relief  which  has  re-acted  on  the  exchanges  and  on  finance. 

The  majority  of  the  ministers  have  used  the  Easter  holidays  to 
leave  Paris.  The  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  too,  has  left  for  the 
Jura  and  intended  to  meet  the  president  of  the  Republic  at  Nice 
on  April  11,  '12,  where  the  solemn  unveiling  of  Gambetta's  statue 
is  to  take  place.  But  the  sudden  outbreak  of  dangerous  disturb- 
ances at  Constantinople^  has  occasioned  the  prime  minister  to 
summon  Pichon  back  to  Paris.  The  disquieting  news  from  Turkey 
has  naturally  greatly  occupied  public  opinion.  The  possibility  of 
the  riots  spreading  further  is  feared  here,  and,  as  a  consequence, 
armed  encounters,  and  persecution  of  Christians  in  the  Balkans, 
which  would  be  equivalent  to  the  re-opening  of  the  Oriental  prob- 
lem to  its  full  dreadful  extent. 

/  cannot  but  deplore  the  fact  that  this  moment  finds  us  unprepared 
not  only  to  solve  the  Oriental  question  in  a  sense  favourable  to  ourselves, 
but  even  to  take  part  effectively  in  the  regulation  of  this  question,  for 

*  Bomb  outrages  by  Armenians  in  Constantinople  and  massacres  of  Armenians 
in  the  vilayets.  / 


272         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

historical  experience,  for  example  the  latest  events,  have  again  proved 
that  world-problems  of  such  a  nature  cannot  be  solved  without  resorting 
to  force.  In  full  recognition  of  this  truth,  I  have  never  ceased  to 
insist,  during  my  fifteen  years*  activity  as  ambassador  at  Constanti- 
nople, on  Russia's  being  prepared  for  events  which  may  be  unde- 
terminable as  to  time,  but  which  are  in  any  case  inevitable.  This 
question  seemed  definitely  settled  shortly  before  my  departure  from 
Turkey.  All  preparations  had  been  made  by  our  war  ministry  and  the 
admiralty  staff  to  influence  matters  in  the  Turkish  capital,  should  dis- 
turbances take  place  there.  Unfortunately,  we  were  able  to  convince 
ourselves  during  the  secret  conferences  held  under  your  chairman- 
ship last  summer  that  nothing  remains  of  these  precautionary 
measures. 

Will  you  now  permit  me  to  give  utterance  to  the  hope  that,  thanks 
to  your  efforts,  measures  wUl  be  taken,  or  the  urgency  of  such  at  least 
recognised,  to  enable  Russia  to  fulfil  her  historic  mission  and  to  pre- 
vent a  world-problem  being  settled  in  a  manner  not  in  accordance  with 
our  interests.  ^ 

*The  documents  show  that  the  "historic  mission"  of  Russia  in  this  respect 
consisted  of  incorporating  Turkey-in-Europe  from  the  Enos-Media  line  east- 
ward, including  Constantinople,  the  Bosphorus,  Dardanelles  and  as  much  of  Asia 
Minor  as  possible. 


II 

ISWOLSKY  AND  THE  FORMING  OF  THE 
BALKAN  LEAGUE 

(March  1909—January  1910) 

(307)  The  Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Sofia  to  Iswolsky.    Telegram,  Feb, 
28-March  13,  1909. 

As  I  am  informed  by  the  Serbian  charge  d'affaires,  Milovano- 
vitch,  the  Serbian  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  is  very  well  satisfied 
with  his  two  days*  stay  at  Sofia.  From  his  conversations  with  Czar 
Ferdinand,  the  ministers  and  other  political  personalities,  he  gained 
the  impression  that  both  countries  have  common  political  interests 
that  point  to  the  neccessity  of  a  closer  relationship.  The  Czar 
mentioned  to  him  the  ineffaceable  impression  made  on  him  by 
his  journey  to  St.  Petersburg,  and  pointed  to  the  fact  that  military 
power  ^  and  a  lively  interest  for  the  Slav  States  were  reviving  at 
St.  Petersburg. 

(308)  The  Russian  Minister  at  Sofia  to  Iswolsky.     Telegram,  April  3-16, 
1909. 

The  Serbian  Minister  told  the  Prime  Minister  today  that  the 
Belgrade  Cabinet  considered  it  desirable  to  enter  on  an  exchange 
of  views  with  Bulgaria  in  connection  with  Turkish  events,  in  order 
to  concert  common  action  for  the  protection  of  their  mutual  inter- 
ests. The  same  communication  was  made  by  Milovanovitch  to  the 
Bulgarian  representative  at  Belgrade.  M.  Malinoff  replied  that  it 
was  difficult  to  come  to  a  decision  in  the  matter  at  this  time,  since 
the  entire  attention  of  the  Bulgarian  Government  was  at  the  mo- 

*  Recuperation  of  Russian  army  from  effects  of  Russo-Japanese  war. 
i«  273 


274         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

ment  directed  to  the  question  of  the  recognition  of  its  independence. 

In  spite  of  this  he  would  be  glad  to  have  further  information,  and  he 
has  requested  Milovanovitch  to  communicate  to  him  his  views  on  the 
Turkish  events  and  his  conception  of  a  common  plan  of  action, 

(309)  Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Minister  at  Sofia.  Telegram,  April  5-18,  1909. 
The  Serbian  Government  has  asked  us  to  support  its  effort  to  begin 

negotiations  with  Bulgaria  regarding  common  action  in  the  Turkish 
crisis.^  You  will  learn  our  standpoint  from  my  telegram  to  our  Min- 
ister at  Belgrade.  I  beg  you  on  your  part  to  keep  this  standpoint 
in  mind  should  further  negotiations  between  Bulgaria  and  Serbia 
take  place.  Although  I  am  able  to  perceive  from  the  words  of  the 
Bulgarian  Minister  here  that  his  Government  is  seriously  prepared 
to  consider  the  question  of  closer  relations  to  Serbia,  we  must, 
nevertheless,  to  a  certain  degree  doubt  the  success  of  such  nego- 
tiations as  we  know  from  former  experience. 

Nevertheless,  we  have  ground  for  expecting  a  greater  success 
this  time,  since  the  complete  subjugation  of  Serbia  by  Austria  is 
feared  in  Bulgaria,  for  this  would  mean  the  immediate  neighbour- 
hood of  Austria-Hungary  to  Bulgaria;  on  the  other  hand  the  Bul- 
garian minister  has  expressed  to  me  his  conviction  that  Bul- 
garia would  now  arrive  at  a  complete  understanding  with  Serbia 
in  the  Macedonian  question.  From  all  this  it  can  be  seen  how  care- 
fully the  negotiations  between  Serbia  and  Bulgaria  must  be  carried  on, 
and  that  we  too  must  not  figure  in  them  too  actively. 

(310)  Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Minister  at  Belgrade.    Telegram,  April  5-18, 

1909. 

IVe  have  always  been  in  sympathy  with  the  idea  of  a  rapprochement 
between  Bulgaria  and  Serbia  and  desired  a  common  plan  of  action  on  the 
part  of  these  two  Powers  to  prevent  misunderstandings  which  might 
prove  dangerous  to  the  common  Slav  interests. 

I  have  spoken  in  this  sense  to  the  Bulgarian  Minister  here, 
who  has  assured  me  that  Bulgaria  likewise  wishes  to  act  in  solidar- 
ity with  Serbia.  I  am  communicating  this  to  our  Minister  at 
Sofia,  since  Paprikoff  ^  intends  to  occupy  himself  with  this  question 
after  his  return  to  Sofia. 

*  Revolution ;   deposal  of  Sultan  Abdul  Hamid. 
'Bulgarian  premier  and  minister  of  foreign  affairs. 


ISWOLSKY  AND  FORMING  OF  BALKAN  LEAGUE     275 

It  is  desirable  that  Serbia  should  maintain  her  self-control  dur- 
ing the  Turkish  crisis,  and  above  all  through  her  actions  or  un- 
cautious  negotiations  with  Bulgaria  afford  Austria  no  pretext  to 
interfere  actively  in  the  Turkish  question.  Please  confer  confiden- 
tially with  Milovanovitch  in  this  sense. 

(311)  The  Russian  Minister  at  Belgrade  to  Iswolsky.    Report,  April  14-27, 
1909.    No.  34. 

Since  the  conclusion  of  the  Serbian-Austrian  conflict,  Serbian 
sympathies  for  Bulgaria  are  becoming  more  and  more  evident. 
The  press  speaks  in  louder  and  louder  tones  of  the  necessity  of  a 
rapprochement  between  the  two  countries  on  the  basis  of  general 
Slav  interests.  This  standpoint  is  also  shared  by  the  Serbian  Gov- 
ernment. The  overtures  made  in  this  sense  by  the  Bulgarian  rep- 
resentative in  Belgrade  have  been  received  with  great  approval.  In 
spite  of  this,  the  negotiations  which  are  already  under  way  have 
not  as  yet  led  to  any  positive  result — not  even  the  rough  draft  of 
an  agreement  between  the  two  Slav  States  has  been  decided  upon. 

(312)  The  Russian  Minister  at  Sofia  to  Iswolsky.     Telegram,  April  21- 
May  4,  1909. 

Today,  in  solemn  audience,  I  was  the  first  among  the  foreign 
representatives  here  to  hand  my  credentials  to  King  Ferdinand.^ 
In  a  conversation  of  one  hour,  which  followed  upon  this,  the  King 
spoke  in  the  warmest  terms  of  the  support  which  Bulgaria  had 
found  in  our  Sovereign,  and  referred  to  Bulgaria's  readiness  to  de- 
velop the  cordial  relations  which  exist  between  Russia  and  Bul- 
garia. The  idea  of  a  still  closer  rapprochement  between  the  two 
countries  was  now  being  discussed  at  Sofia  and  the  King  hoped 
that  I  too  would  take  part  in  this.  As  I  have  received  no  instruc- 
tions in  this  respect,  but  infer  from  the  words  of  the  Bulgarian 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  that  the  question  of  a  political  agree- 
ment between  Russia  and  Bulgaria  had  been  accepted  in  principle, 
I  answered  the  King  in  general  terms  and  indicated  that  it  would 
be  desirable  that  Paprikoff  should  set  up  concrete  proposals.  In 
this  way  I  think  we  would  occupy  a  favourable  position  during 
the  negotiations. 

*  Upon  his  elevation  to  czar. 


276         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

(313)  Iswolsky   to   the  Russian  Minister  at  Sofia.     Telegram,  April  29- 
May  12,  1909. 

Your  telegram  of  April  21  received.  All  that  you  have  said  to 
King  Ferdinand  in  respect  to  the  prospective  political  agreement, 
meets  with  our  approval.  You  may  say  further  that  the  Russian 
Government  will  be  glad  to  consider  and  examine  concrete  proposals 
on  the  part  of  Bulgaria. 

(314)  The  Russian  Minister  at  Belgrade  to  Iswolsky.    Report,  May  12-25, 
1909.    No.3S. 

So  far  as  I  am  able  to  ascertain,  the  Bulgarian  Government 
has  replied  evasively  to  the  Serbian  proposal  to  use  the  text  of  the 
old  commercial  treaty  betwen  Serbia  and  Bulgaria  as  a  point  of 
departure  for  the  impending  negotiations.  Without  making  a  di- 
rect refusal,  the  Bulgarian  Government  has  indicated  that  it  pre- 
ferred to  postpone  the  discussion  of  this  question  for  the  present. 
It  must,  however,  be  remarked  that  it  was  precisely  upon  the  basis 
of  these  concrete  proposals  that  a  first  rapprochement  might  have 
taken  place  which  would  then  have  had  to  assume  more  distinct 
forms.  The  Serbians  wish  to  conduct  the  negotiations  on  a  basis 
of  equality,  whilst  Bulgaria  evidently  merely  wishes  to  listen  to  the 
Serbian  proposals  without  making  any  proposals  of  her  own,  which 
causes  offense  in  Government  circles  here.  Hence  the  possibility 
of  a  rapprochement  appears  very  doubtful,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
the  present  political  situation  affords  the  most  favourable  prelimi- 
nary conditions,  at  least  so  far  as  the  immediate  future  is  concerned. 

(315)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Report,  May  26- June  8,  1909.    No.  44. 

The  Serbo-Bulgarian  negotiations  are  still  at  a  standstill.  In 
Serbian  Government  circles  this  regrettable  delay  is  ascribed  not 
so  much  to  the  negative  attitude  of  the  Bulgarian  Government  as 
to  the  personal  views  of  King  Ferdinand. 

This  view  is  reinforced  by  the  circumstance  that  the  Bulgarian 
King  has  plainly  shown  on  a  number  of  occasions  that  he  does  not 
wish  to  meet  the  Serbian  efforts.  For  example,  on  his  journey 
through  Belgrade  en  route  to  Venice,  he  refused  his  consent  to 
an  official  reception  in  Serbia  and  stopped  the  royal  train  at  the  lit- 


ISWOLSKY  AND  FORMING  OF  BALKAN  LEAGUE     277 

tie  Hungarian  frontier  town  of  Semlin  instead  of  at  Belgrade.  Fur- 
thermore, when  the  Serbian  Representative  at  Sofia  was  to  present 
his  credentials,  the  following  words  were  to  be  embodied  in  these : 

"Slav  solidarity,  the  voice  of  the  blood,  common  sorrows  and 
hopes  and  more  than  all  this — the  unshakeable  belief  in  our  com- 
mon future  induces  us  to  hail  the  Bulgarian  success  as  an  im- 
portant event  of  our  common  future." 

The  Bulgarian  Cabinet  raised  objections  to  these  words  and  de- 
manded their  alteration.  The  Serbian  Representative  therefore  con- 
tented himself  with  a  speech  of  greeting  kept  within  the  limits  of 
generalities. 

These  incidents  induce  the  Serbian  Government  to  assume  that 
Bulgaria  is  exceeding  the  limits  of  consideration  due  to  Austria, 
and  thereby  renders  the  rapprochement  between  the  two  sister  na- 
tions, which  is  at  present  so  desirable,  impossible. 

(316)     Iswolsky  to   the  Russian   Charge  d'Affaires  at  Sofia.     Confidential 
Letter,  Aug.  3-16,  1909.    No.  759. 

I  have  received  your  last  political  reports  which  deal  with 
the  important  question  of  the  present  direction  of  Bulgarian  foreign 
policy.  Your  information  coincides  with  what  has  been  communi- 
cated to  me  from  Serbian  sources.  Both  have  mentioned  the 
momentous  circumstance  that  the  Bulgarian  Government  had  ex- 
pressed the  wish,  that  from  the  credentials  of  the  Serbian  Govern- 
ment the  words  which  mention  the  close  relations  between  the  two 
Slav  peoples  should  be  eliminated 

With  regard,  however,  to  your  mention  of  the  possibility  of  a  par- 
tition  of  Serbia  such  a  supposition  appears  to  us  improbable,  since  Bul- 
garia could  scarcely  wish  to  become  an  immediate  neighbourhood  state 
to  Austria-Hungary. 

In  consideration  of  all  these  circumstances,  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment cannot  remain  indifferent  to  the  new  tendency  of  Bulgarian 
policy,  and  I  request  you  to  enter  on  a  confidential  exchange  of 
opinion  with  the  Bulgarian  Minister  of  Foreign  Aff-^iirs.  You  may 
make  use  of  the  material  herewith  placed  at  your  disposal,  with- 
out, however,  letting  it  be  known  from  which  sources  it  originates, 
and  explain  to  the  Minister  in  a  friendly  way  how  unfavourable 
is  the  impression  made  upon  us,  on  the  one  hand  by  the  secret 


278         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

relations  to  Vienna  and  on  the  other  by  the  unfriendly  attitude  to- 
wards the  neighbouring  Slav  State.  We  naturally  do  not  admit 
the  possibility  that  during  the  existence  of  certain  mutual  obliga- 
tions between  Russia  and  Bulgaria,  the  latter  should  really  have  the 
intention  of  assuming  obligations  to  Austria,  yet  we  find  that  the  Rus- 
sian Government,  without  wishing  to  interfere  in  the  domestic  affairs 
of  the  kingdom,  has  the  right  to  demand  that  Bulgaria,  upon  whom 
Russia  has  just  conferred  so  important  a  service,  should  show  greater 
frankness, 

(317)     The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  London  to  Iswolsky.    Confidential 
Letter,  Oct.  Zl-Nov.  3,  1909. 

I  have  sent  you  a  telegraphic  report  concerning  the  impression 
received  by  the  Serbian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  during  his 
London  visit  and  his  conversations  with  Sir  Edward  Grey  and 
Hardinge  as  to  the  attitude  of  Italy  in  international  policy.  In 
general  he  was  told  what  I  had  already  been  told  by  Hardinge. 
But  to  Milovanovitch,  Sir  Edward  Grey  appears  to  have  made  a 
special  reference  to  the  possibility  that  Austria  might  make  a  step 
to  weaken  the  enduring  and  favourable  impression  which  the  visit 
of  the  Russian  Czar  to  the  Italian  Court  had  called  forth.^ 

These  fears  appear  to  be  excessive  to  Milovanovitch;  it  appears  to 
him  improbable  that  Aehrenthal  will  decide  to  take  any  active  step. 

The  Serbian  Minister  did  not  tell  me  why  he  came  to  London ; 
Hardinge,  however,  whom  I  saw  yesterday,  explained  to  me  that 
he,  as  well  as  Grey,  found  Milovanovitch  to  be  too  restless,  and  pos- 
sibly too  enterprising  besides.  It  was  incomprehensible  to  him 
why  Milovanovitch  had  brought  up  here  in  London  the  question  of 
transferring  the  terminal  to  the  future  Adriatic  railway  more  to- 
ward the  south.^  He  was  given  the  answer  that  England  had  no 
direct  interest  in  this  affair,  which  was  of  interest  rather  to  Rou- 
mania  with  whom  Serbia  should  therefore  come  to  an  understand- 
ing. 

In  addition,  the  Serbian  Minister  expressed  the  wish  that  the  fu- 
ture status  of  the  Sandjak  be  exactly  defined  in  order  to  prevent 

*  Refers  to  consummation  of  Russo-Italian  Agreement  of  Racconigi,  guaran- 
teeing status  quo  in  the  Balkan  peninsula. 
"Through  Albania  instead  of  Montenegro. 


ISWOLSKY  AND  FORMING  OF  BALKAN  LEAGUE     279 

future  annexation  on  the  part  of  Austria.  Hardinge  did  not  tell  me 
what  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  replied,  yet  the  answer  appears  to  have 
been  of  a  negative  nature,  since  he  informed  me  at  the  same  time 
that  Tittoni  ^  had  applied  to  the  British  Ambassador  at  Rome  with 
a  similar  request.  Tittoni,  referring  to  the  agreement  concluded 
between  Italy  and  Russia  at  Racconigi,  regarding  the  maintenance 
of  the  status  quo  in  the  Balkans,  an  agreement  also  accepted  by 
England  and  France,  seems  to  consider  it  possible  to  invite  the 
other  States,  that  is  Austria  and  Germany,  to  accede  to  this  agree- 
ment. 

Hardinge  called  Tittoni  an  ''extremely  nervous''  man,^  and  gave  me 
to  understand  that  the  raising  of  such  a  question  would  be  regarded 
here  as  untimely  and  dangerous. 

It  appears  to  me  that,  in  view  of  the  reference  to  the  attitude 
of  Italy  and  the  possible  intentions  of  Austria,  it  was  not  only  de- 
sirable to  restrain  Serbia  from  some  thoughtless  step,  but  also  to 
indicate  to  Italy  that  she  ought  not  to  change  her  attitude  of  wait- 
ing. In  reality  any  action  by  Aehrenthal,  in  respect  to  the  meeting 
of  Racconigi,  is  here  considered  as  improbable  also. 

(318)  The  Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Rome  to  Iswolsky.   Telegram,  Nov. 
2-15,  1909. 

During  a  conversation  with  the  British  Ambassador,  Tittoni  gave 
expression  to  the  opinion  that,  since  a  convention  had  been  con- 
cluded at  Racconigi  between  Russia  and  Italy  for  the  maintenance 
of  the  status  quo  in  the  Balkans,  and  since  Austria  also  had  recog- 
nized this  point  of  view,  it  ought  to  be  possible  to  carry  out  this 
principle  in  practice.  Tittoni  spoke  neither  of  any  demand  ad- 
dressed to  the  Great  Powers,  nor  of  any  mutual  obligation  in  writ- 
ing. Since  similar  rumours  had  been  mentioned  in  the  French  Ministry 
of  Foreign  Affairs  it  is  intended  to  deny  them  not  only  in  London  and 
St.  Petersburg,  but  also  at  Paris. 

(319)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna  to  Iswolsky.     Telegram,  Nov. 
9-22,  1909. 

I  have  just  spoken  to  Aehrenthal.    He  repeated  to  me  what  I 

have  already  written  you  on  October  31  regarding  his  desire  to 

*  Italian  minister  of  foreign  affairs. 

'As  minister  of  a  country  that  was  a  member  of  the  Triple  Alliance. 


280         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

put  an  end  to  the  newspaper  polemic  regarding  the  relations  be- 
tween the  Cabinets  of  St.  Petersburg  and  Vienna.^  He  repeated 
in  a  most  decisive  manner  his  protest  against  the  role  ascribed  to 
Berchtold  and  he  will  have  a  dementi  issued  through  the  Press 
Bureau  against  all  such  rumours.  The  Minister  is  opposed  to  the 
publication  of  documents,  and  I  on  my  part  have  agreed  to  this 
point  of  view.    The  whole  question  is  therefore  settled. 

(320)     The  Russian  Minister  at  Sofia  to  Iswolsky.     Report,  Nov.   12-25, 
1910.    No.  52. 

The  secret  letter  of  Your  Excellency  of  Oct.  4  of  this  year.  No. 
848,  which  contained  instructions  to  use  the  present  moment  in 
order  to  induce  the  Bulgarian  Government  to  effect  a  rapprochement 
with  Serbia,  was  received  here  at  the  time  of  my  return  from  leave 
of  absence 

The  Imperial  Government  is  aware  that  during  my  three  years* 
activity  at  Sofia  I  have  omitted  nothing  to  bring  about  frank  and 
lasting  relations  between  Bulgaria  and  Serbia.  In  the  course  of 
the  numerous  conversations  which  I  have  had,  not  only  with  mem- 
bers of  the  Government,  but  with  the  King  himself  and  with  vari- 
ous party  leaders,  I  have  brought  forward  all  those  reasons  which 
point  to  the  necessity  of  a  rapprochement  between  the  two  Slav 
States 

One  should  not  forget  that  the  Bulgarians  are  a  people  of  prac- 
tical nature,  and  it  must  be  known  to  the  Ministry  that  the  present 
Bulgarian  Prime  Minister  has  described  himself  as  a  realist  in  poli- 
tics. If  one  assumes  this  standpoint  an  agreement  with  Serbia  ap- 
pears unnecessary.  Serbia  can  give  nothing  to  Bulgaria,  and  alone 
she  can  do  nothing  to  help  Bulgaria  to  realize  her  national  aspirations."^ 

One  must  also  bear  in  mind  that  the  decisive  factor  in  Bulgarian 
foreign  policy  is  King  Ferdinand,  who  lets  himself  be  guided  above 
all  by  personal  considerations. 

Under  such  circumstances  it  will  he  necessary  to  canalize  so  to  say 
the  policy  of  Bulgaria,  keeping  in  mind  that  the  direction  which  we  wish 

*  An  attempt  was  being  made  to  improve  diplomatic  relations  between  Russia 
and  Austria-Hungary.  The  documents  show  that  this  was  a  mere  diplomatic 
maneuver. 

Mn  the  Dobrudja  against  Rumania,  and  in  Macedonia  and  Thrace  against 
Turkey. 


ISWOLSKY  AND  FORMING  OF  BALKAN  LEAGUE     281 

to  give  to  Bulgarian  policy  has  to  correspond  on  broad  lines  to  that  of 
Serbia.  So  far  as  I  am  aware,  the  Serbian  political  leaders  have  placed 
themselves  on  the  side  of  Russia  for  good,  and  as  a  consequence  they 
are  now  on  the  way  towards  a  rapprochement  with  France  and  Eng- 
land} This  formula  would  also  have  to  be  accepted  by  Bulgaria. 
To  this  end  it  will  be  necessary  to  convince  the  latter  that,  in  ac- 
cepting this  formula,  she  would  assure  to  herself  the  complete 
realization  of  her  national  ideals.  Under  such  circumstances  it 
will  also  prove  difficult  for  King  Ferdinand  to  deviate  from  this 
way,  without  having  to  fear  that  such  a  deviation  would  be  interpreted 
as  treason  for  which  he  would  have  to  give  a  personal  accounting,  and 
this  fear  would  restrain  him.  The  best  proof  is  his  former  standpoint 
with  regard  to  the  Macedonian  movement. 

But  in  order  to  give  events  this  direction  it  is  necessary  that  we 
too  should  exactly  define  the  aims  of  our  policy  and  prepare  the 
means  on  condition,  of  course,  that  our  policy,  as  I  have  already  em- 
phasized, bears  a  "national  and  Slav"  character.^ 

//  we,  by  one  means  or  the  other,  shall  have  proved  here  that  Rus- 
sia has  finally  and  for  good  placed  herself  on  this  standpoint,  it  will 
be  easy  to  effect  an  union  of  the  Slav  States  of  the  Balkans,  for  in  that 
case  all  of  them  would  have  a  general  and  fundamental  interest  in  com- 
mon. For  this  reason,  I  have  often  pointed  out  that  the  union  of  the 
Balkan  nations  is  possible  only  if  Russia  takes  the  whole  matter  in  her 
own  hands — otherwise  all  efforts  will  be  futile. 

I  made  use  of  my  first  conversation  with  the  Prime  Minister 
to  mention  the  question  of  the  Bulgarian-Serbian  relations. 
Malinoff  sought  to  convince  me  that  these  relations  were  "friendly;" 
but  it  seemed  to  me  that  he  himself  scarcely  believes  this.  In  addi- 
tion I  spoke  in  the  same  sense  to  the  Chief  of  the  Privy  Cabinet  ^ 
who  has  communicated  the  substance  of  our  conversation  to  the 
King.  I  have  thus  done  everything  that  is  at  present  necessary, 
but,  as  I  have  said,  zue  must  get  to  the  root,  and  this  is  to  be  found 
in  the  fundamental  considerations  which  I  have  presented  above  with 
perfect  frankness  and  which  are  the  result  of  my  three  years'  activity 
here. 

*  Perfected  by  circumstances  and  Russian  efforts  in  1914. 

»  Pan-Slav. 

'  M.  Dobrovitch,  a  man  of  great  influence  in  Bulgaria. 


Ill 

THE  RUSSO-AUSTRIAN  BALKAN   "RAPPROCHEMENT" 
(February — October  1910) 

(321)     The  Russian  Chargi  d' Affaires  at  Vienna  to  Iswolsky.     Telegram,  Jan. 
14-27,  1910. 

A  propos  of  the  rumours  published  in  the  entire  Austrian  and 
foreign  press,  regarding  the  possibility  of  a  decrease  of  tension 
and  a  rapprochement  between  our  two  cabinets,  Aehrenthal  has  re- 
quested me  to  inform,  you  that  he  has  nothing  to  do  with  this  press 
campaign,  and,  likewise,  that  he  never  doubted  that  these  rumours 
did  not  originate  in  Government  circles  at  St.  Petersburg.  As  he 
has  already  informed  you,  the  minister  believes  that  it  would  be 
advisable  to  enlighten  public  opinion  only  after  the  question  had 
assumed  a  more  definite  form,^  and  that  in  all  cases  the  orientation 
of  public  opinion  could  be  undertaken  only  in  common.  It  is  with 
regret  that  I  have  established  the  fact  that  the  newspapers  have 
seized  upon  all  these  questions  in  their  first  stage,  and  I  believe 
that  the  dissatisfaction  may  be  traced  back  to  the  conversation  be- 
tween Wesselitski  and  Aehrenthal.  The  Minister  told  me  that  he 
hoped  to  be  able  to  give  you  an  answer  on  Saturday. 


(322)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Iswolsky.     Letter,  Jan.  21- 
Feb.  3,  1910. 

You  have  been  so  kind  as  to  inform  me  of  the  latest  phase  of  our 
relations  to  Austria-Hungary.  I  thank  you  for  these  communica- 
tions and  I  note  with  the  greatest  satisfaction  that  Aehrenthal, 

*The  question  of  a  better  understanding  between  Russia  and  Austria-Hungary. 

282 


RUSSO-AUSTRIAN  BALKAN  "RAPPROCHEMENT"    283 

having  become  conscious  of  his  former  wrong  and  the  political  dis- 
advantages that  ensued  therefrom,  is  now  making  efforts  once  more 
to  establish  normal  relations  with  you.  I  appreciate  your  answer 
to  the  latest  overtures  of  Count  Berchtold  the  more  highly  since 
in  your  answer,  quite  ignoring  the  personal  side,  you  confine  your- 
self exclusively  to  the  question  of  political  interests;  for  there 
is  no  doubt  that  it  would  be  advantageous  to  establish  an  agree- 
ment between  ourselves  and  Austria  in  Balkan  questions. 

I  sincerely  desire  that  these  negotiations  should  lead  to  results, 
which,  morever,  I  consider  to  be  beyond  doubt.  But  I  cannot  help 
to  doubt  seriously  the  sincerity  of  the  explanations  of  the  Vienna 
Cabinet  and  its  intention  to  act  under  all  circumstances  in  accord- 
ance with  these  explanations 

As  to  the  substance  of  the  question,  the  most  important  point 
for  us,  as  well  as  for  the  cause  of  general  peace,  is  the  principle 
of  the  preservation  of  the  status  quo  in  Balkan  policy.  Once  this 
principle  has  been  clearly  set  up  and  recognized  by  the  other  Great 
Powers,  a  brake  would  be  applied  to  the  ambition  of  the  small  Bal- 
kan States;  they  would  at  one  and  the  same  time  be  assured  of 
their  future,  and  the  Austrian  plans  in  the  Balkans  would  also  be 
hedged  in  in  an  effective  manner 

An  agreement  of  this  sort,  concluded  for  a  certain  number  of 
years,  would  leave  the  Balkan  States  at  perfect  liberty,  both  in  re- 
gard to  their  internal  development  as  well  as  to  their  mutual  rela- 
tions, which  they  might  develop  in  every  possible  way.  At  the 
same  time  Russia  would  be  placed  in  a  position  which  would  enable 
her  to  develop  her  military  forces  in  all  security  and  to  prepare  herself 
for  those  events  which  cannot  be  avoided.  In  the  meantime,  the  further 
evolution  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  would  be  clearer — the  problems 
would  mature,  and  we  would  be  able  to  meet  the  events  that  are  to  be 
foreseen  much  better  equipped  than  otherwise 


(323)     Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Vienna.     Letter,  Jan. 
2Z'Feb.  5.  1910. 

On  January  19 — February  1,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassa- 
dor, in  the  name  of  his  government,  made  me  a  verbal  communi- 
cation, the  contents  of  which  were  at  once  written  down  by  me 


i 


284         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

and  confirmed  by  Berchtold.  This  communication  reads  as  fol- 
lows: 

"As  you  are  aware,  I  reported  to  my  government  regarding 
our  last  conversation.  First  of  all,  I  made  clear  your  point  of 
view,  regarding  the  article  in  the  Fortnightly  Review'^  and  made 
the  point  that  you  conceived  it  to  be  your  right  to  demand  that 
this  article  be  rectified  in  so  far  as  it  contained  false  and  slanderous 
allegations,  at  the  same  time,  however,  you  recognized  that  one 
must  avoid  a  revival  of  polemics  in  the  newspapers,  and  were  pre- 
pared to  drop  the  personal  side  of  the  matter  in  the  interests  of 
the  cause  itself.  Aehrenthal  is  also  of  the  opinion  that  it  is  un- 
timely, and  even  dangerous,  to  revert  to  this  article  in  the  press, 
and  he  declares  that  he  is  prepared  to  come  to  an  understanding 
with  you  as  to  the  manner  in  which  an  interpellation,  that  may  be 
made  in  the  Duma  and  in  the  Delegations,^  is  to  be  answered.  Quite 
apart  from  this  personal  side  of  the  question  I  had  also  to  report 
to  my  Minister  your  overtures  in  connection  with  the  re-establish- 
ing of  contact  between  the  two  governments. 

"Aehrenthal  is  quite  of  your  opinion  that  the  re-establishing  of 
an  exchange  of  opinion  between  our  two  countries  could  exert  only 
a  favourable  influence  upon  the  normal  and  peaceful  development 
of  the  Oriental  questions.  fll 

"A  contact  of  this  kind  might  the  more  easily  be  established 
since  we  still  acknowledge  the  principles  of  the  Convention  of  1897, 
principles  which  will  permit  us  to  take  up  an  exchange  of  opinion 
with  the  St.  Petersburg  Cabinet  at  any  time.  These  basic  princi- 
ples are  the  following: 

"1.  Maintenance  of  the  status  quo  in  Turkey,  so  long  as  circum- 
stances permit. 

"2.  A  mutual  desinteressement  in  case  the  status  quo  can  no 
longer  be  maintained  and 

"3.  A  policy  of  non-interference  in  the  latter  case." 

I  replied  to  Count  Berchtold  that  I  would  not  fail  to  submit 
his  statement  to  the  Czar  and  then  communicate  to  him  the 
answer  of  the  Russian  Government. 

*  Contained  statements  offensive  to  the  Russian  Government,  its  ambassador 
at  Vienna,  and  Iswolsky. 

'The  Austrian  Reichsrat  and  the  Hungarian  Parliament. 


RUSSO-AUSTRIAN  BALKAN  "RAPPROCHEMENT"    285 

(324)  The  Russian  Minister  at  Belgrade  to  Iswolsky.    Telegram.  Jan.  20- 
Feb.  2,  1910. 

The  news  received  from  abroad  concerning  an  impending 
rapprochement  between  Russia  and  Austria  has  created  an  im- 
mense sensation  here.  The  agitation  grows  more  bitter  from  day 
to  day  and  evokes  great  perturbation  in  political,  administrative 
and  social  circles.  The  view  is  expressed  in  newspaper  articles, 
even  official  ones,  that  in  the  event  of  a  reconciliation  between  the 
two  Monarchies,  Serbia  will  prove  to  be  the  victim  since  she  would 
then  be  abandoned  to  complete  enslavement  by  Austria.  In  con- 
nection with  this  a  special  Ministerial  Council  has  been  convened 
and  I  am  met  on  all  sides  with  anxious  inquiries.  I  believe  it  is 
necessary  to  make  a  few  reassuring  declarations,  if  you  consider 
this  possible.  In  this  case,  I  beg  you  to  notify  me  in  what  sense  I 
am  to  speak  here. 

(325)  Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Minister  at  Belgrade.     Telegram.  Jan.  22- 
Feb.  4,  1910. 

Your  telegram  of  January  20  received. 

Our  negotiations  with  Austria  must  cause  no  anxiety  what- 
soever to  the  Serbian  Government.  These  negotiations  deal  neither 
with  a  division  into  spheres  of  interest,  nor  with  a  return  in  one  form 
or  another  to  the  former  understanding,  hut  merely  with  a  resumption 
of  normal  diplomatic  relations  between  the  two  Cabinets.  Our  chief 
objective  is  the  best  possible  maintenance  of  the  status  quo  in  the 
Balkans  and  the  peaceful  development  and  independence  of  the 
Balkan  States.  You  may  communicate  this  confidentially  to  the 
Belgrade  Cabinet.  I  have  already  spoken  to  the  Serbian  Minister 
in  this  sense. 

(326)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  to  Iswolsky.     Telegram, 
Jan.  22-Feb.  4,  1910.    No.  37. 

Since  the  Austrian  Ambassador  has  already  spoken  with  the 
Turkish  Foreign  Minister  regarding  the  expected  rapprochement 
between  Austria  and  Russia  on  the  basis  of  Balkan  questions,  and 
has  maintained  the  point  of  view  which  Austria  attempts  to  pre- 
sent to  the  Sublime  Porte,  do  you  not  consider  it  necessary  that 
we  inform  the  Turkish  Government  of  the  position  which  Russia 


286         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

assumes  in  this  question?  In  consequence  of  Austrian  hints,  thi 
Turks  fear  that  it  is  once  more  a  question  of  an  agreement  for  the  pur' 
pose  of  partitioning  Turkey} 

Just  as  we  were  able  to  produce  a  reassuring  effect  with  regard 
to  the  agreements  entered  into  at  Racconigi,  we  must  now  reconcile 
the  Turks  to  the  thought  of  normal  relations  between  St.  Peters- 
burg and  Vienna.  To  this  end  we  must  give  them  to  understand 
that  there  is  no  question  of  a  renewal  of  the  Murzsteg  Program,^ 
but  that  Austria  is  conscious  of  the  disadvantages  of  strained  re- 
lations with  the  St.  Petersburg  Cabinet  and  has  felt  herself  obliged 
to  accept  the  Russian  Balkan  program — the  latter,  to  which  Italy 
has  also  subscribed,  was  based,  as  is  well-known,  upon  good  rela- 
tions with  Turkey  and  upon  the  effort  to  ensure  equal  rights 
to  all  Turkish  subjects;  and  finally  upon  the  maintenance  oi 
the  status  quo  in  the  Balkans. 

{Z27)     Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople.    Telegram, 
Jan.  2A-Feh.  6,  1910.    No.  136. 

Your  telegram  No.  37  received. 

We  entirely  share  your  opinion  regarding  the  exchange  ol 
views  which  is  at  present  taking  place  between  ourselves  and 
Vienna.  Our  negotiations  with  Austria  are  not  directed  against 
Turkey  in  any  sense,  towards  which  country  now  as  before  we 
cherish  only  friendly  sentiments.  There  is  no  question  of  a  parti- 
tion of  Turkey,  nor  of  a  demarcation  of  spheres  of  interest,  nor  of 
a  renewal  of  the  former  agreement,  but  merely  of  the  resumption 
of  normal  diplomatic  relations  between  both  Cabinets,  in  connec- 
tion with  which  our  chief  objective  is  the  most  clearly  expressed 
guarantee  of  the  maintenance  of  the  status  quo  in  the  Balkans. 

I  beg  you  to  speak  in  this  sense  to  the  Turkish  Government.^ 

(328)     Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Chargi  d*Affaires  at  Vienna.    Letter,  Jan. 
27-Feb.  9,  1910. 

I  must  inform  you  that  in  the  name  of  the  Czar  I  today  made 
answer  to  the  communication  of  the  Austrian  Ambassador  under 

*  Tcharikoff  fails  to  produce  his  evidence  as  to  "Austrian  hints."  Why  should 
Austria  make  them  seeing  that  she  was  a  partner  to  this  case  of  improving  inter- 
national relations? 

'Of  1897. 

'Correspondence  on  this  subject  continues  with  Documents  Nos.  356  and  397.1 


RUSSO-AUSTRIAN  BALKAN  "RAPPROCHEMENT"    287 

date  of  January  19.  In  spite  of  the  fact  that  this  answer  was  given 
verbally  I,  at  the  same  time,  handed  an  aide  mcmoire  of  the  follow- 
ing contents  in  order  accurately  to  define  the  expressions : 

"Although  we  are  of  the  opinion  that  it  is  preferable  not  to 
revert  to  the  article  in  the  Fortnightly  Review,  we  are  prepared 
to  come  to  an  understanding  with  Aehrenthal,  in  case  public  dec- 
larations in  this  question  should  become  necessary. 

"The  Imperial  Government  gladly  agrees  to  the  idea  of  an 
exchange  of  views  between  both  Governments  regarding  the  lead- 
ing principles  of  their  Balkan  policies;  it  believes,  however,  that 
under  the  prevailing  circumstances  this  exchange  of  opinion  can 
no  longer  have  the  character  of  the  agreement  of  1897  and  must, 
on  the  contrary,  assume  a  form  which  would  render  it  possible 
for  all  interested  Powers  to  participate  in  this  exchange  of  views; 
on  the  other  hand,  in  formulating  the  principles  in  question,  the 
recent  changes  in  the  political  situation  of  Turkey  have  to  be  con- 
sidered. 

"The  Imperial  Government  for  this  reason  proposes  to  the 
Vienna  Cabinet  that  the  following  points  be  accepted,  and  that 
these  be  either  defined  by  means  of  an  exchange  of  notes  or  em- 
bodied in  a  single  document  which  might  then  be  brought  to  the 
knowledge  of  the  other  Powers ; 

"1.  The  maintenance  of  the  status  quo  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula. 

"2.  Since  the  new  regime  in  Turkey  is  based  on  the  equality 
of  rights  of  all  nationalities  living  in  Turkey — the  preservation  and 
consolidation  of  this  new  condition  of  things. 

"3.  Independence,  consolidation^  and  peaceful  development  of 
the  smaller  Balkan  States." 

(329)     Iswolskv  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.     Telegram,  Feb. 
11-24,  1910.    No.  245. 

On  February  7  Count  Berchtold  handed  me  the  answer  of  the 
Vienna  Cabinet  to  our  last  communication.  This  answer  does  not 
object  to  our  three  points  which  are  already  known  to  you.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  Vienna  Cabinet  obviously  wishes  to  avoid 
making  a  communication  to  the  other  Powers,  and  proposes  that 
we  content  ourselves  with  a  public  announcement  containing  the 
*  Was  actually  in  progress  under  strictly  Russian  auspices. 


288         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

simple  statement  that  the  exchange  of  opinion  between  both  Gov 
ernments  had  led  to  satisfactory  results. 

I  have  anwered  Count  Berchtold  today  by  a  memorandum  to 
the  effect  that  I  note  the  fact  that  perfect  unity  exists  between 
Russia  and  Austria-Hungary  as  to  political  principles  in  questions 
affecting  the  Balkans,  and  that  consequently  the  normal  political 
relations  between  both  Cabinets  might  be  resumed.  At  the  same 
time  I  have  added  that,  according  to  our  point  of  view,  a  simple 
communication  of  this  kind  would  under  the  prevailing  circum- 
stances not  be  sufficient,  and  that  it  was  in  the  interests  of  general 
peace,  already  at  this  moment  to  persuade  the  other  cabinets  to 
support  the  principles  recognized  by  Russia  and  Austria,  in  order 
that  should  any  possible  event  threaten  the  status  quo,  an  exchange 
of  views  might  at  once  take  place  between  the  interested  Powers.^ 
I  thus  repeated  our  proposal  to  bring  those  points  upon  which  we 
had  come  to  an  agreement,  to  the  notice  of  the  other  Powers. 

Please  communicate  the  above  confidentially  to  the  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs  and  express  the  hope  that  he  will  give  us  his 
moral  support  at  Vienna,  in  order  to  overcome  Aehrenthal's  aver- 
sion to  our  proposal,  since  we  attach  to  it  a  very  great  importance 


(330)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Iswolsky.     Telegram,  Feb 
13-26,  1910.    No.  40. 


Your  telegram  No.  245  received. 

I  have  communicated  its  contents  confidentially  this  morning? 
Grey  is  very  grateful  and  is  prepared  to  take  action  at  Vienna. 

Nicolson  ^  has  been  instructed  to  ask  you  in  what  form  you  would  like 
to  see  this  done,  since  our  communication  to  the  London  Cabinet  is  a 
very  confidential  one  and  Vienna  has  no  knowledge  of  this  step. 

(331)     Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.     Telegram,  Feb. 
14-27,  1910.    No.  256. 

Your  telegram  No.  40  received. 

I  replied  to  Nicolson*s  question  that  Cartwright,^  without  indi- 
cating that  he  was  aware  of  the  contents  of  our  last  aide  memoire, 

*Aehrenthal  considered  this  a  trap,  because  of  Iswolsky's  insistence  upon  a 
conference  a  year  before. 

'  British  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg. 
'  British  ambassador  at  Vienna. 


RUSSO-AUSTRIAN  BALKAN  "RAPPROCHEMENT"    289 

might  tell  Aehrenthal  in  general  terms  that  the  London  Cabinet  de- 
sires that  the  Austro-Russian  negotiations  should  lead  to  a  result  and 
that  it  considers  it  above  all  things  extremely  expedient  that  all  other 
Powers  should  participate  in  this  result. 

{ZZ2)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Rome  to  Iswolsky.    Telegram,  Jan.  30- 
Feb.  12,  1910. 

As  I  am  indisposed,  I  have  asked  Korff  ^  to  give  your  communi- 
cation to  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  The  Minister  took 
note  of  the  declaration  with  the  greatest  interest  and  is  very 
thankful  for  being  kept  au  courant.  He  is  prepared  to  do  his  ut- 
most to  have  your  proposal  accepted  at  Vienna.  He  added,  how- 
ever, that  he  personally  had  doubts  that  Aehrenthal  would  agree 
to  it. 

(333)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Jan.  30'Feb.  12,  1910. 

This  morning  Bollati  told  Korff,  in  a  confidential  conversation, 
that  the  Italian  Government  congratulated  itself  upon  the  pro- 
posals made  by  Your  Excellency  to  the  Vienna  Cabinet,  since  it 
recognized  in  these  proposals  a  reinforcement  of  its  own  policy. 
But,  in  view  of  the  special  interests  of  Italy  in  the  Adriatic  and  con- 
sequently of  her  special  relations  to  Turkey,  the  Cabinet  of  Rome  must 
ask  itself  whether  the  exchange  of  views  between  Petersburg  and  Vienna 
might  not  lead  to  a  double  understanding  to  the  exclusion  of  Italy, 
Korff  declared  that  this  fear  was  groundless,  since  your  Memoran- 
dum clearly  emphasizes  the  fact  that  a  reversion  to  the  Conven- 
tion of  1897  was  precluded,  and,  that,  if  a  new  agreement  should 
be  entered  upon,  this  would  have  to  be  such  that  all  the  Powers 
interested  would  be  able  to  become  part  of  it.  The  best  proof  was 
the  confidential  communication  of  yesterday.  Bollati  then  asked 
how  and  under  what  conditions  the  other  Powers  had  been  sum- 
moned to  declare  their  willingness  to  join. 

(334)  The  Russian  Charge  d* Affaires  at  Vienna  to  Iswolsky.    Letter,  Feb. 
4-17,  1910. 

I  wish  to  express  my  best  thanks  to  Your  Excellency  for  the 
letter  which  informed  me  of  the  conversation  which  has  taken 

*  Russian  counselor  of  embassy  at  Rome. 

19 


290         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

place  with  the  Austrian  Ambassador.  As  agreed,  I  called  upon 
Aehrenthal  on  Monday  evening,  to  learn  from  him  what  impres- 
sion he  had  received  from  the  latest  reports  of  Berchtold's.  My 
telegram  of  February  1  gave  you  a  brief  report  of  my  conversation 
with  Aehrenthal;  this  conversation  was  very  friendly  and  I  have 
not  much  to  add  to  my  telegram 

Proceeding  to  the  question  which  expression  should  be  given 
to  our  agreement,  the  Minister  lingered  for  some  time  upon  this 
side  of  the  question  and  told  me  that  from  the  beginning  he  had 
been  of  the  opinion  that  it  would  be  necessary  to  limit  ourselves 
to  a  contact  between  the  two  Governments ;  this  contact  was  neces- 
sary in  order  to  avert  a  dangerous  situation  in  the  Balkans.  The 
exchange  of  notes  or  any  other  similar  document  as  suggested  by 
you  would,  in  his  opinion,  give  our  rapprochement  too  much  the 
character  of  an  "agreement" — this  agreement  would  have  to  be 
postponed  to  a  time  when  events  in  the  Balkans  may  make  such 
an  agreement  necessary 

It  appeared  to  me,  as  I  mentioned  in  my  telegram  of  February 
1-14,  that  Aehrenthal  wishes  to  avoid  a  communication  of  our  agree- 
ment to  the  other  Powers,  even  though  this  was  not  expressly 
mentioned. 

If  I  do  not  err,  the  lack  of  an  exchange  of  notes  or  of  any  other 
diplomatic  instrument,  in  which  our  agreement  finds  expression, 
does  not  preclude  the  possibility  of  such  a  communication,  since 
both  Cabinets  have  already  exchanged  brief  documents.  Obviously, 
Aehrenthal's  communication  would  have  to  accord  exactly  with 
what  he  gave  me  to  understand  during  our  last  conversation. 

At  the  close  of  our  conversation,  Aehrenthal  mentioned  the 
answers  which  he  would  return  to  the  other  Powers,  in  the  event 
of  his  being  asked  questions  regarding  the  points  which  we  are 
now  discussing  as  has  already  been  the  case  with  the  Italian  Gov- 
ernment  

The  Italian  Ambassador  spoke  to  me  for  a  moment  Monday 
evening,  before  my  visit  to  Aehrenthal;  he  wished  to  know  what 
Aehrenthal  had  replied  to  our  last  communications,  and  he  seemed 
rather  pessimistic  regarding  the  success  of  our  negotiations  with 
Austria.  Avama  seemed  to  be  informed  of  the  basis  of  our  nego- 
tiations, and  it  was  precisely  the  third  point,  "the  peaceful  de- 


RUSSO-AUSTRIAN  BALKAN  "RAPPROCHEMENT"    291 

velopment  of  the  smaller  Balkan  States"  which  caused  his  doubt. 
I  replied  that  inasmuch  as  the  word  "peaceful"  was  added,  there 
was  no  ground  for  suspicion. 

The  French  Ambassador  had  the  same  doubts  at  the  beginning, 
since  he  feared  that  Aehrenthal  might  discern  something  suspi- 
cious in  this 

(335)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Rome  to  Iswolsky.    Telegram,  Feb,  13- 

26,  1910. 

The  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  will  consider  how  he  might 
best  support  your  proposals  at  Vienna,  in  accordance  with  your 
wishes.  He  thanks  you  for  the  communication  and  would  be  glad 
to  know  whether  you  have  addressed  the  same  request  to  the  other 
Powers. 

(336)  The  Russian   Charge   d'Affaires  at  Paris   to   Iswolsky.     Telegram. 
Feb.  13-26,  1910. 

M.  Pichon  is  obliged  for  the  confidential  communication;  he  is 
quite  of  your  opinion  and  has  already  given  the  French  Ambassa- 
dor at  Vienna  instructions  to  support  you  in  everything  which 
might  help  your  proposals  to  triumph. 

{ZZ7)     Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Rome.     Telegram,  Feb.  14- 

27,  1910. 

Your  telegram  of  February  13-26  received.  We  are  keeping  the 
Cabinets  of  Rome,  Paris  and  London  informed  of  our  negotiations  with 
Austria,  and  this  also  applies  to  Berlin  though  in  a  lesser  degree. 

(338)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Iswolsky.    Letter,  Feb.  16- 
March  1,  1910. 

I  received  your  telegram  of  Feb.  11-24,  regarding  our  negotia- 
tions with  Austria  on  Saturday  morning,  but  could  find  neither 
Sir  Edward  Grey  nor  Sir  Charles  Hardinge  at  the  Foreign  Office 
that  day.  I  therefore  made  this  important  communication  to  Mr. 
Tyrell,  Grey's  private  secretary,  who  enjoys  his  particular  confi- 
dence. Without  having  the  authority  to  be  able  to  give  me  a  final 
answer,  Tyrell  told  me  that  the  standpoint  of  the  London  Cabinet 
in  this  question  had  been  so  clear  from  the  very  beginning  that 
he  did  not  for  the  moment  doubt  that  Sir  Edward  would  do  every- 
thing to  be  useful  to  us. 


292         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

And  yet,  he  went  on,  how  shall  we  do  it  and  what  shall  we  say 
at  Vienna  without  committing  an  indiscretion  and  without  con- 
fining ourselves  to  insufficient  generalities?  He  proposed  to  me 
that  Nicolson  be  instructed  to  discuss  this  question  of  diplomatic 
technique  with  you.  I  accepted  this  suggestion.  After  I  had 
received  your  telegram,  which  contains  a  very  happy  formula 
which  might  be  of  service  to  Sir  F.  Cartwright  in  his  conversations, 
I  called  on  Hardinge.  He  confirmed  to  me  the  intention  of  the  Lon- 
don Cabinet  to  give  us  support.  He,  too,  told  me  that  this  action 
at  Vienna  was  of  a  very  delicate  nature  and  that  Aehrenthal  will 
perceive  in  it,  if  not  mistrust,  then  at  least  an  interference  and  a 
not  wholly  justifiable  curiosity. 

Sir  Charles  then  told  me  that  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  determined 
to  make  use  of  another  pretext  in  order  to  beg  the  Austrian  am- 
bassador in  London  to  call  upon  him  and  to  speak  with  him  after 
some  other  affair,  no  matter  what,  had  been  settled.  I  made  free 
to  reply  that  I  believed  that  Your  Excellency  would  be  satisfied 
with  this  procedure,  since  it  had  the  advantage  of  being  less  dis- 
agreeable to  the  Vienna  Cabinet,  and  nevertheless  achieved  the 
same  purpose.  This  would  also  have  the  advantage  that  Mens- 
dorff,  ^  with  whom  I  maintain  close  relations,  would  speak  to  me 
about  this  matter. 

This  will  give  me  the  opportunity  of  telling  him  that  I  was 
very  glad  to  see  that  the  London  Cabinet  had  come  to  the  same 
conclusion  as  our  own  Government :  I  was  aware  that  it  had  been 
wished  for  a  long  time  in  London  that  contact  between  St.  Peters- 
burg and  Vienna  be  resumed,  and  that  it  seemed  to  me,  nay,  that 
I  was  certain,  that  a  communication  to  the  other  Powers  relative 
to  the  three  points  agreed  upon  would  not  only  be  expedient  but 
in  every  way  necessary 

I  hope  that  Your  Excellency  approves  of  my  speaking  in  this 
sense  to  my  Austrian  colleague. 

(339)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Berlin  to  Iswolsky.    Telegram,  Feb.  16- 
March  1,  1910.    No.  17. 

Schon,^  in  his  answer  to  our  last  communication,  has  changed 

his  standpoint  with  regard  to  your  desire  to  inform  all  the  Great 

*  Austro-Hungarian  ambassador  at  London. 

*  German  secretary  of  foreign  affairs. 


I 


RUSSO-AUSTRIAN  BALKAN  "RAPPROCHEMENT"    293 

Powers  of  the  results  of  our  negotiations  with  Austria.  The  former 
feeling  of  satisfaction  seems  to  have  given  place  to  a  certain  mis- 
trust. He  emphasizes,  as  at  first,  the  reserve  shown  by  Aehren« 
thai  in  this  matter,  and  the  personal  sensitiveness  which  renders 
every  exercise  of  German  influence  difficult,  and  he  gave  me  to 
understand,  that  at  heart  he  shared  the  opinion  of  the  Austrians 
that  it  was  inexpedient  to  transmit  a  communication  to  the  other 
Powers  at  this  moment.  He  thought  that  this  might  be  done  later 
on,  when  the  status  quo  in  the  Balkans  should  be  threatened  in 
one  form  or  another.  This  answer  was  obviously  given  after  the 
Secretary  of  State  had  made  his  report  to  the  Emperor. 


(340)     The  Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Vienna  to  Iswolsky.     Telegram. 
Feb.  \6-March  1,  1910.    No,  19. 

I  have  just  made  to  Aehrenthal  the  prescribed  verbal  com- 
munication as  to  the  resumption  of  normal  diplomatic  relations 
between  the  two  Powers.  The  Minister  answered  me  that  he  is 
happy  to  be  able  to  establish  the  fact  that  the  political  principles 
of  both  Cabinets  were  identical  in  Balkan  questions,  and  added 
that  he  would  forward  the  necessary  instructions  to  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  to  take  up  normal  rela- 
tions. With  regard  to  the  second  part  of  the  aide  memoire,  Aehren- 
thal remarked  he  would  once  more  examine  the  question,  but 
he  did  not  believe  that  he  could  change  his  former  point  of  view 
to  the  effect  that  it  was  inexpedient  to  induce  the  other  Cabinets 
to  join  in  the  Austro-Russian  agreement. 

The  resumption  of  the  contact  which  permits  us  to  enter  into 
an  exchange  of  opinion  as  to  all  political  questions  of  the  day, 
seemed  to  him  to  be  sufficient  for  the  moment,  since  the  situation 
in  the  Balkans  was  a  quiet  one.  /  remarked  that  it  might  after  alt 
be  better  to  do  this  now,  since  one  would  be  obliged  to  have  recourse 
to  this  means  if  the  status  quo  in  the  Balkans  should  be  threatened 
and  since  it  appeared  that  danger  in  Greece  might  not  be  quite  excluded 
at  the  moment.  Aehrenthal  replied  that  he  would  once  more  ex- 
amine your  proposal. 

I  do  not  know  whether  the  British  and  Italian  Ambassadors 
have  been  instructed  to  give  us  their  moral  support  in  overcoming 


294         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

the  opposition  of  Aehrenthal.    As  soon  as  I  find  this  out  I  shall 
telegraph  you. 

(341)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Feb.  \7 -March  2,  1910. 

Continuation  of  my  telegram  No.  19. 

The  British  Ambassador  told  me  yesterday  that  Sir  Edward 
Grey  had  determined  to  use  his  personal  influence  with  Mens- 
dorff  in  this  question.  He  added  that  if  in  the  course  of  his  con- 
versation with  Aehrenthal  he  found  it  possible  to  say  something 
in  favour  of  your  proposal,  he  would  do  this,  without  letting  it 
appear  that  he  was  informed  of  the  progress  of  the  negotiations. 
As  to  the  Italian  Ambassador,  he  was  avoiding,  as  the  French  and 
English  representatives  told  me,  every  discussion  concerning  our 
rapprochement  with  Austria.  I  would  therefore  prefer  not  to  speak 
to  him  about  this  for  the  present. 

Aehrenthal  is  leaving  today  for  several  days'  stay  at  Abazzia. 

(342)  The  Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Paris  to  Iswolsky.    Letter,  Feb.  18- 
March  3,  1910. 

In  consequence  of  the  illness  of  my  chief,  I  have  recently  had 
frequent  opportunities  to  speak  with  M.  Pichon.  As  I  have  al- 
ready telegraphed  you,  the  Minister  completely  shares  your  opin- 
ion and  will  do  everything  in  his  power  to  see  that  a  communication 
to  the  other  Powers  be  made,  which  will  not  leave  the  slightest 
doubt  as  to  the  nature  and  the  purpose  of  our  reconciliation  with 
the  Vienna  Cabinet,  and  which  in  a  way  fetters  the  policy  of 
Austria  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula. 

M.  Pichon  is  quite  in  agreement  with  the  three  points  to  which 
you  wish  to  limit  this  communication.  In  his  opinion  these  define 
the  mutual  relations  of  the  two  Powers  in  Balkan  policy  and  will 
facilitate  an  exchange  of  views  between  all  Powers  in  case  of 
sudden  political  complications. 

M.  Pichon,  however,  has  not  concealed  from  me  his  fear  that  at 
the  present  moment  when  normal  relations  with  Vienna  were  being 
restored,  Aehrenthal  would  give  his  consent  to  making  the  agreement 
public  only  with  the  greatest  reluctance,  for  its  publication  would  in 
too  great  a  degree  bind  Austria  with  respect  to  the  other  Cabinets  and 
to  the  public  opinion  of  Europe. 


RUSSO-AUSTRIAN  BALKAN  "RAPPROCHEMENT"    295 

'^AH  the  more  readily  shall  we  be  prepared/'  M.  Pichon  added,  ''to 
support  M.  Iswolsky  whenever  he  wishes  to  carry  out  such  important 
and  necessary  demands." 

(343)  The  Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Vienna  to  Iswolsky.     Telegram, 
Feb.  25-March  10,  1910.    No.  22. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  answer  will  be  sent  to  you  to- 
morrow by  courier;  since  the  situation  had  not  changed,  Aehren- 
thal  told  me,  he  saw  no  reason  for  changing  his  opinion  that  it 
was  inexpedient  to  communicate  to  the  other  Powers  the  princi- 
ples respecting  Balkan  policy  which  had  been  accepted  by  both 
Governments 

Aehrenthal  believes  that  such  a  communication  would  rather 
weaken  than  strengthen  the  fundamental  principles  which  have 
been  set  up.  I  observed  that  at  all  events  the  principle  of  the 
preservation  and  the  consolidation  of  the  new  Turkish  regime 
was  something  new.  The  Minister  hereupon  mentioned  a  little 
misunderstanding  between  you  and  the  German  Ambassador  as 
to  an  "alleged  secret  agreement"  which  Russia  had  wished  to  con- 
clude with  Austria-Hungary.  ^  He  told  me  that  this  misunder- 
standing had  been  cleared  up.  It  nevertheless  appeared  to  him 
that  you  were  of  the  opinion  that  Vienna,  in  not  wishing  to  inform 
the  other  Powers,  desired  to  give  the  political  contact  between 
Russia  and  Austria  the  character  of  an  agreement.  This,  Aeh- 
renthal said,  was  hardly  correct.  He  regards  our  exchange  of 
views  as  concluded;  the  result  a  very  happy  one  and  that  now  it 
was  desirable  that  public  opinion  in  both  countries  be  properly 
directed.  The  Minister  closed  the  conversation  by  saying  that 
the  situation  in  the  Balkans  caused  him  no  anxiety  and  that  every- 
thing seemed  to  be  in  order  at  Constantinople. 

(344)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  March  6-19,  1910. 

Aehrenthal  has  just  handed  to  me  the  text  of  the  communica- 
tion which  is  destined  for  the  purpose  of  directing  public  opinion. 
Count  Berchtold  will  hand  you  this  text.     Publication  is  to  take 

*  The  German  Government  made  formal  inquiry  to  this  effect,  following  Rus- 
sian intimation  that  Germany's  ally,  Austria-Hungary,  was  considering  such  a 
"secret  agreement." 


296         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

place  Monday  in  the  Politische  Korrespondenz,  Aehrenthal  does 
not  consider  it  necessary  that  both  Governments  should  make  an 
identical  and  simultaneous  publication. 


(345)    Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  in  London.    Telegram,  March 
7-20,  1910.    No.  362. 

After  our  negotiations  with  Vienna  have  resulted  in  the  con- 
formity of  the  principles  of  the  Russian  and  the  Austrian  Balkan 
policy  and  normal  diplomatic  relations  have  been  resumed  be- 
tween the  two  Governments,  I  have  today  communicated  this 
fact  to  the  Ambassadors  of  Germany,  France,  England,  Italy  and 
Turkey  by  means  of  an  aide  memoire  to  which  I  appended  the  dip- 
lomatic correspondence  relative  to  these  negotiations.  A  short 
resume  will  be  published  tomorrow  through  the  St.  Petersburg 
Telegraph  Agency. 


(346)     The  Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Vienna  to  Iswolsky.     Telegram, 
March  9-22,  1910.    No.  27. 

Your  telegram  No.  362  was  received  Sunday  night  and  I  did 
not  deem  it  necessary  to  communicate  the  contents  to  Aehrenthal, 
as  the  telegram  contained  no  order  to  that  end.  Today,  calling 
on  Aehrenthal,  who  is  leaving  this  evening  for  Abazzia,  he  told 
me  that  he  expected  that  I  would  inform  him  about  the  Russian 
communique,  since  Count  Berchtold  had  been  unable  to  do  this. 
There  was  nothing  left  for  me  to  do  than  to  tell  him  that  I  had 
received  no  orders  to  that  effect,  and  that  I  was  also  not  in  pos- 
session of  the  text  of  this  communique.  He  then  touched  upon  the 
fact  that  Your  Excellency  had  not  considered  the  wish  of  the 
Vienna  Cabinet  in  connection  with  the  inexpediency  of  permitting 
the  other  Powers  to  participate  in  our  agreement.  Aehrenthal 
finally  spoke  of  the  article  in  the  Fortnightly  Review  and  added 
that  it  would  have  been  desirable  to  have  come  to  an  understand- 
ing, as  he  had  suggested,  regarding  the  answers  to  eventual  inter- 
pellations in  the  Duma  and  in  the  Delegations. 

At  the  close  Aehrenthal,  in  cordial  terms,  told  me  how  satis- 


I 


RUSSO-AUSTRIAN  BALKAN  "RAPPROCHEMENT"    297 

iied  he  was  that  our  negotiations  for  the  maintenance  of  peace  had 
been  brought  to  a  successful  conclusion. 

(347)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople   to  Iswolsky.     Letter, 
April  8-21,  1910. 

The  Turkish  Naval  Ministry  has  shown  energetic  and  deter- 
mined activity  during  the  past  year.  We  ourselves  are  building 
no  new  vessels  in  the  Black  Sea  and  do  not  even  replace  the  old. 
Whilst  Turkey  ostensibly  arms  against  Greece,  she  is  on  the  point 
of  overtaking  us,  should  we  persist  in  maintaining  our  present 
standpoint.  At  any  rate,  the  Turks  have  outstripped  us  with  re- 
gard to  torpedo  boats.  The  vessels  purchased  in  Germany  make 
35  knots  an  hour  whilst  ours  cannot  make  more  than  25. 

Should  the  Turks  buy  the  vessels  of  the  Dreadnought  type, 
as  our  Naval  Agent  at  Paris  reported,  then  the  mastery  of  the 
Black  Sea  will  pass  into  the  hands  of  Turkey.  But  we  cannot 
possibly  allow  this. 

For  this  would  be  tantamount  to  the  destruction  of  Alexander 
Ill's  useful  work.^  At  the  same  time,  the  basis  of  the  Russo-Turk- 
ish  relations  would  be  shifted  to  our  disadvantage.  As  long  as  we 
are  the  more  powerful  in  the  Black  Sea,  we  are  in  a  position  to  menace 
by  one  means  or  the  other  the  Bosphorous  and  the  entire  Turkish  coast. 
The  Turks  fear  us,  esteem  the  value  of  favourable  relations  with  us 
and  must  needs  reckon  with  our  special  interests  in  Asia  Minor  and 
Persia,  despite  all  insinuations  on  the  part  of  Germany. 

But  once  the  Turks,  profiting  by  the  present  moment,  seize 
the  predominance  in  the  Black  Sea,  which  has  not  happened  since 
the  days  of  Peter  the  Great,  then  negotiations  must  be  carried  on 
in  quite  a  different  tone,  and  we  shall  be  forced  either  to  give  in  to 
the  Turks  on  these  important  points,  or  to  accept  the  challenge. 
In  doing  so,  however,  we  should  be  disarmed  from  a  naval  point 
of  view  from  the  very  beginning.    Which  is  to  be  preferred? 

(348)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  April  14-27,  1910.    No.  200. 

I  had  a  confidential  conversation  with  the  Grand  Vizier  to-day 

*  Liberation  of  Bulgaria  and  destruction  of  Turkey  as  a  first  class  Power 
in  Europe.    Should  be  Alexander  "11"  not  "III." 


298         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

on  the  Turkish  naval  armaments.  Prepared  for  this  meeting  by 
our  first  dragoman,  Hakki  Pasha  told  me  that  the  said  armaments 
have  no  other  purpose  than  Turkey's  being  able  to  oppose  Greek 
hostility.  Turkey  has  also  to  consider  the  fact  of  Bulgaria's  pos- 
sessing a  small  mining  fleet.  Turkey  could  not  enter  into  a  strug- 
gle either  with  Russia,  with  France  and  England  or  with 
Austria,  nor  has  she  any  intention  of  doing  so,  since  she  is  pro- 
tected by  her  army  and  by  alliances. 

The  expenditure  for  the  fleet  is  limited  to  5  million  Turkish 
pounds,  distributed  over  ten  years.  From  this  sum  the  voluntary 
subscriptions  and  other  percentages  have  to  be  deducted.  It  is 
true  that  the  Naval  Minister  intends  purchasing  a  15,000  ton 
cruiser.  The  entire  programme  is,  however,  to  be  revised  very 
shortly  by  the  Ministerial  Council,  as  the  means  at  disposal  are 
less  than  was  first  believed.  Personally,  the  Grand  Vizier  con- 
siders the  Naval  Minister's  programme  to  be  too  comprehensive. 
The  Turkish  Government  does  not  by  any  means  intend  entering 
into  competition  with  us,  as  it  is  acquainted  with  our  naval  pro- 
gramme and  also  convinced  of  our  friendly  feelings. 


(349)     Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris.     Telegram,  June  15- 
28,  1910.    No.  905. 

As  the  arrival  of  the  Turkish  Minister  of  Finance  or  of  delegates 
of  the  Turkish  Government  is  expected  very  shortly  at  Paris  to 
confer  on  the  loan,  I  deem  it  necessary  to  communicate  to  you  our 
standpoint  in  this  matter. 

Should  it  be  only  a  question  of  raising  250  million  francs  to  cover 
the  current  Turkish  Budget,  then  an  intervention  on  our  part  will 
be  hardly  necessary.  In  such  case  we  could  content  ourselves 
with  France  rendering  the  loan  dependent  on  the  granting  of  the 
Samsun-Siwas  Railway  concession  to  a  Franco-Russian  syndicate. 

Should  the  conferences  deal  with  a  larger  loan,  which,  after 
covering  the  budget  deficit,  would  leave  considerable  means  at 
the  disposal  of  the  Turkish  Government,  then  we  shall  have  to 
communicate  our  considerations  to  France,  to  whom  they  are  also 
of  importance. 


RUSSO-AUSTRIAN  BALKAN  "RAPPROCHEMENT"    299 

France  has  an  interest  in  our  military  superiority  over  Turkey. 
Every  reinforcement  of  Turkey's  military  position,  especially  on  the 
Caucasian  frontier,  necessitates  corresponding  counter-measures 
on  our  part;  these  would  necessarily  also  have  an  influence  on 
our  western  frontier  as  well.  Hence  we  are  of  the  opinion  that  it 
would  be  both  to  our  and  France's  interest  should  we,  in  conformity 
with  the  Paris  Cabinet,  profit  by  the  lack  of  money  in  Constantinople 
to  secure  from  Turkey  obligations  restricting  Turkey's  future  military 
growth.  From  a  military  point  of  view,  the  question  of  the  Turkish 
railway  constructions  in  the  Caucasus  and  Northern  Persia,^  as 
well  as  the  acquisition  of  men-of-war,  is  fraught  with  especial  im- 
portance. 

It  is  most  important  to  limit  Turkey's  freedom  of  action  in 
this  respect.  Should  the  French  Government  share  our  views  in 
principle  then  we  must  endeavour  to  find  a  formula  acceptable  to 
Turkey.  We  ourselves  would  be  willing  in  this  case  to  renounce 
our  rights  in  the  Samsun-Siwas  line  in  favour  of  the  French  mem- 
bers of  the  syndicate. 

I  beg  you  to  seek  a  confidential  interview  with  Pichon,  keep- 
ing your  statements  within  the  margin  of  a  preliminary  exchange 
of  opinions.  Further  negotiations  will  depend  on  Pichon's  reply, 
which  we  hope  to  receive  very  shortly. 


(350)     The  Russian  Charge  d* Affaires  at  Paris  to  Iswolsky.    Telegram,  June 
17-30,  1910. 

Djavid  Bey  is  expected  at  Paris  on  Saturday.  Pichon  is  still 
without  news  regarding  the  amount  of  the  Turkish  loan.  Calcu- 
lations made  by  the  first  Counselor  of  Finance,  M.  Laurent,  re- 
veal Turkey  to  need  about  600  millions.  But  Djavid  in  all  prob- 
ability will  only  endeavour  to  raise  about  half  of  this  sum  at  first. 
I  have  communicated  to  Pichon  the  standpoint  held  by  our  Gov- 
ernment, as  well  as  the  tenor  of  your  telegram.  He  told  me  it 
was  impossible  in  principle  for  the  French  Government  to  refuse 
the  loan  or  to  demand  an  assurance  from  Turkey  that  the  monies 
resulting  from  the  loan  be  used  neither  for  the  strengthening  of 

*  The  Russian  sphere  of  influence,  occupied  at  that  time  by  Russian  troops. 


300  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

the  fleet  nor  the  increase  of  the  army.  The  French  Government  nev- 
ertheless is  firmly  resolved  to  use  the  loan  to  secure  guarantees  from 
Turkey  which  will  satisfy  France,  England  and  Russia.  It  may  also 
be  possible  at  the  same  time  to  prevent  the  construction  of  new  strate- 
gic lines  to  the  detriment  of  Russia.  The  issue  of  a  loan  wll  be  im- 
possible in  any  case,  unless  the  Great  Powers  acquiesce  in  the 
increase  of  the  Turkish  Customs  Tariff.  This  will  take  time  and 
cause  protracted  discussion.  I  have  the  impression  that  Pichon 
has  been  greatly  alarmed  by  your  reflections. 


(351)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Confidential  Report,  June  24-July  7,  1910. 

In  continuation  of  my  telegram  of  June  17-30,  I  regard  it  as 
my  duty  to  inform  you  that  my  statements  made  a  deep  impres- 
sion on  Pichon.  He  appeared  to  me  to  he  chiefly  disturbed  by  your 
suggestion  that  the  reinforcement  of  the  Turkish  troops  on  the  Persian 
and  Caucasian  frontier  would  result  in  an  immediate  reduction  of 
our  military  strength  on  the  west  boundary  of  Russia.^  He  never- 
theless deemed  it  necessary  to  allude  to  the  impossibility  for 
France  to  demand  Turkish  guarantees  during  the  negotiations 
that  the  financial  means  granted  at  Paris  should  not  be  used  for 
armaments.  Such  a  condition  would  be  incompatible  with  the  dig- 
nity of  the  Ottoman  Empire ;  it  would  be  rejected  and  would  serve 
solely  to  drive  Turkey  towards  Germany,  to  enter  into  a  close 
understanding  with  the  latter  and  to  raise  the  money  elsewhere 

Pichon  informed  me  that  he  intends  to  use  the  loan  to  demand 
tangible  political  concessions  from  Turkey  which  would  be  satis- 
factory in  equal  measure  to  all  the  three  Powers  of  the  Triple 
Entente 


(352)     Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.   Telegram,  July  21- 
Aug.  3,  1910.    No.  1139. 

In  a  personal  and  friendly  conversation  with  the  Turkish  Am- 
bassador a  few  days  ago,  I  asked  him  whether  it  was  true,  as  the 
papers  again  and  again  assert,  that  Turkey  had  the  intention  of  offi- 

*  German  and  Austro-Hungarian  frontiers. 


RUSSO-AUSTRIAN  BALKAN  "RAPPROCHEMENT"    301 

cially  joining  the  Triple  Alliance  and  that  Hakki  Pasha  would  con- 
fer on  this  subject  with  Aehrenthal  at  Marienbad. 

I  remarked  at  the  same  time  that  such  reports  appeared  im- 
probable to  me,  as  it  was  hardly  likely  Turkey  could  have  so 
soon  forgotten  Austria's  part  in  the  Bulgarian  declaration  of  in- 
dependence ^  and,  on  the  other  hand,  must  certainly  still  remember 
Russia's  exertions  to  avert  complications  for  Turkey. 

Turkhan  Pasha  submitted  the  gist  of  this  conversation  to  Con- 
stantinople, and  this  morning  he  read  out  to  me  a  lengthy  telegram 
in  reply,  in  which  Rifaat  most  emphatically  denies  these  reports 
and  corroborates  the  intention  of  the  Turkish  Government  to  main- 
tain its  unrestricted  liberty  of  action  and  uphold  the  very  best 
relations  with  Russia  from  whom  Turkey  has  received  so  many 
proofs  of  good-will. 


(353)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at   Constantinople   to   Sasonoff,  Russian 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.     Telegram,  Oct.  11-24,  1910. 

The  Minister  of  Finance  has  informed  me  how  exceedingly  dis- 
appointed he  is  at  the  abandonment  of  the  loan  negotiations  at 
Paris.  The  demands  formulated  by  the  French  Government  are 
here  considered  incompatible  with  the  further  independence  of 
Turkey  as  a  State;  nor  are  they  by  any  means  in  keeping  with 
the  moderate  amount  of  the  prospective  financial  operations.  It 
is  especially  painful  for  the  Minister  that  France  is  also  opposed 
to  a  conclusion  of  the  loan  in  England,  which  was  already  assured. 
Turkey  needs  money  so  badly  at  present  that  she  will  be  forced 
to  accept  not  only  German  money  but  the  German  political  stipu- 
lations as  well,  although,  according  to  some  reports,  these  are 
directed  against  Russia  and  England. 

The  situation  is  very  grave.  I  presume  that  even  though 
France  considers  it  impossible  to  set  up  easier  conditions  for  the 
protection  of  our  interests,  at  least  she  will  not  oppose  the  con- 
clusion of  the  negotiations  between  Djavid  and  Cassel.^  This 
would  meet  not  only  with  Turkish  approval  but  also  prevent  the 

*  The  documents  show  that  Iswolsky  used  at  Sofia  the  argument  that  Bulgaria 
owed  her  complete  independence  of  Turkey  largely,  if  not  entirely,  to  Russia. 
'Representing  Great  Britain  in  the  Bagdad  railroad  negotiations. 


302         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

dangerous  complications  which  a  success  on  the  part  of  Germany 
and  Austria  in  the  question  of  the  loan  would  certainly  bring  in 
its  train. 

(354)  The  Russian   Charge   d' Affaires  at  Paris   to   Sazonoff.     Telegram,        ai 
^ept.  13-26,  1910.  fl 

Thanks  to  the  energetic  representations  made  to  Cassel  by 
Hardinge  and  Mallet,  ^  the  conclusion  of  a  Turkish  loan  in  London 
has  been  rendered  impossible  for  the  present.  The  London  Cabinet 
has  assured  Pichon  of  its  future  support  in  this  matter,  although  the 
British  Government  unfortunately  does  not  possess  the  means  at  the 
disposal  of  the  Paris  Cabinet,  that  is  to  say,  cannot  prohibit  the  quota- 
tion of  the  loan  on  the  Stock  Exchange. 

(355)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  to  Sazonoff.    Telegram, 
Oct.  10-23,  1910. 

It  is  deplorable  that  the  French  Government  found  it  impos- 
sible to  safeguard  our  important  interests  in  the  question  of  the 
Asia  Minor  railway  constructions  by  including  this  matter  in  the 
Turkish  Loan  negotiations.  Should  these  negotiations  be  of  no 
advantage  to  us,  then  they  should  at  least  not  be  directly  inimical 
to  our  interests.  It  would  now  appear,  however,  that  the  Turks 
attribute  the  difficulties  put  in  their  way  not  so  much  to  financial 
conditions  at  Paris  as  to  our  hostile  attitude.  The  Grand  Vizier 
plainly  told  this  to  the  French  Ambassador ;  all  the  other  Ministers 
are  of  the  same  opinion,  and  this  conception  has  already  re-acted 
on  the  negotiations  between  the  Russian  Embassy  and  the  Sublime 
Porte.  As  the  French  Ambassador  here  pertinently  remarked,  if 
the  Turks  do  not  receive  the  necessary  150  millions  at  Paris  then 
they  will  find  them  at  Berlin.  The  enhancement  of  German  in- 
fluence at  Constantinople  is  of  no  especial  importance  to  the  French, 
but  for  us  most  untimely  complications  of  a  political,  military  and 
economic  nature  may  ensue.  Hence,  it  appears  desirable  to  me  to 
prevail  on  France  not  to  impose  such  stringent  conditions  and  to 
refrain  for  the  present  from  interrupting  the  negotiations,  the 
course  of  which  is  impeded  by  personal  influences  of  all  kinds. 

*  British  ambassador  at  Constantinople. 


RUSSO-AUSTRIAN  BALKAN  "RAPPROCHEMENT"    303 

The  French  themselves  consider  a  loan  of  150  millions  to  be  com- 
pletely covered  by  the  Constantinople  Customs  revenues.  Germany 
will  therefore  gladly  advance  the  sum.  Difficulties  only  ensue  on 
account  of  the  French  demands  relating  to  the  future  administra- 
tion of  the  French  ^  finances.  France  should,  however,  out  of 
friendship  for  us,  content  herself  in  this  intricate  question  with  a 
gradual  procedure  and  seek  to  arrive  at  an  understanding  with 
Turkey. 

*  We  deal  here  evidently  with  a  typographical  error  or  a  slip  of  pen  or  mind. 
What  the  ambassador  meant  is  "Turkish"  finances,  or  if  not  that  the  French 
loans  made  to  Turkey,  which  were  already  under  the  management  of  a  foreign 
commission,  known  as  the  "Administration  of  the  Ottoman  Public  Debt." 


IV 

SAZONOFF  AND  THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE 
(September  1910 — November  1911) 

(356)    Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Minister  at  Sofia.     Telegram,  Sept.  15-28, 
1910. 

You  did  right  to  call  Malinoff*s  attention  to  the  necessity  of  a 
rapprochement  with  Serbia  in  view  of  the  military  convention 
concluded  between  Turkey  and  Roumania.  I  have  spoken  in  the 
same  sense  to  the  Bulgarian  Minister  here  and  added  that  such 
rumours  prove  what  care  must  be  exercised  by  Bulgaria  in  the 
present  troubled  times.  I  on  my  part  have  to  point  out  that,  in 
spite  of  Paleologue*s  ^  assertion,  Paris  does  not  consider  the  exist- 
ence of  a  Turco-Roumanian  military  convention  as  proved. 

I  share  this  view  of  the  French  Government,  but  in  spite  of 
this  consider  Bulgaria's  position  as  no  less  dangerous.  The  atti- 
tude of  the  Roumanian  Government  in  Balkan  questions  has  been 
made  clear  and  the  feeble  dementi  which  has  been  opposed  to  the 
existence  of  a  military  convention  strengthens  us  in  our  belief  of 
Roumania's  intentions  in  the  event  of  an  armed  conflict  between 
Bulgaria  and  Turkey.  ^ 

(357)     Prince  Ouroussoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna.    Confiden- 
tial Report,  Oct.  26-Nov.  8,  1910. 

The  meeting  of  our  Czar  with  Emperor  Wilhelm  has  found  a 
glad  response  in  all  circles  here.    This  meeting  is  regarded  as  an 

^Attached  to  French  Foreign  Office. 

*  Sazonoff  appears  no  longer  sure  that  the  basis  on  which  Russia  reached  an 
understanding  with  Austria-Hungary — the  preservation  of  the  status  quo  in  the 
Balkans — would  stand  much  strain,  as  is  shown  in  the  documents. 

304 


SAZONOFF  AND  THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE     305 

additional  pledge  of  the  preservation  of  peace,  even  though,  as 
the  Viennese  papers  observe,  peace  had  not  been  directly  threat- 
ened. It  is  remarkable  that  the  German-Austrian  press  speaks  of 
the  Potsdam  meeting  as  though  Austria-Hungary  had  participated 
in  it  herself.  One  might  also  draw  the  conclusion  from  Aehren- 
thaFs  words  that  this  meeting  directly  affected  Austrian  policy. 

Of  course  we  need  not  wonder  at,  nor  be  dissatisfied  with  this. 
On  the  contrary:  if  the  Vienna  Cabinet,  even  though  in  secret  it 
may  attempt  to  free  itself  from  dependence  on  Berlin,  follows 
Germany  along  this  path,  this  must  be  regarded  as  a  proof  of  its 
sincere  desire  to  draw  closer  to  Russia. 

It  is  likely  that  Vienna  would  prefer  to  achieve  the  last-named 
result  directly,  but  would  reconcile  itself  to  the  thought  of  also 
using  our  improved  relations  to  Germany  for  this  purpose.  This 
consideration  once  more  compels  me  to  revert  to  the  thought  to 
which  I  have  already  frequently  given  expression:  it  would  be 
desirable  to  a  certain  degree  to  come  to  an  understanding  with 
the  Vienna  Cabinet,  in  case  of  complications  in  the  Balkans  and 
to  make  use  of  the  inclination  to  such  an  understanding  which 
exists  here.  ^ 

It  is,  in  my  opinion,  a  foregone  conclusion  that  one  should  seek 
to  effect  such  a  preventive  agreement  by  means  of  direct  negotiations 
without  outside  mediation.  The  present  moment  seems  auspicious 
to  me.  Even  if  unexpected  and  insurmountable  difficulties  should 
be  raised  on  the  part  of  the  Austrians,  an  unsuccessful  attempt 
would  prove  useful  none  the  less,  since  the  insurmountable  oppo- 
sition of  the  Vienna  Cabinet  would  reveal  to  us  its  real  plans  and 
purposes.  « 

(358)     The  Russian  Minister  in  Greece  io  Sazonoff.    Secret  Report,  Jan.  2- 
15,  1911. 

My  Bulgarian  colleague  has  confidentially  informed  me  as 
follows : 

After  a  short  conversation  relating  to  one  of  the  pending  ques- 
tions, the  Greek  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  told  him  that  he 
hoped  to  discuss  "serious  questions"  with  Hadjimisheff  ^  in  the  near 

'  Renewal  of  a  similar  effort  made  by  Iswolsky  in  the  spring  of  the  same  year. 
'Bulgarian  minister  at  Athens. 


306         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

future;  whereupon  the  latter  replied  that  he  would  be  perfectly 
ready  to  enter  upon  an  exchange  of  views  with  Griparis.^ 

Obviously,  it  concerns  the  question  of  opening  negotiations 
with  a  view  to  a  rapprochement  between  Greece  and  Bulgaria. 
However,  as  the  Bulgarian  Minister  had  so  far  received  no  cor- 
responding instructions,  he  immediately  informed  his  Government 
of  the  statements  made  by  Griparis.  Hadjimisheff  protests  that  the 
Government  at  Sofia  is  desirous  of  establishing  friendly  relations 
with  Greece.  As  a  proof  he  mentioned  his  appointment  to  Athens, 
where,  up  to  the  present,  Bulgaria  had  only  been  represented  by  a 
Charge  d'Affaires. 

But  "an  agreement"  with  the  Cabinet  of  Athens  (he  even  used 
the  term  "alliance")  is  not  compatible  with  the  interests  of  Bul- 
garia. On  the  one  hand,  he  said,  because  written  agreements  fre- 
quently lead  to  the  contrary  result,  and,  on  the  other,  because 
Bulgaria  is  desirous  of  being  at  peace  with  all  the  Balkan  States, 
and  chiefly  aims  at  improving  her  relations  to  Turkey.  For,  al- 
though these  latter  are  quite  normal,  they  are  not  such  as  the 
Bulgarian  Government  wishes  them  to  be. 

Passing  to  the  question  of  the  relations  between  Greece  and 
Bulgaria,  Hadjimisheff  told  me  that  he  failed  to  understand  on 
what  basis  such  an  arrangement  might  be  concluded,  all  the  more 
as  Bulgaria  would  only  be  disposed  to  conclude  a  commercial 
treaty  with  Greece  after  it  had  first  settled  its  trade  relations 
with  the  Great  Powers 

(359)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna  to  Sazonoff.  Confidential  Report, 
Feb.  2-15,  1911. 

Having  read  with  the  greatest  attention  and  impartiality  the 
reports  of  our  representatives  at  Sofia  and  Belgrade  as  well  as  of 
our  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Constantinople,  I  come  to  the  conclusion 
that  all  news  of  the  Serbian  Government  derived  from  secret 
sources  is  to  be  accepted  only  with  reservations.  The  weak  side  of 
the  Serbians  is  their  constant  need  of  political  intrigues  which  are  de- 
voted to  hut  one  purpose — not  to  admit  good  relations  on  the  part  of 
Russia  to  those  Powers  with  which  Serbia's  relations  are  bad.  The  whole 
atmosphere  of  Belgrade  is  saturated  with  unjustifiable  sensitiveness 
*  Greek  minister  of  foreign  affairs. 


SAZONOFF  AND  THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE     307 

and  excitement.  The  Serbian  Government  will  not  concede  that 
Russia  should  conclude  an  agreement  with  Austria  upon  any  basis 
whatsover;  if  it  is  not  the  Serbian  Government  that  calls  our  at- 
tention to  the  deep  and  treacherous  designs  of  Austria,  then  it  is 
the  Serbian  General  Staff.  At  this  moment  when  the  relations 
of  Serbia  to  Turkey  are  by  no  means  satisfactory,  there  is  no 
doubt  in  the  minds  of  the  Serbians  that  Turkey  has  concluded 
some  pact  with  Austria. 

I  am  entirely  of  the  opinion  of  our  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Con- 
stantinople that  Austria-Hungary  has  no  design  upon  the  Sand- 
jak.  ^  I  have  arrived  at  this  conclusion  not  only  on  account  of  the 
repeated  declarations  of  the  Austrian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
in  the  Delegations  that  Austria  has  no  intention  of  continuing 
the  policy  of  territorial  acquisitions  in  the  Balkans,  but  also  by 
reason  of  the  consideration  that  only  thus  could  an  agreement  with 
Russia  be  reached,  which  is  a  direct  political  necessity  for  Austria. 

The  rapprochement  with  France  which  would  be  so  desirable 
for  Austria  is  also  possible  only  under  these  circumstances. 

The  union  of  all  Slav  nationalities  must  naturally  he  the  goal  of 
Russian  policy,  hut  one  asks  oneself  how  is  this  to  he  achieved,  now 
that  the  King  and  the  Government  of  Bulgaria  manifest  such  distrust 
of  Serhia? 

I  consider  it  to  be  my  duty  to  say,  that  I  am  entirely  of  the 
opinion  of  our  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Constantinople,  that  we  must 
seriously  consider  the  necessity  of  arriving  at  a  new  agreement 
with  Vienna,  in  order  to  protect  our  interests  as  far  as  possible 
in  a  peaceful  manner.  It  depends  entirely  upon  the  Imperial 
Government  to  judge  when  the  favourable  moment  for  a  new 
Balkan  agreement  of  this  kind  shall  have  arrived.  On  me  merely 
devolves  the  duty  of  rendering  the  Balkan  intrigues  which  are  directed 
against  such  an  agreement,  ineffective  and  which  might  easily,  and  con- 
trary to  our  desire,  lead  to  a  complete  rupture  with  Austria. 

(360)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  to  Sasonoff.     Telegram, 
Feb.  15-28,  1911. 

The  Turkish  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  has  to-day  entered 
into  a  detailed  exchange  of  opinions  with  me,  which  aims  at  dis- 

'  Sandjak  of  Novi-Bazar — as  was  proven  later. 


308         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

pelling  Russia's  lack  of  confidence  in  Turkish  policies.    His  state- 
ments, which  I  reproduce  below,  refer  to  three  questions,  namely : 

1.)  Pan-Islanxism ; 

2.)  Persia; 

3.)  the  railways  of  Asia  Minor. 


p|^^ 


Rifaat  Pasha  also  touched  on  the  groundlessness  of  the  Rus 
sian  fears  regarding  Turkish  armaments. 

1.)  The  Minister  declared  that  neither  the  Turkish  Govern- 
ment nor  the  Committee  of  Saloniki  sought  to  further  Pan-Islam- 
ism,  as  they  are  fully  aware  that  such  a  policy  would  necessarily 
lead  to  dangerous  complications  with  Russia,  England  and 
France.  ^ 

2.)  The  foundation  of  Turkey's  policy  with  regard  to  Persia 
reposes  in  the  recognition  of  the  independence  and  territorial 
integrity  of  this  country,  Turkey  at  the  same  time  having  special 
commercial  and  frontier  interests.  Turkey  wishes  to  establish 
final  frontiers  with  Persia  as  soon  as  possible,  by  placing  the  mutual 
territorial  claims  and  documentary  evidence  before  a  special  fron- 
tier commission 

3.)  After  Rifaat  had  referred  to  the  confidential  communica- 
tion of  October  31,  1909,  concerning  the  replacement  of  the  Treaty 
of  1900  by  a  new  one,  he  told  me  that  he  would  communicate  to 
me  several  confidential  statements  relevant  thereto  very  shortly. 

(361)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Report,  April  2-15,  1911. 

As  I  informed  you  by  telegraph,  the  Turkish  Government,  after 
lengthy  negotiations  lasting  almost  a  year  and  a  half,  has  ordered 
two  Dreadnoughts.  Thus  early  in  1913  Turkish  vessels  will  ap- 
pear in  the  Black  Sea  which  will  by  far  surpass  ours,  and  should 
Russia  not  possess  by  then  a  certain  number  of  larger  armoured 
vessels  in  the  Black  Sea,  then  the  mastery  in  these  waters  will 
pass  from  Russia  to  Turkey.  The  political  effect  of  such  an  event 
has  long  been  clearly  recognized.    We  are  now  confronted  by  the 

*  Russia,  however,  promoted  Pan-Slavism  with  might  and  main,  as  shown  by 
these  documents. 


SAZONOFF  AND  THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE     309 

fact  of  Turkey  having  ordered  the  vessels,  and,  reluctant  though  we 
may  be  to  do  so,  we  must  immediately  and  unhesitatingly  take  the 
necessary  counter-measures.  Otherwise  we  shall  be  forced  even 
now  to  haul  down  our  flag  in  the  Black  Sea  in  favour  of  the 
Turkish  Crescent. 

The  Grand  Vizier  certainly  impressed  upon  me  that  this  Turk- 
ish measure  was  not  directed  against  us  and  he  declared  his  readi- 
ness to  give  us  all  possible  guarantees  that  Turkey  will  allow  no 
foreign  men-of-war  to  pass  through  to  the  Black  Sea.  But  even  if 
these  assurances  were  embodied  in  a  convention,  they  would  only 
be  of  importance  to  us  in  so  far  as  they  are  based  on  the  fact  of 
absolute  superiority  of  the  Russian  fleet  in  the  Black  Sea. 

I  may  add  that  the  order  for  the  Turkish  Dreadnoughts  reck- 
ons with  Russia  not  being  able  to  construct  similar  vessels  in  the 
course  of  twenty  months,  as  is  possible  with  the  Turkish  orders 
in  England  and  Germany.  This  assumption  is  based  in  turn  on 
the  publication  of  the  Duma  debates  and  on  several  most  unpa- 
triotic utterances  in  the  Russian  press. 

We  cannot  permit  such  an  event  to  take  place,  if  only  Russia 
be  ready  to  make  the  necessary  sacrifices. 

(362)     The  Russian  Minister  at  Belgrade  to  Sazonoff.    Telegram,  Feb.  26^ 
March  11,  1911. 

The  Bulgarian  Minister  at  Sofia  ^  went  to  meet  his  Sovereign  on 
the  latter*s  return  from  Vienna,  and  has  made  me  the  confidential 
communication  that,  as  a  result  of  the  conversation  which  he  had 
had  with  King  Ferdinand,  he  had  gained  the  firm  conviction  that 
His  Majesty  was  but  very  indifferently  satisfied  with  the  meeting 
he  had  had  with  the  Austrian  Emperor,  since  it  had  led  to  no 
definite  results.  According  to  the  Bulgarian  Minister's  opinion, 
this  will  contribute  towards  a  cooling  of  the  relations  between  the 
two  countries  and  towards  strengthening  Russophile  tendencies. 
The  truth  of  my  conclusions  Tocheff  said,  will  perhaps  already 
become  evident  in  the  near  future. 


*M.  Hartwig  probably  meant  the  Bulgarian  minister  at  Belgrade.  The  term 
"Bulgarian  minister  at  Sofia"  has  no  meaning.  Tocheff  was  at  that  time  in  the 
Bulgarian  Cabinet.  Together  with  Daneff  and  Malinoff  he  was  an  old  stand-by 
of  the  Russians. 


310         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

(363)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sazonoff.    Letter,  April  12-25, 
1911.1  ^ 

In  one  of  my  conversations  with  Cruppi  ^  I  touched  on  the  ques- 
tion of  the  loan  just  concluded  in  France  by  the  City  of  Budapest. 
This  financial  operation  has  been  carried  through  with  the  help  of 
the  Credit  Lyonnais.  Such  municipal  loans  do  not  usually  require 
Government  permission  in  order  to  be  quoted  on  the  Paris  Ex- 
change. Thus  the  French  Foreign  Ministry  had  not  officially  the 
possibility  of  preventing  the  loan.  Notwithstanding  this  there  is  no 
doubt,  that  the  Credit  Lyonnais  did  not  act  in  this  question  without 
the  silent  consent  of  the  French  Government.  I  did  not  conceal  from 
Cruppi  that  the  granting  of  a  loan  by  French  banks  would  call  forth 
an  unpleasant  impression  in  Russia,  where  this  would  naturally  be 
regarded  as  the  first  step  towards  the  financing  of  other  Hungarian 
loans.  In  order  to  make  the  necessary  impression  upon  Cruppi, 
I  have  submitted  to  him  the  following  general  considerations  re- 
garding this  particular  case. 

"Of  late,"  I  said,  "I  have  been  forced  to  call  on  several  occa- 
sions the  serious  attention  of  the  French  Government  to  the  injury 
done  to  the  vital  interests  of  Russia  by  the  financial  projects  of  French 
banks.  In  consequence  of  her  enormous  extension  and  the  peculiarity 
of  her  geographical  situation,  Russia  may  be  attacked  at  various  points 
of  her  periphery,  and  she  is  not  equally  strong  on  all  her  fronts.^ 

"Such  enterprises,  as,  for  example,  the  railway  line  from  Chin- 
chow  to  Aigun  or  the  net  of  railways  in  Asia  Minor,  would  impose 
upon  us  immense  expenditures  in  connection  with  the  defense  of 
our  Asiatic  frontiers,  and  this  would  weaken  our  military  po- 
sition along  our  western  frontier,  which  would  be  contrary  to 
the  common  interests  of  France  and  Russia.  Every  loan  granted  to 
Austria-Hungary,  or  even  to  Hungary,  likewise  weakens  the  position 
of  Russia  and  in  consequence  that  of  the  Dual  Alliance.  It  is  exceed- 
ingly  dangerous  to  yield  to  the  illusion  which  is  so  widespread  here, 
namely  that  Hungary  might  form  a  counterpoise  to  the  influence  of 

*  This  and  the  following  document  are  reproduced  here  to  show  the  diplomatic 
aspect  of  international  finance. 

^  French  minister  of  foreign  affairs.  Was  not  an  ardent  Russophile  when  he 
first  took  office. 

'Russia  had  to  reckon  with  attacks  on  her  west  front  only,  to  wit:  the 
frontiers  of  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary 


SAZONOFF  AND  THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE     311 

Germany.  The  last  Bosnian  crisis  has  shown  that  in  decisive  moments 
Hungary  will  always  place  herself  at  the  side  of  Austria  and  Germany"  ^ 

Only  within  the  last  few  days,  we  heard  Ribot  speak  eloquently  of 
the  necessity  of  a  more  uniform  and  logical  policy  for  the  three  Entente 
powers,  and  Cruppi  himself  pointed  out  that  it  was  necessary  to  apply 
this  political  combination  in  reality  and,  so  to  speak,  day  by  day.  It 
appears  to  me  that  foreign  loans  and  financial  operations  represent  a 
field  in  which  the  higher  political  interests  of  France  and  Russia  must 
be  brought  into  harmony,  and  it  would  be  in  the  highest  degree  regret- 
table if  the  efforts  of  the  French  financiers  to  attain  personal  profits, 
would  gain  the  upper  hand  over  the  higher  aims  of  the  two  allied 
Powers. 

The  Minister  replied  that  he  quite  shared  my  opinion  and  that 
he  was  prepared  to  take  this  standpoint  in  every  individual  instance. 
As  to  the  Budapest  loan,  this  was,  so  to  speak,  of  a  special  and  private 
nature  and  there  was  no  possibility  for  the  French  Government  to  op- 
pose this  loan.  Yet  he  would  guarantee  that  this  loan  would  in  no 
wise  imply  the  financing  of  Hungary  for  general  needs  of  the 
state. 

*T  am  very  glad,"  said  he,  "that  you  have  touched  on  this  ques- 
tion and  have  given  me  arguments  of  which  I  shall  make  use  at 
the  proper  moment." 

In  spite  of  this  categorical  explanation  of  Cruppi's,  I  permit 
myself  to  express  the  thought  that  perhaps  the  greatest  difficulty 
of  the  Russo-French  relations  consists  in  bringing  the  interests  of 
those  financial  circles  which  are  so  influential  here,  into  harmony  with 
the  general  tendency  of  the  policies  of  the  Dual  Alliance. 

In  this  special  instance  it  was  scarcely  possible  to  prevent  the 
French  banks  from  participating  in  the  Budapest  Loan,  since  they 
had  already  invested  such  important  sums  in  various  Hungarian 
enterprises.  French  savings  which  seek  an  investment  in  foreign  loans 
and  undertakings  render  the  battle  with  the  cosmopolitan  tendencies  of 
capital^  here  an  extraordinary  difficult  one.  It  is  therefore  our  duty 
to  pay  close  attention  to  the  projects  of  French  financial  circles 
and  in  such  cases  in  which  our  interests  are  seriously  threatened, 

*  Naturally,  being  the  other  half  of  the  Dual-Monarchy. 

'  Favorite  phrase  of  Russian  diplomatists  to  identify  Jewish  financial  groups, 
who  opposed  Russian  diplomacy  because  of  the  treatment  Russia  gave  the  Jew. 


312         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

we  must  in  good  time  exert  an  energetic  pressure  upon  the  French 
Government  in  order  to  prevent  a  realization  of  these  plans. 

(364)     Memorial  by  M.  N.  Rafalowitch^  regarding  Austrian  Influence  in 
French  Banks.    May  14,  1914. 

With  regard  to  the  relations  of  the  leading  Parisian  banks  with 
the  Austrian  world  of  finance,  two  considerations  are  manifest. 
First  the  general  character  of  these  relations,  and,  second,  their  con- 
stant weakening. 

In  consequence  of  political  events,  Austria  has  during  recent 
years  had  no  access  to  the  Paris  market,  and  neither  the  efforts  of 
her  representatives,  nor  her  close  connections  with  the  French 
world  of  finance,  have  helped  her  in  this  respect.  The  Banque  de 
Paris  et  des  Pays  Bas  has  its  representatives  in  the  management  of 
the  Austrian  Bodenkreditgesellschaft  of  which  the  well-known 
political  financier  Sieghardt  is  the  head. 

In  the  Austrian  Landerbank  there  are  likewise  French  mem 
bers  of  the  Committee,  among  others  Crozier,^  the  former  French 
Ambassador  in  Vienna,  who  also  has  a  seat  in  the  Administrative 
Council  of  the  Societe  General,  in  which  a  conspicuous  part  is  also 
played  by  the  Austrian  Adler.  Adler  is  in  reality  the  head  of  a  de- 
partment of  this  enterprise,  even  though  he  does  not  bear  this  of- 
ficial title.  The  former  German  subject  Ullmann  occupies  an  im- 
portant position  in  the  Credit  Lyonnais ; — although  he  entertains  no 
immediate  relations  with  Austria,  he  stands  very  close  to  the  Dis- 
kontogesellschaft  of  Berlin  which  exercises  a  great  influence  at 
Vienna.  The  Credit  Lyonnais  has  on  several  occasions  circulated 
Austrian  and  Hungarian  values  on  the  Paris  market  and  has  dis- 
posed of  treasury  certificates  of  these  two  states  among  its  clients. 

There  is  no  need  of  mentioning  Rothschild,  for,  though  he  is 
very  much  interested  in  Austrian  business,  his  influence  in  Paris 
is  steadily  diminishing.  Finally,  the  Union  Parisienne  has  a  Balkan 
bank  which  depends  directly  upon  Viennese  and  Budapest  financial 
firms  and  which  is  under  the  local  control  of  the  Austrian  Donner. 
It  is  essential,  above  all  things,  to  remark  that  up  to  recently  the  French 

*  Chief  the  Russian  Secret  Political  Police  in  France. 

'Of  whom  Iswolsky  complained  during  the  Balkan  crisis  as  being  not  as 
sharp  with  the  Austrians  as  he  was  expected  to  be. 


SAZONOFF  AND  THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE     313 

banks  in  the  Balkans  have  proceeded  in  common  with  the  Austrians, 
who  have  thereby  been  able  to  exploit  French  capital.  The  funda- 
mental changes  in  the  political  structure  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula 
are  bound  to  influence  the  Franco-Austrian  relations  in  an  un- 
favourable sense. 

In  order  to  attain  this  end,  we  on  our  part  must  proceed  in  a 
very  systematic  fashion.  In  this  we  must  discriminate  between  the 
efforts  of  the  Austrians  to  float  their  values  on  the  Paris  Bourse,  and 
to  proceed  hand  in  hand  with  the  French  banks  in  the  Balkans.  So 
far  as  the  former  efforts  are  concerned,  these  need  not  seriously  dis- 
quiet us  since  they  represent  an  "attempt  with  inadequate  means.*' 
The  French  banks  have  altogether  too  great  a  fear  of  the  interference 
of  their  government,  and  of  the  protest  of  public  opinion,  to  determine 
light-heartedly  upon  such  an  operation  which  might  be  reduced  to  noth- 
ingness by  a  single  newspaper  article  or  by  a  single  step  on  the  part  of 
Russia} 

As  an  example  of  this,  one  might  cite  the  futile  attempt  to 
realize  a  rather  considerable  sum  for  the  Austrian  Treasury  by  set- 
tling the  old  dispute  about  the  Austrian  Southern  railways  in  a 
sense  favourable  to  the  French  owners  of  the  stock.  This  attempt 
was  forestalled  last  year — even  its  execution  was  dubious — through 
the  publication  of  a  suitable  article  in  the  Echo  de  Paris. 

With  reference  to  the  co-operation  of  the  French  and  Austrian 
banks,  we  may  here  too  be  able  to  play  a  very  useful  role.  When 
for  example,  the  Austrian  banks,  with  a  view  to  eventual  participation, 
applied  the  other  day  to  the  French  group  which  is  examining  the  ques- 
tion of  the  inter  nationalisation  of  the  Eastern  Railway  in  Serbia,  it  suf- 
ficed for  the  Russian  representative  to  declare  that  the  Russian  group 
would  not  participate  in  such  a  combination,  to  induce  the  French  to 
give  the  Austrians  a  negative  answer. 

When  one  French  group  reproaches  another  with  being  too  close 
to  the  Austrians  this  is  usually  only  a  ruse  de  guerre.  We  on  our 
part  must  recognize  the  fact  that  all  of  the  chief  French  groups  stand 
very  close  to  Austria  and  that  it  would  be  difficult  to  tell  which  of  them 
are  most  under  Austrian  influence.  We  must  set  up  the  one  general 
rule, — that  we  must  not  leave  the  French  alone  with  the  Austrians  in 
any  questions  or  countries  in  which  we  have  an  interest.  Where  the 

'A  very  interesting  statement  in  the  light  of  international  relations. 


314         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

French  are  to  co-operate  with  Russian  elements  there  will  no 
longer  be  any  room  for  Austrians.  Besides,  this  means  to  us  the 
one  possibility  of  being  informed  at  the  right  moment  of  every 
thing  that  we  wish  to  prevent. 


(365)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  to  Sazonoff.    Telegram, 
March  \9-April  1,  1911.    No.  110. 


I  have  been  informed  by  the  Bulgarian  Minister  that  the  forma- 
tion of  a  Cabinet  with  Tocheff  at  its  head,  and  including  followers 
of  Daneff,  has  created  an  excellent  impression  in  Turkish  circles. 

The  Turkish  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  has  confidentially  told 
me  that  on  the  part  of  Turkey  all  measures  were  being  taken  to 
strengthen  the  good  relations  with  Bulgaria  by  assuring  order,  per- 
sonal security  and  equality  of  rights  to  the  Bulgarian  population  of 
Macedonia,  a  fact  which,  as  we  believe,  ought  to  be  of  interest  t 
the  Bulgarian  Government. 


I 


(366)     The  Russian  Minister  at  Belgrade  to  Sasonoff.     Telegram,  March 
20'April  2,  1911. 


The  King  of  Montenegro  has  caused  the  communication  to  be 
transmitted  here  that  he  fully  concurs  in  the  point  of  view  taken 
by  the  Serbian  Government,  both  as  regards  the  general  political 
situation,  and  also  as  concerns  the  aims  to  be  pursued  by  the  joint 
Serbo-Montenegrin  policy.  The  King  will  consider  the  note  to 
be  sent  in  reply  by  Serbia,  the  contents  of  which  are  intended  to 
form  the  basis  of  an  agreement  to  be  concluded  between  the  two 
countries. 


(367)     The  Russian  Charge  d* Affaires  at  Sofia  to  Sasonoff.     Telegram, 
March  26'April  8,  1911. 

In  the  course  of  a  long  and  frank  interview  with  Daneff,  the  lat- 
ter told  me  that  he  could  not  quite  share  Geshoff 's  views  as  to  the 
Bulgaro-Serbian  relations.  According  to  his  firm  conviction,  Bul- 
garia must  be  united  to  Serbia  by  insoluble  ties — in  her  own  in- 
terest it  is  of  the  greatest  importance  for  Bulgaria  to  deter  Serbia 
from  possible  inclination  towards  Austria,  and  thus  to  erect  a  wall 
to  Austrian  aspirations  in  the  Balkans,  chiefiy  in  the  direction  of 


SAZONOFF  AND  THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE    315 

Saloniki,  which  for  Bulgaria  also  is  a  much  longed-for  goal  of 
aspirations.^ 

(368)  The  Russian  Minister  at  Belgrade  to  Sa::onoff.     Telegram,  May  14- 
27,  1911.    No.  80. 

Provided  you  do  not  object,  it  is  my  intention  to  go  to  Sofia 
in  order  to  confer,  conjointly  with  our  Minister,  with  the  Bul- 
garian Ministers  and  Daneff,  with  whom  I  have  long  been  person- 
ally acquainted.  This  would  make  an  excellent  impression  here 
and  would  perhaps  still  further  facilitate  the  negotiations  between 
Bulgaria  and  Serbia. 

(369)  Neratoff,  Acting  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the  Russian  Minister 

at  Sofia.    Telegram,  June  25'July  8,  1911. 

If  you  deem  it  necessary  for  local  reasons,  we  have  no  objection 
to  your  denying,  in  concert  with  the  Bulgarian  Government, 
through  the  press,  all  rumours  of  the  existence  of  a  military  con- 
vention of  1902  as  being  unfounded.^ 

(370)  Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  in  London.    Telegram,  Jan.  16- 
29,  1913.    No.  136. 

(Same  telegram  sent  to  Paris.) 
Absolutely  secret  and  strictly  confidential. 

I  request  you  to  confidentially  inform  the  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  as  follows : 

The  existence  of  a  military  convention  between  Austria  and 
Roumania  having  been  at  the  time  ascertained,  a  treaty  was  con- 
cluded between  Russia  and  Bulgaria  in  1902,  in  virtue  of  which 
Bulgaria  pledged  herself  to  assist  us  in  the  case  of  a  war  with  one 
of  the  Powers  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  whereas  we,  on  our  part, 
pledged  ourselves  to  guarantee  Bulgaria's  territorial  integrity. 
This  treaty  has  so  far  benefited  us  exclusively,  as  Bulgaria  was  hound 
by  its  stipulations.  We  were  asked  to  do  nothing  more  but  what 
for  political  and  economic  reasons  we  should  have  been  unable  to 
refuse  Bulgaria  even  if  no  such  treaty  had  existed.  Now,  however, 
in  view  of  the  threatening  attitude  assumed  by  Roumania  we  have 

*  Diplomatic  bait. 

'  That  this  military  convention  actually  existed  is  shown  by  Document  No.  370. 


316         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

deemed  it  advisable  to  issue  through  our  Minister  at  Bucharest  a 
friendly  warning  to  the  Roumanian  Government,  of  which  you  may 
likewise  confidentially  inform  the  Foreign  Minister.  We,  for  our 
part,  consider  it  very  desirable  that  the  Cabinets  of  Paris  and  Lon- 
don should  bring  in  their  turn  their  influence  to  bear  upon 
Bucharest. 


(371)  The  Russian  Aw'hassador  at  Vienna  to  Sasonoff.     Telegram,  Sept. 
25-Oct.  8,  19U.    No.  42. 

Strictly  confidential.  Geshoff,  the  Bulgarian  Prime  Minister, 
called  on  me  today,  and  informed  me  of  the  interview  which  he  had 
had  with  the  French  and  the  Austrian  Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs. 
Both  appeared  to  him  to  be  optimistic  and,  as  he  alleges,  told  him 
that  Italy,  in  order  to  make  a  quick  end  of  the  Tripolitan  question, 
would  agree  to  recognize  the  nominal  sovereignty  of  Turkey  in 
Tripoli  and  to  pay  her  an  indemnity.  Geshoff  then  went  on  to  tell  me 
that  our  Ministers  at  Sofia  and  Belgrade  insist  most  energetically  upon 
the  conclusion  of  an  alliance  between  Bulgaria  and  Serbia  under  the 
protectorship  of  Russia. 

Geshoff  is  perfectly  clear  on  the  point  that  a  Balkan  Confedera- 
tion of  this  kind,  formed  in  these  present  disturbed  times,  is  bound 
to  incense  Austria  towards  Bulgaria  and  Serbia,  and  in  this  case, 
Roumania  and  Turkey  would  stand  behind  Austria.  Before  resolv- 
ing upon  such  a  step,  Geshoff  wishes  to  know  upon  what  guaran- 
tees on  the  part  of  Russia,  Bulgaria  could  count 

(372)  The  Russian  Minister  at  Sofia  to  Sasonoff.    Telegram,  Nov.  29'Dec. 
12,  1911. 

Until  yesterday.  King  Ferdinand  had  told  Geshoff  nothing 
about  the  conversations  which  he  has  had  at  Vienna.  On  the  other 
hand,  he  informed  Daneff  that  he  had  not  talked  about  politics 
with  "the  sick,  old  Emperor."  He  has  had  a  long  talk  with  Aehren- 
thal  in  the  course  of  which  the  latter  tried  to  discover  Bulgaria's 
intentions  and  is  alleged  to  have  told  the  King  that  on  principle 
and  under  certain  conditions  Austria  would  have  no  objections  to 
Bulgaria  extending  its  frontiers  in  the  direction  of  Macedonia. 
Hereupon,  the  King  gave  an  evasive  answer.    He  has  noticed  that 


SAZONOFF  AND  THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE     317 

both  Aehrenthal  and  the  political  circles  at  Vienna  had  become 
concerned  and  alarmed. 

King  Ferdinand  has  in  the  course  of  the  last  few  months  kept 
up  constant  and  frank  relations  with  Daneff,  thus  emphasizing,  so 
to  say,  his  reserve  towards  Geshoff .  Daneff  told  me  that,  as  far 
as  he  had  been  able  to  judge.  King  Ferdinand  has  more  and  more 
convinced  himself  in  the  course  of  the  last  few  weeks  that  constant 
and  close  relations  for  their  mutual  support  were  being  kept  up  be- 
tween Russia,  France  and  England,  and  he  is  convinced  that  the 
forces  of  these  three  Powers  are  superior  to  those  of  Germany  and 
Austria. 

The  recognition  of  this  fact  may,  as  Daneff  and  Geshoff  hope,  induce 
the  King  to  finally  agree  to  a  treaty  with  Serbia  and  Russia,  and  then 
there  is  no  return  possible,  either  for  him  or  Bulgaria,  I  entertain  the 
same  hopes;  however  I  still  fear  that  what  may  be  called  the  al- 
most constitutional  irresolution  on  the  part  of  the  decidedly 
neurasthenic  Monarch,  will  finally  yet  gain  the  upper  hand.  I 
further  fear  that  the  exceptional  marks  of  favour  heaped  by  the 
King  upon  that  most  convinced  of  Russophiles,  Daneff,  will  finally 
end  in  Geshoff  seeing  himself  obliged  to  retire  and  that,  in  con- 
sequence, the  coalition  between  the  Zankowists  and  the  Narodniki, 
which  at  present  is  so  very  powerful,  will  be  weakened. 

(Z7Z)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram, 
Oct.  1-14,  1911.    No.  631. 

After  the  ceremony  in  Parliament,  the  new  Foreign  Minister 
Assim  Bey  in  the  course  of  a  lengthy  conversation  begged  me  to 
support  him  in  his  endeavours  to  bring  about  a  rapprochement  with 
Russia,  a  policy  wherein  he  differs  from  his  predecessor.  The 
Minister  also  acquainted  me  with  the  Sultan's  wish  to  despatch  a 
special  delegation  to  the  Crimea  to  welcome  the  Russian  Czar.  I 
informed  Assim  Bey  of  Sazonoff's  intention  to  spend  some  time  in 
the  Crimea.  The  Minister  complained  of  the  obstructions  put  in 
the  way  of  the  food  supplies  for  the  inhabitants  of  the  Yemen  and 
the  Hedjaz  by  English  cruisers  and  requested  your  intervention  in 
the  interests  of  the  Russian  and  Mahommedan  pilgrims.  It  ap- 
pears to  me  that  the  new  Minister  might  be  a  valuable  support  to 
us. 


318         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

(374)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Oct.  2-15,  1911.    No.  634. 

The  Bulgarian  Minister  made  to-day  the  following  communi- 
cation to  me : 

The  new  Turkish  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Assim  Bey,  has 
given  him  to  understand  that  he  only  accepted  the  post  on  the  con- 
dition that  Turkey  would  endeavour  to  come  to  a  special  under- 
standing with  Bulgaria,  and  that  the  Grand  Vizier  accepted  this 
condition  with  great  willingness 

(375)  The  Russian  Ambassador  in  London  to  the  Russian  Foreign  Office. 
Telegram,  Oct.  2\-Nov.  3,  1911.    No.  257.  m| 

Confidential.  Grey  informed  me  that  the  Turkish  Ambassador"" 
here  has  proposed  to  him  in  the  name  of  his  Government  a  close 
rapprochement  between  England  and  Turkey,  adding  that  the  Sub- 
lime Porte  is  first  approaching  England  in  this  matter  and  would 
then  extend  the  understanding  to  Russia  and  France,  on  the  condi- 
tion that  Turkey  receives  active  support  in  the  maintenance  of  her 
sovereign  rights  in  Tripoli.^  Grey  told  me  he  had  replied  in  the 
friendliest  manner,  in  view  of  the  present  negotiations  of  our  Am- 
bassador with  the  Sublime  Porte,  emphasizing  that  he  naturally 
welcomed  the  idea  of  a  permanent  and  definite  understanding  be- 
tween Turkey  and  the  Powers  of  the  Triple  Entente,  but  that  he 
considered  the  present  time  hardly  favourable  for  negotiations,  as 
the  conditions  formulated  by  Turkey  could  not  be  brought  into 
harmony  with  the  principle  of  England's  neutrality.  Grey  regards 
it  as  necessary  to  inform  me  and  the  French  Ambassador  of  the 
Turkish  overtures.  He  furthermore  made  the  Turkish  Ambassa- 
dor understand  that  a  rapprochement  between  England  and  Turkey 
would  necessarily  include  the  regulation  of  various  pending  ques- 
tions, such  as  for  instance,  that  of  the  Bagdad  Railway. 

*  Threatened  at  that  time  by  Italy. 


RUSSIA  AND   GREAT   BRITAIN   AND   THE   STRAITS 

QUESTION 

(October  1911— April  1912) 

{Z76)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Neratoff,  the  Russian  Acting 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.    Telegram,  Oct.  10-23,  1911.    No.  245. 

Your  personal  letter  received. 

M.  Cambon  has  been  instructed  to  sound  Grey  on  the  question 
of  the  Straits^  and  rumours  concerning  the  negotiations  at  Con- 
stantinople that  have  transpired  in  the  press.  I  have  found  it  neces- 
sary to  make  use  of  the  authorization  given  me.  I  told  Grey  that 
the  Russian  Government  believes  the  moment  is  come  for  estab- 
lishing closer  and  friendlier  relations  with  the  Sublime  Porte,  and 
that,  in  consequence,  our  Ambassador  had  made  the  following 
communication,  in  a  strictly  personal  manner,  to  Said  Pasha: 

Russia  undertakes  to  induce  the  Balkan  States  to  maintain 
lasting  peaceful  relations  with  the  Sublime  Porte ;  Russia  does  not 
exclude  the  possibility  of  a  Russian  guarantee  for  Constantinople 
and  the  territory  surrounding  it;  The  Sultan,  on  his  part,  would 
then,  by  his  own  decision,  allow  Russian  men-of-war  free  passage 
through  the  straits.^ 

I  have  explained  this  condition  by  alluding  to  near  momentous 
changes  in  the  Mediterranean  and  I  have  declared  that  the  form 
chosen  by  us  for  such  an  arrangement  would,  in  our  opinion,  make 
it  superfluous  to  enter  in  an  immediate  revision  of  the  treaties.    To 

*  Bosphorus  and  Dardanelles. 

'The  documents  show  that  this  was  not  the  case. 

319 


320         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

this  I  have  added  considerations  as  to  the  advantages  that  would 
result  from  such  an  arrangement  for  the  Entente  Powers.  I  have 
declared  that  the  uncertainty  concerning  the  issue  of  the  minis- 
terial crisis  in  Constantinople  has  been  the  reason  for  Your  Excel- 
lency not  taking  any  further  step  in  the  matter  at  present.  I  have 
added  that  the  Russian  Government  entertains  the  hope,  in  the 
interest  of  our  plan  being  realized,  as  well  as  in  consideration  of 
political  circumstances  in  general,  to  be  able  to  count  on  the  sup- 
port of  France  and  England  in  Constantinople. 

I  have  asked  Grey  to  consider  my  statement  as  one  made  in 
strictest  confidence,  France  only  excepted.  The  eventuality  of 
some  kind  of  compensation  for  England  was  not  mentioned  by  me. 
Grey  answered  that  he  is  ready  to  support  in  Constantinople  the 
solution  of  the  Straits  question  mentioned  in  his  memorandum 
of  October  18th,  1908.  As  to  the  new  form  proposed  by  us,  he  has 
reserved  his  answer,  being  obliged  to  examine  it  in  the  light  of  the 
treaties  and  to  lay  the  entire  matter  of  the  treaties  themselves  be- 
fore the  Cabinet.  He  told  me  that  he  saw  the  importance  of  this 
affair,  and  that,  for  this  reason,  he  must  examine  it  carefully.  I 
have  not  mentioned  any  other  question. 

Grey  will  telegraph  to  O'Beirne.^ 

(377)     The  Same  to  the  Same.   Letter,  Oct.  10-23, 1911. 

After  his  return  from  Paris,  Cambon,  with  customary  courtesy, 
communicated  to  me  a  report  of  Bompard's  ^  containing  details  as 
to  the  beginning  of  our  Ambassador's  negotiations  at  Constanti- 
nople. Likewise  he  has  let  me  know  a  report  of  the  French 
charge  d'affaires  at  St.  Petersburg  regarding  a  conversation  with 
Your  Excellency  on  the  same  subject. 

He  seemed  to  be  as  well  informed  as  myself,  regarding  the 
state  of  affairs.  He  likewise  told  me  that  the  French  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  had  instructed  him  to  ascertain  the  views  of  the 
British  Government  on  this  subject. 

Since  Grey  returned  only  today,  Cambon  addressed  himself  to 
Nicolson.    The  Under-secretary  gave  as  his  personal  opinion,  that 

*  British  charge  d'affaires  at  Petrograd. 
'  French  ambassador  at  Constantinople. 


THE  ENTENTE  AND  THE  STRAITS  321 

the  views  of  the  British  Cabinet  have  not  changed  since  1908.  Yet 
he  doubts  that  the  moment  is  well  chosen,  particularly  in  view  of 
the  fact  that  Turkey  is  at  war  ^  and  that  the  fate  of  the  Turkish 
Ministry  is  not  yet  decided. 

As  the  papers  publish  telegrams  about  negotiations  between 
Russia  and  Turkey,  I  thought  myself  free  to  make  use  of  the  au- 
thorisation contained  in  your  letter,  all  the  more  since  Cambon 
told  me,  on  the  strength  of  the  report  of  the  French  charge 
d'affaires,  that  I  would  be  instructed  to  make  to  the  London  Cabi- 
net a  communication  on  this  subject. 

More  protracted  delay  would  have  caused  surprise  here  and 
would  have  been  all  the  more  out  of  place,  as  the  British  Govern- 
ment had  been  consulted  on  this  question.  Yet  I  do  not  think  that 
Cambon  has  read  Bompard*s  report  to  Nicolson. 

Immediately  after  his  return.  Grey  asked  me  to  come  to  see 
him.  He  first  spoke  to  me  about  Persian  questions,  and  I  have 
just  given  you  a  report  on  this  part  of  our  conversation  by  wire. 
Later  on  I  decided  to  raise  the  question  of  the  Straits,  all  the  more 
so  as,  in  the  course  of  our  conversation  about  Persia,  I  had  con- 
vinced myself,  how  highly  Sir  Edward  values  the  Entente  and  how 
firmly  determined  he  is  to  preserve  it  and  to  avoid  everything  that 
might  endanger  its  existence, 

I  deemed  it  expedient  to  touch  at  first  only  on  the  purely  poli- 
tical aspects  of  this  question  and  to  refrain  at  present  from  dis- 
cussing the  economic  side,  as  this  concerns  the  British  interests 
less  directly. 

I  told  Sir  Edward  I  had  been  authorized  to  make  a  confidential 
communication,  precisely  as  our  Ambassador  at  Paris  had  been 
authorized  to  make  one  to  the  French  Government.  He  probably 
would  not  be  surprised  to  hear  that  the  Russian  Government  con- 
siders the  moment  to  have  arrived  for  establishing  better  relations 
between  Russia  and  Turkey  than  heretofore,^  that  the  general  situa- 
tion makes  this  necessary,  and,  furthermore,  that  in  case  of  such 
a  rapprochement  taking  place,  the  first  Powers  to  profit  by  it  in 
Constantinople  would  be  England  and  France.    The  Russian  Gov- 


*  With  Italy  in  Tripoli. 

'Because  Turkey  was  at  war  with  Italy. 


322         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

eminent  was  determined  to  proceed  only  with  the  greatest  delib- 
eration. Your  Excellency  was  not  fully  persuaded  that  the 
present  moment  is  propitious,  and  that  therefore  for  the  present 
our  Ambassador  ^  was  instructed  only  with  approaching  Said 
Pasha  in  a  personal  manner  with  our  proposal. 

I  told  Sir  Edward  that  our  Ambassador  had  carried  out  these 
instructions  and  that  the  principal  points  of  the  pact,  concerning 
which  Tcharikoff  had  sounded  the  Turkish  Government,  were 
the  following:  Energetic  steps  to  be  taken  by  Russia  in  regard 
to  the  Balkan  Powers  in  order  to  create  on  the  basis  of  the  present 
status  quo  a  condition  of  permanent  Peace  between  these  Powers 
and  Turkey. 

Russia  might  perhaps  go  so  far  as  to  guarantee  the  town  of  Con- 
stantinople and  the  surrounding  territory  to  Turkey.^ 

In  return  for  this,  Russia  would  expect  the  Sultan  to  allow  upon 
his  own  authority  once  and  for  all  time  Russian  men-of-war  free  pas- 
sage through  the  Straits  without  these  ships  being  allowed  to  stop  in 
the  Straits. 

I  told  Sir  Edward  that  we  had  chosen  this  form,  because  every 
other  form  would  have  necessitated  a  tedious  revision  of  the 
treaties  and  created  difficulties  resulting  from  such  a  procedure. 
I  also  added,  that  we  hoped  to  be  able  to  count  upon  the  acquies- 
cense  of  England  and  her  support  in  Constantinople;  according 
to  my  knowledge  the  French  Government  had  received  a  similar 
request  in  a  favourable  manner  and  had  assured  us  of  the  full  sym- 
pathy of  France  with  Russia's  plan. 

Sir  Edward  listened  to  me  with  visible  interest.  He  answered 
immediately  that  he  was  ready  to  support  in  Constantinople  the 
project,  as  described  in  the  memorandum  delivered  to  M.  Iswolsky 
on  October  18,  1908.  This  project  had  been  approved  at  the  time 
by  the  British  Cabinet  and  he  would  therefore  be  able  to  act  im- 
mediately. 

Without  directly  excluding  the  contents  of  this  memorandum, 
I  remarked  that  the  project  which  is  now  mentioned  to  Sir  Edward 
was  different.    He  answered  that  he  was  ready  to  act  in  the  sense 


*  At  Constantinople. 

'A  method  to  gain  control  of  the  city  and  straits,  as  made  evident  by  these 
documents. 


I 


THE  ENTENTE  AND  THE  STRAITS  323 

of  the  memorandum,  but  that  he  could  not  give  me  an  immediate 
answer  on  a  proposal,  since  that  would  have  to  be  examined  from 
the  viewpoint  of  the  existing  treaties,  as  well  as  be  submitted  to 
the  approval  of  the  Cabinet. 

Sir  Edward  added  that  the  intention  of  effecting  a  rapproche- 
ment with  Turkey  was  in  itself  of  the  highest  importance  and  must 
be  carefully  considered  by  the  Cabinet.  I  thanked  him  for  his 
communication,  adding  that  I  had  absolutely  no  intention  of  in- 
sisting on  a  quick  settlement  of  this  question;  my  orders  were, 
above  all,  to  inquire  what  point  of  view  the  British  Government 
adopts  at  present  concerning  the  Straits. 

The  only  personal  remark  made  by  Sir  Edward  was  to  the  effect, 
that  it  would  not  be  easy  for  the  British  Government  to  guarantee  a 
part  of  her  territory  to  Turkey. 

I  do  not  think  that  Sir  Edward  was  in  any  way  prepared  for 
this  conversation.  He  had  only  just  arrived  and  had  received  sev- 
eral other  diplomats  before  me.  From  his  words  I  could  infer,  that 
the  London  Cabinet — although  even  in  1908  England  was  not  averse 
on  principle  to  a  modification  of  the  regime  of  the  Straits  as  deter- 
mined by  existing  treaties,  but  deemed  only  the  time  unpropi- 
tious — today  no  longer  offers  the  objections  that  our  plan  is  not  in 
accord  with  the  times.  It  declares  its  readiness  to  act  immediately 
in  the  spirit  of  the  formula  then  agreed  upon,  but  desires  that  the 
new  formula  proposed  by  the  Russian  Government  should  be  ex- 
amined. 

(378)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  to  Neratoff.     Telegram, 
Oct.  n-24,  1911.    A^o.  655. 

Confidential.  I  thank  you  for  the  information  which  I  shall 
bear  in  mind  during  my  further  dealings  with  Said  Pasha  and  I 
will  send  you  a  detailed  report  as  soon  as  possible.  I  thank  you 
also  for  informing  Grey  of  our  negotiations,  as  the  British  Ambas- 
sador told  me  today.  He  added,  that  Grey  has  confirmed  his  dec- 
larations of  the  year  1908.  I  consequently  informed  Lowther  in 
the  same  measure  as  Bompard,  accentuating  at  the  same  time  the 
private  and  confidential  character  of  my  conversations  with  the 
Grand  Vizier,  so  that  the  Russian  Government  retains  full  free- 
dom of  fixing  the  program  and  the  contents  of  eventual  official 


324         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


negotiations  later  on,  as  well  as  the  text  of  the  arrangements  that 
are  to  come  up  for  discussion. 

At  present  a  friendly  understanding  has  been  reached  between 
the  three  Entente  Powers.  Lowther  told  me  in  confidence  that  up 
to  the  present  no  steps  in  the  sense  of  a  rapprochement  with  Eng- 
land have  been  taken  by  the  Turkish  Government.  But  it  is  clear 
that  an  agreement  between  England  and  Turkey,  to  which  France 
would  become  a  party,  might  form  the  basis  of  such  a  rapproche- 
ment, and  this  agreement  would  create  in  the  Eastern  Mediter- 
ranean a  situation  similar  to  that  existing  in  the  Western  part  in 
virtue  of  the  agreement  between  England,  France  and  Spain.  The 
local  press  considers  the  possibility  of  approaching  England,  and, 
through  England,  Russia.  We  are  still  of  opinion  that  Said  Pasha 
is  at  present  negotiating  with  Germany. 


(379) 


Neratoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London. 
25,  1911.    No.  1589. 


Telegram^  Oct.  12- 


Your  telegram  245  received.    Personal. 

In  a  general  way  we  are  pleased  with  Grey's  first  declaration, 
but  we  request  you  to  inform  us,  as  to  the  extent  of  the  reserva- 
tions made  by  him.  What  does  he  understand  by  a  "new"  formula 
proposed  by  us  and  what  "treaties"  in  particular  does  he  refer  to? 


I 


(380)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Neratoff. 
Oct.  12-25,  1911. 


Confidential  Letter. 


■A 


I  asked  Nicolson  his  opinion  about  my  conversation 

with  Grey  concerning  the  Bosphorus  and  Turkey.  He  answered 
that  it  was  very  interesting,  important  and  in  the  main — ex- 
cellent. He  told  me  Grey  had  telegraphed  to  Lowther  to  apprise 
Tcharikoff  so  that  the  three  Ambassadors  might  get  into  touch. 
Nicolson  asked  me  if  the  letter  addressed  by  Tcharikoff  to  Said 
Pasha  contained  a  comprehensive  project.  I  said  I  was  not  quite 
sure  about  this,  and  added  that  for  the  sake  of  clearness  I  had  not 
mentioned  in  my  conversation  with  Grey  the  less  important  eco- 
nomical questions,  but  that  I  thought  it  would  be  well  to  inform 
him  that  the  increase  of  the  customs  duty  by  four  per  cent,  about 
which  there  existed  an  agreement  with  England  and  France,  was 
not  being  discussed  during  these  negotiations. 


THE  ENTENTE  AND  THE  STRAITS  325 

Nicolson  as  well  as  Cambon  were  very  grateful  for  this  com- 
munication, inasmuch  as  Bompard's  letter  contains  a  not  very  clear 
reference  to  this  question.  Afterwards,  Sir  Arthur  asked  me  how 
I  pictured  such  a  negotiation  to  myself,  as  it  concerned  a  terri- 
torial guarantee  whilst  Turkey  is  at  war;  if  the  negotiations  have 
results,  when  would  the  agreement  come  into  force?  This  was 
important  from  the  Italian  point  of  view  and  might  create  difficul- 
ties between  us  and  Italy.  I  replied  that  I  could  not  give  a  definite 
answer,  but  that  I  was  convinced  that  our  present  relations  with 
Italy  excluded  the  possibility  of  any  unfriendly  act  towards  that 
country. 

Nicolson  is  not  convinced  that  the  present  moment  is  well 
chosen  and  fears  that  Turkey  will  use  these  negotiations  against 
Italy.  However  he  did  not  insist  upon  this,  and  I  mention  his  re- 
mark only  because  it  deserves  attention.  This  must  also  be  said 
of  another  question,  not  mentioned  by  Nicolson  but  by  Cambon — 
the  question  of  the  "Capitulations."  ^  He  does  not  think  that 
France  and  England  would  consent  today  to  the  abolishment  of  the 
capitulations. 

(381)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Oct.  13-26,  1911.    No.  250. 

Your  telegram  No.  1589  received. 

I  used  the  expression  "a  new  formula"  in  order  to  imply  the 
free  passage  of  our  ships  through  the  Straits  as  now  described  by 
you.  Grey  has  declared  his  readiness  to  support,  if  we  so  desired, 
the  passage  as  described  in  the  memorandum  of  1908.  As  our  pres- 
ent proposal  differs  from  this  mem/orandum,  he  begs  us  to  give  him 
time  to  examine  this  question  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  treaties, 
which  determine  the  present  regime  of  the  Straits.  In  this  sense 
I  have  spoken  of  "treaties." 

(382)  Private  Letter  from  Neratoff  to  Benckendorff.    Oct.  20-Nov.  2,  1911. 

No.  692. 

We  learn  with  satisfaction  from  your  report,  as  well  as  from 
that  of  M.  Iswolsky,  that  our  intentions  with  regard  to  the  Straits 

^  Ex-territorial  concessions  held  by  foreign  governments  in  the  Ottoman  em- 
pire, more  especially  in  and  about  Constantinople. 


in        t 


326         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

have  been  favourably  received  in  London  and  in  Paris ;  the  British 
Ambassador  at  Constantinople  has  already  received  instructions 
to  support  the  steps  taken  by  Tcharikoff .  j 

Yet,  it  is  possible  that  these  negotiations  will  have  to  be  de-^l 
layed  or  put  off  for  local  reasons.  It  is  Iwwever  desirable  to  make 
use  of  the  present  political  situation,  in  order  to  induce  the  French  and 
British  Governments  to  express  their  views  on  the  question  of  tl 
Straits,  in  so  far  as  Russia  is  concerned,  in  a  concrete  form  and  in 
writing,  independently  of  any  agreements,  which  we  shall  eventually 
conclude  with  Turkey, 

Furthermore — concerning  England!  We  believe  to  be  able  to 
infer  from  your  reports,  that  Grey  wishes  to  make  his  consent  de- 
pendent on  a  "previous"  understanding  with  Turkey.^  Such  a  con- 
dition does  not  appear  very  intelligible  to  us,  for  without  offering 
England  a  "new"  guarantee  in  an  agreement,  perhaps  undesirable 
to  England,  it  furnishes  Turkey  the  possibility  to  raise  objections 
eventually.  Indeed,  we  do  not  wish  to  solve  the  question  of  the 
Straits  unconditionally  "at  once,'*  we  want  merely  to  fix  the  "condi-  ^ 
tions^'  under  which  a  solution  becomes  possible.^  ,  ^Bl 

We  hope  therefore  that  England  will  be  able,  within  the  scope 
of  these  limitations,  to  define  clearly  her  point  of  view,  in  writing ; 
and  if  you  think  that  this  would  mean  a  progress  as  compared  to 
the  memorandum  of  1908,  we  request  you  to  take  the  matter  up^ 
with  the  British  Ministers. 


(383)     Letter  from  Benckendorff  to  Neratoff.    Oct.  26'Nov.  8,  1911. 


I 


I  reported  to  you  by  telegram  the  communications  which  Tew- 
fik  Pasha  under  instructions  from  his  Government,  has  lately 
m,ade  to  Grey.  They  represent  a  proposal  for  a  rapprochement  be- 
tween Turkey,  England,  Russia  and  France,  though  on  condition 
that  these  three  powers  give  Turkey  their  support  in  her  peace  ne- 
gotiations with  Italy.  Grey's  answer  is  in  the  main  favourable  to 
a  rapprochement  (Grey  tells  me  he  has  taken  up  this  attitude  in 
view  of  our  negotiations  at  Constantinople),  but  it  excludes  the 

*  The  documents  show  that  Grey  had  no  such  intention. 

*  Before  Turkey  was  to  be  subjected  to  pressure. 


THE  ENTENTE  AND  THE  STRAITS  327 

promise  of  a  direct  support  of  the  Turkish  point  of  view  against 
Italy. 

I  see  no  reason  for  doubting  that  Turkey,  disappointed  perhaps 
in  her  expectations  of  Germany  and  Austria,  is  seriously  think- 
ing of  a  rapprochement  with  the  Entente  powers.  But  she  at  once 
states  her  price.  It  must  be  taken  for  granted  that  the  step  under- 
taken by  the  Sublime  Porte  in  London  has  been  called  forth  by 
TcharikofF*s  communications  in  Constantinople. 

Meanwhile  the  Italian  Ambassador  has  informed  Grey  of  the 

Italian  decree  of  annexation The  condition  made  by  Turkey, 

already  unacceptable  before  Italy's  decree,  has  now  become  still 
more  unacceptable.  This  condition,  it  is  true,  is  addressed  to  Eng- 
land, but  seems  to  be  directed  principally  at  Russia,  and  our  nego- 
tiations at  Constantinople  are  therefore  likely  to  be  deferred  for  the 
present.  The  instructions  you  have  forwarded  to  me  in  your  let- 
ter No.  692  are  for  that  reason  all  the  more  opportune. 

The  interruption  of  our  negotiations  in  Constantinople  gives  me 
now  the  possibility  to  bring  up  the  question  of  the  Straits  in  an- 
other form,  according  to  your  instructions,  i.  e.,  independently  of 
our  negotiations  at  Constantinople.  I  will  endeavour  to  obtain  a 
result  which  means  an  advance,  as  compared  to  the  memorandum 
of  1908 — though  it  is  always  difficult  to  induce  the  British  Govern- 
ment to  assume  engagements  on  principle  for  future  eventualities. 

In  this  connection,  I  will  revert  to  a  thought  expressed  in  your 
letter  692.  I  do  not  recall  that  Grey  made  it  a  condition  that  the 
Sublime  Porte  should  have  previously  agreed.  As  you  properly 
remark,  such  an  agreement  will,  of  course,  become  necessary.  But 
so  far  as  I  am  aware.  Grey  and  I  have  not  talked  about  this.  This 
misunderstanding  perhaps  has  its  origin  in  the  fact,  that  I  have 
not  yet  spoken  to  Grey  about  the  abstract  question  of  the  Straits. 
I  described  the  negotiations  between  Tcharikoff  and  Said  Pasha 
in  general  outlines  to  the  Minister,  and,  at  the  same  time,  men- 
tioned the  question  of  a  free  passage  of  the  ships  as  one  of  the 
conditions,  upon  which  we  would  come  to  an  agreement  with  the 
Porte — contingent  on  a  condition  which  I  particularly  accentuated 
and  which  led  to  my  question  to  Sir  Edward :  Whether  the  British 
Government  would  be  prepared  to  support  this  condition  in  Con- 
stantinople.   My  question  as  I  put  it  to  Grey,  referred  to  an  action 


328  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

at  Constantinople,  having  of  course  previously  received  England's 
consent  on  principle — I  did  not  speak  of  a  new  engagement  that 
England  was  to  assume  on  principle  towards  us.  In  this  new 
sense  I  will  now  revert  to  the  matter  in  my  conversations  with 
Grey. 


(384)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Oct.  26'Nov.  8,  1911. 


J 


Since  your  letter  692  was  written,  events  have  confirmed  your 
prediction  as  to  the  negotiations  at  Constantinople.  I  will  not  con- 
ceal from  you  the  fact,  that  this  signifies  difficulties  in  the  way  of  a 
rapid  solution  of  the  Straits  question.  I  shall  make  an  attempt, 
but  am  not  certain  that  I  shall  succeed.  But  even  then,  this  would 
not  in  any  way  signify  that  sentiment  in  England  is  growing  cooler. 
During  the  last  two  years  there  has  been  a  distinct  progress  here. 
So  long  as  our  relations  remain  what  they  now  are,  public  opinion 
will  not  be  excited  by  problems  which  actually  already  belong  to 
the  historic  past.  You  will  find  the  proof  of  this  in  Grey's  answer. 
In  1908  Grey  said: 

"This  shall  and  must  be  done  some  day,  at  present  it  is  too 
soon."  Today  he  no  longer  says :  "It  is  too  soon  still."  He  says : 
I  am  ready  to  act.  But  one  can  act  only  when  circumstances  are 
propitious.  He  hopes  this  will  be  the  case.  Now,  however  this 
question  has  been  postponed.  It  will  be  difficult  to  make  him  alter 
his  point  of  view — ^he  will  recognize  neither  the  usefulness  nor  the 
practical  necessity.  It  is  a  question  of  certain  traditional  methods 
which  find  expression  in  everything.^ 

There  exists  nevertheless  a  way  of  mooting  the  question,  and  I 
will  attempt  it ;  but  we  must  foresee  objections  against  our  present 
formula.  ^  I  believe  these  objections  will  assume  the  following 
form,  not  so  much  on  England's  part,  as  on  that  of  Europe  in 
general. 

Our  aim  is  the  free  passage  through  the  Straits  in  both  directions. 
As  to  this  I  see  no  particular  obstacle.    But  to  convert  the  Black  Sea 

*  Great  Britain's  "traditional  method"  consisted  of  keeping  the  Straits  under 
international  control  so  that  Russia  could  not  use  them  at  will  for  the  purpose  of 
controlling  the  Eastern  Mediterranean. 

'  Benckendorff  knew  British  policy  too  well  to  have  meant  this  statement.  The 
entire  letter  is  an  attempt  at  placating  the  impetuous  Neratoff. 


THE  ENTENTE  AND  THE  STRAITS  329 

into  a  great  port  of  refuge  for  the  Rtissian  fleet  in  the  event  of  war — 
that  is  another  question;  in  which  connection,  we  are  sure  to  encounter 
difficulties. 

Like  yourself  I,  too,  perceive  frequent  signs  that  the  British  Gov- 
ernment wishes  to  reinforce,  even  to  extend,  the  scope  of  our  Entente, 
One  feels,  that  in  all  European  questions  of  the  day,  particularly  in 
those  of  the  Near  East,  our  vieWs  are  in  full  accord  with  one  another. 
But  how  are  we  to  extend  the  community  of  our  action  still  further? 
Or  rather,  in  what  form  are  we  to  clothe  it?  I  am  not  yet  quite  clear 
about  this. 

I  hear  the  idea  of  a  defensive  Alliance  sometimes  mentioned. 
This  is  too  important  a  question  to  be  broached  by  me.  At  pres- 
ent I  have  put  it  aside.  I  believe  that  Buchanan  is  considering  it. 
There  remains  therefore  a  more  general  agreement,  which  might  con- 
cern Constantinople,  the  Balkans,  perhaps  also  Asia  Minor.  It  would 
he  a  question  of  inducing  England  to  accept  our  views,  which  I  consider 
possible;  we  on  our  part  would  concede  Egypt,  etc.,  to  her.  But  a  new 
agreement  of  this  kind  must  necessarily  also  include  the  Far  East. 
This  difficulty  is,  in  my  opinion,  much  greater,  though  not  neces- 
sarily insurmountable.  England  is  satiated  with  colonies,^  she 
desires  no  further  new  acquisitions;  therefore  she  does  not  wish 
any  partition  of  territory,  and  has,  consequently,  set  up  the  prin- 
ciple of  territorial  integrity.  This  concerns  China,  Persia,  as  well 
as  points  where  we  are  not  in  touch ;  furthermore,  England  does  not 
wish  to  proceed  in  any  way  against  America.  I  will  not  say  more 
in  a  letter  improvised  at  the  eleventh  hour. 

The  convention  between  England  and  Russia  has  in  truth  pro- 
duced unexpected  results.  As  our  agreement  was  based  on  Persia, 
it  was  long  believed  that  in  case  things  did  not  go  well  in  Persia, 
the  Entente  would  be  broken  up.  In  reality  our  understanding 
grows  firmer  and  firmer — in  spite  of  the  difficulties  we  encounter 
in  Persia.  But  I  believe  one  ought  not  to  push  too  far  the  deductions 
from  this  observation,  however  correct  it  may  be  in  itself.  A  serious 
quarrel  in  Persia  would  be  disastrous  to  the  Entente.  Yet  the 
only  danger,  which  might  cause  the  disruption  of  the  latter,  is 

*  Matter  of  opinion ;  not  borne  out  by  more  recent  events  giving  Great  Britain 
additional  territories  half  the  extent  of  the  United  States. 


330 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


embodied  in  a  situation  which  would  leave  no  other  solution  than 
the  partition  of  Persia.  ^  We  must  keep  this  in  view,  as  often  as 
there  is  any  question  of  occupying  Persian  territory.  Military 
occupations  of  this  kind  lead  directly  to  this  end ;  everything  else  is 
of  secondary  importance.    The  Stokes  incident  should  be  a  lesson 


to  us. 


(385)    Neratoff  to  Benckendorff.    Telegram,  Nov.  11-24,  1911.    No.  1862. 


For  your  personal  information: 

Our  Ambassador  in  Berlin  telegraphed  on  November   10-23: 

The  Berlin  Cabinet  in  no  way  opposes  our  agreement  with  Turkey  con- 
cerning the  opening  of  the  Straits.  As  to  Kiderlen's  initiative  to  trans- 
mit our  point  of  view  to  Vienna,  the  Secretary  of  State  has  the 
impression  that  Vienna  would  like  to  have  details  about  our  prospective 
agreement  with  Turkey.  It  even  appears  as  though  Vienna  believed 
that  our  agreement  with  the  Sublime  Porte  is  already  signed;  I 
denied  this. 


(386) 


The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  to  M.  Sasonoff. 
Jan.  2-15,  1912. 


4 

Letter,     VI 


May  I,  with  the  expression  of  the  best  New  Year  wishes,  also 
give  expression  to  the  hope  that  your  activity  will  remain  assured 
to  Russia  for  very  many  years  to  come?  Personally,  I  shall  en- 
deavour to  prevent  your  activity  from  being  hampered  by  inner 
and  outer  events  in  Turkey — an  activity  which  bears  on  the  whole, 
not  yet  consolidated,  Russian  front  from  the  Yellow  Sea  to  the 
Prussian  boundaries. 

/  trust  we  shall  not  need  to  exceed  diplomatic  activity  here  also  in 
the  coming  year.  We  cannot  however  be  quite  assured  of  this,  for  the 
following  three  reasons: 

1.  The  long  war  between  Italy  and  Turkey;  2.  the  growing 


Dy  Russia  and  Great  Britain  into  three  zones: 
»f  influence"  and  a  small  neutral  zone.    On  that 


*  Persia  was  already  divided  b] 
The  Russian  and  British  "zones  o\ 

very  date  Russia  was  provocating  Persia  with  a  view  of  creating  a  situation  that^ 
would  result  in  the  final  partition  of  the  country. 


THE  ENTENTE  AND  THE  STRAITS  331 

gravity  of  the  situation  in  Persia ;  3.  the  suspicious  warlike  feeling 
in  Montenegro.  ^ 

1.)  The  dissolution  of  the  Turkish  Parliament  has  now  been 
definitely  decided  and  the  elections  will  take  place  very  shortly. 
The  Sublime  Porte  will  not  deal  with  peace  prior  to  this.  I  am 
forwarding  you  some  statistics  on  Turco-Italian  relations.  /  do 
not  believe  it  would  he  advantageous  to  uSy  however,  were  peace  to  be 
concluded  before  we  have  settled  the  Persian  question. 

2.)  I  received  your  telegraphic  enquiry  on  Turkey's  military 
measures  on  the  Persian  frontier  yesterday  and  applied  to  our 
Military  Agent  here  for  particulars.  As  soon  as  I  have  received  the 
report  of  our  Minister  of  War,  you  promised  me,  I  shall  reply  by 
telegram.  But  I  can  already  see  that  the  Russian  military  pro- 
gram in  the  "contentious  zone"^  is  steadily  increasing.  As  recently 
as  last  spring,  our  General  Staff  deemed  a  military  occupation  of 
Khoi  and  Maku  to  be  sufficient  for  the  safeguarding  of  our  strategic 
interests.  Since  then  other  desiderata  have  been  added  and  already 
partly  realised: 

1.  The  controlling  of  the  Khoi-Urmiah  road;  2.  the  occupa- 
tion of  several  points  on  this  line  of  communication  and  perhaps 
westward  of  it,  too,  and  3.  the  despatching  of  a  part  of  our  Khoi 
detachment  to  Urmiah.  The  continuous  extensions  of  our  pro- 
gramme is  apparently  not  due  to  any  systematic  plan,  but  is  the 
result  of  local  deliberations  and,  above  all,  of  the  wishes  of  the 
Caucasian  Military  Command. 

In  my  opinion  this  should  be  the  guiding  principle  in  solving  the 
problem.  We  must  definitely  determine  what  we  need  in  the  ''conten- 
tious zone"  and  solve  the  question  not  from  the  standpoint  of  local 
but  of  general  political  requirements.  We  must  take  and  hold  what 
we  need,  even  though  it  should  lead  to  war  with  Turkey.  Should  we 
permit  local  deliberations  to  draw  us  further  and  further  into  the 
contentious  zone,  this  would  still  end  in  a  war  with  Turkey  without 
this  being  justified  by  general  political  considerations. 

The  existing  ambiguous  conditions  automatically  lead  to  a  con- 

*  A  puny  and  wholly  negligible  state. 

'  This  zone  was  supposed  to  be  beyond  Russian  and  British  influences.  While 
the  term  contentions  zone  is  used  by  the  writer  of  the  document,  he  probably 
meant  a  zone  in  dispute  or  as  it  would  be  stated  in  French:    Zone  contestee. 


332 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


tinuous  strengthening  of  the  Russian  and  Turkish  forces  in  this 
zone  as  well  as  on  both  frontiers,  and  this  again  might  end  in  an 
undesired  collision.  The  present  Turkish  Government  desires  no 
war  with  us  and  in  fact  fears  it.  But  it  is  under  the  influence  of 
our  inner  and  outer  foes  who  point  to  our  systematic  advances. 
Once  we  ourselves  are  fully  aware  of  what  we  need,  then  the  ten- 
sion ill  our  relations  with  Turkey  will  diminish. 

3.)  I  informed  you  by  telegraph  of  the  strange  behaviour  of  the 
Montenegrin  representative  here.  There  is  something  on  foot  that 
I  cannot  explain  from  here.^  Pallavicini  ^  is  absolutely  correct  in 
his  manner,  but  knows  the  Turco-Montenegrin  negotiations,  at  any 
rate  the  Boundary  Protocol.  The  loan  at  Vienna  points  to  Aus- 
trian support  for  Montenegro.  Our  troubles  in  China  and  Persia 
may  give  rise  to  the  idea  at  Vienna  that  the  proper  time  has  now 
come  to  re-open  activity  in  the  Balkans.  Be  this  as  it  may, 
the  warlike  tendencies  in  Montenegro  must  be  regarded  as  a 
direct  danger. 

For  reasons  of  home  politics,  the  Sublime  Porte  is  attempting 
to  effect  a  reconciliation  with  the  Albanians,  which  would  be  to 
Montenegro's  disadvantage.  Should  the  latter  really  seek  an  un- 
derstanding with  Turkey  and  not  a  pretence  for  a  rupture,  then 
why  does  not  Cettinje  turn  towards  Russia  for  support  in  the  ques- 
tion of  the  Boundary  Protocol  of  1908,  as  was  the  case  on  the 
occasion  of  the  discussions  concerning  the  Lake  of  Scutari,  the 
Antivari-Scutari  Railway  and  the  Malissores  last  summer? 


(387) 


The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Parts  to  Sasonoff. 
Feb.  9,  1912.    No.  17. 


Telegram,  Jan.  27- 


Pcincare  ^  has  just  informed  me  in  writing  that  the  French 
Ambassador  at  Constantinople  has  been  requested  to  confer, 
together  with  Tcharikoff,  with  the  Turkish  Government,  regarding 
a  modification  of  the  Treaty  of  1900.  Poincare  added  that  the 
French  Government  was  pleased  to  be  able  to  assist  us  in  this 


*  Montenegro  was  getting  ready  for  war  with  Turkey. 
'  Austro-Hungarian  ambassador  at  Constantinople. 
'  Minister  of  foreign  affairs  of  France. 


THE  ENTENTE  AND  THE  STRAITS  333 

matter  and  he  begs  you  to  keep  him  fully  informed  of  the  trend  of 
our  discussions  with  Turkey. 

(388)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  to  Sazonoff.    Telegram, 
Jan.  3l-Feb.  13.  1912.    No.  42. 

At  to-day's  diplomatic  reception  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
made  the  following  communication  to  me,  which  he  requested  me  to 
treat  as  strictly  private  and  confidential.  Although  the  discussion 
of  several  questions,  among  others  the  railways  of  Asia  Minor,  has 
been  postponed  at  our  desire,  he  asked  me  whether  we  would  not 
communicate  to  the  Turkish  Government — in  view  of  the  fact  that 
the  French  preparatory  work  on  the  contemplated  sectors  will 
soon  be  ended — the  points  at  which  we  desire  to  connect  the  Rus- 
sian and  Turkish  railways,  as  well  as  our  view  on  the  commercial 
questions  connected  therewith.  The  Minister  pointed  out  that  it 
would  be  desirable  for  Turkey  to  receive  our  sanction  to  the  in- 
crease up  to  15  per  cent  of  the  Turkish  Customs  duties  and  the 
Temetu  taxes.  ^  Such  a  declaration  on  our  part  would  make  it 
easier  for  Turkey  to  arrive  at  an  understanding  with  us  previous 
to  the  final  decision  with  regard  to  the  French  projects.  I  replied 
that  I  was  instructed  to  accept  private  and  confidential  statements, 
but  that  before  I  could  return  a  reply  I  would  have  to  refer  to  my 
Government 

I  regard  it  as  favourable  that  the  Minister  has  taken  the  initia- 
tive in  this  matter  and  that  he  acknowledges  the  urgency  of  an  un- 
derstanding with  us  before  the  French  projects  are  accepted.  I  think 
it  proper  to  inform  the  Minister  of  our  maximum  demands  concern- 
ing the  Asia  Minor  railways ;  we  must  not,  however,  tell  him  plainly 
that  we  shall  oppose  the  construction  of  railways  in  a  certain  zone, 
but  we  must  make  such  constructions  dependent  on  conditions 
which  will  fully  protect  our  interests.  .  .  .  Our  consent  to  the  in- 
crease of  the  Customs  duties  and  the  Temetu  might  cause  the  Sub- 
lime Porte  to  meet  us  halfway  in  railway  matters.  The  Turks  will 
certainly  try  to  bargain  with  us,  but  under  the  prevailing  circum- 
stances, and  supported  by  the  Paris  Cabinet,  we  shall  undoubtedly 
be  the  stronger  of  the  two. 

*  Turkey's  foreign  debts  were  under  a  foreign  administration  which  controlled 
certain  revenues. 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


(389) 


Sa^ionoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople. 
Feb.  3-16.  1912.    No.  230. 


Telegram, 


Before  replying  to  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs*  statements 
submit  the  following  to  the  Sublime  Porte :  MM 

1.)  The  situation  created  by  the  Treaty  of  1900  can  alone  serw' 
as  the  basis  of  our  negotiations ;  hence  the  linking  up  of  the  railway 
nets  in  Asia  Minor  can  be  discussed  only  after  the  fundamental 
principles  concerning  survey  and  construction  of  the  lines  have 
been  determined.  These  principles  are  embodied  in  the  third  clause 
of  the  Treaty  of  1900:  "In  the  construction  of  the  lines  both  parties 
will  have  to  take  into  consideration  the  mutual  commercial  interests 
of  both  States." 

2.)  As  for  the  four  per  cent  Customs  all  countries  are  interested 
in  this,  and  we  thus  cannot  give  a  onesided  promise  to  Turkey, 
all  the  more  as  we  are  unaware  of  the  purpose  to  which  the  surplus 
is  to  be  devoted.  This  would  represent  so  great  a  concession  on  our 
part  that  we  should  have  to  insist  on  a  special  compensation  in  our 
favour. 


(390)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram, 
Feb.  6-19,  1912.    No.  53. 


I 


Your  telegram  No.  230  received. 

I  informed  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  to-day  that  I  was 
instructed  to  tell  him  that  we  desired  to  see  the  principle  of  con- 
sideration of  the  mutual  commercial  interests  of  both  countries 
established  before  we  were  able  to  express  our  readiness  to  open 
negotiations  with  the  Sublime  Porte  on  the  railways  of  Asia  Minor. 
It  is  therefore  a  case  now  of  determining  the  lines  and  the  manner 
of  their  construction.  After  some  hesitation,  the  Minister  accepted 
this  standpoint.  He  will  induce  the  Minister  of  Public  Works  to 
request  detailed  information  from  the  French  contractors  which 
he  will  then  bring  to  our  knowledge. 

We  agreed  with  Assim  Bey  to  look  upon  our  present  exchange 
of  views  as  private  and  to  begin  official  negotiations  at  a  later  date. 
It  appears  to  me  necessary  to  influence  the  French  con- 
tractors to  adapt  their  reply  to  our  desires,  as  it  would  he  advan- 
tageous were  the  French  Syndicate  itself  to  make  an  unfavourable  re- 


THE  ENTENTE  AND  THE  STRAITS  335 

port  upon  those  lines  which  are  disadvantageous  to  us.  The  Trapezund- 
Erzerum  line  presents  especially  severe  technical  difficulties.  The  director 
of  the  Ottoman  Bank,^  Revoil,  helps  us  in  every  respect.  Lamornet  in- 
formed me  that  the  original  estimate  of  the  Syndicate  expenses  will 
be  raised  by  22  per  cent,  as  labour  has  become  much  more  expensive. 
The  appointment  of  Djavid  Bey,  who  is  well-disposed  towards  us 
and  desires  to  win  French  favour,  is  most  fortunate  for  us.  It  is 
desirable  that  the  French  Ambassador  should  return  here  as  soon 
as  possible. 

(391)  The  Same  to  the  Same.     Telegram,  Feb.  7-20,  1912.    No.  54. 

I  refer  to  my  telegram  No.  53. 

I  took  it  upon  myself  to  explain  to  the  Minister  how  strongly 
we  must  insist  on  safeguarding  our  economic  predominance  in 
Northern  Persia,  not  against  Turkish  but  against  foreign  compe- 
tition; for  which  latter  the  construction  of  a  railway  through 
Turkish  territory  in  the  direction  of  the  Caucasian  frontier  and 
Persia  means  great  convenience. 

In  answer  to  the  Minister's  question  whether  we  agreed  to  the 
French  trace,^  I  replied  that  my  Government  would  answer  this 
question  at  the  proper  time.  I  am  convinced  that  the  Turks  have 
no  illusions  as  to  the  nature  of  our  demands,  and  that  the  main 
object  of  the  new  negotiations  will  consist  in  finding  a  formula  en- 
abling the  Turks  to  satisfy  us  and  save  their  own  honour  at  the 
same  time 

(392)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Feb.  8-21,  1912.    No.  58. 

In  his  conversation  with  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  the 
French  Charge  d' Affaires  gained  the  impression  that  the  Turkish 
Government  is  ready  to  accept  the  mode  of  negotiation  proposed 
by  us.  Furthermore,  Assim  Bey  would  appear  to  have  understood 
that  we  must  secure  our  predominance  in  Northern  Persia;  he 
therefore  seems  inclined  to  concede  that  the  French  lines  in  ques- 
tion shall  only  be  built  after  our  railway  net  in  Northern  Persia  has 

*A  Turkish  institution. 
'  Survey. 


336  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

been  completed.  It  seems  to  me  that  instead  of  a  protracted  post- 
ponement of  the  discussions  of  the  direction  and  method  of  con- 
struction of  the  railways  in  the  forbidden  zone,  the  Turks  would 
prefer  to  withdraw  at  once  the  construction  of  various  lines  not 
agreeable  to  us,  such  as,  for  instance,  the  Erzerum-Bajasid  Line, 
and  to  postpone  the  laying  of  other  lines,  such  as  Trapezund-Er- 
zerum  or  even  Erzerum-Ersingian. 

The  French  believe  that  the  Turks  will  have  to  insist  on  the 
rapid  construction  of  the  line  to  Erzerum  and  from  Diarbekir  to 
Bitlis.  In  the  event  of  an  enquiry  from  Djavid  Bey,  the  French 
will  reply  that  the  results  of  the  preparatory  work  will  soon  be 
submitted  to  the  Sublime  Porte,  that  is,  on  the  receipt  of  the  de- 
sired information  from  Paris.  For  technical  reasons  the  railway 
will  only  be  able  to  reach  Erzerum  ten  years  after  work  on  the 
Samsun-Siwas  line  has  commenced. 


(393)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sasonoff.     Telegram,  March 
10-23,  1912.    No.  46. 


I 


Count  Vitali  has  informed  me  that  in  consequence  of  the  urgent 
enquiry  of  the  Sublime  Porte  the  Syndicate  sees  itself  compelled 
to  communicate  its  plans  on  Monday.  Important  details  and  figures 
will  he  purposely  left  out  in  order  to  protract  the  negotiations  so  far 
possible. 


rar  as 

J 


(394)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  to  Sazonoff.    Telegram 
Feb.  2\-March  5,  1912.    No.  88. 

I  am  convinced  that  the  desire  of  the  present  Turkish  Cabinet 
to  arrive  at  an  understanding  with  us  is  so  great  that  it  has  not 
waited  for  the  communication  of  the  results  of  the  French  surveys 
and  that  the  desiderata  now  submitted  to  us  really  represent  the 
maximum  of  the  Turkish  demands.  This  mode  of  action  affords  us 
possibility  of  insisting  on  our  principle  of  considering  the  mutual 
commercial  interests. 

Our  acquiescence  in  the  linking  up  of  the  lines  between  Kars 
and  Erzerum,  which  is  feared  by  the  Turks,  provides  us  with  a 
new  means  of  exerting  pressure  on  them  now,  and  of  securing 
for  the  future  our  commercial  supremacy  in  the  Eastern  part 


THE  ENTENTE  AND  THE  STRAITS  337 

Anatolia.  The  negotiations  with  French  contractors  confirm  Tur- 
key's intention  to  grant  them  the  concessions  and  no  one  else. 
Turkey  is  forced  to  this  by  her  financial  condition  and  by  the  neces- 
sity o£  seeking  support  from  the  Powers  of  the  Triple  Entente. 

The  report  of  the  French  contractors  will  be  a  very  pessimistic 
one  ^  (thanks  to  the  aid  of  Revoil,  who  in  a  strictly  confidential 
manner  is  influencing  the  decision  of  the  Syndicate)— chiefly  from 
a  financial  point  of  view.  .  .  .  These  reports  are  to  be  submitted 
within  a  fortnight.  I  propose  that  we  await  their  effect  before  giv- 
ing an  answer  to  the  Turkish  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs*  com- 
munication of  yesterday. 

(395)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  April  17-30,  1912.    No.  189. 

Assim  Bey  gave  me  yesterday  explanations  of  his  negotiations 
with  my  predecessor.  ^  The  latter  upheld  the  standpoint  of  mutual 
commercial  interests  and  proved  that  Russia,  who  had  conquered 
the  North  Persian  markets  with  so  much  difficulty,  ^  could  not  per- 
mit her  foreign  competitors  to  use  the  Persian  railroads  for  the 
purpose  of  crowding  her  out  of  Persia.*  On  these  grounds,  Assim 
Bey  informed  Tcharikoff  which  lines  Turkey  intends  to  build  in 
the  course  of  a  period  of  eight  years  and  he  waited  for  our  reply. 

I  replied  to  the  Minister  that  I  share  the  views  of  my  prede- 
cessor completely.  The  conversations  between  him  and  the  Turkish 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  had  had,  as  was  arranged,  a  personal 
and  preparatory  character;  the  Sublime  Porte  had  now,  however, 
without  notifying  us,  made  official  mention  of  these  negotiations 
in  the  Speech  from  the  Throne.  I  asked  the  Minister  which  nego- 
tiations were  really  meant  by  this  speech.  Assim  Bey  replied  in 
great  confusion  that  he  had  believed  it  to  be  a  question  of  prepara- 
tory negotiations.  I  again  called  his  attention  to  the  thoroughly 
confidential  nature  of  these  conversations  and  added  that  I  was 
ready  to  resume  the  exchange  of  views,  but  that  the  Turkish  Gov- 
ernment should  remember  that  the  construction  of  the  railways 
depended  on  previously  determined  conditions;  which  are  still  in 

*  Diplomacy  with  a  vengeance- 

'  de  Giers  having  succeeded  Tcharikoff. 

'  Admission  why  Persia  was  occupied,  poHtically  and  militarily. 

*  Directed  mainlv  at  Germany,  as  the  documents  show. 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

force.  In  acordance  with  Turkish  wishes  we  were  ready  to  modify 
these  conditions,  but  we  desired  to  know  what  guarantees  we  should 
receive  as  compensation  for  our  compHance.  We  expected  propo- 
sals in  writing.  Assim  Bey  replied  that  he  must  first  discuss  this 
question  with  the  Grand  Vizier  and  the  Minister  of  Communica- 
tions.^ As  to  the  forbidden  zone,  I  did  not  touch  upon  this  ques; 
tion  at  all 


*  The  project  was  then  abandoned. 


VI 

RUSSIA,  THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE  AND  THE  POWERS 
(March—September  1912) 

(396)  Sasonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.    Telegram,  March 

17-30,  1912.    No.  580. 

Identical  telegram  sent  to  Paris.    Personal. 

A  treaty  has  been  concluded  with  our  cognizance  between  Serbia 
and  Bulgaria  for  the  purpose  of  mutual  defence  and  the  protection 
of  common  interests  in  the  event  of  a  change  of  the  status  quo  in  the  Bal- 
kans or  one  of  the  contracting  parties  being  attacked  by  a  third  Power. 
Geshoff  and  Spalaikowitch,  the  Serbian  Minister  at  Sofia,  have  in- 
formed Ironside,  the  British  Minister  in  Bulgaria,  that  the  treaty 
has  been  concluded.  I  request  you  to  communicate  the  above,  on 
the  first  favourable  occasion,  verbally  to  Poincare  for  his  personal 
information,  and  to  direct  very  earnestly  his  attention  to  the  necessity 
of  keeping  the  conclusion  of  this  treaty  strictly  secret.  You  may  add 
that  as  a  secret  clause  obliges  both  parties  to  primarily  obtain  Russia's 
views  before  taking  any  active  steps,  we  believe  to  have  a  means  at  our 
command  to  influence  both  Governments  while  we  have  at  the  same 
time  taken  a  protective  measure  in  order  to  oppose  any  expansion  of  the 
influence  of  any  Great  Power  in  the  Balkans. 

(397)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sasonoff.    Telegram,  March 
\9-April  1,  1912.    No.  91. 

Received  your  telegram  No.  580. 

Ironside  having  been  informed,  I  deem  it  necessary  to  mention 
the  matter  confidentially  to  Grey.  Provided  I  receive  no  different 
instructions  I  shall  do  so  within  the  course  of  the  next  days. 

339 


340 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


(398)     The   Russian    Charge   d'Affaires  at   Sofia   to   Sazonoif.      Telegram, 
March  22-April  4,  1912.    No.  ZZ. 

The  Bulgarian  Government  is  in  urgent  need  of  a  loan  of  from 
160  to  180  million  francs  in  order  to  conclude  the  conversion  of  the 
82  millions  of  the  6%  loan  and  in  order  to  begin  the  construction 
of  the  Jamboli-Kisil-Agatch  and  Caspian-Silistria  railway  line.  The 
loan  is  to  be  taken  up  in  France,  and  the  French  Minister  at  Sofia 
has  of  late  repeatedly  directed  Geshoff 's  attention  to  the  fact  that 
the  first  condition  which  the  French  Cabinet  would  make,  before 
consenting  to  this  financial  operation  being  carried  through, 
would  be  a  categoric  statement  on  the  part  of  the  Bulgarian  Government 
that  from  now  on  Bulgarin  would  join  the  policy  pursued  by  the  three 
Entente  Powers.  As  a  result,  Geshoff,  acting  with  the  King's  consent, 
has  addressed  himself  to  me  to  request  you  to  assist  Bulgaria  in  this 
matter  and  to  inform  the  Paris  Cabinet  of  the  political  course  Bulgaria 
has  chosen  to  follow.  Geshoff  added  that  the  Bulgarian  Government 
would  give  formal  guarantees  that  the  loan  would  not  be  employed  for 
armaments  but  solely  for  carrying  through  the  conversion  of  the  old 
loan  and  for  railway  construction.  Geshoff  intends  to  inform  the 
French  Minister  that  the  Bulgarian  Government  wishes  to  apply 
for  such  a  loan;  the  Bulgarian  Minister  at  Paris  has  already  re- 
ceived corresponding  instructions. 


(399)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  April  3-16,  1912.    No.  34. 

The  French  Ambassador  has  informed  Geshoff  that  his  Govern- 
ment is  prepared  in  principle  to  consent  to  the  Bulgarian  loan  being 
taken  up  at  Paris.  Negotiations  as  to  the  amount  and  all  details 
will  begin  at  once. 


(400) 


The  Russian  Minister  at  Sofia  td  Sazonoff. 
No.  16. 


Report,  June  7-20,  1912. 


Geshoff,  having  returned  to  Sofia,  informed  me  that  the  treaty  be- 
tween Bulgaria  and  Greece  has  been  signed.  The  substance  of  this 
treaty  has  been  indicated  in  my  telegram  of  May  1.  The  Bulgarian 
Government  has  not  altered  the  expressions  to  the  inexpediency 
and  perilous  nature  of  which  I  had  been  instructed  by  you  to  draw 
Geshoff's  attention.  As  you  are  aware,  Geshoff's  replies  to  our  ob- 


THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE  AND  THE  POWERS        341 

jections  are  not  devoid  of  a  certain  foundation.  However,  I  know 
that  the  Bulgarian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  could  not  have 
effected  any  changes  in  the  text,  even  if  he  had  desired  to  do  so, 
because  this  would  have  delayed  the  signing  of  the  treaty,  while 
on  the  other  hand.  King  Ferdinand  most  emphatically  insisted  on  the 
treaty  being  signed  as  quickly  as  possible,  his  views  being  shared  by 
some  members  of  the  Cabinet  and  by  all  those  in  high  military  com- 
mand.  ^ 

Nevertheless,  I  do  not  believe  that  this  treaty  will  cause  any 
serious  complications  in  the  Balkans.  The  old  mistrust  existing 
between  Bulgarians  and  Greeks  cannot  be  removed  by  a  single  dip- 
lomatic document,  and  each  side  is  primarily  taking  care  not  to  be 
dragged  into  any  dangerous  adventure  without  having  the  certainty 
of  an  ample  reward  in  the  event  of  success.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  Greco-Bulgarian  treaty  constitutes  a  favourable  factor  which 
will  not  only  prevent  the  horrible  bloodshed  between  the  two  ortho- 
dox nationalities  in  Macedonia,  but  may  also  serve  to  create  a 
certain  understanding  and  even,  to  some  extent,  a  uniformity  of  ac- 
tion.   This  is,  in  any  case,  a  great  step  forward. 

(401)  The  Russian  Minister  at  Belgrade  to  Sasonoff.     Telegram,  April  28- 
May  11,  1912.    No.  54. 

The  rumours  of  preparations  for  an  Albanian  insurrection,  which 
I  mentioned  in  my  earlier  reports,  are  confirmed.  According  to  in- 
formation received  here,  the  movement  is  being  encouraged  in  Monte- 
negro, and  arms  and  money  in  plenty  are  being  distributed  from  there. 
The  Serbian  Government  has  refused  the  request  of  the  Arnaut  ^ 
leaders  for  assistance,  and  is  much  alarmed,  because  the  insurrec- 
tion is  this  time  being  organised  in  the  vilayet  of  Kossovo  which  is 
in  close  proximity  to  the  Serbian  sphere  of  influence. 

(402)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  to  Sasonoff.     Telegram, 
July  24-Aug.  6.  1912.    No.  536. 

The  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  has  informed  me  that  the  at- 
tacks of  the  Montenegrins  ^  have  caused  great  excitement  here 

*War  by  the  Balkan  League,  consisting  of  Bulgaria,  Serbia,  Montenegro  and 
Greece,  upon  Turkey  ensued  shortly  afterwards. 
'  Albanian. 
"Upon  the  Turks. 


342 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


and  that  he  has  much  difficulty  in  restraining  his  colleagues  in  the 
Ministry  from  stringent  counter-measures.  /  replied  to  the  Minister 
that  our  information  from  Montenegro  runs  counter  to  his  assertion 
that  it  was  the  Montenegrins  and  not  the  Turks  who  crossed  the  frontier, 
and  that,  therefore,  he  should  investigate  the  reports  of  the  Turkish 
frontier  guards  very  carefully.  I  added  that  in  the  present  state  of  af- 
fairs in  the  interior  of  Turkey,  the  Sublime  Porte  should  avoid  any 
incidents  at  the  Montenegrin  frontier.  It  was  in  the  interests  of 
Turkey  to  settle  also  the  last  incident  through  diplomatic  channels. 
For  this  purpose  negotiations  with  Montenegro  should  immediately  be 
inaugurated  in  order  to  forestall  further  complications.  The  Minister 
acquainted  me  with  the  contents  of  a  telegram  sent  to  the  Turkish  rep- 
resentative at  Cettinje  in  which  the  Sublime  Porte  declares  to  be  con- 
vinced that  King  Nicolas'  Government  was  not  responsible  for  the 
incident,  and  a  proposal  is  made  that  a  joint  investigation  be  institute^ 
in  order  to  prevent  further  complications. 


(403) 


The  Russian  Minister  at  Cettinje  to  Sazonoff. 
1912.    No.  125. 


Telegram,  Aug.  6-19, 


The   incident  at  Berana  threatens   to   lead  to   complications. 

Our  military  agent  here  telegraphs  to  the  General  Staff  today  that  Mon- 
tenegro is  assisting  the  rebels  with  arms,  cartridges  and  soldiers.  I  have 
received  the  same  information  from  the  Austrian  Minister  Giesl  who 
fears  that  Montenegro  will  take  still  further  active  measures.  ^  I  share 
this  fear,  because  Montenegro  is  undoubtedly  making  military  prep- 
arations these  last  days,  and  the  Montenegrin  heir  to  the  throne 
plainly  alluded  the  other  day  to  the  warlike  spirit  of  the  Montenegrin 
Government.  In  the  course  of  a  personal  and  confidential  discussion, 
Giesl  expressed  his  opinion  to  the  effect  that  only  an  immediate  and 
simultaneous  pressure  by  Russia  and  Austria  on  King  Nicolas,  who  is 
completely  under  the  influence  of  some  of  his  ministers,  ^  can  restrain 
him  from  taking  a  rash  step.  Giesl  told  me  he  had  today  asked  for 
instructions  to  that  effect.    I  hasten  to  inform  you  of  this. 


*  What  the  Austrian  diplomatist  knew  was  known  in  Constantinople,  of  course. 
"King  Nicolas  being  at  any  time  under  the  influence  of  his  ministers    is  p( 
sible,  of  course,  but  not  very  probable. 


I 


THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE  AND  THE  POWERS        343 

(404)  The  Acting  Russian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Neratoff,  to  the 
Russian  Ambassador  in  London,  Telegram,  Sept,  25'Oct.  8,  1912. 
No.  2102. 

I  am  telegraphing  to  Sofia,  Belgrade  and  Athens : 

According  to  private  information,  the  Montenegrin  representative 
has  left  Constantinople  after  handing  to  the  Sublime  Porte  a  declaration 
of  war.  If  this  step  has  not  been  taken  in  agreement  with,  and  the  con- 
sent of,  the  other  Balkan  States,  we  assume  that  the  latter  are  not  hound 
to  follow  this  example,  the  less  so  as  the  breaking  off  of  diplomatic  rela- 
tions need  not  be  taken  as  an  inevitable  outbreak  of  war  between  Turkey 
and  Montenegro.  ^  Even  warlike  collisions  between  both  States 
can  be  brought  to  a  standstill  by  the  Powers  bringing  their  influ- 
ence to  bear  on  both  sides,  without  any  serious  danger  arising 
thereby  to  the  vital  interests  of  Montenegro  and  Turkey.  //  it  turns 
out  to  be  true  that  Montenegro  has  acted  independently,  then  draw  the 
attention  of  the  Government  to  which  you  are  accredited  to  the  great 
responsibility  which  would  fall  upon  it  if  it  should  act  in  contradiction 
to  the  representations  of  the  Powers,  which,  as  you  know,  declare  their 
readiness  to  take  the  question  of  reforms  in  Turkey  into  their  own  hands. 
We  are  instructing  our  ambassador  at  Constantinople  at  the  same 
time,  to  tranquilize  Turkey. 

(405)  Sasonoff   to    the   Russian   Minister  at   Sofia.     Confidential   Letter, 

May  17-30,  1912. 

The  arrival  at  Yalta  of  a  Bulgarian  special  mission,  with  Daneff 
at  its  head,  has  enabled  me  to  discuss  with  him  the  main  interna- 
tional questions  concerning  Bulgaria. 

Daneff  began  the  conversation  with  rather  uncompromising 
statements.  He  pointed  out  how  difficult  the  great  financial  burden 
made  it  for  Bulgaria  to  be  in  constant  readiness  for  war  without  being 
able  to  exploit  in  a  diplomatic  way  the  present  difficulties  of  Turkey.^ 
An  immediate  settlement  of  the  Macedonian  question  becomes 
therefore  all  the  more  imperative  for  Bulgaria.  In  consequence  of 
the  Turkish  administration  of  this  territory,  the  Bulgarian  element 

*  Actual  starting  of  the  Balkan  War.  The  action  was  taken  after  the  forming 
of  the  Balkan  League  for  that  very  purpose.  What  Sazonoff  really  meant  by  his 
identical  telegram  to  Sofia,  Belgrade  and  Athens  was  to  indicate  his  displeasure 
at  the  independence  shown  by  the  Balkan  Allies  in  not  consulting  him. 

'The  war  with  Italy. 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


is  losing  gfround.  This  situation  leads  many  circles  in  Bulgaria  to  be- 
lieve that  those  parts  of  Turkish  territory  which  are  gravitating  towards 
Bulgaria  should  he  acquired  by  force  of  arms.  I  found  no  difficulty  in 
proving  to  Daneff  how  little  an  active  step  on  the  part  of  Bulgaria, 
and  the  complications  arising  therefrom  in  the  Balkans,  would 
please  Russian  public  opinion  and  our  Government;  and  how  im- 
probable it  was  that  events  would  take  a  turn  favourable  to  Bul- 
garia in  case  of  a  general  collision.  At  subsequent  conversations  faj 
found  Daneff  more  reasonable  on  that  question.  fl 

As  regards  the  direct  Russo-Bulgarian  relations,  especially  the 
conclusion  of  a  Military  Convention  between  Russia  and  Bulgaria, 
Daneff  tried  to  convince  me  of  the  desirability  of  the  vilayet  of  Adrian- 
ople  being  included  in  the  sphere  of  interest  allotted  to  Bulgaria.  I  re- 
plied that  Adrianople  did  not  belong  to  the  territory  of  Bulgaria  as 
defined  in  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano,  and  that,  moreover,  if  the 
Bulgarian  national  aspirations  were  satisfied,  Adrianople  would 
lose  its  present  significance  as  a  Turkish  outpost,  because,  in  that 
case,  Turkey  herself  would  sink  to  the  level  of  a  second-rate  Power. 

Daneff  then  requested  we  should  give  our  consent  to  the  aboli- 
tion of  the  Capitulations^  as  soon  as  possible,  it  being  desirable 
that  Austria  should  not  forestall  us  in  this  matter.  I  refrained 
from  giving  a  definitive  answer  and  merely  intimated  that  a  happy 
solution  of  this  question  depended,  to  a  certain  extent,  on  Bulgaria 
herself. 

Daneff  furthermore  asked  that  we  should  favour  the  conclusion 
of  a  Customs  Union  with  Serbia ;  also  that  we  should  consent  to  a 
close  union  between  the  officers  of  the  Russian  and  Bulgarian 
armies.  I  held  out  to  him  the  prospect  of  these  two  wishes  being 
granted.  Daneff  complained  of  the  alleged  insincerity  of  French  Gov- 
ernment and  financial  circles  in  the  matter  of  a  Bulgarian  loan  in  Paris. 
I  promised  to  let  the  Bulgarian  efforts  in  that  direction  be  supported 
by  our  Ambassador  at  Paris  and,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  Iswolsky's  declara- 
tions have  since  given  favourable  results  for  Bulgaria. 

We  then  discussed  Bulgaria's  relations  to  the  other  Balkan 
States.  With  regard  to  Roumania,  Daneff  emphasized  with  consid- 
erable annoyance  that  all  attempts  to  render  the  mutual  relations 

*  Ex-territorial  privileges  of  the  Powers  in  Turkey,  especially  in  and  near  Co| 
stantinople. 


THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE  AND  THE  POWERS        345 

more  friendly  had  failed,  and  that  Bulgaria  was  beginning  to  doubt 
whether  it  ever  would  be  possible  to  obtain  such  a  result.  Never- 
theless, negotiations  are  being  conducted  between  the  two  king- 
doms concerning  special  questions  of  shipping  on  the  Danube,  in 
order  to  attempt  to  forestall  continual  interference  on  the  part  of 
Austria.  By  the  way,  Daneff  mentioned  that  Austria  was  prepared 
to  admit  a  Bulgarian  representative  on  the  Danube  Commission, 
but  refused  her  consent  to  the  admission  of  a  Serbian  representa- 
tive. 

Bulgaria  has  been  negotiating  for  some  time  past  with  Greece  about 
the  conclusion  of  a  defensive  alliance  ivhich,  however,  does  not  cover  the 
eventuality  of  a  conflict  between  Greece  and  Turkey  on  account  of 
Crete.  Daneff  admitted  that  it  was  extraordinarily  difficult  to  agree  on 
a  division  of  the  respective  spheres  of  interest  in  Macedonia;  the  ques- 
tion of  the  churches  also  presented  some  difficulties.  He  added  that 
Bulgaria  is  keeping  these  negotiations  secret,  and  that  Greece  for  her 
part  has  no  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  a  Serho-Bulgarian  alliance.'^ 
Naturally  I  approved  of  this  discretion  under  the  existing  circum- 
stances. 

With  regard  to  Montenegro,  we  discussed  the  possibility  of  letting 
this  country  join  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  alliance.  I  emphasized  that  I 
should  consider  such  an  action  a  mistake,  because  there  is  open  enmity 
between  Montenegro  and  Serbia,  and  any  political  treaty  would  be  in- 
sincere,^ quite  apart  from  the  fact  that  such  an  alliance  would  immedi- 
ately become  known  to  Austria. 

Of  great  interest  to  me  was  Daneff*s  categorical  assertion  that  in 
1908  Austria  had  attempted  to  draw  Bulgaria  over  to  her  side  by 
promising  to  concede  Macedonia  to  the  latter  and  by  holding  out  hopes  of 
a  partition  of  Serbia.^  The  Bulgarians,  he  asserted,  had  rejected  these 
overtures,  and  in  this  respect  the  people  were  absolutely  of  one  mind 
with  the  King.  Anyway,  King  Ferdinand  had,  of  late,  changed  in  his 
feelings  towards  Serbia  and  King  Peter. 

*  Diplomacy  has  never  and  nowhere  been  an  honest  business,  it  seems. 

'  It  is  hard  to  define  insincerity  in  the  diplomatic  sense. 

*The  Russian  minister  did  not  place  much  faith  in  the  words  of  "Cospodin" 
Daneff,  whom  he  knew  as  a  diplomatic  cutthroat  second  not  even  to  Iswolsky  him- 
self. While  Count  Aehrenthal  was  not  in  any  sense  a  careful  man,  it  must  be 
doubted  that  he  made  any  such  proposal — least  of  all  to  M.  Daneff  himself,  who 
of  all  Balkan  Pan-Slavs  was  probably  the  most  ardent,  even  as  late  as  1916. 


346 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


li 


(406)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sasonoff.    Confidential  Letter, 
May  24-June  6.  1912. 

The  Bulgarian  Minister  of  Finance,  Todoroff,  spent  some  day; 
here  in  order  to  confer  with  the  French  Government  and  th 
French  banks  about  the  impending  loan.    In  accordance  with  the 
instructions  received,  I  actively  supported  him,  and  Todoroff  lef^_ 
Paris,  highly  pleased  with  the  results  attained.   .   .   .  ■I 

Todoroff  is  convinced — and  this  conviction  is  shared  by  the  other 
members  of  the  Bulgarian  Government — that  a  speedy  termination 
of  the  ItalO'Turkish  war  is  by  no  means  to  the  interests  of  Bulgaria. 
The  present  struggle  must,  in  the  end,  extremely  weaken  hoik  States, 
and  these  two  States  belong  to  that  group  of  Powers  which  is  opposed, 
on  principle,  to  the  Slavs  and  the  Slav  Balkan  States.  The  leaders  of 
all  political  parties  in  Bulgaria  hold  that  such  an  opportunity  will  not 
recur  for  a  long  time,  and  that,  therefore,  Bulgaria  would  make  an  un- 
pardonable mistake  if  she  did  not  try  to  exploit  it  for  the  attainment 
of  her  historic  aspirations.  From  this  standpoint,  the  Bulgarian 
Government  rejects  the  idea  of  a  conference  to  end  the  Italo-Turk- 
ish  conflict  in  its  present  stage.  A  conference  will  become  neces- 
sary, but  not  until  events  will  have  developed  further  and  until  ques- 
tions will  have  arisen  the  settlement  of  which  depends  on  Europe.  This 
attitude  of  Bulgaria  towards  the  war  must  not,  Todoroff  says,  cause  any 
apprehensions  in  Russia.  Geshoff's  Government  is  strong  enough  to 
continue  in  its  attitude  of  waiting  until  the  opportune  moment  will 
arise.  The  Bulgarian  Government  considers  it  to  be  its  immediate  task 
to  settle  upon  a  plan  of  joint  action  with  the  other  Balkan  States.  The 
alliance  with  Serbia  is  the  first  favourable  step  in  this  direction.  Now 
every  effort  must  be  made  to  induce  Roumania  not  to  oppose  Bulgarians 
advance  to  the  south,  and  Todoroff  believes  this  to  be  possible  at  the 
price  of  a  modification  of  the  frontier  near  Silistria.^ 

Negotiations  with  Greece  are  now  at  last  in  progress,  which  will, 
in  all  probability,  lead  to  a  community  of  interests  being  established  be- 
tween Bulgaria  and  Greece.  The  Bulgarian  Government  is  firmly 
resolved  not  to  attempt  to  draw  the  Russian  Government  into  any 
active  steps  against  its  will,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  Russia  mt 
leave  Bulgaria  a  free  hand  to  make  this  or  that  decision,  according  ti 


*A  part  of  the  Bulgarian  Dobrudja  was  to  be  ceded  to  Rumania  for  noi 
interference. 


THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE  AND  THE  POWERS        347 

the  course  of  events,  the  possibility  of  a  joint  action  with  Italy  not  be- 
ing excluded,  the  latter  having,  it  is  alleged,  already  thrown  out  hints  in 
that  direction. 

Bulgaria  admits  Constantinople  and  the  Straits  to  be  the  special  sphere 
of  Russian  interests,  and  reckons  with  the  possibility  of  our  holding 
aloof  until  these  interests  are  involved.  This  would  even  be  to  the  ad- 
vantage of  Bulgaria  in  so  far  as  Russians  attitude  of  reserve  would  pre- 
vent Austria  from  interfering,  and  the  general  liquidation  will  then  be 
conducted  by  Europe,  probably  at  a  congress  or  a  conference,  in  which 
case  Russia  would  be  supported,  not  only  by  France  and  England  but 

also  by  Italy} 

On  my  enquiring  what  King  Ferdinand  thought  of  this  plan, 
Todoroff  replied  that  of  late  the  King  understood  the  real  historic 
mission  of  Bulgaria  and  was  totally  in  agreement  with  his  people  and 
his  Government.  His  consent  to  the  Bulgaro-Serbian  alliance  was  a 
proof  of  this.  On  the  other  hand,  we  must  keep  in  view  the  fact  that 
at  the  critical  moment  he  will  grasp  any  hand  that  offers  him  help.^ 


(407)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Letter,  June  7-20,  1912. 

Poincare  has  spoken  to  me  about  the  visits  of  the  King  of  Bul- 
garia to  Vienna  and  Berlin  and  expressed  his  concern  as  to  the  ob- 
ject and  the  character  of  these  visits.  The  honours  accorded  the 
King  have  surprised  him,  and  he  cannot  help  but  suspect  that  they 
point  to  some  secret  obligations  undertaken  by  King  Ferdinand  to- 
wards Austria  and  Germany. 

''You  know,''  he  said,  ''that  the  French  Government  has  been  willing 
to  facilitate  the  Bulgarian  loan  at  Paris  only  because  the  Russian  Gov- 
ernment has  declared  that  Bulgaria,  after  the  conclusion  of  a  secret  al- 
liance with  Serbia,  was  firmly  resolved  to  side  with  the  three  Entente 
Powers.  In  consideration  of  the  decisive  influence  exerted  by  King 
Ferdinand  on  Bulgarian  policy,  especially  its  foreign  policy,  do 
you  not  think  that,  before  we  put  a  great  deal  of  money  at  Bul- 
garia's disposal,  we  should  make  sure  of  the  King's  real  intentions 
and  should,  in  one  form  or  another,  demand  from  him  a  guarantee 

*An  intrigue  of  a  classical  character. 

'Ferdinand  had  that  habit,  and  his  ministers  were  none  too  loyal,  it  seems. 
Between  Daneff  and  Todoroff  and  their  group,  the  Coburger  had  a  hard  time. 


348 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


that  he  on  his  part  approves  of  the  resolution  of  the  Bulgarian  Gov- 
ernment mentioned  above?" 

Poincare  then  drew  my  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  rumoui 
of  the  signing  of  a  secret  Bulgaro-Serbian  agreement  had  already 
tound  its  way  into  the  press.  He  knows  nothing  of  the  source  of 
these  rumours.  The  "Temps"  states  it  has  received  this  informa- 
tion from  its  St.  Petersburg  correspondent.  Other  papers  assert 
that  a  French  correspondent  had  seen  the  text  of  the  agreement  at 
St.  Petersburg.  The  former  French  Minister  at  Sofia,  Paleologue, 
thinks  this  rumour  has  emanated  from  the  palace  and  is  intended  to 
serve  some  intricate  plans  of  King  Ferdinand. 


n 


(408)    Sazonoif  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.     Telegram,  June 
25'July  8,  1912.    No.  1266. 


I 


No.  1.  We  are  in  receipt  of  information  from  Sofia  regarding 
a  warlike  spirit  which  is  noticeable  in  several  Bulgarian  circles. 
We  are  giving  to  our  Minister  at  Sofia  the  instructions  with  which 
we  acquaint  you  in  No.  2. 


(409) 


Sasonoff  to  the  Russian  Minister  at  Sofia. 
1912. 


Telegram,  June  25'July  8, 


J 


No.  2.  Everything  reported  by  you  will  be  considered  by 
Please  continue  closely  to  watch  the  development  of  the  warlike 
spirit  at  Sofia.  It  appears  desirable,  however,  to  give  the  Bul- 
garians to  understand  that  according  to  strictly  secret  information 
in  our  possession,  immediate  peace  negotiations  between  Italy  and 
Turkey  are  not  precluded.  This  circumstance  would  deprive  any 
Bulgarian  action  of  its  practical  basis  and  would  change  the  pres- 
ent circumstances  very  much  to  Bulgaria's  disadvantage  :^  Bulgaria 
would  find  herself  confronting  Turkey  in  complete  isolation. 


(410)     The  Russian  Minister  at  Sofia  to  Sasonoff. 
1912.    No.  115. 


Telegram,  Sept.  7-20, 


On  my  enquiring  about  the  existence  of  a  Military  Convention  be- 
tween Bulgaria  and  Montenegro,  Geshoff  answered  evasively  that  "the 
Bulgarian  Government  had  received  certain  proposals  from  King  Nico- 

*  Sazonoff  always  resented  the  exercise  of  initiative  by  the  Balkan  states,  these 
being  to  him  mere  appanages  of  Russia. 


THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE  AND  THE  POWERS        349 

las"  hut  that  it  had  not  yet  given  a  definite  answer.  I  am  convinced, 
however,  that  the  Military  Convention  is  prepared  though  not  yet  signed. 
The  spreading  insurrection  of  the  Malissores  is  a  proof  of  the  Bulgari- 
ans having  created  for  themselves  the  possibility  of  intervening  at  the 
shortest  notice. 


(411)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople.     Telegram,  July  7-20, 
1912.    No.  494. 

The  British  Charge  d' Affaires  here  has  been  informed  by  Grey  that 
the  Serbian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Berlin  had  made  warlike  statements  to 
the  German  Undersecretary  of  State,  whereupon  he  had  been  advised 
to  observe  calmness  and  prudence.  I  told  the  British  Charge  d' Affaires 
that  I  had  no  knowledge  of  warlike  intentions  on  the  part  of  Serbia. 


(412)     The  Russian  Minister  at  Belgrade  to  Sasonoff.    Telegram,  July  8-21, 
1912.    iVo.  89. 

I  refer  to  the  telegram  of  our  Ambassador  at  Constantinople 
No.  494. 

The  Serbian  representative  at  Berlin  has  apparently  only  given 
expression  to  his  personal  view  for,  as  is  evident  from  my  reports, 
Serbia  is  absolutely  averse  to  warlike  plans  of  any  kind.  The  best 
proof:  The  King  has  gone  to  Koseilyatsch  for  the  cure;  Pashitch 
has  retained  the  transition  Ministry,  has  gone  to  the  provinces, 
and  will  then  go  to  Marienbad;  the  Prime  Minister  Trifkovitsh  is 
going  to  Germany  for  the  cure  on  Wednesday.^  In  spite  of  all  this, 
however,  I  must  admit  that  a  general  spirit  of  unrest  has  not  been  al- 
layed here,  but,  on  the  contrary,  has  even  increased  as  disquieting  news 
comes  in  from  all  sides.  In  England  the  opinion  seems  to  prevail 
that  a  revolution  and  bloodshed  in  Turkey  are  inevitable.  Infor- 
mation received  from  Bulgarian  and  other  sources  confirms  these 
rumours.  Austria  is  quite  openly  holding  offensive  manoeuvres  near 
Ostrova,  in  the  direction  of  the  Morava,  in  the  region  of  the  Matchva 
and  the  Drina.^  No  doubt,  the  Serbians  will  be  forced  to  take  some 
precautionary  measures  so  as  not  to  be  surprised  by  events  and  to 

*  A  time-honored  ruse  calculated  to  lull  the  victim  into  a  false  sense  of  security. 
'  Along  the  Serbian  border. 


350 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


forestall,  at  least  partly,  serious  political  complications  in  the  Bal- 
kans.^ 


(413)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  July  10-23,  1912.    No.  91. 


J 


The  Serbian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  is  very  much  aston- 
ished at  the  statements  of  the  Serbian  representative  at  Berlin, 
since  there  was  no  reason  for  them.  He  confirmed  everything  I 
telegraphed  to  you  yesterday,  and  added  that  the  Minister  of  War  also 
had  gone  abroad  for  his  health.  Very  disquieting  reports  from  Con- 
stantinople were  received  here  today,  according  to  which  it  is 
planned  to  dethrone  the  Sultan  on  the  anniversary  of  the  10th  of 
July. 


(414) 


The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna  to  Sasonoff. 
29,  1912.    No.  54. 


Telegram,  July  16- 


The  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  positive 
denies  the  correctness  of  the  statements  of  the  Serbian  Consul  at 
Budapest.     So  far,  Austria  has  not  taken  any  military  measures 
proper;  it  is  well  known,  however,  to  what  an  extent  nervousnei 
prevails  at  Belgrade. 


(415)     The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Belgrade  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram, 
Aug.  7-20,  1912.    No.  108. 


The  Serbian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  looks  upon  Austria's 
proposal,  as  far  as  it  refers  to  the  decentralisation  of  Turkish  rule, 
as  a  continuation  of  the  policy  of  Aehrenthal  who  endeavoured  to 
create  an  autonomous  Albania  out  of  the  vilayets  of  Kossovo,  Monastir, 
Yanina  and  Scutari,  all  of  which  feel  themselves  drawn  to  the  four 
neighbouring  States.^  On  that  account  the  latter  cannot  give  their 
assent  to  Berchtold*s  ^  proposal  which  is  opposed  to  their  Albanian 
interests  and  which  is  hardly  likely  to  produce  reassurance.  The 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  expressed  himself  in  that  sense  to 


*  Quite  a  remarkable  document — the  expression  of  a  man  who  was  purposely 
misleading  his  superior.    A  close  analysis  of  it  is  recommended. 

'Not  true.  The  Albanians  had  been  trying  for  years  to  break  away  from 
Turkey  and  set  themselves  up  as  an  autonomous  state,  having  no  intention  to  join 
either  Bulgaria,  Montenegro,  Serbia  or  Greece. 

'  Austro-Himgarian  minister  of  foreign  affairs. 


THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE  AND  THE  POWERS        351 

the  Austrian  Charge  d' Affaires.  He  hopes  to  come  to  an  agree- 
ment with  the  Bulgarians  in  this  question.  Please  send  instruc- 
tions. 

For  the  present  I  confine  myself  to  pointing  out  that  Russia  is  still, 
as  heretofore,  the  protector  of  the  Slavs  ^  as  a  whole  and  is  thoroughly 
acquainted  with  the  interests  and  requirements  of  Serbia  which  she  has 
so  much  at  heart.  The  press  and  public  opinion  express  their  com- 
plete distrust  of  the  alleged  unselfish  intentions  of  Austria  who  by 
her  present  demeanour  proves  anew  that  she  is  interested  in  the 
continuance  of  the  troubles  in  the  Balkans. 


(416)  The  Russian  Minister  at  Belgrade  to  Sazonoff,    Telegram,  Sept.  14- 
27,  1912.    No.  141. 

The  Turkish  mobilisation  is  still  causing  excitement.  Turkey's 
explanation  that  certain  units  had  been  called  to  the  colours  on 
account  of  the  manoeuvres  which  had  already  been  planned  at  an 
earlier  date,  naturally  finds  no  credence,  for  nearly  all  troops  of 
European  Turkey  are  being  concentrated;  this  is  confirmed  from 
various  quarters.  It  was  my  task  to  persuade  the  Government 
here  not  to  hasten  counter-measures.  Pashitch  has  also  adopted  my 
standpoint  and  has  telegraphed  to  the  Bulgarian  Government,  which 
detnanded  an  inmtediate  Serbo-Bulgarian  mobilisation,  to  put  off  the 
beginning  and  the  execution  of  this  measure  as  long  as  possible, 
Serbia  and  Bulgaria  have  apparently  agreed  that  their  general  mobili- 
sation shall  begin  on  September  16,  and  last  until  September  25,  or  26, 
Serbia  using  manoeuvres  as  a  pretext."^  Thus  we  have  20  days  be- 
fore us  in  the  course  of  which  we  may,  perhaps,  be  able  to  force 
Turkey  to  desist  from  mobilisation,  for  once  the  two  armies  stand  / 
opposite  each  other  a  rifie  shot  will  suffice  to  set  the  fire  ablaze. 

(417)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  to  Sazonoff.    Telegram, 
Sept.  17-30,  1912.    No.  731. 

Urgent.    The  Serbian  Minister  here  has  informed  me  that  he 
had  been  instructed  by  Pashitch  to  demand  explanations  from  the 

*  Their  master,  if  possible. 

*A  highly  moral  proceeding,  which  was  coupled  to  an  understanding  with 
Montenegro  to  start  the  ball  rolling.    See  documents  dealing  with  this. 


352 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


Sublime  Porte  regarding  the  calling-up  of  the  reserve  division  of 
Uskub  and  Mitrovitsa;  likewise  to  demand  the  release  of  the  de- 
tained war-material  or  its  return  to  Marseilles.^  The  Serbian  rep- 
resentative has  declared  to  the  Sublime  Porte  that  he  would  wait 
for  an  answer  for  two  days,  whereupon  he  would  leave.^  The 
stipulation  of  a  limit  of  two  days  will  only  increase  the  general_ 
irritation,  considering  the  present  excited  state  of  the  Turks. 


(418)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Sept.  17-30,  1912.    No.  734. 


i 


Concerning  his  negotiations  with  regard  to  the  detained  war 
material,  the  Serbian  representative  gives  me  the  following  infor- 
mation :  In  reply  to  his  protest  and  his  declaration  that  Serbia's  policy 
towards  Turkey  had  remained  friendly,^  the  Turkish  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  said  that,  as  soon  as  the  declarations  of  the  Serbian 
representative  were  repeated  in  writing,  the  war  material  would  be 
allowed  to  pass  through.  On  Saturday  the  Minister  informed  the  Sub- 
lime Porte  that  he  could  not  give  such  a  declaration  in  writing, 
whereupon  the  Turkish  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  asked  him 
once  more  to  apply  by  telegram  to  Pashitch  for  authority  to  give 
such  a  declaration.  So  far,  not  a  word  has  been  said  of  retumin 
the  war  material  to  Marseilles. 


(419)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna  to  Sazonoff.    Confidential  Letter, 
July  4-17,  1912. 


I 


I  have  had  a  long  conversation  with  Berchtold  in  the  course  of 
which  he  took  pains  to  express  his  friendliest  feelings  towards  Rus- 
sia  

The  rumours  of  a  republican  movement  in  the  Balkans  which 
our  Minister  at  Sofia  is  said  to  report,  have  reached  him  too,  but 
Berchtold  hopes  that  these  rumours  are  exaggerated.  Neverthe- 
less, he  looks  upon  the  situation  in  Turkey  and  Albania  as  very 
threatening.     It  will  all  depend  upon  how  far  the  Turkish  army 


*It  will  be  remembered  that  the  Bulgarian  loan  was  raised  in  France. 
'An  ultimatum. 

'  The  arms  were  to  be  used  by  the  Balkan  League  against  Turkey,  there  beii 
no  longer  any  doubt  in  the  minds  of  the  Turks. 


THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE  AND  THE  POWERS        353 

will  remain  loyal  to  the  Sultan  and  not  go  over  to  Albania.  The 
latest  reports  of  the  Austrian  agent  in  Albania  are  alarming. 
Berchtold  thinks  some  influence  should  he  brought  to  hear  on  the  Gov- 
ernments of  Bulgaria  and  Serhia,  in  order  to  deprive  them  of  all  de- 
sire to  interfere;  if  the  fire  were  to  he  set  ablaze,  however,  the  Powers 
would  have  to  try  to  localize  the  fighting  and  to  refrain  from  any  in- 
terference. I  conclude  from  these  words  that  Berchtold  wanted 
to  defend  his  Government  against  the  reproach  of  an  advance  in 
the  Balkans,  as  the  Berlin  Cabinet  has  probably  informed  him  in 
confidence  of  our  apprehensions.  The  Minister  is  leaving  Vienna 
in  a  few  days  but  will  retain  the  management  of  the  Ministry. 


(420)  The  Russian  Acting  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Neratoff,  to  the 
Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Vienna.  Telegram,  Aug.  5-18,  1912. 
No.  1566. 

This  telegram  is  being  communicated  to  the  Russian  Represen- 
tatives at  Paris,  London,  Berlin,  Rome  and  Constantinople. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  has  presented  a  memo- 
randum to  us  in  which  the  Vienna  Cabinet  proposes  to  the  Powers 
to  enter  upon  an  exchange  of  views  as  to  the  situation  in  the  Bal- 
kans. The  Austrian  Government  welcomes  the  intention  of  the  Sub- 
lime Porte  to  concede  certain  privileges  to  the  Albanians,  and  thinks 
the  other  nationalities  of  European  Turkey  ought  to  be  very  satis- 
fied with  this  first  step  towards  administrative  decentralisation, 
because  at  some  time  in  the  future  they  could  demand  the  same 
privileges  for  themselves.  But  Bulgaria,  Greece  and  even  Serbia, 
are  inclined  to  see  in  the  concessions  granted  to  the  Albanians  a  menace 
to  the  interests  of  the  other  nationalities  and  in  Bulgaria  the  feeling 
seems  to  be  such  that  grave  difficulties  might  be  created  to  the  peaceful 
policy  of  Geshoff's  Ministry, 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Government  therefore  proposes,  on  the 
one  hand,  to  support  the  new  direction  of  the  Turkish  internal 
policy,  and,  on  the  other,  to  make  representations  to  the  Balkan 
States  in  order  to  show  them  that  Turkey's  present  policy  is  to 
the  interests  of  the  nationalities  in  Turkey  which  are  related  to 
them,  and  that,  therefore,  they  must  refrain  from  taking  any  steps 
that  might  threaten  peace  in  the  Balkans. 


354 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


In  reply.  Minister  Sazonoff  told  the  Ambassador  that  he  is 
agreed  as  to  such  advice  being  given  at  Constantinople  so  long  as 
there  is  no  question  of  a  too  far-reaching  autonomy;  but  this  ad- 
vice must  not  assume  the  character  of  collective  representations 
because  such  might  not  be  agreeable  to  the  Turkish  Government. 
As  regards  the  steps  to  be  taken  with  the  Balkan  States,  however,  these 
were,  in  our  opinion,  no  longer  of  any  practical  value  since  we  had  al- 
ready advised  calmness  and  prudence;^  under  certain  conditions  they 
might  even  have  the  opposite  effect  by  weakening  the  position  of 
the  Government 


m 


(421)    Neratoff  to  the  Russian  Embassies  at  Paris  and  London.    Telegrani 
Aug.  S-18,  1912.    No.  1564. 

The  Bulgarian  and  Serbian  representatives,  acting  on  instruc- 
tions received  from  their  respective  Governments,  have  asked  us  to 
take  the  initiative  in  securing  for  the  Christian  population  of  Eu- 
ropean Turkey  the  same  privileges  now  obtained  by  the  Albanians 
as  the  result  of  their  negotiations  with  Turkey.  This  request  has 
been  addressed  to  us  on  account  of  the  difficult  position  of  their 
Governments  which  has  been  caused  by  the  excitement  prevail- 
ing in  those  countries.  This  state  of  excitement  would  be  aggra- 
vated if  it  should  appear  that  the  Albanians  had  achieved 
important  results  after  having  taken  up  arms,  while  the  remaining 
nationalities,  yielding  to  the  will  of  the  Powers,  would  be  forced 
to  go  on  living  under  the  former  unbearable  conditions. 

In  view  of  Count  Berchtold's  proposals  we  on  our  part,  think  this 
step  of  Bulgaria  and  Greece  at  St.  Petersburg  cannot  be  allowed  to 
pass  unnoticed.  Although  Count  Berchtold  takes  it  for  granted 
that  the  reforms  in  Albania  will  naturally  be  extended  to  the  other 
nationalities  too,  yet  there  is  ground  for  fearing  that  opinions 
and  good  advice  will  not  suffice  to  bring  about  an  amicable  settle- 
ment. We  think  it  would  be  best  to  fulfil  the  wishes  of  the  Bulgarian 
and  Greek  Governments  to  a  certain  degree.  For  this  purpose,  the 
privileges  granted  to  the  Albanians  should  be  restricted  as  far  as  pos- 
sible,^ and  a  promise  should  be  exacted  from  the  Turkish  Govern- 


'Of  a  sort  promoting  Pan-Slavism. 

'The  Albanians  wanted  national  autonomy. 


THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE  AND  THE  POWERS        355 

ment  to  grant  the  same  privileges  to  the  remaining  nationalities 
too.  The  initiative  with  regard  to  the  latter  point  might  be  left 
to  the  Turks  after  the  Ambassadors  at  Constantinople  will  have 
arrived  at  an  understanding  with  Turkey. 

This,  our  view,  appears  to  us  not  to  be  opposed  to  Berchtold*s 
proposals. 


(422)     The  Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Paris  to  Sasonoff.    Telegram,  Aug. 
10-23,  1912.    No.  152. 

In  reply  to  the  Austrian  proposal,  Poincare  has  addressed  a  tele- 
gram to  the  French  Ambassador  at  Vienna  of  the  following  pur- 
port: France  would  gladly  advise  Turkey  to  extend  the  privileges 
she  is  about  to  grant  to  the  Albanians  also  to  the  other  Christian 
nationalities.  At  present  France  cannot  take  it  upon  herself  to  effect 
a  change  in  the  status  quo.  On  this  condition  she  is  prepared  to  enter 
on  an  exchange  of  views.  She  will,  of  course,  not  adopt  any  decision 
without  having  previously  come  to  an  understanding  with  Russia  and 
England. 


(423)     The  Russian  Charge  d* Affaires  at  Vienna  to  Sasonoff.    Confidential 
Report,  Aug.  2-15,  1912. 

I  did  not  omit  to  ask  Berchtold  as  soon  as  possible  what  his 
views  were  regarding  events  in  the  Balkans.  I  gained  the  impres- 
sion that  he,  no  less  than  we,  wishes  to  localize  the  conflict.  He 
recognizes  the  danger  of  this  conflict  not  only  in  the  last  Monte- 
negrin frontier  incident,  but  in  case  of  events  of  the  nature  of  the 
massacres  at  Kotshan  which  might  cause  active  intervention  on 
the  part  of  Bulgaria.  The  key  to  the  political  situation  lies,  as  far 
as  he  can  see,  at  Constantinople:  if  the  Government  succeeds  in 
holding  out,  there  is  some  hope  of  localizing  the  conflict,  while  it 
is  impossible  to  foresee  the  effects  of  anarchy,  or  even  of  disturb- 
ances lasting  any  length  of  time. 

In  addition  to  the  above  I  beg  to  submit  the  following  con- 
siderations: Although  there  is  undoubtedly  a  restive  military 
party  here,  and  although  Austria  has  taken  preparatory  measures, 
details  of  which  I  am  giving  in  my  report  No.  29,  yet  I  am  con- 


356  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

vinced  that  there  is  no  serious  cause  for  alarm  lest  Austria  be 
following  up  aggressive  aims  at  the  present  juncture.  They  are 
fully  aware  here  of  the  consequences  such  a  policy  might  lead  to:  it 
would  he  the  signal  for  the  European  war.  And  such  a  war  is  too 
dangerous  for  Austria  that  she,  or  any  other  country,  should  con- 
sciously provoke  such  a  catastrophe. 

For  Austria  war  is  perhaps  still  less  desirable  than  for  another 
Great  Power,  considering  her  financial  as  well  as  military  unprepared- 
ness 

In  conclusion  I  beg  to  observe  that  the  general  tone  of  the  local 
press  hardly  appears  to  admit  the  idea  that  the  spirit  of  the  population 
is  of  that  high  tension  which  alone  makes  preparation  for  a  war  of  ag- 
gression possible. 


(424)     The  Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Paris  to  Sazonoff.    Telegram,  Aug 
16-29,  1912. 


Paleologue  ^  tells  me  Georges  Louis  has  telegraphed  that 
rumour  was  circulating  at  St.  Petersburg  according  to  which 
Berchtold  wished  to  propose  a  conference  and  you  had  said  the 
Entente  should  forestall  him.  It  was  your  opinion  that  France 
should  take  the  initiative.  This  idea  evidently  pleased  him  very 
much.  While  I  was  with  Paleologue,  Poincare  was  conferring 
with  the  British  Ambassador  on  this  question. 


(425)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Rome  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram,  Aug.  8- 
21,  1912. 

Bollati  ^  considers  it  a  remarkable  feature  of  the  Austrian  pro- 
posal that  the  Vienna  Cabinet  has  assumed  the  standpoint  of  the 
agreement  of  1910,  viz.,  the  maintaining  of  the  status  quo  and  the 
principle  of  peaceable  development.  While  agreeing,  on  principle, 
to  the  Austrian  proposal,  or  rather  to  its  second  part,  since  the 
first  does  not  concern  Italy,  the  Italian  Government  thinks,  as  we 
do,  that  the  steps  which  Austria  proposes  should  be  taken  in  the 

*Then  attached  to  the  French  foreign  office. 
'  Italian  minister  of  foreign  affairs. 


I 


THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE  AND  THE  POWERS        357 

Balkan  capitals  might  become  dangerous.    In  his  opinion  the  Aus- 
trian initiative  will  remain  a  dead  letter. 

The  representatives  of  the  Balkan  States  called  on  me  today 
and  told  me  their  Governments  were  extremely  disturbed  by  the 
Austrian  proposal.  /  tried  to  reassure  them  by  declaring  that  the  Rus- 
sian Government  reckons  on  their  political  acumen  and  will  hardly 
proffer  new  advice.  The  Bulgarian  Minister  declared  that,  if  Turkey 
refuses  immediately  to  introduce  reforms  in  Macedonia  and  to  ap- 
point a  Christian  governor,  his  Government  will  he  forced  forth- 
with to  declare  war  on  Turkey,  as  otherwise  a  revolution  would  break 
out  in  Bulgaria. 


(426)     The  Russian  Charge  d* Affaires  at  Paris  to  Sazonoff.    Telegram,  Aug, 
\9-Sept.  1,  1912. 

Paleologue  confidentially  informed  me  that  the  British  Gov- 
ernment agreed  to  an  exchange  of  views  among  the  Entente 
Powers,  but  that  it  insisted  that  eventual  steps  should  be  under- 
taken conjointly  by  all  five  Powers.  England  has  in  mind  the 
European  Concert  and  dreads  anything  that  might  produce  rivalry 
among  the  two  groups  of  Powers,  but  fears  above  all  a  renewed 
strain  on  Austro-Russian  relations. 


(427)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  to  Sazonoff.     Confiden- 
tial Letter,  Aug.  16-29,  1912. 

I  need  no  longer  point  to  the  alarming  news  which  reaches 
this  place  from  the  Balkan  States.  Encouraged  by  the  conclusion  of 
secret  alliances,  and  convinced  of  their  superiority,  the  Balkan  States 
have  only  one  idea:  not  to  allow  the  favourable  moment  to  pass,  and  to 
throw  themselves  into  the  fight  as  soon  as  possible.  The  existence  of 
such  plans  has  been  confirmed  under  my  very  eyes,  almost  hourly,  by 
the  ever  increasing  nervousness  of  my  Balkan  colleagues  here. 
All  of  them,  and  chief  among  them  the  Bulgarian  Minister,  con- 
tinually address  the  following  question  to  me: 

"When  will  Russia  at  last  begin  to  act?" 

You  will  admit  such  a  spirit  to  be  dangerous  in  the  extreme. 
Under  these  circumstances  the  slightest  disturbances  at  Constanti- 


358         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

nople  may  lead  to  warlike  complications.  On  the  other  hand  such 
disturbances  are  all  the  more  likely  since  the  battle  of  the  political 
parties  at  Constantinople  has  set  in  anew.  It  is  possible  that  the 
general  tension  will  become  so  great  that  the  Balkan  States  will  no 
longer  ask  themselves  whether  Russia  too  will  move,  and  that  they  will 
take  up  arms  against  her  will.  I  believe  the  coming  of  this  moment 
depends  on  a  mere  chance  rather  than  on  any  predetermined  dates, 
and  we  must,  therefore,  take  our  measures  without  delay.  All  the 
more  so,  since  we,  as  far  as  I  know,  have  no  guarantees  that  the  Bui- 
I  garian  claims  will  be  satisfied  with  the  erection  of  a  Greater  Bulgarian 
j  Empire  within  the  limits  set  out  in  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano,^  Per- 
\  sonally  I  am  of  opinion  that,  given  the  slightest  hope  of  success, 
Bulgarian  aspiration  will  not  turn  to  the  South  but  to  the  East 
against  the  capital  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  I  think  the  fact  of  our 
being  unprepared  will  be  but  a  further  incentive  for  the  Bulgarians 
to  attain  this  long  desired  object,  being,  as  they  are,  convinced 
that  we  have  no  means  of  preventing  them. 

The  possibility  of  our  being  drawn  into  such  inopportune  com- 
plications, as  well  as  the  menace  to  our  historic  ideals,  force  me,  to 
repeat  that  we  must  be  armed,  since  the  events  we  fear  can  only  be 
averted  if  there  exists  no  doubt  in  our  own  mind  as  well  as  in  that  of 
the  Balkan  peoples  that  we  shall  not  permit  ourselves  to  be  surprised  by 
these  events.^ 


(428)     The  Russian  Minister  at  Sofia  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram,  Sept.  7-20, 
1912.    No.lU. 

As  an  armed  action  by  Bulgaria  in  the  near  future,  can  no  longer 
be  averted,  I  take  the  liberty  of  submitting  to  you  the  following 
considerations:  //,  in  our  own  interests,  we  do  not  intend  to  allow 
Varna  and  Burgas  ^  to  be  bombarded  by  the  Turkish  fleet;  Turkish 
troops  to  be  landed  all  along  the  entire  coast  of  Bulgaria;  and 
communication  by  cable  between  Odessa  and  Varna,  and  our  trade  with 
Bulgaria  to  be  interrupted,  then  our  Black  Sea  fleet  will  have  to  be 
ready  to  sail  within  less  than  two  weeks. 

*  Czar  Alexander  II.  Liberator  of  the  Balkan  Slavs,  was  very  fond  of  the  Bul- 
garians and  in  this  sense  influenced  the  said  treaty. 

'  A  case  of  mother  and  daughter  torn  by  the  same  love. 
'  Bulgarian  ports  on  the  Black  Sea. 


THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE  AND  THE  POWERS        359 

I  repeat  the  suggestion  made  in  my  letter  of  August  24th,  that 
Russia  should  declare  she  would  not  allow  any  disturbances  on  the 
zvhole  west  coast  of  the  Black  Sea}  It  is  most  likely  the  Sublime  Porte 
will  yield  and  will  under  stake  not  to  send  its  fleet  to  the  Black  Sea: 
but,  in  order  to  get  that  far,  we  must  let  Turkey  as  well  as  Europe 
know  that  our  fleet  is  ready  to  take  a  landing  force  on  board. 

*  Tying  the  hands  of  the  Turkish  government  in  favor  of  Russia's  Slav  friends, 
who  were  about  to  descend  upon  Turkey.    A  fine  example  of  malevolent  neutrality. 


VII 


THE  CONFLICT  OF  RUSSIAN  AND  BULGARIAN  POLI 

CIES  IN  TURKEY 


(October — November  1912) 


s 


(429) 


The  Russian  Acting  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Neratoff,  to  the 
President  of  the  Ministerial  Council,  Secretary  of  State  Kokowtseff. 
Strictly  Secret  Letter. 


St.  Petersburg,  October  10-23,  1912. 

Some  time  ago,  the  War  Ministry  raised  the  general  question, 
what  tasks  the  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs  might  usefully  allot  t^. 
the  Military  Department  in  view  of  the  general  situation.  fj 

As  this  question  is  intimately  connected  with  the  close  defini- 
tion of  the  general  problems  to  be  solved  by  the  Government,  I 
think  it  is  my  duty  to  submit  to  you  the  following  considerations 
which  the  Foreign  Ministry  would  deem  essential. 

In  the  Balkan  War,  which  has  just  begun,  the  following  two  cir- 
cumstances require  to  be  noted:  First,  the  limited  resources  of  both 
belligerent  parties,  especially  of  the  Balkan  States;  and  secondly,  the 
necessity  of  reckoning  with  the  possible  success  of  the  Balkan  States 
CLs  well  as  of  Turkey. 

These  two  eventualities  must  necessarily  be  kept  in  view  while 
our  immediate  political  tasks  and  our  military  possibilities  are  being 
determined.  It  is  the  aim  of  the  Foreign  Ministry,  as  soon  as  it 
may  appear  feasible,  to  unite  the  Powers  for  the  purpose  of  inter- 
vening in  the  war  after  the  first  decisive  actions,  before  the  oppo- 
nents' strength  will  have  been  exhausted.  The  possibility  of  such  a 
turn  of  the  war  in  the  near  future  must  be  foreseen. 

360 


RUSSO-BULGARIAN  CONFLICT  IN  TURKEY        361 

As  two  different  results  of  the  war  are  within  the  range  of  pos- 
sibility, we  must  consider  two  different  difficulties — both  dangerous 
to  us. 

In  case  the  Balkan  States  should  gain  the  upper  hand,  and  the  in- 
violability of  the  territorial  status  quo  in  Turkey  were  to  be  endangered 
by  the  outcome  of  the  war,  diplomatic  as  well  as  military  proceedings  on 
the  part  of  Austria  and  Roumania  are  not  out  of  the  question.  The  war 
preparations  of  both  States  point  to  this  possibility,  preparations  which 
are  being  silently  and  carefully  made,  to  which  the  reports  of  our  mili- 
tary agents  at  Vienna  and  Bukarest  testify.  Looked  at  from  the  politi- 
cal point  of  view,  it  would  appear  to  be  useful  to  oppose  to  these 
measures  like  measures  on  our  part,  these  to  be  taken  with  the  utmost 
caution  as  silently  as  possible. 

The  War  Ministry  already  reported  at  the  meeting  of  the  Min- 
isterial Council  on  the  4th  inst.,  on  the  decision  arrived  at  by  the 
Military  Department  to  take  such  measures. 

But  the  second  eventuality  must  likewise  be  foreseen,  viz.,  that 
the  Turkish  army  might  gain  the  upper  hand  or  at  any  rate,  that 
Turkey  might  reckon  with  the  war  being  dragged  out,  in  conse- 
quence whereof  the  Balkan  States  would  be  placed  in  a  critical 
position.  It  is  hardly  to  be  assumed  that  Turkey  will  yield  to  more 
diplomatic  pressure  of  the  Powers,  and  will  accept  conditions 
alike  acceptable  to  their  opponents,  quite  apart  from  the  difficulty 
of  uniting  the  Powers  for  conjointly  exerting  any  pressure.^ 

The  representations  of  our  diplomats  will  weigh  in  the  balance,  in 
so  far  as  they  will  be  backed-up  by  actual  power.  It  must  be  borne  in 
mind  as  being  essential  that  we  should  be  in  a  position  to  dispose  of 
such  a  force  at  our  Caucasian  frontier  whenever  necessary,  especially 
considering  that  the  Turks  seem  to  be  shifting  a  part  of  their  troops 
from  our  frontier  to  the  seat  of  war. 

Therefore,  in  order  to  prevent  our  being  surprised  by  events  it 
would,  at  the  moment,  seem  equally  advisable  to  make  careful  but  well- 
planned  preparations  on  our  territory  bordering  on  Turkey,  such  as  the 
above  m^entioned  measures  with  respect  to  Austria  and  Roumania,^ 

*An  obscure  phrase.  It  probably  was  intended  to  read  or  will  accept  condi- 
tions acceptable  to  her  opponents. 

"The  contingency  in  mind  was  joint  action  against  the  Balkan  allies  hy  Tur- 
key, Austria-Hungary  and  Roumania;  the  measures  spoken  of  are  mobilization. 


362 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


I  feel  bound  to  add  that,  while  it  is  extremely  undesirable  that 
any  unnecessary  information  or  noise  should  be  spread  abroad,  it 
appears  still  more  essential  for  our  task  of  guarding  the  interests 
of  Russia  in  maintaining  peace,  that  we  and  our  rivals  should  be  fully 
conscious  of  the  fact  that  our  diplomatic  representations  are  properly 
hacked-up  by  military  force. 

Equally  we  may,  in  all  probability,  reckon  upon  the  actual  support 
of  France  and  England  only  to  such  an  extent  as  those  two  Powers 
shall  be  able  to  count  on  our  preparedness  to  take  risks 


I 


(430)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  the  Russian  Foreign  Ministry. 
Report,  Oct.  10-23,  1912. 

In  pondering  day  and  night  over  the  various  eventualitites 
which  may  come  to  pass,  I  always  return,  in  spite  of  myself,  to  the 
following  three  possibilities :  a  decisive  victory  of  the  Balkan 
States ;  a  like  victory  of  the  Turks ;  a  dragging  out  of  the  war  and, 
consequent  thereon,  disturbances  and  massacres  of  Christians  at 
Constantinople  or  other  places  in  the  Ottoman  Empire. 

The  first  of  these  eventualities,  and  the  one  which,  in  my  opinion, 
is  least  likely  to  come  about,  would,  at  the  same  time  be  the  most 
dangerous  in  its  consequences  for  general  peace;  it  would  push  into  the 
foreground,  in  all  its  historical  significance,  the  question  of  the  fight  of 
the  Slavs  not  only  against  Islam  but  also  against  the  Teutons.  ^  In 
such  a  case  it  will  hardly  be  possible  to  put  one's  faith  in  any  palliative 
measures,  and  it  will  become  necessary  then  to  prepare  for  a  great  and 
decisive  general  European  War. 

Somewhat  less  dangerous,  from  the  general  European  standpoint, 
yet  extremely  troublesome  for  us,  would  be  a  decisive  victory  of  Tur- 
key. Such  a  victory  would  produce  an  enormous  excitement  of  public 
opinion  with  us  and  would  impose  upon  us  the  duty  to  come  to  the 
rescue  of  the  Slav  States. 

While  speaking  of  this,  I  remember  that  at  the  time  of  my 
being  in  charge  of  the  Foreign  Ministry,  the  Military  Convention 
with  Bulgaria  was  discussed  without  its  being  concluded  (whether 
it  has  since  been  concluded  I  do  not  know).     The  Bulgarians  de- 


*That  is  Pan-Slavism  against  Pan-Islamism,  and  Pan-Slavism  against  Pan; 
Germanism. 


RUSSO-BULGARIAN  CONFLICT  IN  TURKEY        363 

dared  that  in  case  of  a  war  with  Turkey  alone  they  would  require  no 
other  help  from  us,  but  that  we  mobilize  the  Caucasian  military  district. 
I  also  remember  that  at  the  end  of  1906  or  at  the  beginning  of  1907,  the 
then  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  General  Palitsyn,  had  on  his  own  initia- 
tive almost  brought  about  a  war  with  Turkey  on  our  Caucasian  frontier. 
He  naively  believed  such  a  "guerilla  war"  could  remain  localized. 
With  the  assistance  of  the  late  Stolypin  I  abruptly  put  a  stop  to 
these  attempts;  in  doing  so  I  chiefly  put  forward  the  argument  that 
any  collision  between  us  and  Turkey,  even  on  the  Caucasian  frontier, 
would  serve  as  a  signal  for  the  attack  of  the  Balkan  States  on  Turkey. 

At  the  present  time,  this  argument  loses  its  point,  and  it  seem^ 
to  me  as  if  we  were  already  bound  to  foresee  that  events  may  in- 
duce us  to  have  recourse  to  the  above  mentioned  remedy  of  exerting 
pressure  on  Turkey,  a  method  which,  while  comparatively  harmless, 
is  at  the  same  time  effective. 

As  I  meet  Poincare  almost  daily,  and  in  confidential  talks  with  him 
touch  upon  the  most  varied  subjects,  I  considered  it  possible  to  moot 
this  question  too,  with  the  express  reservation  that  I  was  merely  ex- 
pressing my  personal  view  and  was  thinking  aloud,  so  to  speak.  At 
first  my  ideas  visibly  startled  him.  In  reply  he  told  me  that  such  a 
onesided  action  on  the  part  of  Russia  would  impair  the  unity  of  action 
of  the  Powers,  and  would  induce  Austria  to  parallel  action.  This 
would,  he  was  convinced,  arouse  great  animosity  against  Russia  in 
England  and  would  lead  to  a  rupture  of  the  Triple  Entente. 

1  replied  that  I  only  had  in  my  mind  the  case  of  a  decisive  suc- 
cess of  Turkey.  Austria  was  not  interested  in  strengthening  the 
Turkish  Empire,  but  only  in  weakening  the  Slav  States;  she 
would,  therefore,  in  the  case  of  a  defeat  of  the  latter,  hardly  seek 
ground  for  interfering,  and  would  probably  remain  inactive  in 
case  of  any  complications  arising  between  us  and  Turkey  in  the 
Asiatic  seat  of  war.  To  Germany  such  complications  which  would 
draw  us  away  from  our  western  frontier  would  only  be  advantageous 
and  desirable.  As  for  England,  it  was  to  her  interests  not  to  allow  any 
collision  between  us  and  Turkey  and  to  act  the  role  of  mediator  and 
peace-maker. 

Today  I  had  an  opportunity  of  convincing  myself  that  my  conversa- 
tion had  not  been  futile  and  that  Poincare's  attitude  towards  my  ideas 
is  one  not  only  of  perfect  calm  but  also  of  a  certain  interestedness  (not 


364 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


to  say  somewhat  sympathetic),  because  it  permitted  it  to  appear  as  if  our 
intervention  were  forced  upon  us,  and  in  that  form  it  would  be  least 
dangerous  to  general  peace.  ^ 

/  hope  you  will  not  reprove  me  for  having  of  my  own  accord 
broached  such  an  important  and  delicate  question  to  Poincare.  It  ap- 
pears to  me  to  be  in  our  favour  if  we  can  convince  him  of  the  inevita- 
bility of  our  active  intervention  which  may,  under  certain  circumstances, 
become  imperative.  If  we  should  abstain  from  such  intervention  we 
shall,  by  doing  so,  earn  the  gratitude  of  France.  If,  however,  the  in- 
tervention becomes  a  fact,  Poincare  will  be  prepared  for  it  and  zvill  be  in 
a  position  to  let  us  enjoy  his  full  diplomatic  co-operation  in  localising 
the  trouble.  I  take  the  liberty  of  remarking  that,  if  we  should  have 
to  decide  on  mobilisation  or  even  only  on  a  transfer  of  our  Cauca- 
sian troops  according  to  the  course  events  may  take,  it  seems  to  me 
that  we  should  notify  Monsieur  Poincare  thereof  in  good  time,  so  that 
he  will  be  able  to  lend  us  adequate  assistance  in  smoothing  the  way  in 
London. 

The  third  eventuality,  that  of  the  war  actions  being  dragged 
out  without  any  decisive  successes  either  on  the  one  or  the  other 
side,  would  appear  to  be  particularly  favourable  to  collective  med- 
iation by  the  Powers,  and  will  probably  relieve  us  of  the  necessity 
of  onesided  active  intervention.  On  the  other  hand,  such  an  eventu- 
ality may  provoke  internal  unrest  and  massacres  of  Christians  in 
Constantinople  or  other  places  in  the  Ottoman  Empire.  It  is  very 
difficult  to  foresee  such  events,  either  as  to  their  extent  or  to  their 
nature,  and  to  predetermine  the  measures  that  may  possibly  appear 
imperative.  I  consider  it  expedient,  however,  to  take  this  oppor- 
tunity of  reminding  you  of  the  negotiations  which  took  place  in 
1896  between  the  Powers  on  the  occasion  of  the  Armenian  mas- 
sacres and  the  disturbances  which  were  expected  in  Constantinople. 

On  the  initiative  of  the  French  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,^ 
Monsieur  Hanotaux,  it  was  proposed  to  concentrate  a  number  of 
warships,  I  think  two  each  of  every  Power,  near  the  Dardanelles. 
The  reply  of  the  Russian  Government  was  handed  to  the  French 
Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  in  the  form  of  a  strictly  secret  mem- 


Indicating  how  far  the  enterprising  Iswolsky  could  take  the  initiative. 
In  1896. 


RUSSO-BULGARIAN  CONFLICT  IN  TURKEY        365 

orandum  and  communicated  to  Baron  Mohrenheim^  at  Paris 
in  strict  secrecy  for  his  personal  information.  Unfortunately,  I  have 
not  been  able  to  find  this  memorandum  in  the  archives  of  the  Em- 
bassy, neither  has  it  so  far  been  found  in  the  French  Foreign  Min- 
istry. I  remember  that,  in  declaring  ourselves  in  agreement  with 
Monsieur  Hanotaux's  proposal,  we  made  a  reservation  with  regard 
to  any  separate  actions  of  our  Black  Sea  Fleet  which  might  appear 
necessary,  including,  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  the  possibility  of  our  occu- 
pying some  points  on  the  Bosporus.^  1  recalled  this  precedent  at  the 
time  of  the  Constantinople  revolution  in  1908  when  disturbances 
were  also  expected  there.  Do  you  believe  that  it  would  be  useful  at 
the  present  juncture  to  recall  this  precedent  to  mind?  In  conversations 
with  me,  Poincare  repeatedly  acknowledged  that  the  possibility 
might  arise  not  only  of  undertaking  purely  diplomatic  actions  under 
certain  circumstances,  but  also  of  arranging  collective  demonstra- 
tions of,  either  all  the  Powers,  or  of  separate  groups.  It  is  most  de- 
sirable that  the  nature  of  such  steps  should  be  settled  beforehand 
and  that  the  Cabinets  be  prepared  in  case  of  any  sudden  emergency 
arising. 

In  mentioning  the  calm  judgment  and  even  a  certain  interest 
which  Poincare  took  in  the  idea  of  the  possibility  of  any  pressure 
being  exerted  by  Russia  on  Turkey  by  mobilizing  or  transferring 
the  troops  in  the  Caucasus,  /  forgot  to  add  that,  nevertheless,  Mon- 
sieur Poincare  very  insistently  urged  the  necessity  of  exhausting  all 
means  of  collecti/ve  influence  of  the  Powers  over  Turkey  in  case  of  the 
latter's  victorious  advance  against  the  Balkan  States,  before  resolving 
upon  such  measures.  In  doing  so  Monsieur  Poincare  said  he  was 
confident  that  such  influence,  if  exerted  as  unanimously  as  the  case 
required,  would  necessarily  prove  effective.  He  also  still  believes 
that  the  Powers  might,  in  case  of  the  Turkish  arms  being  favoured 
by  the  fortunes  of  war,  successfully  continue  to  make  representa- 
tions to  the  Sublime  Porte  in  favour  of  serious  reforms  in  Mace- 
donia. I  did  not  conceal  from  him  that  I  had  but  little  faith  in 
such  a  possibility,  and  that  I  believed  that  none  but  a  Turkey  van- 
quished and  exhausted  would  allow  any  interference  of  the  Powers 
in  this  matter. 

*  Russian  ambassador  at  Paris  at  that  time. 

'In  violation  of  all  Straits  Treaties  then  in  force. 


366  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

(431)     Sasonoff's  report  to  the  Czar  on  his  journey  abroad  in  Sept.'Oct. 
1912.    Extract. 

The  situation  in  the  Balkans  which  has  for  some  time  now  been 
very  unsatisfactory  has  become  further  aggravated  during  my 
absence  abroad.  Accordingly,  all  questions  connected  with  it  have 
become  of  primary  importance  and  have  played  a  most  prominent 
part  in  my  negotiations  with  the  statesmen  of  England,  France  and 
Germany. 

It  was  clear  to  all  of  them,  that  conditions  in  the  Balkans,  if 
allowed  to  develop  uncontrolled,  might  take  so  threatening  a  turn 
that  the  Great  Powers,  too,  would  unavoidably  be  involved  in  ex- 
tremely dangerous  complications.  It  was  equally  clear  that  the 
imminent  danger  could  only  be  averted  by  a  common  and  imme- 
diate influence  being  brought  to  bear  by  all  the  Great  Powers. 

In  this  respect  my  presence  in  the  most  important  European 
Capitals  at  such  a  serious  moment  seemed  extremely  opportune,  as 
personal  exchange  of  views  with  the  leaders  of  the  foreign  policy 
of  England,  France  and  Germany  simplified  and  expedited  those 
negotiations  which  were  aimed  at  the  establishment  of  unity  among 
the  Powers  and  intended  to  render  their  actions  uniform. 

While  still  at  Balmoral,  Poincare  made  known  to  Your  Majesty  the 
proposal  which  contained  4  points  the  acceptance  of  which  should,  ac- 
cording to  the  opinion  of  the  author  of  the  plan,  he  urged  on  Austria 
and  Germany  by  Russia,  France  and  England.  The  third  point  men- 
tioned, which  refers  to  the  possibility  of  coercive  measures  against 
Turkey,  did  not  meet  with  the  approval  of  the  Cabinet  of  St.  James 
which  did  not  even  wish  any  allusion  made  to  such  a  possibility. 

In  the  meantime  our  Ambassador  at  Paris,  acting  on  my  instruc- 
tions, succeeded  in  making  it  clear  to  Poincare  that  the  key  to  the 
situation  was  to  be  found  at  Vienna,  as  any  action  of  the  other 
Powers  would  remain  ineffective,  if  Austria  were  not  to  join  the 
Powers  for  the  purpose  of  amicably  settling  the  disturbances  and 
if  she  were  to  undertake  any  onesided  steps,  so  that  we  ourselves 
might  be  forced  to  abandon  the  policy  of  non-intervention  to  which 
we  honestly  wish  to  adhere.  In  view  of  these  circumstances,  the 
French  Government  presented  a  new  proposal,  according  to  which 
the  Powers  were  to  depute  Russia  and  Austria — these  being  the 
States  most  interested  in  the  maintenance  of  order  in  the  Balkan 


1 


RUSSO-BULGARIAN  CONFLICT  IN  TURKEY        367 

to  make,  on  behalf  of  the  Great  Powers,  declarations  in  the  Balkan 
capitals,  with  the  object  of  preventing  the  outbreak  of  hostilities. 
This  proposal  was,  as  is  well  known  to  Your  Majesty,  accepted  by 
all,  with  the  amendment  proposed  by  England,  according  to  which 
an  adequate  declaration  should  be  made  at  Constantinople  by  the 
representatives  of  all  the  five  Great  Powers. 

Before  the  answer  arrived  from  Vienna  I,  for  my  part,  availed 
myself  of  a  meeting  with  the  Austrian  Ambassador,  on  my  return 
journey  in  London,  to  ask  him  to  draw  his  Government's  attention 
to  the  fact  that  we  attach  the  greatest  importance  to  Austria's  co- 
operation with  the  other  Powers  at  the  present  disquieting  moment. 
In  doing  so  I  gave  Count  Mensdorff  to  understand  that  the  *'sine  qua 
non"  for  Russia's  non-interference  in  the  Balkan  troubles  was  a  like 
attitude  on  the  part  of  Austria-Hungary.  As  regards  Poincare's  pro- 
posal, concerning  a  joint  action  of  Russia  and  Austria  on  behalf  of 
the  remaining  Powers,  I  am  inclined  to  observe  towards  it  a  sympa- 
thetic attitude,  since  the  proposal,  to  a  certain  degree,  restrains  Aus- 
tria's freedom  of  action  and  affords  us  at  the  same  time  an  occasion  for 
a  lively  exchange  of  views  with  the  Vienna  Cabinet  without  the  initia- 
tive coming  from  us. 

During  my  three  days'  stay  at  Paris,  the  Balkan  affairs  were 
matter  of  the  deepest  concern  to  the  European  Cabinets,  and 
formed  the  major  part  of  my  negotiations  with  Poincare. 

After  the  French  Foreign  Minister  had  consulted  with  me,  he 
worked  out  the  formula  for  the  declaration  to  be  made  in  the  Balkan 
Capitals  and  tried  to  obtain  the  consent  of  the  Powers  as  quickly 
as  possible. 

Whilst  I  received  the  representatives  of  the  Sublime  Porte  and 
of  the  Balkan  States  in  London,  Paris,  and  Berlin  I  strongly  advised 
them  to  be  reasonable.  At  Paris,  Poincare  and  I  once  even  received 
the  representatives  of  Bulgaria,  Serbia  and  Greece  together,  in 
order  thus  to  lend  more  weight  to  our  representations. 

I  repeatedly  pointed  out  to  the  Turkish  Ambassador  in  London, 
Tewfik  Pasha,  that  it  was  desirable  for  the  Sublime  Porte  to  con- 
clude peaca  with  Italy  because  there  was  hope  that  that  would 
moderate  the  zeal  of  the  remaining  opponents  of  the  Sublime  Porte 
and  thus  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  might  be  prevented.  As  a  mat- 
ter of  fact,  the  effect  of  the  Italo-Turkish  war  was  favouring  the 


368 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


Balkan  peoples  in  their  endeavour  to  solve  their  chronic  quarrels  by 
force  of  arms,  and  I  heard  much  regret  that  the  Powers  had  at 
that  time  not  paid  sufficient  heed  to  Russia's  appeal  to  make  an 
end  of  the  war  in  Tripoli,  before  the  conflagration  in  the  Balkans 
began. 

The  successive  negotiations  in  England,  Paris,  and  Berlin  which 
were  occasioned  by  the  circumstances  explained,  enable  me  to 
form  a  fairly  clear  conception,  based  on  personal  impressions,  of  the 
varied  attitudes  of  the  three  Great  Powers  in  the  Balkan  question. 

All  actions  of  England  are,  at  present,  dominated  by  one  para- 
mount anxiety,  viz.;  not  to  draw  upon  herself  the  anger  of  the  Mussul- 
man world,  so  that  she  might  rely  upon  the  Mohammedan  part  of  the 
Indian  population  for  the  necessary  security  of  British  rule.  ^  Hence 
the  seeming  indifference  towards  the  fate  of  the  Christians  living  under 
the  sway  of  Turkey,"^  which  is  contrary  to  England's  former  attitude; 
hence  the  irresolute  policy  in  Persia  and  Central- Asia. 

Apart  from  this,  England  is  guided  by  the  desire  not  to  weaken  the 
present  Ottoman  Government  in  which  the  Anglophile,  Kiamil  Pasha, 
is  playing  an  important  role,  as  well  as  to  prevent  the  Young  Turks 
with  Ferid  Pasha  from  coming  into  power, — the  latter  being  a  friend 
of  Germany. 

These  considerations  make  it  clear  why  England,  in  spite  of 
every  wish  to  contribute,  together  with  the  other  Powers,  towards 
the  pacification  of  the  Balkans,  has,  nevertheless,  often  been  detri- 
mental to  the  common  cause  by  hesitating  to  consent  to  this  or  that 
measure,  for  fear  of  the  impression  it  might  make  at  Constanti- 
nople. 

In  considering  the  above  one  may  positively  assert  that  it  would  be 
impossible  to  rely  on  England's  support  once  further  complications 
were  to  call  for  any  energetic  pressure  on  the  Sublime  Porte.  ^ 

In  France,  the  complications  in  the  Balkans  have  aroused  anx- 
ieties of  a  twofold  nature  by  which  the  conduct  of  our  Ally  in  the 
present  events  has  been  governed. 


*  In  India;  which  depends  mainly  upon  factional  strife  between  Mohammedan 
and  Hindoo. 

*In  which  Russia  took  interest  only  because  thev  were  Slavs  of  the  Greek 
Orthodox  faith,  so  far  as  the  Balkans  were  concerned,  or  were  Armenians  whose 
hostility  toward  the  Ottoman  government  promoted  Russia's  "historic  mission." 

"A  wise  conclusion. 


RUSSO-BULGARIAN  CONFLICT  IN  TURKEY        369 

First,  France  is  troubled  by  the  idea  that  events  in  the  Balkans 
might  in  one  way  or  another  cause  the  intervention  of  the  most- 
interested  Powers,  viz.,  Russia  and  Austria,  thereby  in  turn  impli- 
cating France  in  the  war.  It  was  fear  of  that  nature  which  especially 
moved  Monsieur  Poincare  to  remind  us  last  summer  in  a  perfectly 
friendly  and  confidential  manner,  that,  according  to  the  letter  of  the 
Treaty  of  Alliance,  only  an  attack  by  Germany  upon  Russia  constituted 
a  case  for  putting  France's  obligations  towards  us  into  effect.^ 

Secondly,  France  has  invested  considerable  capital  in  various 
undertakings  in  the  Balkans  and,  consequently,  she  cannot  be  an 
indifferent  spectator  of  the  disturbances  which  are  brewing  there 
and  through  which  she  is  liable  to  sustain  material  losses. 

It  is  for  these  reasons  that  the  French  Government  is  striving 
so  strenuously  for  a  peaceable  solution  of  the  collisions  which  have 
taken  place,  and  has  taken  the  initiative  in  a  number  of  proposals 
which  are  aimed  at  this  object. 

At  Berlin,  I  was  enabled  to  establish  the  fact  that,  on  the  whole, 
Germany  is  but  little  concerned  at  the  war  of  the  Balkan  States,  but 
following  the  example  of  France,  Germany  dreads  being  implicated  in 
a  European  war  as  a  consequence  of  her  treaty  obligations,  and  in  case 
war  in  the  Balkans  should  be  inevitable,  she  is  ready  to  do  anything  to 
localise  such  a  war.  From  this  viewpoint,  Poincare' s  proposal  to  depute 
Russia  and  Austria  to  announce  the  will  of  Europe  at  Sofia,  Belgrade, 
Cettinje  and  Athens  was  sympathetically  received  at  Berlin,  all  the  more 
so  because  there  evidently  exists  at  the  present  moment  some  doubt  as 
to  the  inclination  of  the  Vienna  Cabinet  to  listen  to  the  advice  given  it 
by  its  northern  Ally,  and  the  Germans,  therefore,  prefer  not  to  put  their 
influence  at  Vienna  to  the  test,  being  afraid  they  will  no  longer  meet 
with  the  former  obedient  attention  there.  It  seems  to  me  that 
this  state  of  affairs  is,  to  a  certain  degree,  explained  by  the  fact  that 
Austria  is  not  averse  to  accentuating  her  independence  of  Germany, 
profiting,  as  she  does,  by  Germany  being  obliged  to  adhere  to  the  al- 
liance with  Austria  and  being  afraid  of  standing  isolated  among  all  the 
Great  Powers.^ 

*The  casus  foederis:  a  strong  reminder. 

*  A  very  able  estimate  of  the  case.  Sazonoff  contradicts  here  the  many  state- 
ments of  an  opposite  meaning  he  made  during  the  European  War.  Germany 
was  obliged  to  either  back  up  Austria-Hungary  or  stand  alone— what  that  would 
have  meant  these  documents  show  very  clearly. 

24 


370  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

At  any  rate,  they  have  repeatedly  assured  me  at  Berlin  of  their 
being  prepared  beforehand  to  approve  of  any  measures  upon  whic^_ 
Kussia  and  Austria  had  agreed.  ff 

The  same  shades  in  the  attitude  of  the  above-mentioned  Powers, 
towards  the  general  situation  in  the  Balkans,  may  also  be  observed 
in  their  views  of  the  separate  questions  connected  with  the  Near 
]East. 


(432)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram,  Oct. 
8-21,  1912.    No.  267. 


Personal.    Very  confidential. 

War  and  the  possibility  of  complications  are  dreaded  here  more 
and  more;  one  has  but  little  faith  in  the  program  which  has  been 
limited  by  Poincare*s  formulas.  Attention  turns  towards  the  ques- 
tion of  Austro-Russian  relations.  The  opinion  gains  ground  more 
and  more  that,  if  an  agreement  could  be  arrived  at  between  Vienna 
and  ourselves,  it  would  be  received  with  satisfaction  in  all  quarters. 
The  part  played  by  the  most  interested  Powers  would  be  acknowl- 
edged as  being  fully  justified  and,  furthermore,  the  co-operation  of 
Russia  with  Austria  would  offer  an  absolute  guarantee  of  disinter- 
estedness, which  might  perhaps  be  the  only  means  of  frustrating 
attempts  at  sowing  dissension.  The  complete  confidence  of  the  Brit- 
ish Government  in  ours  would  not  suffice.  Nevertheless,  this  confidence 
is  so  great  that  any  Russian  initiative  in  the  direction  alluded  to  would 
meet  with  the  active  support  of  England.  ^  Perhaps  such  an  initiative 
might  be  substituted  for  the  French  program  in  the  following  man- 
ner :  Russia  and  Austria  would  receive  a  new  mandate  from  Europe 
for  intervening  with  the  Balkan  States  at  the  opportune  moment, 
and  this  step  would  promptly  be  supported  at  Constantinople  by  all 
the  Powers.  The  basis  for  the  peace  conditions,  which  should  be 
communicated  to  the  belligerents  at  the  moment  of  intervention, 
would  be  about  as  follows : 

The  complete  integrity  of  Turkey  in  the  City  and  District  of 
Constantinople. 

Nominal  Turkish  sovereignty  in  all  the  remaining  provinces  of 
European  Turkey. 

*Too  optimistic  a  statement 


I 


RUSSO-BULGARIAN  CONFLICT  IN  TURKEY        371 

Introduction  of  organic  reforms  under  the  joint  control  and 
guarantee  of  the  Great  Powers. 

No  territorial  modifications  for  the  belligerents.  ^ 

This  plan  has,  in  my  opinion,  the  following  advantages;  Rus- 
sia's real  interests  will  be  protected ;  her  international  prestige  and 
her  future  authority  will  be  strengthened ;  a  guarantee  for  the  main- 
tenance of  peace  between  Russia  and  Austria;  all  intrigues  which 
poison  the  present  situation  will  be  frustrated ;  finally,  a  much  more 
effectual  and  more  expedite  program  than  that  of  the  French. 

/  am  not  in  a  position  to  judge  zuhether  so  definite  an  agreement  be- 
tween ourselves  and  Austria  is  feasible.  The  present  attitude  of  Austria 
however  seems  favourable  to  it,  especially  if  the  word  autonomy  be  not 
uttered.  ^  Neither  do  I  know  whether  difficulties  of  quite  another 
nature  would  be  created  in  Russia,  but  I  believe  England's  support 
would  be  assured  to  you.    I  have  good  grounds  for  assuring  that. 

In  order  not  to  hurt  the  feelings  of  the  French,  I  think  it  would 
be  correct  first  to  consult  Grey  in  strict  confidence.  If  this  meets 
with  your  approval,  I  myself  can  do  so  personally.  We  can  be 
sure  of  his  maintaining  silence.    Kindly  reply. 


(433)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Oct.  8-21,  1912.    No.  268. 

/  told  Nicolson  at  the  time,  in  strict  confidence,  of  the  conclusion  of 
the  Serbo-Bulgarian  Alliance.  Nicolson  was  already  aware  of  it,  prob- 
ably through  the  Paris  Cabinet.  At  that  time  he  considered  this  Con- 
vention to  be  aimed  against  the  possibility  of  an  Austrian  aggres- 
sion. He  made  no  further  comment  and  only  said  that  he  had  no 
faith  in  the  discretion  of  King  Ferdinand  and  would  not  be  sur- 
prised if  the  latter  were  secretly  to  send  some  kind  of  information 
about  this  subject  to  the  Vienna  Cabinet. 


(434)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Oct.  8-21,  1912.    No.  269. 

Grey  gave  me  Buchanan's  telegram  to  read,  in  which  the  latter 
reports  his  interview  with  you  of  the  5th-18th.  You  drew  the  atten- 

*The  Balkan  Allies  and  Turkey. 

'  In  regard  to  Albania,  upon  which  Austria-Hungary  insisted. 


372  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

tion  to  the  necessity  of  the  Powers,  above  all  Russia,  England,  and 
France,  coming  to  as  definite  an  understanding  as  possible  upon 
those  proposals  which  might,  when  some  favourable  opportunity 
presents  itself,  form  the  basis  of  an  intervention.  Grey  entirely 
shares  your  view.  He  does  not  wish  to  enter  further  upon  these 
proposals  today  and  wishes  to  say  only  this : 

It  is  his  opinion  that,  in  any  case,  even  if  Turkey  should  win  a 
decisive  victory,  the  order  of  things  in  the  Turkish  provinces  inhab- 
ited by  Christians  must  be  fundamentally  changed ;  that  radical  re- 
forms with  the  direct  co-operation  of  the  Powers  have  become 
imperative;  if  this  should  hurt  the  national  pride  of  the  Turks, 
there  was  no  other  way  than  to  maintain,  as  far  as  possible,  a 
purely  nominal  Turkish  sovereignty ;  he  was  in  favour  of  the  main- 
tenance of  the  territorial  status  quo ;  and,  lastly,  Turkey  should  on 
no  account  be  allowed  to  gain  any  advantage. 

Grey  has  certain  doubts  regarding  Crete.  He  thinks  the  fate  of 
this  island  should  be  determined  by  all  the  Great  Powers  in  concert, 
including  Turkey.  Personally  he  would  only  oppose  the  annexation 
of  Crete  by  some  other  Great  Power ;  the  same  applies  also  to  the 
Greek  islands  which  were  occupied  by  Italy.  Here  I  interjected 
that  surely  I  was  right  in  assuming  that  England  herself  had  not 
cast  her  eyes  on  those  islands?    In  reply  Grey  said  to  me: 

"By  no  means,"  and  added  that  the  words  ascribed  to  Cart- 
wright  ^  were  a  pure  invention.  I  confidentially  asked  Grey  whether 
he  was  opposed  to  these  islands  being  simply  annexed  by  Greece? 
He  replied  he  would  raise  no  objections  if  the  Powers  gave  their 
consent. 

(435)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Oct.  8-21,  1912.    No.  270. 

I  refer  to  telegram  No.  269. 

Grey,  thereupon,  continued  the  discussion,  quite  confidentially, 
and  said  he  had  heard  to  his  regret  that  the  Russian  press  accused  him 
of  obstructing  the  Russian  policy  in  Turkey  in  order  to  spare  the  feel- 
ings of  the  Mohammedans.^  Grey  told  me  he  considered  these  re- 
proaches unjustified,  and  that  it  was  only  in  connection  with  Persia, 

*  British  ambassador  at  Vienna. 

'Which  was  perfectly  true,  and  sound  politics. 


RUSSO-BULGARIAN  CONFLICT  IN  TURKEY        373 

on  the  occasions  of  such  incidents  as,  for  example,  that  in  Meshed, 
that  he  had  pointed  out  that  England  considered  it  important  to 
spare  these  feelings.  What  he  had  just  told  me  with  reference  to  the 
outcome  of  this  war,  in  so  far  as  Turkey  was  concerned,  was  surely 
a  proof  that  the  consideration,  paid  to  these  feelings,  played  only 
a  very  subordinate  part.  He  hopes  the  Russian  Government  will,  in 
return,  make  things  easy  for  him  in  Persia,  because  the  Turkish  ques- 
tion will  certainly  cause  him  difficulties;  however,  these  would  certainly 
have  no  effect  on  England's  attitude. 

The  entire  conversation  with  Grey  proves  that  he  has  completely 
veered  round  in  his  opinions,  in  the  interests  of  the  maintenance  of  the 
Entente,  and  that  he  is  resolved,  for  the  sake  of  the  Entente,  to  grant 
far  greater  concessions  at  the  cost  of  Turkey  than  he  was  prepared  to 
grant  hitherto.  I  look  upon  this  discussion  with  Grey  as  very  important. 


(436)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Letter,  Oct.  9-22,  1912. 

Yesterday,  I  sent  you  several  telegrams  of  special  importance, 
particularly  one  in  which  Grey  accepts  your  proposal  with  refer- 
ence to  an  immediate  exchange  of  views.  I  thereupon  asked  him 
whether  he  had  any  proposals  to  make. 

Grey  spoke  first  of  the  reproach  levelled  against  him  as  to  his 
being  too  considerate  of  the  Caliph.  Then  he  discussed  those 
points  which  have  been  established  at  Paris :  The  Sultan's  remain- 
ing at  Constantinople,  reforms,  territorial  integrity. 

He  said  nothing  with  regard  to  the  first  point.  His  silence,  how- 
ever, leads  me  to  assume  that  he  upholds  it.  His  remarks  as  to  the 
reforms  were  particularly  exhaustive.  He  desires  them  to  be  very 
radical ;  under  the  control  and  guarantee  of  the  Powers ;  not  even  a 
definite  victory  should  be  permitted  to  bring  any  advantage  to  Turkey. 
I  do  not  wish  to  draw  any  premature  conclusions  regarding  the  third 
point,  concerning  the  question  of  integrity.  Grey  had  already  excluded 
territorial  gains  in  Turkey's  favour;  in  a  reversed  sense  he  seemed  to  be 
less  positive.    That  is  all  I  can  say. 

As  regards  the  nominal  Turkish  sovereignty,  his  words  mean 
that  he  would  concede  a  minimum:  "So  many  forms  of  Turkish 
sovereignty  have  already  been  found,  that  it  ought  to  be  easy  to 
come  to  an  understanding."     As  you  see,  he  has  not  really  added 


374  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

anything  but  he  has  circumscribed  the  question  in  a  pro-Slav,  or  rather 
pro-Christian  sense  and  cleared  the  whole  situation. 

This  would  have  been  significant  in  any  case;  but  it  is  so  all  the 
more  because  Grey*s  standpoint  was  thoroughly  considered.  I 
have  heard  a  good  deal  about  the  mental  work  done  within  the 
Cabinet.  Nicolson's  influence  and  astute  intelligence  have  largely 
contributed  to  it;  probably  also  this  or  that  letter  from  Buchanan;^ 
some  people  likewise  assert,  without  my  being  certain  thereof, — 
the  King. 

You  can  easily  imagine  that  I  did  not  assume  the  role  of  counsel 
for  the  defence  of  the  Russian  press  before  the  Foreign  Office.  I 
have,  nevertheless,  answered  in  the  affirmative  to  the  oft  repeated 
question,  addressed  to  me  in  Parliamentary  circles :  "Is  there  really  a 
strong  current  in  Russia,  stronger  than  was  expected?"  I  have 
clearly  seen  that  the  following  dilemma  must  be  settled : 

A  further  sparing  of  the  feelings  of  the  Caliph  to  a  degree  incon- 
sistent with  the  Entente  with  Russia;  or,  on  the  other  hand,  an 
upholding  of  the  Entente  and  only  a  minimum  of  regard  for  the 
Caliph,  i.e.,  the  Sultan's  remaining  at  Constantinople. 

The  Entente  has  carried  off  the  victory. 

I  knew  this  before  my  interview  with  Grey,  and  it  was  for  this 
reason  that  I  sent  you  my  confidential  telegram  No.  267. 

I  am  grateful  to  Grey  for  having  taken  a  definite  stand  today 
while  the  fight  within  his  own  party  is  still  going  on,  and  while  the 
Sultan's  cause  still  enjoys  strong  sympathies.  This  evolution  of 
Grey's  reveals  courage. 

In  conclusion :  As  long  as  the  Sultan  remains  at  Constantinople, 
Grey  will  agree  to  everything  calculated  to  maintain  the  peace. 
Consequently,  any  solution  acceptable  to  us  and  to  Austria  will 
be  also  acceptable  to  him.  But  he  has  no  sympathy  with  the  Aus- 
trian plans  in  the  Balkans ;  thus,  our  program,  and  not  that  of  Aus- 
tria— if  there  be  such  a  program — will  be  supported  by  him,  to  the 
extent  just  outlined  and  in  the  interests  of  the  Entente.^ 

Now,  what  is  chiefly  occupying  my  mind  is,  above  all  things, 
this  question :  Will  it  be  possible  for  us  to  come  to  an  understand- 

*  British  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg. 

*  The  documents  show  that  Benckendorfif  mistook  his  man,  especially  in  the 
important  matter  of  getting  a  seaport  for  the  Serbs  on  the  Adriatic. 


RUSSO-BULGARIAN  CONFLICT  IN  TURKEY        375 

ing  with  Austria  as  to  radical  and  lasting  reforms?  One  can  now 
foresee  that  certain  reforms  will  obstruct  Austria's  path  still  more 
than  would  a  Greater  Serbia.  /  say  Austria,  for  I  really  do  not  see  any 
other  danger,  because  it  appears  to  me  proved  that  no  other  Power 
could  desire  war. 

If,  from  a  personal  point  of  view,  the  result  of  your  visit  has 
been  most  satisfactory  to  Grey  and  yourself,  matters  are  not  quite 
so  propitious  between  Paris  and  London.  No  special  significance 
attaches  to  this  but  things  are  not  as  they  should  be.  I  do  not 
know  Paleologue.  He  is  not  particularly  well-liked  here,  and  an 
important  role  is  ascribed  to  him. 

Lichnowsky*s  ^  appointment  has  been  well  received. 

(437)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Oct.  11-24,  1912.    No.  275. 

Confidential.  Cambon  informs  me  that  Nicolson  had  expressed 
his  view  to  the  effect  that  one  of  the  Great  Powers  must  work  out 
a  schedule  of  reforms,  and  even  if  it  were  not  complete  it  should, 
nevertheless,  be  well  defined  in  its  main  points  so  that  it  might  be 
proposed  to  the  other  Powers.  Nicolson  thinks  Russia  would  be  the 
proper  Power  for  this,  and  it  would  be  best  if  Russia  were  to  come  to 
an  understanding  with  Austria  before  submitting  her  proposals  to  the 
other  Powers. 

It  is  my  impression  that  formulas  that  are  being  continually 
supplemented  are  not  looked  upon  as  practicable  here. 


(438)    Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.    Telegram,  Oct.  11- 
24,  1912.    No.  2314. 

Your  telegram  No.  267  received. 

We  consider  the  basic  principles  referred  to  therein  to  be  per- 
fectly acceptable  and  have  communicated  them  to  Paris  for  an  edi- 
torial revision.  We  should  think  it  possible  to  omit  any  mention 
of  the  guarantee  of  the  reforms  by  the  Powers  since  the  idea  of  a 
conference  also  implies  a  guarantee.  We  intend  simultaneously  to 
occupy  ourselves  with  working  out  a  concrete  program  of  reforms 
which  would  be  at  our  disposal  at  any  time  even  supposing  con- 

*Grerman  ambassador  at  London. 


376  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

siderable  modifications  would  have  to  be  made  in  it  in  accordance 
with  the  events  of  the  war. 

We  should  like  to  know  whether  the  basic  principles  mentioned 
by  you  were  formulated  by  Grey  or  whether  they  resulted  from  your 
general  observations  on  the  spot.  We  draw  your  attention  to  the 
fact  that  a  joint  action  of  Russia  with  Austria  alone  cannot  take  place 
under  any  circumstances,  even  if  it  should  he  taken  in  the  name  of  all 
the  other  Powers.  The  improvement  in  our  relations  to  Vienna  has 
enabled  us  to  localize  the  war,  but  in  the  matter  of  positive  prob- 
lems connected  with  the  intervention  as  well  as  with  the  liquida- 
tion of  the  war,  we  count  upon  the  closest  possible  understanding 
with  France,  England  and  Italy. 

(439)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram,  Oct. 
15-28,  1912.    No.  282. 

Referring  to  your  program  of  reforms,  Nicolson  told  me  yester- 
day that,  if  the  success  of  the  Allies  continues  and  develops  yet 
further,  your  plan  would  very  likely  no  longer  accord  with  the 
new  conditions.  He  reiterated  his  personal  opinion  that  it  would 
be  difficult  to  uphold  the  principle  of  territorial  integrity.  He  re- 
ferred to  the  opinion  expressed  in  nearly  the  whole  of  the  English 
press.  I  assured  him  you  had  reserved  for  yourself  the  freedom 
of  modifying  the  program  in  accordance  with  the  requirements  of 
the  moment  and  that,  therefore,  territorial  acquisitions  in  favour  of 
the  Allies  ^  were  not  precluded. 

I  think  Nicolson's  words  reflect  the  views  of  the  British  Gov- 
ernment. I  can  only  confirm  what  Nicolson  said  about  the  Eng- 
lish press.  The  evolution  is  as  sudden  as  it  is  evident.  In  military 
circles,  however,  the  possibility  of  a  Turkish  army,  concentrated 
near  Constantinople,  being  able  to  bring  about  a  change  in 
the  situation,  is  not  wholly  precluded — if  only  this  army  be  not 
completely  demoralised. 

(440)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Oct.  16-29,  1912.    No.  283. 

My  conversation  with  Nicolson  to-day  again  referred  to  your 
program  of  reforms.    I  asked  him  if  he  was  acquainted  with  it.    He 

*  Bulgaria,  Serbia,  Greece  and  Montenegro.    This  statement  was  not  in  accord 
with  what  the  documents  reveal. 


RUSSO-BULGARIAN  CONFLICT  IN  TURKEY        377 

replied — ^not  entirely.  I  considered  it  necessary  to  communicate 
to  him  the  contents  of  your  telegram  No.  2358.  Nicolson's  reply 
was  about  the  same  as  yesterday;  he  showed  particular  interest 
when  I  described  to  him  the  zone  reserved  for  the  Sultan.  I 
furthermore  told  him  that  I  could  also  confidentially  inform  him  of 
your  views  on  the  maintenance  of  the  status  quo.  1  told  him  you 
were  fully  conscious  of  the  fact  that  for  us  the  maintenance  of  the 
status  quo  ante  could  not  be  looked  upon  as  a  principle,  so  that, 
if  one  or  the  other  Power  should  express  itself  in  favour  of  its  modi- 
fication to  the  advantage  of  the  Allies,^  it  would  be  psychologically  im- 
possible for  Russia  to  raise  objections. 

Nicolson  said  he  understood  this  perfectly.  /  told  him  the  reason 
why  you  had  expressed  yourself  so  carefully  in  this  respect  was,  that 
you  were  afraid  territorial  aggrandizement  of  the  Balkan  States  might 
evoke  demands  for  proportionate  compensation  on  the  part  of  other 
Powers,  I  mentioned,  as  a  first  instance,  Roumania.  I  did  not  wish 
in  any  way  to  express  an  opinion  as  to  Austria's  intentions,  but 
that  you  had  been  taken  unawares  by  the  sudden  and  unexpected 
veering  round  of  opinion  at  Vienna;  the  question  of  the  Sandjak 
should  not  be  allowed  to  be  raised;  besides  the  matter  need  not 
necessarily  deal  with  territorial  compensations — any  other  project, 
imposed  as  a  condition,  might  secure  Austria  a  predominating  in- 
fluence in  the  Balkans.    This  would  be  unacceptable  to  us. 

I  told  Nicolson  that,  in  case  of  mediation,  Russia  must  protect 
herself  against  such  a  contingency.  Nicolson  told  me  that  what 
he  had  just  heard  had  made  a  great  impression  upon  him.  He  in- 
quired whether  he  might  summarize  the  whole  situation  as  follows : 
Our  plan  of  reforms  depends  on  events  which  might  necessitate 
territorial  changes. 

The  necessity  of  a  declaration  of  disinterestedness  on  the  part 
of  the  mediatory  Powers. 

The  Maritza  to  form  the  boundary  of  the  undiminished  au- 
thority of  the  Sultan.2 

I  replied  that  I  agreed  with  this  definition,  and  added  that  you 

'  The  Balkan  Allies. 

'The  military  success  of  the  Balkan  Allies  had  made  consideration  of  this 
matter  necessary.  The  Turkish  forces  had  been  defeated  in  a  series  of  well- 
planned  actions,  due  largely  to  the  military  ability  of  the  Bulgars. 


378  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

believed  it  necessary  to  expedite  the  mediation,  the  French  taking 
the  initiative. 

Nicolson  said  he  would  discuss  what  he  had  just  heard  with  no 
one  but  Grey. 

(441)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Oct,  17-30,  1912.    No.  284. 

I  refer  to  my  telegram  No.  283. 

During  my  conversation  with  Nicolson,  I  purposely  said  noth- 
ing as  to  what  kind  of  agreements  or  treaty  between  Austria 
and  Serbia  we  were  afraid  of.  My  mode  of  procedure  was  de- 
vised to  prove  that  a  declaration  of  disinterestedness  was  neces- 
sary in  any  case;  mainly,  however,  because  Austria's  altered 
standpoint  regarding  the  territorial  status  quo  might  point  to  the 
possibility  of  Austria  seeking  compensation  of  some  other  kind — 
say,  by  means  of  an  agreement  or  an  alliance  or  a  commercial 
treaty,  imposed  moreover  as  a  condition — which  would  signify  a 
very  considerable  compensation  irreconcilable  with  Russian 
interests. 

In  this  case  Austria  would  not  assume  a  disinterested,  but  a 
conditional  attitude,  by  keeping  above  everything  else  her  eyes 
on  her  own  individual  interests.  /  think  this  is  important;  for,  if 
Tife  already  permitted  it  to  he  foreseen  today  that  we  shall,  at  some 
future  date,  seek  to  prevent  Austria  from  coming  to  an  understanding 
with  the  aggrandized  Balkan  States  in  matters  economic,  the  parts  in 
the  play  would  he  interchanged.  I  doubt  whether  in  this  case 
we  would  enjoy  the  actual  support  of  the  western  Powers.  For, 
if  an  economic  arrangement  between  sovereign  States,  in  accord- 
ance with  their  mutual  interests  might  in  the  future  forestall  the 
danger  of  a  European  war,  it  appears  to  me  that  such  an  arrange- 
ment would  be  approved  of  by  public  opinion  as  well  as  by  the 
Governments  of  the  Western  Powers.  On  the  other  hand,  however, 
one  cannot  prevent  us  from  opposing  any  arrangement  whatsoever,  if 
from  the  beginning  it  he  conceived  by  Austria  as  some  condition  to  he 
imposed.  This  is  in  my  opinion  an  incontrovertible  principle,  precisely 
as  it  will  he  necessary  to  establish  a  certain  balance  between  the  terri- 
torial acquisitions  of  the  belligerent  Balkan  States,  especially  between^ 
Bulgaria  and  Serbia. 


RUSSO-BULGARIAN  CONFLICT  IN  TURKEY        379 

(442)     Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.    Confidential  Letter, 
Oct.  18-31,  1912.    No.  675. 

Latterly,  the  French  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  has  repeatedly 
emphasized,  during  his  conversations  with  M.  Iswolsky,  that  it  ap- 
peared to  him  highly  desirable  that  more  explicit  information  con- 
cerning the  substance  of  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  Alliance  and  Russia's 
attitude  in  this  question  be  given  to  Grey.^  In  consideration  of 
the  fact  that  the  proposed  mediation  of  the  Powers  permits 
of  the  closest  intercourse  possible  between  St.  Petersburg,  Paris 
and  London,  we  consider  it  desirable  that  you  should  now  once 
more  revert  with  Grey  to  these  questions  which  you  had  already 
discussed  with  him  last  Spring. 

You  may  tell  him  the  Russian  Government  had  been  aware  of 
the  fact  that  Geshoff  had  at  the  time  given  information  to  the 
London  Cabinet  as  to  this  subject,  through  the  medium  of  the 
British  Minister  at  Sofia;  it  was,  therefore,  not  necessary  for  you  to 
speak  with  Grey  explicitly  about  this  treaty,  the  less  so  as  this  treaty 
was  to  he  kept  strictly  secret  as  desired  by  the  two  interested  Govern- 
ments. 

Now,  with  reference  to  the  treaty  between  Bulgaria  and  Serbia 
itself,  I  direct  your  attention  to  the  standpoint  assumed  by  Rus- 
sia in  this  matter  from  the  very  beginning. 

The  Imperial  Government  was,  at  the  time,  kept  informed  of 
the  course  of  negotiations  between  Sofia  and  Belgrade.  These 
were  based  upon  the  considerations  that  an  end  must  be  made  of 
the  fratricidal  feuds  between  them  by  a  demarcation  of  their 
mutual  interests  and  by  exactly  determining  their  respective 
spheres  of  influence  in  the  territories  of  European  Turkey. 

On  this  condition  the  agreement  between  the  two  States  was 
fully  approved  by  us.  For  we  had  always  seen  in  the  discord 
between  Serbia  and  Bulgaria  an  impediment  in  the  way  of  a  paci- 
fication of  the  Balkans.  In  consequence  of  mutual  distrust,  there 
prevailed  an  unhealthy  and  heavy  atmosphere  of  intrigue  and  poli- 
tical machinations,  which  made  it  impossible  to  further  the  real 

*The  documents  show  that  the  Balkan  League  was  formed  under  Russian 
auspices  and  that  the  Russian  government  was  its  guiding  genius  until  the  Balkan 
governments  "kicked  over  the  traces."  It  is  all  too  evident  that  Sazonoff  is 
prompting  Benckendorff  in  this  letter  for  the  benefit  of  Grey,  instead  of  record- 
ing a  fact,  as  it  would  seem  at  first  glance. 


380         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

national  interests  of  either  State.  Everything  calculated  to  con- 
duce to  the  purifying  of  this  atmosphere  was  cordially  welcomed  by 
us. 

Since  we  presumed  that  the  new  relations  between  Serbia  and  Bul- 
garia would  prove  the  more  permanent  the  less  pressure  there  was 
brought  to  bear  by  a  third  party,  we  did  not  interfere  in  the  direct 
negotiations  between  the  Cabinets  of  Sofia  and  Belgrade.  When  the 
treaty  was  signed  and  we  were  notified  of  it  we  found  in  it  a  great 
deal  that  went  beyond  the  objectives  described  above  and  that  was 
bound  to  cause  us  to  entertain  serious  misgivings.  However,  the 
main  object,  that  of  putting  an  end  to  the  abnormal  relations  that 
existed  between  two  neighbouring  peoples  related  by  ties  of  blood, 
was  achieved.  We  did  not  wish  to  jeopardize  this  result  by  rais- 
ing objections  and  protests.  In  this  treaty,  Russia's  role  was  estab- 
lished as  that  of  the  supreme  arbiter  in  cases  of  differences  of  opinion. 
We  were  not  asked  whether  we  agreed  to  Russia  being  mentioned 
in  a  Bulgaro-Serbian  treaty,  but  if  we  rejected  such  a  proposal 
we  were  bound  to  fear  that  we  should  influence  the  further  de- 
velopment of  the  policy  of  the  two  countries  in  an  undesirable 
sense.  These  considerations  have  caused  us  to  refrain  from  raising 
any  objections. 

This,  from  the  very  beginning,  has  been  our  standpoint  with 
regard  to  the  Bulgaro-Serbian  Treaty.  At  the  present  moment 
that  part  of  the  treaty  which  refers  to  an  exact  delimitation  in  case 
of  a  victorious  war  with  Turkey,  is  of  special  practical  signifi- 
cance. 

By  virtue  of  this  treaty,  all  territories  conquered  conjointly  will  be- 
long to  the  two  signatory  Powers  as  a  joint  dominion,  and  these  con- 
quests will  be  divided  immediately,  but  not  later  than  within  three 
months  after  the  conclusion  of  peace,  in  the  following  manner:  ^ 
(here  follows  an  exact  determination  of  the  geographical  bound- 
aries between  Serbia  and  Bulgaria). 

In  bringing  the  foregoing  to  your  notice  I  beg  to  draw  your  atten- 
tion to  the  fact  that  the  exact  delimitation  of  these  territories  does  not 
signify  in  our  eyes  a  final  determination  of  the  boundaries,  but  merely 

*  Consult  map  of  Balkan  showing  frontiers  established  definitely  by  Peace 
Treaty  of  Bucharest,  1913.  With  exception  of  Dobrudja  frontier  and  boundary 
between  Bulgaria  and  Serbia  in  Macedonia  these  were  the  lines  drawn. 


RUSSO-BULGARIAN  CONFLICT  IN  TURKEY        381 

a  suggestion  as  to  the  mutual  relation  of  the  interests  of  both  States; 
this  relation  then  has  been  acknowledged  by  both,  and  we  shall  see  to 
it  that  the  proper  balance  shall  be  established  within  this  relation  should 
occasion  arise  which  might  make  compensations  necessary. 

(443)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Oct.  18-31,  1912.    No.  2403. 

I  am  telegraphing  to  Sofia.  We  must  reckon  with  fresh  Bul- 
garian successes  in  the  near  future.  A  dangerous  situation  would 
be  created  by  a  siege  along  the  line  of  Chatalja.^  In  this  case,  we 
fear  a  change  in  the  public  opinion  of  Europe  to  the  disadvantage 
of  Bulgaria,  and  the  possibility  that  the  Turkish  capital  might  be 
occupied  by  international  forces,  in  order  to  counteract  the  danger 
of  extensive  riots  breaking  out  there  and  to  protect  the  interests 
of  Turkey's  creditors.  Among  these  latter,  France  and  England 
rank  first.  It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  these  two  States  are  going 
to  sacrifice  their  interests,  even  if  Russia  were  to  seek  to  restrain 
them  from  taking  action  of  any  kind.  If,  then,  a  change  of  opinion 
unfavourable  to  the  Balkan  League  were  to  take  place  at  Paris 
and  London,  there  is  no  doubt  but  that  such  a  contingency  would 
be  utilized  at  Vienna  and  Bucharest,  and  we  have  little  hope  that 
we  should  then  be  able,  as  heretofore,  to  keep  Austria  and  Rou- 
mania  from  intervening.^ 

All  these  considerations  lead  us  to  advise  the  Bulgarian  Gov- 
ernment, in  a  friendly  but  earnest  spirit,  to  recognise  the  neces- 
sity of  prudence  and  to  halt  in  tin^e.  We  assume  that  in  this  case, 
and  before  a  possible  failure  at  Chatalja  has  become  a  fact,  the 
Balkan  States  might  count  on  territorial  acquisitions.  In  any  case, 
they  have  been  assured  of  the  full  support  of  our  diplomacy  on 
the  condition,  well  known  to  Bulgaria,  that  all  compensations  in 
the  shape  of  reforms  or  territorial  acquisitions  will  be  limited  by  a 
line  which  runs  from  the  mouth  of  the  Maritza  by  way  of  Adri- 
anople  to  the  Black  Sea.  From  this  line  on,  the  whole  territory 
belonging  to  Constantinople  must  remain  under  the  actual 
sovereignty  of  the  Sultan.^     No  compromises  whatsoever  are  pos- 

*Line  of  fortifications  protecting  Constantinople  from  the  West. 
'Austria   had    no    such    intention,   and    Sazonoff    himself    later    encouraged 
Rumania  to  invade  Bulgaria. 

'Sazonoff  had  in  reality  reserved  it  for  Russia. 


382  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

sible  in  this  matter.  We  hope  that  Bulgaria  will  not  place  herself 
and  Russia  in  the  difficult  position  of  our  having  to  accentuate  this 
still  more  emphatically  at  Sofia.  Please  inform  us  of  the  outcome 
of  your  interview  with  Geshoff . 

(444)  Sasonoff  to  the  Russian  Embassies  at  Paris  and  London.    Telegram, 

Oct.  18-31,  1912.    No.  2405. 

I  refer  to  my  telegram  No.  2403.    Personal. 

Friendly,  but  earnest,  representations  by  France  end  England  at 
Sofia  and  Belgrade  would  be  greatly  welcomed  by  us,  but  these  should 
not  bear  the  character  of  a  premeditated  action  among  the  Powers  and 
must  not  permit  our  initiative  to  become  noticeable. 

(445)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sazonoff.    Telegram,  Oct.  19- 
Nov.  1,  1912.    No.  290. 

Your  telegram  No.  2405  received.    Personal. 

I  beg  you  to  observe  that  the  latest  developments  have  pro- 
duced so  deep  an  impression  here  that  all  interest  in  the  cause  of 
the  Turks  has  vanished.  As  yet  I  cannot  judge  how  far  this  feel- 
ing will  go,  but  it  may  go  very  far.  Grey  will  meet  with  strong  op- 
position in  Parliament  against  the  preservation  of  Turkey  in  the  Bal- 
kans except  at  Constantinople.  I  will  not,  however,  venture  any  com- 
ment upon  what  impression  the  occupation  of  Constantinople  by 
the  Bulgarians  would  produce  here. 

(446)  Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.    Telegram,  Oct.  20- 

Nov.  2,  1912. 

We  have  accepted  the  following  proposals  of  France: 

1.  The  Powers  will  take  a  collective  step  with  the  belligerent 
States  for  a  suspension  of  hostilities. 

2.  The  sovereignty  of  the  Sultan  at  Constantinople  and  in  the 
adjoining  territory  will  be  maintained  without  any  restrictions. 

3.  In  the  remaining  parts  of  European  Turkey  the  national, 
political  and  administrative  institutions  will  be  changed  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  requirements  of  each  district;  and  this  is  to  be 
done  in  such  a  manner  that  the  interests  of  all  interested  States, 
will  be  properly  balanced. 


RUSSO-BULGARIAN  CONFLICT  IN  TURKEY        383 

4.  For  the  purpose  of  conjointly  settling  the  various  questions 
involved,  the  Powers  will  meet  at  a  conference  to  which  the  bel- 
ligerent States  and  Roumania  shall  also  be  invited. 

I  am  giving  further  explanations  of  our  standpoint  in  telegram 
No.  2423. 

(447)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Oct.  20'Nov.  2,  1912.    No.  2423. 

According  to  our  view,  intervention  in  the  war  by  the  Powers 
can  be  successful  only  if  this  step  be  undertaken  without  delay. 
The  general  interest  in  the  security  of  Constantinople  calls  for  the 
creation  of  a  zone  of  defense  which  would  be  subject  to  the  actual 
sovereignty  of  the  Sultan.  The  boundary  of  this  district  is  de- 
fined, as  you  know,  by  a  line  running  from  the  Mouth  of  the 
Maritza,  including  Adrianople,  to  the  Black  Sea.  The  whole  re- 
maining part  of  European  Turkey  should,  in  our  opinion,  be  divided 
among  the  Allies  by  virtue  of  the  right  of  actual  occupation.  In  this 
matter  we  are  prepared  to  stand  for  the  maximum  of  what  can  be 
achieved. 

By  this  means,  a  lasting  peace  would  be  assured  in  the  Balkans, 
and  the  difficult  proceedings  connected  with  mediation  would  be 
simplified.  Nothing  but  the  speedy  and  unanimous  consent  of  the 
Powers  to  these  conditions  can  avert  the  danger  of  the  occupation 
of  Constantinople  by  the  Balkan  Allies;  such  occupation  might 
entail  European  complications,  for,  if  the  Allies  are  not  given  a 
definite  promise  by  the  Powers  regarding  the  fulfilment  of  their 
wishes,  they  will  not  be  able  to  wait  any  longer,  and  may  then 
proceed  to  occupy  Constantinople  so  as  to  have  a  pawn  in  hand. 

Of  course,  several  other  subordinate  questions  would  have  to 
be  examined  at  the  same  time.  On  principle  we  think  it  possible 
for  us  to  concede  the  establishment  of  an  autonomous  Albania  under 
the  Sultan's  sovereignty,  but  in  doing  so  it  should  not  be  forgotten 
that  Serbia  must  be  given  access  to  the  Adriatic  Sea.  A  rectification 
of  the  frontier  must  be  made  between  Bulgaria  and  Roumania  in  order 
to  reward  the  latter  for  her  correct  attitude  during  the  war.  We  are 
prepared  to  support  any  steps  in  this  direction  at  Sofia.  We  would 
consent  to  an  agreement  being  made  between  Austria  and  Serbia 
for  the  purpose  of  procuring  to  the  former  facilities  for  the  free 
transit  of   Austrian  goods   through   the   new   Serbian   territory. 


384  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

Russia  in  its  capacity  of  a  great  Orthodox  Power  deems  herself  entitled 
to  defend  the  present  independent  position  of  the  Oecumenic  Patriarch.^ 
You  may  place  yourself  on  the  above  standpoint  in  your  nego- 
tiations with  the  British  Government. 


(448)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram,  Oct. 
20-Nov.  2,  1912.    No.  295. 

Your  telegrams  2403  and  2405  received. 

I  have  spoken  to  Grey.  He  says  it  would  be  impossible  to  ask 
the  Bulgarians  to  halt  before  the  line  of  Chatalja  because  that 
would  mean  a  sacrifice  which  might  enable  the  Turks  to  concen- 
trate again  and  to  frustrate  the  results  hitherto  attained  in  the  war. 
He  says  that  public  opinion  in  England  would  express  itself  so 
categorically  in  favour  of  Bulgaria  that  he  could  not  put  forward 
such  a  demand.  He  thinks  he  may  assume  that  your  telegram  was 
despatched  before  the  news  of  the  latest  victory  of  the  Bulgarians, 
which  seems  to  have  been  a  decisive  one,  had  arrived. 

Grey  read  me  a  telegram  from  the  British  Minister  at  Sofia. 
It  contained  the  news  of  the  complete  collapse  of  the  Turkish  army 
and  of  the  Bulgarian  advance  on  Chatalja  with  the  object  of  push- 
ing on  to  Constantinople.  Grey  believes  it  to  be  too  late  now,  and 
asks  himself  whether  you  are  not  of  the  same  mind.  I  replied  that, 
as  far  as  Constantinople  was  concerned,  I  was  certain  of  your  opin- 
ion, and  I  reminded  him  of  the  vital  importance  attached  by  Russia 
to  the  question  of  Constantinople.^  Grey  told  me  he  recognised  the 
difficulty  of  the  position  and  would  let  me  know  his  decision  later. 

This  morning  Grey  showed  me  an  authorized  Bulgarian  state- 
ment in  the  Times.    It  reads: 

"If  the  Bulgarian  troops  enter  Constantinople,  they  will  do  so 
for  the  purpose  of  dictating  the  peace  there  and  will  then  im- 
mediately withdraw  again  from  the  capital." 

Grey  said  he  was  going  to  take  this  statement  as  a  point  of  de- 
parture for  an  interview  with  the  Bulgarian  Minister  here. 

After  this  interview  had  taken  place.  Grey  told  me  the  following : 

*  Head  of  the  Greek  Orthodox  Church,  residing  at  Constantinople. 
'Russia  had  reserved  Constantinople  for  herself  and  did  not  want  the  Bul- 
garians to  acquire  a  claim  there. 


RUSSO-BULGARIAN  CONFLICT  IN  TURKEY        385 

He  had  first  asked  the  Minister  whence  this  statement  had  eman- 
ated. Madjaroff  replied  that  it  came  from  him  and  expressed  his 
personal  opinion.  Grey  in  reply  said  he  spoke  as  a  friend  of  Bul- 
garia and  called  to  witness  the  demonstrations  of  sympathy  of  the 
English  for  the  Bulgarian  Cause;  he  need  not  remind  him  of  the 
sympathy  of  Russia,  but  he  could  only  say  that  the  standpoint  of 
Russia  with  regard  to  Constantinople  had  been  fixed  ever  since  the 
beginning  of  the  crisis.  It  was,  therefore,  of  the  utmost  importance 
that  Bulgaria  should,  as  soon  as  possible  remove  the  apprehen- 
sions of  the  Russian  Government  with  regard  to  her  intentions 
concerning  Constantinople,  for  otherwise  Bulgaria,  threatened  as 
she  already  was,  with  a  pressure  from  Roumania  and  perhaps  also 
from  Austria,  might  also  lose  the  sympathies  of  Russia  and  find  her- 
self in  an  extremely  difficult  position.  Madjaroff  promised  im- 
mediately to  telegraph  the  above  to  Sofia. 

(449)    Sazonoff  to  the  RussioM  Ambassador  at  Paris.     Telegram,  Oct.  22- 
Nov.  4,  1912.    No.  2455. 

In  our  opinion,  the  Allies  can  be  restrained  from  occupying 
Constantinople  only  if  the  Powers  unanimously  declare  to  the  Bal- 
kan States  that  the  whole  of  European  Turkey  up  to  the  well-known 
line  via  Adrianople  to  the  Black  Sea  will  be  partitioned  among 
them  and  if  the  Great  Powers  accept  the  standpoint  set  forth  in  my 
telegram  No.  2423,  i.e.,  if  the  economic  interests  of  Austria  be 
taken  into  due  consideration.  We  deem  it  highly  desirable  that 
France  should  forthwith  make  such  a  proposal  to  the  Powers.  We 
believe  the  key  to  the  whole  situation  is  to  be  found  at  Berlin,  and 
the  success  of  the  French  proposal  will,  to  a  great  extent,  depend 
upon  the  influence  exerted  by  the  German  Government  at  Vienna. 

Please  inform  Poincare  ^  confidentially  that  the  occupation  of  Con- 
stantinople by  the  Balkan  States  would  cause  the  simultaneous  appear- 
ance of  our  entire  Black  Sea  Fleet  in  the  Turkish  capital.  In  order  to 
avoid  the  great  danger  of  general  European  complications,  such  as 
would  result  from  an  action  of  this  nature,  it  is  important  that 
France  exercise  to  the  full  the  influence  she  commands  at  Berlin 
and  Vienna.    We  draw  the  attention  of  our  Ally  to  the  fact  that 

*  French  minister  of  foreign  affairs. 


386 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


Russian  public  opinion,  which  follows  developments  in  the  Balkans 
with  the  most  intense  attention,  may  place  the  Government  in  an 
extremely  difficult  position.^  For  your  personal  information,  I  add  that 
our  military  authorities  now  consider  it  possible  to  alter  their  original 
standpoint  and  are  prepared  to  grant  concessions  in  favour  of  Bulgaria, 
as,  for  instance,  Adrianople. 


(450) 


The  Russian  Ambassador  at 
22-Nov.  4.  1912.    No.  298. 


London  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram,  Oct. 


Your  telegram  No.  2423  received. 

When  I  was  about  to  inform  Grey  of  its  contents,  he  read  me 
telegram  of  Buchanan^s  with  a  very  detailed  report  upon  the  same 
subject.  I  thereupon  told  him  I  had  nothing  to  add  because 
Buchanan's  telegram  contained  still  more  details  than  your  own. 
Grey  said  he  had  no  objections  to  make ;  he  considered  the  informa- 
tion about  the  Sandjak  to  be  very  important.^  He  saw  in  it  a  valu- 
able indication  of  Austrian  intentions.  Serbia  might,  perhaps, 
make  difficulties  which  ought,  however,  not  to  be  insurmountable ; 
at  all  events,  he  foresaw  no  objections  from  any  quarter,  hut  the 
question  of  Serbian  access  to  the  sea  was  a  very  delicate  one. 
He  particularly  approves  of  the  project  regarding  Saloniki.  He 
shares  your  opinion  that  quick  action  is  imperative,  for  it  would  be 
difficult  to  bring  the  Bulgarian  army  to  a  halt  without  positive 
guarantees  being  given  to  the  Allies. 

He  reverted  to  this  idea,  that,  in  order  to  be  able  to  act,  it 
would  be  necessary  to  be  fully  acquainted  with  the  Austrian  con- 
ditions. He  leaves  it  to  you  to  choose  the  best  way  of  attaining 
this  object.  He  does  not  see  why  Austria  could  not  express  her 
wishes  just  as  plainly  as  Russia.  I  have  no  doubt  that  Buchanan 
has  correctly  expressed  your  ideas,  with  which  Grey  agrees. 

(451)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Oct.  22'Nov.  4,  1912.    No.  299. 

I  refer  to  my  telegram  No.  298. 

Grey  thereupon  told  me,  confidentially,  that,  neither  Buch- 
anan's telegram,  nor  the  telegram  addressed  to  me,  contained  any 

*The  Russian  government  did  not  usually  heed  public  opinion. 

'The  Vienna  Cabinet  had  agreed  to  an  eventual  partition  of  the  Sandjak  of 
Novi-Bazar  between  Serbia  and  Montenegro,  and  the  territory  was  later  divide  ' 
among  them. 


RUSSO-BULGARIAN  CONFLICT  IN  TURKEY        387 

reference  to  the  islands  in  the  Aegaean  Sea  occupied  by  Greece.  He 
believes  that  if  Greece  intends  to  keep  these  islands  she  could  do 
so  only  under  strictly  defined  conditions.  It  would  be  to  the  general 
interest  that  a  second-rate  Power  should  not  be  in  a  position  to 
close  the  straits  whenever  it  pleased.  In  this  question  the  Russian 
interests  were  still  more  involved  than  the  British;  and,  if  he  be- 
lieved that  he  might  mention  Russian  interests  here,  this  was  due  to 
the  fact  that  the  British  Government  had  not  changed  its  standpoint  re- 
garding the  straits  and  also  because  this  question  must  be  settled  in  a 
sense  favourable  to  Russia  as  soon  as  we  considered  it  necessary  to 
bring  it  up  for  discussion.  ^ 


(452)     Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris.     Telegram,  Oct.  24- 
Noz:  6,  1912.    No.  2A7A. 

We  wish  to  oppose  the  temporary  occupation  of  Constantinople 
by  the  Allies.  But  we  wish  to  point  out  how  difficult  further  nego- 
tiations would  become  in  that  case.  If  the  Ottoman  Governm,ent 
leaves  Constantinople  and  withdraws  to  Asia  Minor,  it  need  fear 
no  further  losses,  the  Turkish  army  would  be  able  to  recover  from 
the  blows  it  has  lately  received,  and  there  would  be  no  necessity 
for  the  Sublime  Porte  to  show  any  disposition  to  yield,  because  the 
situation  could  not  become  much  worse.  Something  similar  oc- 
curred at  Pekin  in  1900  when  the  flight  of  the  Government  delayed 
the  negotiations  which  followed  upon  the  occupation  of  the  Chi- 
nese capital. 

B^t  any  delay  in  the  peace  negotiations  at  the  present  moment  might 
jeopardize  the  interests  of  the  Balkan  Allies,  as  they  have  but  insufficient 
means  at  their  disposal  and  as  there  is  no  absolute  unanimity  in  Europe; 
and  might  subject  the  peace  of  Europe  to  a  severe  strain.  On  the  other 
hand,  a  prolonged  occupation  of  Constantinople  by  the  Allies  might 
force  us  likewise  to  send  our  fleet,  which  would  remain  there  precisely 
as  long  as  the  Allies.  ^  We  think,  therefore,  that  the  Powers  should 
now  decide  whether  they  want  to  accede  to  Turkey's  request  and 
take  the  necessary  steps  for  mediation. 

*  The  documents  show  that  Grey  was  not  always  of  that  turn  of  mind  and 
that  he  used  this  bait  quite  often  to  bring  Russia  into  line. 

*  For  which  the  French  and  British  government  were  not  prepared. 


388  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

(453)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sazonoff.    Telegram,  Oct.  25- 
Nov.  7,  1912.    No.  307. 

Your  telegram  No.  2474  received. 

I  have  informed  Grey  of  its  contents.  He  says  that,  even  though 
the  decision  of  the  Russian  Government  came  as  a  surprise,  he  knew 
perfectly  well  what  Constantinople  signified  to  Russia  and  that  he  did 
not,  therefore,  wonder  at  our  decision.  As  I  had  used  the  word 
"escadre"  Grey  asked  me  whether  that  meant  the  fleet  only.  ^  I  re- 
plied that  your  telegram  contained  no  further  intimation.  There- 
upon he  informed  me  of  the  contents  of  a  telegram  from,  Lowther,  ^ 
according  to  which  things  seem  to  be  somewhat  calmer  at  Constan- 
tinople. It  seemed  as  if  the  Sublime  Porte  had  again  gained  the 
upper  hand,  and  the  opinion  of  several  foreign  military  agents, 
among  others  also  the  German,  was  that  the  troops  of  Constanti- 
nople, if  only  better  equipped,  would  be  in  a  position  to  hold  the 
Chatalja  line  for  some  time.  Lowther  adds  that  the  military 
agents  moreover  were  not  all  of  the  same  mind.  In  reply,  I  told 
Grey  that  the  moment  for  the  appearance  of  our  fleet,  and  also  the  cir- 
cumstances under  which  it  would  appear  had  been  plainly  determined 
by  us. 


(454)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Oct.  2S'Nov.  7,  1912.    No.  308. 


I 


Personal.  Grey  thinks  that,  if  the  predictions  in  Lowther's 
telegram  be  correct,  the  situation  would  be  considerably  relieved. 
The  Sultan  remaining  in  Constantinople  was  the  only  satisfactory 
solution.^  But  should  he  leave  the  capital,  his  return  would  meet 
with  serious  difficulties,  among  others  public  opinion  in  several 
countries,  more  especially  in  England,  would  raise  protests. 
Since  a  settlement  in  favour  of  Bulgaria  can  not  apparently  be  con- 
ceded, chiefly  on  account  of  Russia,  he  had  thought  of  a  particular 
combination — neutralisation  and  free  city — as  the  least  of  other  evils, 
nevertheless  he  first  wished  to  ask  you  as  to  your  opinion. 

I  replied  that  I  very  much  doubted  whether  such  a  project  could 
meet  with  your  approval,  because  the  resulting  international,  el 

*  Grey  did  not  know  the  French  language,  f^*-"^^- 

*  British  ambassador  at  Constantinople. 
•Again,  Grey  had  veered,  giving  way  to  British  public  opinion. 


RUSSO-BULGARIAN  CONFLICT  IN  TURKEY        389 

nological,  religious,  and  geographical  difficulties  would  be  too  great. 
Grey  said  he  was  naturally  conscious  of  this  and  he  had  mentioned 
the  idea  only  in  case  it  should  become  impossible  to  uphold  the 
Turkish  rule  at  Constantinople.  I  told  him  I  could  not  alter  my 
standpoint,  that  I  was,  nevertheless,  grateful  to  him  that  he  had 
mentioned  this  project  to  you  first,  since  no  other  Power  was  inter- 
ested in  the  question  to  the  same  extent  as  Russia.  I  added  that  the 
only  advantage  in  his  proposal,  which  I  discerned,  was,  that  it 
would  wound  national  and  religious  feelings  less  than  any  other; 
two  questions  had  to  be  kept  in  view,  the  Bosphorus  and  the  Darda- 
nelles, and  in  this  twofold  respect  Russia  must  he  given  special  guar- 
antees, for  a  mere  alteration  of  the  Paris  Treaty  ^  would  not  suffice 
in  this  instance. 

(455)     The  Russian  Minister  at  Belgrade  to  Sasonoff.    Telegram,  Oct.  27- 
Nov.  9,  1912.    No.  276. 

From  all  informations  received  and  carefully  examined  by  me 
the  following  conclusions  are  to  be  drawn : 

An  agreement  has  been  reached  between  the  four  Allies,  that  is 
to  say,  a  block  has  been  formed — in  order  to  obtain  the  annexation 
of  the  conquered  territory  in  any  case.  As  regards  Serbia  and 
Bulgaria,  the  agreement  is  firm,  mutual,  and  complete.  Both 
States,  however,  have  their  suspicions  of  Greece  whose  eyes  are 
principally  fixed  on  the  possession  of  Saloniki  and  even  Bitoli.  The 
Bulgarians  will  oppose  this,  wherein  they  will  be  supported  by  the 
Serbians.  Montenegro's  attitude,  which  inspires  but  little  confi- 
dence, is  chiefly  perturbing  the  Serbians. 

A  particularly  unpleasant  impression  is  created  by  Montenegro's 
endeavours  to  put  difficulties  in  the  way  of  Serbia  realizing  her 
historic  claims.  A  proof  hereof:  the  unexpected  occupation  of  the 
unfortified  cloister  of  Detchan ;  the  entry  of  the  Montenegrins  into 
Prisren  which  was  already  occupied  by  Serbian  troops;  and  the 
open  attempt  to  forestall  the  Serbians  at  San  Giovanni.  The  Allies, 
however,  are  inclined  to  keep  all  this  friction  secret,  in  order  to 
appear  united  against  the  attempts  of  the  Powers  to  mediate.  The 
demands  of  the  Allies,  which  they  have  united  to  defend  to  the 
uttermost  by  force  of  arms,  are  the  following: 

» Of  1856. 


390 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


1.)  All  territories  conquered  by  their  armies  to  form  a  joint- 
dominion  which  is  to  be  divided  later  by  mutual  agreement.  aU 

2.)  The  Allies  will  not  even  admit  the  idea  of  an  autonomous 
Albania  or  Macedonia  and  will  oppose  any  such  plan. 

3.)  Macedonia  is  to  be  divided  among  Bulgaria,  Serbia  and 
Greece;  Albania,  among  Montenegro,  Serbia  and  Greece. 

4.)  The  special  demands  of  Bulgaria  extend  in  the  direction  of 
Constantinople  up  to  a  line  from  the  Mouth  of  the  Maritza  to  Lule- 
Burgas — Bunar-Hissar  as  far  as  the  Black  Sea.  There  can  be  no 
idea  of  restoring  Adrianople  and  Kirk-Kilisse  which  have  cost  such 
heavy  sacrifices.  ^  ■| 

5.)  The  special  demands  of  Serbia  comprise  the  Sandjak  ot 
Novi-Bazar,  a  narrow  strip  of  which  is  to  be  left  to  Montenegro ; 
the  whole  of  Old-Serbia  and  the  northern  part  of  Albania, 
with  the  coast  from  Medua  as  far  as  Cameni  or  Skumhia,  subject  to 
an  agreement  with  Greece  to  whom  falls  the  remaining  part  of  this^ 
province.  fl| 

The  Allies  have  resolved  to  carry  through  these  demands 
jointly. 


(456) 


Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London. 
Nov.  5.  1912.    No.  2461. 


Telegram,  Oct.  23- 


I 


I  am  telegraphing  to  Paris. 

The  Austrian  Ambassador  declared  to  me  today  that  his  Govern- 
ment renounces  all  idea  of  territorial  compensations  in  its  favour.^ 

When  I  asked  him  why,  in  that  case,  the  Vienna  Cabinet  did  not 
accept  the  French  formula  referring  to  disinterestedness,  Thurn  replied 
that  it  is  not  stipulated  therein  that  the  disinterestedness  applies  to  terri- 
torial acquisitions  only. 

I  assume  France  might  let  Vienna  have  a  rectification  to  this 
effect.  I  pointed  out  to  Thurn  that  one  had  to  reckon  with  Serbia's 
vital  interest,  i.e.,  the  acquisition  of  an  access  to  the  Adriatic  Sea, 
and  that  Austria  should  not  oppose  this,  so  as  to  be  able  to  estab- 
lish good  neighbourly  relations  with  Serbia.    The  Ambassador  re^i 

*  Especially  to  the  Bulgarians. 

'Austria-Hungary  relinquished  her  special  claims  and  right  upon  the  Sandjak 
of  Novi-Bazar  and  consented  to  its  being  annexed  by  Serbia  and  Montenegro 
without  exacting  compensation. 


RUSSO-BULGARIAN  CONFLICT  IN  TURKEY        391 

plied  that  he  would  forward  my  answer  to  Vienna,  but  that  his 
Government  must  consider  public  opinion. 

Referring  to  economic  interests,  Thurn  pointed  out  that  it  was 
desirable  to  protect  these  by  something  more  than  simply  a  com- 
mercial treaty  with  Serbia,  whereupon  I  replied  that  in  my  opinion 
there  was  nothing  better  calculated  to  serve  that  purpose  than  a 
commercial  treaty. 

From  my  conversation  with  the  German  Ambassador,  I  gained  the 
impression  that  Berlin  will  try  to  induce  Vienna  to  yield.  I  assume 
that,  for  the  present,  the  efforts  of  French  and  English  diplomacy  must 
run  parallel  to  our  procedure  and  be  directed  towards  exercising  a 
friendly  influence  in  that  sense,  without  any  categorical  declaration  being 
presented  which  might  bear  the  character  of  a  threat. 

(457)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sazonoff.    Telegram,  Oct.  24- 
Nov.  6,  1912.    No.  302. 

The  French  Charge  d' Affaires  has  acquainted  me  with  a  tele- 
gram in  which  the  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin  reports  on  an 
interview  with  the  Italian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  The  latter 
has  expressed  his  personal  opinion  to  the  effect  that  the  Powers 
of  the  Triple  Alliance  were  thoroughly  in  accord  and  that  for  this 
reason  there  was  no  cause  to  expect  that  peace  would  be  menaced. 
In  the  course  of  this  interview,  San  Giuliano  ^  maintained,  in  spite 
of  Cambon's  objections,  that  Italy  and  Austria,  who  desired  the  cre- 
ation of  an  Albanian  State,  insist  upon  the  exclusion  of  Serbia  from 
the  Adriatic  coast,  and  gave  him  to  understand  that  the  desire  of  Serbia 
to  be  granted  an  access  to  the  sea  might  be  satisfied  in  the  Aegaeap  Sea. 

(458)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Oct.  25-Nov.  7,  1912.    No.  306. 

Your  telegram  No.  2461  received. 

Grey  tells  me  he  is  perfectly  conscious  of  the  seriousness  of  the 
two  questions  regarding  Austria  and  Serbia.  He  fears  that  the 
question  of  Serbian  access  to  the  Adriatic  might,  more  easily,  as- 
sume an  acute  character  than  that  concerning  the  Austrian  eco- 
nomic interests  for  which,  in  his  opinion,  it  will  prove  easier  to 
find  a  satisfactory  settlement.     I  replied  that  this  question  also 

*  Italian  minister  of  foreign  aflFairs. 


392 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


must  not  be  too  lightly  estimated,  since  it  might  transform  itself 
into  an  absorption,  which  would  explain  the  Austrian  obstinacy 
to  exclude  Serbia  from  the  sea.  I  told  him,  Serbia  would  resist 
with  the  utmost  energy,  so  that  Austria  might  again  take  into  con- 
sideration the  project  of  annexation.  Grey  said  that  yesterday  the 
Serbian  Minister  had  indeed  spoken  of  a  very  energetic  declaration. 
This  roused  his  fear  that  now  it  might  no  longer  be  possible  to 
bring  the  demands  of  both  countries  into  accord,  and  therefore  he 
considered  it  to  be  more  expedient  to  defer  the  solution  of  thijga 
question  until  the  general  settlement.  f  | 

For  this  reason,  the  Powers  should  ask  the  Balkan  Allies 
whether  they  would  be  inclined  to  accept  mediation  and  to  formu- 
late their  wishes  themselves.  Since  Austria  to-day  stands  outside 
the  European  Concert,  it  will  not  be  possible  to  induce  her  to  join 
the  Powers  in  any  action  which  looks  like  an  attempt  at  reconcilia- 
tion on  the  basis  outlined  by  you;  but  there  was  no  reason  why 
Austria  should  take  part  in  the  action  proposed  by  him.  I  learn 
from  Mensdorff  ^  that  Grey  has  emphasized  to  him  the  necessity  of 
modifying  Austrian  wishes,  though  he  acknowledged  that  they  were^ 
perfectly  legitimate  from  an  economic  standpoint. 


(459) 


Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Rome. 
Nov.  8,  1912.    No.  2500. 


Telegram,  Oct.  26- 


Will  you  point  out  to  the  Italian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affai: 
that  it  is  highly  desirable  that  Austria  should  yield  in  the  question 
of  admitting  Serbia  to  the  Adriatic  Sea.  It  is  dangerous  to  refuse 
to  take  account  of  facts.  Serbia  will  not  be  satisfied  with  anything 
else  and  counts  on  the  undivided  support  of  the  Balkan  League,  which 
quite  accords  with  the  warlike  spirit  of  the  peoples  concerned.  A  Ser- 
bian naval  power  need  not  cause  Austria  any  concern?  We  are  pre- 
pared seriously  to  consider  the  economic  interests  of  Austria  as  well  as 
the  wishes  of  Austria  and  Italy  regarding  the  establishment  of  an  auton- 
omous Albania.  We  wish  to  secure  a  lasting  peace  in  the  Balkans. 
This  is  impossible,  if  the  just  interests  of  Serbia  are  not  satisfied 
/  assume  it  also  corresponds  with  the  interests  of  Italy  that  her  futu\ 


I 


*  Austro-Hungarian  ambassador  at  London. 

'Austria-Hungary  and  Great  Britain  feared  that  this  Serbian  seaport  on  tl 
Adriatic  might  become  a  Russian  naval  base  in  the  Mediterranean. 


I 


RUSSO-BULGARIAN  CONFLICT  IN  TURKEY        393 

relations  with  Russia,  and  the  Powers  in  solidarity  with  that  country, 
be  exactly  defined  and  that  therefore  she  will  now  exert  influence  on 
her  Ally.  In  this  way,  Italy  would  also  re-establish  her  position  in  the 
Balkan  capitals,  which  appears  to  have  been  badly  shaken  by  the  con- 
clusion of  peace  with  Turkey  at  the  moment  of  the  declaration  of  war, 
on  a  purely  financial  basis.  ^  While  discussing  this  matter  with  the 
Italian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  you  must  try  to  clothe  your  words 
in  as  friendly  a  shape  as  possible  so  as  not  to  hurt  the  pride  of  the 
Italians. 

(460)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sazonoff.    Letter,  Oct.  2S-Nov. 
7,  1912. 

With  reference  to  Poincare's  proposal  to  prevent  the  possibility 
of  Austria  making  territorial  acquisitions  in  the  Balkans,  I  think  it 
is  necessary  that  I  should  give  you  the  exact  wording  of  Poincare's 
communication,  as  I  fear  there  may  have  been  errors  in  my  cipher 
telegram. 

I  have  just  telegraphed  you  that  I  think  it  desirable  that  you 
should  return  a  positive  reply  in  writing  to  this  communication. 
The  French  proposal  was  made  after  the  matter  had  been  discussed 
by  the  Cabinet,  and  it  expressed  a  perfectly  new  standpoint  of 
France  in  the  matter  of  the  territorial  aggrandizement  of  Austria 
in  the  Balkans.  Whereas,  France,  up  to  the  present,  had  declared  that 
local,  so  to  speak,  purely  Balkan,  events  could  not  induce  her  to  take 
any  active  measures,  the  French  Government  now  appears  to  admit  that 
an  acquisition  of  territory  on  the  part  of  Austria  in  the  Balkan  would 
affect  the  general  European  equilibrium  and,  consequently,  also  the 
special  interests  of  France.^ 

I  did  not  fail  to  draw  Poincare's  attention  to  the  fact  that,  by 
his  proposing  to  consult  in  common  with  us  and  England  on  the 
means  that  might  be  employed  in  preventing  such  acquisitions,  he 
raises  the  question  of  the  practical  consequences  of  the  agreement 
proposed  by  him.  From  his  reply  I  was  able  to  gather  that  he  is  per- 
fectly conscious  of  the  fact  that  France  may  thus  become  involved  in  a 

*  Method  of  the  diplomatic  agent  provocateur ;  Sazonoff  himself  had  been  in 
favor  of  that  peace. 

'Austria  had  declared  that  she  expected  no  territorial  compensation,  but 
wished  to  safeguard  her  economic  interests  in  the  Balkans, 


394 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


warlike  action.  For  the  present,  of  course,  he  submits  this  question 
merely  for  our  consideration,  but  in  a  conversation  with  me,  Paleo- 
logue  ^  plainly  admitted  that  the  proposed  agreement  might  lead  to  some 
kind  of  active  step.  He  told  me  that,  when  considering  the  various 
possible  effects  of  this  proposal,  he  had  drawn  the  attention  of  his 
chief  to  an  instance  in  the  year  1832  when  France  had  taken  An- 
cona  after  the  occupation  of  Ferrara  by  the  Austrians,  and  had  not 
evacuated  it  until  after  the  Austrians  had  withdrawn  from  the 
first-named  town. 

It  seems  to  me  we  must  seriously  consider  all  that  has  been  said 
above  and  we  must  avail  ourselves  of  this  opportunity,  to  fix  the  new 
standpoint  of  the  French  Government  in  case  of  a  possible  expansion 
of  Austria  in  the  Balkans  and  to  prepare  for  the  future  a  joint  action 
of  Russia,  France,  and  England  in  case  Austria  should,  in  the  further 
course  of  developments,  abandon  her  present  standpoint  of  refraining 
from  all  territorial  acquisitions. 


(461 )     Poincare  to  Iswolsky,  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris.    Autograph  Let- 
ter, Oct.  22-Nov.  4,  1912. 

As  I  have  just  informed  you,  the  enigmatic  attitude  of  Austria 
causes  similar  misgiving  to  the  French  as  to  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment. In  agreement  with  the  Ministerial  Council,  I  consider  it 
expedient  that  we  should  even  now  arrange  a  joint-action  program 
in  case  Austria  should  seek  to  realize  a  territorial  aggrandizement. 
You  were  so  kind  as  to  tell  me  that  such  a  contingency  was  pro- 
vided for  in  the  agreements  entered  into  at  Racconigi,  and  that  Italy 
as  well  as  Russia  had  declared  that  they  would  oppose  the  terri- 
torial expansion  of  any  Great  Power  in  the  Balkans.  The  French 
Government  is  likewise  of  the  opinion  that  such  proceedings  would 
encourage  all  kinds  of  aspirations.  I  should  like  to  know,  there- 
fore, whether  the  Imperial  Russian  Government  clearly  refuses  as 
does  ours,  to  countenance  all  annexations  of  Turkish  territory  by 
any  Great  Power,  and  whether  it  would  be  inclined  to  consult,  in 
concert  with  France  and  England,  as  to  what  means  should  be 
adopted  in  order  to  prevent  any  such  danger? 


^  Assistant  to  Poincare,  who  later  replaced  the  very  rational  Georges  Lotiis, 
French  ambassador  to  Russia. 


# 


RUSSO-BULGARIAN  CONFLICT  IN  TURKEY        395 

(462)     Sasonoff  to  the  Russian  Minister  at  Belgrade.     Telegram,  Oct.  27- 
Nov.  9,  1912.    No.  2513. 

The  question  of  an  access  to  the  Adriatic  Sea  for  Serbia  has, 
during  the  last  few  days,  undergone  such  a  development  as  to 
cause  us  serious  apprehensions.  We  are  still  prepared,  as  heretofore, 
to  lend  to  Serbia  our  active  diplomatic  support,  in  conjunction  with 
France  and  England.  According  to  reliable  information,  Germany  and 
Italy  are  prepared  to  oppose,  together  with  Austria,  any  territorial  ac- 
quisitions by  Serbia  on  the  Adriatic  Sea.  The  conflict  arising  from  this 
must  not  be  aggravated  to  the  danger-point  of  a  general  European  war. 
The  attitude  of  some  of  the  Serbian  representatives  abroad  must, 
for  this  reason,  seem  all  the  less  appropriate.  We  learn  that  the 
Serbian  representative  at  Berlin  told  Kiderlen  that  the  Allies  had 
already  divided  among  themselves  the  whole  of  the  Adriatic  coast 
and  Serbia  was  sure  not  only  of  the  support  of  Bulgaria  but  also  of 
Russia. 

So  far  as  we  are  concerned,  we  consider  such  a  statement  inad- 
missible. The  treaty  of  alliance  does  not  entitle  Serbia  to  count 
on  the  military  support  of  Bulgaria  in  the  matter  of  Serbian  access 
to  the  sea.  The  losses  sustained  by  Serbia  and  Bulgaria  during  the 
last  war  make  a  collision  appear  hopeless  from  the  very  beginning. 
The  dispatch  of  Serbian  troops  in  the  direction  of  Durazzo,  to  the  occu- 
pation of  which  Austria  will  not  give  her  consent,  also  signifies  that 
Serbia  allows  herself  to  be  ruled  by  impulse.  Tell  Pashitch  ^  that  the 
Serbians  must  not  make  difficult  for  us  the  role  we  have  assumed  as 
their  advocates. 

In  the  question  of  the  access  of  Serbia  to  the  Adriatic  Sea  we 
distinguish  between  the  means  and  the  end.  The  need  is  as  complete 
a  security  of  the  economic  independence  of  that  country  as  pos- 
sible ;  the  means — the  access  to  the  Adriatic  Sea  obtained  either  as 
the  result  of  a  territorial  occupation  on  the  coast  or  by  means  of  a 
railway  connection  with  one  port  or  the  other,  under  the  same  con- 
ditions as  those  which  would  eventually  be  conceded  to  Austria  for 
the  transit  of  her  goods  to  Saloniki.  //  Serbia  yields  in  the  matter 
of  acquiring  an  Adriatic  port  of  her  own,  then  it  will  be  possible 
to  insist  upon  the  other  conditions,  as  for  instance,  the  terri- 
torial   expansion    of   Serbia    to    the    south,    or    the   greatest   possible 

*  Serbian  minister  of  foreign  affairs  and  premier. 


396 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


limitation  of  Albanian  territory.  If  Austria  fail  to  understand 
that  it  is  to  her  own  interest  that  permanent  peace  in  the 
Balkans  be  assured,  we  assume  that  at  least  Serbia — who 
emerges  from  the  war  with  conquests  to  her  credit  far  beyond  any- 
thing she  could  formerly  have  hoped  for — must  now  understand 
that,  by  putting  forward  excessive  demands,  she  would  now  jeopard- 
ize what  she  has  achieved.  It  is  to  the  interest  of  Serbia  that  she 
does  not  set  her  demands  too  high,  as  their  non-fulfilment  would 
merely  hurt  Serbian  pride  all  the  more. 


(463)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Oct.  29-Nov.  11,  1912.    No.  2526. 

Austria's  resolve  to  oppose  the  acquisition  of  an  Adriatic  port 
by  Serbia  cannot  be  shaken  we  are  informed,  and  meets  with  the 
approval  of  Austria's  Allies.  On  the  other  hand,  France  and  England 
openly  declare  that  they  have  no  inclination  of  rendering  the  conflict 
with  the  Triple  Alliance  more  acute  on  that  account.  We  on  our  part 
are  warning  Serbia  not  to  count  upon  her  being  able  to  involve  us.  We 
are  not  going  to  war  with  the  Triple  Alliance  on  account  of  a  Serbian 
port  on  the  Adriatic. 

As  to  the  alleged  resolve  of  the  Allies  to  divide  among  them- 
selves the  whole  of  European  Turkey,  regardless  of  the  interests 
of  Austria  and  Italy,  we  are  likewise  warning  them  of  the  conse- 
quences to  which  such  an  unreasonable  policy  might  lead,  as  Serbia 
would  thus  lose  the  sympathies  of  France  and  England.  It  is 
dangerous  not  to  take  facts  into  consideration.  Therefore  one  can- 
not close  one's  eyes  to  the  conviction  that  it  will  be  necessary  to  create 
a  coastal  state  of  Albania.'^  If  the  Serbians  show  more  inclination  to 
yield  it  will  be  easier,  when  the  boundaries  and  the  organisation  of 
this  Albanian  State  come  to  be  determined,  to  insist  on  favourable 
terms  and  to  obtain  economic  advantages  for  Serbia.  The  more 
overbearing  the  attitude  of  Serbia,  the  greater  the  danger  of  her 
becoming  isolated.  Please,  speak  quite  openly  to  Pashitch  and 
warn  him  of  an  expedition  to  Durazzo.  The  Serbians  should  not 
place  us  in  the  predicament  of  being  compelled  to  break  with  them,  as 
they  will  do  if  we  should  be  forced  openly  to  acknowledge  that  they 
have  gone  too  far  in  this  affair. 

*Upon  which  Austria-Hungary  and  Italy  insisted. 


RUSSO-BULGARIAN  CONFLICT  IN  TURKEY        397 

(464)  Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.    Telegram,    Oct.  28- 
Nov.  11,  1912.    No.  2540. 

We  have  gained  the  impression  that  Austria  is  firmly  resolved 
not  to  admit  Serbia  to  the  Adriatic  Sea  and  that  she  has  made  sure 
of  the  support  of  her  Allies.  In  consideration  of  this  solidarity  among 
the  Powers  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  it  is  most  important  for  us  to  know 
what  the  attitude  of  France  and  England  would  be  if  it  should  not  be 
possible  to  prevent  active  proceedings  on  the  part  of  Austria. 

I  have  tried  to  convince  the  Austrian  Ambassador  that  such 
a  step  would  be  dangerous  and  inexpedient.  I  have  asked  Thurn 
to  enquire  of  Vienna  by  telegraph  whether  it  might  be  thought 
possible  to  let  Serbia  have  a  port  on  the  Adriatic  Sea  if 
this  port  were  given  a  purely  commercial  character.  The  Ambassador 
doubts  that  this  will  be  possible  and  points,  on  the  other  hand,  to 
his  Government's  readiness  to  agree  to  an  absolutely  equivalent 
securing  of  Serbian  economic  interests  as  well  as  to  the  railway 
transit  to  the  Adriatic  or  to  Saloniki. 

I  assume  that  it  will  become  necessary  in  the  near  future  to 
establish  some  sort  of  balance  between  the  aspirations  of  Austria 
and  the  economic  as  well  as  political  interests  of  Serbia.  It  is  of 
paramount  importance  that  Albanian  territory  should  be  diminished  as 
far  as  possible  and  that  certain  guarantees  referring  to  the  future  organi- 
sation of  that  country  be  obtained.  These  matters  might  form  the  sub- 
ject of  a  preliminary  exchange  of  views,  but  a  final  decision  can 
only  be  reached  by  all  the  Powers  in  common,  after  all  pertinent 
questions  have  been  carefully  considered.  It  therefore  appears  to 
us  improper  that  Austria  should  now  wish  to  settle  the  question  of 
Serbian  access  to  the  Adriatic  in  a  final  manner. 

(465)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram,  Oct. 
29-Nov.  11,  1912.    No.  315. 

I  asked  Grey  whether  he  preferred  this  or  that  solution 

of  the  Serbian  question?  He  replied,  he  considered  the  interests  of 
Austria  to  be  analogous  to  those  of  Serbia,  and  he  thought  that  for 
Serbia  as  well  as  for  Austria  a  railway  under  Serbian  administra- 
tion and  control,  leading  to  a  port  yet  to  be  more  precisely  desig- 
nated, might  satisfy  the  legitimate  demands  of  Serbia  as  well  as 
the  requirements  of  the  general  political  situation. 


398 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


(466)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Oct.  SO-Nov.  12,  1912.    No.  316. 

Paul  Cambon  read  m,e,  in  strict  confidence,  two  telegrams  from 
Jules  Cambon  to  Poincare  which  referred  to  the  wellknown  inter- 
view of  Kiderlen  and  the  Serbian  Charge  d' Affaires.  One  contains 
Kiderlen*s  version,  the  other  that  of  the  Serbian  representative. 
I  detect  an  important  omission  in  the  latter  telegram.  As  I  do  not 
know  whether  Poincare  has  communicated  the  contents  of  both 
telegrams  to  our  Ambassador  at  Paris,  I  wish  to  make  good  the 
possible  omission.  The  Serbian  Charge  d'Affaires  asked  whether 
Germany,  in  the  event  of  a  war  between  Russia  and  Austria  on  account 
of  the  pending  Austrian-Serbian  conflict  would  regard  this  as  a  ''casus 
foederis/'  and  when,  thereupon,  an  answer  in  the  affirmative  had  been 
given,  he  enquired  if  a  ''casus  foederis'*  would  also  be  established  if 
France  were  not  to  take  part  in  the  war?  Kiderlen  replied  that  even 
in  such  a  case  Germany  would  take  up  arms,  ^ 


(467)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  1-14,  1912.    No.  319. 


4 


Grey  has  given  me  the  following  information  as  to  his  inter- 
view with  Count  Mensdorff,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador. 
Acting  on  Berchtold's  instructions,  the  latter  had  first  declared  that 
the  Minister,  like  Sir  Edward  himself,  would  look  upon  military 
operations  by  Serbia  in  Albania  as  warlike  measures  the  justifi- 
cation of  which  could  not  be  disputed ;  he  did  not,  however,  share 
Sir  Edward's  view  that  an  exchange  of  opinions  between  Austria 
and  Serbia  might  have  been  avoided:  in  the  first  place,  because 
Serbia  had  taken  the  initiative;  and  secondly,  because  Austria 
wished  to  prevent  Serbia  from  securing  for  herself,  by  force  of 
arms,  a  pawn,  the  possession  of  which  was  likely  to  influence  the 
territorial  boundaries  of  Albania.  Grey  read  Mensdorff  the  tele- 
gram which  he  had  sent  to  Belgrade  and  added  that  he  knew 
that  Russia  had  given  equally  plain  counsel  at  Belgrade;  he  took 
cognizance  with  lively  satisfaction  of  the  Austrian  standpoint  re- 
garding the  Serbian  operations,  and  he  believed  he  might  conclude 
therefrom  that  the  Vienna  Cabinet  would  refrain  from  making 


*  If  the  German  secretary  of  foreign  affairs  really  did  make  such  a  statement, 
none  would  have  reason  to  envy  the  German  public. 


RUSSO-BULGARIAN  CONFLICT  IN  TURKEY        399 

any  threats.  Mensdorff  replied  that  was  exactly  his  view.  ^  Grey 
particularly  emphasized  to  Mensdorff  the  danger  and  inexpediency 
of  such  a  threat. 

(468)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  1-14,  1912.    No.  320. 

Your  telegram  2540  received. 

Have  communicated  its  contents  to  Grey.  He  adheres  to  his 
standpoint  regarding  the  Serbian  aspirations  in  Albania  and  the 
danger  of  an  Austrian  military  action  against  Serbia.  He  touched 
upon  these  two  points  in  his  conversation  with  Mensdorff  concern- 
ing which  I  reported  in  my  telegram  No.  319.  In  accordance  with 
your  wishes  he  counselled  moderation  at  Belgrade.  When  I  drew 
Grey's  attention  to  the  solidarity  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  and  asked  him 
if  he  could  tell  me  anything  about  England's  attitude  in  case  our  efforts 
to  prevent  an  Austrian  action  were  not  successful,  he  replied,  after 
some  moments'  reflection,  that  it  was  impossible  for  him  to  give  a 
direct  answer  to  a  question  referring  to  a  possibility  which,  since  his 
interview  with  Mensdorff,  no  longer  appeared  probable,  and  also  be- 
cause the  attitude  of  England  depended,  above  all,  on  the  attitude  of 
the  remaining  Powers.  The  attitude  of  solidarity  gave  us  valuable  in- 
dications in  that  respect  but  no  positive  facts. 

(469)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  1-14,  1912.    No.  321. 

To  complete  my  telegram  No.  320.    Personal. 

I  have  treated  the  question  of  the  eventual  attitude  of  England 
with  a  certain  amount  of  discretion  and,  for  various  reasons,  did 
not  express  myself  explicitly.  In  the  first  place,  because  Cambon 
had  already  discussed  this  point  with  Grey.  Grey  had  told  him  that 
we  had  been  assured  of  the  diplomatic  support  of  England,  but  that, 
for  the  present,  a  direct  question  as  to  the  opening  of  hostilities  would 
place  him  in  a  different  position.  It  is  my  belief  that  it  will  depend 
upon  events  how  this  question  is  going  to  be  solved.  Moreover, 
public  opinion  to-day  is  satisfied  with  the  results  obtained  for  the 
Slav  Cause,2  and  does  not  think  of  war.    Unfortunately,  on  top  of 

^  Mensdorff's  role  would  seem  to  be  a  peculiar  one ;  in  addition  to  being  the 
familiar  of  Count  Benckendorff,  Russian  Ambassador,  he  seems  to  have  been  too 
easily  impressed  by  Grey. 

*  Surely  not  British  public  Opinion, 


400 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


this,  comes  the  circumstance  of  a  Ministerial  crisis  which,  though 
probably  postponed,  has  shaken  the  position  of  the  Cabinet.  In 
this  connection  Bonar  Law  again  repeated  at  the  beginning  of  yes- 
terday's debate  that  he  had  perfect  confidence  in  the  foreign  policy 
of  the  Cabinet  and  that  this  confidence  would  be  retained  in  criti- 
cal times  as  well. 

Grey  himself  has  spoken  to  me  about  the  ministerial  crisis  and 
told  me  that  it  would  not  affect  foreign  policy.  He  added  in  strict 
confidence  that  in  this  respect  he  was  in  constant  touch  with 
Lansdowne.  It  must  be  observed  that  Grey  said  nothing  that  could 
lead  me  to  assume  that  England  would  refrain  from  interference. 

Under  the  present  circumstances  Grey's  answer  is  all  I  could 
expect.  The  mentioning  of  the  role  of  the  other  Powers  connects 
Grey's  answer  with  the  statement  which  Nicolson  made  to  Cambon 
and  which  I  should  not  have  mentioned  otherwise,  because  Nicol- 
son only  expressed  his  personal  opinion  and  has  not  the  compe- 
tence to  answer  such  a  question:  Nicolson  told  Cambon,  with  every 
reservation,  that,  if  the  Triple  Alliance  were  fighting  against  the  En- 
tente, England  would,  he  thought,  take  part  in  the  war.  I  must  add, 
however,  that  Nicolson's  views  do  not  always  reflect  Grey's  views. 
I  believe  Grey  does  not  think  the  moment  has  arrived  for  submit- 
ting this  question  to  the  Cabinet. 


(470)     Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris. 
Nov.  1-14,  1912. 


Confidential  Letter, 


I 


In  consideration  of  the  significance  of  the  statements  which 
were  made  to  you  by  the  French  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and 
which  were  contained  in  your  letter  of  Oct.  25-Nov.  7,  I  quite  agree 
with  you  that  it  is  desirable  that  the  new  standpoint  of  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  Republic  of  France  with  regard  to  an  eventual  ex- 
pansion of  Austria  in  the  Balkans  be  fixed.  I  agree,  therefore,  that 
Poincare's  letter  should  be  answered  by  us  likewise  in  writing, 
and,  as  the  letter  of  the  French  Minister  was  addressed  to  you,  it 
would  be  best  if  our  answer  were  also  given  through  you.  I  en- 
close a  draft  for  such  a  letter  and  I  think  I  ought  to  add  the  fol- 
lowing consideration. 

All  information  at  our  disposal  points  to  the  fact  that  at  least  fo^ 
the  present  Austria  is  not  striving  for  any  territorial  acquisitions 


RUSSO-BULGARIAN  CONFLICT  IN  TURKEY        401 

the  Balkans.  Notwithstanding,  Austria  might — entirely  according 
to  the  way  things  will  develop,  and  in  consideration  of  the  conflict 
with  Serbia  over  the  access  to  the  Adriatic — resolve  upon  the  an- 
nexation of  Turkish  or  even  of  Serbian  territory. 

In  both  cases  it  would  be  most  important  for  us  to  be  sure  that, 
in  case  of  an  intervention  on  our  part,  France  will  not  remain  indif- 
ferent. On  the  other  hand,  it  must  be  taken  into  account  that  the 
situation  in  the  Balkans  is  changing  very  quickly,  and  we  are  un- 
able to  foresee  all  chance  happenings  that  might  induce  us  to 
adopt  this  or  that  measure,  and  I  think  it  necessary,  therefore,  that 
in  our  negotiations  with  the  foreign  Cabinets  we  should  avoid  any- 
thing that  might  restrict  our  freedom  of  action  in  the  future.  In  this 
respect  it  seems  desirable  to  me  that  any  declarations  of  too  categori- 
cal a  nature  in  your  proposed  written  statement  be  avoided,  such  as  are 
expressed,  for  instance,  in  the  words  of  the  French  Minister  ''to  oppose 
the  territorial  expansion  of  any  Great  Power  in  the  Balkans."  For 
that  might  also  apply  -to  Russia  in  the  region  of  the  Straits.^  Naturally, 
I  mention  this  last  consideration  exclusively  for  your  private  informa- 
tion. 

(471)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Draft  of  a  Letter. 

I  did  not  fail  to  submit  the  contents  of  your  letter  of  Nov.  4th 
to  the  Russian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  M.  Sazonoff  authorises 
me  to  declare  that  Russia  like  France  could  not  regard  indifferently 
a  territorial  aggrandisement  of  Austria  in  the  Balkans.^  He  has  much 
pleasure  in  taking  note  of  the  French  Government's  view  that  the  in- 
terests of  France  would  be  affected  by  such  an  eventuality.  In  this 
respect,  the  Russian  Government  is  prepared  to  come  to  an  understand- 
ing with  the  Cabinets  of  Paris  and  London  upon  the  mode  of  action 
which  would  become  necessary  in  such  a  case. 

(472)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sasonoff.     Telegram,  Nov. 
3-16,  1912.    No.  Z2Z. 

As  Grey  confidentially  informs  me,  the  Italian  Ambassador 
has  declared  that,  if  it  was  a  question  of  a  guarantee  for  Albania, 

*  Which  was  SazonofiF's  arriere  pensee. 

'  "Austria"  substituted  for  "any  Great  Power,"  as  proposed  by  Poincarc. 


402 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


he  thought  that  his  Government  would  prefer  a  guarantee  of  all  Powers 
to  the  guarantee  of  Austria  and  Italy  alone. 


I 


• 


(473)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  5-18,  1912.    No.  324. 

Nicolsoti  read  me  a  telegram  from  Buchanan  which  reports 
your  last  conversations  with  the  representatives  of  Germany  and 
Austria.  He  informed  me  of  the  purport  of  the  answer  which  Grey 
thinks  he  will  give  Buchanan.  Grey  attaches  the  greatest  impor- 
tance to  the  settlement,  in  principle,  of  the  Albanian  question. 
Nicolson  laid  stress  on  that  point  because  he  thinks  it  will  be  impos- 
sible to  influence  Austria  effectually  unless,  at  the  same  time, 
reassuring  declarations  be  made  to  her  regarding  the  standpoint 
the  Powers,  including  Russia,  in  the  Albanian  question. 

I  replied  you  had  already  admitted  the  possibility  of  an  auton- 
omous Albanian  coastal-State.  Nicolson  replied  that  a  declaration 
to  this  effect  must  be  made  at  Vienna,  and  he  hoped  you  would  not 
raise  any  objections  to  this.  In  view  of  your  telegram  No.  2540,  I 
really  believe  that  would  be  most  desirable.  The  standpoint  of  "the 
Balkans  for  the  Balkan  Peoples"  will  surely  also  be  applied  to  the 
Albanians.  ■j 

The  obduracy  of  the  Serbians  creates  no  good  impression  here.  I^ 
view  of  the  grave  consequences  which  might  attend  the  present  situa- 
tion, the  most  important,  perhaps  the  crucial,  point  so  far  as  England 
is  concerned,  is  this:  that  apart  from  the  utmost  unanimity  in  the  most 
important  questions,  everything  be  avoided  that  might  be  construed  as 
a  Serbian  provocation,  and  that  our  support  be  given  only  upon  this 
condition;  in  that  way  we  should  let  the  responsibility  for  an  aggressive 
policy  redound  exclusively  upon  Austria.  The  tone  adopted  by  Serbia 
and  Montenegro  is  in  itself  producing  the  impression  that  the  Austrian 
Government  manifests  calmness  and  even  patience.  I  attach  the  great- 
est importance  to  this  circumstance.  This  consideration  will  be 
further  dealt  with  in  my  letter  which  you  will  receive  by  courier.^ 

*  Documents  456  to  473  are  given  in  this  chapter,  because  in  them  is  laid  bare 
the  extent  of  Sazonoff's  program  of  reinforcing  Serbia,  thus  early  in  the  Balkan 
crisis,  as  against  intractable  Bulgaria.  In  order  to  please  the  Serbs,  Sazonoff  was 
willing  to  sacrifice  Albania,  and  when  he  found  that  this  would  be  difficult  he 
thought  of  Albania  as  a  coastal  State. 


VIII 

SAZONOFF  AND  SERBIA'S  PORT  ON  THE  ADRIATIC 

(November  1912) 

(474)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sasonoff.    Telegram,  Nov.  4-17, 
1912.    No.  369. 

In  the  course  of  a  conversation  concerning  the  French  reply  to 
my  communications  referring  to  the  Austro-Serbian  conflict,  Poin- 
care  explained  to  me  that  it  would  he  impossible  for  him  to  say,  even 
privately,  zvhich  course  French  policy  would  adopt  in  case  of  active  inter- 
vention on  the  part  of  Austria,  before  the  Russian  Government  had 
communicated  to  him  its  own  views  on  the  subject.  It  is  for  Russia,  he 
remarked  to  me,  to  take  the  initiative  in  a  question  in  which  she  is  inter- 
ested above  all  others;  whilst  it  will  be  France's  task  to  give  her  full  and 
active  support.  If  the  French  Government  were  to  take  the  initiative 
itself,  it  would  either  run  the  risk  of  exceeding  the  intentions  of  its 
ally,  or  of  not  doing  them  justice.  In  order  to  avoid  all  possibility  of 
doubt  as  to  how  far  we  should  carry  our  support  of  Serbia,  I  thought 
it  necessary  to  point  out  a  passage  from  the  instructions  of  the 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  to  our  Minister  at  Belgrade  in  which  it 
is  said,  that  France  and  England  had  openly  declared  that  they  are 
by  no  means  disposed  to  allow  an  accentuation  of  the  conflict  with 
the  Triple  Alliance. 

All  in  all,  Poincare  added,  this  means,  that  if  Russia  makes  war, 
France  will  also  make  war,  because  we  know  that  Germany  will  stand 
by  Austria  in  this  question.  In  answer  to  my  query,  whether  he  knew 
England's  point  of  view  in  this  matter,  Poincare  said  that,  according 
to  his  information,  the  London  Cabinet  would  for  the  moment  confine 
itself  to  promising  Russia  its  entire  diplomatic  support,  but  that  this 
would  not  under  certain  conditions  exclude  more  energetic  assistance. 

403 


404  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

(475)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  5-18,  1912.    No.  372.         

In  order  to  avoid  any  misunderstanding,, and  in  consideration  of 
the  great  importance  attaching  to  the  question,  I  read  my  telegram 
369  to  Poincare,  who  is  completely  in  agreement  with  its  text. 

He  merely  asked  me  more  precisely  to  develop  his  ideas  regarding  one 
point,  namely  that  which  concerns  the  conditions  on  which  France  would 
wage  war. 

''It  must  he  well  understood,"  he  said,  "that  France  would  go 
war  if  the  particular  case  of  the  casus  foederis  provided  for  in  the 
alliance  be  fulfilled,  that  is,  if  Germany  were  to  support  Austria  b 
force  of  arms  against  Russia."  ^ 


(476)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sazonoff.    Letter,  Nov.  7-20, 
1912. 


I 


My  telegrams  of  the  last  fortnight  have  informed  you  of  my 
various  interviews  with  Grey.  I  deem  it  necessary  to-day  to  refer 
to  your  telegram  2540,  in  which  I  was  instructed  to  ask  Grey  what 
the  attitude  of  England  would  be  if  Austria  proceeds  to  take  mili- 
tary measures  against  Serbia. 

As  I  have  already  telegraphed  you,  Grey  answered,  that  he  could 
not  give  me  a  definite  reply  until  he  knew  what  the  other  powers  ^^^(l 
going  to  do.  You  will  notice  that  the  Foreign  Secretary,  without  coi^^ 
sidering  the  precise  form  of  my  question,  and  without  any  preliminaries, 
has  taken  into  consideration  the  last  eventuality.  I  think  I  do  not  err  in 
asserting  that  Grey,  in  speaking  of  the  attitude  of  the  other  Powers, 
did  not  mean  to  say  that  he  wanted  to  know  what  our  programme 
would  be.  He  assumed  the  standpoint  of  an  actual  conflict.  It  is  there- 
fore necessary  to  ascertain  what  would  be  the  attitude  of  France, 
Germany  and  also  of  Italy. 

You  will  recall  that,  during  the  Bosnian  Crisis,  Grey  had  mentioned 
to  me  that  the  possibility  of  a  German  hegemony  would  be  a  menace 
to  peace.  Lately,  that  is  during  the  negotiations  between  England 
and  Germany,  which  had  been  the  result  of  Lord  Haldane*s  visit, 
these  negotiations  had  been  frustrated  by  the  formula,  that  England, 
although  she  did  not  join  or  intended  to  join  a  combination  of 

*  The  documents  show  that  Russia  had  reserved  for  herself  "freedom  of  action^ 
to  the  exclusion  of  Austria-Hungary,  the  neighbor  state  of  the  Balkans,  and 
France  supported  her  ally  in  this. 


SAZONOFF  AND  SERBIA'S  ADRIATIC  PORT       405 

Powers  which  had  aggressive  designs  on  Germany,  desired  to  retain 
a  free  hand  in  case  of  an  aggressive  policy  on  the  part  of  Germany. 
/  believe  that  the  British  Government  will  adhere  to  these  two  principles 
at  present. 

Your  Excellency  has  seen  by  my  telegram  that  I  have  not  in- 
sisted further  upon  this  question.  I  believe  it  would  have  been 
useless.  He  had  told  me  enough  to  prove  to  us,  that,  under  certain 
special  conditions,  England  would  enter  the  war.  For  this,  in  my  opinion, 
two  conditions  are  necessary:  in  the  first  place,  the  active  intervention 
of  France  must  make  this  war  a  general  one;  secondly,  it  is  absolutely 
necessary  that  the  responsibility  for  the  aggression  fall  upon  our  oppon- 
ents. ^  I  believe  it  is  absolutely  necessary  that  we  keep  this  point 
well  in  mind.  First  of  all,  it  involves  the  necessity  of  maintaining 
the  principle  of  our  own  disinterestedness. 

By  means  of  this  principle  we  obtain  an  influence  which  may  possibly 
be  a  decisive  one.  Should  we  bring  up  questions,  as,  for  instance, 
that  of  the  Straits,  or  others  in  Asia  Minor,  where  Russian  interests 
alone  are  at  stake,  we  should  most  certainly  deprive  ourselves  of 
this  influence.  Like  Your  Excellency,  I  am  well  aware  of  the  vast  im- 
portance which  England's  participation  in  case  of  war  would  have  for  us 
and  if  it  is  the  question  of  a  sacrifice  on  our  part,  I  think  that  we  must 
make  this  sacrifice.  I  repeat,  judging  by  present  public  opinion  in  Eng- 
land, and  consequently  in  the  eyes  of  the  British  Government  itself,  the 
aggressor,  according  to  the  present  feeling  in  the  country,  would  be  in  the 
wrong.  It  will  be  necessary  clearly  to  emphasise  the  aggressive  char- 
acter of  Austrian  and  German  policy.  This  will  be  all  the  more  easy 
for  us  if  we  are  true  to  the  standpoint  which  we  have  maintained 
since  the  beginning  of  the  crisis.  It  is  only  necessary  that  we 
remain  logical. 

As  to  English  public  opinion,  no  change  has  taken  place  during 
this  last  fortnight.  The  part  of  the  public  that  desires  peace  has 
been  reassured  with  regard  to  the  future  of  the  Balkan  peoples. 
Nobody  in  England  doubts  their  being  the  victors.  England's 
strong  sympathy  for  these  nations  is  gratified.  This  results  in  an 
optimism  which  is  not  altogether  advantageous  for  us. 

As  the  end  mentioned  has  been  attained,  it  will  be  difficult  for 
public  opinion  in  England  to  understand,   that  such  causes,  as  for 

*  All  of  which  took  place  in  July,  1914. 


406  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

instance,  a  Serbian  harbour  on  the  Adriatic  or  the  size  of  Albanian 
territory,  causes  which  are  only  of  secondary  consideration  in  its  eyes, 
might  step  by  step  lead  up  to  war. 

The  same  with  certain  limitations  might  be  said  of  the  future  of 
Constantinople.  However  this  optimism  and  confidence  bring 
about  still  another  result.  Public  opinion  in  England  acknowledges  the 
indisputable  fact  that  Austria,  on  account  of  her  geographical  situation, 
has  very  important  economic  interests  in  the  Balkans,  and  the  right  to  de- 
fend these  is  conceded  to  her.  Public  opinion  is  not  farseeing  and  does 
not  trouble  about  hidden  motives.  Still,  I  believe,  that  in  this,  too,  the 
question  of  who  is  to  be  the  aggressor  will  be  of  the  greatest  significance. 
Only  under  these  circumstances  would  the  British  Government 
have  the  support  of  public  opinion  which  the  Government  needs  for 
energetic  action.  Grey  and  his  ministerial  colleagues  are,  no  doubt, 
occupied  with  reflections  of  this  kind.  I  see  the  echo  of  them  in  the 
answer  which  he  has  given  to  the  question  I  put  to  him. 

When  the  opportunity  occurs  I  shall  not  fail  to  refer  to  this 
question  again  and  send  you  as  detailed  an  account  as  possible. 


(477)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sasonoff.     Telegram,  Nov.  7- 
20,  1912.    No.  376. 

I  have  communicated  the  contents  to  Poincare,  who  thereupon 
entered  into  conversations  with  the  Ambassadors  of  Italy,  Germany 
and  Austria  on  the  same  subject.  Tittoni  confirmed  the  plan  sub- 
mitted in  telegrams  374  and  377  and  supplemented  it  by  insisting 
that  Diakowo,  Ipek  and  Prisren  must  remain  part  of  Serbia. 
Tittoni  likewise  told  him  that  you  were  obliged  to  change  your  standpoint 
on  account  of  the  excited  state  of  public  opinion  in  Russia  and  that  you 
must  support  the  Serbian  demand  of  access  to  the  Adriatic.  Tittoni  is 
very  much  concerned  about  it,  because  Italy  has  pledged  herself  to  adhere 
to  the  principle  of  Albanians  integrity  and  in  case  of  war  on  account  of 
this  question,  Italy  would  be  bound  to  give  Austria  armed  assistance. 

Poincare  observed,  that  this  would  scarcely  be  in  accordance  with 
what  he  knew  of  the  Russo-Italian  agreement  of  Racconigi.  It  was 
utterly  in  contradiction  to  the  Franco-Italian  Agreement  of  1902,  by 
virtue  of  which  France  had  the  right  of  counting  upon  Italian  neutrc 
ity  in  case  of  war  with  Germany  and  Austria. 


SAZONOFF  AND  SERBIA'S  ADRIATIC  PORT        407 

Tittoni  answered  that  the  agreement  with  Austria,  concerning 
Albania,  had  been  drawn  up  previous  to  the  understanding  with 
Austria  and  Russia  and  would  be  absolutely  binding  for  the  Italian 
Government.  This  places  Italy  in  a  most  difficult  position,  and  she 
is  therefore  endeavouring,  by  every  means  in  her  power,  to  arrive  at 
a  peaceful  solution  of  this  predicament.  In  the  course  of  the  conver- 
sation, Poincare  told  Tittoni  that  Russia  could  absolutely  rely  on  armed 
assistance  from  France,  if  the  Austro-Serbian  conflict  should  lead  to  a 
general  war.  This,  Poincare  declared,  made  a  visible  impression  on 
Tittoni. 


(478)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  10-23,  1912.    No.  383. 

Poincare  has  read  me  a  telegram  from  Vienna,  in  which  the 
French  Ambassador  reports,  that  the  tension  of  public  opinion  at 
Vienna  is  extreme  and  that  the  Austrian  Government  has  heard  of 
your  having  changed  your  point  of  view  during  the  last  few  days  in 
regard  to  the  Serbian  claims  and  are  now  willing  to  support  these 
claims.  Moreover,  the  Vienna  Cabinet  has  learned,  that  we  are  making 
extensive  military  preparations  on  the  Austrian  frontier.  Austria,  on 
her  part,  is  mobilising  three  army  corps  in  Galicia  and  has  finished  her 
military  measures  against  Serbia.  The  French  Charge  d' Affaires  added, 
that  the  German  Ambassador  is  openly  declaring  that  Germany  will  sup- 
port Austria,  and  that,  in  case  of  war,  Germany  will  only  put  small  forces 
into  the  field  against  Russia  and  direct  her  main  efforts  against  France, 
and  that  ''Germany  will  overcome  Russia  only  at  Parish' 

On  the  other  hand  Poincare  expects  that  Ismail  Kemal  Pasha, 
who  apparently  had  already  arrived  at  Durazzo,  would  within  a  few 
days  proclaim  the  independence  of  Albania  and  that  he  will  be  sup- 
ported by  the  Austrian  fleet.  For  that  reason,  the  advance  of  the 
Serbian  troops  towards  Durazzo  threatens  complications  not  only 
with  the  Albanians  but  also  with  the  Austrians,  which  would  lead 
to  the  Austrian  invasion  of  Serbia. 

All  this  alarms  the  French  Government,  and  Poincare  asks 
whether  you  still  uphold  the  point  of  view  set  forth  in  the  instruc- 
tions you  gave  to  our  Minister  at  Belgrade,  or  whether  a  change  has 
really  taken  place  in  this  respect?  Poincare  is  convinced  that  Austria, 
as  well  as  Italy,  is  firmly  resolved  not  to  allow  the  Serbians  to  get  to 


408         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

Duraszo,  and  if  you  have  actually  decided  to  aid  the  Serbian  advance  a 
this  harbour,  this  with  all  its  consequences  must  lead  to  a  conflict  between 
Russia  and  Austria.  J| 

By  way  of  answer  I  acquainted  Poincare  with  the  contents  oP" 
your  telegram  2687,  from  which  it  appears  that  you  are  endeavour- 
ing to  find  a  peaceful  solution  of  this  question  and  that  there  is  no 
reason  for  the  assumption,  that  we  are  trying  to  incite  the  Serbians 
to  any  dangerous  actions.  Upon  his  remarking  that  it  was  alleged 
from  several  sides,  that  our  Minister  at  Belgrade,  Hartwig,  ^  continued 
to  incite  the  Serbians,  I  replied  that,  from  my  experiences  in  1908,  /  was 
all  too  well  aware  how  easily  unjust  charges  were  made  against  Russia 
and  Russian  diplomats.  At  the  close,  Poincare  declared  with  emphasis 
how  extremely  important  it  was  that  Serbia  at  the  present  critical  mo- 
ment should  not  invoke  advice  given  her  by  Russia,  and  that  it  must  be 
clear  to  all  that  if  Serbia  insists  on  her  advance  on  Duraszo  she  does  so 
at  her  own  peril.  ^    Poincare  requests  me  to  inform  you  of  the  above. 


(479)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram,  Nov. 
10-23,  1912.    No.  330. 

As  Kiderlen  has  expressed  the  opinion,  that  it  would  be  exped- 
ient for  the  Powers  to  state  forthwith  what  questions  they  wish  to 
bring  up  for  discussion  at  the  conclusion  of  peace,  a  misunderstand- 
ing has  resulted  from  the  version  which  Jules  Cambon  ^  transmitted 
to  Paris  and  the  steps  taken  here  by  Lichnowsky.*  The  number  of 
points  mentioned  by  Kiderlen  are  not  the  same,  nor  are  their  con- 
tents alike. 

For  this  reason,  and  in  order  to  accelerate  the  negotiations  them- 
selves, Poincare  has  asked  Grey  whether  it  would  not  be  useful  to 
substitute  the  telegraphic  exchange  of  opinion  by  a  Conference  of 
Ambassadors  who  would  be  authorized  to  settle  the  questions  raised 
by  Kiderlen.  Grey  has  answered,  that  he  would  agree  to  this  pro- 
posal and  was  agreeable  to  the  choice  of  Paris. 

*  Notorious  as  Russian  agent  provocateur  in  Serbia  and  the  Balkans  generally. 

*  Poincare  surrendered  to  public  opinion,  the  French  press  still  holding  that 
the  claims  of  Serbia  were  unjustified  and  not  a  proper  cause  for  going  to  war. 

'  French  ambassador  at  Berlin. 

*  German  ambassador  at  London. 


SAZONOFF  AND  SERBIA'S  ADRIATIC  PORT        409 

According  to  Grey,  the  Powers  would  have  to  reserve  to  them- 
selves the  solution  of  the  following  questions : 

1.)  Albania, 

2.)  Serbia's  access  to  the  Adriatic, 

3.)  the  Greek  Isles. 

Each  of  the  Powers  might  mention  the  question  in  which  it  is 
especially  interested. 

(480)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov,  10-23,  1912.    No.  332. 

Personal.  Nicolson  is  rather  sceptical  as  regards  the  reception  of 
Poincare's  proposition,  with  reference  to  a  Serbian  harbour  on  the 
Adriatic,  will  receive  in  Germany  and  Austria.  He  believes  that 
Austria  is  determined  not  to  oppose  Serbia's  access  to  the  Mediter- 
ranean, but  that  she  would  certainly  resist  any  territorial  acquisi- 
tion. He  believes  that  the  expression  of  "neutral  harbour"  must  be 
more  clearly  defined.  He  likewise  believes  that  much  will  depend 
upon  the  meeting  of  the  Archduke^  and  Emperor  William. 
Schemua's  journey  to  Berlin  has  impressed  him  just  as  the  news  of  a 
Russian  Mobilisation,  which  is  taken  from  the  Vienna  ''Reichspost."  ^ 
It  is  feared  here,  that  the  military  measures  taken  by  us  are  more  ex- 
tensive than  those  taken  by  Austria.  It  is  admitted  that  this  may  be 
necessary.  But  this  impression  is  regrettable,  as  I  informed  you  in  my 
last  letter.  Although,  as  I  believe,  England's  attitude  will  depend  chiefly 
upon  Germany's  course  of  action,  yet  Austria's  policy  in  this  crisis  is  not 
criticised  as  severely  as  it  is  with  us.  What  is  known  of  her  present 
claim  is  compared  with  her  plans  before  the  war.  The  inference  is  to 
the  credit  of  Austria.  It  is  also  thought  that  Serbia  expects  too  much 
from  the  support  of  the  Powers  that  have  expressed  their  sympathy 
with  this  country. 

1  am  communicating  this  to  you  for  your  information. 

(481)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  11-24,  1912.    No.  333. 

The  observations  which  I  have  made  these  last  few  days  prove, 
that  Austria  will  make  no  territorial  concessions  in  Albania  in 

*  Francis  Ferdinand  of  Austria,  heir  apparent. 

"  Rather  vague.    The  sense  probably  is  that  Nicolson  was  impressed  by  both. 


410  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


M 


favour  of  Serbia.    I  believe,  that  the  utmost  that  could  be  realize 
would  be  a  neutral  harbour  on  the  territory  of  an  autonomous 
Albania.     Whatever  France's  attitude,  which  is  conditioned  by  ouMM 
treaty  of  alliance,  may  be,  I  believe,  that  we  should  lose  the  moral  sup^^ 
port  not  only  of  England  but  also  of  France,  if  we  were  to  grant  Serbia 
more  extensive  assistance.  ^1 

//  /  am  not  mistaken  it  appears,  that  public  opinion  in  Russia  t^" 
ruled  by  the  thought  of  achieving  some  revenge  for  1909.  ^  /  myself 
cherish  this  sentiment  too  mnich  to  permit  myself  to  disapprove  of  such 
a  feeling  in  Russia.  But  it  seems  to  me  also  that  we  have  already- 
achieved  this  revenge  in  an  extensive  measure — thanks  to  the  Em. 
peror*s  policy  whose  proper  representative  you  are. 

It  is  not  the  fear  of  a  conflict  with  the  Balkan  Allies  and  their 
armies  which  at  this  moment  restrains  Austria.  Only  Russia,  and 
the  position  she  occupies,  induced  Austria  to  renounce  her  pro- 
gramme as  it  existed  after  1909 :  i.  e.  any  territorial  expansion  in  the 
Sandjak  and  Saloniki.  Austria  has  also  been  compelled  at  the  same 
time  to  agree  to  the  partition  of  the  Balkans  among  the  Balkan 
Allies  and  the  creation  of  an  Albanian  State  under  the  protectorate 
of  all  the  Powers.  ^  At  least  I  an^  not  aware  that  Austria  has  pro- 
tested against  such  an  idea.  This  in  the  main  implies  a  complete 
change  in  Austrian  policy.  Moreover,  thanks  to  Russia's  wise  and  dis- 
interested policy,  the  whole  question  of  the  Balkan  has  found  an  unex- 
pected solution  without  having  brought  about  a  European  war.  ^1 

/  believe,  that  some  day,  when  public  opinion  in  Russia  will  come  t™^ 
see  things  in  this  light,  no  single  epoch  of  Russia's  modern  history  will 
appear  more  glorious.  Our  wise  and  disinterested  policy  has  won  for  us 
the  support  of  France  and  England  and  as  a  beginning  that  of  Italy  as 
well.  To  endanger  this  result,  and  that  because  of  a  secondary  consider- 
ation, concerning  Serbia's  ambition  rather  than  her  justified  interest, 
would  mean,  to  my  mind,  a  departure  from  the  way  which  we  have 
hitherto  so  successfully  followed.  ^  And  thus  we  should  perhaps  give 
our  opponents  a  favourable  opportunity  for  aggression,  when,  by  a 

*  The  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina. 

'Austria-Hungary  and  Italy  risked  war  with  the  Entente  in  defense  of  Al- 
banian autonomy.  The  former  did  not  want  to  have  the  Balkan  entirely 
slavisized,  and  Italy  had  plans  in  regard  to  Albania  that  were  agreeable  to  her 
claims  on  the  remainder  of  the  Adriatic  coast. 

•  Benckendorff  did  not  mean  what  he  said;    Sazonoff  had  to  be  cajoled  inl 
being  reasonable. 


SAZONOFF  AND  SERBIA'S  ADRIATIC  PORT       411 

final  demand  on  our  part,  the  absolute  necessity  of  which  we  can- 
not prove,  the  international  situation  should  have  changed  to  our 
disadvantage. 

Please,  excuse  the  candour  of  this  telegram.  That  which  I  tell 
you  is  the  result  of  observations  which  I  am  able  to  make  here  every 
day.  Some  day,  I  believe,  public  opinion  in  Russia  will  be  con- 
gratulating itself  on  the  result  attained  and  these  results  have  been 
obtained  without  war  by  the  authority  and  the  prestige  of  Russia 


(482)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sazonoff.    Telegram,  Nov.  12- 
25,  1912.    No.  385. 

The  Austrian  Ambassador  here  has  informed  Poincare  to-day, 
that  the  Vienna  Cabinet  cannot  allow  Serbia  access  to  San  Giovanni 
di  Medua,  even  though  this  harbour  may  be  neutralised. 

He  added,  that  Austria  is  willing  to  renounce  all  claims  of  special 
commercial  privileges  for  herself  and  to  concede  to  Serbia  a  railway 
line  to  a  neutral  harbour  on  Albanian  territory  with  the  right  of  import- 
ing arms  and  munition  in  time  of  peace  through  this  harbour. 


(483)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  12-25,  1912.    No.  386. 

I  refer  to  my  telegram  376. 

In  a  conversation  with  me,  Tittoni  in  some  measure  softened 
down  the  statements  he  made  to  Poincare.  He  declared  that  Italy 
would  be  obliged  to  assist  Austria  only  within  the  closely  defined 
frontiers  of  Albania.  Consequently,  if  Serbia  insists  on  the  seizure 
of  a  part  of  Albania,  Italy  will  be  obliged  to  act  in  conjunction  with 
Austria  and  even  to  proceed  to  an  occupation  of  Albania  in  common. 
In  his  opinion,  this  will  not  lead  to  any  serious  complications,  as  all 
the  Powers  admit  that  the  Albanian  question  has  general  European 
and  not  Serbian  importance. 

I  answered  Tittoni  that  Serbia,  in  spite  of  Russia's  pacifying  in- 
fluence, might  perhaps  provoke  a  conflict  with  Austria  in  the 
Albanian  question.  If  Austria  should  answer  this  with  an  invasion 
of  Serbia,  a  general  war  might  follow,  in  the  course  of  which, — as 
is  evident  from  statements  made  by  Poincare — Italy  would  find  her- 
self in  line  with  the  armed  opponents  of  Russia  and  France.    Tittoni 


412  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

replied  that,  according  to  his  own  personal  opinion,  Austria's  mili- 
tary measures  against  Serbia,  outside  Albania,  did  not  oblige  Italy 
to  support  Austria;  he  would  however  confer  with  San  Giuliano  on 
the  subject. 

Tittoni  says  that  Berchtold  has  given  Italy  the  categoric  assur- 
ance that  he  does  not  at  present  intend  to  make  any  claims  what- 
ever on  Serbia,  that  Austria  renounces  all  economic  privileges  for 
herself  and  agrees  to  a  double  railway  connecting  Serbia  with 
Antivari  and  a  neutral  harbour  on  Albanian  territory,  but  that 
Austria  would  oppose  a  territorial  exit  of  Serbia  to  the  Adriatic. 
Generally  speaking,  the  impression  I  received  from  the  interview 
with  Tittoni  was  that  a  means  of  preventing  an  accentuation  of  the 
conflict  would  be  a  temporary  joint  occupation  of  Albania  by  Aus- 
tria and  Italy  and  that  the  final  settling  of  the  Albanian  question 
might  then  be  placed  in  the  hands  of  Europe,  as  Italy  is  by  no  means 
desirous  of  entering  upon  a  permanent  condominium  with  Austria. 
I  have  communicated  the  contents  of  this  interview  to  Poincare 
who  is  greatly  interested  in  this  question. 


(484)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  12-25,  1912.    No,  388. 


^^^11 


Personal.  I  am  drawing  your  special  attention  to  Tittoni's  idea 
of  a  temporary  Austro-Italian  occupation  of  Albania.  It  seems  to 
me  that  such  a  plan  could  be  more  fully  developed  and  lead  to  a 
collective  occupation  of  Albania  by  European  States,  in  which  we 
might  follow  Germany's  example  in  the  Cretan  question  and  re- 
frain from  such  an  occupation  whilst  reserving  to  ourselves  a  parti- 
cipation in  the  settlement  of  the  Albanian  question.  In  this  way, 
the  Albanian  question  would  at  once  be  eliminated  from  the  Austro- 
Serbian  or  Austro-Balkan  conflict  and  it  would  be  easier  for  Serbia 
to  bow  to  a  collective  step  of  Europe  than  to  the  intervention  of 
Austria  alone. 


(485)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  13-26,  1912.    No.  390. 

The  French  Ambassador  telegraphs  from  Rome.  San  Giuliano 
thinks  himself  entitled  to  suppose  that  Austria  will  desist  from  all 
active  measures  against  the  Serbians  should  they  occupy  Durazzo. 


SAZONOFF  AND  SERBIA'S  ADRIATIC  PORT        413 

.(486)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sazonoff,     Telegram,  Nov. 
13-26,  1912.    No.  342. 

Although  Grey  has  never  asked  me  whether  you  have  changed 
your  point  of  view  in  regard  to  the  Serbian  demands,  I  know  that  the 
doubts  felt  at  Paris  have  also  found  their  way  to  him,  even  though 
Buchanan's  telegrams  proved  the  reverse.  I  have  therefore  deemed 
it  necessary  to  acquaint  Grey  with  your  answer  to  Iswolsky.  He 
merely  replied  that,  in  his  opinion,  all  these  misunderstandings 
have  in  the  main  arisen  in  consequence  of  the  attitude,  and  es- 
pecially the  language,  if  not  of  Pashitch  himself,  then  of  the  politi- 
cal leaders  of  Serbia  and  that  this  language  must  cause  anxiety  at 
Vienna. 

(487)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  13-26,  1912.    No.  345. 

Grey  has  instructed  Buchanan  to  communicate  to  you  his  opin- 
ion on  Pashitch's  utterance  in  the  "Times"  and  to  ask  for  your 
consent  to  the  declarations  he  intends  to  make  at  Belgrade.  Grey 
has  been  asked  about  this  communication  by  Lichnowsky  and 
Mensdorff  and  has  confined  himself  to  declaring  this  publication  to 
be  inopportune  and  regrettable,  as  the  solution  of  this  question  de- 
pended upon  the  Powers.  He  added  that  he  did  not  wish  to  con- 
ceal from  me  that  this  publication,  in  its  form  and  contents,  was 
fatal  and  so  apt  to  give  events  a  serious  turn,  that  he  deemed  it 
necessary  to  give  a  clear  explanation  of  his  opinion  at  Belgrade. 

Grey  said  nothing  further,  but  evidently  he  hopes  that  you  will 
not  allow  this  incident  to  pass  unnoticed. 

(488)  Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.     Telegram,  Nov. 

14-27,  1912.    No.  2738. 

I  have  telegraphed  Hartwig  the  following  on  November  7-20 
sub  No.  2659: 

The  Government  is  more  and  more  disposed  to  a  peaceful  solu- 
tion of  the  question  of  Serbian  access  to  the  Adriatic,  as  in  our  eyes, 
this  question  has  only  a  local  significance.  Serbia's  present  atti- 
tude, however,  precludes  a  peaceful  issue.  We  are  under  the  im- 
pression, that  the  Serbians  cannot  seriously  count  upon  support  on 
the  part  of  the  Balkan  Allies,  as  their  forces  are  exhausted  by  the 
war  which  has  not  come  to  an  end. 


414 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


Consequently  your  interview  and  the  explanation  by  Pashitch  are 
challenge  that  will  only  harm  the  Serbians  and  will  increase  our  difficul- 
ties in  lending  them  further  support  in  the  general  settlement  of  the  war. 
Please  dampen,  in  a  cautious  way,  the  ardour  of  Pashitch,  and  avoid  in- 
terviews which  may  lead  to  unwarranted  comments  upon,  and  accusa- 
tions against,  your  activity  which,  it  is  alleged,  is  not  in  accord  with  o\ 
general  policy. 


(489)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sazonoff. 
26,  1912.    No.  394. 


Telegram,  Nov.  13- 


Poincare  has  read  to  me  a  very  obscure  telegram  from  the 
French  Ambassador  in  St.  Petersburg,  concerning  the  question  of 
the  Straits.  Georges  Louis  reports  that  you  have  lately  changed 
your  point  of  view  and  are  no  longer  in  agreement  with  the  original 
principle  of  "neutralisation  of  the  straits."  /  told  Poincare  that,  so 
far  as  I  knew,  there  never  was  any  question  of  ''neutralising  the  straits," 
and  that  the  solution  proposed  by  us  in  1908  was  of  a  very  different 
nature.  Poincare  stated  to  me  that  if  we  have  the  intention  of  raising 
this  question,  France  will  of  course  give  us  her  most  energetic  support, 
only  she  begs  us  to  apprise  her  in  due  time  of  our  plans  and  intentions 


I 


(490) 


Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris. 
30,  1912.    No.  2764. 


Telegram,  Nov.  17- 


The  French  Ambassador  asked  me,  apparently  under  Poincare's 
instructions,  if  we  did  not  intend  to  submit  also  the  question  of  the 
straits  to  the  proposed  preliminary  conference  at  Paris.  ^  I  replied 
that  we  do  not  wish  to  anticipate  this  question  and  that  if  necessary, 
we  reserve  it  for  discussion,  all  the  more  so  as  we  are  able  to  forego 
a  strict  enumeration  of  all  questions  which  will  be  discussed  at  the 
preliminary  conference.  Our  views  as  to  the  Straits  are  contained 
in  a  letter  addressed  to  you  which  you  will  receive  by  the  next 
courier. 

*  This  refers  to  the  Ambassadorial  Conference  at  London,  called  for  the 
purpose  of  settling  the  claims  and  counter-claims  arising  from  the  Balkan  War 
then  still  in  progress.  It  is  hard  to  understand  why  Poincare  should  so  promptly 
react  to  a  suggestion  made  by  Sazonoff,  unless  he  was  anxious  to  further  bedevil 
the  situation. 


SAZONOFF  AND  SERBIA'S  ADRIATIC  PORT       415 

(491)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Confidential  Letter,  Nov.  15-28,  1912.    No. 
7S7. 

In  your  letter  of  November  27th  you  touched  upon  the  question, 
whether  it  would  not  seem  opportune  to  establish  an  understanding 
with  France  as  to  the  changes,  which  we  would  like  to  introduce 
into  the  "legal"  and  "de  facto"  status  of  the  Straits,  in  connection 
with  the  present  crisis  in  the  Balkans.  At  the  same  time,  the 
French  Ambassador  has  inquired  here  what  attitude  we  would  as- 
sume in  the  face  of  possible  demands  by  Bulgaria  in  this  respect. 
Consequently  I  think  it  my  duty  to  acquaint  you,  above  all,  with 
those  considerations,  which  have  lately  guided  our  Foreign  OfHce 
in  this  important  question. 

From  the  earliest  beginnings  of  the  crisis  we  have  kept  in  mind 
that  the  war  might  result  in  a  change  in  the  status  of  the  Straits.  Yet, 
at  the  same  time,  we  feared  to  raise  this  question  too  soon  before  the 
full  success  of  the  Balkan  States,  the  possibility  of  the  occupation  of 
Constantinople  by  their  troops,  and  the  views  of  the  other  Great  Powers, 
concerning  events  in  the  Balkan  had  clearly  revealed  themselves.  This 
consideration  has  forced  us  to  maintain  a  certain  reserve  as  to  the 
English  proposal  to  discuss  the  question  of  an  eventual  interna- 
tionalisation  of  Constantinople  and  of  new  guarantees  as  to  the 
status  of  the  Straits.  We  believe  that  the  vital  interests  of  Russia 
in  the  Straits  cannot  be  protected  by  any  legal  guarantees  or  stipula- 
tions, as  these  could  always  be  circumvened ;  we  always  must  rather 
consider  the  question:  by  what  actual  force  is  it  "de  facto"  possible  to 
protect  a  given  status  of  the  Straits  from  infringements f 

As  a  matter  of  course,  we  have  shown  still  more  reticence  to- 
wards suggestions  coming  from  Vienna,  to  establish  a  certain 
parallelism  between  our  interests  and  those  of  Austria-Hungary: 
Russia  should  declare  herself  uninterested  concerning  the  western  part 
of  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  while  Austria  would  concede  to  us  full  free- 
dom of  action  in  Constantinople.  Assuming,  on  the  one  hand,  that 
any  change  in  the  regime  of  the  Straits  could  take  shape  only  after 
the  termination  of  the  war,  and  that,  on  the  other  hand,  we  cannot 
enter  into  the  question  of  compensations,  as  this  would  be  harmful 
to  the  interests  of  the  Balkan  States,  we  have  until  now  maintained 
a  waiting  attitude,  without,  of  course,  neglecting  to  seize  the  propi- 
tious moment  to  give  clear  expression  to  our  desiderata. 


416         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


1 


Though  the  further  development  of  the  war  cannot  as  yet  be 
foreseen,  we  may  yet  take  it  for  granted  that  the  advance  of  the 
Allies  has  now  already  reached  its  culminating  point  and  that 
the  possibility  of  an  occupation  of  Constantinople  is  very  re- 
mote indeed.  Therefore  our  first  assumption  remains,  that  Con- 
stantinople and  a  sufficiently  large  strip  of  land  in  Europe  will 
remain  in  Turkish  possession.  It  is  to  be  supposed  that  Bulgaria, 
even  after  a  victorious  war,  will  require  a  considerable  time  to  re- 
cuperate from  her  losses  and  to  establish  herself  finally  in  the 
conquered  territories.  Turkey,  weakened  and  vanquished,  must  face 
tasks  no  less  difficult.  Russia,  having  abstained  from  participating  in 
the  war,  is  now,  on  the  one  hand,  able  to  increase  her  influence  over  the 
Balkan  States,  including  possibly  also  Roumania — on  the  other  hand, 
to  consolidate  her  position  in  Turkey  for  whom  friendly  relations  witi 
Russia  are  now  more  important  than  ever. 

All  this  induces  us  at  the  present  moment  to  be  particularly  cau- 
tious when  answering  proposals  which  might  be  made  to  us  by  other 
Powers  with  regard  to  the  Straits.  We  must  beware  of  agreeing  to 
the  establishment  of  any  restrictive  guarantees  which  might  in  future 
form  a  hindrance  to  a  final  solution  in  accordance  with  our  interests. 
On  the  other  hand,  we  cannot  miss  the  present  favourable  oppor- 
tunity to  introduce  a  few  less  radical  but,  nevertheless,  important 
modifications  of  the  actual  regime.  We  think  it  best  to  deal  with 
the  Straits  question  as  in  1908,  i.e.,  to  enable  the  border  States  of 
the  Black  Sea  to  have  free  passage  for  their  men-of-war  in  times 
of  peace  under  certain  conditions  which  guarantee  the  safety  of 
Constantinople.  Naturally,  there  is  at  present  no  possibility  of 
signing  a  onesided  agreement  between  Russia  and  Turkey  on  this 
question ;  such  an  agreement  would  be  in  contradiction  to  our  rela- 
tions with  the  Balkan  States.  It  would  also  hardly  be  necessary, 
for,  instead  of  friendly  assurances  which  remained  at  the  time 
without  result  on  account  of  the  self-consciousness  displayed  by 
the  Turks,  we  now  possess  more  effective  means  for  influencing 
Turkey,  particularly  at  this  moment,  when  part  of  the  Turkish 
army  has  been  transferred  from  our  frontier  to  the  theatre  of  war. 
We  must,  naturally,  pay  the  greatest  attention  to  the  attitude  of  the 
Great  Powers,  and  we  can  state  as  a  fact,  that  during  recent  years  the 
ground  has  been  well  prepared  for  a  solution  in  our  favour. 


Ii 


SAZONOFF  AND  SERBIANS  ADRIATIC  PORT        417 

As  you  are  aware,  our  wishes  in  this  question  cannot  surprise 
any  of  the  European  Governments,  and  all  of  them  have  in  their 
time  expressed  their  conditional  consent.  In  no  way  do  we  wish  to 
adopt  the  theory  of  agreement  or  compensation,  as  far  as  Austria 
is  concerned;  but  we  have  never  denied,  that  Austrian  economic 
and  political  interests  in  the  Balkans  have  to  be  taken  into  account. 
We  have,  therefore,  agreed  to  the  principle  of  an  autonomous  Al- 
banian state  bordering  on  the  sea.^ 

As  to  the  question  of  a  Serbian  corridor  to  the  Adriatic,  we  have 
advised  the  Belgrade  Cabinet  to  consider  the  interests  of  its  neighbour. 
We  therefore  consider  ourselves  entitled  to  expect  the  Vienna  Cabinet 
to  adopt  a  similar  attitude  as  to  our  interests  in  the  Straits.  At  all 
events,  we  believe  that  the  opposition  of  Austrian  diplomacy  in 
this  question  would  scarcely  be  able  to  form  a  grave  obstacle  to 
the  fulfilment  of  our  extremely  moderate  wishes. 

Such  are  in  general  the  considerations  which  guide  us  in  the 
question  of  the  Straits.  In  communicating  them  to  you — in  case 
you  should  speak  to  Poincare  on  this  subject,  I  deem  it  necessary 
to  add  that  we  do  not  think  it  advisable  to  come  forward  at  present 
with  any  independent  proposal,  since  the  theory  of  cornpensations 
(as  shown  above)  does  not  serve  our  interests.  But  should  cir- 
cumstances change  and  this  question  become  part  of  the  order 
of  the  day,  then  it  would  indeed  interest  us  to  learn  the  point  of 
view  of  the  French  Government,  in  order  that  we  might  accurately 
determine  the  time  and  the  means  for  attaining  our  end. 

(492)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sazonoff.    Letter,  Nov.  20- 
Dec.  2,  1912. 

It  is  with  the  greatest  interest  that  I  have  read  your  letter  to 
our  Ambassador  in  Paris  dated  November  15-28,  No.  787. 

As  the  question  of  the  Straits  is  treated  exhaustively  in  this 
important  document,  I  need  on  my  part  make  no  further  comment. 
Your  Excellency  knows  the  present  views  of  the  London  Cabinet. 
Without  my  having  touched  on  this  question.  Grey  has  spoken 
with  perfect  frankness.  Alluding  to  the  negotiations  of  1908,  he 
told  me  that  the  London  Cabinet  has  agreed  to  our  intention  to 
change  the  status  of  the  Straits,  but  with  the  limitation,  that  he.  Grey, 

'  Which  to  prevent,  Sazonoff  also  was  ready  to  go  to  war  for. 

IT 


418 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


did  not  consider  the  ground  sufficiently  prepared,  nor  believed  the  cii 
cumstances  to  be  favourable.  He  has  added  that  the  situation  had 
changed  since  then.  He  also  gave  me  to  understand,  that  this 
question  is  one  of  those  which  Russia  could  propose  for  discussion 
when  the  Balkan  crisis  comes  to  an  end.  Grey  spoke  in  both  cases 
of  the  plan  which  has  been  drawn  up  by  yourself.  You  will  remem- 
ber that  this  plan  is  embodied  in  the  memorandum  transmitted  to  us 
by  Grey  at  that  time.  These  negotiations  assumed,  by  the  way, 
a  previous  understanding  on  our  side  with  Turkey.  I  do  not  be- 
lieve that  this  condition  has  changed.  In  fact  the  Turkish  Empire, 
even  though  it  issues  from  the  present  crisis  ever  so  weakened  as 
we  may  foresee  today,  has  still  not  lost  all  its  importance  in  the 
eyes  of  England.  Freed  from  friction  with  its  Christian  subjects — 
the  continual  cause  of  all  disturbances,  difHculties  and  dangers — 
Turkey  has  become  an  exclusively  Mohammedan  and  Asiatic  Em- 
pire and  represents  a  power  of  the  greatest  importance  to  England. 

Howsoever  that  might  be,  we  may  count  on  the  support  of  Eng- 
land, should  the  question  of  the  Straits,  in  the  natural  course  of 
events,  be  put  on  the  programme.  We  have  even  been  encouraged 
by  England  in  this  respect,  for  as  I  have  said  before,  I  have  dis- 
cussed this  question  with  Grey  and  with  Nicolson  not  on  my  own 
initiative.  But  naturally  the  British  Minister  judges  things  froqy_ 
his  own  point  of  view  and  not  from  that  of  Russia.  fll 

As  to  the  latter,  I  entirely  share  your  opinion,  as  expressed  in 
your  letter  to  M.  Iswolsky.  It  is  of  course  impossible  to  foresee 
how  the  Balkan  crisis  will  end,  but  I  am  convinced  even  now,  that 
at  a  moment,  when  all  powers  start  to  maintain  the  general  balance 
of  power — and,  Austria  excepted,  no  power  thinks  of  raising  any 
special  question — ^we  cannot  insist  on  a  solution  of  a  direct  Rus- 
sian question.  We  would  in  that  case  lose  a  great  deal  of  our  moral 
influence  and  would,  above  all,  pave  the  way  for  the  compensation 
theory,  which  might  become  most  dangerous  for  us,  as  for  all  Bal- 
kan States. 


(493)     Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.   Confidential  Letter, 
April  18-May  1,  1913.    No.  381. 

In  connection  with  the  impending  deliberations  of  the  Financial 
Commission  in  Paris,  I  think  it  necessary  to  acquaint  you  with 


SAZONOFF  AND  SERBIA'S  ADRIATIC  PORT        419 
certain  considerations  bearing  upon  definite  questions  of  our  policy. 

So  far  as  we  can  represent  to  ourselves  the  point  of  view  of 
the  British  Government — which,  by  the  way,  has  lately  expressed 
the  opinion  that  in  a  discussion  by  the  Great  Powers  of  their  atti- 
tude towards  Turkey,  Russia  has  the  first  voice — Grey  is  of  the 
opinion,  that  in  future  Turkish  finances  must  be  subjected  to  Euro- 
pean control.  This  control  would  be  extended  not  only  to  the 
sources  of  income,  but  also  to  the  expediency  of  the  expenses.^  In 
this  way  it  would  be  possible  to  obtain  a  restriction  of  Turkish 
armaments  and  to  use  an  eventual  surplus  for  the  improvement 
of  the  Turkish  administration. 

This  program  is  in  many  respects  alluring,  but  it  evades  the  answer 
to  one  question:  If  Turkish  armaments  are  restricted,  where  is  the  guar- 
antee for  the  effective  protection  of  Constantinople  and  the  Straits? 
As  the  frontier  between  Turkey  and  Bulgaria  will  be  a  very  extended 
one,  must  not  Turkey  make  the  utmost  efforts  to  defend  her  capital? 

This  question  put  by  us,  is  likely  to  astonish  those  who  suspect  Rus- 
sia of  harbouring  intentions  of  conquest.  We  certainly  do  not  wish 
to  anticipate  the  future,  but  we  cannot  fail  to  state  that,  if  the  ulti- 
mate defense  of  Constantinople  and  the  Straits  is  not  sufficiently 
assured,  this  fact,  instead  of  serving  our  interests,  constitutes 
merely  a  dangerous  temptation  for  Bulgaria,  and  the  question  of 
the  Straits,  if  raised  too  early,  would  place  us  in  an  extremely 
awkward  position.  If  we  have,  consequently,  on  the  one  hand,  no 
reason  for  preventing  Turkey  from  taking  the  necessary  measures 
against  a  possible  attack  on  Constantinople  and  the  Straits,  we  need, 
on  the  other  hand,  scarcely  fear  that  Turkey  would  grow  too  power- 
ful, as  she  has  just  now  suffered  an  unexampled  defeat.  And  as 
the  problem  of  the  Straits  involves  a  whole  series  of  other  ques- 
tions, the  solution  of  which  requires  careful  preparations,  it  would 
be  dangerous  and  premature  to  contemplate  now,  before  the  com- 
pletion of  this  preparatory  work,  the  possibility  of  decreasing  still 
further  the  defensive  power  of  Turkey. 

Apart  from  this,  the  connection  which  the  British  Government 
desires  to  establish  between  the  economic  revival  of  Turkey  and 

*  Which  would  have  made  of  the  Ottoman  empire  another  satrapy  of  the 
Entente,  such  as  Persia  already  was. 


420  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


her  disarmament,  contains  a  certain  inner  contradiction:  should 
the  first  end  be  attained,  and  Turkey's  financial  situation  improve, 
no  pressure  from  without  could  prevent  her  from  military  arma- 
ments. This  is  our  first  objection  against  the  establishment  of  a 
European  financial  control  over  Turkey.  As  to  the  technical  ques- 
tion, how  this  control  is  to  be  carried  into  effect,  we  have  equally 
quite  a  number  of  misgivings.  Experience  has  shown  that  a  joint 
administration,  financial  or  political,  cannot  take  the  place  of  the 
Sovereign  Power  of  the  Straits  itself.  It  is  therefore  to  be  appre- 
hended that  the  proposed  international  control  will  either  not  fulfil 
its  purpose,  or  lead  to  the  hegemony  of  one  of  the  powers,  for  in- 
stance to  that  of  Germany.  The  new  body  proposed  will  be  given 
not  only  financial,  but  also  political  functions,  and  will,  therefore, 
reveal  the  same  peculiar  features  as  any  conference  of  delegates 
representing  the  Great  Powers.  If  it  is  often  extremely  difficult  in 
practice  to  unite  all  Powers,  on  one  common  formula,  and  if  this 
can  be  achieved  only  by  keeping  the  working  of  the  formula  as  vague 
as  possible,^  this  observation  applies  all  the  more  to  the  activity  of 
the  proposed  controlling  organ  in  which  the  most  diverse  and  fre- 
quently contending  interests  of  the  different  States  would  oppose 
each  other. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  involuntarily  hesitate  to  restrict  Rus- 
sia's freedom  of  action  in  Turkey  by  establishing  a  European  con- 
trol. Events  are  developing  in  a  direction  which  might  enable  us 
to  establish  better  relations  with  Turkey  than  we  could  maintain 
heretofore — without  aiming  at  Utopian  possibilities. 

Turkey  must  clearly  recognize  that  Constantinople  and  the 
Straits  are  gravely  threatened  in  the  future.  This  danger  will 
weigh  more  heavily  in  the  eyes  of  the  Turks  than  their  traditional 
distrusts  of  Russia;  the  interest  of  preventing  the  Straits  from 
coming  under  the  dominion  of  another  power,  an  interest  common 
in  a  certain  degree  to  both  of  us,  will  bring  Turkey  closer  to  us. 
If  this  is  the  case,  the  Turks  must  realise  that  the  best  means  of 
protecting  themselves  against  Bulgaria  lies  in  the  influence  which 
Russia  exercises  at  Sofia.  This  does  not  in  the  least  presume  a 
hostile  attitude  of  Russia  towards  Bulgaria.  The  latter  knows  very 
well,  that  the  Straits  belong  to  Russia's  incontestable  sphere  of  interest 
*  The  general  practice  of  diplomacy  and  the  great  breeder  of  war. 


SAZONOFF  AND  SERBIA'S  ADRIATIC  PORT        421 

and  that  in  this  respect  any  weakness  or  hesitation  on  our  side  is  ut' 
terly  inadmissible. 

(494)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram^ 
April  27'May  10,  1913.    No.  341. 

Though  I  am  personally  convinced  that  Turkey  is  on  the  grade 
of  a  general  decline,  yet  I  must  lay  stress  on  the  fact  that  Turkish 
politicians  do  not  consider  the  situation  of  the  empire  so  hopeless, 
as  to  permit  any  extensive  international  guardianship.  They  can 
also  count  in  this  respect  on  the  support  of  several  Great  Powers.^ 
The  Entente  Powers  must  keep  this  in  view,  in  order  not  to 
come  forward  with  proposals  that  would  never  receive  general  as- 
sent. 

//  /  consider  this  question  from  the  point  of  view  of  our  own  in- 
terests, I  cannot  refrain  from  recognizing  the  fact  that  the  introduction 
of  an  international  element  into  our  relations  with  Turkey,  which  have 
been  direct  up  to  the  present,  could  only  hinder  and  delay  our  his- 
torical task  to  take  possession  of  the  Straits.  In  so  far  as  Turkey  is 
not  a  large  market  for  the  sale  of  our  goods,  we  are  not  at  all  interested 
in  her  regeneration. 

What  would  be  most  to  our  advantage  would  be  this: — The 
establishment  for  the  time  being  of  sufficient  order  in  Turkey  to 
ensure  the  personal  and  material  safety  of  the  population,  regard- 
less of  religion  and  nationality.  This  would  enable  us  to  postpone 
the  liquidation  of  Turkey  until  the  moment,  when  our  participation  in 
this  process  of  liquidation  would  afford  us  the  greatest  possible  advan- 
tages. As  you  remark  in  your  letter  391,  we  may  count  on  estab- 
lishing better  relations  with  Turkey  than  hitherto.  But  in  order  to 
weaken  the  Turkish  resistance  against  us,  we  must  strive  to  eliminate 
from  our  relations  with  Turkey  such  bodies  as  would  enable  our  rivals 
to  point  out  that  we  are  working  deliberately  against  Turkey* s  own 
interests,"^  as  for  instance,  it  is  being  done  in  the  questions  of  the  in- 
crease of  the  Turkish  customs  duty. 

*  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary. 

'  M.  de  Giers  advised  that  Russia  make  no  agreements  with  the  Powers,  so  that 
she  could  play  fast  and  loose  until  the  Ottoman  empire  should  be  surrendered 
into  her  hands  by  circumstances — a  general  war,  for  instance. 


IX 


SERBIA  AND  THE  LONDON   AMBASSADORIAL 
CONFERENCE 

(November — December  1912) 

(495)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sasonoff.    Telegram,  Nov.  13- 
26,  1912.    No.  392. 

Poincare  is  of  your  opinion.  The  idea  of  a  Conference  has 
been  suggested  several  times  by  Poincare  in  London,  Berlin  and 
Vienna.  Poincare  calls  attention  to  his  proposal  of  such  a  con- 
ference as  early  as  October  15th.  This  proposal  still  holds  good, 
so  that  a  new  initiative  would  prove  unnecessary.  hI 

Inasmuch  as  Germany  and  Austria  have  declared,  that  they 
would  attend  a  conference  only  if  an  understanding  concerning 
the  most  important  points  of  the  programme  had  been  arrived  at,^ 
Poincare  believes  that  the  preliminary  conference  which  you  pro- 
posed, would  be  the  only  practical  means  of  precluding  a  long  de- 
lay— ^which  is  inevitable  with  telegraphic  communications.  On 
the  other  hand,  Poincare  finds  it  difficult  to  take  the  initiative, 
since  these  deliberations  will  probably  take  place  at  Paris.  Ac- 
cordingly he  asks  whether  you  do  not  think  it  possible  that  the 
London  Cabinet  would  take  such  an  initiative,  since  Grey  deems 
it  expedient  that  the  conference  take  place. 


(496)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  13-26,  1912.    No.  393. 

In  conversation  with  the  French  Ambassador,  Kiderlen  ex- 
pressed his  opinion  to  the  effect,  th^t  only  the  Great  Powers 
should  participate   in  the   Conference.     Poincare   has   instructed 

'This  was  to  prevent  the  springing  of  diplomatic  traps  of  a  brand-new  make. 

422 


I 


SERBIA  AND  THE  AMBASSADORIAL  CONFERENCE  423 

Cambon  to  remind  Kiderlen,  that  in  the  proposal  of  October  15th 
the  attendance  of  the  Balkan  States  and  Roumania  was  spoken  of 
and  that  the  French  Government  was  still  adhering  to  this  stand- 
point. Poincare  believes,  that  your  proposition  simplifies  the  mat- 
ter in  as  much  as  only  the  six  Ambassadors  of  the  Great  Powers 
will  attend  the  preliminary  deliberations,  while  the  Balkan  States, 
under  certain  conditions,  could  take  part  in  the  final  conference. 
The  appointment  of  Ambassadors  with  special  authorizations  is 
under  consideration  in  London,  but  this,  according  to  Poincare, 
would  not  be  necessary. 

(497)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sasonoff.     Telegram,  Nov. 
15-28,  1912.    No.  2,A7. 

Grey  would  be  prepared  to  take  the  initiative,  but  desires  first 
to  ask  Kiderlen  to  ascertain  Berchtold's  opinion.  He  thinks  it 
more  prudent,  as  he  is  not  sure  of  Austria's  acceptance  and  be- 
cause a  refusal  or  even  a  conditional  acceptance,  on  the  part  of 
Austria,  would  jeopardize  the  success  of  the  conference.  Grey 
will  suggest  Paris,  though  he  believes  that  the  Berlin  Cabinet  may 
possibly  prefer  a  neutral  capital,  such  as  for  instance  The  Hague. 
Grey  adheres  to  the  opinion  that  this  conference  will  have  to  con- 
sider only  questions  connected  with  the  liquidation  of  the  Bal- 
kan war.  He  has  already  spoken  to  the  Ambassadors  of  Italy  and 
Germany.  He  has  made  an  important  observation  to  the  latter; 
he  told  him,  that  if  all  the  Powers  were  at  present  making  serious 
efforts  to  preserve  peace,  England  and  Germany  were  those  countries 
which  are  least  interested  in  Balkan  questions  and  therefore  most  in- 
terested in  the  preservation  of  peace.  If  war  should  break  out,  the 
real  cause  would  lie  far  deeper  than  the  secondary  causes  which  may 
provoke  the  war,  so  that  he  could  see  no  serious  guarantee  that  Eng- 
land and  Germany  would  not  both  be  drawn  into  the  war. 

(498)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  15-28,  1912.    No.  348. 

Grey  informs  me  of  a  telegram  from  Buchanan  according  to  which 
you  appear  to  be  reverting  to  an  alternative  for  Serbia's  access  to  the 
Adriatic.  Grey  does  not  believe  that  Austria  would  accept  the 
project  of  even  a  neutralised  harbour  if  its  territory  were  to  be 


424         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

Serbian.  According  to  Grey,  such  a  decision  would  jeopardize  the 
success  of  the  prospective  conference.  Grey  considers  it  most 
desirable  that  this  question  be  solved  on  the  initiative  of  Rus- 
sia in  a  form  acceptable  to  Austria. 

Grey  is  fully  aware  of  how  difficult  this  will  be;  on  the  other 
hand,  he  recalls  in  confidence  the  events  of  1909,  when  the  diplo- 
matic support  on  the  part  of  Russia  and  England  could  not  ob- 
tain for  Serbia  any  compensation  for  the  annexation  of  Bosnia; 
on  the  contrary  to-day  Russia's  moral  and  diplomatic  support  has 
enabled  Serbia  to  annex  the  Sandjak.  Grey  infers  from  this,  that 
Serbia  has  no  right  to  claim  more  from  Russia  to-day  than  the 
support  of  safeguarding  Serbian  economic  interests  in  the  Adriatic 
under  conditions  acceptable  to  Austria.  Grey  has  asked  me  to 
keep  this  conversation  confidential.  I  asked  Grey  whether  this 
consideration  was  meant  to  be  a  condition  under  which  he  would 
alone  convene  a  conference.  Grey  answered  that  it  was  not  a  condi- 
tion, but  that  he  would  consider  such  a  solution  of  the  question 
most  desirable,  as,  in  this  way,  the  results  of  the  conference  might 
perhaps  be  determined  beforehand. 


(499)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  15-28,  1912.    No.  349. 

Paul  Cambon  has  informed  Grey,  that  Kiderlen  explained  to 
Jules  Cambon,  that  it  would  be  advisable  for  the  Powers  to  state, 
without  delay,  the  points  which  they  desired  to  have  discussed  at 
the  conclusion  of  peace.  Kiderlen  has  mentioned  the  following 
points  to  Jules  Cambon: 

Albania,  Constantinople, — Germany  was  not  very  much  in- 
terested in  this  question — Adrianople,  Mount  Athos,  compensa- 
tions for  Roumania,  the  Aegaean  Isles. 

At  the  same  time  Lichnowsky  has  taken  a  similar,  if  not  wholly 
identical,  step.  With  regard  to  Albania  the  German  Government 
declares,  that  it  does  not  regard  military  occupation  on  the  part  of 
Serbia  as  a  definite  political  solution.  Concerning  Serbia's  access 
to  the  Adriatic,  Germany  proposes  a  railway  and  a  harbour,  but 
not  on  Serbian  territory;  Constantinople,  Adrianople  and  Mount 
Athos  are  mentioned  only  as  another  example  and  the  Aegaean^ 
Isles  are  not  mentioned  at  all. 


SERBIA  AND  THE  AMBASSADORIAL  CONFERENCE  425 

Grey  finds  that  these  two  steps  do  not  coincide  sufficiently  and 
deducts  from  this,  that  telegraphic  negotiations  might  cause  mis- 
understandings. This  reflection  has  urged  him  to  accept  Poin- 
care's  proposal  of  convoking  a  conference  at  which  every  Power 
could  mention  the  questions  it  is  most  interested  in.  With  regard 
to  himself,  Grey  proposes  the  three  points  mentioned  in  my  tele- 
gram 330.  In  answer  to  my  question,  he  declared  that  other  points 
might  be  added  to  the  programme  as,  for  instance,  the  Turkish 
public  debt. 

(500)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  16-29,  1912.    No.  351. 

Nicolson  told  me  last  night,  that  the  communication  recently 
made  by  Grey  to  Lichnowsky  has  been  repeated  in  a  telegram  to 
the  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin.  The  conciliatory  and  friendly 
form  in  which  Grey  couched  this  communication  does  not  alter  the  im- 
portance of  the  warning. 

I  must  add,  however,  that  Grey's  words  did  not  convey  to  me  the 
sense  of  a  definite  obligation  towards  ourselves.  I  believe  that  Grey, 
above  all,  intended  to  prevent  the  Berlin  Cabinet  from  judging  the 
situation  as  though  it  could  count  upon  England's  neutrality  in  any 
case.  I  had  pointed  out  to  Grey,  how  perilous  such  an  assumption 
might  prove  on  the  part  of  Berlin.    Grey  acted  upon  my  suggestion. 

Although  my  faith  has  been  considerably  strengthened,  neverthe- 
less, I  am  convinced  that  the  circumstances,  which  would  accompany 
the  beginning  of  hostilities,  would  exert  a  special  influence  on  the  final 
decision  of  the  British  Government.  I  deem  it  in  every  sense  neces' 
sary  that  on  the  day  Russia  takes  up  arms,  it  would  have  to  be  entirely 
clear  to  public  opinion,  that  Russia  could  not  act  otherwise  and  that 
she  had  made  use  of  every  possible  means  for  the  sake  of  peace — in  all 
questions — also  in  the  important  question  of  Serbian  access  to  the 
Adriatic. 


(501)    Sasonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.     Telegram,  Nov. 
17-30,  1912.    No.  2762. 

The  British  Ambassador  here  handed  me  a  memorandum,  in 
which  the  proposal  is  made  in  Grey's  name,  that  in  the  course  of 
the  preliminary  conference  at  Paris,  Russia  should  take  the  initia- 


426  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

tive  and  persuade  Serbia  and  Montenegro  to  content  themselves 
with  the  partition  of  the  Sandjak  of  Novi-Bazar  and  not  to  insist 
on  territorial  acquisitions  on  the  Adriatic.  We  pointed  out  to  the 
Ambassador  that  such  a  procedure  by  Russia  would  meet  with 
strong  opposition  on  the  part  of  public  opinion  in  Russia  and  create 
an  unfavourable  situation  for  Serbia,  because  the  concessions,  which 
Austria  had  already  been  forced  to  make  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war,  would  now  assume  the  aspect  of  a  new  success  on  our  part. 
After  all,  the  year  1909  cannot  be  compared  with  present  events, 
for  general  conditions,  as  well  as  the  strength  of  the  opposing  in- 
terests and  forces,  are  different  from  what  they  were  formerly. 
We  are  doing  all  we  can  to  induce  Serbia  to  be  more  yielding,  but  our 
exertions  can  only  be  crowned  with  success  if  the  Serbians  are  con- 
vinced that  we  are  doing  all  we  can  on  our  part  to  protect  their  interests 
by  peaceful  means  and  that  our  endeavours  in  this  direction  are  sup- 
ported by  France  and  England.  During  the  prospective  preliminary 
conference  at  Paris,  we  prefer  not  to  take  the  initiative,  but  to 
propose  amendments  to  the  proposals  made  by  the  other  Powers. 

(502)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram,  Nov. 
\^-Dec.  1,  1912.    No.  355. 

Your  telegram  No.  2762  received.    Personal. 

Your  objections  to  Grey's  proposal  are  entirely  justified  and  I 
have  already  made  use  of  them  here.  Grey  will  understand  us. 
I  beg  you,  however,  to  bear  in  mind,  that  Grey  is  above  all  think- 
ing of  the  possibility  of  a  war.  In  this  connection,  I  beg  you  to  ob- 
serve how  extremely  important  it  is,  that  the  blame  for  obduracy  in 
the  most  difficult  question  at  the  Conference  should  fall  upon  Austria 
alone.  It  will  not  be  easy  to  accomplish  this  and  yet  everything  may 
depend  upon  it.  At  the  critical  moment.  Grey  will  have  public 
opinion  on  his  side  only  if  Russia  has  done  all  within  her  power 
to  maintain  peace  in  so  far  as  her  position  permits.  Grey  considers 
the  possibility  of  a  harbour  on  Serbian  territory  as  out  of  the  question. 
He  is  averse  to  lending  his  support  to  this  demand  in  a  manner 
which  would  be  unpopular  in  England.  His  attitude  towards  the 
solution  of  the  question  of  a  harbour  on  Albanian  territory  is, 
however,  different :  he  is  perfectly  willing  to  give  us  his  diplomatic 
support. 


SERBIA  AND  THE  AMBASSADORIAL  CONFERENCE  427 

I  do  not  deem  it  necessary  to  enumerate  all  the  special  points 
which  we  desire  to  lay  before  the  Conference,  as  we  are  confining 
ourselves  to  the  examination  of  the  questions  proposed  by  the  other 
Powers,  Yet,  I  believe,  that  if  our  final  decision  in  this  most  iin^or- 
tant  question  should  be  shrouded  in  mystery,  an  indistinct  and  undecided 
attitude  on  the  part  of  the  British  and  possibly  also  of  the  French 
representative,  would  result  from  this,  whilst  the  representatives  of  the 
Triple  Alliance  would  be  united.  I  am  told  here  that  it  is  feared, 
that  you  have  altered  your  original  opinion  in  this  respect.  With- 
out rendering  a  service  to  the  Serbian  interests  or  helping  to  pre- 
serve peace,  this  might  later  on  seriously  imperil  Russia's  own  in- 
terests. Grey's  comparison  of  the  present  situation  with  the  year 
1909  is  intended  to  be  nothing  but  an  argument  which  might  be 
used  at  Belgrade,  as  well  as  for  influencing  public  opinion  in 
Russia  and  England.  Had  Russia  not  adopted  her  present  attitude, 
and  manifested  no  sympathy  with  the  Slav  cause,  the  victory  of  the 
Allies  would  not  have  been  possible.    This,  moreover,  is  perfectly  true. 

It  seems  to  me  that  it  is  not  proved  that  Austria  will  consent 
to  a  conference  if  this  question  be  not  clearly  defined.  If  an  Aus- 
trian refusal  should  result  from  this,  the  consequences  it  would 
entail  would  be  fatal  for  us.  In  any  case,  I  deem  it  necessary  to 
disclose  at  least  to  France  and  England  our  utmost  concessions.  I 
see  no  other  means  of  influencing  the  attitude  of  these  two  Powers. 
In  the  contrary  event,  the  Conference  might  prove  to  be  a  danger 
to  our  own  interests,  instead  of  being  a  remedy. 

(503)     Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.     Telegram,  Nov. 
ZUDec.  4,  1912.    No.  2781. 

We  are  on  principle  not  opposed  to  the  choice  of  London, 
instead  of  Paris,  for  the  prospective  preliminary  conference.  We 
learn,  however,  that  Grey  is  not  in  favour  of  the  choice  of  Lon- 
don as  he  does  not  sufficiently  command  the  French  language.^ 
On  the  other  hand,  we  are  afraid  of  hurting  Poincare's  personal 
feelings,  which  might  have  an  unfavourable  influence  on  the  degree 
of  support  that  we  are  expecting  from  our  Allies  during  the  Con- 
ference.   I  request  you  to  speak  to  Grey  about  it,  and  if  you  should 

*  The  diplomatic  manner  of  saying  that  Grey  did  not  know  that  language. 


428 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


notice  that  he  personally  prefers  Paris,  please  ask  him  to  insist 
upon  the  choice  of  Paris,  as  otherwise  the  holding  of  the  prelim- 
inary discussions  might  be  called  into  question. 

(504)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  2\-Dec.  4,  1912.    No.  2791. 

I  refer  to  my  telegram  2781.    Personal. 

The  Austrians  are  evidently  afraid  of  Iswolsky,  and  Kiderlen 
has  no  special  confidence  in  Schon.^  In  our  opinion,  these  con- 
siderations of  a  personal  nature  are  discounted  by  the  fact,  that  the 
initiative  of  the  Representatives  in  the  preliminary  conference  will 
be  determined  by  precise  instructions  from  their  Governments. 

(505)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram,  Nov.  21- 
Dec.  4,  1912.    No.  412. 

Personal.  During  a  conversation,  Poincare  declared  to  me, 
that  the  wish  of  the  Austrians,  to  hold  the  preliminary  conference 
in  London  was  not  very  complimentary  to  him  personally.  At 
the  same  time  he  gave  me  to  understand,  that  he  would  not  regret 
the  choice  of  London,  as  the  result  of  the  conference  would  be  at 
best  "piece  work."  For  my  part,  I  must  confess  that  the  deep  dis- 
trust and  lack  of  good- will  displayed  towards  me  by  Berlin  and 
Vienna  would,  in  case  I  should  participate  in  the  conference,  prove 
to  be  an  unpropitious  factor.  In  London  the  colourless  Mens- 
dorff,^  and  Lichnowsky,  who  has  not  yet  had  time  to  create  a 
position  for  himself,  will  not,  of  course,  be  able  to  cope  with  the 
influence  of  Benckendorff  and  Cambon.  It  seems  to  me  that  it 
would  therefore  not  be  particularly  advantageous  for  us  to  insist 
upon  the  choice  of  Paris. 

(506)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram,  Nov. 
22-Dec.  5,  1912.    No.  365. 

Your  telegram  2781  received. 

I  shall  not  be  able  to  speak  to  Grey  until  to-morrow.  The 
London  Cabinet  has  not  received  any  kind  of  answer  in  regard 


*Cj€rman  ambassador  at   Paris — but  the   German   government  kept   him   on 
post,  nevertheless. 

*A  fine  characterization. 


SERBIA  AND  THE  AMBASSADORIAL  CONFERENCE  429 

to  the  Ambassadorial  Conference.  Kiderlen  replied  to  Goschen^ 
that  he  was  in  sympathy  with  the  proposal  and  would  ascertain 
the  opinion  of  the  Vienna  Cabinet.  Berchtold  ^  said  that  he  would 
examine  the  proposal  and  give  his  answer  through  the  offices  of 
Mensdorff.  The  latter  has  expressed  his  personal  view  that  Berch- 
told will  formulate  certain  conditions,  Kiderlen  and  Berchtold 
have  mentioned  London  as  the  seat  of  an  eventual  conference. 

You  are  quite  right  in  what  you  say  as  to  Grey's  attitude.  He 
would  be  loath  to  accept  London  and  would  agree  to  this  only,  if 
no  other  way  out  could  be  found.  Like  yourself,  he  does  not  wish 
to  offend  Poincare  on  any  account;  it  is  for  this  reason  that  he 
prefers  Paris.  He  knows  the  difficulties;  but  will  pay  due  atten- 
tion to  all  your  considerations. 


(507)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  22-Dec,  4,  1912.    No.  366. 

Your  telegram  2791  received.     Personal. 

As  I  am  told,  Lichnowsky  and  Mensdorff  are  both  opposing 
Paris  most  energetically  and  for  the  same  reason,  Tittoni  must 
also  be  mentioned  in  this  connection.  The  Italian  Ambassador 
Imperiali  ^  shares  this  point  of  view,  but  as  I  believe,  for  personal 
reasons. 


(508)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  23-Dec.  6,  1912.    No.  368. 

The  Austrian  Ambassador  this  morning  gave  Grey  a  verbal 
answer  with  regard  to  the  Conference.  It  contains  the  Austrian 
Government's  assent  to  the  Ambassadorial  Conference,  designates 
London  as  the  place  of  meeting  and  formulates  a  condition  with  re- 
gard to  a  Serbian  harbour. 

Since  Mensdorff  says  that  a  similar  step  has  been  taken  at  St. 
Petersburg  and  Paris,  I  believe  there  is  no  necessity  for  me  to 
enter  further  into  this  stipulation.  Grey  would  like  to  have  your 
opinion  as  soon  as  possible.    He  replied  to  Mensdorff  in  general  terms. 

*  British  ambassador  at  Berlin. 

'  Austro-Hungarian  minister  of  foreign  affairs. 

'At  London. 


430  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

(509)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  23'Dec.  6,  1912.    No.  369. 

Continuation  of  my  telegram  No.  368. 

Nicolson  told  me  in  confidence  that  Grey  replied  to  Mensdorff 
to  the  effect  that  it  would  in  his  opinion  have  been  better  if  the 
question  of  a  Serbian  harbour  on  the  Adriatic  had  formed  the  sub- 
stance of  the  instructions  to  the  Austrian  representative  at  the 
Conference  instead  of  figuring,  as  now,  as  a  special  condition  on 
which  Austria  would  be  willing  to  participate  in  the  conference. 

(510)  Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.     Telegram,  Nov. 
25-Dec.  8,  1912.    No.  2829. 

The  Austrian  Ambassador  has  informed  me  of  the  consent 
of  his  Government  to  the  Ambassadorial  Conference  in  London, 
and  added  that  the  Austro-Italian  Convention  was  to  be  made  the 
point  of  departure  in  the  Albanian  question.  I  replied,  that  the 
secret  Austro-Italian  convention  could  have  significance  only  to 
the  two  contracting  Powers  and  could  in  no  wise  limit  the  abso- 
lute freedom  of  the  other  Powers.  As  to  the  Serbian  harbour,  the 
Ambassador  has  not  made  any  restrictive  conditions. 

(511)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  26-Dec.  9,  1912.    No.  2836. 

We  consider  it  most  desirable  that  the  question  of  the  Am- 
bassadorial Conference  should  be  settled  as  soon  as  possible. 
This  would  relieve  the  present  situation  which  signifies  a  great 
danger  to  European  peace.  Therefore,  if  Grey  should  find  it  dif- 
ficult to  urge  Austria  and  Germany  to  give  up  their  standpoint,  we 
on  our  part,  do  not  consider  it  right  to  insist  upon  the  choice  of 
Paris.  I  have  in  this  sense  expressed  my  opinion  to  the  French 
Ambassador,  and  added,  that  we  deeply  regret  that  the  Conference 
is  not  to  take  place  at  Paris,  but,  that,  on  the  other  hand,  I  was 
convinced  that  Poincare  would  be  of  our  opinion  and  would  see 
the  necessity  of  the  earliest  possible  meeting  of  the  Conference. 
In  answer  to  the  Ambassador's  question,  as  to  how  I  would  explain 
the  preference  given  to  London,  I  replied,  that  I  did  not  see  Austria's 
resistance  in  this  so  much  as  an  attempt  on  the  part  of  Germany  to  draw 
closer  to  England  in  the  hope  of  separating  her  from  her  friends,  Russia 
and  France, 


SERBIA  AND  THE  AMBASSADORIAL  CONFERENCE  431 

(512)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  26-Dec.  9,  1912.    No.  2838. 

Assuming  that  the  Ambassadorial  Conference  signifies  a  pre- 
paratory exchange  of  opinion  by  the  Great  Powers  regarding  the 
liquidation  of  the  war,  we  consider  that  the  Roumanian  representa- 
tives should  be  permitted  to  attend  only,  as  suggested  by  Berlin, 
if  the  matters  brought  up  for  discussion  touch  Roumanians  inter- 
ests directly.  The  representative  of  Roumania  may,  upon  an 
unanimous  vote  of  the  Ambassadors,  be  summoned  to  make  state- 
ments and  to  present  his  government's  wishes,  but  he  cannot  be 
allowed  to  participate  in  the  general  Conference. 

(513)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  26-Dec.  9,  1912.    No.  2837. 

We  consider  it  necessary  without  delay  to  enter  upon  an  ex- 
change of  views  with  Paris  and  London  concerning  the  questions 
to  be  discussed  at  the  Ambassadorial  Conference,  in  order  to  reach 
as  complete  an  understanding  as  possible.  The  most  important 
questions  are  Albania  and  Serbia's  access  to  the  Adriatic. 

As  you  are  aware,  our  main  object  is  to  guarantee  the  political 
and  economic  emancipation  of  Serbia.  At  the  same  time  we  are 
making  efforts  to  deprive  this  question  of  the  character  of  an 
Austro-Serbian,  or  even  Austro-Russian  conflict  wrongly  attrib- 
uted to  it. 

In  our  opinion,  the  best  way  out  of  this  difficulty  would  be  to 
consult  first  of  all  as  to  the  organisation  of  Albania ;  the  frontiers 
of  this  state  to  be  fixed  later  on.  In  our  opinion  Albania  ought  to 
become  an  autonomous  province  under  the  sovereignty  of  the  Sultan  and 
the  right  should  be  conceded  to  Turkey  to  maintain  there  a  certain 
number  of  troops.  You  will  receive  further  particulars  by  post. 
The  general  principle  which  we  desire  to  see  adopted  lies  in  the 
neutralisation  of  Albania  and  her  coasts  in  the  sense  that  no  other 
Power  should  have  the  right  to  create  there  any  great  influence 
for  itself. 

Serbia  must  have  the  right  to  a  direct  connection  free  of  cus- 
tom duties  with  the  sea  through  Albania  as  well  as  by  all  railways 
which  are  to  connect  Serbia  with  the  Albanian  harbours.  All  the 
military  requisites  of  Serbia  must  also  enjoy  this  freedom.  The 
connection  of  the  Serbian  railways  with  the  Albanian  harbours. 


432  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

which  can  be  established  by  an  international  syndicate,  must  vouch- 
safe a  safe  and  undisturbed  traffic  through  Albania. 

We  are  of  the  opinion,  that  the  negotiations  regarding  Albania*! 
frontiers  must  be  made  dependent  upon  Austria's  readiness  to  sat- 
isfy Serbia's  justifiable  interests.  According  to  our  opinion,  the 
frontiers  of  this  district  would  be  formed  in  the  North  by  a  line 
from  the  Adriatic  along  the  river  Drina  until  its  union  with  the 
white  Drina ;  in  the  East  from  this  point  along  the  Drina  until  the 
Lake  of  Ochrida  and  further  along  the  west  shore  of  this  lake 
directly  south,  a  little  further  east  than  Onitza,  whence  the  southern 
boundary  would  lead  in  a  direct  line  towards  Delvinjo  to  the  sea.^ 

From  the  course  of  the  negotiations,  and  in  agreement  with  the 
representatives  of  France  and  England,  you  will  see  whether  it  would 
not  prove  expedient  to  allow  Austria  to  take  the  initiative  in  fixing  the 
frontiers  of  Albania  and  to  propose  only  our  rectifications  of  the  Aus- 
trian proposals.  I  request  you  to  confer  with  Grey  about  this,  so  as 
to  establish  a  common  course  of  action, 

(514)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  21 -Dec.  10,  1912.    No.  2845. 

Identically  to  Paris.  I  am  telegraphing  to  our  Minister  at  Bel- 
grade : 

The  Serbian  Minister  has  informed  me,  in  the  name  of  his  Gov- 
ernment, that  it  is  to  be  feared  that,  within  a  week's  time,  Austria 
will  be  taking  decisive  steps  in  order  to  force  Serbia  to  give  up  all 
claim  to  an  Adriatic  harbour.  The  Belgrade  Cabinet  believes  that 
Austria's  military  measures  result  from  this.  Austria  also  desires 
a  pretext  for  intervention,  so  as  to  be  able  to  push  back  the  fron- 
tiers of  Serbia's  territorial  acquisition  as  far  to  the  East  as  pos- 
sible and  to  incorporate  Prisren  into  Albania.  The  Minister  asserts, 
that  Austria  is  contemplating  Serbia's  economic  and  political 
subjugation.  The  Serbian  Ministers'  statements,  in  conjunction 
with  the  undoubtedly  serious  general  political  situation,  are  caus- 
ing us  clearly  to  define  the  policy  which  we  intend  to  adopt  in  the 
future. 

All  the  Powers,  including  Austria,  have  agreed  to  examine  in 
common  the  questions  which  result  from  the  war.    Our  point  o£ 

*  Which  would  have  left  a  good  third  of  Albanians  out  of  Albania. 


H 


SERBIA  AND  THE  AMBASSADORIAL  CONFERENCE  433 

view  in  regard  to  the  questions  concerning  Serbia  is  known  at 
Belgrade.  We  are  prepared  to  support  Serbia's  political  and  economic 
emancipation,  as  well  as  her  access  to  the  Adriatic  through  Albanian 
territory,  whereby  actual  guarantees  must  be  given  her  for  the 
unimpeded  transit  of  military  and  commercial  goods.  We  are  like- 
wise prepared  to  insist  on  the  Albanian  frontiers  being  drawn  up 
as  far  as  possible  to  the  West,  but  we  are  of  opinion,  that  it  is  not 
possible  to  obtain  for  Serbia  sovereign  rights  over  part  of  the  Adri- 
atic coast.  We  have  agreed  to  an  interchange  of  opinions  between 
the  Ambassadors  with  the  desire  of  giving  Serbia  every  possible  as- 
sistance to  the  above  mentioned  extent.  It  is  in  Serbia's  interest 
that  we  are  not  informing  the  Vienna  Cabinet  of  our  programme,  but 
are  merely  declaring  that  the  instructions  given  to  our  representative 
are  conciliatory  in  spirit  and  give  due  consideration  to  Austria's  in- 
terests. 

But  we  must  be  certain  that  Serbia  will  submit  to  a  joint  de- 
cision by  Russia,  France  and  England,  for,  if  the  opposite  should 
prove  the  case,  Serbia  could  not  count  on  our  assistance,  as 
neither  France  nor  England  would  support  her  in  this  question. 

Neither  we,  nor  the  Powers  friendly  to  us,  concede  that  the  decision 
with  regard  to  a  European  war  should  rest  with  the  Serbian  Govern- 
ment.^ We  therefore  believe,  that  the  best  means  of  preventing 
complications  would  be  an  early  statement  on  the  part  of  Serbia, — 
this  statement  could  be  made,  for  instance,  to  the  British  repre- 
sentative at  Belgrade — that  in  the  question  of  access  to  the  Adria- 
tic, Serbia  would  submit  to  the  counsel  and  the  decision  of  the 
Entente  Powers.  In  this  way  Serbia  would  obviate  the  danger  of 
an  Austrian  ultimatum. 


(SIS)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sazonoff.    Telegram,  Nov.  27- 
Dec.  10,  1912.    No.  429. 

Your  telegram  2838  received. 

Poincare  is  still  of  the  opinion  that  there  is  no  reason  to  permit  the 
representative  of  Roumania  to  be  present  at  the  Ambassadorial  Con- 
ference, even  upon  the  conditions  designated  by  you,  since  the  represen- 
tatives of  the  other  Balkan  States  will  not  participate.    The  more  so, 

*Yet,  indirectly,  such  was  the  case  in  1914. 


434         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

as,  according  to  his  information,  Roumania  will  avail  herself  of  this 
opportunity  to  support  the  Austrian  standpoint  in  the  Albanian  question 
in  the  most  energetic  manner.  You  are  aware  that  Grey  has  replied  to 
Austria  and  Germany  in  this  sense. 


(516)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  27'Dec.  10,  1912.    No.  431. 


Your  telegram  2837  received. 

In  general,  Poincare  agrees  with  you,  but  would  like  to  call 
special  attention  to  the  following.  In  his  opinion  it  would  be  disad- 
vantageous to  leave  Albania  under  the  direct  sovereignty  of  the 
Sultan  without  control  on  the  part  of  the  Powers.  Poincare  prefers 
either  Albania's  complete  independence  or  the  sovereign  rights  of 
the  Sultan,  as  in  Egypt.  But  he  attaches  special  importance  to  a 
general  European  control,  since  otherwise  Albania  would  inevitably 
come  under  Austria's  influence.  He  agrees  with  your  idea  of  the 
neutralisation  of  Albania  and  her  coasts,  but  believes  that  it  will  be 
necessary  to  lay  special  emphasis  upon  the  neutralisation  of  the  rail- 
way lines  between  Serbia  and  the  Albanian  ports. 

With  regard  to  the  Albanian  boundaries,  he  wishes  to  see  them 
limited  as  far  as  possible  and  believes  that  the  line  proposed  by  you  coin- 
cides approximately  with  the  frontier  conceded  by  Italy.  Poincare  will 
express  his  opinion  more  definitely,  as  soon  as  the  details  promised 
by  you  shall  have  come  to  hand. 

(517)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sasonoff.     Telegram,  Nov. 
2S-Dec.  11,  1912.    No.  384. 

Your  telegram  2837  received. 

I  have  communicated  its  contents  to  Grey,  and  added  that  I  am 
convinced  that,  on  this  basis,  the  three  Entente  Powers  could  not 
only  mutually  support  one  another,  but  that  an  understanding  of  all 
the  Powers  must  be  arrived  at  upon  this  basis. 

Grey  told  me  that  he  would  be  compelled  to  consult  a  map  regarding 
the  geographical  frontiers  of  Albania;  that,  however,  in  any  case,  he 
finds  our  proposals  "excellent."  He  told  me,  that  if  we  could  not 
come  to  an  understanding  with  Austria  on  this  basis,  Austria  must 
have  changed  the  point  of  view  she  has  hitherto  held ;  your  propos- 
als took  account  of  the  Austrian  conditions  and  even  embodied  in 


I 


SERBIA  AND  THE  AMBASSADORIAL  CONFERENCE  435 

part  the  wishes  of  Austria.  As  to  the  exclusion  of  the  predominating 
influence  of  a  single  Power  in  Albania,  Grey  told  me  in  confidence, 
that  he  had  reason  to  assume  that  Italy  shares  this  opinion.  Grey, 
furthermore,  told  me  he  believes  more  than  ever,  that  the  organisa- 
tion of  Albania  must  first  of  all  be  discussed  at  the  Ambassadorial 
Conference  and  once  this  problem,  as  well  as  the  Serbian  access  to 
the  Adriatic,  shall  have  been  solved,  one  might  perhaps  publish  the 
result  obtained.  He  believes  that  general  relief  would  be  achieved 
by  this  and  that  the  other  questions  could  then  be  quietly  discussed. 

(518)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  29-Dec.  12,  1912.    No.  387. 

/  hear  from  Camhon,  that  Grey  has  told  Mensdorff  and  Imperiali, 
that  he  was  opposed  to  the  direct  admission  of  the  Roumanian  repre- 
sentative to  the  Ambassadorial  Conference.  The  general  opinion  is, 
that  it  would  be  impossible  to  grant  Roumania  such  a  favour  with- 
out allowing  Bulgaria  to  enjoy  a  similar  advantage — something 
which  would  change  the  entire  character  of  the  Conference. 

(519)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Dec.  1-14,  1912.    No.  393. 

Grey  accepts  your  proposal  with  regard  to  Roumania,  but  is  of 
the  opinion  that  the  Ambassadors  would  have  to  concern  them- 
selves with  this  question  only  if  a  direct  understanding  between 
Roumania  and  Bulgaria  ^  proves  to  be  impossible.  Grey  has  informed 
the  Cabinets  that  he  has  changed  his  original  point  of  view. 

'Following  Bulgaria's  refusal  to  cede  to  Rumania  a  part  of  the  Dobrudja, 
as  compensation  for  Rumania's  desertion  of  her  ally,  Turkey,  during  the  Balkan 
war,  Rumanian  troops  invaded  Bulgaria  and  advanced  to  within  a  short  distance 
of  its  capital,  Sofia. 


n 


X 

RECENT  PHASES  OF  RUSSIAN  POLICY  IN  THE  BALKAN. 
(January — ^July  1914) 

(520)     Poklewski'Koziel,    Russian    Minister    at    Bucharest    to    SazonofF. 
Secret  Report,  Jan.  11-24,  1914. 

Having  come  into  contact  with  the  most  prominent  political 
leaders  of  Roumania,  I  should  like  to  sum  up  my  first  impressions 
in  this  letter  and  draw  certain  conclusions,  although  I  must  in  ad- 
vance apologise  for  a  certain  hastiness  arising  from  the  circum- 
stance that  I  have  been  here  only  a  short  time. 

As  Your  Excellency  is  aware,  I  have  received  an  exceedingly 
warm  welcome  in  Governmental  circles  here,  and,  again  and  again, 
sentiments  of  genuine  friendship  for  Russia  have  been  expressed  to 
me.  ^  I  found  the  same  welcome  in  society  here.  I  have  spoken  to 
former  Ministers,  Senators,  Deputies  and  various  leaders  of  the 
Roumanian  army ;  when  the  absence  of  responsibility  of  these  per- 
sons made  it  possible  for  them  to  give  still  more  unmistakable 
utterance  to  their  thoughts  and  feelings. 

To  my  mind,  all  this  corroborates  the  fact  already  pointed  out 
by  my  predecessor,  and  also  emphasized  by  my  French  and  English 
colleagues,  that  an  important  or  perhaps  even  a  decisive  change 
in  public  opinion  has  been  brought  about  here  in  favour  of  Russia. 
Besides  one  must  hear  in  mind,  that  the  events  of  last  year  which  have 
inspired  the  Roumanians  and  above  all  their  military  leaders  with  confi- 
dence, in  their  own  strength,  have  at  the  same  time  also  encouraged  the 
efforts  of  the  Irredentists.    These  are  not  so  much  directed  against 

*  Rumania's  friendship  was  due  to  Sazonoff  having  handed  over  to  her,  by  the 
Peace  of  Bucharest,  July  28,  1913,  a  part  of  the  Dobrudja,  peopled,  almost  exclu- 
sively, by  Bulgarians. 

436 


RUSSIA'S  RECENT  BALKAN  POLICY  437 

Russia  as  against  Transsylvania^  with  its  three  million  Roumanians. 
This  latter  circumstance  naturally  also  tends  to  enhance  Rou- 
manians sympathy  for  Russia.  When  one  considers  that  Roumania 
has  long  been  looked  upon  as  a  member  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  the 
statements  made  by  the  Ministers  here,  that  Roumania  enjoys  per- 
fect freedom  of  action  in  her  foreign  policy,  and  that  she  will  in  the 
future  pursue  only  Roumanian  interests  have  a  decidedly  favourable 
significance  for  us. 

The  question,  however,  arises,  are  such  statements  sincere  and 
is  Roumania  really  not  bound  to  Austria  by  any  agreement  what- 
ever? ^  It  seems  to  me  that  in  answering  this  question  the  follow- 
ing points  of  view  must  be  kept  in  mind. 

1.)  The  old  and  most  cordial  friendship  existing  between  the 
Austrian  Monarch  and  King  Carol. 

2.)  The  strong  influence  exercised  by  Germany  upon  the  King 
and  the  Roumanian  Government. 

This  Great  Power  is  looked  upon  by  many  people  as  a  disinter- 
ested friend  of  Roumanians.  It  is  appealed  to  for  advice  at  critical 
moments  and  it  always  sends  hither  all  necessary  information  and 
advice.  It  is  known  for  instance,  that  Kiderlen,  up  to  his  death 
maintained  a  private  correspondence  with  King  Carol,  who  was  in- 
formed by  him,  as  early  as  April  1912,  of  the  conclusion  of  the 
Alliance  between  Bulgaria  and  Serbia.  One  need  not  doubt  that  an 
influence  of  this  kind  is  exerted  by  Germany  upon  the  Roumanian 
Government  and  this  influence  is  certainly  being  used  to  keep 
Roumania  in  the  path  of  Austrian  policy. 

3.)  Although  the  Roumanian  Government  has  always  denied 
the  existence  of  an  Alliance  with  Austria,  it  is  scarcely  to  be 
doubted  that  such  an  Alliance  was  actually  concluded  at  the  time 
and  this  is  conceded  here  by  many  people.  If  that  be  so,  one  asks 
oneself  at  what  moment  did  this  Alliance  cease  to  exist?  It  is 
extremely  difficult  to  answer  this  question,  because  one  cannot 
point  out  any  period  at  which  a  mutual  estrangement  between  the 

*  The  minister  had  in  mind  Austria-Hungary,  of  course — Transsylvania  being  a 
part  of  Hungary.  The  Rumanian  irredentists  were  divided  in  two  camps: 
Bratianu-Jonescu,  Transsylvania;    Marghiloman-Carp,  Bessarabia. 

'  Such  a  treaty  existed  and  it  is  remarkable  that  the  Russian  minister  finds  it 
necessary  to  speculate  upon  this  point  since  most  persons  familiar  with  inter- 
national affairs  at  all  knew  of  its  existence. 


438  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

two  countries  is  noticeable — something  which  doubtless  would 
have  been  the  result  of  the  termination  of  the  Alliance. 

4.)  I  have  been  told  by  several  Members  of  the  Government 
here,  that  Roumania  is  obliged  to  maintain  friendly  relations  with 
Austria,  since  the  fate  of  the  Roumanians  in  Transsylvania  depends 
on  Austria-Hungary.  On  the  other  hand,  we  see  that  Count  Czer- 
nin  has  been  appointed  Austrian  Minister  at  Bucharest.  He  is  not 
a  diplomat,  but  a  confidant  of  Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand,  who, 
on  the  occasion  of  his  last  visit  to  Roumania,  spoke  with  the  local 
representatives  of  the  Transsylvanian  Roumanians  and,  inquiring 
as  to  their  wishes,  openly  criticised  the  Hungarian  Government  on 
account  of  its  present  policy  regarding  the  Roumanians.  Some 
years  ago.  Count  Czernin  himself  compiled  a  pamphlet  in  which 
he  advocated  the  rights  of  the  nationalities  oppressed  by  Hungary. 
In  an  interview  in  a  newspaper  the  other  day,  he  expressed  the 
hopes  that  the  Hungarian  Government  would  make  concessions  to 
the  Roumanians. 

When  one  considers  that  the  Austrian  and  Hungarian  news- 
papers are  singing  the  praises  of  King  Carol  and  of  Majorescu  and 
evince  sympathy  with  Bratianu,  the  new  Prime  Minister,  one  could 
scarcely  speak  of  an  estrangement  between  the  two  countries.  In 
my  opinion,  it  would  therefore  be  more  correct  to  assume  that  Aus- 
tria is  doing  her  utmost  to  keep  Roumania  from  giving  notice  of 
cancellation  of  the  treaty  of  alliance  which  on  the  part  of  the  Rou- 
manian Government  would  mean  nothing  less  than  the  confirniation 
of  the  complete  change  in  public  opinion.  ^ 

All  the  foregoing,  in  conjunction  with  certain  personal  impres- 
sions and  observations,  leads  me  to  conclude  that  in  the  meanwhile 
the  Roumanian  Government  will  not,  or  cannot,  give  notice  of  the 
treaty  of  alliance  with  Austria  and  that  the  alliance  is  therefore 
still  in  force. 

I  have  communicated  this  personal  view  of  mine  to  a  Roumanian 
with  whom  I  have  been  on  friendly  terms  for  years.  This  person- 
ality has  long  occupied  a  leading  position  in  the  Roumanian  diplo- 
matic service  and  has  always  been  a  sincere  friend  of  Russia.    On 


*The  treaty  had  not  yet  expired.  There  was  no  need  to  merely  "conclude" 
this.  It  was  a  known  fact.  If  Poklewski-Koziel  had  read  the  Austro-Hufl' 
garian  newspapers  during  the  crisis  of  1912-13  he  would  have  known  this. 


I 


RUSSIA'S  RECENT  BALKAN  POLICY  439 

my  arrival  at  Bucharest  he  was  able  to  give  me  many  useful  hints 
and  to  facilitate  my  first  steps  considerably. 

The  personality  in  question  has  informed  me this  treaty 

was  concluded  for  a  period  of  10  years  by  the  late  Bratianu;  it  was 
renewed  for  a  similar  period,  but  during  one  of  the  Carp  ministries, 
the  mention  of  a  time  limit  was  omitted  and  the  provision  was 
added  that  the  treaty  would  expire  a  year  after  the  official  notice 
had  been  given  by  one  of  the  two  parties.^ 

(521)     The  Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Bucharest  to  Sazonoff.    Confident 
tial  Report.    Feb.  4-17,  1914.    No.  9. 

As  I  had  the  honour  of  informing  Your  Excellency,  in  my  confi- 
dential telegram  No.  24,  the  Roumanian  Prime  Minister,  Bratianu, 
has  asked  the  Turkish  Minister  here  to  inform  his  Government, 
that  in  case  of  any  warlike  action  on  the  part  of  Turkey  against 
Greece, — which  for  the  time  being  could  only  take  place  by  land, 
i.e.,  with  active  or  passive  assistance  of  Bulgaria, — Roumania  could 
not  remain  an  indifferent  spectator,  but  would  be  forced  to  regard 
such  a  step  as  a  violation  of  the  peace  treaty  of  Bucharest  ^  and  in 
order  to  protect  its  inviolability  she  would  not  shrink  from  adopt- 
ing extreme  measures. 

In  this  way  the  Roumanian  Government,  after  having  long 
been  undecided,  has  now,  under  the  steady  influence  of  Greece  and 
Serbia,  in  an  impressive  manner  clearly  defined  its  attitude  in  a 
possible  conflict  between  Greece  and  Turkey.  This  will  doubtless 
have  a  sobering  effect  upon  Turkey  and  at  any  rate  avert  the 
danger  of  new  convulsions  in  the  Balkan. 

The  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  whilst  communicating  the 
above  mentioned  step  of  Roumania,  remarked  to  me  that  the  Bu- 
charest Cabinet  has  decided  upon  this  because  of  a  complete  lack 
of  confidence  in  the  sincerity  of  the  peaceful  protestations  of  Bul- 
garia. To  judge  by  the  feeling  prevailing  there,  she  would  scarcely 
miss  the  favourable  opportunity  of  a  Turkish  attack  upon  Greece  to 
realize  her  longing  for  revenge  in  one  way  or  another. 

*  A  very  floundering  letter,  written  by  a  man  who  wanted  to  be  wise  and  cau- 
tious at  the  same  time  and  had  little  to  do  it  with.  Poklewski-Koziel  was  at 
one  time  charge  d'affaires  at  London,  and  minister  at  Teheran  during  the  crisis. 

'Of  1913,  at  the  making  of  which  Austria-Hungary  waged  war  against  Pan- 
Slavism  and  the  Entente  single-handedly,  Germany  being  on  Russia's  side. 


440  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

"In  a  duel  fought  between  Greece,  with  whom  we  have  no  alli- 
ance, and  Turkey,  who  has  not  signed  the  Peace  Treaty  of  Bu- 
charest," continued  Parumbaro,  "we  can  remain  inactive  if  it 
should  be  fought  at  sea.  But  at  present,  as  Turkey  has  not  yet  re- 
ceived the  ships  ordered  in  England  for  her  navy,  war  can  only  be 
waged  on  land,  i.e.,  on  the  condition  that  the  Turkish  army  advance 
through  Bulgarian  territory.  If  we  were  convinced  that  Bulgaria 
would  oppose  her  forces  to  the  advance  of  the  Turkish  Army,  we 
need  in  no  wise  interfere  in  this  question  but  we  have  not  this 
conviction.  On  the  contrary,  we  have  every  reason  to  believe 
that  Bulgaria  will  also  mobilise  her  army  in  case  of  the  invasion  of 
Greek  territory  by  Turkish  troops^ — ^not  to  ward  off  the  Turkish 
attack,  but,  on  the  contrary,  to  go  over  to  the  Turkish  side,  which 
would  result  in  the  disturbance  of  the  balance  of  power  in  the 
Balkans,  which  was  established  by  the  Conference  of  Bucharest 
under  such  great  difficulties.  The  provisions  of  this  conference  are 
founded  on  our  general  policy.  A  departure  from  it  would  be  in- 
compatible with  our  point  of  view  and  we  hope  that  the  warning 
given  to  the  Turkish  Government  will  have  the  desired  effect." 

(522)     The  Russian  Minister  at  Belgrade  to  Sasonoff.    Report,  Feb.  11-24, 
1914.    No,  7. 

During  the  stay  of  Venizelos  ^  and  Pashitch  ^  at  Bucharest,  news 
was  spread  in  the  Balkan  press,  and  in  European  newspapers,  of 
Roumania  having  joined  the  Serbian-Greek-Montenegrin  Alliance. 
As  Pashitch  quite  frankly  informed  me,  this  news  is  wholly  incor- 
rect. Neither  a  formal  alliance,  nor  any  kind  of  written  agreement, 
has  been  signed  at  Bucharest.  On  the  other  hand,  the  statements 
made  by  the  Roumanian  statesmen,  as  well  as  by  the  representa- 
tives of  Greece  and  Serbia,  have  clearly  demonstrated  the  serious 
inclination  to  conclude  an  agreement.  Roumania  is  firmly  re- 
solved to  maintain  the  provisions  of  the  peace  treaty  of  Bucharest  of 
July  28,  1913,  and  under  no  circumstances  will  she  allow  any  alter- 
ation to  be  made ;  likewise  is  she  determined  to  reject  every  attempt 

*  Possible  only  at  that  time  through  Bulgarian  territory,  so  that  the  Bulgarian 
army  would  already  be  mobilized  either  for  or  against  the  Turks.  A  fine  instance 
of  diplomatic  beating  about  the  bush. 

'  Minister  of  foreign  affairs  of  Greece. 

'Minister  of  foreign  affairs  and  premier  of  Serbia. 


RUSSIANS  RECENT  BALKAN  POLICY  441 

to  change  the  status  quo.  This  intention  is  supported  by  all  the 
political  leaders  and  the  present  Bratianu  Cabinet. 

According  to  the  words  of  the  Serbian  Prime  Minister  no  one 
at  Bucharest  has  so  clear  a  conception  of  the  political  situation  of 
the  Balkans  as  King  Carol  himself.  During  an  audience  granted  to 
Pashitch,  he  condemned  the  senseless  conduct  of  Turkey  and  Bul- 
garia and  closed  with  the  exclamation : 

"Who  could  still  believe  that  Roumania  may  be  compelled  to  in- 
tercede in  order  that  Turkey  should  retain  possession  of  certain 
Aegaean  Islands?" 

This  exclamation  of  the  venerable  King  made  a  deep  impression 
upon  Pashitch  who  inferred  from  this,  that  in  case  of  urgent  need, 
the  King  would  set  his  army  in  motion  to  protect  Greek  interests. 

Without  doubt,  such  an  utterance,  made  by  the  King,  is  a  proof 
of  the  fact  that  an  important  change  has  taken  place  in  the  politi- 
cal views  of  the  Monarch,  as  up  to  now,  he  has  always  followed  the 
instructions  from  Berlin  and  Vienna.^ 

(523)    Sasonoff  to  the  Russian  Minister  at  Sofia.    Confidential  Letter,  Feb. 
17-March  2,  1914.    No.  129. 

The  letters  and  reports  received  from  you,  since  your  arrival  at 
Sofia,  depict  the  difficult  conditions  prevailing  in  Bulgaria  since  the 
last  war,  and  which  she  has  not  yet  succeeded  in  overcoming.  His 
skilfulness  enables  King  Ferdinand  to  veer  around  between  the 
numerous  difficult  complications  of  the  domestic  situation  and  his 
wish  to  improve  his  relations  with  Russia  as  much  as  possible,  with- 
out compromising  himself  in  his  relations  with  Austria  on  whose 
sympathy  his  Government  is  at  present  dependent. 

Considering  the  complicated  political  situation,  the  Russian  rep- 
resentative can  essentially  adopt  only  a  waiting  attitude.  This,  of 
course,  does  not  prevent  a  friendly  exchange  of  views  with  the 
King  or  leading  personalities.  But  these  conversations  cannot  in- 
spire us  with  much  confidence,  as  you  rightly  observed  in  your 
letter  of  February  5.    They  give  us  no  guarantee  for  the  future,  for 

*  In  order  to  prevent  the  reader  being  seized  by  vertigo,  it  must  be  stated  that 
Rumania  had  an  alliance  with  Turkey — ^a  potential  scrap  of  paper.  Bulgaria, 
having  been  well  trimmed  at  the  Bucharest  Peace  Treaty  of  1913,  by  Sazonoff, 
Rumania,  Serbia  and  Greece,  deemed  it  prudent  now  to  range  herself  on  the 
side  of  the  Turks  in  the  dispute  arising  from  the  continued  occupation  by  Greece 
of  islands  in  the  Aegaean  Sea. 


442 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


even  Daneff  himself,  although  the  watchword  "Russophile"  ha< 
been  given,  was  not  prevented  at  that  time  from  playing  with  Aus- 
tria instead  of  siding  with  us.  I  may  consequently  call  your  atten- 
tion to  the  circumstance  that  the  present  Cabinet  does  not  enjoy 
our  confidence.  The  more  so  as  the  reputation  of  the  personalities 
who  compose  it,  is  very  dubious. 

The  coming  election  will  perhaps  bring  a  majority  for  the  Rado- 
slavoff  Cabinet.  What  attitude  would  you  adopt  in  this  case? 
Perhaps  we  could  support  Bulgaria  in  certain  concrete  cases  if  a 
guarantee  is  given  us  that  Bulgaria  is  acting  independently  of  the 
members  of  the  present  or  possible  future  Cabinets.  But  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  effect  a  rapprochement  between  Russia  and  Bulgaria  and  be- 
tween Bulgaria  and  Serbia  through  the  good  offices  of  Russia  unless 
a  complete  change  in  public  opinion  and  a  change  of  the  Govern- 
ment takes  place.  For  as  long  as  the  present  Ministers  are  in  power, 
it  is  advisable  for  us  to  observe  reserve  and  extreme  caution.^ 

If  the  present  Cabinet  should  be  replaced  by  a  Coalition  Min- 
istry, with  Malinoff  at  its  head,  we  should  welcome  such  an  event, 
in  the  consciousness  of  being  able  to  save  Bulgaria  from  ruin. 
A  ministerial  change  of  this  kind  would  lead  to  active  support  on  our 
part.  For  instance,  it  would  render  it  possible  for  us  to  accelerate  the 
final  settlement  of  the  Bulgarian  Loan  at  Paris  and  to  prepare  the 
way  for  a  rapprochement  between  Bulgaria  and  Serbia.  ^  But  even  then, 
we  shall  observe  extreme  caution  and  only  advance  by  degrees,  for, 
otherwise,  we  should  incur  the  danger  of  shaking  Serbians  confi- 
dence in  ourselves  and  of  alienating  Roumania  from  us,  if,  at  the 
same  time  we  should  not  succeed  in  binding  Bulgaria  to  us  by  the 
closest  ties. 


(524)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna  to  Sazonoff.    Letter,  March  21- 
April  3,  1914. 

However  deplorable  the  Second  Balkan  War  ^  has  been  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  Slavs,  one  cannot  deny  that  the  result  of  this 

*  Bulgaria's  attitude  was  the  result  of  SazonoflF  having  handed  to  Rumania  a 
large  slice  of  the  Dobrudja — a  territory  as  Bulgarian  as  Maine  is  American. 

'  Serbia  and  Bulgaria  had  dissolved  their  alliance  and  gone  to  war  against 
each  other. 

'Between  Bulgaria  and  Serbia  and  Rumania,  due  to  the  fact  that  Serbia  and 
Russia  prevented  Bulgaria's  annexation  of  Macedonia,  though  the  Macedonians 
wanted  to  join  the  Bulgars.  Rumania  seized  this  opportimity  of  pressing  her 
own  claims. 


RUSSIA'S  RECENT  BALKAN  POLICY  443 

war,  so  far  as  it  is  a  question  of  special  Russian  interest,  has  been 
advantageous  to  us.  Indeed  what  would  have  happened  if  wisdom  had 
prevailed  at  Sofia  at  the  conclusion  of  the  armistice  with  Turkey,  and 
if  the  Bulgarian  Government  had  been  willing  to  accept  the  justifiable 
demands  of  Serbia  as  to  the  alteration  of  the  agreement  existing  between 
them,  and  the  entirely  unjustifiable,  but  relatively  modest,  demands  of 
Roumania?  So  far  as  the  expansion  of  her  territory  and  strength  of  her 
population  are  concerned,  Bulgaria  would  have  become  the  greatest  of 
the  Balkan  States;  Roumania  would  have  hastened  to  approach  her, 
probably  Turkey  too,  and  if  finally  even  a  rapprochement  with  Austria 
had  been  brought  about — which  I  have  always  thought  possible  even 
before  the  war  with  Serbia — a  block  hostile  to  us  would  have  been 
formed  in  the  Balkans,  consisting  of  Austria,  Bulgaria,  Roumania  and 
Turkey} 

Now,  however,  under  existing  political  conditions,  Austria  is 
entirely  isolated  in  the  Balkans  and  every  attempt  on  her  part  to 
alter  the  status  quo  would  meet  with  decided  resistance  on  the  part 
of  the  League — Roumania,  Serbia  and  Greece. 

For  this  reason,  everything  must  be  avoided  that  could  set 
Roumania  at  variance  with  Serbia  and  Greece,  an  end  which  Aus- 
trian diplomacy  will  probably  try  to  attain.  In  this  respect,  Aus- 
tria possesses  an  efficacious  means  in  Albania.  It  must  be 
understood  at  Belgrade  and  Athens  that  every  imprudence  on  their 
part  can  only  be  of  service  to  Austria,  as  it  would  evoke  Roumanians 
dissatisfaction,  whilst  Austria  and  Italy,  left  to  themselves  in  Al- 
bania, would  ultimately  quarrel. 

This  situation,  and  the  knowledge  that  the  Vienna  Cabinet  has 
committed  an  error  in  supporting  Bulgaria  during  the  last  crisis, 
are  calling  forth  in  Austria  and  Hungary  that  vague  general  appre- 
hension which  has  become  apparent  of  late. 

In  conclusion,  I  should  like  to  express  my  regret,  that  our  news- 
papers,  and  especially  the  French  ones,  are  so  noisily  expressing  their 
satisfaction  as  to  the  new  course  of  Roumanian  policy.  To  do  this  is 
quite  futile,  because  the  only  significant  fact  for  us  is  that  we  have  dis- 
engaged Roumania  from  the  coalition  opposed  to  us,  and  not  the  dip- 
lomatic success  obtained.    This  noise,  however,  excites  our  enemies  and 

^The  very  thing  which  the  Sazonovian  Peace  of  Bucharest  prevented  to  the 
great  detriment  of  Bulgaria. 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


induces  them  to  do  their  utmost  to  retrieve  what  they  lost.  In  Ron- 
mania,  this  circumstance  will  he  used  by  the  elements  hostile  to  us,^  so  as 
to  represent  matters  as  if  the  Entente  Powers  wished  to  compromise 
Roumania  and  cut  off  her  retreat. 


(525) 


The  Russian  Charge  d'Aff aires  at  Cettinje  to  Sazonoff. 
March  13-26,  1914.    No.  17. 


Telegram, 


I 


King  Nicolas,  after  having  hesitated  for  long,  gave  orders  these  days 
to  deliver  to  King  Peter  his  autograph  letter  which  had  been  sent  to 
Belgrade  some  time  ago.  In  this  letter,  Serbia  is  invited  to  conclude 
without  delay,  an  arrangement  with  Montenegro,  concerning  the  union  of 
the  two  nations  in  the  military,  diplomatic  and  financial  field,  with  "a 
reservation  as  to  the  independence  and  individuality  of  both  States  and 
their  dynasties."  ^  At  the  close  of  the  letter,  King  Nicolas  emphasizes 
how  very  useful  such  an  arrangement  would  he  to  the  unliberated  Ser- 
bians and  that  it  will  he  true  to  the  spirit  of  Russia,  the  eternal  pro 
tectress  of  the  Slavs. 


(526)     The  Same  to  the  Same.     Telegram,  March  13-26,  1914.    No.  18. 

Continuation  of  my  telegram  No.  17. 

As  we  know  the  actual  frame  of  mind  of  the  King  of  Montene- 
gro, and,  on  the  other  hand,  must  take  into  consideration  in  this 
question  the  standpoint  of  Italy  and  Austria,  the  latter  of  whom 
is  openly  apprehensive  and  hostile  to  the  amalgamation  of  the  two 
Serbian  States,  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  the  treaty  of  union  of  the 
two  sister  nations  can  have  prospect  of  success  only  if  the  condi- 
tions mentioned  by  the  King  of  Montenegro  are  taken  into  con- 
sideration, i.e.,  if  the  independence  of  Montenegro  is  guaranteed. 
The  best  means  of  promoting  the  peaceful  development  of  the  Serbian 
and  Montenegrin  amalgamation  is,  in  my  opinion,  the  resumption  of  the 
activity  of  our  military  instructors  in  Montenegro  within  the  compass  of 
the  Serbian  military  programme.  At  the  same  time,  Serbian  instruc- 
tors cannot  be  given  permission  to  exercise  this  activity  in  Monte- 
negro, since  such  a  measure  would  lead  to  a  premature  agitation 
directed  towards  amalgamation  which  in  its  turn,  might  lead  to 


I 


*  The  Carp-Marghiloman  coalition. 

'  A  new  Russian  move  to  get  a  Serbo-Russian  port  on  the  Adriatic  Sea. 


RUSSIA'S  RECENT  BALKAN  POLICY  445 

dangerous  complications — even  to  the  occupation  of  the  Sandjak 
by  Austria  and  an  armed  conflict  between  Serbia  and  Austria. 

(527)  Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Minister  at  Belgrade.    Telegram,  March  16- 
29,  1914.    No.  602. 

I  refer  to  the  telegrams  from  Cettinje  Nos.  17  and  18. 

Serbians  attempt  to  send  military  instructors  to  Montenegro 
appears  for  the  moment  to  meet  with  political  difficulties.  I  request 
you  to  inform  Pashitch  of  this  in  confidence.  ^ 

(528)  The  Russian  Minister  at  Belgrade  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram,  March 
17-30,  1914.    No.  104. 

Your  telegram  No.  602  received. 

According  to  the  opinion  of  Miushkovitch,^  there  is  no  question 
of  sending  Serbian  military  instructors  to  Montenegro,  and  Pash- 
itch considers  this  plan  to  be  impracticable  under  present  condi- 
tions. He  is  of  the  opinion  that  if  such  ideas  have  been  mooted  at 
Cettinje  they  exclusively  serve  the  purpose  of  expediting,  as  much 
as  possible,  the  sending  of  Russian  instructors  in  combination  with 
the  granting  of  further  subsidies.^ 

(529)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  March  17-30,  1914.    No.  104.* 

I  refer  to  the  telegrams  from  Cettinje  Nos.  17  and  18. 

The  letter  in  question,  from  the  King  of  Montenegro,  was  read 
to  me  by  Pashitch  who  called  on  me  the  other  day,  accompanied  by 
Miushkovitch.  From  the  clear  and  sincere  words  of  the  former, 
I  perceive  that  the  offer  of  the  King  of  Montenegro  has  long  been 
expected  and  is  looked  upon  as  another  step  towards  the  hearty 
reconciliation  and  rapprochement  of  the  two  States;  it  does  not, 
however,  mean  an  amalgamation  which  under  the  present  circum- 
stances is  not  even  thought  of  here. 

The  preservation  of  the  dynasty  and  the  complete  independence 
of  the  state  is  the  basic  condition.  The  agreement  must  hear  a  cul- 
tural character  and  refer  to  finance,  trade,  customs,  traffic,  diplomatic 

*  A  case  of  prompt  reaction. 

*  Montenegrin  charge  d'affaires  at  Belgrade. 

*  From  Russia. 

*  Repetition  of  No.  104  probably  due  to  error. 


446 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


and  partly  also  to  the  military  institutions,  proceeding  solely  from 
the  thought  of  mutual  protection.  The  question  of  the  instructors 
will  not  be  touched  upon. 

The  long  experience  of  Pashitch  in  statesmanship,  as  well  as  his 
prudence,  are  a  warrant^  to  Your  Excellency  that  no  uncautious 
step  will  be  taken  and  that  the  proposed  agreement,  of  which  we 
have  had  timely  information,  will  not  lead  to  the  complications 
apprehended  by  our  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Cettinje.  The  proposed 
reply  to  King  Nicolas  will  be  couched  in  a  friendly  spirit.  I  am 
waiting  for  the  departure  of  our  courier  in  order  to  remit  to  you 
copy  of  these  two  documents  and  a  detailed  report. 


(530) 


Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Minister  at  Belgrade. 
Feb.  20'March  5,  1914.    No.  130. 


Confidential  Letter, 


I  consider  it  necessary  to  inform  you  of  the  substance  of  a  con- 
versation which  I  had  of  late  with  Count  Czapari  the  new  Austro- 
Hungarian  Ambassador.^  hI 

The  conversation  concerned  the  consequences  that  might  re- 
sult from  a  disturbance  of  European  peace.  After  observing  that 
his  Government  had  not  intended  him  to  enter  upon  this  exchange 
of  opinions,  Czapari  mentioned  that  the  noticeable  tendency  for  a 
mutual  rapprochement  or  union  of  Montenegro  and  Serbia,  was 
causing  the  greatest  perturbation  everywhere.  fll 

"If  such  a  union  should  take  place,  Austria  could  not  remain  ™ 
passive  spectator.    The  interests  of  the  monarchy  in  the  Adriatic 
do  not  allow  of  any  displacement  of  the  balance  of  power.    The 
Adriatic  has  the  same  significance  to  Austria-Hungary  as  the  Black 
Sea  to  Russia." ' 

I  replied  to  my  visitor  that  the  events  depicted  by  him  would 
hardly  materialize  in  the  near  future.  Whilst  the  old  King  still 
lives,  nobody  will  seriously  think  of  his  ever  abdicating  the  throne. 
As  far  as  Russia  is  concerned,  /  remarked,  we  can  scarcely  be  sus- 
pected of  being  in  favour  of  a  restriction  of  the  monarchical  principle 


*  A  most  remarkable  statement  in  the  light  of  these  documents. 
'  At  St.  Petersburg. 

"  Meaning  that  the  amalgamation  of  Montenegro  and  Serbia  would  have  given 
Serbia  a  port  on  the  Adriatic  and  Russia  a  naval  base  in  the  Mediterranean. 


1 


RUSSIA'S  RECENT  BALKAN  POLICY  447 

Montenegro.  In  spite  of  this,  we  do  not  lose  sight  of  the  possibility 
that,  after  the  death  of  King  Nicolas,  his  successor  will  scarcely 
enjoy  the  same  esteem  in  his  country  as  did  his  father.  But,  as  we 
do  not  wish  to  interfere  in  the  internal  affairs  of  Montenegro,  we  are 
not  in  a  position  to  favour  one  or  the  other  of  these  endeavours,  al- 
though it  would  appear  that  this  idea  is  spreading  in  Austria  and 
Hungary.  It  is  difficult  to  influence  an  excited  people,  if  one  is  not 
sure  of  success. 

On  the  other  hand,  I  cannot  see  why  it  is  so  positively  assumed 
that  a  union  of  Montenegro  and  Serbia  would  involve  the  interests 
of  Austria  and  Hungary.  One  cannot  foresee  the  future,  but  one 
can  discuss  what  might  happen  under  certain  conditions.  For  ex- 
ample, even  some  years  ago,  it  was  considered  an  axiom  of  the 
Austrian  Monarchy,  that  Austria  could  not  renounce  the  Sandjak. 
Aehrenthal,  nevertheless,  did  this,  after  other  occurences  on  the 
neighbouring  frontiers  had  brought  about  a  change  in  favour  of 
Serbia  and  Montenegro.  Has  the  Monarchy  suffered  any  kind  of 
disadvantage  through  this  ? 

The  reference  to  Austria's  and  Russia's  interests  in  the  Adriatic 
and  the  Black  Sea  is  not  convincing  to  me.  Up  to  the  present  the 
general  opinion  has  prevailed  that  there  could  only  be  a  Russian 
and  a  Turkish  Naval  Power  in  the  Black  Sea ;  to-day  we  see  that  the 
Border-States,  Roumania  and  Bulgaria,  are  also  striving  for  the 
possession  of  a  navy  of  their  own.  And  what  happens?  Russia 
in  no  wise  opposes  these  efforts  and  regards  them  as  not  at  all  disad- 
vantageous to  her  own  interests.  Ought  Austria  to  be  disquieted  in 
any  way  to  behold  Serbian,  instead  of  Montenegrin,  harbours  in  the 
Adriatic  in  the  future?  All  these  reflections,  I  concluded,  are  a 
proof  that  future  events  cannot  be  foreseen  but  that  in  one  way  or 
another  we  must  reconcile  ourselves  to  a  given  situation. 

With  this  our  conversation  was  ended.  I  am  unable  to  judge 
whether  the  assertion  of  the  Ambassador  that  he  was  speaking  on 
his  own  initiative  was  correct  or  not.  But  I  believe  I  am  right  in 
assuming  that  the  alarm  mentioned  by  Czapari  actually  prevails  in 
Austria. 

I  am  communicating  the  above  for  your  personal  information 
only.  Should  you  discuss  this  question  with  Pashitch  I  should 
like  you  to  emphasize  the  confidential  nature  of  my  conversation 


448 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


with  the  Ambassador  and  to  advise  him  to  be  extremely  cautious  in 
this  question  which  is  of  such  importance  to  Serbia. 


(531) 


I 


The  Russian  Minister  at  Belgrade  to  Sasonoff.    Report,  March  25- 
April  7,  1914.    No.  18. 

I  make  free  to  thank  you  for  communicating  to  me  your  con- 
versation with  the  new  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  as  referring 
to  the  union  between  Serbia  and  Montenegro.  I  have  availed  my- 
self of  the  first  opportunity  of  communicating  your  standpoint  in 
this  question  to  Pashitch,  whereby  I  satisfied  myself  that  he  fully 
realizes  the  danger  of  an  artificial  acceleration  of  a  normal  develop- 
ment and  that  he  is  entirely  conscious  of  the  necessity  of  exercising 
the  utmost  caution 

I  will  add  the  following  for  your  information.  Lately  I  had  a 
similar  conversation  with  the  Austrian  representative  here  as  to  the 
possibility  of  an  amalgamation  of  Montenegro  with  Serbia.  I  re- 
marked, that  for  the  moment  I  saw  no  such  signs,  and  that  Giesl, 
who  had  been  in  Cettinje  for  so  many  years,  must  be  well  aware  of 
the  feeling  of  distrust  which  the  King  of  Montenegro  harbours 
against  Serbia  and  that,  therefore,  cordial  relations  between  th^, 
two  countries  seem  to  be  out  of  the  question.  ^  if  | 

Giesl  replied,  that  this  was  indeed  so,  but  that  it  was  not 
a  question  of  the  King,  since  he  was  old  and  seriously  ill; 
his  sons  were  not  popular  with  the  people  and  would  probably 
be  content  to  go  abroad  if  paid  a  sufficient  compensation.  The 
psychological  moment  would  then  have  arrived  and  the  question 
of  a  union  of  Montenegro  and  Serbia  would  then  be  raised  of  its 
own  accord.  Giesl  added,  that  he  had  not  been  instructed  by  his 
Government  to  mention  this,  but  that  he  had  merely  expressed  his 
personal  opinion  to  me.  The  perfect  analogy  between  the  explana- 
tions of  the  two  Austrian  representatives  is  so  clear  that  one  may  no 
doubt  rightly  assume  that  they  have  acted  in  the  name  of  their 
Government. 

(532)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Confidential  Report,  May  6-19,  1914.  No.  26. 

After  the  Monarchs  of  Serbia  and  Montenegro  had  exchanged 

touching  autograph  letters,  the  question  of  the  union  of  the  two 

*  Austria-Hungary  banked  on  this  feeling  of  distrust  in  regard  to  the  seapoq 
on  the  Adriatic. 


RUSSIA'S  RECENT  BALKAN  POLICY  449 

related  countries  appeared  to  have  sunk  entirely  into  oblivion.  As 
he  had  been  without  any  news  from  Cettinje  for  some  time,  the 
representative  of  Montenegro  here  began  to  be  seriously  concerned 
about  it  and  feared  that  King  Nicolas  had  again  changed  his  at- 
titude towards  Serbia. 

Contrary  to  all  expectations,  however,  Miushkovitch  was  given 
the  urgent  order,  a  fortnight  ago,  to  enter  into  a  final  exchange  of 
opinions  with  Pashitch,  as  soon  as  possible,  as  to  the  prospective 
agreement  and  to  come  to  Cettinje  with  a  fixed  programme. 

Naturally,  Pashitch  wisely  refrained  from  drawing  up  a  pro- 
gramme, but  took  pleasure  in  verbally  confirming  to  the  Montene- 
grin representative  that  he  was  willing  to  accept  the  fundamental 
principles  of  the  agreement  already  mentioned  by  me  before, 
namely : 

Preservation  of  the  dynasty  and  the  independence  of  the  two 
States; 

Amalgamation  of  the  two  armies;  the  supreme  command  over 
the  troops  within  the  boundaries  of  the  respective  Kingdoms  will 
remain  the  prerogative  of  each  Monarch;  the  establishment  of  a 
joint  General  Staff  which  will  work  out  military  plans  together ; 

The  common  orientation  of  foreign  policy  and  representation 
abroad ; 

Similar  judicial  and  administrative  authorities ; 

Union  of  the  finances,  customs,  postal  service  and  telegraphs. 

Miushkovitch  has  taken  cognizance  of  these  desires  and  has  gone 
to  Cettinje.  No  official  news  has  come  to  hand  as  to  the  success  of 
his  mission,  but  from  secret  information  it  appears  that  King  Nicolas 
gave  his  Minister  a  most  ungracious  reception  and  did  not  enter  into  a 
more  detailed  conversation  concerning  the  instructions  he  had  given  him. 
The  reception  on  the  part  of  the  Ministers  was  equally  cold.  Under 
these  conditions  it  will  be  difficult  to  count  upon  the  Serbian  and 
Montenegrin  negotiations  having  a  favourable  result  in  the  near 
future.  In  the  meantime,  I  have  received  the  confidential  letter 
from  Under-Secretary  Neratoff  of  April  17,  No.  289,  by  virtue  of 
which  I  am  instructed  to  speak  to  the  Serbian  Prime  Minister  about 
the  military  situation  in  Montenegro  in  connection  with  internal 
and  financial  policy. 

After  Pashitch  had  learned  from  me,  that  we  were  in  principle 


450 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


willing  to  settle  the  question  of  the  Russian  military  instructors 

in  accordance  with  the  Serbian  plans  in  Montenegro,  Pashitch  asked  '^JUk 
to  express  to  you  his  profound  gratitude  for  our  constant  interest  i^ 
Serbia.     He  begs  me  to  assure  you,  that  in  the  prospective  Serbo- 
Montenegrin  agreement  the  Russian  desires  concerning  the  military 
questions  will  be  taken  into  consideration. 


(533)    Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Minister  at  Belgrade. 
July  7,  1914.    No.  1351. 


Telegram,  June  24- 


I 


Confidential.  The  recent  events  in  Serbia,  which  have  led  to 
an  accentuation  of  the  anti-Serbian  feeling  at  Vienna,  induce  us 
to  advise  the  Serbian  Government  to  treat  with  the  utmost  caution 
all  questions  which  might  tend  to  accentuate  this  feeling  and  thus 
create  a  dangerous  situation.  We  are  consequently  of  the  opinion 
that  it  would  be  advisable  to  postpone  the  negotiations  concerning  the 
Serbo-M ontenegrin  rapprochement  a  little,  for  these  negotiations  have 
already  attracted  the  attention  of  Austria-Hungary  and  even  of  Ger- 
many. 

I  beg  you  to  communicate  confidentially  this  opinion  to  Pashitc 


(534) 


The  Russian  Minister  at  Sofia  to  Sazonoff. 
1914.    No.  69. 


Telegram,  April  9-22, 


According  to  various  reports,  negotiations  are  in  progress 
Berlin  as  to  a  Bulgarian  loan  of  about  250  million  francs.  Up  to  the 
present,  the  German  Government  has  not  given  its  consent  on  ac- 
count of  Roumanian  protests.  Apparently,  one  has  now  succeeded 
in  persuading  Roumania  to  give  up  her  negative  attitude,  and  at 
Sofia  it  is  assumed  that  the  loan  will  be  raised  on  condition  that 
there  is  to  be  no  expenditure  on  military  armaments.  It  is  a  ques- 
tion of  life  and  death  to  the  Radoslavoff  Cabinet  to  raise  such  a  loan 
in  the  course  of  the  next  month,  and  it  will  consequently  accept  all 
conditions. 


(535)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  April  13-26,  1914.    No.  72. 

It  appears  to  me  more  and  more  probable,  that  the  loan  will  be 
raised.  /  am  making  efforts,  together  with  the  French  Minister  here, 
to  prove  to  the  King  and  public  opinion  here,  that  the  financial  policy  of 


RUSSIA'S  RECENT  BALKAN  POLICY  451 

the  present  Bulgarian  Government  with  regard  to  the  economic  and 
political  situation  is  fatal  for  the  country.  According  to  my  information, 
it  is  to  be  assumed  that  English  and  Belgian  money  will  be  employed 
for  the  loan.  Do  you  not  believe  it  possible  to  prevent  this?  The  French 
Minister  asserts  that  liis  Government  is  doing  everything  possible  to 
prevent  French  capital  from  going  to  Bulgaria,.  The  Minister  of 
Finance  here  has  openly  acknowledged  to  the  French  Minister,  that 
this  loan  is  absolutely  necessary  in  order  to  consolidate  the  position 
of  the  present  Cabinet.  We  must  make  the  utmost  efforts  to  thwart 
the  plans  of  Radoslavoff  and  Tontcheff. 

(536)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sazonoff.    Telegram,  April  16- 
29,  1914.    No.  106. 

Doumergue  has  just  confirmed  to  me  that  he  has  given  categorical 
instructions  to  the  French  banks  to  place  no  means  at  Bulgarians  dis- 
posal in  the  shape  of  a  Bulgarian  loan  in  Germany.  According  to  the 
French  Government's  information  from  Berlin,  the  negotiations  at  Ber- 
lin have  been  fruitless,  which  Doumergue  attributes  to  the  refusal  of 
the  French  banks. 


(537)  Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.     Telegram,  April 
23-May  6,  1914.    No.  9. 

I  deem  it  extremely  important  to  frustrate  Bulgaria's  intention  to 
raise  a  loan  in  Germany,  and  I  beg  the  British  Government  to  direct  its 
representative  at  Sofia  to  support  our  Minister  in  the  fulfillment  of  his 
instructions  to  restrain  Bulgaria  from  a  disadvantageous  financial  opera- 
tion which  would  be  bound  to  lead  to  the  complete  economic  subjection  of 
Bulgaria  by  Germany.  The  French  Minister  at  Sofia  has  already  under- 
taken successful  steps  in  this  connection. 

(538)  The  Russian  Minister  at  Sofia  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram,  April  30- 
May  13,  1914.    No.  84. 

Urgent.  After  the  steps  taken  in  London  and  Paris,  we  have  ex- 
hausted all  our  resources  to  prevent  the  raising  of  the  loan.  But  the 
necessity  of  a  loan  is  making  itself  felt  here  more  and  more.  In  con- 
sequence of  this  consideration,  and  in  order  to  prevent  the  Austro- 
German  influence  here  from  growing  stronger,  I  have  decided  to  pro- 


452 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


pose  a  final  means,  after  having  discussed  it  at  length  to-day  with  my 
French  colleague  and  the  representatives  of  the  French  banks.  We 
might  bring  it  to  the  King's  cognisance  that  Russia,  who  does  not  trust 
the  present  Government,  but  who  is  as  solicitous  as  before  as  to  Bul- 
garia's political  and  financial  independence,  will  now  make  the  following 
proposal.  France  will  be  induced  to  advance  the  money  needed  by  the 
country — about  100  millions — to  the  King  personally,  without  imposing 
the  onerous  conditions  now  being  discussed  at  Berlin.  At  the  same 
time  the  declaration  must  be  made  that,  until  the  conclusion  of  a 
loan,  France  will  renounce  to  be  repaid  the  75  millions,  and  Russia 
the  45  millions  treasury  notes  due  for  military  supplies.  dl 

The  representative  of  French  financial  interests  at  Sofia  is  convince™ 
that  such  an  operation  is  tantamount  to  the  realisation  of  the  loan  and 
will  render  it  impossible  for  the  Berlin  banks  to  obtain  the  loan.  Apart 
from  the  fact,  that  we  are  removing  Bulgaria  from  Austrian  influence 
in  future,  the  influence  of  Austria  and  Germany  here  will  also  be  weak- 
ened in  this  way,  and,  sooner  or  later,  the  present  Cabinet  will  be 
brought  to  fall,  whereas  an  immediate  removal  of  the  Ministers  m 
agreeable  to  us  would  entail  great  difficulties. 

I  took  account  of  this,  when,  through  Dobrovitch,^  I  advised  the 
King,  yesterday,  to  change  the  Ministry,  and  for  this  reason  I  indi- 
cated the  possibility  of  a  compromise  and  the  formation  of  a  Coalition 
Government.^  I  may  take  it  for  granted,  that  the  French  Government 
will  agree  to  our  wishes  on  this  occasion  as  before;  naturally  one  must 
bear  in  mind  that  Paris  must  offer  more  favourable  conditions  for  a 
possible  loan  than  Berlin;  besides  the  representative  of  the  French 
banks  here  is  sure  of  this.  He  is  a  very  experienced  man,  who  will  be 
able  to  communicate  all  details  to  Paris  at  any  time.  If  this  plan,  which 
I  grant  is  somewhat  out  of  the  common,  meets  with  your  approval,  we 
must  com£  to  an  understanding  with  Paris  without  delay,  since  the 
Minister  of  Finance  may  sign  the  loan  any  day, — which  would  compli- 
cate the  whole  question  because  of  the  German  Government.  I  have 
reflected  upon  this  step  for  a  long  time  and  have  come  to  the  conclusion 
that  there  is  no  other  way  out  for  us  if  we  desire  to  guarantee  the  in^ 
terests  of  Bulgaria  as  well  as  of  Russia. 


II 


*  Chief  of  Czar  Ferdinand's  cabinet  privi. 

*  It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  Bulgaria  was  wholly  independent  of 
in  a  politico-international  sense. 


RUSSIA'S  RECENT  BALKAN  POLICY  453 

(539)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sazonoff.    Telegram,  May  5- 
18,  1914.    No.  122. 

The  French  Government  is  of  the  opinion  that  it  is  in  the  interests 
of  Russia,  as  well  as  of  France,  not  to  allow  Bulgaria  to  come  under 
the  financial,  and  consequently  also,  the  political,  influence  of  Germany 
and  Austria;  for  this  reason  it  is  ready  to  accept  the  plan  proposed  by 
our  Minister  at  Sofia.  One  assumes  here  that  a  compromise  might  be 
effected  through  the  formation  of  a  Coalition  Cabinet  Malinoff — Gen- 
nadieff.  The  immediate  grant  of  an  advance  payment  precludes  the  pos- 
sibility of  a  loan  elsewhere.  The  granting  of  a  loan  could  then  be  made 
dependent  upon  a  change  of  the  political  orientation  of  Bulgaria.  If 
Russia  agrees  to  this,  and  withdraws  her  veto,  the  French  Government 
believes  that  it  will  be  able  to  prevail  on  the  French  banks  to  grant  Bul- 
garia an  advance  of  80  or  90  million  francs  and  not  further  to  insist  on 
the  repayment  of  the  7S  million  treasury  notes.  The  loan  might  then 
be  raised  towards  the  end  of  the  year. 


(540)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  May  10-23,  1914.    No.  125. 

Margerie  has  just  told  me  that  the  financial  institutions  which 
have  so  far  undertaken  to  raise  the  Bulgarian  loan,  namely  Banque 
de  Paris  et  des  Pays  Bas,  Credit  Lyonnais,  Societe  Generale,  Comptoir 
National  d'Escompte,  and  others,  obstinately  refuse  to  grant  an  ad- 
vance to  Bulgaria  and  refer  to  the  unsatisfactory  condition  of  the 
money  market.  Margerie's  intention  is  to  approach  yet  today  other 
financial  groups,  which  have  connections  with  Creuzot  ^  and  Regie 
Generale  and  are  interested  in  Bulgarian  supplies  and  railway  con- 
structions ;  he  hopes  to  be  able  to  give  rae  an  answer  tomorrow. 

(541)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  May  U-IS,  1914.    No.  126. 

The  negotiations  of  the  French  Foreign  Office  with  the  banks 
still  encounter  difficulties.  Margerie  told  me  that  a  certain  partici- 
pation of  the  Russian  banks,  in  the  advance  to  be  granted  to  Bul- 
garia, might  facilitate  the  negotiations.  I  request  urgent  instruc- 
tions. 

*  Manufacturers  of  steel,  machinery,  guns  and  military  arms  generally. 


454 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


(542)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  May  17-30,  1914.    No.  134. 

The  negotiations  with  the  banks  have  not  yet  been  terminated. 
Margerie  hopes  for  a  favourable  issue,  but  he  will  hardly  receive  a 
reply  before  Tuesday,  as  Monday  is  Whit-Monday.  As  to  the  text 
of  the  communication  to  be  made  to  the  King,  the  French  Government 
is  of  the  opinion  that  this  communication  must  be  couched  in  a  wholly 
friendly  spirit,  expressive  of  the  traditional  sentiments  of  Russia  for 
Bulgaria.  ^1 

For  this  reason  it  is  considered  here  inexpedient  to  force  the  Kin^ 
at  this  moment,  especially  before  the  possibility  of  the  German  loan  has 
been  finally  excluded,  to  pledge  himself  to  replace  the  Radoslavoff 
Cabinet  by  another.     The  French  Government  proposes  the  following 
text  which  our  Minister'^  might  communicate  to  the  King: 

"Your  Majesty  is  aware  that  the  Bulgarian  Government  did  not, 
according  to  private  information,  deem  it  necessary  to  appeal  to 
the  French  Government  in  order  to  avail  itself  of  the  Parisian 
money  market  to  satisfy  the  financial  requirements  of  Bulgaria. 
The  Bulgarian  Government  has  appealed  to  German  Banks,  and  is 
on  the  point  of  signing  an  agreement  under  especially  onerous 
conditions.  Such  an  agreement  threatens  to  call  in  question  the 
economic  and,  to  a  certain  degree,  also,  the  political  independence 
of  the  country  for  a  considerable  length  of  time.  The  Governments 
of  Russia  and  France,  animated  by  the  desire  to  prove  their  disinter- 
ested friendship  to  Bulgaria,  have  approached  banks  in  Paris  and  St. 
Petersburg  in  order  to  ascertain  whether  it  would  not  be  possible  to 
place  at  the  disposal  of  the  Bulgarian  Government  those  means  which 
it  is  in  need  of  at  present,  until  in  the  course  of  a  few  months  more 
favourable  circumstances  might  enable  it  to  conclude  a  definite  loan. 
The  French  and  Russian  banks  have  favourably  considered  this 
request  and  are  prepared  to  advance  about  600  million  francs  with- 
out delay.  Moreover  they  have  agreed  to  postpone  the  redemption 
of  the  treasury  notes  until  the  conclusion  of  the  loan.  /  am  in- 
structed to  m^ke  to  Your  Majesty  this  communication  which  proves  the 
sympathy  of  Russia  and  France  for  Bulgaria.  My  Government  hopes 
that  Your  Majesty  will  rightly  estimate  the  importance  of  this  step** 

*The  Russian  at  Sofia,  M.  Savinski.  The  urgency  of  this  move  is  ominous. 
Why  oflFer  an  advance  when  the  certainty  of  a  loan  would  have  eased  things 
instantly  ? 


RUSSIA'S  RECENT  BALKAN  POLICY  455 

(543)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  May  17-30,  1914.    No.  135. 

Continuation  of  my  telegram  No.  134. 

The  French  Government  is  convinced  that  such  a  communication 
zmould  have  the  effect  desired  by  Russia  and  France,  and  offer  the  King 
the  possibility  of  preparing  a  change  of  Cabinet.  So  long  as  we  confine 
ourselves  to  an  advance-payment,  and  the  loan  itself  has  not  yet  been 
concluded,  it  will  be  possible  for  Russia  and  France  effectually  to  in- 
fluence the  course  of  Bulgarian  policy.  As  to  the  definite  request,  that 
the  King  should  pledge  him^self  to  form  a  new  Cabinet,  we  m^ight  sug- 
gest this  later  on,  when  Bulgaria,  after  having  received  a  considerable 
advance,  will  no  longer  be  in  a  position  to  disengage  herself  in  a  finan- 
cial way,  and  only  in  case  the  King  will  not  have  had  the  opportunity 
before  the  end  of  the  year,  that  is  to  say  before  the  issue  of  the  loan, 
to  place  the  Government  in  the  hands  of  other  Ministers, 

Margerie  adds  that  a  blunter  manner  of  procedure  at  the  present 
moment  might  offend  the  King  and  bring  about  the  opposite  effect. 

(544)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  May  24-June  6,  1914.    No.  143. 

The  negotiations  with  the  banks  are  still  not  concluded,  but 
Margerie  hopes  to  receive  a  final,  and  in  fact,  a  favourable  answer. 
One  is  also  of  the  opinion  here,  that  we  will  not  succeed  in  hinder- 
ing the  signing  of  the  loan  in  Berlin;  that  for  the  present  it  would 
be  useless  to  make  the  proposal  in  question  to  the  King  and  that  all 
our  efforts  must  be  directed  towards  preventing  parliament  ^  from  ac- 
cepting the  loan.  Margerie  agrees  with  the  view  of  our  Minister  at 
Sofia,  that  the  news  of  France's  having  refused  to  lend  money  to  Bui- 
garia  must  be  categorically  contradicted. 

(545)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  June  6-19,  1914.    No.  163. 

A  financial  group  at  the  head  of  which  is  the  Banque  Perrier, 
has  the  intention  of  granting  Bulgaria  not  an  advance,  but  an  im- 
mediate loan  of  200  million  francs.  It  counts  in  this  upon  the 
participation  of  the  Russian  banks  in  the  form  of  an  exchange  of 
Bulgarian  treasury  notes  against  obligations  of  the  new  loan  by 
our  banks,  so  that  they  would  not  have  any  new  expenses  to  incur. 

*The  Bulgarian  Sobranje. 


456         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

/  beg  you  to  inform  me  whether  such  a  plan  has  been  approved  by  t) 
Russian  Government, 


(546) 


The  Russian  Minister  at  Sofia  to  Sazonoff. 
1914.    No.  121. 


Telegram,  June  16-29, 


The  catastrophe  at  Sarajewo^  has  naturally  made  a  deep  im- 
pression not  only  upon  the  exchanges  of  Vienna  and  Berlin  but 
also  of  Paris.  Consequently,  Bauer,  the  representative  here  of  the 
Banque  Perrier,  told  me  that  he  must  send  a  telegram  to  the  Pari- 
sian and  Belgian  Banks  which  are  participating  in  the  loan.  There- 
fore, the  details,  which  I  am  able  to  communicate  to  you  today 
are  not  final. 


(547)    The  Same  to  the  Same,    Telegram,  June  17-30,  1914.   No,  122. 

Bauer  saw  Radoslavoff  today,  and,  although  he  was  unable  to 
make  any  definite  proposals  owing  to  the  latest  occurrences,  he 
was  satisfied  with  the  interview,  Radoslavoff  has  given  him  to 
understand,  that  after  the  assassination  of  the  Archduke,  there  is 
little  hope  of  concluding  the  loan  in  Berlin  and  that  the  Bulgarian 
Government  will  address  itself  to  Perrier;  this,  however,  could 
only  take  place  after  some  time  had  elapsed.  Bauer  leaves  for 
Constantinople  tomorrow  and  from  there  he  will  go  to  Paris.  He 
is  willing  to  return  here  as  soon  as  this  should  prove  to  be  neces- 
sary. He  reiterated  in  the  most  emphatic  manner  that  his  plan 
could  not  succeed  without  the  participation  of  the  Russian  State 
Bank,  and,  although  he  is  acting  in  co-operation  with  the  French 
Government,  he  would,  in  such  a  case,  rather  renounce  the  whole 
operation,  though  with  the  greatest  regret.  In  addition  to  all  other 
undesirable  consequences,  one  will  then  be  justified  in  levelling 
at  us  the  reproach  that  we  wish  merely  to  frustrate  the  negotiations 
in  Berlin,  but  that  we  ourselves  have  no  intention  of  granting  a 
loan.  In  view  of  this  consideration,  it  is  absolutely  necessary  to  make 
sure  of  the  moral  support  of  the  Russian  State  Bank;  Perrier  sees  in 
this  support  a  reassurance  to  the  French  public,  in  so  far  as  it  would 
arouse  in  them  the  hope  of  the  preservation  of  peace;  our  material 
participation  need  only  be  a  minimum. 

*  Assassination  by  members  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana,  a  Serbian  secret  political 
organization  of  a  Pan-Slav  character,  of  Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand  of  Austria, 
heir  presumptive,  and  his  morganatic  wife,  the  Duchess  of  Hohenberg. 


I 


BOOK  THREE 
THE  ENTENTE  AND  GERMANY 


457 


INTRODUCTION  TO  BOOK  THREE 

THE  ENTENTE  AND  GERMANY 

(February  1907— July  1914) 

The  minutes  of  a  meeting  of  the  Russian  ministerial  council — 
that  is  the  Russian  cabinet — held  on  February  first,  1907,  contain 
the  following: 

^'This  time  it  is  a  matter  of  coming  to  a  decision  as  to  the  proposal 
of  the  British  government  to  divide  Persia  into  spheres  of  influence. 
Until  quite  recently  this  idea  had  met  with  no  approval  from  public 
opinion,  and  in  government  circles  the  conviction  even  prevailed  that 
Persia  must  come  entirely  under  Russian  influence  and  that  Russia 
must  press  onward  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  which  would  necessitate  the 
building  of  a  trans-Persian  railway  and  a  fortified  terminal  station 
on  the  shores  of  the  above-mentioned  Gulf.  The  events  of  the  past 
few  years  have,  however,  shown  this  plan  to  be  impossible  of  realisa- 
tion and  that  everything  must  be  avoided  that  might  lead  to  a  conflict 
with  England." 

It  was  the  Anglo-Russian  Convention  of  1907  which  marks, 
politically,  the  era  which  ended  in  the  peace  treaties  of  Versailles, 
St.  Germain,  Sevres  and  where  not. 

That  convention  put  Persia  under  the  control  of  two  Powers 
that  had  no  interests  in  the  victimized  country  that  were  not  highly 
selfish.  Though  commonplace  pleas  regarding  civilization  were 
heard  at  the  time,  the  fact  is  that  exploitation  was  the  sole  reason 
back  of  the  agreement.  It  was  no  different  in  Manchuria,  Mon- 
golia and  China,  where  Russia  had  agreed  with  Japan  to  tax  peoples 
for  the  benefit  of  governments  and  investors  far  away.  To  these 
arrangements,  the  French  were  a  party — silent  partners,  usually, 

459 


460 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


who  invested  money  and  cashed  the  interest  thereon,  without  losing 
for  a  moment  sight  of  the  fact  that  this  had  to  be  done  in  such  a 
manner  that  no  politico-international  phase  of  French  interested- 
ness  was  ignored  or  damaged. 

The  United  States  and  Germany  did  not  wish  to  surrender  the 
Far  East  to  the  Russo-Japo-Anglo-French  interests,  and  insisted 
upon  a  policy  known  as  the  "Open  Door."  That  policy  was  to 
enable  all  to  trade  in  the  Far  East,  and  invest  capital,  for  the  eco- 
nomic development  of  these  territories,  rather  than  for  purely 
political  purposes,  as  the  Russians  and  Japanese  had  especially  in 
mind. 

For  getting  freedom  of  action  in  the  Far  East,  Russia  ceded 
its  arrogated  right  of  interference  in  Tibet  to  the  British,  for  such 
was  the  character  of  the  deal  made. 

There  remained  Italy.  As  a  member  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  that 
country  had  always  been  looked  upon  in  Paris,  London  and  St. 
Petersburg  as  the  lever  that  might  be  used  to  make  a  breach  into 
the  political  parapet  of  Central  Europe — Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary.  But  Italy  had  her  price  also.  She  was  given  a  free 
hand  in  the  last  of  Turkish  territories  in  North  Africa,  Cyrenaica 
and  Lybia,  and  proceeded  to  annex  them. 

Thus  the  entire  Entente  was  built  up  on  the  prostrate  bodies 
of  subject  peoples:  The  Mongols  in  Asia,  the  Persians,  and  the 
Turks ;  upon  the  East  in  fact,  if  we  include  India  and  Egypt. 

Austria-Hungary  was  in  no  sense,  not  even  the  narrowest,  an 
empire,  though  that  term  is  usually  associated  with  it.  It  had  no 
colonies  and  desired  none,  so  far  as  political  and  military  activity 
were  applied.  Together  with  Germany,  the  country  paid  much 
attention  to  internal  development,  the  growth  of  industry  and  the 
expansion  of  foreign  trade.  Nothing  could  very  well  be  more  dis- 
similar than  the  policies  of  the  two  groups  that  formed  the  Triple 
Alliance  and  the  Entente.  The  one  selected  "peaceful  penetration" 
of  foreign  countries  as  the  method  of  meeting  imports  with  ex- 
ports, and  leaving  a  balance  of  trade,  if  possible,  while  the  other 
subjected  foreign  aggregates  and  states  politically  and  militarily, 
and  then  exploited  those  whom,  ostensibly,  the  change  was  to 
benefit  culturally,  if  that  was  the  only  way  of  explaining  it  to  a_ 
gullible  world  public. 


THE  ENTENTE  AND  GERMANY  461 

Germany  had  obtained  from  the  Turkish  government  the  con- 
cession for  the  building  of  the  Bagdad  railroad.  That  concession 
was  not  a  very  important  one,  as  concessions  go,  though  many 
statements  to  the  contrary  have  been  made.  The  Bagdad  railroad 
was  to  start  at  Konia,  the  South  Anatolian  railhead  of  the  Otto- 
man Anatolian  railroad.  Thence  it  was  to  be  led  into  the  Plains 
of  Cilicia,  where,  at  Adana,  it  was  to  join  the  French  Syrian  line 
Mersina-Tarsus-Adana,  to  continue  then  to  Rodjo  in  Syria,  use 
the  right  of  way  of  another  spur  of  the  French  Syrian  railroad  as 
far  as  Aleppo,  from  which  point  the  line  would  have  to  be  laid 
as  far  as  Bagdad,  striking  the  river  Euphrates  at  Djerablus,  whence 
a  line  was  to  be  run  into  Persia,  if  the  concession  therefore  could 
be  obtained.  The  original  plan  was  to  extend  the  line  from  Bag- 
dad to  Basra,  and  possibly  to  Koweit  on  the  Persian  Gulf.  How 
the  building  of  the  line  beyond  Bagdad  was  frustrated  by  the  Brit- 
ish and  Russians  forms  a  most  entertaining  chapter  in  this  book. 

The  situation  in  Persia  and  Turkey  was  not  in  itself  the  start- 
ing point  of  the  condition  that  led  to  the  Great  War  ultimately. 
It  was  merely  the  first  clinical  symptom — the  first  general  warn- 
ing that  a  great  conflict  was  going  on  in  the  chancelleries  of  Eu- 
rope, which  finally,  in  the  nature  of  things,  would  end  on  the 
battlefield,  or  as  some  have  put  it,  be  continued  there  with  military, 
instead  of  diplomatic,  means. 

With  German  trade  in  the  Near  East  increasing,  the  Berlin 
government  could  not  remain  indifferent  to  the  "political  penetra- 
tion" of  Persia  by  Russia  and  Great  Britain,  two  nations  which  had 
before  demonstrated  that  they  were  none  too  well  disposed  toward 
Germany,  as  in  the  Morocco  affair,  for  instance.  There  was  no 
reason,  moreover,  why  Germany  should  not  oppose  the  subjection 
of  Persia.  The  action  itself  was  immoral  enough,  and  the  conduct 
of  the  Russians  especially  gave  ample  room  for  intervention,  if  not 
interference.  But  German  commercial  interests  did  not  want  to 
have  their  business  disturbed.  The  Berlin  government  recognized 
officially  that  Russia  and  Great  Britain  had  special  privileges  in 
Persia  and  merely  took  steps  intended  to  prevent  exclusion  of 
German  trade  by  Entente  control  of  Persia's  financial  administra- 
tion. 

The  Anglo-Russian  Convention  regarding  Persia  made  it  plain 


462 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


everywhere  that  the  Entente  had  become  an  international  factor 
of  definite  tendencies.  The  terms  of  the  Franco-Russian  treaty  of 
alliance  could  only  be  guessed  at.  The  many  on-dits  that  circulated 
in  diplomatic  circles,  concerning  its  provisions,  were  so  contradic- 
tory for  the  greater  part  that  none  could  be  guided  by  it.  The  case 
had  to  be  observed  and  a  diagnosis  attempted.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  world  was  equally  in  the  dark  in  regard  to  the  relations  of 
France  and  Great  Britain,  designated  the  entente  cordiale.  None 
knew  really  whether  a  casus  foederis  formed  a  part  of  the  agreement 
or  not,  and  to  this  very  day  the  documents  in  the  case  have  not 
seen  the  light  of  day,  though  the  correspondence  here  published 
leaves  not  the  least  doubt  as  to  the  motives  actuating  the  states- 
men of  France  and  Great  Britain.  So  far  as  the  relations  of  Rus- 
sia and  Great  Britain  were  to  be  estimated  on  the  outside,  the 
convention  referred  to  was  sufficient  to  warn  all  those  who  might 
get  into  conflict  with  either.  The  attachment  displayed  by  Is- 
wolsky  and  Sazonoff  toward  the  British  and  French  governments  is 
truly  remarkable  in  n^any  respects.  Sir  Edward  Grey,  and  the 
French  ministers  of  foreign  affairs,  heard  of  everything  the  Rus- 
sian government  planned,  with  the  exception  of  the  few  occasions 
When  it  was  all  too  patent  that  Russian  interests  were  not  as  well 
tended  as  they  might  have  been  by  the  Entente — from  the  angle  of 
the  Entente. 

Germany  had  a  good  example  of  this  in  the  first  Morocco  crisis,^ 
though  somewhat  in  the  dark  still  as  to  the  meaning  of  the  joint 
action  of  the  three  Powers,  which  obliged  her  to  leave  France  in 
possession  of  much  more  in  Morocco  than  she  was  entitled  to, 
even  under  the  most  elastic  conceptions  of  modern  diplomacy. 
Much  was  made  by  France  of  her  interests  in  Morocco  as  "neigh- 
bor" of  that  country,  in  the  same  manner  as  much  was  being  made 
of  that  by  the  Russians  and  British  in  Persia,  though  to  regard 
Great  Britain  as  a  "neighbor"  of  Persia,  was  probably  stretching 
the  meaning  of  words.  At  any  rate,  Germany  emerged  from  her 
first  tussle  with  the  Entente  much  worsted  politically.  Her  gov- 
ernment did  not  want  war,  and  the  empire  was  fast  changing  into 
a  commercial  realm,  the  administration  of  which  made  necessary 
more  concessions  to  the  Entente  than  was  good  for  all.  The  suc- 
cessful business  man  fears  nothing  more  than  a  change  to  new 


I 


THE  ENTENTE  AND  GERMANY  463 

conditions,  and  Germany  was  rapidly  acquiring  that  mentality, 
even  though  a  small  number  of  fierce  Pan-Germans  made  fearful 
noises  at  times. 

The  aftermath  of  the  Bosnian  Crisis  and  Morocco  was  another 
tightening  of  the  "iron  ring"  about  the  Triple  Alliance,  of  which 
Italy  was  no  longer  a  dependable  member,  the  Agreement  of  Rac- 
conigi  being  already  a  fact.  It  was  thought  that  the  Algeciras 
Convention  would  clear  the  atmosphere  a  little,  but  that,  too,  was 
a  fallacious  hope.  Such  measures  merely  postponed  the  inevitable ; 
did  not  eliminate  it,  because  the  roots  of  the  evil  were  not  so  much 
as  touched,  as  the  documents  show  all  too  plainly.  Already  the 
question  of  the  naval  race  between  Germany  and  Great  Britain 
was  up — the  foremost  subject  of  discussion  and  debate.  Though 
England  had  been  able  to  call  in  some  of  the  units  of  her  fleet  in 
Far  Eastern  waters,  and  was  building  ships  in  feverish  haste,  the 
German  naval  program  was  such  that,  no  matter  how  the  British 
government  might  try  to  avert  it,  the  period  was  seen  in  which  the 
Two-Power  Standard  could  no  longer  be  maintained. 

The  German  government  tried  for  a  while  to  get  a  better  un- 
derstanding with  the  French.  The  concessions  that  had  been  made 
in  the  Morocco  matter  were  such  as  to  permit  the  belief  that  bet- 
ter relations  could  be  reached.  Emperor  William  went  out  of  his 
way  to  promote  them  but  was  not  very  successful.  Though  quite 
an  able  man  in  some  respects,  he  lacked  the  perspective  necessary 
to  see  that  the  international  situation  was  far  beyond  such  remedies 
as  personal  and  official  concessions  constituted.  The  fact  is  that 
the  world  was  misleading  itself,  and  was  being  misled  by  well 
sounding  words  and  phrases  that  had  no  meaning.  The  meetings 
of  kings  and  statesmen,  especially  the  inevitable  dinners  that 
marked  them,  were  made  the  occasions  of  protestations  that  were 
pleasing,  but  dangerous  because  they  went  to  the  core  of  things 
in  no  instance.  Emperor  William's  interview  with  Dr.  Dillon  of 
the  London  "Daily  Telegraph"  duly  excepted. 

In  November,  1909,  the  Bagdad  railroad  question  became  acute. 
The  Deutsche  Bank  had  obtained  a  concession  from  the  Turkish 
government  to  build  the  line.  As  in  all  such  cases,  there  was  no 
great  objection  when  news  of  the  transaction  first  reached  the 
W/Orld.    Somebody  needed  time  to  create  a  situation.    Iswolsky  had 


464 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


done  this  in  the  Bosnian  crisis,  and  he  did  it  again  in  this  case, 
despite  the  fact  that  Germany  had  counted  on  his  silence  at  least, 
if  not  his  support,  expecting  to  get  in  some  manner  recognized  he|^- 
very  complacent  spectatorship  in  the  division  of  Persia.  ■■ 

The  railroad  in  question  was  to  be  constructed  on  Ottoman 
territory  entirely,  and  an  agreement  between  the  concessionary 
and  the  Turkish  government  would  have  been  enough  to  dispose 
of  the  case.  Such  was  the  attitude  of  the  German  government  and 
the  Sublime  Porte.  But  such  was  not  the  view  of  St.  Petersburg, 
London  and  Paris.  In  these  capitals  it  was  held,  that  the  building 
of  the  railroad  was  a  matter  that  needed  the  sanction  of  the  En- 
tente governments. 

The  position  of  Iswolsky,  Grey  and  Pichon  could  not  be  de- 
fended very  easily  at  first,  until  it  was  decided  to  attack  the  under- 
taking from  the  angle  of  Turkish  finance.  It  had  been  arranged 
that  some  of  the  money  needed  to  build  the  line  should  be  raised 
by  a  4  per  cent  increase  of  the  Turkish  import  duties.  This  gave 
everybody  a  chance  to  be  heard.  In  the  first  place,  the  adminis- 
tration of  the  Turkish  public  debt  was  an  international  one.  Great 
Britain,  France  and  Russia  could  be  heard  in  that  department,  and, 
finally,  they  advanced  the  argument  that  it  could  not  be  in  the 
interest  of  the  Entente  to  have  its  imports  into  Turkey  additionally 
taxed  for  the  benefit  of  a  railroad  enterprise  in  the  hands  of  the 
Germans.  Next,  the  kilometer-guarantee  was  attacked,  though  this, 
in  all  fairness,  was  modest  enough,  seeing  that  the  road  would  be 
a  very  expensive  one,  the  Konia-Adana  division  through  the  Taurus 
range  having  no  less  than  75  tunnels,  one  of  them  about  three  miles 
long,  while  the  roadbed  in  the  mountains  was  of  the  costliest  con- 
struction even  in  daylight. 

These  arguments  being  answered,  the  Entente  governments, 
acting  always  in  accord,  interposed  many  objections  in  regard  to  the 
branchlines  that  were  to  be  laid  down  as  economic  feeders  of  the 
railroad.  Every  one  of  them  was  given  a  political  and  strategic 
character,  and  finally  the  railroad  com'pany  agreed  not  to  build  any 
of  them  for  the  time  being,  despite  the  loss  in  revenue  that  would 
be  suffered.  While  these  difficulties  were  being  reviewed  and  laid 
aside  for  future  use,  the  British  began  to  have  special  objections  of 
their  own.    The  London  government  decided  that  it  would  en- 


THE  ENTENTE  AND  GERMANY  465 

danger  British  interests,  if  the  railroad  was  extended  beyond  Bag- 
dad— to  Basra  and  Koweit  on  the  Gulf.  Again  the  German  gov- 
ernment reconciled  itself  to  the  pleasure  of  the  Entente.  The 
French  also  had  now  thought  of  special  interests  and  demanded  a 
concession  from  the  Turkish  government  for  a  line  to  run  from 
Alexandrette  to  Bagdad,  a  much  better  project  than  the  Germans 
had,  which  they  could  not  ask  for,  however,  since  the  Syrian  roads 
involved  were  in  the  control  of  the  French.  Count  Benckendorff 
wrote  to  Sazonoff  that  the  French  project  was  entirely  an  obstruc- 
tive scheme,  and  in  this  he  was  right,  since  the  French  never  again 
pressed  the  point.  One  of  the  reasons  why  the  Bagdad  railroad 
matter  did  not  develop  into  another  crisis  was  that  Russia  had  no 
money  to  invest  and  had  been  bluffing;  that  Great  Britain,  too, 
had  been  bluffing,  and  that  France  was  not  just  then  able  to  make 
investments,  having  engaged  herself  financially  to  Russia  to  such 
an  extent  that  even  the  very  prolific  French  banks  found  it  hard 
to  keep  up  the  pace. 

The  Germans  hoped  that  the  death  of  King  Edward  would  im- 
prove at  least  Anglo-German  relations  a  little.  But  that  was  not 
to  be.  So  long  as  Sir  Edward  Grey  was  in  charge  of  British  foreign 
affairs,  no  change  in  policy  could  be  looked  for,  and  King  George 
continued  within  the  sphere  his  father  had  created,  even  though 
the  powers  of  the  crown  were  again  being  reduced  to  their  tradi- 
tional dimensions,  which  were  by  no  means  generous.  It  was  not 
likely  that  a  country  which  had  just  emasculated  its  House  of 
Lords  would  give  such  powers  to  King  George  as  he  would  have 
needed  to  influence  the  situation  as  radically  as  was  necessary  in 
order  to  give  Great  Britain's  foreign  policy  a  new  direction.  All 
hope  in  that  quarter  was  doomed  to  failure,  therefore. 

Efforts  in  behalf  of  a  better  understanding,  between  Great 
Britain  and  Germany,  were  a  little  more  successful  when  the  British 
Liberal  Party  was  approached.  The  Liberals  were  not  by  nature 
in  sympathy  with  Russian  political  institutions ;  they  also  failed  to 
realize  why  Great  Britain  should  pull  chestnuts  out  of  the  fire  for 
the  French  imperialists,  but  the  improvements  noticeable  were  on 
the  surface  only.  As  Count  Benckendorff  put  it,  the  Conservatives 
and  Liberals  of  Great  Britain  were  one  as  imperialistic  as  the 
other — under  different  labels.    The  objections  of  the  Liberal  Party 


466 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


to  Russian  reactionariness  was  certainly  but  a  faint  imitation  of 
what  the  French  radicals  felt,  and  if  the  latter  did  not  succeed  in 
modifying  the  foreign  policy  of  their  government,  the  British  Lib- 
erals had  no  chance  at  all.  While  the  Russians  had  ample  reason 
now  and  then  to  complain  of  the  distrust  manifested  toward  them 
by  the  French  socialists,  they  never  had  a  good  cause  for  complaiqfc  u 
given  them  by  the  British  Liberals.  fl 

An  interesting  intermezzo  was  to  shift  political  thought  from 
the  old  bones  of  contention  for  a  little  while.  The  Dutch  govern- 
ment decided  to  put  its  coast  batteries  on  the  mouth  of  the  Scheldt 
in  better  shape.  The  Belgian  press  raised  a  loud  cry  against  that, 
as  did  the  French  and  British.  The  argument  used  was  one  of  the 
oddest  hypotheses  ever  advanced,  to  wit:  That  the  mouth  of  the 
Scheldt  was  being  fortified  in  the  interest  of  the  Germans.  The  sen- 
sation being  a  little  too  ridiculous,  it  soon  died,  though  not  without 
M.  Iswolsky  being  able  to  report  to  Sazonoff : 

''In  spite  of  this,  as  I  have  learned,  the  newspaper  campaign,  which 
was  first  taken  up  by  certain  Belgian  newspapers,  zvas  conducted  with 
French  money  and  secret  participation  of  the  French  military  attache 
in  Belgium  in  the  hope  of  frustrating  in  this  indirect  manner  the  ejMi 
cution  of  the  Dutch  plan"  "' 

The  fact  is  that  the  Dutch  government  knew  what  was  going 
on  in  Belgium.  French,  British  and  Belgian  engineers  were  taking 
stock  of  the  military  contingencies  that  would  arise  in  case  of  a  gen- 
eral European  war.  This  was  also  the  reason  why  the  Dutch  gov- 
ernment saw  fit  to  improve  its  coast  defenses,  generally,  because  in 
case  of  a  general  war  the  neutrality  of  Holland  was  as  susceptible 
to  violation  as  the  more  reinforced  status  of  Belgium.  Holland 
wanted  to  guard  against  the  very  emergency  it  had  to  meet  in 
October,  1914,  when  the  Entente  governments  considered  the  forc- 
ing of  the  Scheldt  so  that  relief  might  be  brought  to  the  besieged 
city  of  Antwerp.  While  navigation  on  the  river  was  open  to  all, 
the  defense  of  the  status  of  the  river,  and  the  adjacent  territory, 
was  a.duty  of  the  Dutch. 

Another  war  crisis  came  in  the  spring  of  1911  when  the  French 
violated  the  Algeciras  Convention,  and  the  Franco-Spanish  Agree- 
ment of  1904,  by  sending  troops  into  the  capital  of  Morocco,  Fezj^ 
when  this  was  contrary  to  both  agreements  and  when  there  was 


THE  ENTENTE  AND  GERMANY  467 

need  of  it,  as  shown  by  the  documents.  The  Germans  and  Spanish 
feared  that  their  interests  would  be  again  placed  behind  those  of  the 
French  and  opposed  the  contemplated  move  diplomatically.  The 
Entente  governments  paid  no  heed  to  what  Berlin  and  Madrid  had 
to  say,  and  the  result  was  that  the  German  government  sent  the 
gunboat  "Panther"  to  Agadir,  ostensibly  for  the  purpose  of  protect- 
ing the  Europeans  in  and  near  that  port ;  in  reality  for  the  purpose 
of  showing  the  Entente  that  there  was  an  end  to  all  things.  The 
documents  show  that  while  the  Russian  and  British  press  supported 
the  act  of  France,  the  Russian  and  British  foreign  offices  were  not 
at  all  sure  that  the  French  government  had  not  gone  too  far,  in  thus 
openly  violating  an  agreement  to  which  nearly  all  of  Europe  was  a 
party,  though  on  this  occasion  Sir  Edward  Grey  also  found  it  neces- 
sary to  assure  the  French  "that  the  agreements  between  England 
and  France  imposed  on  England  the  obligation  to  support  France." 
He  went  still  further,  when  he  informed  the  German  ambassador — 
to  the  latter's  inquiry  what  would  be  the  consequences  if  the  Mo- 
roccan government  passed  entirely  under  French  influence  as  the 
result  of  a  violation  of  the  Algeciras  Act — that  in  the  event  of  en- 
tanglements all  English  obligations  would  become  "operative." 

The  Moroccan  "drama"  was  once  more  taken  off  the  stage 
by  Germany's  eating  humble  pie,  especially  when  the  attitude  of 
the  Italians  had  made  it  plain  that  in  case  of  trouble  they  could 
not  be  counted  upon.  Italy  had  a  military  understanding  with 
France  and  was  counting  upon  permission  to  occupy  Cyrenaica 
and  Lybia. 

In  November  of  1911,  the  armament  question  became  acute. 
The  Liberals  wished  to  limit  the  British  naval  construction  pro- 
gram, so  as  to  have  some  money  for  socio-economic  betterments 
which  they  had  promised  the  people  of  England.  There  was  to  be 
a  sort  of  old-age  insurance,  among  other  things.  But  all  that  took 
money,  and,  so  long  as  the  mad  race  in  armament  went  on,  there 
was  little  prospect  of  getting  the  sums  needed.  There  was  in 
Germany  also  an  element  that  wished  to  see  naval  and  military 
expenditures  reduced,  and  the  idea  had  many  more  supporters  in 
government  circles  than  has  been  assumed. 

By  now,  however,  the  armed  camps  of  Europe  were  no  longer 
theories,  but  the  sternest  of  facts.    It  was  not  any  longer  a  ques- 


468 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


tion  of  any  two  opponents  coming  together,  but  a  matter  of  Ger- 
many pleasing  all  three  of  her  adversaries.  The  situation  was 
simply  an  impossible  one.  For  instance,  the  documents  show  that 
the  French  were  in  reality  opposed  to  a  naval  understanding  be- 
tween the  Germans  and  British,  because  it  was  felt  that  the  money 
Germany  did  not  spend  on  her  navy  she  would  spend  by  increasing 
her  army,  in  which  event  France  would  have  to  bear  the  brunt. 
The  Russian  government,  too,  was  of  that  opinion.  The  result  was, 
that  the  mission  of  Lord  Haldane  was  doomed  before  he  set  foot 
into  Germany.  Haldane  admitted  to  Jules  Cambon,  the  French 
ambassador  at  Berlin,  that  his  mission  was  not  a  matter  of  entente, 
but  one  of  detente — detention,  the  French  diplomatist  putting  the 
words  in  his  mouth  and  he  affirming  them.  Though  the  Haldane 
errand  availed  nothing,  the  French  and  Russian  governments  grew 
not  a  little  alarmed,  and  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  to  assure  them  in 
what  he  would  call  categorical  terms  that  really  nothing  had 
changed,  which  was  a  fact. 

All  Europe  was  agog  when  Mr.  Asquith,  British  premier,  and 
Mr.  Churchill,  First  lord  of  the  admiralty,  met  Lord  Kitchener  on 
Malta  in  the  spring  of  1912.  The  attempts  to  come  to  an  under- 
standing in  regard  to  naval  preparedness  had  now  been  recorded  as 
a  complete  fiasco,  while  the  British  had  been  able  to  strengthen 
their  home  fleet  by  leaving  it  to  the  French  to  patrol  more  of  the 
Mediterranean.  Meanwhile,  France  had  made  more  loans  to  Rus- 
sia, which  were  being  used  for  the  complete  reorganization  of  the 
Russian  army,  and  the  building  of  strategic  railroads  along  the 
German  and  Austro-Hungarian  frontiers.  The  reports  of  the  press 
from  Russia  brought  news  every  day  of  another  Pan-Slav  event  or 
demonstration,  and  down  in  Belgrade,  which  was  a  sort  of  Slav 
nerve  center — the  political  solar  plexus  of  the  movement  in  fact — 
these  activities  raised  loud  echoes.  The  men  who  had  labored  hard- 
est at  the  preservation  of  peace  were  dismayed.  It  seemed  that 
there  was  no  remedy  for  this  cancer  that  was  eating  the  vitals 
of  Europe. 

To  make  the  situation  worse,  news  came  that  France  and  Great 
Britain  were  about  to  conclude  a  formal  alliance,  and  that  Russia's 
position  in  the  Entente  would  be  similarly  defined  by  a  treaty  with^ 
Great  Britain.    Sir  Edward  Grey  was  averse  to  doing  either.    ~' 


THE  ENTENTE  AND  GERMANY  469 

mutual  relations  of  the  Entente  members  were  perfectly  satisfac- 
tory, as  he  viewed  it,  and  experience  had  shown  that  the  cement  of 
common  interests  was  strong  enough  to  serve  every  purpose  of  the 
British  empire,  and  more  than  that  he  was  not  inclined  to  contract 
for.  The  arrangements  he  had  with  France  and  Russia  were  most 
advantageous  to  his  government  and  people,  as  is  shown  by  the 
document  with  remarkable  clearness.  The  danger  of  an  invasion  of 
India  by  Russia  had  been  removed  by  occupying  the  Russians  in 
Persia.  The  Straits  question  also  was  taken  care  of  in  this  manner. 
The  concessions  to  the  French  in  Morocco  had  brought  a  fine  com- 
pensation to  the  British — in  the  form  of  absolute  control  of  Egypt. 
Out  in  the  Far  East  the  British  interests  had  been  promoted  by  a 
complete  understanding  between  Japan  and  Russia,  so  that  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  could  well  afford  to  limit  discussions  with  the  Germans 
to  questions  in  far-away  Africa,  which  were  indeed  interesting  topics 
for  interviews,  but  influenced  in  no  wise  the  tense  situation  in 
Europe.  On  the  other  hand.  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  entered  upon  the 
most  cordial  relations  with  the  American  government,  whose  offer 
of  an  arbitration  treaty  he  had  accepted  at  a  time  when  he  was  in- 
triguing against  the  United  States  in  the  Far  East. 

In  the  summer  of  1912  another  attempt  was  made  to  improve 
Anglo-German  relations.  Why  nothing  came  of  it  is  shown  by 
the  documents.  The  meeting  of  the  German  and  Russian  emperors 
at  Balticport  also  resulted  in  nothing.  In  that  season,  however,  the 
Bagdad  railroad  controversy  was  laid  by. 

The  Italo-Turkish  war  did  not  excite  Europe  very  much.  The 
outcome  was  a  foregone  conclusion,  and,  so  long  as  Italy  abstained 
from  taking  Turkish  islands,  no  crisis  was  likely  to  ensue.  But  the 
situation  changed  completely  as  soon  as  the  Balkan  war  was  well 
under  way.  As  a  precaution,  Austria- Hungary  had  concentrated 
some  of  her  troops  on  the  Serbian  border,  and  Bethmann-Hollweg 
had  made  a  speech  with  little  tact  in  which  he  pointed  to  the  de- 
pendable qualities  of  the  Triple  Alliance — qualities  of  which  the 
Entente  needed  no  reminder,  wanted  none  in  fact.  The  result  was 
that  the  Russian  government  accepted  the  political  situation  as 
very  strained  and  went  so  far  as  to  make  inquiry  of  the  Swiss  gov- 
ernment what  it  intended  doing  to  safeguard  its  neutrality  in 
times  of  war.     Sazonoff  took  care  to  have  it  become  known  in 


470 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


London  and  Paris  that  he  had  taken  this  step.  The  Swiss  govern- 
ment, growing  alarmed,  caused  its  diplomatic  representatives  to 
sound  the  French  and  British  governments  as  to  what  their  atti- 
tude would  be  in  case  of  war,  to  which  Grey  replied  that  Great 
Britain's  attitude  would  depend  upon  the  circumstances.  Five  days 
later,  M.  Poincare,  the  French  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  submitted 
to  Sir  Edward  Grey  the  draft  of  a  speech  he  was  to  deliver  in  the 
French  chamber  of  deputies  on  the  foreign  policy  of  the  French 
government,  which  occasion  the  British  secretary  for  foreign  af- 
fairs availed  himself  of  to  say  that  there  had  been  no  change  in 
British  foreign  policy.  Grey  agreed  with  Poincare's  speech,  as  di^a 
Mr.  Asquith,  the  premier.  fl 

There  was  more  alarm  in  Germany  under  the  surface  than  the 
spectator  suspected.  Through  Russian  news  channels,  it  had  been 
made  known  that  Germany  was  earning  herself  the  enmity  of  Rus- 
sia because  of  the  support  she  gave  to  Austria-Hungary.  There  is 
no  doubt  that  the  men  in  Vienna  regarded  Germany's  obligation  as 
ally  as  an  asset  they  could  use  ad  libitum,  and  now  and  then  it  was 
necessary  to  advise  caution.  But  Germany  could  not  very  well 
forsake  the  only  fairly  dependable  ally  she  had,  even  if  that  relation 
made  Italy  an  uncertain  quantity  and  earned  Germany  the  dis- 
pleasure, if  not  the  hatred,  of  the  Russians.  An  Austria-Hungary 
abandoned  by  Germany  would  have  been  the  weak  prey  of  the 
Russian  Pan-Slavs  and  Grand-Ducal  war  clique,  and  her  dismem- 
berment could  not  have  taken  place  without  Germany  getting  in- 
volved in  the  war  anyway,  since  France,  if  not  England,  under  such 
circumstances,  would  have  found  the  bone  of  contention  necessary 
to  start  trouble.  There  was  only  one  way  open  for  Germany,  and 
that  was  an  alliance  with  Russia — if  that  was  to  be  had.  The 
Franco-Russian  alliance  was  at  first  directed  against  Great  Britain, 
to  be  sure,  but  with  Great  Britain  effecting  an  entente  with  France 
that  alliance  had  to  be  turned  against  Germany  for  the  sheer  lack 
of  any  other  objective.  Critics  of  the  German  government,  at  home 
and  abroad,  were  not  in  a  position  to  see  the  real  inside  of  the 
foreign  offices  at  Paris,  London  and  St.  Petersburg,  and  did  not 
understand  the  dumfounding  dilemma  which  the  documents  now 
disclose. 

The   situation   was   again   rendered   critical   in   the   winter   of 


THE  ENTENTE  AND  GERMANY  471 

1913-4,  when  the  Ottoman  government  decided  to  have  a  German 
officer  become  the  instructor  general  of  its  army,  to  which  office 
was  to  be  attached  the  command  of  the  First  Ottoman  army  sta- 
tioned in  and  near  Constantinople.  London,  Paris  and  St.  Peters- 
burg argued  that  this  would  place  the  Turkish  army  under  German 
control,  and  Sazonoff  said  that  his  diplomatic  representatives  could 
not  stay  in  a  city  in  which  a  German  officer  was  the  highest  in 
command.  For  the  purpose  of  getting  the  necessary  ground  to 
stand  on,  Sazonoff  assumed  that  the  head  of  the  military  mission  to 
Turkey  would  usurp  every  military  function  of  the  Ottoman  gov- 
ernment, when  as  a  matter  of  fact  there  was  no  question  of  the 
officer  being  more  than  a  contract  employe  of  the  Ottoman  govern- 
ment, engaged  to  render  special  services,  and  responsible  for  all  his 
acts  to  the  Turkish  ministry  of  war. 

The  situation  was  an  awkward  one  for  the  Entente,  because 
there  was  active  in  Turkey  a  British  naval  mission,  the  head  of 
which  was  also  a  contract  officer,  having  functions  similar  to  those 
which  General  Liman  von  Sanders  Pasha  was  to  assume,  and  being 
in  his  turn  responsible  to  the  Turkish  ministry  of  marine.  In  fact, 
the  sphere  of  Admiral  Limpus  was  the  more  important  and  greater, 
since  he  was  entrusted  with  the  management  of  the  Turkish  navy 
and  coast  defense  system,  the  latter  an  organization  which  the 
British  could  use  to  the  detriment  of  the  Russians  any  day.  De- 
spite this,  the  controversy  was  carried  to  ridiculous  extremes,  even 
by  Sir  Edward  Grey,  who  had  to  do  most  of  his  work  in  the  dark, 
because  it  did  not  become  him  to  object  to  the  employment  by  the 
Turks  of  Liman  Pasha,  so  long  as  he  had  to  bear  in  mind  that  there 
was  in  Turkey  a  British  naval  mission  under  the  command  of  an 
officer  of  such  high  standing  as  Admiral  Limpus. 

Grey  did  not  tell  the  irate  Russians  what  his  point  of  view  really 
was,  but  he  admitted  to  the  French  ambassador  at  London  that  he 
did  not  wish  to  go  too  far  in  Constantinople,  which  Sazonoff 
thought  "a  very  regrettable  change  in  England's  attitude."  Sazo- 
noff had  started  to  belabor  the  Turkish  government,  with  the  aid  of 
the  French  and  British  foreign  offices,  but  Said  Halim  Pasha  re- 
mained firm  in  his  stand  that  the  question  of  employing  military 
and  naval  missions  was  a  purely  Turkish  affair ;  which  did  not  as- 
sume an  international  character,  so  far  as  the  Sublime  Porte  saw 


472  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


it,  since  it  was  for  the  officers  in  question  to  decide  whether  they 
wished  to  accept  such  service  or  not.  Baffled  in  this  manner,  and 
full  of  rage,  the  Russian  minister  of  foreign  affairs  seems  to  have 
entertained  starting  trouble  for  the  Turks  in  Armenia,  as  is  shown 
by  a  telegram  from  the  Russian  ambassador  at  Constantinople. 

Liman  von  Sanders  Pasha  thought  it  best  in  the  end  to  relinquish 
the  command  of  the  First  army.  Before  the  opera-boujfe  character  of 
the  "situation"  was  finally  recognized  by  the  European  publics,  war 
had  been  imminent  again,  for  on  January  5th,  1914,  Iswolsky  was 
able  to  report  that,  in  a  friendly  interview  with  von  Jagow,  the 
French  ambassador  at  Berlin  had  been  told  that  if  the  Liman  con- 
troversy were  given  a  "European  character"  Germany  would  not  be 
in  a  position  to  adopt  a  yielding  attitude.  A  similar  statement  was 
made  by  the  German  state  secretary  for  foreign  affairs  to  the  British 
ambassador,  and  Iswolsky  could  report  from  Paris  that  "every  step 
made  in  common  by  Russia,  France  and  England  would  meet  with 
strong  resistance  at  Berlin  and  render  the  situation  considerably 
more  acute ;  should  we  nevertheless  consider  it  necessary  to  under- 
take such  a  step  in  common,  France  would  naturally  join  us,  but  in 
this  case  one  must  foresee  the  further  progress  of  events  and  come 
to  an  understanding  as  to  further  actions  in  common." 

Pourparlers  between  London  and  Berlin  were  still  confined  to 
African  questions,  when  Mr.  Churchill  proposed  that  in  future  the 
relations  in  strength  of  the  German  and  British  navies  should  be  as 
10  to  16  for  first-class  battleships,  the  Canadian  dreadnoughts  not 
included,  and  that  a  "naval  holiday"  should  ensue.  The  proposal  led 
to  a  renewal  of  the  rumours  that  Anglo-German  relations  were  im- 
proving, and  the  French  ambassador  at  London  was  much  worried 
by  them.  Even  Count  Benckendorff  was  not  immune  to  anxiety  on 
that  subject,  taking  the  sound  position,  however,  that,  before  much 
could  come  of  anything  in  the  political  department,  an  understand- 
ing would  have  to  be  reached  between  Great  Britain  and  Germany 
in  matters  purely  economic.  Such  was  the  situation.  On  April  2nd, 
1914,  Sazonoff  made  bold  to  propose  to  the  French  government,  in 
cautious  terms,  albeit,  that  the  Triple  Entente  should  be  developed 
into  something  having  more  the  qualities  of  the  Triple  Alliance. 
The  documents  do  not  show  what  induced  him  to  advocate  so  sane 
a  course.     The  fact  is  that  the  cause  of  peace  would  have  been 


THE  ENTENTE  AND  GERMANY  473 

served  by  that  step»  as  Sazonoff  put  it  in  his  Confidential  Letter  to 
Iswolsky  of  April  2nd.  The  diplomatic  world  of  Europe  would 
then  have  dealt  with  known,  or  at  least  determinable,  factors,  and 
the  prospect  of  a  general  war  and  all  its  horrors  might  have  caused 
even  the  more  desperate  to  look  before  they  leaped. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  was  opposed  to  the  forming  of  an  alliance.  If 
hitherto  it  had  been  Sazonoff  who  wanted  freedom  of  action  at  the 
expense  of  his  political  friends,  it  was  now  Grey's  opportunity  to 
go  a  little  further.  He  was  not  to  be  bound  by  an  alliance.  He 
would  go  as  far  as  to  conclude  a  naval  convention  with  Russia,  the 
matter  having  been  broached  to  him  by  Poincare  and  Doumergue, 
the  former  now  president  of  France,  and  the  latter  minister  of 
foreign  affairs,  on  the  occasion  of  the  visit  to  France  of  King 
George  and  Queen  Mary. 

But  before  entering  upon  negotiations  for  that  purpose.  Grey 
wanted  to  have  the  Russians  imderstand  full  well  that  there  was  a 
difference  between  a  treaty  of  alliance  and  a  mere  naval  convention. 
For  this  reason  he  caused  the  exchange  between  the  French  ambas- 
sador, himself  and  Count  Benckendorff,  of  a  document  that  carries 
on  its  very  face  the  stamp  of  being  spurious  in  so  far  as  its  real 
purpose  is  concerned.  The  document  mentions  that  *Jrom  time  to 
time,  during  the  course  of  the  last  few  years,  the  experts  of  the  French 
and  British  military  and  naval  authorities  have  consulted  with  one 
another/'  with  the  letter  bearing  the  date  of  November  22nd,  1912, 
and  then  states  circumstantially  that  neither  moment  nor  condition 
had  been  set  for  a  casus  foederis. 

With  this  formality  attended  to,  the  Russian  staff  of  admiralty 
adopted  a  resolution  in  which  its  wishes  were  stated,  every  one  of 
them  being  a  desideratum  directed  against  Germany.  The  Russian 
naval  attache  in  London  was  then  empowered  to  act  as  go-between 
and  courier  for  the  Russian  and  British  staffs  of  admiralty,  but  be- 
fore the  negotiations  had  progressed  very  far,  a  transcript  of  the 
resolution  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  German  government — about  the 
middle  of  June,  1914,  a  few  days  before  Archduke  Francis  Ferdi- 
nand was  assassinated. 


I 

GENESIS  OF  THE  ANGLO-RUSSIAN  ENTENTE 
(February  1907 — December  1908) 

(548)  Protocol  of  Deliberations  of  the  Russian  Ministerial  Council  of  Feb- 
ruary 1,  1907,  on  the  Project  of  a  Treaty  with  England  on  Persian 
affairs. 

At  the  opening  of  the  meeting,  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
reminded  the  Council  that  the  question  of  an  understanding  with 
England  as  to  Persian  affairs  had  already  been  ventilated,  al- 
though solely  a  propos  of  a  loan  to  be  granted  to  the  Persian 
Government. 

This  time  it  was  a  matter  of  coming  to  a  decision  as  to  the  proposal 
of  the  British  Government  to  divide  Persia  into  spheres  of  influence. 
Until  quite  recently,  this  idea  had  met  with  no  approval  from  Russian 
public  opinion,  and  in  Government  circles  the  conviction  even  prevailed 
that  Persia  must  come  entirely  under  Russian  influence,  and  that  Russia 
must  press  onward  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  which  would  necessitate  the 
building  of  a  trans-Persian  railway  and  a  fortified  terminal  station  on 
the  shores  of  the  above-mentioned  Gulf.  The  events  of  the  past  few 
years,  however,  have  shown  this  plan  to  be  impossible  of  realization 
and  that  everything  must  be  avoided  that  might  lead  to  a  conflict  with 
England.  The  best  means  for  achieving  this  purpose  is  the  demarcation 
of  the  spheres  of  influence  in  Persia. 

The  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  expressed  himself  as  being  a 
convinced  adherent  of  this  Standpoint,  and  desired  to  learn  the 
opinion  of  the  Ministers  present  as  to  the  expediency  of  such  a 
policy,  before  the  meeting  entered  upon  the  discussion  of  the  pro- 
posals made  by  England. 

The  Ministerial  Council  accepted  the  principle  of  spheres  of  in- 

474 


GENESIS  OF  ANGLO-RUSSIAN  ENTENTE  475 

fluence  as  the  only  basis  possible  for  an  agreement  with  England, 
whereupon  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  pointed  out  the  close 
connection  existing  between  this  question  and  the  Bagdad  Railway. 
Only  a  treaty  with  England  could  lead  to  the  expected  results,  if  no 
objections  were  raised  against  the  Treaty  on  the  part  of  Germany. 
As  events  in  Morocco  have  shown,  Germany  distrusts  all  agreements 
concluded  without  her  knowledge  and  which  might  in  any  manner  affect 
her  position  as  a  world  Power.  There  is  all  the  more  reason  for  such 
anxiety  on  our  part,  since  Germany  has  already  turned  her  atten- 
tion to  Persia  and  apparently  intends  creating  important  inter- 
ests for  herself  there.  This  is  furthermore  confirmed  by  the  fact 
that  the  possibility  of  a  Treaty  between  Russia  and  England  has 
aroused  lively  perturbation  in  Germany.  This  however  has  been 
disposed  of  by  the  statements  of  the  Russian  Government  at  Berlin. 
We  gave  them  to  understand  that  Russia  would  take  upon  herself  no  ob- 
ligations without  having  previously  come  to  an  understanding  with  Ger- 
many, should  the  proposed  agreement  affect  German  interests  in  any  way. 
But  to  be  completely  secure,  it  would  be  necessary  to  come  to  a 
definite  understanding  with  our  Western  neighbour  and  to  circum- 
scribe, to  a  certain  degree,  our  mutual  interests.  Such  a  basis  of 
negotiations  is  presented  by  the  Bagdad  Railway  which  Russia  has 
hitherto  attempted  to  prevent  by  all  possible  means,  relying  on  the 
support  of  France  and  England.  The  Ministerial  Council  must  now 
decide  whether  it  be  to  Russia's  advantage  to  renounce  such  a 
policy. 

The  Minister  of  Finance  pointed  out  that  the  rumours  of  Ger- 
many's extensive  economic  designs  on  Persia  were  greatly  exag- 
gerated. According  to  his  information,  the  German  banks,  which 
especially  finance  German  enterprises  in  Asia,  are  so  extremely 
occupied  that  they  are  hardly  able  to  take  part  in  new  undertak- 
ings in  Persia,  all  the  more  so  as  the  continuous  disturbances  in 
Iran  hardly  create  sound  conditions  for  trade  and  commerce.  True, 
several  leading  German  banks  have  formed  a  new  institution, 
'^Die  Orientalische  Bank,"  and  intend  opening  a  branch  at  Teheran, 
but,  so  far  as  is  known,  the  activity  of  this  institution  in  Persia  is 
to  be  more  of  an  informative  nature,  to  determine  which  Persian 
markets  might  in  the  future  be  of  use  to  Germany.  Nevertheless,  the 
fact  of  German  interests  in  Persia  cannot  be  denied  and  the  under- 


476         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

standing  with  Germany,  referred  to  by  the  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  is  therefore  decidedly  desirable. 

Referring  to  the  Bagdad  Railway,  Kokowtzeff^  reiterated  that  all 
his  former  objections  to  this  railway  still  held  good.  Although  it  is  an 
important  line  of  transit  between  Western  Europe  and  India,  and 
would  partly  replace  Ocean  Traffic,  yet  it  avoids  our  territory  and 
consequently  does  not  permit  us  to  participate  in  the  advantages  of 
this  transit.  The  Bagdad  Railway  will  also  undoubtedly  increase 
the  productiveness  of  the  territories  of  Asia  Minor  and  Mesopo- 
tamia through  which  it  passes,  and  thus  create  new  competition  for 
the  Russian  wheat  export  trade.  Especial  danger  for  our  predomi- 
nance in  Northern  Persia  is  embodied  in  the  branch  lines  leading 
towards  the  Persian  frontier,  which  will  make  access  to  our  eco- 
nomic sphere  of  influence  possible  for  German  and  English  indus- 
trial products. 

We  cannot,  however,  disguise  the  fact  that  we  do  not  possess  the 
power  to  prevent  the  construction  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  or  to  defer  it 
for  any  length  of  time.  The  only  means  at  our  disposal — our  influence 
on  France — are  not  reliable  and  we  would  hardly  succeed  in  restraining 
French  capital  from  participation  in  this  enterprise. 

The  idea  of  entering  into  competition  with  the  Bagdad  Railway, 
by  the  building  of  a  new  line  connecting  the  Russian  railways  with 
India  by  way  of  Afghanistan,  will  also  have  to  be  given  up. 
England  would  doubtless  regard  such  a  line  as  far  more  dangerous 
than  the  Bagdad  Railway.  We  shall  therefore  have  to  reconcile  our- 
selves to  the  idea  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  and  endeavour  to  obtain  com- 
pensations from  Germany.  In  any  case,  the  Minister  does  not  regard 
Russia's  participation  in  the  Bagdad  Railway  as  desirable.  Our  finan- 
cial position  does  not  permit  us  to  take  an  active  part;  a  fictitious  par- 
ticipation, moreover,  through  a  private  banking  concern  or  a  French 
group  of  capitalists,  affords  us  no  advantages.  The  Russian  Ambas- 
sador at  London  thereupon  remarked,  that  since  England  had  hitherto  al- 
ways calculated  on  Russian  participation  in  the  internationalising  of  the 
Bagdad  Railway,  our  withdrawal  might  give  quite  a  different  aspect  to 
the  whole  question. 

The  Minister  of  Trade  believes  that  Russian  obstruction  in 
the  Bagdad  Railway  question  would  only  be  of  use  could  the  con- 

*  President  of  Ministerial  Council— virtually  Russian  prime  minister. 


I 


GENESIS  OF  ANGLO-RUSSIAN  ENTENTE  477 

struction  of  the  line  be  postponed  for  several  decades.  As  this  is 
impossible,  it  would  be  desirable  to  secure  as  advantageous  com- 
pensations as  possible  in  return  for  our  acquiescence. 

The  Bagdad  Railway  is  so  injurious  to  Russian  interests  that  we  can 
scarcely  hope  to  receive  compensations  of  real  importance  to  us.  Hence 
we  must  content  ourselves  with  paralysing  as  far  as  possible  its  harm. 
In  this  respect  we  must  differentiate  between  the  main  and  the  branch 
lines  approaching  the  Persian  frontier.  For  Russian  interests,  the 
main  line  signifies  the  concentration  of  the  transit  service  from  Europe 
to  the  Persian  Gulf.  Since  1883,  when  the  Caucasus  was  closed,  this 
transit  service  has  not  passed  through  Russia,  so  that  our  losses  now 
would  only  be  indirect.  The  branch  lines  mentioned  above,  however, 
especially  those  touching  Persian  territory,  signify  a  direct  menace  to  us, 
as  they  would  open  the  North  Persian  markets,  which  we  have  hitherto 
controlled,  to  foreign  goods.  Hence  the  following  provision  in  favour 
of  Russia  should  be  established  at  the  pending  negotiations  with 
England  and  Germany : 

1.)  Germany  guarantees  that  no  branch  lines  be  built  in  the 
direction  of  the  Persian  frontier,  as,  for  instance,  Khanekin. 

2.)  England  and  Germany  must  support  us  as  to  the  renewal  of 
the  obligation  of  the  Persian  Government,  valid  until  the  year  1910, 
and  providing  that  Persia  would  build  no  railways  in  the  North  ^  or 
that  such  should  be  built  only  with  our  sanction,  consequently  also 
with  due  regard  to  our  interests. 

3.)  The  Treaty  of  1900  with  Turkey  relating  to  railways  in  Asia 
Minor  must  be  extended  in  our  favour. 

The  representatives  of  the  War  Ministry  and  the  General  Staff, 
unanimously  confirm  the  impossibility  of  reconciling  the  Bagdad 
Railway  with  Russian  strategic  interests;  the  advantages  which 
would  accrue  to  Turkey  through  this  railway  could  only  be  equal- 
ised by  a  corresponding  development  of  our  Caucasian  railway 
system,  and  corresponding  reinforcement  of  our  troops  in  the  fron- 
tier districts.  We  can  obtain  no  compensations  of  a  military  nature 
from  other  States.  Nevertheless,  they  ^  are  of  opinion  that  under 
certain  conditions  we  could  give  our  consent  to  the  Bagdad 
Railway. 

*  An  unusual  condition  in  this  age  of  railroads. 
'  The  military. 


478         ENTENtE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

(549)     Iswolsky,  Russian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Count  Benckendorff,] 
Russian  Ambassador  at  London.    Confidential  Letter,  Dec.  6-19,  1907.       ' 

I  have  read  with  the  liveliest  interest  your  two  letters  of  Novem-' 
ber  6-19,  in  which  you  report  on  the  exchange  of  views  on  the 
Bagdad  Railway  which  recently  took  place  at  Windsor  between 
Emperor  William  and  Baron  Schon  on  the  one,  and  the  British 
Government,  on  the  other,  hand.  I  greatly  appreciate  Sir  Edward 
Grey's  attitude  and  the  kind  information  he  sent  me  through  you. 

I  beg  you  to  present  my  best  thanks  to  the  Minister  and  I  also 
take  this  opportunity  of  acquainting  you  in  a  few  words  with  the 
standpoint  of  the  Imperial  Government  on  the  question  of  the  Bag- 
dad Railway.  The  German  project  has  met  with  no  more  sympathy  in 
Russia  than  in  England  and  France.  Without  touching  on  the  strate- 
gic importance  of  this  enterprise,  we  must  regard  with  anxiety  the 
influence  such  a  railway  would  exert  in  the  Turkish  neighbouring 
provinces  bordering  on  the  Caucasus,  the  Black  Sea  and  Persia. 
Our  principal  source  of  concern,  however,  is  the  influence  on  Persia, 
for  we  cannot  for  a  moment  doubt  that  the  construction  of  the 
Bagdad  Railway,  and  its  ultimate  connection  with  future  railways 
in  Persia,  will  open  this  country  to  German  political  influence  and 
commercial  undertakings. 

//  England  and  France' have  retained  absolute  freedom  of  action  in 
this  matter,  the  position  of  Russia  is  not  quite  the  same  since  the  Peters- 
burg Cabinet,  at  the  beginning  of  the  Anglo-Russian  negotiations, 
assured  Berlin  that  it  would  not  enter  into  any  obligations  without  having 
come  to  a  previous  friendly  understanding  with  Berlin. 

It  is  quite  natural  that  our  attitude  towards  Germany  has  led  to 
an  exchange  of  opinions  for  the  exclusive  purpose  of  securing  our 
vital  interests  in  Persia ;  even  England  herself  recognised  these  in- 
terests as  justified  in  the  convention  concluded  with  us 

(550)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Letter,  June  5-18,  1908. 

During  the  meeting  of  our  Emperor  with  King  Edward  at 
Reval,  I  was  received  by  His  Majesty  and  had  a  number  of  lengthy 
conversations  with  Sir  Charles  Hardinge,  the  English  Undersecre- 
tary of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs.  I  consider  it  my  duty  to  acquaint 
you,  confidentially,  for  your  own  personal  information,  with  certain 
details  of  this  exchange  of  opinions. 


GENESIS  OF  ANGLO-RUSSIAN  ENTENTE  479 

The  general  impression  which  this  meeting  has  left,  was  an 
extremely  favourable  one  from  a  political  point  of  view.  King_Ed-* 
ward  openly  expressed  his  satisfaction  and  sees  in  this  meeting  a 
confirmation  and  strengthening  of  the  agreement  reached  between 
Russia  and  England,  as  well  as  a  pledge  for  the  further  solidarity 
of  both  Governments.  His  Majesty  emphasized  with  particular 
satisfaction  the  hopeful  turn  of  affairs  in  our  domestic  politics  and 
th-*  approval  which  the  activity  of  Secretary  of  State  Stolypin  has  j 
met  with  in  serious  English  circles.  ^ 

Summarizing  Hardinge's  various  declarations,  I  must,  above  all 
things,  emphasize,  that  no  attempt  was  made  on  his  side  to  depart 
from  the  standpoint  of  concrete  agreements,  the  existing  as  well  as 
the  prospective  ones,  nor  to  draw  us  into  general  political  combi- 
nations. Sir  Charles  confirmed  the  fact  that  the  London  Cabinet 
is  entirely  of  our  opinion  that  the  entrevue  at  Reval  need  occasion 
no  anxiety  to  the  other  States;  as  to  what  may  especially  concern 
Germany,  the  British  Government  sincerely  desires  to  maintain  the  very 
best  relations  with  her  and  does  not  believe  that  these  relations  will  be 
strained  for  any  reason  in  the  immediate  future. 

^"In  spite  of  this/'  Sir  Charles  Hardinge  remarked  to  me,  "one  can- 1 
not  close  one's  eyes  to  the  fact,  that,  if  Germany  should  continue  to  in- 
crease her  naval  armaments  at  the  same  accelerated  pace,  a  most  alarm- 
ing and  strained  situation  might  arise  in  Europe  in  7  or  8  years}  Then, 
without  doubt,  Russia  would  be  the  arbiter  of  the  situation;  it  is  for 
this  reason  that  we,  in  the  interest  of  peace  and  the  preservation  of  the 
balance  of  power,  desire  that  Russia  be  as  strong  as  possible  on  land  ) 
and  on  sea/' 

Sir  Charles  reiterated  this  idea  more  than  once,  whereby  he  ap- 
parently wished  to  have  it  understood  that  he  is  expressing  not  his  own 
personal  opinion  but  the  decided  political  conviction  of  the  London  % 
Cabinet.  — • 

Proceeding  to  the  separate  questions  of  interest  to  Russia  and 
to  England,  Sir  Charles  spoke  warmly  of  the  hopeful  results  of  the 
Agreement  signed  last  year,^  thanks  to  which  not  a  single  one  of 
the  questions  which  had  recently  arisen  between  Russia  and  Eng- 

*  The  plans  of  the  Russian  General  Staff  provided  for  the  outbreak  of  a  war 
with  Germany  for  the  years  1915-6.    The  war  started  in  1914. 

'  Providing  for  the  division  of  Persia  into  British  and  Russian  "zones  of 
influence." 


480 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


land,  had  taken  a  dangerous  or  acute  character.  According  to  him,^ 
it  is  only  due  to  the  Convention,  and  the  absolute  sincerity  with  which 
Russia  fulfilled  her  obligations,  that  the  incident  on  the  Afghan  Frontier, 
did  not  result  in  the  advance  of  the  Indian  troops  into  Afghanistan^ 
the  London  Cabinet  appreciates  our  attitude  all  the  more  since,  regarded 
from  the  purely  formal  side  of  things,  the  Convention  regarding 
Afghanistan,  which  has  so  far  not  been  recognized  by  the  Emir,  has  not 
yet  com,e  into  force ^fl 

(551)     Memorandum  transmitted  by  the  British  Foreign  Office  to  the  Russian       , 
Embassy  in  London.    Oct.  9,  1908.  b| 

His  Majesty's  Government  have  examined  with  much  interest™? 
and  careful  attention  the  aide-memoire  communicated  by  the  Rus- 
sian Government  to  His  Majesty's  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg 
on  the  2-15  August  on  the  subject  of  railway  construction  in  Persia. 

Some  misapprehension  appears  to  have  arisen  in  regard  to  the 
precise  nature  of  the  proposals  of  His  Majesty's  Government,  who, 
in  approaching  the  Russian  Government,  contemplated  not  actual 
construction,  but  rather  timely  co-operation  in  earmarking  con- 
cessions which  otherwise  might  be  exploited  to  the  detriment  of 
Great  Britain  and  Russia. 

His  Majesty's  Government  attach  the  highest  importance  to  a 
complete  understanding  with  the  Russian  Government  on  this 
question.  They  consider,  however,  for  reasons,  which  will  be  in- 
dicated forthwith,  that  any  Convention  now  concluded  by  the  two 
Powers,  with  the  Persian  Government,  should  be  of  a  protective 
character  and  calculated  to  assure  to  Great  Britain  and  Russia  a 
secure  position  as  regards  enterprises  involving  political  issues, 
whenever  the  time  is  ripe  for  construction. 

Apart  from  the  uncertainty  of  the  political  situation,  there  are 
many  factors,  now  unknown  quantities,  which,  in  the  opinion  of 
His  Majesty's  Government,  render  impracticable,  in  existing  cir- 
cumstances, any  definite  scheme  of  railway  development  in  Persia, 
such  for  instance,  as  the  absence,  at  any  rate  in  Southern  Persia, 
of  all  surveys  even  of  a  preliminary  character,  as  to  the  ultimate 
constitution  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  Company  and  the  question  of 
whether  or  not  a  branch  line  is  constructed  from  Bagdad  to  Khane- 
kin.    Many  developments  of  this  nature  must  be  awaited,  before  a 


GENESIS  OF  ANGLO-RUSSIAN  ENTENTE  481 

railway  from  Julfa  to  Mohammerah  can  be  built  with  adequate 

prospects  of  commercial  success 

His  Majesty's  Government  are  of  opinion,  that,  in  view  of  the 
important  political  interests  at  issue.  Great  Britain  and  Russia 
would  be  fully  justified  in  informing  the  Persian  Government  that 
in  the  event  of  railway  communications  being  established  in  Persia, 
they  would  expect  to  have  the  refusal  upon  terms  equally  favour- 
able to  any  offered  by  third  parties,  of  all  Concessions  which  might 
be  in  contemplation. 

(552)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Iswolsky.    Letter,  Nov.  12- 
25,  1908. 

....  This  matter  of  an  armed  intervention  in  Persia  appears  to 
me  of  such  importance,  that  I  should  reproach  myself,  were  I  not 
at  once  to  draw  the  attention  of  the  Imperial  Ministry  to  the  con- 
sequences resulting  from  a  rupture  of  our  agreement  with  England, 
and  from  a  new  orientation  of  English  policy.  I  intentionally  use 
this  manner  of  expression,  even  though  I  am  aware  that  it  is  not 
usually  employed  in  Russia.  We  are  fond  of  assuming  the  standpoint 
that  we  may  choose  between  a  rapprochement  with  England  or  one  with 
Germany. 

In  reality  we  have  to  choose  between  isolation,  which  would  be 
the  outcome  of  a  German-English  understanding  or  a  rapproche- 
ment with  England.  For  political  reasons,  England  has  never  been 
willing  to  entertain  the  idea  of  an  agreement  with  Germany,  but  has 
sought  security  in  the  ententes  with  France  and  Russia. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  impossible  for  me  to  explain  German 
policy  otherwise  than  that  the  Berlin  Cabinet  seeks  every  oppor- 
tunity, or  even  first  creates  the  opportunity,  to  attempt  to  disrupt 
the  two  Ententes  of  England.  I  am  daily  more  convinced,  that  be- 
tween the  constant  friendliness  of  Germany  towards  us,  and  that 
towards  England,  broken  off  again  and  again  and  interloaded  with 
threats,  there  is  a  difference,  in  the  sense  that  the  conciliatory  at- 
titude of  Germany  tozvards  England  is  of  a  more  serious  nature.  It  is 
not  necessary  for  me  to  discuss,  where,  under  such  circumstances,  the 
political  and  national  interests  of  Russia  would  lie. 

I  believe  that  it  is  only  in  London  that  one  can  judge  how  persistent 
are  the  efforts  of  Germany  to  come  to  an  understanding  with  England, 


432         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

in  particular  the  efforts  of  Emperor  William,  who  has  committed  one 
error  after  another,  principally,  because  his  personal  efforts  were  fruit- 
less and  he  found  himself  in  London  face  to  face  with  a  stone  wall. 
But  the  mistakes  of  the  Kaiser  signified  just  so  many  new  diffi" 
culties  which  he  had  created  for  himself.  If  we  assume  that  the 
recent  events  in  Berlin  will  impose  a  greater  reticence  upon  the 
Kaiser,  then  German  policy,  steered  in  this  direction,  would  be  the 
more  dangerous  to  us 

In  spite  of  this,  it  is  correct,  if  we  take  English  mentality  as  it  really 
is,  that  Germany  as  a  nation  is  judged  more  favourably  than  hitherto. 
One  respects  her  power,  her  energy,  the  results  she  has  achieved  through 
her  work.  One  mistrusts  the  German  Government  most  decidedly, 
the  nation  much  less.  And,  from  time  to  time,  many  voices  are  heard, 
asserting  that  at  heart  Emperor  William  appears  to  be  sincere  towards 
England.  Such  opinions  are  to  be  found  in  the  press,  and  in  the 
two  political  parties  there  are  not  unimportant  elements,  which 
adopt  this  point  of  view.  Not  a  single  one  of  these  voices  suggests, 
however,  the  possibility  of  an  entente  with  Germany.  Not  only  be- 
cause the  existing  agreements — of  which  one  is  not  so  popular  as 
the  other — suffice  for  Englishmen,  but  also  because  the  naval  ques- 
tion forms  an  insurmountable  barrier 

The  conclusion  I  seek  to  drazv  from  the  above  is,  that  if,  for  any 
reason,  our  understanding  with  England  should  be  broken,  in  spite  of 
the  high  importance  which  England  sets  upon  her  agreement  with 
France,  the  basis  for  an  English- German  understanding  would  be  far 
better  prepared  than  is  usually  assumed. 

(553)     Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Rome.     Letter,  Nov.  20- 
Dec,  3,  1908. 

I  believe  I  ought  to  inform  you  of  a  conversation  which  I  had 
with  the  French  Ambassador.  Admiral  Touchard,  apparently  under 
orders  from  his  Government,  has  confidentially  told  me  that  during  the 
last  Casablanca  incident,^  Barrere,  the  French  Ambassador  in  Rome, 
had  learned  from  reliable  sources,  that  Prince  BUlow  and  Baron  Schon 
had  left  it  be  understood  i/n  Rome,  that  Germany  had  received  from  Rus- 
sia the  assurance  that  in  no  ccLse  would  she  participate  in  a  war  between 
Germany  and  France. 

*  Outcome  of  the  Morocco  crisis. 


GENESIS  OF  ANGLO-RUSSIAN  ENTENTE  483 

According  to  Touchard,  you,  too,  had  heard  of  this,  but  had  not 
deemed  it  necessary  to  refute  these  statements.  The  Ambassador 
added  that  the  French  Government  naturally  places  no  faith  in  such 
insinuations,  hut  considers  it  its  duty  to  communicate  them  to  us,  in 
case  we  should  want  to  regulate  the  utterances  of  our  Representatives 
abroad  in  this  important  question. 

I  replied  to  Admiral  Touchard  that  up  to  the  present  I  had 
found  no  allusion  to  the  matter  in  your  correspondence ;  that  neither 
our  general  attitude  nor  that  of  our  Ambassador  at  Berlin  could 
give  the  slightest  cause  for  the  insinuations  reported  by  Barrere. 

'*You  know,'*  I  remarked,  "that  the  exact  terms  of  our  alliance  with 
France  are  known  to  none;  it  is  of  course  known  that  these  agreements 
are  above  all  of  a  defensive  character,  hut  the  "casus  foederis"  can  he 
merely  guessed  at;  on  the  other  hand,  one  ought  to  know  in  Berlin  that 
the  agreements  between  Russia  and  France  have  not  been  changed  and 
that  they  form  the  unchangeable  basis  of  our  policy ;  this  has  once  more 
been  publicly  confirmed  at  Reval  this  summer,  and  Germany  has  de- 
manded no  explanation  from  us,  neither  before  nor  during  the  last 
incident.  It  appears  to  me,  moreover,  that  the  German  statesmen  re- 
gard the  alliance  between  Russia  and  France  as  an  important  factor 
of  the  European  balance  of  Power;  Fiirst  Billow  has  publicly  expressed 
this  thought  in  the  Reichstag;  what  alarms  and  excites  Germany 
much  more  is  the  suspicion,  that  our  recent  rapprochement  with  Eng- 
land should  embody  the  danger  of  an  already  concluded,  or  to  be  con- 
cluded, triple  alliance  against  Germany.  I  have  always  considered  it 
necessary  to  refute  such  a  suspicion;  on  the  occasion  of  my  last 
visit  at  Berlin,  I  did  not  fail  once  more  to  repeat  that  our  agree- 
ments with  the  London  Cabinet  contain  nothing  which  is  not 
publicly  known  and  that  we  have  not  joined,  nor  intend  to  do  so,  a 
"new"  alliance  directed  against  anybody,  I  am  not  certain  to  have 
convinced  the  Berlin  Cabinet,  for  the  German  Government  bases 
its  attitude  in  the  Bosnian  and  Herzegovinian  question  on  the  fact 
of  a  "new  grouping  of  Powers'*  and,  as  a  necessary  consequence, 
of  drawing  the  alliance  with  Austria  still  closer 


II 

AFTERMATH  OF  THE  AUSTRO-SERBIAN  CRISIS 

(January  1909 — March  1910) 

(554)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Iswolsky.    Letter,  Jan.  21- 
Feb.  3,  1909. 

On  the  eighth  of  February,  King  Edward  and  the  Queen  left 
London  for  Berlin,  whence  their  Majesties  will  return  directly 
here.  This  visit,  in  view  of  existing  political  conditions,  attains  a  most 
particular  significance.  Since  it  reacts  on  the  relations  between  Ger- 
many and  England,  it  will  likewise  influence  the  general  situation;  one 
'must  assume  that  this  will  take  place  in  the  sense  of  a  relaxation  of 
tension;  the  degree  of  relaxation  I  am,  however,  unable  to  judge  from 
here. 

This  is  the  result  which  the  public,  as  well  as  the  press,  has  in 
view  and  this  they  expect  all  the  more  because  they  have  lately 
been  forced  to  recognise  the  perils  to  which  peace  has  been  ex- 
posed, for  which  the  blame  in  a  great  degree  is  attributed  to  the 
Anglo-German  tension.^ 

The  Cabinet  appears  to  cherish  the  same  wish,  without  harbour- 
ing any  too  great  illusions  concerning  the  results  realisable.  Eng- 
land bound,  on  the  one  hand,  through  her  relations  with  France, — 
relations  which  have  lately  stood  a  severe  but  convincing  test  in  the 
Casablanca  incident, — on  the  other  hand,  bound  by  her  relations 
with  Russia,  has  certainly  not  formulated  any  program  which 
might  form  the  basis  for  discussion  in  Berlin  between  herself  and 
Germany  alone.    /  even  doubt  whether  she  has  any  intention  of  dis- 

*  The  documents  show  that  the  tension  in  this  instance  was  caused  by  Russia's 
attitude  in  regard  to  the  annexation  by  Austria-Hungary  of  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina. 

484 


I 


AFTERMATH  OF  THE  BOSNIAN  CRISIS  485 

cussing  those  points  which  might  be  proposed  to  her  by  Germany.  I 
think,  that  in  that  respect  there  will  be  a  repetition  of  what  happened 
in  London,  on  the  occasion  of  the  visit  of  Emperor  William  and  at 
Kronberg  in  connection  with  King  Edward's  visit} 

From  one  point  of  view,  the  mood  of  the  English  Government  is 
altered  and  for  the  better.  Whatever  may  have  been  the  attitude  of 
German  policy  at  the  outbreak  of  the  present  Balkan  crisis,  the  English 
Government  to-day  is  convinced,  that  for  some  time  past  at  least,  the 
Berlin  Cabinet  has  been  advising  moderation  in  Vienna.  The  London 
Cabinet  lays  too  great  an  importance  upon  Germany's  retaining  this 
attitude  in  the  future,  not  to  touch  upon  that  subject,  and  I  believe  that 
a  serious  effort  will  be  made  in  this  direction. 

That  is  probably  the  only  subject  upon  which  King  Edward  will 
personally  speak.  I  believe  that  His  Majesty  is  very  little  disposed  to 
return  to  the  question  of  the  "Iron  Ring"  which  is  alleged  to  encircle 
Germany,  nor  to  any  other  questions  of  general  politics.  As  I  under- 
stand.  King  Edward  is  going  to  Berlin  in  order  to  observe  closely  how 
he  will  be  received  at  Court  and  by  the  population  of  Berlin,  and  further- 
more, on  his  return,  to  observe  what  impression  the  Berlin  reception  will 
have  made  in  England.  And  I  am  inclined  to  assume,  that  the  King 
hopes  that  the  Berlin  reception  will  be  better  than  is  generally 
assumed  in  England,  and  that  consequently  the  moral  relief  of 
tension  will  be  the  greater.  But  the  King  himself  does  not  wish 
to  talk  politics.  More  than  ever,  I  think  that  the  necessary  mutual  con- 
fidence which  is  necessary  for  intimate  political  conversations  is  lacking.^ 
Moreover,  the  moment  for  official  conversations  does  not  appear  to  him 
as  well  chosen,  so  far  as  his  own  person  is  concerned.  He  therefore 
leaves  matters  in  the  hands  of  his  Ministers. 

I  believe  I  have  already  informed  Your  Excellency,  privately, 
why  King  Edward  imposes  such  reserve  upon  himself.  Even  be- 
fore the  publication  of  the  revelations  in  the  Daily  Telegraph,"  ^  and  the 
resultant  consequences  as  to  the  conduct  and  position  of  Emperor  Wil- 
liam, it  had  been  pointed  out  in  England,  although  with  greater  modera- 

*  Both  meetings  were  without  good  result  and  left  international  affairs  worse 
confounded  than  before. 

'Due  to  strained  personal  relations  between  King  Edward  and  Emperor 
William. 

'  Containing  statements  by  Emperor  William  that  caused  a  world-wide  sensa- 
tion because  of  lack  of  tact  and  absence  of  restraint. 


486  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

Hon,  that  the  role  played  by  the  British  Sovereign  was  too  marked  and 
too  personal,  in  order  fully  to  harmonise  with  the  constitution  of  the 
nation.  The  criticism  which  was  expressed  in  Germany,  concern- 
ing Emperor  William,  had  evidently  worked  upon  King  Edward, 
and  he  will  undoubtedly  do  everything  in  order  to  prevent  such 
or  rather  similar  manifestations,  since  it  is  out  of  the  question  that 
such  manifestations  could  assume  the  same  shape  here  as  in  Ger- 
many. 

The  first  result  is,  that  the  King,  for  these  reasons,  will  he  accom- 
panied by  a  responsible  member  of  the  Cabinet. 

This  letter  was  written,  before  I  had  once  more  spoken  to  Sir 
Charles  Hardinge;  I  have  just  seen  him.  I  asked  him  what  I 
should  communicate  to  Your  Excellency  concerning  the  visit  of 
King  Edward  to  Berlin.  He  said  that  the  visit  would  take  place, 
because  the  visit  was  owing  from  the  King,  and  that  the  meeting 
would  exert  a  quieting  influence  on  public  opinion  in  both  coun- 
tries ;  that  this  time  the  King  would  be  accompanied  by  a  member 
of  the  Cabinet,  such  a  wish  having  been  expressed  in  English 
circles;  that  Lord  Crewe  had  only  been  instructed  to  discuss  cer- 
tain African  questions,  and  only  to  raise  the  question  of  arma- 
ments in  case  the  German  Ministers  should  touch  upon  it,  but  not 
to  take  the  initiative 

In  the  strictest  confidence,  Sir  Charles  added  that  a  portion  of  the 
British  public  harboured  hopes  which  he  held  to  be  exaggerated.  I 
can  but  declare  to  you,  he  said,  that  according  to  our  opinion  in  the 
Foreign  Office,  so  long  as  the  question  of  Naval  Armaments  exists,  the 
establishment  of  normal  relations  between  Germany  and  England,  how- 
ever desirable  in  themselves,  will  not  be  possible, 

(555)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Jan.  2S'Feb.  10,  1909. 

Grey  tells  me,  a  propos  of  the  Berlin  visit,  that  he  saw  no  signs 
of  the  German  Government  being  likely  to  revert  to  the  Bagdad 
Railroad  question.  If,  however,  this  should  come  to  pass,  Har- 
dinge would  adhere  to  the  reply  already  given,  that  the  London 
Cabinet  is  prepared  to  negotiate  all  four  and  not  two  only.^  Grey, 
however,  does  not  regard  it  as  entirely  impossible  that  Germany 

*  Numbers  refer  to  negotiating  Powers,  to  wit :  Great  "Britain,  Russia,  France 
and  Germany,  instead  of  Great  Britain  and  Germany. 


AFTERMATH  OF  THE  BOSNIAN  CRISIS  487 

might  this  time  be  willing  to  accept  a  negotiation  by  four,  which 
renders  the  establishment  of  our  standpoint  necessary.  Grey  re- 
peated to  me  the  instructions  given  to  Crewe  and  Hardinge.    He 

declared  to  Metternich,^  that  the  London  Cabinet  would  not  touch  upon 
the  question  of  a  Naval  budget,^  but  was  willing  to  discuss  this,  if  Ger- 
many were  to  take  the  initiative  in  the  matter.  The  Bagdad  Railroad 
was  not  mentioned  in  this  conversation  with  Metternich. 

(556)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Letter,  Jan,  2S-Feb.  10,  1909. 

In  accordance  with  his  custom,  the  French  Ambassador  here 
has  sent  me  copies  of  the  documents  exchanged  between  France 
and  Germany  in  regard  to  Morocco ;  in  particular,  the  letters  that 
are  not  to  be  published.  At  the  last  moment,  the  French  Gov- 
ernment expressed  the  wish  that  Baron  Schon's  letter,  which  ori- 
ginally was  intended  only  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  the  French 
letter,  should  in  addition  contain  a  repetition  of  the  obligations 
assumed  by  Germany;  Baron  Schon  complied  with  this  request 
without  hesitation. 

Cambon  told  me,  that  during  the  early  days  of  last  week  the 
German  Government  urged  the  French  Cabinet  to  conclude  a  Sup- 
plementary Treaty  to  the  Algeciras  Act;  that  the  French  Govern- 
ment did  not  originally  wish  to  go  beyond  the  latter,  as  they  were 
of  opinion  that  this  Agreement  was  one  of  mutual  concessions; 
that,  however,  Pichon  had  left  Jules  Cambon^  complete  freedom 
of  action  in  this  matter. 

Jules  Cambon  drew  up  the  documents  in  question,  which  were 
then  accepted  by  the  German  Government  without  discussion  of 
any  kind.  Hereupon,  Jules  Cambon  went  to  Paris  and  the  signatures 
were  exchanged,  as  my  French  colleague  said  to  me,  much  to  the  as- 
tonishment of  the  French  Government,  a  privileged  position  in  Morocco 
being  thus  suddenly  accorded  them  by  Germany,  after  objections  had 
repeatedly  been  made  by  her  against  such  a  position,  objections  which 
seemed,  even,  to  threaten  peace. 

Cambon  tells  me  that  they  are  still  wondering  at  Paris  how  the 
German  attitude  can  be  explained. 

*  German  ambassador  at  London. 

'To  wit:   The  attempts  to  limit  naval  armament. 

'French  ambassador  at  Berlin. 


I 


488  ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD  H 

They  believe,  two  explanations  might  be  given.  S| 

The  first  is  that  Germany's  policy  in  this  matter  renders  tne 
personal  position  of  Prince  BUlow  in  Berlin  easier.  To  me,  this 
does  not  seem  a  very  convincing  explanation,  for  I  cannot  see  how 
such  important  concessions  could  be  of  advantage  to  Prince  BUlow. 

The  second  explanation  seems  to  me  more  plausible.  Germany 
abandons  the  idea  of  making  France  acquiesce  by  means  of  threats, 
and  resolves  on  another  expedient;  in  order  to  make  the  desired  im- 
pression still  more  complete,  the  understanding  between  Germany  and 
France  had  to  be  concluded  before  the  King  of  England  arrived  in 
Berlin.  For  this  reason,  the  Agreement  was  signed  on  the  eve  of 
the  English  visit. 

As  Cambon^  and  political  circles  at  Paris  assume,  Germany 
is  extremely  desirous  of  arriving  at  an  understanding  with  Eng- 
land in  regard  to  one  or  the  other  question,  for  example,  the  Bag- 
dad Railway.  In  this  respect,  it  seemed  to  the  Berlin  Cabinet  ad- 
visable to  begin  with  France,  in  order  to  be  able  to  say  to  England : 
"You  see,  we  have  been  able  to  reach  an  agreement  even  with 
France — the  Power  most  closely  allied  with  England;  let  us  now 
do  the  same." 

/  told  Cambon,  I  did  not  believe,  Russia  would  raise  any  objection 
to  an  Agreement  which,  to  be  sure,  refers  to  a  question  of  com- 
paratively minor  importance,  but  which,  nevertheless,  removes  a  pos- 
sible pretext  for  threatening  peace.  I  believe,  however,  that  the 
German  Government  cherishes  the  mental  reservation  of  render- 
ing France's  close  relations  to  England  less  necessary;  in  this  re- 
spect the  negotiations  between  Paris  and  Berlin  are  not  without  ^_ 
significance  to  us.  ^H 

Cambon  replied  that  Grey  had  expressed  the  same  opinion;  he  ^^ 
had  said  to  him  that  the  new  Agreement  represented  a  new  guarantee 
for  peace  and  that  it  was  certainly  desirable;  in  this  respect  he  did  not 
believe,  however,  that  the  Franco-German  understanding  was  a  very 
profound  one  and  for  this  reason  it  would  probably  remain  a  "fagade" 
agreement.^ 

Cambon  added  that  Paris  was  of  like  opinion,  because  the  Morocco 
question,  important  as  it  might  have  become,  was  still,  at  bottom,  only  of 

*Paul  Cambon,  French  ambassador  at  London. 
'Making  a  pleasant  "front." 


AFTERMATH  OF  THE  BOSNIAN  CRISIS  489 

secondary — of  colonial — importance,  whereas  the  true  reasons  for  the 
impossibility  of  establishing  a  real  understanding  between  France  and 
Germany  lay  far  too  deep  to  be  removed  by  means  of  diplomatic  docu- 
ments. 

(557)  The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  London  to  Iswolsky.     Telegram, 
Feb.  2-15,  1909. 

Your  telegram  No.  183  received. 

Grey,  having  received  a  telegram  of  like  import  from  the  British 
Ambassador  at  Petersburg,  sent  for  me  and  declared  that  he 
was  extremely  sorry  that  the  Russian  Government  could  harbour 
the  idea  that  any  change  could  take  place  in  English  policy  as  re- 
gards the  Near  East.^  The  Press  communiques,  regarding  the 
results  of  the  Berlin  visit,  are  kept  within  the  limits  of  the  usual 
expressions  of  good-will,  but  it  is  clearly  indicated  that  the  com- 
munity of  views  of  the  English  and  German  Governments  in  the 
Balkan  question  relates  to  the  maintenance  of  peace,  the  status  quo 
and  the  new  Turkish  regime. 

Grey  declared  in  the  most  positive  manner,  that  the  policy  of  Eng^ 
land  was  still  the  same  as  during  your  last  visit  to  London,  that  England 
desired,  in  conjunction  with  Russia,  to  proceed  in  the  Near  East,  and 
is  prepared,  as  formerly,  to  give  her  diplomatic  support  in  favour  of 
Serbia.  On  the  other  hand,  I  can  see  no  sign  of  any  alteration  in  Eng- 
lish policy,  unless  it  be  that  England,  now  more  than  ever  before,  is 
desirous  of  maintaining  peace.  By  the  next  courier  I  shall  send  you 
details  concerning  the  Berlin  visit,  the  main  consequence  of  which  is, 
that  England  has  become  convinced  that  Germany  wishes  no  war  and 
is  ready  to  do  all  in  her  power  to  serve  the  cause  of  peace.  Respecting 
the  manner  in  which  an  Austro-Serbian  conflict  may  be  avoided, 
Grey  remarked  to  me  that  he  would  furnish  me  with  an  answer  in 
the  very  near  future. 

(558)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Letter,  Feb.  3-16,  1909. 

On  January  31 — February  13,  Their  Majesties  returned  from 
Berlin,  and  the  press  of  the  entire  world  regards  their  visit  as 
highly  satisfactory. 

*  Persia,  Turkey  and  the  Balkans. 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


So  far  as  I  have  heard,  this  journey  has  made  the  most  agreeable 
impression  upon  the  King  and  Queen.  Sir  Charles  Hardinge  stated 
to  me  that  the  reception,  alike  on  the  part  of  the  Berlin  people, 
and  the  German  Imperial  couple,  was  very  warm  and  hearty,  and 
that  the  few  political  talks  he  had  with  the  Imperial  Chancellor 
and  Baron  Schon  were  of  a  pleasant  and  conciliatory  nature. 

It  became  apparent,  however,  as  established  by  further  ques- 
tions of  mine,  that  those  conversations  were  of  a  wholly  general 
character,  and  that  great  care  was  taken  to  avoid  such  questions 
as  have  of  late  given  rise  to  differences  between  the  two  Govern- 
ments, so  that  Sir  Charles  himself  admits  that  the  visit  led  to  no 
tangible  results. 

The  question  of  the  Naval  Program  and  the  Bagdad  Railroad 
were  not  touched  upon  on  the  part  of  the  German  Government ;  as 
previously  agreed,  nothing  being  said  on  the  part  of  the  English. 

Prince  Biilow  said  much  to  the  effect  that  he  has  never  shared 
the  views  of  the  Vienna  Cabinet,  that  England  sought  to  bring 
about  general  complications,  and  for  that  purpose  made  use  of  the 
crisis    caused   by   the   annexation    of    Bosnia    and    Herzegovina. 

In  this  he  did  not  spare  Aehrenthal;  condemned  his  methods;  and 
complained  of  the  difficult  situation  of  Germany,  called  upon  to  sup- 
port an  ally,  whose  policy  Germany  was  not  always  able  to  approve  of. 
The  Chancellor  expressed  his  extreme  satisfaction  concerning  the 
Morocco  agreement  with  France;  he  avowed  the  peaceful  trend  of  Ger- 
man policy  and  stated  further  that  Berlin  had  often  sent  moderating 
advice  to  Vienna.  . 

Public  opinion  in  England  has  followed  the  details  of  the  Ber- 
lin meeting  with  the  greatest  sympathy  and  in  the  press,  as  well 
as  in  political  circles,  the  hope  is  expressed  that  relations  with 
Germany  may  thereby  be  materially  improved.  But  coarse  reality 
spares  no  illusions,  and  to-day  already,  in  the  Speech  from  the  Throne, 
mention  is  made  of  the  necessity  of  the  credits  for  the  English  naval 
armaments  being  raised.  Presently,  the  radical  Cabinet  will  put  for- 
ward a  proposal,  and  the  peacefully  inclined  Parliament  will  pass  a  bill 
for  taxes  with  which  to  cover  this  extra  expense,  and  all  that  in  the 
knowledge  that  the  new  heavy  sacrifices  made  are  due  to  the  naval 
armaments  of  Germany.  Such  arguments  make  a  deeper  impression 
upon  the  public  mind  than  all  fine  words  and  sincere  amenities. 


AFTERMATH  OF  THE  BOSNIAN  CRISIS  491 

(559)     Count   Osten-Sacken,  Russian  Ambassador  at  Berlin   to   Iswolsky. 
Letter,  Feb.  6-19,  1909. 

In  my  telegram  of  last  Tuesday  I  sent  Your  Excellency  a  brief 
report  about  my  conversation  with  the  Secretary  of  State,  con- 
cerning the  results  of  the  visit  of  King  Edward  to  Berlin  from  the 
political  point  of  view. 

You  are  already  aware  that  no  written  agreement  has  been 
signed.  Everything  was  confined  to  conversations  between  the 
Chancellor  and  Sir  Charles  Hardinge.  Baron  Schon  has  assured 
me,  that  even  the  Monarchs  did  not  speak  a  single  word  about  poli- 
tics, and  it  was  only  at  the  moment  of  departure  from  the  station, 
that  King  Edward  said,  to  Emperor  William,  that  he  considered  the 
excitement  of  British  public  opinion  and  the  press  concerning  the  in- 
crease of  the  German  fleet  as  ridiculous.  The  King  expressed  himself 
as  follows : 

''You  have  the  vote  of  assent  of  the  Reichstag  for  the  pro- 
gramme which  you  decreed  necessary  for  the  naval  forces  of  Germany 
and  you  must  carry  out  this  programme" 

As  regards  the  interviews  which  took  place  between  Sir  Charles 
Hardinge  and  Prince  Bulow,  they  were  confined  exclusively  to  Bal- 
kan questions. 

According  to  Baron  Schon,  neither  the  Bagdad  Railroad,  nor  Per- 
sia, nor  the  acquisition  of  coaling  stations  either  in  Africa,  Asiatic  or 
other  waters  were  mentioned.  As  regards  the  Balkans,  a  complete 
understanding  was  reached,  namely  the  necessity  for  the  mainte- 
nance of  the  status  quo,  and  above  all  things  to  prevent  a  breach 

between  Austria,  Serbia  and  Montenegro 

Hardinge  congratulated  the  Chancellor  upon  the  conclusion  of  the  Mo- 
rocco Agreement  between  Germany  and  France.  The  London  Cabinet 
sees  in  this  a  valuable  pledge  for  peace  and  is  prepared  to  support  all  fur- 
ther efforts  of  that  kind.  According  to  him,  this  zvas  also  the  purpose  of 
King  Edward's  visit  to  Berlin.  The  presence  of  His  Majesty  in  the 
German  Capital  was  not  only  a  proof  of  friendly  feelings  towards 
Emperor  William,  but  likewise  a  pledge  to  the  German  people 
that  the  English  feel  no  antagonism  towards  them.  England 
wishes  to  maintain  good  neighbourly  relations  between  the  two  na- 
tions. The  British  Under-Secretary  of  State  added  that  King 
Edward  was  greatly  moved  by  the  attitude  of  the  population  of 


492 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


the  capital  and  that  he  carried  away  the  pleasantest  memories  of 
his  reception  at  the  Berlin  Rathaus.  fli 

This  summarizes  the  conversation  between  the  Chancellor  ancr' 
the  English  Under-Secretary — the  only  political  conversation  dur- 
ing the  visit.  ^1 

The  press  imagines  that  it  knows  more,  and  I  have  already  se^" 
you  a  few  specimens.    It  is  difficult  to  ascertain  whether  the  source 
of  these  disclosures  is  worthy  of  credit.     If  I  should  hear  any 
further  details  later  I  shall  communicate  them  to  you. 

The  relations  of  Prince  Billow  to  the  Kaiser  remain  the  same,  a 
correct,  and  somewhat  reserved,  attitude  on  the  part  of  the  Mon- 
arch. ^1 


(560)     The  Russian  Charge  d*Affaires  at  Berlin  to  Iswolsky.    Confidential 
Report,  March  20-April  2,  1909. 

A  confident  feeling  prevails  in  Germany  at  present,  since  there 
is  a  general  conviction  that,  thanks  to  the  energy  of  German  policy 
and  Germany's  unshakeable  loyalty  to  her  ally,  the  crisis  in  the 
Balkans  has  met  with  a  peaceful  solution. 

Germany  heaves  a  sigh  of  relief.  Austria  is  bound  by  new  ties  of 
gratitude.  The  relations  with  France  have  become  more  satisfactory 
since  the  ratification  of  the  last  Morocco  treaty,  and  the  possibility  of  a 
meeting  between  Emperor  William  and  the  President  of  the  French 
Republic  hovers  before  the  German  imagination.  The  fear  of  isola- 
tion begins  to  wane.  Germany  is  beginning  to  emerge  from  the 
difficult  position  in  which  she  considered  herself  placed  after  the 
Conference  of  Algeciras. 

Satisfaction  here  is  all  the  greater,  since  people  believe  that 
the  attitude  of  Germany,  during  the  Bosnian  crisis,  was  the  best 
answer  Germany  could  make  to  the  efforts  of  her  enemies  to  un- 
dermine German  influence  in  the  council  of  European  Powers.  To 
restore  her  prestige,  Germany  did  not  hesitate  to  stand  by  the  side 
of  Austria,  ready,  if  necessary,  to  support  her  attitude  by  force  of 
arms. 

Now  that  the  danger  has  passed,  the  official  press  endeavours 
not  further  to  emphasize  any  more  this  determination,  although 
there  is  a  hint  in  the  last  speech  of  the  Chancellor  that  Germany 


AFTERMATH  OF  THE  BOSNIAN  CRISIS  493 

would  not  have  shrunk  from  extreme  measures,  if  her  own  interests 
and  those  of  Austria  had  demanded  them. 

The  theory  of  an  armed  peace  is  the  basis  of  German  Realpolitik, 
and  this  principle  Germany  employs  chiefly  as  regards  England, 
as  the  debates  about  fleet  construction  have  shown.  In  the  shade 
of  peaceful  declarations  Germany  is  unceasingly  working  to  increase 
her  readiness  at  sea.  These  efforts  for  the  present,  however,  aim  mainly 
at  defence  and  at  the  preservation  of  German  prestige.  Realising  the 
terrible  danger  of  an  armed  conflict  with  all  its  consequences,  the  re- 
sponsible leaders  of  German  policy  have  in  general  shown  great  modera- 
tion of  late,  and  the  attempt  of  the  Berlin  Cabinet  to  thrust  its  role  as 
mediator  into  the  background,  and  to  ascribe  the  peaceful  solution  of  the 
Bosnian  crisis  to  the  initiative  of  Russia's  policy,  is,  in  this  connection, 
significant. 

General  appearances  indicate  that  the  main  ambition  of  the  German 
Government  is  in  the  direction  of  restoring  relations  of  confidence  with 
Russia  and  of  demonstrating  at  the  same  time  that  Germany  is  an  im- 
portant factor  in  world  policy. 

(561)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Report,  May  15-28,  1909. 

The  visit  of  Kaiser  William  to  Vienna,  and  the  heartiness  of  the 
meeting  of  the  Monarchs,  continue  to  be  the  subject  of  interest 
in  the  press,  which  emphasizes  that  the  relations  between  Germany 
and  Austria-Hungary  have  been  strengthened  by  new  ties.  The 
newspapers,  satisfied  with  the  stability  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  point 
to  its  peaceful  aims  and  its  importance  for  the  maintaining  of  the 
general  balance  of  power  in  Europe.  The  effort  to  give  special 
political  importance  to  the  meeting  of  the  Monarchs  in  Vienna,  is 
made  clear,  on  the  one  hand,  by  the  desire  on  the  part  of  the  German 
official  press  to  divert  public  attention  from  the  rather  complicated 
internal  situation,  brought  about  by  the  carrying  out  of  the  finan- 
cial reforms,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  in  view  of  the  increasingly 
difficult  relations  with  England,  it  seems  desirable  to  show  that 
Germany  is  not  isolated. 

In  spite  of  all  attempts  to  bring  about  a  rapprochement,  such  as 
the  sending  of  deputations,  exchanges  of  greetings  and  speeches 
between  various  English  and  German  Societies,  whereby  the  cul- 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

tural  interests,  which  are  common  to  both  lands,  are  emphasized, 
the  mutual  distrust  between  England  and  Germany  does  not 
seem  to  disappear,  but  to  become  more  and  more  deeply  rooted. 
Symptomatic  on  the  one  side  is  the  English  dread  of  a  German  attack 
upon  England,  reproduced  by  phantastic  rumours  of  German  spies  and 
airship  raids,  on  the  other  hand,  characteristic  of  German  sentiment 
are  the  constant  references  to  the  anti-German  policy  of  England,  not  to 
speak  of  the  feverish  activities  of  the  German  authorities  to  strengthen 
the  navy  for  the  contingency  of  a  conflict  zviih  England. 

Under  the  influence  o£  such  thoughts,  Germany  seeks  to  im- 
prove her  relations  with  France  and  fears  the  possibility  of  a  still 
further  rapprochement  of  Russian  and  English  policy,  not  only  in 
oriental  questions,  but  also  in  those  of  world-politics. 

The  judgment  of  the  German  press  on  our  proceedings  in 
Persia  is  noteworthy,  for  the  newspapers  seek  to  prove  that  the 
measures  which  we  have  taken  can  scarcely  correspond  to  the 
wishes  of  England.^ 


(562)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Berlin  to  Iswolsky.    Report,  June  12- 
25.  1909.    No.  41. 


I 


I  regard  it  as  my  duty  to  transmit  to  you  the  full  text  of  the 
speech,  which  Emperor  William  delivered  Tuesday  evening  on 
board  the  "Deutschland"  off  Hamburg  concerning  his  meeting 
with  the  Russian  Emperor.  The  words  of  the  German  Monarch 
are  so  important  that  all  the  newspaper  articles  which  have  ap- 
peared during  the  last  few  weeks  pale  into  insignificance  besides 
them. 

The  expressions  which  Emperor  William  employed  concerning  his 
own  love  of  peace,  and  that  of  the  Russian  Emperor,  seem  inspired  by 
the  loftiest  feelings.  Without  entering  into  details,  regarding  the  pres- 
ent political  situation.  Emperor  William  declared  that:  ''All  nations 
have  need  of  peace."  Therefore  both  Monarchs,  with  God's  help, 
would  work  for  the  strengthening  and  maintenance  of  peace. 

Such  sentiments  have  not  been  uttered  for  a  long  time  and  the 

lively  interest  which  they  have  evoked  in  all  classes  of  the  German 

population  is  wholly  comprehensible.    The  newspapers  of  the  different 

political  parties  had  of  course  already  expressed  their  satisfaction 

'  A  fact  demonstrated  by  the  documents. 


AFTERMATH  OF  THE  BOSNIAN  CRISIS  495 

the  last  meeting  of  the  Emperors,  but  this  feeling  has  now  been  dis- 
tinctly heightened  and  a  general  optimism  has  become  noticeable  in 
judgments  of  the  present  political  situation, 

(563)    Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Berlin.    Confidential  Letter, 
June  IS-July  2,  1909. 

I  shall  relate  to  you  as  briefly  as  possible  the  impression  I  re- 
ceived during  the  last  meeting  of  our  Monarch  with  Emperor  Wil- 
liam in  Finnish  waters. 

First  of  all,  let  me  tell  you  how  greatly  surprised  I  was  by  the 
marked  change  in  the  attitude  of  the  German  Monarch :  During  the 
whole  time  he  most  carefully  avoided  speaking  either  to  me  or 
with  our  Prime  Minister  about  foreign  affairs;  the  same  in  his 
conversations  with  His  Majesty;  only  at  the  last  moment,  after 
the  farewell  breakfast  on  the  "Hohenzollern,"  when  our  Mon- 
arch asked  him  what  political  question  interested  him  most  at  the 
moment.  Emperor  William  spoke  at  length  about  the  movement 
of  the  Arabs  of  Yemen  against  the  Caliphate  of  the  Sultan,  which 
according  to  his  opinion  must  interest  all  States  with  Mohammedan 
population.  But  not  a  word  about  the  relations  between  England 
and  Germany.  And,  for  the  first  time,  we  behold  Emperor  Wil- 
liam reading  in  French  a  toast  which  had  been  carefully  prepared 
and  which  was  almost  a  verbatim  repetition  of  the  address  of  our 
Monarch,  for  the  text  of  which  we  had  been  asked. 

But  though  he  evidently  forced  himself  to  maintain  the  great- 
est reserve  in  political  questions.  Emperor  William  gave  free  rein 
to  his  good  humor  and  cordiality,  striving  to  prove  at  every  moment 
that  his  personal  feelings  toward  our  Sovereign  had  in  no  wise 
changed.  I  had  m,oreover  been  told  by  General  Tatitcheff  ^  that 
this  would  probably  be  the  attitude  of  Emperor  William,  since  he 
had  openly  remarked  in  the  presence  of  Baron  Schon,  immediately 
before  his  departure  from  Berlin : 

"I  am  a  constitutional  sovereign ;  your  duty  it  is  to  carry  on  the 
political  conversations." 

Baron  Schon  had  indeed  a  long  conversation  with  me.  Natur- 
ally, we  discussed  the  crisis  provoked  by  Austria-Hungary,  like- 

*  Military  representative  of  the  Russian  Czar  at  Emperor  William's  court 


496 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


wise  the  role  that  Germany  played  in  the  matter  and  the  com- 
plaints at  Berlin  about  the  state  of  public  opinion  and  of  the  press 
in  Russia. 

As  was  to  be  expected,  Schon  tried  to  destroy  what  German 
diplomacy  calls  the  legend  of  German  pressure  upon  Russia,  and 
he  wished  to  convince  me  that  in  the  conflict  between  Austria  and 
ourselves,  Germany  had  acted  only  from  feelings  of  friendship. 
Without  letting  myself  be  drawn  into  polemics  about  this  ques- 
tion, I  sought  to  divert  the  attention  of  the  German  Minister  to 
the  consequences  of  the  last  crisis. 

"If  Europe,"  I  remarked,  "was  on  the  eve  of  a  general  war,  and 
if  our  traditional  relations  to  Germany  were  temporarily  clouded, 
the  responsibility  rests  wholly  upon  Aehrenthal.  So  long  as  the 
Vienna  Cabinet  remained  true  to  the  agreement  made  with  us, 
all  went  well.  Unfortunately,  Aehrenthal  took  it  into  his  head  to 
take  advantage  of  the  temporary  difficulties  of  Russia  to  carry  on 
an  ambitious,  I  may  even  say,  a  rather  unfair  policy  with  regard 
to  us. 

"Need  one  be  surprised,  therefore,  that  the  dissatisfaction  of 
Russian  public  opinion  and  the  press  turned  against  Germany, 
who  had  twice  declared  her  entire  solidarity  with  Austrian  policy 
and  thereby  made  Austria's  success  certain?  That  which  is  dis- 
quieting above  all  things  is  the  uncertainty  as  to  whether 
new  surprises  are  not  imminent  on  the  part  of  Aehrenthal. 
But  every  further  penetration  of  Austria  in  the  Balkans  may  call  forth 
a  still  sharper  conflict  than  that  of  last  winter,  and  if  the  Danube  Mon- 
archy should  once  more  he  supported  by  Germany,  then  it  would  be 
difficult  to  maintain  the  peace  of  Europe." 

Baron  Schon  sought  to  explain  the  attitude  of  Germany,  by 
saying  that  she  faced  a  new  grouping  of  the  Powers  in  Europe 
and  must  therefore  knit  her  ties  with  Austria-Hungary  still  closer.^ 
I  made  use  of  this  opportunity  once  more  to  give  him  positive 
assurances  concerning  the  nature  of  our  understanding  with  Eng- 
land, an  understanding,  which  is  not  of  a  general  character  and 
which  has  no  feature  directed  against  Germany.  I  added  that  at 
St.  Petersburg,  as  well  as  at  Paris,  there  is  a  firm  conviction  that 
every  attempt  to  change  the  present  ententes  into  alliances  would 

*  Proven  beyond  all  doubt  by  these  documents. 


AFTERMATH  OF  THE  BOSNIAN  CRISIS  497 

mean  a  serious  danger  to  peace,  and  that  Germany,  therefore,  need 
not  harbor  the  least  suspicion  of  Russia  or  of  France. 

Schon  assured  me,  on  his  part,  that  Germany,  by  no  means, 
desired  to  influence  Austria-Hungary  to  undertake  new  enterprises 
in  the  Balkans,  and  that  he  was  personally  convinced  that  Aehren- 
thal  meditated  no  new  plan  of  adventure.  He  said  that  it  gave  him 
the  greatest  satisfaction  to  he  able  to  declare,  that  the  relations  be- 
tween France  and  Germany  had  materially  improved  since  the  last 
Morocco  Agreem^ent,  The  only  clouds  on  the  horizon  were  the  rela- 
tions with  England:  in  this  direction  the  atmosphere  was  charged  with 
electricity.  Of  course,  Germany  could  not  admit  that  a  foreign  power 
should  dictate  the  extent  of  her  naval  armaments;  hut  the  present 
situation  would  become  dangerous,  if  protracted,  for  which  reason  an 
amicable  solution  must  be  found}   .... 

It  appears  to  me  on  the  whole  that  the  result  of  the  meeting  is 
very  satisfactory.  I  believe  that  the  dissatisfaction  felt  with  us  at 
Berlin  has  been  removed  and  we  have  furnished  proof  to  Europe 
that  Germany  maintains,  as  heretofore,  good  relations  with  Russia. 
This  was  particularly  important  in  view  of  the  impending  visit  of  our 
Monarch  to  France  and  England.  It  is,  moreover,  likely  that  the  two 
Monarchs  on  the  return  voyage  from  England  will  meet  once  more  in 
the  Kiel  Canal. 

Regarding  Persia,  Baron  Schon  repeated  to  me  that  Germany 
is  only  pursuing  economic  aims  in  that  country  and  that  the  Ger- 
man Minister  at  Teheran  had  been  instructed  to  abstain  from 
any  action  that  might  cause  us  political  difficulties.  I  made  no 
complaint  against  Count  Quadt  and  his  subordinates  and  con- 
tented myself  with  receiving  the  assurances  of  Baron  Schon. 

(564)     The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  London  to  Iswolsky.    Letter,  Oct. 
28-Nov.  10,  1909. 

Some  of  the  English  Ministers,  in  the  course  of  yesterday's 
Banquet  at  the  Guildhall,  made  political  speeches.  After  Asquith 
had  stated,  that  in  several  questions  of  Imperialism  great  headway 
had  been  made,  he  uttered  an  optimistic  opinion  regarding  the 
international  situation.     After  he  had  dilated  upon  the  cordial 

*An  emotional  exposition  of  the  case  which  did  great  harm  to  Germany's 
relations  with  Great  Britain. 


498 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


relations  existing  between  England,  Japan  and  America,  he  ac- 
centuated the  fact  that  the  understanding  come  to  by  England 
with  other  nations  had  shown  that  she  had  no  selfish  or  aggressive 
aims,  and  that  now  there  was  nothing  in  the  way  of  regulating 
relations  with  Germany,  which  would  be  to  the  interest  of  both 
countries. 

Without  being  able  to  guarantee  the  correctness  of  my  asser- 
tions, I  think  that  during  his  fortnight's  visit  here,  Dernburg,  the 
German  Colonial  Secretary,  in  his  conversations  with  several  of  the 
political  leaders,  raised  the  question  of  German-English  relations 
and  that  the  English  Premier  gave  expression  to  the  desire,  that  the 
relations  between  the  two  countries  should  be  improved,  only  in  conse 
quence  of  this  exchange  of  views. 


II 


(565) 


The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Berlin  to  Iswolsky. 
Nov.  12,  1909. 


Report,  Oct  30- 


In  Germany,  the  effort  to  establish  better  and  franker  rela- 
tions with  England  is  becoming  of  late  more  and  more  evident. 
These  efforts  find  expression  both  in  the  press  and  in  the  speeches 
of  the  German  Colonial  Minister  in  England,  after  his  return  from 
Africa. 

One  must  assume  that  this  new  Anglophile  current  is  encour- 
aged by  the  Government  and  that  it,  very  likely,  forms  a  reply  to 
the  recent  utterances  of  Asquith,  to  the  effect  that  the  Cabinet 
had  on  occasion  made  a  proposition  to  Germany  to  come  to  a: 
understanding  with  regard  to  a  limitation  of  naval  armaments. 

In  any  case  the  press  unanimously  declares,  that  the  change  of 
Chancellors  facilitates  an  understanding  with  England  and  that,  sinci 
Bethmann-Hollweg,  who  is  pro-English,  entered  office,  a  great  step  for- 
ward had  been  made  in  that  direction.  The  brilliant  reception  accorded 
Dernburg  in  England,  the  German-English  discussions  concerning  the 
Congo,  the  speeches  of  Admirals  Koster  and  Seymour  at  the  presence 
of  the  German  and  English  naval  squadrons  at  the  Hudson  Celebra- 
tions, all  these  events  have  borne  witness  to  the  friendly  feelings  which 
are  mutually  expressed  by  the  German  and  English  people. 

The  haste  and  decision  with  which  the  '^revelations"  of  the  ex- 
Diplomat  von  Rath  were  officially  denied,  prove  to  what  an  extent  the 
good  will  of  England  is  valued  in  Berlin,  and  how  very  much  it 


I 


AFTERMATH  OF  THE  BOSNIAN  CRISIS  499 

sought  to  remove  all  obstacles  that  stand  in  the  way,  or  ndght  seem 
to  put  off  or  delay  in  any  manner  the  resumption  of  better  relations. 

(566)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Confidential  Letter,  Oct.  30-Nov.  12,  1909. 

Though  the  visit  of  Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand  ^  was  wholly 
private,  yet  it  cannot  be  denied  that  the  general  situation  attaches 
to  this  event  a  serious  political  significance,  which  has  manifested 
itself  plainly  in  the  extremely  nervous  mood  of  Emperor  William. 

Emperor  William  discerns  in  the  general  development  of  Euro-  j 
pean  politics  certain  efforts  to  isolate  Germany  and  he  is  working 
all  the  harder  to  strengthen  his  alliance  with  Austria  and  to  in- 
crease the  power  of  the  Hapsburg  Monarchy ' 

Everyone  who  knew  the  political  feelings  of  Emperor  William 
when  he  ascended  the  throne,  namely  his  determination  to  carry 
out  the  last  testament  of  his  grandfather  to  make  the  relations 
with  Russia  still  closer  and  more  friendly,  cannot  fail  to  realize 
that  during  the  last  few  years  a  great  change  has  come  over  Em- 
peror William  in  this  respect.  He  no  longer  appears  to  believe  that, 
there  is  a  desire  on  our  side  to  maintain  further  the  traditional  friendly 
relations  with  Germany."^ 

Despite  all  conciliatory  utterances,  he  is  yielding  more  and  more 
to  the  strivings  of  Austria,  which  wishes  to  use  the  confidence 
of  her  ally  for  the  purpose  of  restoring  the  inner  and  outer  power 
of  the  Danube  Monarchy.  There  can  be  no  question  that  Emperor 
William  is  still  struggling  inwardly.  This  has  often  found  expres- 
sion in  his  attitude  toward  General  Tatitcheff  and  toward  our 
military  attache.    I  regard  it  as  my  duty  to  inform  you  of  the  above. 

(567)  The  Russian  Charge  d*Affaires  at  Berlin  to  Iswolsky.    Letter,  March 
5:18,1910,  

Although  leading  circles  in  Germany  have  repeatedly  declared 
that  the  German  Government  desires  a  resumption  of  neighbourly 
relations  between  Austria  and  Russia,  the  cold  reserve  of  Baron 
Schon  in  regard  to  the  pending  negotiations  between  St.  Peters- 
burg and  Vienna  implies  quite  a  different  attitude  of  the  German 
Government. 

*  Austro-Hungarian  heir  apparent. 

'  In  which  he  was  well  informed,  as  these  documents  show. 


500 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


The  reason  for  this  is  to  be  sought  in  that  feeling  of  suspicion  which 
Germany  of  late  has  been  harbouring  concerning  our  foreign  policy; 
for  the  Germans  seem  ever  and  again  to  fear  the  efforts  of  the  enemies 
of  Germany  to  isolate  her. 

The  ratifications  of  a  long  series  of  international  conventions, 
to  which  Germany  was  not  a  party,  as  well  as  the  fear  of  a  con- 
flict with  England,  which  has  increased  since  the  Russian  rap- 
prochement with  England,  have  called  forth  this  distrust  on  the 
part  of  Germany.  This  became  specially  manifest  after  the  meet- 
ing at  Racconigi,^  as  they  seem  to  be  of  the  opinion  in  Germany 
that  we  wish  to  separate  her  from  one  of  her  allies.  i 

There  is  no  doubt  that  our  negotiations  with  Austria  awaken 
the  same  feeling  of  suspicion.  Our  efforts  to  draw  the  other 
Powers  into  these  negotiations,  in  order  thus  to  keep  Austria  in 
some  wise  from  engaging  in  any  more  of  Aehrenthal's  adventures, 
are  regarded  in  Germany  as  an  attempt,  inspired  by  England,  to 
involve  Austria  into  a  formal  convention,  and  to  loosen  her  ties 
with  Germany  so  as  to  deprive  Germany  of  her  second  ally.  This 
thought  has  found  clear  expression  in  articles  of  the  "Vossische 
Zeitung**  and  of  the  "Germania,"  in  which  the  British  Ambassador 
at  Vienna  ^  is  charged  with  leaving  no  stone  unturned  to  break 
asunder  the  German-Austrian  alliance. 

The  visits  of  the  Balkan  Sovereigns  to  St.  Petersburg  and  Con- 
stantinople likewise  cause  disquiet.  In  the  marked  reserve  of  the 
Bulgarian  and  Serbian  Ministers,  they  discern  hostility  towards 
Austria  and  they  fear  the  formation  of  a  Balkan  block  with  Turk- 
ish connivance. 


*  The  agreement  between  Russia  and  Italy  concerning  the  Balkans. 

'Cartwright  had  openly  been  charged  with  fostering  this  policy  and  Mens- 
dorff,  A.-H.  Ambassador  at  London,  maintained  relations  with  Benckendorff 
that  were  considered  next  to  be  being  peculiar. 


Ill 

THE  ENTENTE  AND  THE  BAGDAD  R.  R.  QUESTION 

(November  1909— June  1910) 

(568)     Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  London.    Letter,  Nov. 
5-18,  1909. 

We  learn  on  good  authority  that  new  discussions  have  taken 
place  between  Turkey  and  Germany  with  respect  to  the  Bagdad 
Railway.  The  British  Minister,  Churchill,  who  met  Mahmud  Pasha 
at  the  German  manoeuvres,  informed  him  that  an  English  group 
intended  to  apply  for  a  concession  from  the  Sublime  Porte  for  the 
building  of  a  railway  from  Bagdad  to  Koweit,^  but  without  any 
kind  of  guarantees. 

A  similar  communication  would  also  appear  to  have  been  simul- 
taneously made  to  the  Turkish  Ambassador.  For  political  reasons, 
the  Turkish  Government  found  it  difficult  to  sanction  this  proposal ; 
in  the  assumption,  however,  that  England  would  insist  on  her 
proposal  and  meet  with  support  in  the  Turkish  Parliament,  she 
applied  to  Germany  for  advice.  Hereby,  the  Berlin  Cabinet  is  to 
be  made  to  understand  that  the  Sublime  Porte  intends  informing 
the  British  Government  that  the  German  Bagdad  Company  had 
already  been  granted  such  a  concession,  but  that  Turkey  is  willing 
to  find  a  means  to  ensure  to  England  participation  in  the  construc- 
tion of  the  Persian  Gulf-Bagdad  Railway  under  the  same  conditions 
as  Germany,  or  even  France,  enjoys  and  to  concede  to  these  three 
Powers  control  over  this  line. 
*  On  the  Persian  Gulf. 

501 


502         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


In  Germany,  readiness  has  been  expressed  to  influence  the 
Bagdad  Railway  Company  in  this  sense,  but  only  on  condition 
that  the  agreements  regarding  the  Bulgurlu-Halif  branch  line,  and 
the  obligations  resulting  therefrom,  are  strictly  adhered  to.  Ap- 
parently, the  Turkish  Government  raises  no  objections. 

(569)     Memorandum  from  the  British  Embassy  at  St.  Petersburg,  Nov.  6-19,  1909. 

The  Russian  Government  is  aware  that  Sir  G.  Lowther,  some 
weeks  ago,  applied  to  the  Sublime  Porte  for  a  concession  for  a 
railway  to  connect  the  Persian  Gulf  with  Bagdad  by  the  Valley  of 
the  Tigris.  At  the  same  time,  a  preferential  option  was  requested 
to  connect  the  Mediterranean  with  Bagdad  by  an  extension  of  the, 
above  line  along  the  Euphrates.  \ 

The  Russian  Government  will  likewise  be  aware  that  the  Eng- 
lish Government  has  agreed,  under  certain  conditions,  to  a  4  per  cent 
increase  of  the  Turkish  Customs  duties  with  the  reservation  that 
no  kilometer  guarantee  ^  be  paid  out  of  the  returns  of  this  increase 
and  that  a  written  assurance  to  this  effect  be  demanded  from 
Germany  by  the  Turkish  Government.  It  is,  however,  improbable 
that  such  an  assurance  can  be  given,  for  the  Bagdad  Railway  Com- 
pany is  aware  that  no  kilometer  guarantee  can  be  paid,  unless  the 
Powers  give  their  consent  to  the  increase,  and  unless  at  least  a 
part  of  these  returns  be  used  for  the  kilometer  guarantee. 

A  few  days  ago,  Herr  Gwinner  ^  informed  Mr.  Babington  Smi 
that  he  was  now  prepared  to  accept  the  following  conditions. 

1.)  British  control  over  the  sector  Bagdad-Persian  Gulf. 

2.)  This  sector  is  to  be  built  with  English  material  and  by 
English  contractors. 

3.)  Non-British  interests  to  participate  only  in  an  unimportant 
degree  in  this  sector. 

4.)  The  railway  north  of  Bagdad  to  be  in  no  way  dependent  on 
the  British  group. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  has  informed  Count  Metternich  that  the  Brit- 
ish Government  could  not  give  its  consent  to  the  increase  of  the 
Turkish  Customs  duties,  without  an  arrangement  being  arrived  at 

*  A  subsidy  promoting  the  building  of  this  railroad. 

•  Official  of  the  Deutsche  Bank. 


a 

1 


THE  BAGDAD   RAILROAD   QUESTION  503 

relevant  to  the  Bagdad  Railway.  He  pointed  out  that  the  necessity 
of  inviting  Russia  and  France  to  participate  renders  it  difficult  for 
the  British  Government  to  take  part  in  the  building  of  the  railway. 
Grey  has,  however,  just  learnt  that  the  German  Government  would 
possibly  renounce  in  favour  of  England,  the  right  to  continue  the 
railway  south  of  Bagdad,  who  in  this  case  could  come  to  an  under- 
standing with  Turkey  regarding  the  Bagdad-Persian  Gulf  Railway. 
This  is  exceedingly  important  for  the  British  interests  in  Mesopo- 
tamia and  is  one  of  the  points  on  which  the  British  Government  has 
always  insisted.  The  other  Powers,  including  Russia,  apparently 
incline  towards  consenting  unconditionally  to  the  increase  of  the 
Turkish  Customs  duties;  the  British  Government  will  probably 
follow  suit  if  Germany  yields  on  the  point  just  referred  to. 

A  German  line  to  the  north  of  Bagdad  interests  the  British 
Government  much  less  than  a  railway  in  a  different  direction  from 
Bagdad  towards  the  West. 

A  decision  must  be  arrived  at  on  this  question,  as  it  is 
a  matter  concerning  the  increase  of  Turkish  import  duties. 
The  British  Government  alone  cannot  oppose  the  increase  in  the  tar- 
iff, and  once  this  is  conceded,  there  will  he  no  more  obstacles  in  the 
way  of  the  construction  by  Germany  of  the  Bagdad  Railway. 


(570)     Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople.     Telegram, 
Nov.  10-23,  1909. 

Strictly  confidential. 

The  British  Ambassador  has  handed  me  a  memorandum  from 
which  I  learn  that  an  agreement  is  under  way  between  England 
and  Germany  with  respect  to  the  Bagdad  Railway,  which  will 
cause  us  to  turn  renewed  attention  to  this  question.  Germany  will 
transfer  to  England  all  her  rights  regarding  the  Bagdad-Persian 
Gulf  line  on  condition  that  England  give  up  the  line  north  of 
Bagdad. 

The  British  Government  is  apparently  ready  to  accept  the 
German  proposal,  and  to  consent  to  the  Turkish  Customs  tariff 
increase  as  well;  in  so  doing,  England  gives  her  sanction  to  the 
kilometer  guarantee  being  taken  from  the  revenues  arising  from 
the  Customs  increase. 


504 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


It  is  not  clearly  discernible  from  the  British  memorandum 
whether  England  is  now  attempting  to  evade  her  former  promise 
that  all  four  Powers  negotiate  together. 

At  all  events,  we  must  remember  that  this  question  can  take 
quite  a  new  turn  in  case  of  the  Anglo-German  negotiations  materi- 
alising, and  this  would  cause  us  to  exercise  extraordinary  pre- 
cautions where  the  Bagdad  Railway,  the  kilometer  guarantee  and 
the  Customs  increase  are  concerned. 

I  intend  to  submit  this  question  to  a  Ministerial  Council  and 
you  would  oblige  me  by  letting  me  have  your  suggestions  and 
views. 


(571) 


The  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg^  to   Iswolsky. 
Nov.  11-24,  1909. 


Letter. 


After  our  conversation  last  Friday,  I  submitted  to  my  Govern 
ment  several  of  your  observations,  which  you  yourself  designated 
as  being  first  impressions  and  not  your  definite  conclusions. 

I  have  now  received  further  statements  from  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
which  I  trust  will  dispel  all  ambiguities.  Above  all,  I  wish  to  em- 
phasize that  no  arrangements  have  been  concluded  with  the  Ger- 
man Government  and  no  negotiations  taken  place  as  yet.  My 
Government  did  not  give  Germany  a  free  hand;  she  possessed  such  al- 
ready by  virtue  of  the  concession.^  Germany  hopes  to  raise  the  neces- 
sary financial  means  through  a  tariff  increase,  and  all  the  Powers,  with 
the  exception  of  England,  were  apparently  willing  to  consent  to  this 
increase,  without  setting  up  any  condition  regarding  the  Bagdad  Rail- 
way. My  Government  had  to  consider  what  conditions  should  be 
formulated  for  the  protection  of  British  interests.  Nothing  further 
has  been  told  the  German  Ambassador  than  what  I  communicated 
in  my  Memorandum  of  November  6-19. 

As  I  wrote  you  in  my  private  letter  two  or  three  days  ago,  my 
Government  communicated  to  you  Gwinner's  proposals  as  soon  as 
it  received  them,  and  our  views  as  to  which  conditions  would  be 
acceptable  for  Germany  were  based  on  Gwinner's  statements  and 
not  on  any  kind  of  negotiations  with  the  German  Government,  for 
no  negotiations  have  taken  place. 


I 


Sir  Arthur  Nicolson. 


THE  BAGDAD  RAILROAD   QUESTION  505 

My  Government  is  most  desirous  of  learning  the  conditions  under  ^ 
which  the  Russian  Government  would  take  part  in  the  railway  north  of 
Bagdad.* 

We  have  always  demanded  the  control  and  construction  of  the 
line  south  of  Bagdad  and  cannot  content  ourselves  with  less.  No 
doubt  can  exist  that  the  railway  will  be  built  eventually,  whether 
England  and  Russia  take  a  part  or  not,  and  from  this  point  of  view, 
England  must  give  serious  consideration  to  the  present  situation 
and  the  Gwinner  proposals.  But  before  anything  further  he  done  in  the 
matter  Grey  would  like  to  have  Russia's  opinion.  There  is  one  reason 
which  makes  the  question  of  the  southern  sector  of  the  railway  a 
most  urgent  one;  the  Turkish  Government  is  starting  irrigation 
work  south  of  Bagdad,  and  it  is  probable  that  the  rivers  will  cease 
to  be  navigable  owing  to  lack  of  water.  The  river-transport  of 
Anglo-Indian  commerce,  which  has  been  in  British  hands  for  more 
than  fifty  years,  would  thus  be  utterly  lost,  without  any  possibility 
of  a  substitute  until  the  railway  is  built. 

You  will  see  from  the  above  that  my  Government  informed 
you  of  the  Gwinner  proposals  without  loss  of  time  and  that  it  has 
commenced  no  negotiations  with  Germany  and  has  settled  nothing. 
My  Government  desires  to  be  acquainted  with  your  views  on  the  pos- 
sibility of  Russian  participation  in  the  railway  north  of  Bagdad  *  as 
soon  as  possible,  as  well  as  with  the  conditions  on  which  you  would 
sanction  a  Customs  increase. 

(572)     The  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  to  Iswolsky.    Letter,  Nov. 
14-27,  1909. 

In  order  to  supplement  the  information  already  given  to  you, 
I  wish  to  state  that  the  British  Government  has  taken  no  other 
steps  than  to  inform  you  and  Paris  of  the  contents  of  Gwinner's 
proposals  and,  so  far,  has  not  yet  replied  to  the  latter.  These  pro- 
posals represent  the  minimum  of  what  would  satisfy  public  opin- 
ion in  England  and  the  British  interests,  and  in  order  to  obtain  the 
southern  sector,  my  Government  would  be  willing  to  renounce  its 
interests  in  the  railway  north  of  Bagdad.    The  British  group  wishes 

Compare  statements  2  and  3  and  4.  Out  of  these  contradictions  came  the  diffi- 
culties Germany  experienced  in  regard  to  the  line.  The  railroad  north  of  Bagdad 
did  not  enter  upon  territory  controlled  by  Russia  in  any  form. 


506 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


to  obtain  a  concession  for  a  branch  line  from  Bagdad  to  Khanekin 
and,  although,  my  Government  is  desirous  of  obtaining  such  a  con- 
cession, or  of  building  the  line  in  question  conjointly  with  Russia, 
it  has  refrained  from  any  steps  whatsoever  in  this  matter  and  will 
do  nothing  in  this  direction  without  Russia.  My  Government  ac- 
knowledges that  a  railway  line  leading  to  a  point  on  the  boundary 
of  the  Russian  sphere  of  influence  in  Persia  must  involve  Russian 
interests. 

The  German  Government  knows  that  Gwinner  has  made  defi- 
nite proposals,  but  my  Government  wishes  the  negotiations  to 
retain  in  future  also  their  purely  private  character.  We  wish  to 
learn  Russia's  point  of  view,  which  hitherto  has  been  entirely  un- 
known to  us,  as  a  decision  cannot  be  postponed  much  longer 
respecting  the  Turkish  Customs  increase.  We  naturally  have  noth- 
ing against  Germany  recognising  the  Russian  interests  in  the  Rus- 
sian zone  of  influence  in  Persia,  but  it  would  not  be  a  matter  of 
indifference  to  us  should  Russia  in  return  grant  Germany  conces- 
sions in  the  neutral  zone.  ^1 

My  Government  naturally  has  nothing  against  negotiations  hetweewKX 
Russia  and  Germany  concerning  Russia's  participation  in  the  railway 
north  of  Bagdad,  but  the  British  Government  hopes  that  Russia  will., 
keep  it  informed  regarding  such  negotiations. 


(573) 


Iswolsky   to   the   Russian   Ambassador   at    Constantinople.     Letter, 
Nov.  13-26,  1909. 


I 


On   November    10-23,   I   informed  you  of  the   Memorandum—- 
handed  to  me  by  the  British  Ambassador  here.    Enclosed  you  wiWf^ 
find  a  copy  of  this  document  which  contains,  in  addition  to  particulars 
of  the  projected  understanding  between  England  and  Germany,  several 
none  too  lucid  references  as  to  the  reasons  why  England  and  Germany 
must  conclude  an  agreement. 

I  will,  however,  not  enter  into  details  that  might  possibly  re- 
quire to  be  rectified,  but  deem  it  necessary  to  explain  the  basic 
elemients  of  the  whole  matter  and  its  conflicting  individual  interests. 

You,  no  doubt,  remember  that  the  question  of  the  Bagdad  Rail- 
way, inasmuch  as  this  affected  our  direct  interests,  was  examined 
in  1907  by  the  Ministerial  Council,  as  the  question  was  raised  at 


THE  BAGDAD  RAILROAD  QUESTION  507 

time  whether  a  special  agreement  should  not  be  concluded  between 
ourselves  and  Germany,  comprising  not  only  the  problem  of  the 
Bagdad  Railway  as  such,  but  also  its  possible  development  with 
reference  to  the  whole  question  of  railway  construction  in  Asia 
Minor. 

The  counter-proposals  worked  out  by  us  were  not  communicated 
at  the  time  to  the  German  Government,  as  the  course  of  the  then  general 
negotiations  showed  that  the  Powers  chiefly  interested,  apart  from  Rus- 
sia, namely  England  and  France,  took  the  mew  proposed  by  the  London 
Cabinet  that  this  matter  should  be  collectively  examined  by  all  four 
Powers.  This  attitude  was  in  the  highest  degree  advantageous  for  us, 
as  the  probability  of  the  building  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  seemed  in- 
definitely postponed,  and  this  question  has  indeed  since  then  not  been 
referred  to  in  our  negotiations  with  Germany. 

The  documents  recently  handed  me  by  Nicolson  contain  no  direct 
mention  that  England  had  now  decided  to  make  her  attitude  regarding 
the  Bagdad  Railway  enterprise  independent  of  the  views  and  interests 
of  France  and  Russia.  The  very  fact  of  this  communication  being 
made  would  rather  be  a  proof  to  the  contrary,  but  in  any  case  we  must 
reckon  with  a  possibility  of  England  and  Germany  effecting  an 
understanding  on  this  question  with  comparative  ease.  And  this  con- 
sideration causes  us  seriously  to  examine  our  own  interests  and  to 
take  immediate  measures  for  their  protection.  The  question  is 
whether  we  shall,  in  future,  also  adhere  to  the  idea  of  negotiations 
in  common  sxtiong  the  Four  Powers,  or  whether  we  shall  deal  with 
Germany  separately;  this  question  will  probably  be  solved  very 
soon,  once  we  have  come  to  an  understanding  with  the  London 
Cabinet.  //  in  my  telegram  I  recommended  to  you  to  exercise  particu- 
lar caution  and  reserve,  this  arose  from  the  consideration  that  we  wish 
to  preserve  our  absolute  freedom  of  action.^ 

As  to  the  question  itself,  three  different  interests  intersect  each 
other.  The  significance  of  the  railway  line  for  us,  the  possibility  of 
its  construction  by  the  aid  of  the  kilometer  guarantee,  and  the  set- 
ting aside  for  this  end  of  the  income  accruing  from  the  4  per  cent 
Customs  increase. 

*A  peculiar  mental  slant  of  Iswolsky's  was  that  while  he  reserved  for  himself 
"freedom  of  action"  in  all  things,  he  never  granted  the  same  right  to  others — not 
even  his  allies  and  associates. 


508         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

The  significance  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  from  a  political,  strategical 
and  economic  point  of  view,  so  far  as  Russia  is  concerned,  has  already 
been  exhaustively  investigated.  Our  standpoint  remains  unaltered.  The 
construction  of  this  railway  will  have  injurious  consequences  for  us  and 
we  must  take  measures  to  mitigate  these  results.  It  will  hardly  he  pos- 
sible to  prevent  the  execution  of  the  German  project,  first,  because 
Germany's  expenditure  for  this  enterprise  has  already  been  a  very  large 
one,  secondly,  because,  on  the  whole,  French  financial  circles  regard  the 
undertaking  favourably,  and,  thirdly,  because  England  now  seems  in- 

y  dined  to  give  her  consent  upon  certain  conditions.  Thus,  it  is  now 
principally  a  matter  of  determining  on  what  conditions  we  could 
declare  our  readiness  to  cease  opposing  the  German  undertaking. 
It  must  be  remarked  however,  that  Germany  now  apparently  re- 
nounces to  execute  her  original  project  in  its  entirety,  and  like 
England,  we  too  shall  now  have  to  determine  the  limits  of  Ger- 
many's freedom  of  action  in  order  to  protect  our  interests  ivl 
Turkey  and  in  Persia. 

/^  As  for  the  kilometer  guarantee,  it  will  hardly  be  possible  to 
/  build  the  railway  without  such  a  guarantee.  Nor  will  it  be  possible 
(     to  use  another  source  of  revenue  of  the  Turkish  Government  for 

\  this  purpose.  Thus  the  necessity  arises  of  applying  the  4  per  cent 
Customs  increase  for  this  purpose.  The  opposition  of  the  Powers  on 
this  point  has,  however,  placed  insurmountable  difficulties  in  the  way  of 
the  German  enterprise. 

Our  further  resistance  might  continue  to  hamper  the  German  inten- 
tions in  the  future.  A  change  in  our  attitude  might  be  made  by  us 
dependent  on  the  yielding  attitude  shown  by  Germany  in  the  question 
of  defining  our  mutual  interests  in  connection  with  the  Bagdad  Railway. 
Thus,  we  have  the  possibility  to  use  the  measure  now  proposed 
by  Turkey  to  further  our  own  important  interests  in  the  Eastern 
districts  of  Turkey.  These  negotiations,  naturally,  can  be  under- 
taken independently  of  the  Bagdad  Railway.    Even  if  we  were  to 

I    come  to  an  understanding  with  the  Sublime  Porte  on  the  Customs  in- 

\  crease,  this  would  not  yet  solve  the  problem  of  the  kilometer  guarantee; 
further  negotiations  with  us  will  have  to  take  place  on  this  point. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  arrive  at  an  understanding  with  Germany 
as  to  the  Bagdad  Railway,  the  Berlin  Cabinet  would  have  an  in- 
terest in  bringing  our  negotiations  with  Turkey  to  a  conclusion  as 


I 


THE  BAGDAD  RAILROAD   QUESTION  509 

soon  as  possible  and  might  perhaps  help  us  to  exert  pressure  on 
Turkey. 

These  are  the  general  considerations.  It  is  your  task  seriously 
to  investigate  all  sides  of  this  question  and  to  throw  light  on  it  from 
the  local  point  of  view.  May  I  therefore  request  you  to  communi- 
cate your  views  to  us  at  your  earliest  convenience? 


(574)     The  Same  to  the  Same,    Letter,  Nov.  14-27,  1909. 

In  order  to  render  my  letter  of  November  13-26  complete,  I  am 
enclosing  the  copy  of  a  new  communication  from  the  British  Am- 
bassador here. 

You  will  see  from  this  that  England  even  now  does  not  give  us 
a  clear  reply  as  to  whether  the  negotiations,  as  to  the  Bagdad 
Railway,  are  to  be  conducted  jointly  or  whether  separate  negotia- 
tions will  take  place  between  Germany  and  the  other  Powers. 
Immediately  on  receipt  of  the  English  document,  I  replied  to  the  Ambas- 
sador to  the  effect  that  the  concession  for  the  Bagdad-Khanekin  line  had 
been  already  granted  to  the  German  company  and  that  new  negotia- 
tions could  therefore  hardly  he  carried  on  with  the  Sublime  Porte.  As 
to  the  English  desires,  regarding  the  neutral  zone,  I  have  in  a  most 
friendly  manner  drawn  the  Ambassador's  attention  to  the  fact  that  we 
must  be  given  considerable  freedom  of  action  in  eventual  dealings  with 
Germany,  as  Germany  apparently  will  insist  on  concessions  on  our  part 
— just  as  England  has  the  intention  of  resigning  her  participation  in  the 
railway  north  of  Bagdad.  As  for  keeping  England  informed  con- 
cerning our  negotiations  with  Germany,  I  have  naturally  promised 
this,  just  as  until  now  we  have  concealed  nothing  from  England 
regarding  all  such  negotiations  with  Germany. 


(575)     The  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  to  Iswolsky.    Letter,  Nov. 
\d>-Dec.  1,  1909. 

Referring  to  our  former  conversations  regarding  the  Bagdad 
Railway,  I  hasten  to  inform  you  that  no  negotiations  are  taking 
place  with  the  German  Government,  but  that  Gwinner  has  made 
overtures  to  an  English  group  of  financiers.  It  is  not  yet  clear  what 
results  these  discussions  will  have,  and  until  these  proposals  are 


510 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


submitted  to  the  London  Cabinet,  with  the  sanction  of  the  Germair 
Government,  it  is  impossible  to  say  whether  the  proposals  will  be 
acceptable  to  us.  Should  this  be  the  case,  they  will  even  then  not  he 
accepted  by  us  until  we  have  come  to  an  understanding  with  Russia  andj 
France,  so  that  a  decision  will  always  he  made  by  all  four} 


(576) 


The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  to  Iswolsky.     Strictly 
Confidential  Letter,  Nov.  25-Dec.  8,  1909. 


on 

i 


I  hasten  to  inform  you  of  what  was  communicated  to  me  ii 
confidence  by  the  French  Ambassador  here  concerning  the  pro- 
jected Anglo-German  Bagdad  Railway  Treaty. 

Bompard  read  to  me  a  report,  received  from  the  French  Min- 
ister of  Foreign  Affairs,  which  corresponds  to  the  information 
given  to  you  by  Nicolson. 

The  English  communications  have  made  a  painful  impression 
the  Paris  Cabinet.    One  naturally  concedes  England's  fair  behaviour 
this  matter  and  that  she  has  kept  her  promise  to  consider,  together  with 
France  and  Russia,  a  possible  understanding  with  Germany  concerning 
the  Bagdad  Railway.    But  one  can  read  between  the  lines  of  the  Eng- 
lish communication  that  England  is  very  desirous  of  accepting  the  Ger- 
man proposals,  although  the  latter  are  not  at  all  in  keeping  with  French^m 
interests  and  hardly  do  justice  to  ours.  ^t\ 

According  to  the  contents,  the  projected  treaty  is  of  the  greatest 
importance ;  it  is  equivalent  to  the  partition  of  Turkey  into  a  Brit- 
ish and  a  German  sphere  of  interest:  England  granting  Germany 
freedom  of  action  in  Turkey,  in  Europe  and  in  Asia  Minor,  and 
claiming  such  for  herself  only  in  the  Turkish  territories  in  the 
vicinity  of  the  Persian  Gulf .^ 

The  French  Ambassador  is  of  the  opinion  that  England  is  more  and 
more  concentrating  all  her  energies  on  the  domination  of  the  roads 
leading  to  India, — the  Persian  Gulf  and  the  Indian  Plains — and  Eng- 
land appears  to  be  less  and  less  interested  in  Constantinople  and  the 
Turkish  problems  proper.  The  London  Cabinet  has  safeguarded  itself 
by  its  conventions  with  Russia  against  an  extension  of  Russian  influence 


*  Iswolsky  thus  carried  his  point. 

'  For  the  purpose  of  assuring  doubly  that  Russia  would  not  be  able  to  use 
shores  of  the  Persian  Gulf  as  a  naval  base,  which  was  Russia's  intention. 


1 


THE  BAGDAD  RAILROAD   QUESTION  511 

in  the  Persian  Gulf.  The  projected  treaty  with  Germany  completes 
England's  sovereignty  in  the  Persian  Gulf.  England  will  then  attempt 
to  free  herself  in  Egypt  from  the  obligations  to  obtain  Turkey's 
sanction  in  certain  political  and  financial  matters,  and  once  this  end 
is  attained,  England  will  no  longer  take  an  active  part  in  the  other 
questions.  But  this  cannot  be  desirable  for  France.  Although 
several  Frenchmen  are  taking  part  in  the  Bagdad  Railway  project 
yet  this  enterprise  is  an  exclusively  German  one  and  France  pos- 
sesses neither  a  vote  nor  any  rights  at  all.  The  number  of  shares 
in  French  possession  is  an  insufficient  one. 

Bompard  is  surprised  by  the  obstinacy  with  which  Germany  in- 
sists on  the  Customs  increase.  This  obstinacy  proves  the  cor- 
rectness of  the  assumption  that  the  sources  of  revenue  assigned 
for  the  safeguarding  of  the  railway  from  Eregli  to  El-Halif  do  not 
suffice  for  a  second  issue  of  certificates.  The  Ambassador  is  of  the 
opinion  that  the  Powers  should  insist  that  the  surplus  income  from  the 
Customs  should  not  be  used  for  the  payment  of  the  kilometer  guarantee 
of  the  Bagdad  Railway.  France,  at  any  rate,  cannot  permit  her  trade 
to  be  hampered  by  an  increase  of  the  Customs  duties  in  favour  of  a 
foreign  enterprise. 

I,  on  my  part,  am  of  the  opinion  that,  similarly  to  England's 
and  Russia's  delimitation  of  their  mutual  spheres  of  influence  in 
Persia,  such  a  step  is  now  being  planned  by  England  and  Germany 
with  regard  to  Turkey,  with  the  difference  that  Germany  is  con- 
ceded an  enormous  preponderance  of  power.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  words  of  the  Ambassador  plainly  point  to  the  desirability,  from 
the  English  point  of  view,  of  an  Anglo-German  agreement.  I  must 
also  point  out  that  England  shows  herself  to  be  less  and  less  inter- 
ested in  Constantinople  and  the  purely  Turkish  questions  as  com- 
pared to  her  former  active  policy  in  the  Near  East.  This  is,  however, 
wholly  in  keeping  with  the  general  trend  of  British  policy  to  safeguard 
the  present  British  possessions  by  means  of  diplomatic  conventions,  with- 
holding from  all  active,  even  purely  diplomatic  steps,  in  other  questions. 

England  is  only  debarred  from  simply  accepting  the  German 
proposal  now  by  the  fact  that  she  herself  formerly  proposed  to 
make  this  question  the  object  of  common  discussions  by  all  four 
Powers.  But  the  form  of  the  present  negotiations — among  private 
groups — suffices  to  arrive  at  an  understanding  and  renders  a  con- 


-/, 


512         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

ference  of  all  four  more  difficult  for  us  and  for  France.  Should, 
furthermore,  an  understanding  be  arrived  at  between  England 
and  Germany,  the  result  would  be  two  opposing  groups;  France 
and  Russia  would  stand  alone,  which  has  to  be  prevented  from 
a  political  point  of  view.  Hence,  there  remain  only  direct, 
though  parallel,  negotiations  between  Germany  and  England,  Ger- 
many and  Russia,  and  Germany  and  France this  gives 

us  the  possibility  of  hindering  the  German  enterprise  also  in  future; 
should  we  give  our  sanction  we  shall  be  able  to  obtain  corresponding 
concessions.  Should  the  Paris  Cabinet  wish  to  bring  this  clause  to  bear 
on  the  Bagdad  Railway,  then  we  shall  only  be  the  gainers  thereby.  .  .  .  »J 
It  is  also  important  that  the  initiative  of  a  partition  of  Turkey  int 
definite  spheres  of  influence  be  taken  by  Germany,  as  this  will 
certainly  be  injurious  to  German  interests  in  Turkey.^ 


* 


(577)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Iswolsky.    Report,  Nov.  26- 
Dec.  9,  1909. 


1 


England  has  made  explanations  at  Paris  similar  to  those  whic 
she  had  made  at  St.  Petersburg  as  to  the  negotiations  opened  by 
Gwinner.  /  must  however  observe  that  the  French  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs  has  disapproved  the  English  intention  to  build  the  line  to 
the  Persian  Gulf,  which  is  of  direct  interest  to  England,  dependent  on 
the  international  question  of  the  Turkish  Customs  increase.  fli 

On  this  occasion,  I  should  like  to  state  that  the  struggle  betwee^' 
the  English  political  parties,  and  between  the  Upper  and  Lower 
Houses,  is  being  watched  with  the  greatest  interest  here  in  France. 
The  French  sympathies,  naturally,  go  out  to  the  present  Govern- 
ment, which  attempts  to  oppose  the  century-old  privileges  of  the 
English  Lords.  From  a  political  point  of  view,  however,  Pichon  is 
alarmed  by  the  inner  political  struggle  in  England  which  detracts  the 
attention  of  the  British  Government  from  questions  of  foreign  policy. 
In  view  of  the  present  situation  in  France,  however,  it  is  of  the  utmost 
importance  that  England  continue  to  play  her  former  leading  part  in 
European  matters  and  act  as  a  check  on  Germany;  should  England 
recede  to  the  background  bellicose  intentions  might  once  more  arise  in 
Germany,  which  would  be  dangerous  to  France. 

*  The  documents  show  Germany  had  no  such  intention  and  that  Tcharikoif 
up  this  hypothesis  for  the  sole  purpose  of  causing  friction. 


THE  BAGDAD  RAILROAD   QUESTION  513 

(578)  Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople.     Telegram, 

Dec.  9-22,  1909. 

The  French  Ambassador  here  informs  me,  that  Hilmi  Pasha  ^ 
had  categorically  declared  Turkey  would  in  no  case  consent  to  a 
solution  of  the  Bagdad  question  which  would  lead  to  the  partition 
of  this  railway  between  the  interested  Powers.  Turkey  can  only 
admit  the  participation  of  the  Powers  in  equal  parts  on  the  whole  length 
of  the  line.^  Louis  ^  is  of  the  opinion  that  this  is  the  view  not  only  of 
the  Turkish  Government  but  of  Young  Turkish  circles  as  well.  The 
attitude  taken  by  Turkey  can  seriously  jeopardize  the  execution  of  the 
Anglo-German  understanding  and  shows  us  a  way  out  of  the  present 
difficulties. 

(579)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Iswolsky.    Letter,  Dec.  6-19,  1909. 

In  Grey's  absence,  I  pointed  out  to  the  Under-Secretary  of  State, 
Sir  Charles  Hardinge,  the  diffiiculties  resulting  from  the  last  Anglo- 
German  negotiations  on  the  Bagdad  Railway.  Sir  Charles  reiterated 
that  until  now  it  has  only  been  a  question  of  discussions  among  financial 
groups  and  that  nothing  had  yet  been  determined  as  to  definite  proposals. 

Although  he  expressed  some  doubt  as  to  the  possibility  of  bring- 
ing the  negotiations  to  a  successful  issue.  Sir  Charles  did  not  con- 
ceal from  me  that  an  unexpected  proposal,  in  absolute  keeping  with 
England's  political  interests,  renders  it  hardly  possible  for  the 
London  Cabinet  not  to  take  it  into  consideration.  He  added  how- 
ever, that  the  Russian  interests  would  have  to  be  adequately  protected 
and  that  the  British  Government  therefore  immediately  informed  us  of 
the  negotiations. 

I  pointed  out  how  disadvantageous  to  us  the  creation  of  any- 
thing resembling  a  German  sphere  of  influence  in  the  north  of  Asia 
Minor  *  would  be.  Sir  Charles  admitted  this  and  immediately  re- 
ferred to  the  Samsun-Sivas  Line  and  the  Bagdad-Khanekin  branch, 
which  were  both  suited  to  act  as  a  safeguard  against  this  danger; 
England  had  already  acknowledged  Russia's  interest  in  these  two 
questions 

*  Ottoman  minister  of  foreign  affairs. 

*A  precaution  against  the  partition  of  Turkey. 

*  Georges  Louis,  French  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg. 

*  Consisted  entirely  of  the  railroad  concession  in  question. 


114       ^ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

To  my  question  as  to  the  probable  political  results  of  a  solution 
of  the  Bagdad  Railway  question,  he  replied  that  **there  will  be  one 
important  question  less  between  England  and  Germany — the  only 
concrete  question."  I  did  not  consider  it  necessary  to  mention  the 
question  of  the  negotiations  between  all  four  Powers,  as  I  knew 
jthat  Sir  Ernest  Cassel  ^  had  not  yet  returned  from  Berlin. 

My  impression  is  that  the  British  Government  will  admit  only  one 
solution  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  problem,  if  the  line  be  carried  through 
to  the  Persian  Gulf,  namely:  the  cession  to  England  of  the  last  sector;- 
moreover,  the  British  Government  is  in  no  hurry,  will  not  admit  further 
concessions  in  favour  of  Germany  and  would  view  the  rupture  of  the 
present  negotiations  with  philosophical  calm.  British  interests  can  be 
safeguarded  only  by  the  maintenance  of  the  status  quo  or  the  solu- 
tion proposed  to-day 


4 


(580)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Dec.  8-21,  1909.    No.  240. 

Hardinge  informs  me  that  Cassel  has  returned  from  Berlin  with- 
out an  agreement  having  been  arrived  at  so  far.  Cambon  has  com- 
municated to  me  a  report  from  the  French  Ambassador  in  Constan- 
tinople to  the  effect  that  Hilmi  Pasha  is  seriously  opposing  the 
partition  of  the  railway  in  three  different  sectors.  Cambon  has  in- 
formed Hardinge  of  this  report.  The  latter  tells  me  he  believes 
the  information  to  be  correct. 


I 


(581)     The  Same  to  the  Same,    Telegram,  Dec.  11-24,  1909.    No.  243. 

Grey  has  made  to  me  the  following  communication  concerning 
the  Bagdad  Railway. 

As  the  British  Government  had  learned  that  the  surplus  accru- 
ing from  the  Customs  had  been  promised  to  the  German  Bagdad 
Railway  Company,^  and  that  in  this  case  the  railway  would  be 
built  under  conditions  disadvantageous  to  England,  the  London 
Cabinet  has  refused  its  consent  to  the  requested  Customs  increase, 
if  the  Turkish  Government  does  not  give  a  pledge  that  the  surplus 

*  British  negotiator  in  the  Bagdad  railroad  matter. 

*  Bagdad-Basra-Koweit. 

*  Grey  knew  this  before,  of  course. 


THE  BAGDAD   RAILROAD   QUESTION  515 

will  not  benefit  the  German  enterprise  and  if  an  official  German 
declaration  to  this  effect  is  not  forthcoming.  The  latter  declaration 
could  not  be  given. 

At  this  juncture,  Gwinner  indirectly  proposed  a  method  which 
might  have  avoided  these  difficulties  from  an  English  point  of  view. 
The  Russian  Government  was  at  once  informed  of  this.  There- 
upon Sir  Ernest  Cassel  offered  his  services  to  continue  the  nego- 
tiations with  Gwinner  at  Berlin.  He  was  authorised  to  do  so,  on  the 
condition,  however,  that  the  result  of  these  negotiations  could  in  no  wise 
hind  the  decisions  of  the  British  Government,  as  Russia  and  France 
are  interested  in  the  result  of  an  Anglo-German  agreement 

(582)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  to  Iswolsky.     Report. 
Dec.  11-24,  1909. 

.  .  .  The  French  Ambassador  here  is  of  the  opinion  that  the 
French  Government  should  inform  the  Sublime  Porte  not  only 
verbally  as  hitherto,  but  also  in  writing,  that  it  cannot  consent  to 
the  increase  of  duties  on  French  goods  in  favour  of  an  enterprise 
in  which  France  does  not  participate  and  that,  should  the  Sublime 
Porte  have  advised  Germany  to  come  to  an  understanding  with 
England  on  the  Bagdad  Railway  question,  Germany  should  also 
enter  into  negotiations  with  France. 

As  to  the  negotiations  themselves,  Bompard  attributes  to  them  not 
only  local,  purely  Turkish,  but  rather  a  general  European  significance. 
In  these  negotiations,  he  discerns  an  express  desire  on  the  part  of  Eng- 
land  and  Germany  to  improve  their  present  relations,  the  Bagdad  Rail- 
way question  offering  a  favourable  opportunity.  The  possibility  of  an 
Anglo-German  rapprochement  is  disadvantageous  and  harmful  to  France 
and  Russia.^  In  any  case  both  Powers  will  lose  the  English  sup- 
port at  Constantinople  on  which  they  were  hitherto  able  to  rely. 

/  myself  go  even  further  than  my  French  colleague,  and  reckon  with 
the  possibility  of  a  Franco-German  understanding  respecting  the  Bag- 
dad Railway  which,  so  far  as  French  capital  is  concerned,  already  exists. 
We  can  hardly  expect  that  the  Sublime  Porte  will  place  difficulties 
in  the  way  of  the  proposed  agreement  and  that  thus  a  way  out  of 
the  difficult  situation  be  offered  to  us.    In  this  case  we  are  threatened 

*  Such  was  the  milk  in  this  cocoa-nut. 


516         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

by  disadvantageous  isolation,  should  we  not  by  then  have  arrived  at 
understanding  with  Germany  and  Turkey. 


(583)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Iswolsky.    Report,  Jan.  7-20,  1910. 

During  the  past  few  days,  negotiations  on  the  Bagdad  Railway 
have  taken  place  between  the  French  and  Turkish  Governments. 
Turkey  enquired  of  the  Paris  Cabinet  whether  the  latter  would 
give  its  consent  to  a  4  per  cent  increase  of  the  import  duties. 

The  French  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  replied,  that  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  England  and  Germany  had  demanded  concessions  for  railways, 
the  French  Government  also  holds  itself  justified  in  demanding  the 
concessions  for  a  railway  from  Bagdad  to  the  town  of  Horns  in  Syria, 
from  where  a  French  railroad  leads  to  the  Mediterranean  and  the 
other  Syrian  towns.  To  this  answer  was  made  in  Constantinople 
that  Turkey  would  under  no  conditions  admit  the  establishment  of 
foreign  spheres  of  influence  and  railways  resulting  therefrom. 

Consequently  the  proposed  agreement  between  England  and  Ger- 
many would  appear  impracticable  and  the  entire  question  of  the  Bag- 
dad Railway  seems  indefinitely  postponed.  It  is  therefore  necessary 
that  some  new  event  bring  this  question  up  again. 


(584)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Iswolsky.    Letter,  Jan.  20- 
Feb.  2,  1910. 

Like  our  Ambassador  in  Constantinople,  I  am  now  restricting 
myself  to  personal  conversations  with  my  colleagues,  principally 
with  Cambon.  The  latter  yesterday  informed  me  that  he  had  yes- 
terday asked  Grey  how  matters  stood  with  respect  to  the  Bagdad 
Railway.    The  Minister  had  confined  himself  to  replying  in  French; 

"It  does  not  go  at  all." 

On  his  return  from  Paris,  Cambon  spoke  to  me  of  Gwinner's 
visit  to  the  French  capital,  which  had  also  led  to  no  result. 

Gwinner  is  said  to  have  expressed  himself  in  very  categorical 
terms  and  to  have  declared  that  the  whole  question  was  of  no  poli- 
tical importance  and  that  Russia  was  not  directly  interested.  He 
had  pointed  out  that  in  case  of  necessity,  Germany  could  renounce 
her  claim  to  the  4  per  cent  Customs  increase  for  the  construction 


THE  BAGDAD  RAILROAD   QUESTION  517 

of  the  840  kilometers,  as  the  surplus  of  the  Public  Debt  would  be 
set  free  and  could  be  used  for  the  financing  of  the  Bagdad  Railway. 

Cambon  regards  this  supposition  as  an  empty  threat,  as  the 
Turkish  Budget  of  1910  closes  with  a  deficit  of  100  million  francs. 
To  cover  this,  it  would  be  necessary  to  raise  a  loan,  which  in  turn 
would  require  the  above-mentioned  surplus  as  cover. 

Grey  also  mentioned  the  opinion  expressed  by  Gwinner  that  it 
would  suffice  if  the  financial  groups  come  to  an  understanding 
among  themselves  and  that  the  sanction  of  the  Government  would 
be  unnecessary.  Cambon,  however,  believes  that,  so  far  as  England 
is  concerned,  this  would  mean  an  exclusively  financial  control  of 
the  southern  sector.  It  is  hardly  to  be  assumed  that  the  British 
Government  would  content  itself  with  this.  England  apparently 
insists  on  a  complete  control,  that  is,  England  wishes  to  build  her 
sector  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  with  her  own  money  and  to  work 
it  by  British  officials.  Government  participation  therefore  appears 
absolutely  necessary. 

As  to  the  French  demands,  Cambon  seems  to  have  been  more 
open  towards  me  than  with  our  Ambassador  at  Paris.  Apart  from 
branch  lines  leading  in  Syria  to  the  Mediterranean,  the  French 
Government  insists  on  a  special  line  which,  starting  from  Bagdad, 
turns  almost  due  west  and  after  crossing  Syria  ends  in  Homs- 
Tripoli.    //  /  do  not  err,  this  means  a  purely  obstructive  scheme. 

Without  desiring  to  express  an  opinion  concerning  the  future, 
I  have  gained  the  impression  that  the  negotiations  of  the  financial 
groups  at  Berlin,  London  and  Paris  have  so  far  led  to  no  result. 

The  Turkish  Ambassador  here  is  firmly  convinced  that  Turkey 
will  never  sanction  the  principle  of  separate  sectors. 


(585)    Jswolsky  to  the  Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  London.     Telegram, 
March  2A-April  6,  1910.    No.  457. 

I  am  telegraphing  to  Constantinople: 

The  French  Ambassador  reports  that  the  negotiations  between 
Turkey  and  Germany  concerning  the  Bagdad  Railway  at  Con- 
stantinople have  been  resumed,  it  being  intended  to  use  the  sur- 
plus of  the  "Dime"  for  the  kilometer  guarantee  in  the  place  of  the 
Customs  increase.    Louis  adds  that,  according  to  information  the 


^ 


518         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

French  Government  possesses,  these  negotiations  will  very  shortly 
lead  to  a  result  advantageous  to  Germany. 

I  must  request  you  to  examine  this  information  and  to  inform 
me  in  what  manner  such  negotiations  might  react  on  the  mutual 
relations  between  England,  France,  Germany  and  Turkey. 


(586)     The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  London  to  Iswolsky.     Telegram, 
March  26-April  8,  1910.    No.  75. 

Your  telegram  No.  457  received. 

A  similar  communication  was  made  here  yesterday  by  th< 
French  Charge  d' Affaires,  who  was  given  the  reply  that  a  tele- 
gram had  been  received  a  few  days  ago  from  the  British  Ambas- 
sador at  Constantinople  to  the  effect  that  a  speedy,  and,  for  Ger- 
many advantageous,  termination  of  the  negotiations  between  Ger- 
many and  Turkey  concerning  the  substitution  of  the  "Dime"  for 
the  Customs  increase  is  to  be  expected.  Sir  G.  Lowther  ^  has  been 
instructed  to  lodge  a  protest  at  Constantinople,  as  the  opinion  pre- 
vails here  that  such  a  combination  is  not  permissible  and  only 
serves  to  give  the  Sublime  Porte  the  possibility  of  covering  the 
shortage  in  the  "Dime"  by  the  surplus  income  from  the  Customs. 
So  far  as  is  known,  the  surplus  of  the  "Dime"  is  not  yet  free  and 
the  Turkish  Government  will  only  be  able  to  dispose  of  it  within 
a  few  months.  Mallet  added  that  the  Sublime  Porte  had  at  the 
same  time  been  asked  what  advantages  England  might  expect 
should  the  German-Turkish  agreement  be  concluded. 


(587)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  to  Iswolsky.    Telegram, 
March  27-April  9,  1910. 

The  French  Ambassador  here  has  informed  me  that  he  himself 
had  sent  to  Paris  the  news  of  fresh  negotiations  between  Germany 
and  Turkey.  The  opposition  of  the  London  Cabinet,  and  the  renewal 
of  its  claims  on  the  Bagdad-Basra  sector,  has  again  brought  the  entire 
matter  to  a  standstill  to  the  marked  displeasure  of  Germany  and  Turkey, 
and  this  has  also  called  forth  a  certain  degree  of  disappointment  in 
France, 

*  British  ambassador  to  Turkey. 


THE  BAGDAD   RAILROAD   QUESTION  519 

(588)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Iswolsky.     Telegram.  April 
6-19,  1910.    No.  79. 

Hardinge  tells  me  that,  in  consequence  of  the  German  claims, 
he  does  not  consider  an  understanding  between  England  and  Ger- 
many to  be  any  longer  possible.  The  British  Government  is  also 
firmly  determined  to  demand  from  Turkey  an  English  concession  for 
the  line  leading  to  the  sea. 

(589)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  to  Iswolsky.     Report^ 
April  8-21,  1910. 

The  British  Ambassador  has  read  me  the  text  of  his  communi- 
cation to  the  Turkish  Government,  which  is  referred  to  in  the 
telegram  of  our  London  Charge  d' Affaires  of  March  26. 

This  communication  corresponds  with  the  contents  of  the  above 
telegram,  with  the  one  difference,  that  Lowther  does  not  enquire 
as  to  the  advantages  England  would  receive,  but,  in  place  of  this, 
points  out  directly  that  England  must  participate,  in  common 
with  Germany,  in  the  Bagdad-Basra  sector. 

It  has  struck  me  that  this  claim  is  far  more  moderate  than  the 
condition  hitherto  imposed  by  England,  namely,  that  "the  Bagdad- 
Basra  sector  must  belong  to  the  English." 

To  my  question,  what  was  to  be  understood  by  "participation 
in  common,"  the  Ambassador  replied  that  this  was  synonymous 
with  the  safeguarding  of  British  interests.  Apparently  the  British 
Government  no  longer  deems  it  possible  to  bring  the  entire  Bagdad- 
Basra  line  into  its  own  possession,  and  is  ready  to  share  it  with 
Germany,  demanding,  however,  predominance  for  itself,  both  in 
the  question  of  construction  and  exploitation  of  this  line.  My 
British  colleague  gave  me  to  understand  that  he  regards  the  whole 
affair  as  a  failure,  inasmuch  as  Germany  will  succeed  in  carrying 
the  railway  to  Bagdad  with  the  help  of  the  "Dime,"  quite  inde- 
pendently of  whether  the  other  Powers  acquiesce  in  the  increase 
of  the  Turkish  Customs  or  not. 

It  seems  to  me  that  he  is  right,  and  in  particular  Baron  Mar- 
schall  ^  is  right,  who  only  recently  declared  that  the  Germans  would 
carry  the  Anatolian  Railway  to  Bagdad,  as  they  alone  could  con- 

*  Grerman  ambassador  at  Constantinople. 


520         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


struct  this  "first-class"  line  which  Turkey  needs.    On  the  other  hand, 
the  last,  and  considerably  more  modest,  demands  of  the  English  are 
far  more  acceptable   to   Turkey   than   the   earlier   ones,   which  wer^m 
analogous  to  a  partition  of  Turkey  into  spheres  of  influence.  f  | 

As  the  Germans  at  the  last  Berlin  negotiations  were  apparently 
ready  to  leave  the  Bagdad-Basra  sector  to  the  English,  the  possibility 
of  an  adjustment  of  the  Bagdad  conflict  between  England,  Germany 
and  Turkey  has  to  be  reckoned  with.  Mk 

This  will  not  be  agreeable  to  the  French,  but  they  will  find  a  com^^ 
pensation  in  the  participation  of  their  capital  in  the  El  Halifa-Bagdad 
enterprise,  where  the  "Dime'*  offers  a  good  security. 

It  now  remains  to  determine  the  compensation  we  could  demand, 

\Germany  and  England  must  certainly  grant  us  some  concessions, 
if  only  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  Anglo-German  negotiations  take 
place,  if  not  with  our  direct  participation,  at  any  rate  with  our  knowl- 
edge, whereby  the  London  Cabinet  scarcely  has  the  right  to  conclude 
an  agreement  with  Germany  before  the  Russian  interests  are  safe- 
guarded  


(590) 


Iswolsky  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London. 
22.  1910.    No.  523. 


Telegram,  April  9- 


Your  telegram.  No.  79  received. 

As  the  Bagdad  Railway  negotiations  are  extremely  complicated, 
we  should  like  to  know  what  Hardinge  meant  when  he  spoke  of  the 
impossibility  of  an  Anglo-German  agreement  on  the  Bagdad  Rail- 
way question,  and  which  line  to  the  sea  is  meant  for  which  Eng- 
land demands  a  concession  from  the  Turkish  Government. 


I 


(591) 


The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Iswolsky. 
10-23.  1910.    No.  80. 


Telegram,  April 


Your  telegram  No.  523  received. 

It  will  be  difficult  to  give  a  reply  before  Grey  returns  next  Fri- 
day. Hardinge  told  me  that  the  demands  which  were  set  up  in 
the  course  of  a  conversation  between  Bethmann  and  Goschen  ^ 
left  no  room  for  the  hope  that  an  Anglo-German  understanding 


*  British  ambassador  at  Berlin. 


THE  BAGDAD  RAILROAD  QUESTION  521 

would  be  arrived  at;  that  the  British  Government  does  not  at 
present  intend  to  answer  the  Germans,  and  will  restrict  itself  to 
demanding  a  concession  at  Constantinople  for  a  railroad  leading  to 
the  sea, — as  I  infer,  in  connection  with  the  French  Tripoli-Homs- 
Bagdad  project.^ 


(592)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  April  12-25,  1910.    No.  82. 

In  reply  to  your  telegram  No.  523. 

England  demands  the  concession  for  a  railway  connecting  Bag- 
dad with  the  Persian  Gulf.  The  London  Cabinet  will  demand  this 
concession  in  any  case,  quite  independent  of  whether  the  French  demand 
for  a  Horns-Bagdad  concession  leads  to  any  result  or  not,  in  order  thus 
to  create  a  "fait  accompli/' 

(593)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Letter,  April  13-26,  1910. 

I  have  received  your  telegram  No.  523  with  reference  to  the 
state  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  question  and  have  replied  in  like 
manner. 

During  my  conversation  with  Sir  Charles  Hardinge,  the  latter 
did  not  explain  further  why  he  does  not  believe  in  the  success 
of  the  Anglo-German  negotiations.  He  restricted  himself  to  the 
statement  that,  far  from  returning  to  the  conditions  taken  into 
consideration  by  Cassel  and  Gwinner,  which  had  already  been  de- 
clared unacceptable  by  England,  the  Berlin  Cabinet  had  to-day 
propounded  demands  even  far  in  excess  of  these.  He  told  me  that 
the  British  Government  did  not  intend  to  give  a  direct  reply  to 
the  statement  made  to  Goschen  by  Bethmann-Hollweg,  but  to  con- 
front Germany  with  a  fait  accompli 

(594)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  April  2\-May  4,  1910.    No.  85. 

Your  telegram  No.  523  received. 

Grey  confirmed  to  me  that  he  does  not  at  present  intend  to  fol- 
low up  the  overtures  made  by  the  German  Imperial  Chancellor 
to  Goschen.     According  to  his  opinion  this  conversation  necessi- 

*A  wrong  inference. 


522         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

tates  no  direct  reply ;  above  all,  Grey  sees  no  basis  for  negotiations 
in  this  conversation,  either  for  a  political  understanding  or  for  a 
solution  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  question. 

Grey  regards  it  as  inadmissible  that  the  British  Government,  which 
still  has  several  strings  to  its  bow,  should  render  its  participation  de- 
petident  on  concessions  in  Persia.  Grey  told  me  that  he  by  no  means 
intends  systematically  to  oppose  the  Bagdad  Railway,  but  that  the  London 
Cabinet  is  against  the  monopoly  of  another  Power  where  a  railway 
line  is  concerned  which  is  of  the  greatest  importance  for  the  political 
and  economic  interests  of  England.  It  may  be  inferred  from  this 
that  the  British  Government  will  either  obtain  participation  in 
the  line  under  the  conditions  deemed  necessary — without  making 
any  concessions  in  Persia, — or  the  English  interests  will  be  safe- 
guarded by  England  building  the  final  sector  alone. 

Grey  has  given  the  Turkish  Government  to  understand  that 
under  present  circumstances  he  would  not  give  his  consent  to  the 
4  per  cent  Customs  increase.  He  believes  that  the  intention  to 
use  the  "Dime"  surplus  for  the  Bagdad  Railway  can  only  be  realized 
if  the  Turkish  Government  receive  the  consent  of  the  Powers  to 
the  Customs  increase.  Grey  believes  that  this  is  only  a  financial 
manoeuvre.    Grey's  words  were  by  no  means  pessimistic. 

(595)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  to  Iswolsky.     Telegram, 
April  2S-May  11,  1910. 

The  British  Ambassador  here  tells  me  that  he  has  had  an 
exhaustive  conversation  with  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  and 
the  Grand  Vizier  as  to  Grey's  demand  of  a  Bagdad-Persian  Gulf 
concession.  The  Turks  have  declared  that  they  were  under  legal 
and  moral  obligations  to  Germany  as  regards  the  entire  Bagdad 
Line  down  to  the  Persian  Gulf.  The  Ambassador  replied  that, 
even  if  there  existed  a  moral  obligation  to  Germany,  there  was  no 
question  of  a  legal  one.  England  cannot  give  her  assent  to  the  Cus- 
toms increase  without  receiving  corresponding  advantage  for  British 
merchants.  The  Turks  did  not  refer  to  a  "sphere  of  interest."  The 
conversation  has  had  no  result. 

Apparently,  Rifaat  Pasha  intends  to  discuss  the  whole  matter 
in  London,  whither  he  leaves  to-morrow  with  the  Heir  Apparent 
to  attend  King  Edward's  funeral 


THE  BAGDAD   RAILROAD   QUESTION  523 

(596)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Iswolsky.     Telegram,  May 
5-18,  1910.    No.  107. 

I  have  asked  Hardinge  how  matters  stood  with  regard  to  the 
English  concessions  to  the  Persian  Gulf.  Hardinge  replied  that 
this  question  would  be  discussed  with  Rifaat  Pasha  on  the  occasion 
of  his  presence  in  London  and  that  the  London  Cabinet  intended 
carrying  on  these  negotiations  in  a  very  energetic  manner. 

(597)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  May  25-June  7,  1910.    No.  122. 

It  is  confirmed  that  the  Anglo-Turkish  negotiations  are  not 
proceeding  favourably.  Under  these  conditions  it  would  be  most 
disadvantageous  to  negotiate  with  Germany,  and  it  is  hardly  likely 
that  the  London  Cabinet  will  take  up  negotiations  with  Berlin.  I 
believe  that  we,  too,  are  in  the  same  unfavourable  position.  It 
seems  to  me  that  we  should  first  come  to  an  understanding  on  a  comr- 
mon  basis  and  then  await  a  more  favourable  moment.^  In  any  case  it 
is  preferred  here  that  Germany  should  take  the  initiative. 

*  The  solution  of  the  problem  was  postponed. 


IV 


NEW  PHASE  OF  INTERNATIONAL  ORIENTATION 
(Effect  of  the  Potsdam  Meeting) 
(April  1910— February  1911) 


(598)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Iswolsky.    Letter,  April  27- 
May  10,  1910. 

The  King  ^  did  me  the  honour  to  invite  me  this  morning  to  Marl- 
borough House.  His  Majesty  has  also  received  the  other  Ambas- 
sadors in  private  audience. 

The  King  was  deeply  moved.  After  some  brief  words  as  to  his 
personal  grief,^  and  after  a  few  compliments  paid  me  personally, 
the  King,  upon  my  mentioning  the  relations  between  England  and 
Russia,  remarked  to  me  that  even  at  the  time  when  these  relations 
were  by  no  means  what  they  should  have  been,  he  had  always 
wished  to  see  the  difficulties  settled.  He  had  observed,  to  his 
greatest  satisfaction,  that  the  negotiations  had  led  to  results;  he 
also  desired  that  our  relations  in  the  future  should  be  as  friendly 
and  as  cordial  as  at  present.  Above  all  things  he  would  like  that 
this  satisfactory  state  of  affairs  should  be  a  lasting  one. 

"As  far  as  I  am  concerned,"  said  the  King,  "I  will  work  all  my 
life  to  achieve  this  result." 

I  remarked  to  His  Majesty  that  I  would  esteem  it  highly,  if  he 
would  grant  me  the  permission  to  transmit  these  words  to  my 
Government.  The  King  gave  his  consent.  The  personal  sentiments 
of  the  King,  as  long  as  he  was  heir  to  the  throne,  have  always  been 


*  George  V. 

•  Death  of  Edward  VII. 


524 


I 


A  NEW  PHASE  OF  ORIENTATION  525 

known  to  me,  but  now,  since  they  have  been  confirmed  in  the  most 
solewM  fashion  on  the  day  following  his  accession,  his  words  seem  to 
me  to  possess  a  quite  particular  significance. 


(599)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  May  29'June  11,  1910.    No.  125. 

Hardinge  this  morning  advised  me  of  his  appointment  as  Viceroy 
of  India  and  added  that,  if  he  has  been  able  to  serve  the  relations 
between  Russia  and  England  in  his  present  office,  he  was  now  all  the 
more  firmly  determined,  in  going  to  India,  to  work  in  the  same  sense 
and  that  he  hoped  to  be  still  more  successful  there,  Hardinge  said  he 
would  be  grateful,  if  his  words  would  be  submitted  to  our  Emperor, 


(600)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  June  2-15,  1910.    No.  134. 

In  connection  with  the  probable  recall  of  Nicolson  from  St.  Peters- 
burg, Grey  told  me  last  evening  that  he  hoped  that  the  Petersburg  Cabi- 
net would  be  convinced  that  the  appointment  of  the  Viceroy  of  India, 
and  the  Ambassadorial  change  at  St.  Petersburg,  were  intended  chiefly 
to  strengthen  the  ties  between  Russia  and  England.  It  is  his  opinion, 
that  the  situation  demanded  that  somebody  should  be  in  office  in  Lon- 
don who  is  as  well  acquainted  with  the  current  questions  as  Hardinge 
and  Nicolson.  Grey  told  me  he  insisted  upon  the  argument,  because 
the  Emperor,  perhaps,  would  not  like  to  part  with  an  Ambassador  to 
whom  he  had  always  given  so  gracious  a  reception.  Hardinge  told  me 
that  the  King  had  spoken  of  the  consideration  due  to  our  Emperor, 


(601)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  June  25'July  8,  1910.    No.  178. 

I  was  received  by  the  King  this  morning,  in  order  to  hand  him 
my  credentials.  His  Majesty  said  to  me  that  he  would  repeat  what 
Grey  had  probably  already  told  me,  namely,  that  the  recall  of  Nicolson 
was  due  to  a  single  reason — the  wish  to  preserve  the  excellent  relations 
between  Russia  and  England  and  render  them  still  closer.^  The  King 
added,  that  he  had  written  to  our  Sovereign  on  this  subject. 

*  Sir  Arthur  Nicolson  was  a  most  conspicuous  and  sinister  figure  in  interna- 
tional relations  thereafter. 


526         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

(602)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Berlin  to  Iswolsky.     Report,  Julv  23- 
Aug.  5,  1910. 

The  new  German  Secretary  of  State  has  arrived  at  Berlin  and 
at  once  assumed  his  office.  On  the  way  from  Bucharest,  Herr  von 
Kiderlen-Wachter  proceeded  to  Marienbad  to  confer  with  his 
Austro-Hungarian  colleague.  Public  opinion  here  emphasizes  the 
friendly  relations  between  the  two  Ministers  and  welcomes  Kid- 
erlen's  determination  to  come  into  personal  contact  with  Aehren- 
thal  before  entering  upon  his  new  functions.  Similar  significance 
was  attached  in  its  day  to  the  meeting  between  the  Austrian  Min- 
ister of  Foreign  Affairs  and  the  German  Chancellor. 

The  fact  that  the  Balkan  problems,  in  which  Herr  von  Kiderlen 
is  regarded  as  an  expert,  have  grown  more  acute,  coupled  with  the 
arrival  of  the  Turkish  Grand  Vizier  at  Marienbad,  and  the  possi- 
bility of  a  more  active  policy  of  Russia  in  the  Balkans  have,  it  is 
assumed  here,  rendered  personal  conferences  between  the  two 
Ministers  necessary. 

It  is  rumored  that  these  negotiations  have  taken  the  shape  of 
a  definite  arrangement,  making  a  common  policy  of  the  two  allied 
Powers  in  the  Balkans  possible. 

(603)  The  Same  to  Sasonoff.    Report,  Oct.  29'Nov.  11,  1910.    No.  103. 


I 


The  visit  of  our  Emperor  to  Potsdam  has  made  a  great  im- 
pression in  all  circles  of  public  opinion  here.  Not  only  have  Court 
and  Government  circles  expressed  their  pleasure  at  this  event, 
but  all  newspapers,  too,  attribute  historic  importance  to  it. 

In  accordance  with  given  instructions,  stress  was  at  first  laid 
on  the  family  character  of  the  visit.  Later,  however,  a  more  correct 
appreciation  of  this  event  found  expression  and  some  newspapers, 
as  for  instance  the  "Berliner  Tageblatt"  and  the  "Frankfurter  Zeit- 
ung"  hastened  to  efface  the  unpleasant  impression  which  their 
uncalled-for  judgments  of  Russian  affairs  had  produced  on  us. 
Without  making  any  reference  to  a  definite  political  question  the 
"Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung"  ^  speaks  merely  of  the  influ- 
ence which  the  personal  relations  of  the  two  Monarchs  will  have 
on  the  further  preservation  of  peace. 


*  Semi-official  daily  of  the  (jerman  government 


\ 


A  NEW  PHASE  OF  ORIENTATION  527 

(604)     The  }ius'sian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sazonoff.    Letter,  Dec.  2-15,  1910. 

Grey  requested  me  to  call  on  him  and  said  he  desired  to  discuss 
certain  political  questions  with  me,  to  which  I  had  referred  in  my 
conversations  with  Sir  A.  Nicolson  ^  during  his  absence. 

In  the  first  place  there  was  the  linking  up  of  the  Russian  and 
Indian  railroads  in  Persia.  I  explained  that  I  had  no  official  authori- 
sation to  discuss  this  project  with  the  British  Government,  but  that  I 
knew  Your  Excellency's  views,  which  favoured  this  project,  both  as  re- 
gards the  economic  advantages  and  more  especially  on  account  of  the 
political  effect,  as  such  an  undertaking  could  only  be  possible  when  the 
mutual  mistrust  of  the  past  years  had  finally  vanished;  the  friendship 
and  mutual  confidence  between  England  and  Russia  would  thus  be 
confirmed  more  efficiently  than  by  any  other  means.^ 

1  added  that  we  would  make  an  official  proposal  later,  when  the 
project  had  assumed  a  more  definite  shape.   Sir  Edward  replied : 

"I  am  about  in  the  same  position  as  M.  Sazonoff.  The  question 
will  be  examined.  The  Secretary  of  State  for  India  has  already 
done  so  and  the  Government  will  soon  have  to  come  to  a  decision 
as  to  its  attitude.  For  my  part,  I  want  to  point  out  that  the  time  has 
come  to  silence  all  objections  arising  from  the  former  mistrust  between 
England  and  Russia.  This  does  not  preclude  the  necessity  of  an  in- 
vestigation by  the  Government,  as  we  shall  have  to  ask  the  Com- 
mjittee  of  National  Defence." 

The  Minister  then  pointed  out  that  this  matter  would  also  now 
have  to  be  considered  from  another  standpoint.  It  is  a  question  of 
the  Bagdad  Railway.  Even  if  the  fear  of  an  invasion  of  India  by 
Russia  has  now  vanished,  yet  too  close  a  connection  of  the  Bagdad 
Railway  with  the  Indian  railways  through  Persia  creates  no  inconsider- 
able difficulties.  A  strategical  main  line,  beginning  in  Turkey  would 
thus  exist:  this  circumstance  must  be  taken  into  serious  consideration 
nowadays  when  Islam  appears  to  be  awakening  everywhere. 

I  interrupted  the  Minister  with  the  observation  that  you  had 
already  pronounced  yourself  against  the  trans-Persian  Railway 
touching  Ispahan,  as  this  town  was  too  close  to  Khanekin;  it 

*  British  under-secretary  of  foreign  affairs. 

'Hitherto  violently  opposed  by  the  British  government  which  feared,  and 
properly  so,  that  the  joining  of  these  railroads  would  facilitate,  if  not  invite,  an 
invasion  of  India  by  Russian  troops. 


528         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


seemed  to  me  that  this  should  allay  the  Minister's  fears.     Grey 
assented  to  this,  but  said  that  Teheran  too  was  not  far  away. 

/  replied  that  his  standpoint  was  only  justified,  when  all  the  diffi-^ 
cutties  in  the  way  of  a  construction  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  should 
have  been  overcome,  in  other  words,  when  an  agreement  would  have 
been  reached  between  the  Governments  of  England,  France,  Germany, 
Russia  and  Turkey}  HI 

Sir  Edward  thereupon  enquired  whether  the  last  agreements  " 
between  Russia  and  Germany,  the  general  contents  of  which  you 
had  so  kindly  transmitted  to  him,  would  not  influence  the  further 
course  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  question.  /  replied  that  I  had  learnt 
from  you  in  person  that  the  agreements  mentioned,  in  so  far  as  they  relate 
to  a  connecting  of  the  railways,  would  only  come  into  force  when  ara/\ 
understanding  had  been  arrived  at  between  Germany,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  England  and  France,  on  the  other:  this  had  been  your  standpoint 
towards  the  German  Ministers SI 

/  added  that  there  could  be  no  idea  of  linking  up  the  lines  in  Khane- 
kin  before  the  entire  Bagdad  Railway  question  had  been  solved  in  an 
international  sense. 


(605) 


Sasonoff  to 
7-20,  1910. 


the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.     Telegram,  Dec 


I 


Your  letter  of  December  2  received. 

Your  answer  to  Grey  contains  a  serious  error.  Our  consent  to  the 
linking  up  of  the  railways  at  Khanekin  does  not  depend  on  a  previous 
understanding  of  the  four  Powers  in  the  Bagdad  question}  The  lat- 
ter refers  only  to  our  wish  that,  in  case  of  a  partition  of  the  railway 
into  separate  sections,  the  branch  line  Sedidje-Khanekin  be  left  to 
us.  We  went  on  the  assumption  that  the  Germans  would  construct 
the  Bagdad-Khanekin  railway  in  any  case  and  that  we  had  only 
to  protect  our  own  interests  in  Persia.  I  spoke,  before  my  journey 
to  Potsdam,  to  O'Beirne^  in  this  sense,  and,  after  my  return,  to 
Buchanan.*    This  is  the  standpoint  I  also  adopted  in  my  conversa- 

*  Broaching  again  in  this  manner  the  plan  of  the  Russians  to  have  the  Bagdad 
railroad  question  decided  by  all  instead  of  Germany  and  Great  Britain  and 
Turkey,  which  plan,  however,  was  changed  at  the  Potsdam  meeting. 

'The  Russian  government's  "freedom  of  action." 

*  British  charge  d'affaires  at  St.  Petersburg. 

*  Sir  George,  British  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg. 


1 


A  NEW  PHASE  OF  ORIENTATION  529 

tions  with  you.    I  request  you  immediately  to  inform  Grey  of  this 
in  order  to  clear  up  the  misunderstanding  which  has  arisen. 


(606)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sasonoff.     Telegram,  Dec. 
8-21,  1910.    No.  279. 

Your  telegram  No.  1779  received. 

In  Grey's  absence  I  called  on  Nicolson  and  informed  him  that 
I  must  rectify  an  error  which  had  arisen  in  the  course  of  my  last 
conversation  with  Grey.  /  explained  to  him  that  Russia  had  under- 
taken the  obligation,  quite  independent  of  an  agreement  among  the 
four  Powers,  to  connect  the  railways,  she  would  build  in  North  Persia, 
with  Khanekin,  as  soon  as  Germany  should  have  completed  the  sectors 
Koniah-Bagdad  and  Bagdad-Khanekin.  I  added,  that  we  had  been 
prompted  by  the  consideration  that  even  without  the  agreement  of 
the  four  Powers,  the  construction  of  the  above-mentioned  sections 
by  Germany  is  assured,  and  that  we  therefore  must  take  measures 
for  the  protection  of  our  interests  in  our  Persian  sphere  of  influence. 
/  added,  that  in  the  contemplated  understanding  with  Germany,^  com- 
plete liberty  had  been  left  us  regarding  the  direction  of  our  railways  in 
Persia,  and  that  we  had  declared  that  Germany  must  not  reckon  on  any 
concession,  of  a  financial  or  economic  nature,  on  our  part  in  the  Bagdad 
Railway  question.  This  leaves  us  complete  freedom  of  action  in  case 
of  German  negotiations  with  England  or  France,  or  in  other  words, 
we  had  in  no  way  pledged  ourselves  in  the  question  of  the  4  per 
cent  Customs  increase. 


(607)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Letter,  Dec.  23,  1910-/om.  5,  1911. 

Near  as  we  are  to  the  general  elections,  it  is  just  as  difficult  to 
foresee  the  results.  Speeches  follow  one  another  without  casting 
any  new  light  upon  the  situation.  All  has  already  been  said,  and 
the  speakers  limit  themselves  to  repetitions,  which  naturally  assume 
forms  more  and  more  acute.  The  question  of  the  Upper  House, 
or  rather  its  legislative  powers,  comes  ever  more  into  the  fore- 

*The  Russian  government  did  not  usually  honor  "contemplated"  understand- 
ings. The  change  of  attitude  was  due  to  the  meeting  of  the  Russian  and  German 
emperors  at  Potsdam. 


530         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

ground,  but  even  in  this  connection  there  is  neither  a  program  n< 
a  solution  proposed. 

The  present  electoral  campaign — apart  from  these  purely  domesi 
interests — is  noticeable  through  the  renewed  flaring  up  of  an  unfore- 
seen chauvinism.  This  finds  expression  in  the  bogey  of  the  German 
menace,  which  is  emphasised  more  or  less  by  all  parties,  but  especially 
by  the  Conservatives.  It  is  no  longer  only  a  matter  of  more  or  less 
sensational  newspaper  articles,  but  of  serious  speakers,  such  as  Lor<Mm 
Cromer,  Lord  Curzon  and  others.  VI 

/  recently  asked  the  German  Ambassador,^  what  he  thought  of  the 
attitude  of  the  English  parties  during  the  election  from  the  standpoint 
of  German-English  relations.  He  replied,  that  in  spite  of  the  hostile 
outcry  against  Germany  which  resounded  round  us,  he  never  rem^em^ 
bered  a  time  when  the  relations  between  the  two  Governments  had  been 
better.  If  the  Conservative  Party  should  come  into  power,  one  should 
first  see  them  at  work.  Meetings  and  press  polemics,  as  at  present, 
have  naturally  their  bad  features,  but  he  did  not  propose  to  exaggerate 
their  significance  and  was  not  unduly  alarmed  by  them. 

My  German  colleague  believes  that  the  Conservative  Party  wishes 
to  show  that  the  country  mmst  be  prepared  for  all  emergencies — and 
this  opinion  is  shared  throughout  the  country.    If  England's  influentic 
personages  were  really  pursuing  ambitious  or  aggressive  aims,   thi 
would  take  good  care  not  to  speak  so  loud  of  them.    According  to  Counl 
Metternich,  it  is  all  a  matter  of  electioneering  party  manoeuvres,  which^ 
apart  from  the  very  much  disputed  question  of  Tariff  Reform,  has  ^411 
fixed  program.    This  is  of  course  always  a  sign  of  weakness. 

As  regards  myself,  I  fully  share  the  point  of  view  of  my  German 
colleague.  /  even  think,  that  the  entire  agitation  does  not  go  very  far, 
since  above  all  it  is  worked  up  by  the  speeches  of  a  brilliantly  popular 
and  experienced  but  discontented  party-leader — I  mean  Admiral  Lord 
Charles  Beresford 

There  scarcely  exists  any  difference,  between  the  views  of  the  Con- 
servatives and  the  Radicals,  as  regards  foreign  policy,  and  both  parties 
are  agreed  as  to  the  necessity  of  armaments.'^  Pichon's  view  applies,  how- 
ever, to  election  time.  Foreign  policy  is  nothing  more  than  an  election 
catchword.    That  is  my  conception  of  the  present  anti-German  agitation. 

*  Count  Metternich. 

'A  view  completely  sustained  by  the  European  War. 


mi 


A  NEW  PHASE  OF  ORIENTATION  531 

(608)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Utter,  Dec.  21,  1910-/om.  3,  1911. 

To-day  I  called  on  Sir  Arthur  Nicolson  and  asked  him,  whether 
he  had  any  special  information  to  give  me  prior  to  the  departure 
of  our  courier. 

Sir  Arthur  replied  that  no  special  matters  were  under  discus- 
sion, nevertheless  he  regretted  a  certain  nervousness  at  Paris,  at  any 
rate  in  the  press  and  among  the  public.  He  told  me  that  the  Italian 
Ambassador  had  just  been  to  see  him,  and  appeared  to  attach  great 
importance  to  certain  articles  in  the  "Daily  News."  These  articles 
would  seem  to  be  very  pro-German  or  rather  anti-French. 

Sir  Arthur  told  the  Ambassador  that  the  "Daily  News"  was  an 
organ  of  the  Radical  Party  which,  it  is  true,  supports  the  Government, 
hut  which  has  no  connection  with  the  Cabinet,  whose  views  by  no 
means  coincide  with  those  of  the  party  mentioned.  Should  a  section  of 
the  Radical  Party  believe  itself  to  be  compelled,  by  one  reason  or  another, 
to  arraign  itself  against  the  French  Government,  this  tendency  has  not 
a  shadow  of  influence  on  the  attitude  of  the  British  Government;  the 
relations  between  the  Governments  of  England  and  France  are  just  as 
intimate  as  before;  nothing  has  changed  in  the  relations  of  perfect  con- 
fidence between  England  and  Russia.  On  the  contrary,  he  believes 
that  this  entente  is  steadily  growing  firmer,  which  naturally  does 
not  exclude  an  improvement  in  the  relations  between  Russia  and 
Germany,  and  he  at  least  would  be  satisfied  if  the  same  could  be 
said  of  England  and  Germany;  in  short,  this  was  nothing  more 
than  the  usual  nervousness  of  the  Paris  public  and  intrigues  in  the 
French  press. 

Continuing  our  conversation  confidentially.  Sir  Arthur  told  me  that 
to  be  sure  he  regards  the  tendency  of  the  "Daily  News"  and  various 
other  papers  as  being  inspired  by  the  German  press. 

This  latter.  Sir  Arthur  told  me,  to-day  unfortunately  seeks  to 
represent  n^atters  as  if  the  entire  political  situation  is  now  based 
on  the  arrangements  arrived  at  between  Russia  and  Germany,  as 
well  as  on  those  which,  it  is  alleged,  will  soon  be  concluded  be- 
tween England  and  Germany,  whereby  Germany  is  credited  with 
the  main  role  and  France  thrust  wholly  on  one  side.  This  awakens 
uneasiness  at  Paris  and  perhaps  this  is  not  wholly  unintentional. 

In  London  one  is  calmer.  Sir  Arthur  concluded,  but  he  wishes 
the  St.  Petersburg  correspondent  of  the  "Times"  were  ni^ore  careful. 


532         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

He  has  informed  the  whole  world,  that  the  Russian  Government  in 
tends  replying  to  a  German  note  of  the  year  1907.    I  know  nothing 
of  this  but  in  a  serious  paper  one  must  say  either  more  or  nothing. 
Sir  Arthur  added  that  the  present  tendencies  of  the  Radical  party  i 
England  would  not  last  and  that  no  importance  can  be  attached  t 

them 

At  the  close  of  the  conversation,  Sir  Arthur  said  that  he  had 
learnt  with  pleasure  that  you  now  appeared  satisfied  with  the 
course  of  the  negotiations  at  Teheran.  He  really  believes  that  for 
a  moment  the  impression  prevailed  at  Constantinople,  especially 
after  the  last  British  note,  that  Russia  and  England  are  contem- 
plating a  partition  of  Persia.  These  fears  seem  to  be  dispelled — 
Sir  Arthur  believes  German  diplomacy  to  have  meddled  in  this 
affair,  at  least  at  the  beginning. 


t 


(609)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sasonoff.    Telegram,  Dec.  27, 
1910-/an.  9,  1911. 


As  rumours  are  continuously  recurring  in  the  French  press, 
referring  to  alleged  results  of  the  Potsdam  meeting,  Pichon  has 
decided  to  postpone  no  longer  his  speech  in  Parliament.  He  will 
touch  on  France's  relations  to  all  the  Powers,  and,  above  all,  he 
will  emphasize  the  impregnability  of  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance, 
as  well  as  the  utter  confidence  in  our  policy  and  the  satisfaction  with 
which  France  would  welcome  a  possibility  of  preventing  friction  be- 
tween Russia  and  Germany.  Pichon  is  convinced  that  he  can  counter- 
balance, in  this  way,  the  reports  mentioned  above. 


I 


(610)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sasonoff.    Telegram,  Dec.  25, 
1910-/on.  7,  1911.    No.  286. 


I 


The  "Evening  Times,"  yesterday,  published  a  telegram  from  St. 
Petersburg,  containing  the  text  of  your  draft  of  our  agreement 
with  Germany  as  to  Persia  and  the  Bagdad  Railway. 


(611)    Sasonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.    Telegram,  Dec.  28, 
1910-/an.  10,  1911.    No.  1880. 

We  have  now  received  the  copy  in  question  of  the  ^'Evening  Times 
May  I  ask  you,  to  submit  to  Nicolson  the  request  of  the  Russian  Go 


1 


A  NEW  PHASE  OF  ORIENTATION  533 

ernment  to  institute  a  careful  investigation  as  to  the  source  from  which 
the  editor  could  have  received  the  text.  We  attach  the  greatest  im- 
portance to  this  matter  which  touches  both  Russian  and  English  interests, 

(612)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram.  Dec, 
29,  1910-/an.  11.  1911.    No.  289. 

Your  telegram  No.  1880  received. 

Nicolson  is  of  your  opinion  that  it  is  most  important  to  discover 
the  origin  of  this  indiscretion.  The  Foreign  Office  is  occupied  with ' 
the  question  and  will  communicate  the  result  to  us.  Nicolson  does 
not  believe  the  indiscretion  to  have  been  committed  in  London,  as 
the  text  published  here  contains  a  slight  addition  to  the  wording 
communicated  by  you  to  the  British  Ambassador. 

(613)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Letter,  Jan.  2-15,  1911. 

Last  Friday  Nicolson  reverted  to  the  indiscretion  ^  of  the  "Eve- 
ning Times."  He  told  me  the  Foreign  Office  had  commenced  in- 
vestigations ;  he  believes  himself  already  able  to  assure  me  that  no 
breach  of  confidence  occurred  in  the  Foreign  Office.  He  made  no 
surmises. 

Cambon  told  me  this  morning  that  he  had  spoken  to  a  journalist 
who  is  very  well  informed  of  all  that  concerns  the  press.  All  the 
leading  papers  are  trying  to  explain  the  mystery  but  have  not  as 
yet  been  able  to  solve  the  riddle. 

The  "Evening  Times"  is  quite  a  new  concern.    It  is  only  beenf 
appearing  since  last  summer.    The  editor  is  a  certain  Mr.  Whatney,  I 
formerly  collaborator  to  the  "Daily  Mail"  and  the  "Standard."    It  \ 
has  been  proved  that  this  paper  maintains  no  correspondents  of  its  f 
own  abroad.    This  leads  to  the  supposition  that  the  information  was 
communicated  in  London.    This  is  also  the  opinion  held  by  Cam- 
bon*s  informant.     Thus  it  would  resolve  itself  into  an  indiscretion 
committed  either  at  the  Foreign  Office  or  at  the  Embassies  either  of 
Russia,  France  or  Germany. 

Cambon  does  not  share  this  view.  He  logically  infers  that  we 
are  all  in  the  possession  of  the  same  text,  whereas  the  English  trans- 
lation contains  an  addition  at  the  end  of  the  first  line  of  the  fourth 

*  Hardly  an  "indiscretion"  from  the  journalistic  angle. 


534         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

Article.  One  must  therefore  assume  that  at  St.  Petersburg  some  one 
had  come  into  possession  of  a  wording  which  had  later  been  changed, 
or  at  Berlin — of  a  modification  to  be  proposed. 

It  is  assumed  by  many  in  London  that  the  German  Government  is 
the  originator  of  the  indiscretion,  especially  in  view  of  its  continuous^^ 
contact  with  the  press.  II 

Neither  I  nor  Cambon  deem  this  possible.    I  cannot  see  what  Ger- 
many could  gain  hereby.     I  find  that  the  German  press  at  least  is 
somewhat  disappointed ;  it  regards  this  result  of  the  Potsdam  meet- 
ing as  too  modest  in  comparison  with  the  wide  horizon  that  ap^l 
peared  to  be  opened  by  Bethmann-HoUweg's  speech ^" 

Cambon  tells  me  that  Jaures,^  like  all  socialists  and  extreme  Radicals, 
is  an  opponent  of  the  Alliance  with  Russia  and  is  openly  in  favour  of  a 
rapprochement  with  Germany.  The  same  may  be  said  of  the  ultra- 
Radical  party  in  London,  the  German  influence  extending  to  its  organs, 
as  for  instance  the  ''Daily  News/'  Certain  agents  are  working  on 
this  ground  in  favour  of  Germany  and  against  Russia.  I  hasten  to 
add  that  they  have  no  influence  on  the  Government,  which  knows, 
better  than  all  others,  that  the  rumours  floating  in  London  of 
alleged  negotiations  between  the  London  and  Berlin  Cabinets, — 
one  even  hears  of  an  understanding  having  been  already  reached — 
possess  no  foundation  whatsoever.  jHI 

I  am  afraid  the  addition  to  the  document  published  in  its  Eng-*' 

lish  translation  by  the  "Evening  Times"  has  caused  more  surprise 

here  than  can  be  good.    Not  a  word  has  been  said  to  me,  but  the 

difference  in  both  wordings  was  noticed  at  once.     I  ask  myself 

whether  this  uncertainty  does  not  render  the  value  of  the  document 

communicated  by  us  to  both  Governments  questionable  to  a  certain 

/  degree  and  whether  it  would  not  be  wise  to  give  an  explanation  re- 

/    garding  this.     One  must  not  allow  doubts  to  arise  as  to  our  having 

I    communicated  an  incomplete  document. 

(614)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Letter,  January  2-15,  1911. 

I  feel  I  must  inform  Your  Excellency  about  the  attitude  taken  at 
present  by  English  public  opinion,  as  to  the  relations  between  Rus- 
sia and  England. 

^One  of  the  leaders  of  the  French  Radicals;  assassinated  at  the  outbreak  of 
the  European  War. 


A  NEW  PHASE  OF  ORIENTATION  535 

The  "Observer,"  the  most  influential  of  the  Sunday  papers,  has 
published  a  long,  somewhat  unclear  and  rather  pessimistic  article 
on  England's  position. 

The  main  and  ever-recurring  theme  is  the  following : 

The  Triple  Entente  exists ;  it  has  not  ceased  action,  although  it  ^ 
has  received  a  blow.     The  article  professes  to  level  no  reproach  at  \ 
Russia  for  having  come  to  an  understanding  with  Germany  on  the  Bag- 
dad Railway,  since  the  Anglo-Russian  Convention  contains  no  provision    ; 
forbidding  this,  but  it  states  that  England  has  one  defender  less  in  a 
vital  question  of  her  policy. 

The  more  reserved  articles  of  the  "Times,"  without  going  so 
far  as  this,  give  on  the  whole  the  same  impression.  The  sagacity  of 
the  public,  even  of  the  best  informed  circles,  has  not  been  able  to  realise 
that,  in  reality,  no  agreement,  relating  to  the  Bagdad  Railway,  has  been 
concluded  between  Russia  and  Germany  ^ — a  term  covering  the  entire 
Germain  concession,  and  that  in  the  understanding  in  question,  which  re- 
lates to  the  Russian  sphere  of  influence  in  Persia,  the  railway  problems 
have  only  secondary  importance. 

I  believe  this  error  to  be  the  real  cause  of  the  uneasiness.  And, 
unfortunately,  the  Ministerial  speeches  so  far,  both,  that  of  Beth- 
mann-Hollweg  as  that  of  Pichon,  do  not  throw  any  light  on  this 
subject ;  they  pass  over  it  in  silence. 

I  want  to  call  your  attention  to  this  circumstance;  I  believe  it 
would  be  well  to  fill  up  this  gap. 

I  have  been  strengthened  in  this  view  by  a  conversation  to-day 
with  Cambon,  who  returned  from  Paris  two  days  ago. 

He,  usually  so  well-informed  on  all  affairs  in  Turkey  and  Asia 
Minor,  appeared  this  time  to  be  quite  in  the  dark. 

Like  everybody  else,  he  too,  referred  to  the  Russo-German  agreement 
on  the  Bagdad  Railway  and  observed  that  France  and  England  would  be 
quite  isolated  in  future. 

On  my  trying  to  enlighten  him  he  asked  me : 

"What  do  you  really  understand  under  the  term  *Bagdad 
Railway'?" 

I  gave  him  your  definition :   "As  far  as  Bagdad." 

He  seemed  surprised  at  this  and  only  said: 

*  Such  an  agreement  had  been  made  at  Potsdam.  For  a  while  it  clouded 
the  horizon  of  the  Entente  and  gave  Europe  a  short  respite  from  incessant  fear 
of  war.    The  effect  of  the  agreement  was  short-lived. 


536         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


I 


"But  this  is  really  most  important." 

I  remembered  the  postscript  to  your  private  letter  of  December 
1-14,  and  I  read  to  him  the  sentence  relevant  to  this  subject. 

He  appeared  to  be  most  astonished : 

"Nobody  seems  to  have  any  idea  of  this  and  on  reading  the 
published  document  in  this  sense,  it  acquires  a  totally  different 
meaning,"  he  said. 

/  replied  that  Sir  Arthur  Nicolson,  at  any  rate,  was  acquainted  wit 
the  contents  of  this  highly  confidential  letter. 

"That  is  why,"  Cambon  said  to  me,  "I  found  him  much  calmer ; 
I  cannot  conceal  from  you  that  this  was  not  the  case  with  him  be- 
fore my  departure  for  Paris." 

Cambon  has  also  spoken  to  Chirol  of  the  "Times";  he  too  is 
uneasy,  does  not  see  matters  clearly  and  fears  the  work  of  the 
Radical  Party  in  favour  of  Germany.  I  was  surprised  that  Cambon, 
who,  moreover,  has  not  seen  Iswolsky,  was  not  better  informed  on 
the  subject.  I  naturally  refer  solely  to  public  opinion  in  this  letter. 
I  hope  to  see  Sir  Edward  Grey  before  the  departure  of  our  courier 
and  will  send  you  an  account  of  our  conversation. 


4 


(615)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Letter,  January  4-17,  1911. 

After  a  somewhat  long  absence.  Sir  Edward  Grey  this  morning 
requested  me  to  call  on  him.  He  received  me  with  the  statement 
that  he  wished  to  make  clear  to  me  England's  standpoint  in  the 
question  of  the  negotiations  that  had  taken  place  at  Potsdam  be- 
tween Your  Excellency  and  the  German  Government. 

He  is  afraid  that  England's  position,  in  any  future  negotiations 
that  may  take  place  on  the  Bagdad  Railway,  is  now  considerably 
weakened. 

He  described  in  a  few  words,  the  course  of  the  negotiations  and 
reminded  me  of  the  "Negotiations  of  the  Four,"  which  we  had 
agreed  upon  before  the  arrival  of  Emperor  William  at  Windsor. 
This  formula  was  confirmed  at  Windsor,  at  which  time  Baron 
Schon  neither  accepted  nor  rejected  it,  but  it  was  soon  afterwards 
declined  at  Berlin,  in  consequence  of  which  the  idea  arose  of 
separate  negotiations,  the  final  result  of  which  was,  however,  to  be 
determined  by  "all  Four." 


A  NEW  PHASE  OF  ORIENTATION  537 

The  negotiations  between  Cassel  and  Gwinner,  last  year,  were 
carried  on  in  this  sense.  The  outcome  of  these  negotiations  between 
financiers  was,  for  various  reasons,  not  confirmed  by  the  British 
Government,  but  the  letter,  in  which  Grey  communicates  the  deci- 
sion of  the  London  Cabinet  to  Cassel's  representative,  points  out 
that  the  British  Government  could  not  in  any  case  come  to  a  definite 
decision  without  having  previously  applied  to  France  and  Russia. 
Grey  showed  me  this  letter.  The  last  paragraph  confirmed  what 
he  had  told  me. 

I  replied  that  no  communication  of  this  nature  had  been  made  to 
me  at  the  time,  and  that  I,  therefore,  could  not  have  transmitted  it 
to  the  Russian  Government.  I  added  that  I  was  well  acquainted  with 
the  ideas  on  which  Your  Excellency  based  our  present  negotiations 
with  Germany.  We  had  in  reality  negotiated  in  order  to  safeguard  our 
interests  in  our  sphere  of  interest  in  Persia,  and  in  order  to  achieve  this 
we  had  indeed  given  positive  promises  to  Germany.  But  the  German 
project  in  its  entire  compass  had  not  formed  the  subject  of  special 
negotiations :  the  term  "Bagdad  Railway"  in  the  project  communi- 
cated to  the  British  Governm,ent  only  meant  the  line  from  Konia 
to  Bagdad, — a  line  that,  if  not  yet  complete,  has  already  been  fin- 
ished in  part. 

Sir  Edward  then  resumed  the  conversation  and  said  the  short  de- 
scription he  had  just  given  me  had  no  other  purpose  than  to  express 
his  thoughts  more  lucidly,  hut  that  he  would  tell  me,  without  hesitation, 
that  our  reading  of  the  term,  '*Bagdad  Railway"  was  of  the  greatest  im- 
portance, and  that  it  would  he  important  that  our  interpretation  he 
plainly  understood  and  accepted  hy  Germany,  and  if  possible  find  expres- 
sion in  the  text  of  the  agreement. 

Grey  then  declared  that  England's  position  in  her  future  negotia- 
tions with  Germany  is  weakened  in  any  case,  as  the  latter  has 
obtained  two  extremely  important  concessions  from  Russia : 

1.)  The  Bagdad  Railway  has  found  an  outlet  in  Northern  Persia, 
a  fact  that  offers  great  economic  and  financial  advantages  and  is 
furthermore  of  incontestable  political  importance  to  Germany. 

2.)  Germany  has  obtained  that  Russia  ceases  her  opposition  on 
principle  to  the  Bagdad  project.  Sir  Edward  regards  this  result  as 
all  the  more  important  for  Germany  as  hitherto  the  reverse  was  the 
case.    Russia  had  in  truth  assisted  in  crippling  Germany's  efforts, 


\ 


538 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


and  the  St.  Petersburg  Cabinet  had  for  a  long  time  maintained  its 
standpoint,  that  the  German  project  would  be  injurious  to  Russian 
interests;  London  did  not  take  this  standpoint  so  clearly,  so  that 
it  happened  on  several  occasions  that  the  London  Cabinet  itself 
pointed  out  to  us  that,  in  the  whole  nature  of  things,  we  should  not 
be  able  permanently  to  uphold  such  an  opposition  on  principle. 

These  two  points,  according  to  Sir  Edward,  signify  a  great  re- 
lief for  Germany  and  render  England's  position  more  difficult  in 
precisely  the  same  degree. 

After  an  interval  Sir  Edward  said : 

"If  I  have  plainly  explained  our  standpoint  I  must  ask  you  to 
believe  that  I  regard  a  perfectly  open  exchange  of  views  between 
our  two  Governments  as  necessary,  but  in  so  doing,  I  wish  to  make 
neither  reproaches,  nor  complaints.  On  the  contrary,  I  wish  to 
maintain  our  relations  in  the  same  degree  of  confidence  and  sin- 
cerity as  hitherto.  I  go  even  further,  I  do  not  wish  my  words  to 
prejudice  the  result  of  your  negotiations  with  Germany.  I  hope 
these  negotiations  will  lead  to  a  result  and  I  fear  that,  should  this 
not  be  the  case,  the  situation  will  become  even  more  dangerous,  to 
the  disadvantage  of  both  of  us." 

Sir  Edward  then  summarised  his  statement  and  asked  me  to 
draw  your  attention  to  three  points : 

The  importance  to  Germany  of  having  received  assurances  from 
us  concerning  the  linking-up  of  the  railways  in  Persia.  Then,  he 
deems  it  extremely  important  that,  should  we  connect  Khanekin 
with  a  point  in  Northern  Persia,  whatever  Germany's  participation 
may  be,  the  control  and  management  of  this  branch  line  in  our  Per- 
sian sphere  of  interest  should  remain  solely  in  Russian  hands  to  the 
exclusion  of  every  kind  of  German  interference. 

Sir  Edward  gave  a  reason  for  this.  He  said  we  must  not  forget  the 
pan-Islam  movement;  Persia  is  Mohammedan,  as  is  Afghanistan,  and 
since  both,  Russia  and  England,  possess  numerous  Mohammedan  sub- 
jects, a  Turkish  army  commanded  by  German  officers,  controlling  a  rail- 
way in  Persia  which  is  under  German  influence — would  be  a  permanent 
danger,  the  importance  of  which  must  not  be  underrated. 

Grey's  third  observation  concerns  the  boundary  line  we  have 
drawn  for  German  enterprises.  He  fears  the  German  Government 
may  draw  the  conclusion  therefrom  that  the  enumeration  of  those 


A  NEW  PHASE  OF  ORIENTATION  539 

Persian  districts,  which  interest  us,  excludes  an  interest  on  our  part 
in  the  remaining  Persian  territory.  This  would  be  most  disadvan- 
tageous to  England. 

Sir  Edward  trusts  that  you  will  not  lose  sight  of  these  three 
points  in  your  negotiations  with  Germany. 

In  conclusion,  he  told  me,  that  it  was  not  impossible  that  Ger- 
many will  make  proposals  to  the  London  Cabinet,  and  that  Turkey 
will  request  the  consent  of  the  Powers  to  the  four  per  cent  Customs 
increase ;  he  hopes  to  be  able  to  assume  that  Russia  has  preserved 
complete  freedom  of  action  in  this  respect. 

/  replied  that  in  case  of  negotiations  respecting  the  entire  Bagdad 
Railway  with  branch  lines  to  the  Mediterranean  and  the  Persian  Gulf, 
we  would  remain  true  to  our  obligations  to  England  and  France, 

(616)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Jan,  8-21,  1911.    No.  4. 

I  learn  from  a  trustworthy  source,  that  in  case  of  alterations  be- 
ing introduced  in  the  draft  of  the  German-Russian  Agreements  as 
communicated  here  by  us,  previous  information  is  here  expected, 
in  order,  if  necessary,  to  be  able  to  point  to  any  detrimental  effect 
on  English  interests  in  the  sense  of  my  letter  of  January  4-17. 

(617)  Sasonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.    Confidential  Letter, 

Jan.  14-27,1911.    No.  21. 

Replying  to  your  telegram  No.  4,  I  request  you  to  inform  Grey 
that  I  shall  not  fail  to  keep  him  informed  as  to  the  course  of  our 
negotiations  with  Germany.  I  regard  it,  however,  as  absolutely 
necessary  to  preserve  the  character  of  strict  secrecy  for  these  nego- 
tiations. To  prevent  the  possibility  of  such  unpleasant  indiscretions, 
as  the  publication  of  the  text  of  the  prospective  agreement  with  Ger- 
many, I  shall  in  future  confine  myself  to  verbal  communications  and  re-S 
frain  from  giving  any  written  statements.  i 

(618)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sasonoff.     Personal  Con- 
fidential  letter,  Jan.  14-27,  1911. 

The  King  ^  yesterday  honoured  me  at  Windsor  by  a  most  con- 
fidential conversation  bearing  on  two  questions  wliich  are  of  like 

*  George  V. 


540         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


importance  to  both  countries :  the  Bagdad  Railway  and  the  project 
of  a  connection  between  the  Caucasian  and  the  Indian  railways. 

The  King  is  of  the  same  opinion  as  Grey,  with  regard  to  the  first  __ 
question,  and  I  will  restrict  myself  to  a  few  observations.  ■I 

Aided  by  a  small  map,  the  King  showed  m,e  that  the  Bagdad 
Railway  is  only  completed  from  Konia  to  Bulgurlu^ ;  work  has  of 
course  been  commenced  on  several  sections  beyond,  but  the  Taurus 
offered  great  technical  difficulties ;  up  to  now  the  entire  enterprise 
most  probably  does  not  command  sufficient  means  to  extend  be-^. 
yond  El-Halif.  f  | 

The  King  inferred  therefrom  that  the  whole  affair  was  not  as 
far  as  had  been  stated,  and  that  we  had  plenty  of  time  before  us. 
This  circumstance  renders  it  in  his  opinion  all  the  more  necessary 
to  formulate  the  text  of  the  proposed  understanding  between  Ger- 
many and  ourselves  as  clearly  as  possible,  especially  the  meaning 
with  which  we  invest  the  words  "Bagdad  Line,"  that  is,  "up  to 
Bagdad."  I  remarked  to  the  King  that  we  should  undoubtedly 
emphasize  this  clearly. 

The  King  replied  that  this  question  may,  perhaps,  only  come  up  for 
discussion  in  a  few  years'  time,  and  should  it  then  he  necessary  to  choose 
between  a  less  clear  official  document  and  a  perfectly  clear  statement,  it 
is  to  he  feared  that  the  document  and  not  the  statement  would  he  valid; 
at  any  rate  the  document  might  give  rise  to  an  interpretation  which 
could  produce  a  situation  dangerous  to  all  Powers. 

The  King  said  he  was  speaking  quite  openly  in  the  spirit  and  in 
the  interests  of  our  Entente  to  which  he  will  adhere  more  closely  than 
ever  and  which  he  considers  to  he  the  hasis  of  the  world's  peace;  he  is 
determined  to  take  account  of  Russia's  interests  in  all  these  questions 
and  is  convinced  that  our  Emperor  is  animated  hy  the  same  feelings. 

The  King  laid  stress  on  the  extraordinary  importance  of  this 
question  for  England. 

The  King  then  discussed  our  obligation  to  connect  Khanekin 
with  Teheran  or  another  place  in  North  Persia.  He  addressed  the 
following  questions  to  me : 

In  case  Russia  builds  a  railway  in  the  direction  of  the  Caspian 
Sea  with  the  intention  of  linking  up  the  Russian  lines  with  the 

*  Points  on  the  Anatolian  high-plateau ;    at  the  latter  the  railroad  enters  the 
Taurus  mountains  and  presented  many  great  engineering  problems. 


A  NEW  PHASE  OF  ORIENTATION  541 

Indian,  is  Russia  under  the  obligation  to  connect  this  line  with 
Khanekin  also? 

I  replied  that  I  could  give  no  direct  answer,  but  that  I  consid- 
ered it  probable.  Besides,  the  negotiations  had  not  yet  been  con- 
cluded. 

The  King  replied  that  this  circumstance  was  of  the  greatest  impor- 
tance; true,  it  was  a  matter  of  a  railroad  in  the  Russian  sphere  of 
influence,  but  this  question  is  fraught  with  extraordinary  strategic  im- 
portance for  England  and,  above  all,  he  said,  it  was  a  question  of  the 
control  of  the  railway  to  Teheran  or  to  another  place  in  North  Persia. 
Russia's  control  is  a  guarantee  for  England — Germany's  control  a 
danger. 

The  King  dwelt  on  these  considerations.  He  was  thinking  more 
than  ever  of  the  important  results  which  a  connection  between  the  Rus- 
sian and  Indian  railways  must  have;  he  would  exercise  all  his  influence 
in  favour  of  this  project  and  he  sees  in  this  the  solution  of  many  a  dif- 
ficulty caused  by  the  Bagdad  Railway,  especially  if  the  above  mentioned 
scheme  could  be  brought  to  a  speedy  solution. 

The  King  told  me  he  believes  that  he  is  in  a  position  to  know  that 
the  project  of  a  trans-Persian  railway  is  regarded  at  Berlin  with  extra- 
ordinary scepticism.  It  is  believed  there  that  the  mutual  confidence 
between  Russia  and  England  will  not  go  so  far  as  this.  This  is  a  mis- 
take, the  King  said,  and  we  must  prove  it} 

I  replied  that  our  Emperor  favoured  our  project  just  as  the  King 
does ;  that  he,  too,  discerned  therein  a  strengthening  of  our  entente ; 
I  added,  however,  that  we  must  not  conceal  from  ourselves  that  the 
plan  would  have  to  overcome  great  financial  difficulties.  The  King 
hereupon  returned  with  animation  that,  should  Russia  and  England 
really  desire  to  build  the  railway,  the  money  would  have  to  be  found. 

Like  Sir  Edward  Grey,  the  King  also  brought  this  conversation 
to  a  close  by  observing  that,  despite  the  doubts  he  had  confided  to 
me,  he  not  only  warmly  desired  the  conclusion  of  our  negotiations 
with  Germany,  but  was  even  convinced  that  such  a  conclusion  was 
to  England's  interest. 

I  asked  the  King  whether  I  might  communicate  this  conversa- 
tion to  you.    He  replied  that  he  authorised  me  to  do  so. 

*The  very  opposite  is  proven  by  the  documents  relating  to  Persia's  division, 
which  see. 


542         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


(619)     The  Same  to  the  Savie.    Private  Letter,  Feb.  1-14,  1911. 

My  letter  of  January  14-27,  dealing  with  my  visit  to  Windsor," 
was  already  written  when  I  received  your  private  comm,unication  of 
January  12-25,  and  it  is  to  serve  you  as  an  introduction  to  this  let- 
ter. I  shall  reply  to  your  letter  point  by  point  but  will  commence, 
with  the  last: 

Buchanan  has  spoken  to  you  in  confidence  concerning  Kiihl- 
mann's  activity  here.  The  communication  is  confidential, — to  a  cer- 
tain degree.  Mr.  von  KUhlmann  does  indeed  keep  permanently  in 
touch  with  the  editorial  offices  of  the  newspapers  here,  but  he 
openly  confesses  that  he  wishes  to  prepare  public  opinion  for  the 
German  proposals  shortly  to  be  expected.  Personally,  I  have  no 
doubt  whatsoever  that  they  concern  an  entente  generate,  begin- 
ning with  Persia. 

As  for  the  British  Government,  it  has  been  expecting  these  pro- 
posals since  your  return  from  Potsdam  and  your  conversations  with 
O'Beirne  and  Buchanan.  During  my  first  meetings  with  Grey  and 
Nicolson  I  was  immediately  told  that : 

"Nothing  has  come  as  yet,  we  have  received  nothing  so  far." 

Moreover,  the  London  Cabinet  has  been  long  prepared.  The 
trend  of  German  policy  had  become  clear  to  me  since  the  entrevues 
in  London  and  Kronberg.  Already  at  the  time  of  your  stay  at  Rome, 
I  constantly  pointed  to  this  in  my  reports.  The  basic  idea  of  this 
policy  is  to  be  found  in  the  words  addressed  to  Hardinge  by  Em- 
peror William :  ''the  two  decisive  factors  in  this  world  are  the  German 
Army  and  the  British  Navy/'  Windsor,  Highcliffe  are  further  stages. 
I  will  not  here  attempt  to  clear  up  the  mystery  of  the  "Daily  Tele- 
graph."^ But  it  is  not  to  be  denied:  it  is  the  appeal  of  a  mighty 
sovereign  to  the  British  nation.  The  form  of  procedure  may  not  have 
been  a  happy  one — but  the  essence  of  the  matter  is  clear. 

And  what  was  England's  reply:  "We  are  bound  and  can  only 
negotiate  *all  four.'  "  This  was  once  more  said  to  Cassel,  and  to 
Gwinner,  only  recently. 

Personally,  I  am  firmly  convinced  that  the  London  Cabinet  will 
uphold  this  standpoint  also  in  the  future,  so  long  as  the  Anglo- 
Russian  Entente  will  exist, — but  exist  in  its  full  scope.    It  must  be 


*  The  emperor's  famous  interview  with  Dr.  Dillon,  correspondent  of  that  paj 


A  NEW  PHASE  OF  ORIENTATION  543 

the  basis  of  British  policy  as  a  whole  from  Morocco  to  China.  Such 
is  the  belief  of  the  King,  Grey,  Asquith,  Balfour,  Lansdowne,  Nicolson 
and  Hardinge.  Nothing  less :  the  maintenance  of  peace  between  the 
two  great  nations  in  Asia  and  the  protection  of  their  mutual  inter- 
ests. As  soon  as  the  Entente  is  confined  to  certain  questions,  Eng- 
land will  see  herself  forced  to  consider  the  German  wishes  relating 
to  concessions  and  the  partition  of  spheres  of  influence, — this  will, 
step  by  step,  annul  our  entente,  and  the  Anglo-German  understanding 
will  then  assume  a  general  character,  for  such  a  combination  possesses 
a  very  fascinating  feature  for  England:  the  possibility  of  limiting  her 
armaments.  Such  an  Entente  will  certainly  have  to  overcome  a  great 
many  difficulties, — the  beginning,  above  all,  will  be  arduous,  but  once 
under  way,  it  will  go  the  whole  length.  And  the  isolation  of  Russia 
will  be  the  inevitable  result.  I  am  aware  that  I  am  repeating  myself  but 
the  gravity  of  the  situation  forces  me  to  express  my  opinion  frankly  and 
openly. 

You  say  in  your  letter :  "Distrust  as  to  our  relations  to  England 
and  France."  So  far  as  France  is  concerned,  you  are  naturally  bet- 
ter informed  than  I  am.  I  wish  merely  to  remark  that  Pichon's 
speech  contains  a  gap  :^  he  had  mentioned  the  relations  of  France 
to  Russia,  and  the  relations  of  France  to  England,  but  not  a  com- 
bination of  the  three  Powers.  This  caused  a  very  painful  impres- 
sion here,  whilst  it  pleased  Germany,  as  I  see  from  the  papers. 

Now  as  to  London.  Perfect  confidence  is  felt  here  as  to  the 
sincerity  of  our  Emperor  and  consequently  of  his  Ministers  as  well. 
It  is  feared,  however,  that  Germany^s  position  is  so  strong  that  she 
will  be  able  to  gain  the  greatest  advantages  in  her  negotiations 
with  us — advantages  which  would  strike  at  the  very  root  of  the 
Anglo-Russian  Entente ;  Germany's  power  reposes  in  the  fact  that 
Russia's  negotiations  with  her  must  now  necessarily  be  carried  to 
a  conclusion,  namely,  with  a  view  to  the  future  peaceful  relations 
of  the  Powers  to  one  another.  The  King  and  Grey  have  also  told 
me  this  and  they  were  perfectly  sincere  in  declaring  that  they 
wished  our  negotiations  to  be  concluded.  Grey  fears  a  failure,  but 
he  asks  himself  what  price  will  have  to  be  paid? 

The  frankness  with  which  you  spoke  to  O'Beirne  and  Buchanan 
both,  before  and  after  Potsdam,  has  been  fully  appreciated  here. 
*  M.  Pichon  had  portrayed  the  situation  as  it  actually  was. 


544 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


Since  then,  however,  it  has  been  feared,  that  you — pray  excuse  the 
expression — have  been  hard  pushed 

You  have  asked  me  to  communicate  the  gist  of  the  whole 
matter  to  Grey  and  Nicolson,  to  lead  them  back  to  the  real  point— ^ 
the  four  per  cent  Customs  increase.^ 

This  I  have  already  done  and  successfully,  too,  as  my  reports 
show.  For  Grey  himself  admits  that  this  is  the  one  point  concern- 
ing which  he  reckons  on  our  support;  the  remainder  are  friendly 
commentaries.  But  his  tone  more  than  his  words,  expressed  his 
regret 

Your  letter  gives  me  the  possibility  of  completely  reassuring 
Grey  on  the  subject  of  the  Customs  increase, — but  nothing  more. 
And  I  need  more  to  be  able  to  assume  that  the  impending  Anglo- 
German  negotiations  will  not  harm  us. 

I  will  briefly  summarise: 

Hitherto  no  proposals  have  been  made  on  the  German  side.  It 
is  not  believed  in  press-circles  here  that  they  are  imminent.  Ger- 
many, apparently,  intends  first  to  bring  the  negotiations  with  us 
to  a  close  in  order  then  to  be  able  to  say  to  England :  This  is  how 
we  stand  with  Russia.  The  British  Ministers  have  confidence  in 
your  intentions,  but  these  do  not  coincide  with  the  English  stand- 
point. It  is  a  question, — pardon  me — of  the  degree  of  the  sentiment 
of  solidarity. 

My  responsibility  towards  the  Emperor  and  the  country  forces 
me  to  speak  so  plainly  on  this  important  question. 

I  will  conclude  with  another  question,  which  has  no  such  far- 
reaching  importance;  it  refers  to  your  letter  No.  21.  A  statement 
of  this  kind  on  my  part  would  be  ill-received  here  and  cloud  our 
good  relations.  I  shall  therefore  await  further  instructions.  The 
circumstance,  that  the  version  published  here  does  not  precisely  cor- 
respond with  the  text  submitted  by  me,  ought  to  clear  the  Foreign  Office 
of  every  vestige  of  suspicion.  The  King  and  Grey  would  feel  greatly 
hurt.  I  believe  it  would  be  well  if  you  kept  Buchanan  always  fully 
informed;  all  the  more  so  as  we  could  only  in  such  case  count  on  a 
similar  frankness  on  the  part  of  England  in  her  negotiations  with  Ger- 
many. 

*An  attempt  at  obstruction;  despite  the  Russo-German  understanding  in  re- 
gard to  the  Bagdad  railroad  question. 


41 


A  NEW  PHASE  OF  ORIENTATION  545 

(620)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sasonoff.    Letter,  Jan.  20-Feb. 
2,  1911. 

I  have  as  yet  not  written  you  anything  on  the  question  of  tlie 
fortification  of  Flushing,  which  has  caused  such  great  excitement 
in  the  French  Press,  since  I  wished  first  of  all  to  obtain  a  clear 
picture  of  all  the  numerous  rumours  and  to  ascertain  the  attitude 
of  the  French  Government  in  this  question. 

Upon  reading  the  declaration  of  Pichon  in  Parliament,  in 
answer  to  the  interpellation  of  the  well-known  chauvinist  De  la 
Fosse,  I  felt  convinced  that  the  French  Foreign  Minister  had  been 
surprised  and  that  his  statements  would  appear  later  on  far  too 
categorical. 

The  day  after  this  declaration,  Pichon  considerably  weakened  the 
significance  of  his  statements  in  an  interview  with  a  Dutch  corre- 
spondent. Hereupon,  he  considered  it  necessary  to  send  a  circular  tele- 
gram to  the  French  representatives  accredited  to  the  Signatory  Powers 
of  the  Treaty  of  1839,  in  which  the  exact  m>eaning  of  his  speech  is  ex- 
plained. 1  did  not  see  the  text  of  this  telegram,  but  Pichon  com- 
municated its  contents  to  me. 

The  idea  of  an  intervention  in  the  question  of  the  fortification  of 
Flushing  is  denied,  and  it  is  emphasised  that  in  Parliament  he  did  not 
speak  of  negotiations,  but  of  ^'friendly  conversations''  between  the 
Powers  Guaranteeing  the  Neutrality  of  Belgium. 

From  various  conversations  which  I  had  with  Pichon,  I  con- 
clude that  he  is  not  particularly  worried  over  this  question  and 
that  he  does  not  wish  to  attach  too  much  significance  to  it.  Up  to 
now  he  has  not  been  able  to  examine  the  legal  side  of  it. 
It  is  his  personal  opinion,  however,  that  Holland  has  the  indisputable 
right  of  fortifying  the  mouth  of  the  Scheldt.  On  the  other  hand, 
neither  Pichon  nor  the  French  Government  doubt,  that  the  idea  of  the 
fortifications  originated  in  Germany  and  that  the  Dutch  Government 
acts,  if  not  in  virtue  of  a  direct  convention,  then,  in  fear  for  the  inde- 
pendence of  Holland  in  case  of  a  European  war.  If  Pichon  and  his 
colleagues  retain  their  composure,  it  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  con- 
viction prevails  here  that  Germany,  in  a  new  Franco-German  war, 
would  in  any  case  violate  Belgian  neutrality.^     For  this  reason,  the 

*The  Belgian  government  had  already  reached  an  understanding  with  the 
French  and  British  general  staffs  and  governments,  having  been  whipped  into 


546 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


fortification  of  Flushing  is  considered  a  less  important  detail  of  the 
general  German  plan  of  attack  upon  France.  In  spite  of  this,  as  I 
have  learnt,  the  newspaper  campaign,  which  was  first  taken  up  by 
certain  Belgian  newspapers,  was  conducted  with  French  money  and 
under  secret  participation  of  the  French  military  attache  in  Belgium 
in  the  hope  of  frustrating  in  this  indirect  manner  the  execution 
of  the  Dutch  plan.  So  far  as  I  am  able  to  judge,  one  still  reckons 
here  on  the  possibility  of  a  success  of  the  press  campaign  and  hopes 
that  Holland,  even  though  she  does  not  fully  give  up  her  plan,  will 
nevertheless  postpone  or  alter  it. 


I 


line  by  means  of  the  press  campaign  related  to  the  "Congo  Atrocities,"  the  details 
of  which  were  invented  to  within  95  per  cent,  of  their  total.  The  true  inward- 
ness of  this  campaign  was  fully  understood  by  the  government  of  the  Nether- 
lands and  the  Dutch  general  staff  was  in  the  possession  of  information  of  the 
military  "surveys"  that  were  being  made  in  Belgium,  jointly  by  Belgian,  French 
and  British  officers.  The  Dutch  government,  moreover,  had  no  illusions  on  the 
position  of  Belgium  in  case  of  a  war  between  the  Triple  Alliance  and  Triple 
Entente,  be  this  in  a  military  sense,  so  far  as  invasion  by  Germany  was  con- 
cerned, or  in  a  political  sense,  in  regard  to  Belgium's  leaning  towards  the  En- 
tente. The  Dutch  general  staff  had  to  count  upon  Antwerp  being  made  the 
objective  of  a  German  invasion,  and  it  had  to  consider  military  counter-measures 
in  the  same  direction  or  locality  by  the  forces  of  the  Entente.  These  very  prob- 
lems reached  their  culmination  during  the  siege  and  taking  of  Antwerp,  in 
October  of  1914,  when  the  governments  of  Great  Britain,  France  and  Russia 
actually  considered  forcing  the  Scheldt,  to  bring  relief  to  Antwerp,  but  desisted 
finally,  because  the  Dutch  government  declared  itself  by  rushing  all  of  its 
mobilized  troops  to  the  mouth  of  the  river.  London,  Paris  and  Petrograd  did 
not  urge  the  point  after  that— principally  because  the  case  of  Belgium's  invasion 
by  Germany  would  have  ceased  to  be  good  propaganda  material  if  Holland  had 
been  subjected  to  a  like  measure  by  the  Entente. 


ENTENTE  VERSUS  GERMANY  IN  SOUTHWEST  ASIA 
(January — September  1911) 

(621)  Sasonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.    Telegram,  Jan.  22- 

Feb.  4,  1911.    No.  93. 

I  refer  to  the  telegram  from  our  Ambassador  at  Paris,  No.  6. 

The  British  Ambassador  here  told  me  the  same  as  Pichon, 
pointing  out  that  England  was  ready  to  grant  us  financial  support  in 
the  construction  of  the  Khanekin-Teheran  line,  in  order  to  prevent  our 
building  this  railway  in  conjunction  with  Germany.  At  Potsdam,  and 
also  from  my  conversations  with  the  German  Ambassador  here,  I 
gained  the  impression  that  Germany  considers  the  Khanekin- 
Teheran  line  as  absolutely  necessary  and  that  she  would,  in  one 
way  or  another,  insist  on  the  construction  of  this  line.  I  personally 
believe  that,  perhaps,  Germany  foresees  England's  invincible  op- 
position and  therefore  renounces  the  plan  of  continuing  the  Bag- 
dad Railway  to  the  Persian  Gulf  and  will  instead  of  this  direct  the 
main-line  towards  Persia. 

Under  these  circumstances  it  is  most  important  i6v  us  to  keep 
the  Khanekin-Teheran  line  in  our  hands.  In  this  case  we  must  at- 
tract English  and  French  capital;  the  proposals  of  Pichon  and 
Buchanan  are  advantageous  to  us.  Will  you  please  determine  the 
conditions  upon  which  English  finance  would  participate? 

(622)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Jan.  22'Feb.  4,  1911.    No.  94. 

Our  Ambassador  at  Paris  telegraphs,  sub  No.  6: 
"Pichon  is  extremely  alarmed  by  a  report  from  Louis  to  the  ef- 
fect that  it  would  appear  front  a  conversation  with  you  that  an 

547 


548         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

important  alteration  of  the  original  Russo-German  draft  is  being 
contemplated:    you  were  inclined  to  build  the  Teheran-Khanekin 
Railway  together  with  Germany,  on  the  condition  that  the  control  m 
of  the  line  and  a  60  per  cent  share  be  assured  to  us.  | 

"Pichon  is  convinced  that  the  admission  of  Germany  into  our 
Persian  sphere  of  influence, — whilst  France  for  our  sake  has  re- 
tired from  all  activity  in  that  country,  as  for  instance  in  the  ques- 
tion of  the  foreign  advisers, — would  call  forth  very  vigorous  at- 
tacks on  his  policy  in  France  and  might  be  interpreted  as  a  separa- 
tion on  our  part  from  the  Triple  Entente.  He  is  also  convinced 
that  this  plan  would  be  most  unpleasant  to  England." 

(623)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Jan.  22-Feb.  4,  1911.    No.  95. 

Our  Ambassador  at  Paris  telegraphs  in  continuation  of  his  tele- 
gram No.  6,  that  Pichon  expressed  his  personal  opinion  to  the  ef- 
fect that,  in  order  to  meet  the  difficulties  mentioned,  one  might, 
perhaps,  give  the  Teheran-Khanekin  line  an  international,  instead 
of  a  Russo-German,  character.  Russia  participating  in  the  enter- 
prise conjointly  with  England,  France  and  Germany,  the  first- 
mentioned  to  have  a  preferential  position.  This  proposal  seems  all 
the  more  natural  to  him,  as  it  will  be  necessary,  in  any  case,  to  ap- 
proach French  and  English  capital.  Pichon  hardly  believes  that 
any  protests  would  be  raised  on  the  part  of  Germany.  The  stand- 
point of  the  British  Cabinet  is  unknown  to  him. 

(624)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sasonoi.     Telegram,  Jan. 
24-Feb.  6,  1911.    No.  16. 

Your  telegrams  Nos.  93,  94  and  95  received. 

Replying  to  your  question  at  the  close  of  telegram  No.  93,  Nicol- 
son  tells  me  that  Buchanan's  communication  must  be  regarded  as 
a  concrete  proposal  made  by  the  British  Government,  to  take  part 
with  English  capital  in  the  construction  of  the  Khanekin-Teheran 
line— either  with  Russia  and  England  alone,  in  which  case,  how- 
ever, England  could  not  raise  the  entire  capital,  or  with  Russia, 
England,  France  and  Germany  conjointly,  as  France  proposed,  and 
naturally  under  exclusively  Russian  control.  Nicolson  tells  me 
there  is  a  third  solution,  which  the  British  Government  would  have  J 


ENTENTE  VS.  GERMANY  IN  S.  W.  ASIA  549 

preferred,  namely  that  Russia  undertake  the  enterprise  alone  within 
her  sphere  of  interest,  a  solution  which,  unfortunately,  seems  to  have 
been  rejected  in  the  course  of  your  conversation  with  Buchanan. 
Nicolson  added  that  it  was  impossible  for  him  to-day  to  give  to  us 
the  extent  and  conditions  of  English  participation,  as  he  had  no 
figures  at  his  disposal. 

(625)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Jan.  24'Feb.  6,  1911.    No.  17. 

Continuation  of  my  telegram  No.  16. 

Nicolson  continued  the  conversation  confidentially,  and  reverted 
to  the  formula  which  was  referred  to  in  your  conversation  with 
Buchanan:  Russia  undertakes  to  construct  the  Teheran-Khanekin 
line  but  reserves  the  sole  right  to  exercise  control,  and  to  de- 
termine the  participation  of  other  Powers  in  this  enterprise.  He 
regards  this  formula  as  an  especially  happy  one.  He  did  not  conceal 
from  me,  that  the  London  Cabinet  considered  the  admission  of  German 
interests  into  our  zone  as  giving  cause  for  anxiety,  hut  he  admits  that 
the  participation  of  France  must  entail  that  of  Germany.  Regarding 
the  cession  of  the  line  to  Germany  alone,  Nicolson  declared  that  the 
British  nation  would  hold  the  Cabinet  responsible  for  this.  In  order 
to  render  possible  the  Anglo-Russian  Convention,  England  had  re- 
nounced all  advantages  in  the  Russian  sphere  of  interest  and  could 
not  now  permit  that  we  grant  Germany  a  concession  which  would 
be  regarded  here  as  dangerous  to  England's  vital  interests.  Nicol- 
son is  very  disturbed  and  I  do  not  think  he  is  in  error. 

(626)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Jan.  lA-Feh.  6,  1911.    No.  19. 

I  have  had  a  short  casual  conversation  with  the  German  Am- 
bassador here,  in  the  course  of  which  he  told  me  that  he  considers 
the  allusions  in  Pichon's  speech,  as  to  confidential  communications 
having  been  made  by  the  Russian  Government,  to  be  pure  boast- 
ing :  a  new  demonstration  on  the  part  of  the  Triple  Entente  would, 
however,  call  forth  serious  difficulties. 

(627)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Jan.  25-Feb.  7,  1911.    No.  20. 

Cambon  yesterday  called  upon  Nicolson  immediately  after  I 
had  done  so.    He  told  me  he  was  surprised  at  Nicolson's  uneasiness 


550        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

and  how,  again  and  again,  he  had  pointed  to  the  extraordinary  im- 
portance of  the  Teheran-Khanekin  line  to  the  Entente,  as  the  En- 
tente was  principally  based  on  a  policy  in  Persia.  He  again  reverted 
to  the  formula  mentioned  in  my  telegram  No.  17.  A  combination 
of  Four,  including  Germany,  is  also  being  considered  here,  but  only 
in  case  of  emergency.  No  doubt  exists  for  me,  that  this  question 
has  become  the  pivot  of  the  political  situation,  and  that  England 
attributes  to  it  such  great  importance,  that  in  case  we  cede  the  line 
to  Germany,  England  would  alter  her  entire  policy.  Nicolson's 
anxiety  has  a  personal  side,  since  both,  Grey  and  he,  gave  guaran- 
tees on  the  occasion  of  general  anxiety  of  public  opinion,  following 
the  Potsdam  meeting,  that  you  had  made  no  promises  at  Potsdam 
which  ran  counter  to  British  interests.  Nicolson  told  Cambon,  that  if 
no  way  out  could  be  found,  this  would  mean  the  collapse  of  the  entire 
British  policy  of  the  last  six  years.  Nevertheless,  he  admits  that  our 
negotiations  with  Germany  must  lead  to  some  result,  and  he  still 
hopes  that  this  may  be  achieved  without  any  damage  to  the  En- 
tente ;  what  he  fears  is  not  so  much  the  point  of  departure,  as  the 
further  development  of  our  negotiations  with  Germany. 


(628)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Jan.  27'Feh.  9,  1911.    No.  23. 

Personal.     Strictly  confidential. 

I  learn  from  a  reliable  source  that,  although  the  death  of  his 
brother  naturally  meant  a  severe  blow  to  Grey,  this  misfortune  is 
not  the  sole  reason  for  his  absence  at  present.  Our  late  decisions 
concerning  Persia  have  played  a  considerable  part  in  this,  and  great 
efforts  were  necessary  to  dissuade  him  from  his  original  intention  of 
tendering  his  resignation  and  withdrawing  from  public  life.  Our  atti- 
tude in  the  railway  question  has  shaken  his  inner  conviction  that  Rus- 
sia still  possesses  full  liberty  of  action  in  her  sphere  of  interest,  and  he 
believes  that  England  should  first  have  been  asked  in  so  important  a 
matter.  As  he  possesses  no  document,  on  which  he  could  have  sup- 
ported himself  officially,  he  regarded  his  resignation  as  the  only  way  out. 
He  has  now  renounced  this  idea,  but  the  impression  produced  on 
Grey  proves  the  great  importance  which  England,  chiefly  for 
strategic  reasons,  attaches  to  Germany's  progress  in  these  regions. 
Nothing  of  this  has  been  made  known,  neither  to  the  general  public, 


ENTENTE  VS.  GERMANY  IN  S.  W.  ASIA  551 

nor  to  the  press.  But  it  is  certain  that  public  opinion  in  England, 
basing  itself  less  on  the  letter,  than  on  the  spirit,  of  our  later  agree- 
ments as  to  the  Bagdad  Railway,  considered  our  mutual  interests 
in  this  part  of  the  East  to  be  closer  united  even  than  during  the 
annexation  crisis  in  the  Balkans.  Should  we  be  unable  to  prevent  a 
disillusion  of  this  nature,  this  would  lead  to  very  serious  consequences. 
Some  time  ago,  Grey  expressed  a  lively  desire  to  speak  to  you 
personally.  I  told  him  I  believed  that  you  would  come  here  in  the 
spring. 

(629)  Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.    Telegram.  Jan.  28- 
Feb.  10,  1911.    No.  128. 

Your  telegrams  Nos.  22  and  23  received. 

The  nervousness  of  the  English  is  surprising.  The  London  Cabinet 
was  already  aware  last  October,  that,  in  the  negotiations  about  to 
take  place  with  Germany,  the  principal  subject  to  be  discussed 
would  be  a  railway  from  Khanekin  to  Teheran.  Negotiations  to 
this  effect  are  still  taking  place,  but  no  decisions  have  been  reached. 
We,  by  no  means,  entertain  the  idea  to  leave  this  line  to  Germany, 
and  we,  likewise,  do  not  believe  that  a  participation  of  German 
capital,  or  even  an  internationalisation  of  the  enterprise,  will  take  place. 
We  are  only  debating  the  question  whether,  and  under  what  conditions, 
French  and  English  capital  could  participate;  the  control  of  the  entire 
enterprise  naturally  being  reserved  to  us.  I  shall  speak  in  this  sense 
to  Buchanan  who  has  hitherto  received  all  my  communications 
very  calmly,  and  I  hope  that  his  reports  will  also  have  a  soothing 
effect  in  London.  We  must  avoid  reverting  too  frequently  to  this 
subject  before  a  definite  decision  has  been  reached. 

(630)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram.  Jan. 
29-Feb.  11,  1911.    No.  25. 

Your  telegram  No.  128  received. 

I  have  not  seen  Nicolson  since  our  last  meeting.  I  have,  how- 
ever, just  spoken  to  Cambon,  who  told  me,  that  the  last  telegram 
from  Buchanan  had  really  converted  Nicolson,  and  that  the  same 
was  the  case  at  Paris.  They  have  been  quieted  chiefly  by  the  state- 
ment made  by  you  to  the  French  Charge  d' Affaires  at  St.  Peters- 
burg,  that  you   possess   freedom   of   action   in   connection   with 


552         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

Germany  and  that  you  command  the  situation  in  case  of  English 
and  French  participation. 

(631)  Sasonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.    Telegram,  Jan.  29- 

Feb   11,  1911.    No   133. 

Your  telegrams  Nos.  16  and  17  received. 

A  special  Ministerial  Council  has  examined  the  question  of 
participation  of  British  and  French  capital  in  the  construction  of 
the  Khanekin-Teheran  line,  and  it  has  been  decided  that,  in  order 
to  prevent  this  line  exercising  an  injurious  influence  on  our  com- 
merce, it  is  necessary  to  build  a  new  line  right  to  the  centre  of 
Persia,  either  connecting  Teheran  with  the  net  of  Russian  railways, 
or  with  a  Persian  port  on  the  Caspian  Sea.  This  can  be  effected 
only  with  the  help  of  foreign  capital,  and  we  should  therefore  like 
to  know  whether  we  could  count  upon  France  and  England  financ- 
ing this  new  railway?  We  must  take  public  opinion  here  into 
consideration,  which  insists  on  our  reaching  Teheran  before  the 
Teheran-Khanekin  Railway,  which  is  so  detrimental  to  us,  be  com- 
pleted; it  is  even  thought  better  to  leave  the  latter  to  Germany, 
in  case  of  emergency. 

May  I  request  you  to  let  us  have  a  reply  before  Tuesday  next 
if  possible? 

(632)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sasonoff.    Telegram,  Jan.  30- 
Feb.  12,  1911.    No.  26. 

Your  telegram  No.  133  received. 

I  shall  not  be  able  to  speak  to  Nicolson  before  Monday  and 
therefore  do  not  believe  that  an  official  reply  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment can  be  given  in  time.  I  do  not  foresee  any  objections  on  prin- 
ciple. //  must  not  be  forgotten,  however,  that  Government  influence 
on  financial  circles  here  is  even  more  indirect  than  at  Paris.^  The  Gov- 
ernment has  apparently  made  enquiries  concerning  the  Khanekin- 
Teheran  line.  Our  new  enquiry  comes  as  a  surprise  to  the 
Government;  two  circumstances  which  will  hardly  render  it  pos- 
sible for  the  London  Cabinet  to  assume  an  immediate  obligation. 

^  Proposed  foreign  loans  in  France  depend  for  quotation  on  the  Exchange 
upon  the  consent  of  the  government. 


ENTENTE  VS.  GERMANY  IN  S.  W.  ASIA  553 

(633)     The  Same  to  the  Same.     Telegram,  Jan.  Sl-Feb.  13,  1911.    No.  27. 

Nicolson  tells  me,  that  he  is  very  well  satisfied  with  Buchanan's 
last  telegram  which  has  led  to  a  clearing-up  of  the  situation. 


(634)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Feb.  2-15,  1911.    No.  32. 

Grey  takes  full  account  of  the  importance  which  a  railway  from 
Teheran  to  the  North  possesses  for  Russia,  but  does  not  believe 
that  English  capital  will  take  part  in  this  enterprise  without  a 
guarantee  from  the  Russian  Government.  As  soon  as  the  con- 
struction of  the  Khanekin-Teheran  line  seemed  to  be  assured,  the 
Foreign  Office  examined  its  importance  for  British  trade  in  the 
South,  and  the  building  of  a  railway  from  the  Persian  Gulf  was 
discussed,  the  direction  of  this  line  not  being  defined. 

On  this  occasion,  he  had  come  to  the  conviction  that  no  Eng- 
lish capital  could  be  found  for  such  a  line  without  a  Government 
guarantee  being  forthcoming,  and  he  met  with  the  same  aversion 
in  Parliamentary  circles  as  you  encountered  in  the  Duma.  Grey 
infers  from  this  that  if  English  capital  is  not  inclined  to  support 
British  interests  in  the  South,  it  will  be  still  less  inclined  to  do  this 
for  Russian  interests  in  the  North. 


(635)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Feb.  4-17,  1911.    No.  37. 

Grey  has  shown  me  in  confidence  the  copy  of  a  telegram  from 
Buchanan,  dated  February  16,  and  the  substance  of  his  reply. 

1.  The  British  Government  shares  the  opinion  that  a  rupture  of  our 
negotiations  with  Germany,  in  their  present  stage,  would  he  disastrous 
from  a  political  point  of  view} 

2.  The  Russian  Government  is  itself  able  to  judge  better  than 
all  others  how  disadvantageous  it  would  be  to  leave  the  Khanekin- 
Teheran  line  to  Germany.  Should  Russia  believe  that  this  is  not 
contrary  to  her  interests,  then  England  need  not  insist  upon  her 
objections,  if  only  the  Russian  Government  retain  its  freedom  of 
action  regarding  the  other  questions  connected  with  the  Anglo- 
Russian  Convention. 

*  Sazonoff  proposed  to  disregard  the  result  of  the  Potsdam  meeting. 


554        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

3.  Without  a  Government  guarantee,  the  participation  of  British 
capital  in  Persian  railway  lines  will  meet  with  insurmountable 
difficulties. 

4.  As  to  a  British  line  in  Southern  Persia,  the  English  plans, 
regarding  the  Gulf  sector  of  the  Bagdad  Railway,  are  not  yet  de- 
cided upon. 

But  even  if  this  railway  were  to  be  constructed,  British  interests 
are  bound  to  become  dependent  on  the  influence  of  Germany  on  the 
Bagdad-Khanekin  railway,  the  more  so  because  German  influence 
would  be  able  to  extend  as  far  as  Teheran.  Thus  the  British  Gov- 
ernment is  forced  to  think  of  other  lines  which  would  guarantee 
equal  advantages.  In  any  case,  England  is  considering  the  ques- 
tion of  a  railroad  in  Southern  Persia  in  order  to  prevent  it  from 
falling  into  other  hands. 

(636)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Feb.  4-17,  1911.    No.  38. 

Personal.  The  decision,  negative  in  a  double  respect,  arrived 
at  by  our  Ministerial  Council,  as  reported  by  Buchanan  in  his  tele- 
gram, is  bound  to  lead  to  a  dead  point,  because  our  political  interests 
are  inconsistent  with  the  interests  of  our  Treasury.  At  all  events  it 
seems  inadmissible  to  me  that  we  should  abandon  the  railway 
scheme  and  renounce  all  political  influence  in  the  North  of  Persia 
in  favour  of  Germany ;  but  to  prevent  this,  the  Ministerial  Council 
grants  us  but  one  single  means  of  protecting  our  interests — a 
guarantee  on  the  part  of  our  Government  to  be  replaced  by  a  guar- 
antee on  the  part  of  England. 

Such  an  attitude,  it  appears  to  me,  precludes  the  possibility  of 
a  satisfactory  solution.  Would  it  not  be  possible  for  the  Ministerial 
Council,  to  modify  its  decisions  in  view  of  the  extraordinary  im- 
portance of  the  political  interests  at  stake,  and  leave  open  to  us  the 
future  possibility  of  being  in  a  position  to  apply  at  Teheran  for  both 
concessions,  without  touching  upon  the  question  of  the  participation  of 
the  other  Powers?  The  financial  side  of  the  question  can  then  be 
solved  later.  Such  a  course  would  accord  with  the  obligations 
undertaken  by  us  towards  Germany  and  would,  at  the  same  time, 
satisfy  the  desires  of  Russian  public  opinion  with  regard  to  our 
influence  in  the  North  of  Persia.     To  me  the  fact  seems  incon- 


ENTENTE  VS.  GERMANY  IN  S.  W.  ASIA  555 

trovertible,  that  the  promise  to  connect  Khanekin  with  Teheran 
necessarily  presupposes  a  Government  guarantee,  if  not  direct  Rus- 
sian participation. 


(637)    Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.     Telegram,  Feb. 
4-17,  1911.    No.  155. 

I  request  you  to  let  us  know,  as  quickly  as  possible,  whether 
the  English  will  not  provide  funds  without  a  Russian  Government 
guarantee  for  the  line  from  Teheran  to  the  North  only,  or  whether 
this  also  refers  to  the  line  Teheran-Khanekin. 


(638)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram,  Feb. 
5-18,  1911.    No.  39. 

Your  telegram  No.  155  received. 

I  saw  Grey  this  morning.  English  capital  will  participate,  neither 
in  the  line  Teheran-Khanekin,  nor  in  the  Teheran-North  Persian  line, 
without  the  guarantee  of  the  Russian  Government.  A  guarantee  of  the 
British  Government  is  out  of  the  question ;  Parliament  would  refuse 
its  consent.  Moreover,  Grey's  telegram  to  Buchanan  leaves  no 
doubt  in  that  respect. 


(639)        The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Feb.  5-18,  1911.    No.  40. 

It  still  appears  to  me  that,  if  we  ask  at  Teheran  for  a  concession 
for  the  Khanekin-Teheran  line  and  reply  to  Germany  in  this  sense, 
the  decision  of  our  Ministerial  Council  w!ould  be  fulfilled. 
We  are  merely  securing  for  ourselves  a  privilege,  which  would  postpone 
the  difficulty  for  quite  a  number  of  years  without  our  undertaking  any 
financial  obligations.^  By  that  time  it  should  be  possible  to  find  an 
international  combination.  In  case  of  necessity,  there  still  remains 
our  renunciation  in  favour  of  Germany,  but  only  in  the  extremest 
necessity,  not  now.  The  same  consideration  applies  to  the  line 
from  Teheran  to  the  North.  In  the  latter  case,  however,  Russian 
participation  seems  imperative,  because  Russian  interests  are  at 
stake.    But  we  would  have  gained  time. 

*A  time-honored  expedient  of  diplomacy. 


556         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

(640)  Sasonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.     Telegram,  Feb. 

10-23,  1911.    No.  182. 

The  British  Ambassador  here  has  informed  me  that  England 
intends  to  construct  a  railway  from  Mohammerah  to  Khoramabad 
near  the  boundary  of  our  Persian  sphere  of  interest.  /  replied 
to  the  effect  that  such  a  railway  would  he  directly  harmful  to  our  eco- 
nomic interests  and  would  arouse  grave  misgivings  in  Russia. 

(641)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sasonoff.     Letter,  Feb.  13- 
26,  1911. 

I  have  received  your  telegram;  No.  182. 

Sir  G.  Buchanan  on  his  part  has  sent  a  report  here  of  his  con- 
versation with  you.  I  shall  not  fail  to  act  on  the  lines  indicated  by 
you  to  the  British  Ambassador.  I  do  not  know  whether  the  Brit- 
ish Government  has  already  come  to  a  definite  decision  in  this  mat- 
ter. I  believe  that  a  great  deal  will  depend  on  the  result  of  the 
impending  negotiations  between  England  and  Turkey  and  later  on 
probably  between  England  and  Germany  regarding  the  Gulf  sec- 
tor of  the  Bagdad  Railway. 

Our  agreement  with  Germany  on  the  Khanekin-Teheran  line 
will  also  be  a  factor — in  other  words  it  is  a  question  of  the  entire 
Bagdad  to  Teheran  line.  I  incline  to  the  view  that  England  will 
endeavour  to  secure  concessions  in  South  Persia,  in  order,  as  Sir 
Edward  says,  to  prevent  these  falling  into  the  hands  of  any  other 
Power  later  on;  the  construction  itself  will  depend  on  circum- 
stances.^ 

I  must  remark,  however,  that  the  pressure  exerted  by  public 
opinion  on  the  British  Government  is  growing  steadily,  in  order  to 
secure  a  more  effectual  protection  of  English  commercial  interests 
in  these  districts. 

So  long  as  Persia  was  a  closed  territory,  the  question  was 
never  brought  forward,  but  the  era  of  concessions  and  enterprise 
has  now  dawned.  It  seems  hardly  likely  to  me,  that  England,  with 
all  her  nianifold  interests,  could  remain  behind.  This  was  also  my 
impression  on  reading  the  telegram  from  our  Consul-General  at 
Calcutta.    No  doubt  can  exist  but  that  our  railway  line  in  the  North, 


*  Of  all  the  railroad  concessions  obtained  by  Great  Britain  in  the  course  of 
years  in  Southwest  Asia  not  a  single  foot  was  ever  laid  down. 


I 


ENTENTE  VS.  GERMANY  IN  S.  W.  ASIA  557 

which  must  sooner  or  later  lead  to  a  more  extensive  network  of  rail- 
ways, represents  the  beginning  of  the  partition  of  Persia  and  necessarily 
leads  to  the  construction  of  English  lines  in  South  Persia;  I  can  con- 
ceive that  these  railways  will  pass  into  English  hands  at  the  Indian 
frontier  and  later  on  perhaps  be  connected  with  our  railways  at  a  point 
not  yet  determined.  For  these  reasons  I  cannot  understand  why  such 
railway  constructions  meet  with  so  little  approval  with  us,  although 
I  must  admit  the  correctness  of  the  financial  considerations.  I  fear, 
however,  that  we  are  losing  time,  and  I  believe  we  should  at  least 
secure  the  concessions  for  ourselves. 

Under  these  circumstances,  I  do  not  believe  that  we  shall  suc- 
ceed in  inducing  the  British  Government  to  waive  its  intentions. 

I  say  all  this,  because  I  regard  it  as  my  duty  to  give  you  full 
information  with  respect  to  the  English  standpoint. 

I  do  not  believe  that  we  should  be  justified  in  basing  a  protest 
against  the  English  scheme  on  the  Anglo-Russian  Convention,  just 
as  England  could  not  protest  against  our  line  leading  to  Teheran. 

The  Anglo-Russian  Convention,  the  wording  of  which  was  inten- 
tionally so  formulated  as  to  render  protests  by  other  nations  impossible, 
aimed — I  do  not  believe  that  this  can  be  controverted — at  the  purpose 
which  has  so  frequently  been  revealed,  namely  that  of  uniting  our  efforts 
to  prevent  Germany  from  obtaining  a  foothold  in  Persia 

What  Grey  told  us,  regarding  the  linking  up  of  Khanekin  with 
Teheran,  touches  on  a  question  which  appears  to  me  extraordi- 
narily important, — ^he  told  us  that  the  Russian  understanding  with 
Germany  has  weakened  his  position,  should  he  have  to  nego- 
tiate with  Germany  with  respect  to  the  Bagdad  Railway. 
He  avers  that  German  enterprise  has  secured  an  outlet,  which  now 
renders  it  independent  of  English  consent;  besides  this,  England  can  no 
longer  rely  on  Russia's  opposition  to  the  Bagdad  Railway  as  a  matter  of 
principle.  France's  opposition  was  from  the  very  beginning  not 
very  categorical.  Sir  Edward  Grey  therefore  finds  that  England 
is  now  far  naore  isolated  in  this  question  than  before. 

(642)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Letter,  March  1-14,  1911. 

Grey  requested  me  to-day  to  call  upon  him.    He  told  me  that  he 
had  been  so  busy  of  late,  owing  to  Asquith's  ^  absence,  that  it  had 
*  British  Premier. 


558        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

not  been  possible  for  him  to  see  me,  but  he  wished  to  inform  me, 
without  delay,  that  the  British  Government  had  received  formal 
proposals  from  Constantinople  concerning  the  railway  line  between 
Bagdad  and  the  Persian  Gulf. 

These  proposals  aim  at  internationalising  this  part  of  the  Bag- 
dad Railway,  Germany,  England  and  France  each  participating 
with  20  per-cent  and  Turkey  with  40  per-cent.  The  line  would  end 
at  Koweit,  which  must  be  treated  as  Turkish  territory. 

Sir  Edward  immediately  told  me,  that  the  British  Government  would 
not  accept  this  proposal;  he  had,  however,  for  the  present,  confined  him- 
self to  stating  that  the  Turkish  proposals  would  be  taken  into  considera- 
tion. Speaking  to  me,  the  Minister  added  nothing  more;  only  in 
connection  with  Koweit  he  said,  that  England  was  bound  by  her 
understanding  with  the  Sheik,^  which  obliged  her  to  maintain  the 
present  situation. 

Sir  Edward  requested  me  to  treat  this  information  as  confiden- 
tial ;  he  had  made  a  similar  statement  to  the  French  Ambassador. 

/  need  hardly  observe,  that  the  new  Turkish  communications  will 
not  promote  a  solution  of  the  question  and  that  the  examination  of  the 
Turkish  proposals,  according  to  the  English  Secretary  of  State,  is  only 
a  pure  formality  in  order  not  to  break  off  the  negotiations  by  a  direct 
refusal,^ 

(643)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sazonoff.    Telegram,  Feb.  18- 
March  3,  1911.    No.  26. 

After  Cruppi,  I  received  a  visit  from  the  new  Naval  Minister 
Delcasse,  the  most  prominent  member  of  the  Cabinet  whose  re- 
turn to  power  has  aroused  such  lively  discussion  in  the  European 
press.  Delcasse  repeated  to  me  everything  that  Cruppi  had  said 
regarding  the  unshakeable  nature  of  the  foreign  policy  of  France 
and  the  radical  tendencies  wrongly  attributed  to  the  Cabinet. 
In  addition  to  this,  he  declared  to  me,  that  his  entrance  into  the  Cabinet 
formed  the  guarantee  that  special  care  would  be  devoted  to  the  military 
power  of  France.  His  first  task  would  be  the  creation  of  a  strong 
fleet,  and  he  hopes  to  be  able  to  have  at  his  disposal  six  new  armoured 

*  An  Arab  chieftain  owing  allegiance  to  the  Ottoman  government  and  not  quali- 
fied to  make  "understandings"  with  Great  Britain  which  either  "bound"  or 
"obliged"  Grey. 

^The  documents  continue  with  No.  646. 


ENTENTE  VS.  GERMANY  IN  S.  W.  ASIA  559 

vessels  not  later  than  August  or  September.  He  also  guarantees  that 
the  new  Cabinet  wUl  redouble  its  efforts  regarding  the  land  forces.  It 
is  not  at  all  his  intention  to  exceed  the  competency  of  his  office,  and  to 
arouse  suspicion  on  the  part  of  Germany,  yet  he  has  assured  me,  that 
he,  on  his  part,  will  do  everything  in  order  to  m^ke  the  relations  be- 
tween France  and  Russia  as  close  as  possible,  and  he  has  begged  me  to 
lay  his  sentiments  of  sincere  devotion  to  Russia  at  the  foot  of  the  throne.^ 
On  leaving  me,  Delcasse  drove  to  pay  a  visit  to  the  German 
Ambassador. 


(644)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Letter,  March  1-14,  1911. 

....  With  regard  to  foreign  relations,  I  have  recently  sent  you 
a  brief  report  regarding  the  statements  made  to  me  by  Cruppi  and 
Delcasse.  Since  then,  I  have  also  had  long  conversations  with 
Monis  and  Caillaux.  They  have  all  assured  me  of  the  unshake- 
able  firmness  of  France's  Foreign  Policy,  and  of  the  absolute  sin- 
cerity of  the  new  Government  regarding  the  alliance  with  Russia.^ 
Even  though  a  certain  criticism  of  Pichon*s  policy  could  be  felt, 
it  was  merely  in  the  sense  of  the  newspaper  articles  in  which  the  prede- 
cessor of  Cruppi  was  accused  of  not  having  made  the  most  of  the 
Triple  Entente  for  the  advancement  of  the  interests  of  France,  Russia 
and  England.  Although  Delcasse  emphasized,  that  he  did  not  wish  to 
exceed  the  competency  of  the  Ministry  of  the  Navy,  it  is  nevertheless 
assumed  that  he  will  influence  the  activity  of  Cruppi,  since  the  latter  has 
little  experience  in  foreign  questions.  Delcasse  has  sought  to  convince 
me  that  the  new  Government  will  not  only  not  permit  any  weakening 
of  the  military  power  of  France,  but  will  develop  the  land  and  naval 
forces  to  a  still  higher  efficiency.  Delcasse  explained  to  me  that,  even 
though  civilians  were  once  more  placed  in  control  of  the  two  mili- 
tary departments,  the  former  organisation  of  the  higher  military 
offices  as  introduced  by  General  Brienne  and  Admiral  Boue,  would 
be  retained  in  future.  With  special  reference  to  the  fleet,  his,  Del- 
casse*s,  appointment  as  Naval  Minister  was  a  guarantee  that  par- 
ticular importance  was  attached  to  it  and  he  hopes  to  have  the  new 

*  Strong  language  for  a  quasi-radical. 

'  Misgivings  were  due  to  the  formation  of  a  ministry  of  men  who  had  marched 
under  the  socialist  and  radical  standards. 


560        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

squadron  of  battle-ships  in  commission  not  later  than  August  or 
September. 

(645)  The  Same  to  the  Same.      Telegram,  Feb.  \S-March  3,  1911. 

The  new  French  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  came  to  see 
to-day,  immediately  after  his  appointment,  and  before  he  had  paid 
any  other  visits,  and  assured  fne,  in  the  most  categorical  form,  that, 
in  the  matter  of  foreign  affairs,  the  new  Government  would  inflexibly 
pursue  the  policy  of  the  former  Cabinet,  and  that  he  himself  would 
devote  all  his  efforts  to  preserve  and  to  further  the  close  rela- 
tions of  friendship  and  alliance  between  France  and  Russia.  In 
a  long  conversation,  he  sought  to  refute  the  radical  tendencies  at- 
tributed to  the  new  Cabinet  and  declared  that  he  and  his  colleagues 
set  order  at  home,  and  the  external  Power  of  France,  above  every- 
thing else.  The  new  Cabinet  is  severely  criticised  in  intelligent  and 
moderate  circles;  personally  Cruppi  made  a  very  good  impression 
upon  me. 

(646)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Letter,  March  3-16,  1911. 

The  new  French  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Cruppi,  has  not 
yet  sufficiently  acquainted  himself  with  current  business,  to  be  able 
to  enter  upon  an  exchange  of  opinions  with  me  as  to  the  questions 
that  interest  us.  Especially  in  the  matter  of  the  Bagdad  Railway, 
and  the  construction  of  railways  in  Asia  Minor  in  general,  he,  as  yet, 
has  no  clear  insight.  Bompard  ^  arrived  here,  the  other  day,  in  order 
to  report  explicitly  on  these  questions.  Furthermore,  Cruppi  has 
summoned  the  two  brothers  Cambon  ^  to  Paris,  and  the  Minister 
thinks  he  cannot  begin  the  discussions  with  me  until  he  has  ex- 
changed views  with  them.  I,  on  my  part,  reminded  him,  that  his 
predecessor  had  promised  to  keep  me  constantly  informed,  and  not  to 
undertake  anything  without  a  previous  exchange  of  opinions  with  us. 
Cruppi  renewed  this  promise  with  the  greatest  willingness,  and 
declared  that  he  would  meet  me  as  soon  as  he  had  discussed  mat- 
ters with  the  two  brothers  Cambon. 

'  French  Ambassador  at  Constantinople. 

'Paul  and  Jules,  French  ambassadors  at  London  and  Berlin,  respectively. 


ENTENTE  VS.  GERMANY  IN  S.  W.  ASIA  561 

In  spite  of  Cruppi's  evident  desire  not  to  enter  more  closely  into 
the  questions  raised  by  me,  I  took  this  opportunity  of  correcting  the 
impression,  he  had  evidently  gained  from  various  newspapers,  especially 
English  ones,  of  the  meeting  at  Potsdam.  These  papers  present  this 
event  as  if  Russia  had  deserted  England  and  France  in  the  Bagdad  ques- 
tion, and  for  this  had  been  granted  concessions  in  Persia  by  Germany — 
through  which  the  position  of  the  London  and  Paris  Cabinets  had 
become  much  more  difficult. 

I  explained  to  Cruppi  that  our  proposed  agreement  with  Ger- 
many, regarding  Persia,  in  no  wise  anticipates  the  solution  of  the 
Bagdad-Khanekin  question,  no  more  than  of  all  other  questions 
connected  with  the  Bagdad  enterprise.  Our  promise,  no  longer 
to  oppose  the  participation  of  foreign  capital  in  the  Bagdad  scheme, 
does  not  only  not  signify  any  weakening  of  the  English  and  French 
positions,  but,  on  the  contrary,  takes  account  of  the  constant  com- 
plaints made  against  us  by  English  and  French  financiers. 
In  conclusion  I  once  again  emphasized  our  lively  hope  that  the  Paris 
Cabinet  will  take  no  step  without  consulting  us  beforehand. 


(647)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  March  9-22,  1911.    No.  31. 

I  refer  to  my  letter  of  March  3rd. 

After  his  interview  with  the  brothers  Cambon,  Cruppi  appointed 
next  Saturday  for  an  interview  with  me.  In  all  probability  the 
question  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  will  be  discussed.  I  urgently  beg 
to  be  instructed  as  to  whether  I  may  officially  confirm  the  idea 
mentioned  in  my  letter,  viz ;  That,  by  the  conclusion  of  an  agreement 
with  Germany,  we  in  no  wise  separate  ourselves  from  France  and 
England  and  that  we  have  not  anticipated  any  important  decisions.  May 
I,  in  particular,  state  that  we  have  retained  a  free  hand  in  the  matter  of 
the  four  per  cent  increase  in  the  customs  duties,  and  that  we  are  free 
to  make  our  consent  subject  to  one  or  another  condition,  according  to 
agreement  with  France  and  England?  Finally,  if  we  should  speak  of 
an  eventual  inter  nationalisation  of  the  Bagdad-Persian  Gulf  Railway, 
may  I  insist  on  our  participation,  even  if  it  be  only  a  fictitious  one, 
because  by  that  means  we  should  secure  predominance  to  the  group  of 
the  three  Entente  Powers? 


562         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

(648)  Neratoff,  Acting  Russian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  to   the  Russian 
Ambassador  at  Paris.    Telegram,  March  10-23,  1911.    No.  308. 

Your  telegram  No.  31  received. 

We  have  no  objection  to  your  making  the  proposed  declaration 
to  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  We  have  not  undertaken  any- 
thing with  regard  to  the  Bagdad  Railway  or  the  Khanekin  branch 
line.  We  have  merely  abandoned  our  opposition  to  the  participation 
of  foreign  capital  in  the  scheme,  and  have  expressed  a  wish  to  take  over 
the  Sedidje-Khanekin  line,  in  case  the  raihvay  should  be  divided  up 
among  the  interested  Powers.  We  are  in  no  wise  bound  in  the  question 
of  the  four  per  cent  increase  in  the  customs  duties.  With  regard  to  the 
railway  from  Bagdad  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  we  consider  it  proper,  that 
we,  as  one  of  the  four  interested  Powers,  should  participate  in  this 
scheme,  if,  in  addition  to  England,  Germany  and  Turkey  should  do 
so — but  only  on  condition  that  no  financial  sacrifices  be  demanded  of  us. 
Our  participation  may  be  of  help  to  England  and  France.  We 
should  be  glad  to  learn  the  course  of  further  negotiations. 

(649)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sazonoff.    Letter,  March  13-26,  1911. 

After  we  had  discussed  the  question  of  the  railways  in  Asia 
Minor  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Black  Sea,  Cruppi  and  I  passed  on  to 
the  discussion  of  the  Bagdad  Railway. 

Here  also,  Cruppi  adopted  a  non-committal  attitude,  and  said 
nothing  definite  about  the  standpoint  of  the  French  Government 
regarding  the  last  phase,  which  presents  itself  as  a  result  of  Ger- 
many's renouncing  her  claims  to  the  section  Bagdad-Persian  Gulf, 
neither  did  he  say  anything  about  the  intentions  of  France  in  the 
future.  He  merely  said,  that  my  presentation  of  the  attitude  of 
Russia,  in  the  question  of  the  Bagdad  Railway,  as  I  had  expounded 
it  to  him  in  our  private  interview,  had  been  extremely  interesting 
to  him,  and  that  he  had  communicated  my  statements  to  P.  Cam- 
bon  who  was  attentively  watching  this  question  in  London. 

On  the  strength  of  your  telegram  of  March  10-23,  I  informed 
the  Minister  that  I  now  confirmed  these  statements  in  the  name  of 
the  Imperial  Government.  Cruppi  replied,  he  attached  the  greatest 
importance  to  that  information,  and  promised  to  keep  us  au  courant. 
When  I  asked  him  which  solution  France  preferred — a  division  into 


ENTENTE  VS.  GERMANY  IN  S.  W.  ASIA  563 

separate  sections,  or  internationalization  of  the  whole  line — Cruppi  made 
no  definite  reply. 


(650)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sasonoff.    Confidential  Let' 
ter,  March  1-14,  1911. 

Grey  announced  to  me,  that  he  had  a  very  confidential  communi- 
cation to  make.  The  German  Government  had  just  renewed  a 
step,  which  had  already  been  made  two  years  ago  without  then 
leading  to  any  practical  result.  It  consists  in  a  proposal  to  enter 
into  direct  negotiations  regarding  questions  which  were  to  be 
more  closely  defined.  The  Berlin  Cabinet  had  suggested  that  it  would 
he  useful  to  find  a  general  formula  which  would  more  closely  determine 
the  relations  between  the  two  nations. 

Sir  Edward  stated  to  me,  that  certain  interests  of  England,  and 
those  of  general  peace,  might  make  the  improvement  of  relations 
between  England  and  Germany  desirable  by  concluding  an  agree- 
ment, which  would  be  supplementary  to  the  German-French  Mo- 
rocco agreement,  and  the  present  negotiations  between  Germany 
and  Russia. 

The  London  Cabinet  in  consequence  indicated  three  points 
which  might  form  the  basis  of  an  agreement:  (1)  The  Bagdad 
Railway.  (2)  The  Railways  in  South  Persia.  (3)  Armaments. 

I  asked  the  Minister  whether  he  had  more  definitely  specified 
the  term  Bagdad  Railway.  He  said  that  he  had  defined 
the  question  by  this  single  word  without  further  explanations. 
The  same  might  he  said  concerning  the  railways  in  South  Persia,  and,  he 
went  on  to  say,  for  England  the  thing  was  to  protect  herself  against 
the  danger  of  German  railway  concessions  in  those  districts  where 
England  wants  to  have  the  exclusive  control  of  railway  lines,  the  con- 
cessions for  which  she  will  eventually  demand.  This  did  not  signify 
that  England  would  oppose  German  participation  if  this  were  to  be  of  a 
purely  financial  nature,  no  more  than  she  would  oppose  French  and 
Russian  co-operation  if  this  should  be  desired. 

Sir  Edward  said  nothing  concerning  the  armaments.  His  views 
on  this  subject  are  already  known  to  you.  I  do  not  think  that  he 
believes  in  the  immediate  realisation  of  this  idea,  but  it  is  his  in- 
tention to  bring  it  up  for  discussion. 


564        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

As  to  the  idea  of  a  general  formula,  which  Germany  has  pro- 
posed, the  Minister  expressed  himself  in  detail.  In  his  first  reply 
to  the  German  Government,  he  did  not  entirely  reject  such  an  idea, 
but  he  remarked,  that  the  agreement  between  England,  France  and 
Russia  contained  no  such  general  formula,  that,  at  all  events,  the 
London  Cabinet  could  not  accept  any  formula,  which  might  preju- 
dice the  existing  connections  with  the  Cabinets  of  Petersburg  and 
Paris,  but  that  he  would  be  willing  to  consider  any  eventual  propo- 
sitions of  the  German  Governm,ent. 

In  explanation,  Sir  Edward  added,  that  he  could  not  see  the  neces- 
sity of  such  a  general  formula,  and  that  such  a  formula  would  be  pos- 
sible only,  if  Russia  and  France  were  to  be  included;  that  would  lead 
to  a  kind  of  general  agreement,  but  which,  anyhow,  could  not  alter  the 
actual  situation.^ 

1  thanked  Sir  Edward  for  his  communication,  and  told  him  that 
Your  Excellency  would  appreciate  their  strictly  friendly  and  con- 
fidential character. 

The  proposed  negotiations  therefore  cover  four  points  and  not  three, 
the  three  which  had  been  proposed  by  England  and  that  of  the  general 
formula  proposed  by  the  Berlin  Cabinet.^ 

(651)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Letter,  March  15-28,  1911. 

In  consequence  of  the  departure  of  our  last  Courier,  I  have  not 
yet  had  time  to  give  you  an  account  of  my  impression  of  the  com- 
munication which  Grey  made  to  me.  /  need  not  go  into  details  con- 
cerning the  question  of  armaments  which,  it  appears  to  me,  is  more  a 
matter  of  form.  Even  if  this  question  could  not  be  solved  it  would 
not  mean  that  the  proposed  negotiations  have  not  led  to  practical  re- 
sults. I  have  to  mention  only  the  point  which  is  due  to  the  initiative 
of  Germany — the  general  formula,  which  is  to  determine  the  future 
relations  of  the  two  Powers.  From  the  political  point  of  view,  this 
appears  to  me  to  be  the  most  important  point.  It  would  mean  an 
Anglo-German  agreement  covering  all  questions  which  directly 
interest  us — Turkey,  Persia  and  the  whole  East. 

You  will  have  observed  that  Grey,  in  his  reply,  has  stated  his  firm 

*  An  instance  of  Grey's  remarkable  ethics.    Some  sort  of  an  agreement  was  to 
be  reached  with  Germany,  but  it  would  not  "alter  the  actual  situation." 
'  A  sample  of  the  alertness  of  Count  Benckendorff 's  mind. 


ENTENTE  VS.  GERMANY  IN  S.  W.  ASIA  565 

intention  to  adhere  to  the  basis  of  the  three-Power  Entente,  whereby 
all  such  proposals  as  an  exclusive  agreement  between  Germany  and 
England  are  declined. 

I  cannot,  however,  deny  that  public  opinion  in  England,  to-day,  is 
less  indisposed  to  m^ke  concessions  to  Germany,  in  order  to  improve 
the  relations  between  the  two  countries,  than  has  been  the  case  hereto- 
fore, and  I  must  add,  that  the  veil,  which  covers,  in  the  eyes  of  the 
general  public,  our  negotiations  with  Germany,  works  here  like  some 
corrosive,  and  that  it  is  in  our  interest  to  put  an  end  as  soon  as  possible 
to  this  situation. 

As  is  generally  known,  the  English-Russian  Entente  has  for  particu- 
lar reasons  never  been  popular  with  the  extreme  Left  in  Parliamentary 
circles.  The  pro-German  propaganda  first  turned  to  this  party,  and  then 
utilized  our  present  negotiations  with  Germany  in  order  to  attract  to  it- 
self wider  circles  of  the  liberal  party.  The  goal  is  far  from  being 
reached,  but  certain  journals,  as  for  instance  the  ''Westminster  Gazette" 
no  longer  oppose  the  thought  of  better  relations  with  Germany 

Such  a  spirit  encourages  the  efforts  in  favour  of  a  rapprochement 
with  Germany,  and  these  will  be  weakened  only  after  the  scope  of  our 
negotiations  with  Germany  has  been  made  known. 

The  most  important  point  is  that  of  our  freedom  of  action  in 
the  question  of  the  4%  increase  of  the  Turkish  customs  duties.  If 
this  freedom  is  clearly  established,  England  will  know  to  what 
point  she  can  reckon  upon  our  support  in  the  matter  of  the  Bagdad 
Railway  negotiations,  and  the  impression  will  thereby  be  avoided,  that 
Russian  policy  is  answerable  for  the  concessions  which  England  must 
make  in  this  matter. 

I  do  not  believe  that  it  will  be  possible  for  her  further  to  maintain 
all  her  claims  regarding  Koweit  and  the  Bagdad  line  to  the  Persian  Gulf. 
It  will  be  rather  a  question  of  altering  the  Turkish  proposals  in  a 
sense  favourable  for  England. 

I  furthermore  consider  it  at  the  present  moment  urgent  to  rele- 
gate to  the  background  all  questions  in  which  Russian  and  English 
interests  are  opposed  in  the  Persian  railway  question,  by  declaring 
ourselves  in  agreement  with  such  lines,  the  construction  of  which 
is  unavoidable.  We  should  also  settle  all  other  questions  in  the 
most  conciliatory  spirit,  such  as,  for  instance,  that  of  the  boundary 
of  territorial  waters. 


566        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

Otherwise,  it  would  be  of  too  great  an  advantage  to  Germany  to  deal 
separately  with  us  and  with  England.  Every  semblance  of  a  discord 
between  us  and  England  would  be  directly  useful  to  Germany. 

(652)  The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Berlin  to  Sazonoff.    Report,  March 
18-31,  1911. 

The  British  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  has  agreed  to 
the  idea  of  an  Anglo-American  Arbitration  Treaty,  which  would 
not  contain  the  usual  limitations,  but  would  extend  to  all  questions. 
This  declaration  has  created  a  certain  amount  of  excitement,  not 
only  in  Governmental  circles  here,  but  also  among  the  public. 

In  this  declaration  of  Grey's,  one  is  inclined  to  see  the  first  step 
towards  a  rapprochement  between  England  and  America — which  rap- 
prochement is  considered  in  the  German  press  as  a  danger  to  German 
interests — a  coalition  of  England  and  America,  with  the  possible  partici- 
pation of  France.  These  fears  weaken  the  impression  made  by  Grey's 
speech,  who  expressed  the  hope  of  an  improvement  in  the  relations  be- 
tween Germany  and  England. 

(653)  Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.     Telegram,  March, 

3-16,  1911.    No.  271. 

I  am  writing  to  Teheran : 

"The  British  Ambassador  has  returned  to  the  question  of  a 
concession  for  an  English  railway  from  Mohammerah  to  Khorama- 
bad.  He  remarked  that  England  was  greatly  interested  in  secur- 
ing such  a  concession  for  herself,  although  she  does  not  intend  to 
construct  the  railway  without  having  previously  notified  us. 

"This  line  would  later  be  extended  to  Julfa,  in  order  to  link  it  up 
with  our  Caucasian  lines,  as  stipulated  in  the  Russian  proposal  of 
1908  concerning  a  Persian  railway  from  the  Caspian  Sea  via  Te- 
heran to  Mohammerah.  The  English  Government  apparently,  needs 
such  a  concession  principally  to  soothe  public  opinion  in  England,  and 
perhaps  to  be  able  to  exert  pressure  on  Germany  in  the  matter  of  the 
Southern  end  of  the  Bagdad  Railway.  I  again  pointed  out  to  the  Am- 
bassador how  very  harmful  such  a  railway  would  be  to  our  commercial 
interests,  whereupon  he  repeated  that  it  was  at  present  only  a  question 
of  a  concession.'' 


ENTENTE  VS.  GERMANY  IN  S.  W.  ASIA  567 

(654)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram, 
March  8-21,  1911. 

The  negotiations  of  the  Sublime  Porte  with  the  Bagdad  Railway 
Company  are  almost  concluded  and  the  ratification  is  to  take  place 
within  the  next  few  days.  Simultaneously,  the  Turkish  Government 
informed  the  British  Ambassador,  that  it  only  awaits  the  signing  of  the 
German  renouncement  to  the  Bagdad-Persian  Gulf  line  in  order  to  begin 
negotiations  with  England  regarding  this  section  of  the  Bagdad  line. 
The  negotiations  with  the  French,  as  to  the  Adriatic  Railway  and 
the  Samsun-Sivas  line,  are  proceeding  favourably,  the  Turks,  ap- 
parently, wishing  to  meet  the  French.  The  negotiations  with 
Chester,  on  the  other  hand,  are  dragging  considerably,  this  render- 
ing the  latter  dependent  on  us;  we  might  be  able  to  make  use  of 
this  circumstance  very  shortly. 

(655)  Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.     Telegram,  March 

11-24,  1911.    No.  312. 

Our  Minister  at  Teheran  telegraphs : 

"Within  the  last  few  days  Greenway,  one  of  the  directors  of  the 
Anglo-Persian  Petroleum  Company  and  of  the  Persian  Bank,  has 
arrived  from  South  Persia.  He  has  personally,  and  of  his  own  ac- 
cord, proposed,  to  the  Ministers  and  the  Regent,  to  finance  a  rail- 
road from  Mohammerah  to  Smirenabad,  should  the  British  and 
Russian  Government  be  agreeable  to  this : 

"The  Ministers  have  received  this  proposal  with  approval,  al- 
though they  fear  opposition  on  the  part  of  the  Persian  Parliament. 
The  Regent  wishes  the  railroads  in  Persia  to  be  built  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible; England  and  Russia,  in  his  opinion,  to  draw  up  a  common 
plan,  which  according  to  the  importance  of  the  different  lines, 
would  be  gradually  executed." 

(656)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  March  14-27,  1911.    No.  330. 

We  replied  to  the  communication  of  the  British  Ambassador 
regarding  the  Mohammerah-Khoramabad  line  with  the  following 
memorandum : 

"The  proposed  railroad  is  situated  in  the  neutral  zone,  and,  ac- 
cording to  Article  3  of  the  Convention  of  1907,  we  cannot  deny 


568        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

England  the  right  to  demand  such  a  concession  for  herself.  The  ter- 
minal of  this  line  is,  however,  situated  in  closest  proximity  to  our  zone 
of  influence;  the  line  would  he  injurious  to  our  economic  interests  and  — 
would,  therefore,  he  very  unfavourahly  received  hy  public  opinion.^  I 
Hence  we  learn  with  pleasure,  that  at  present  it  is  only  a  matter  of 
securing  the  concession  for  England,  and  that  all  questions,  relating 
to  the  carrying  out  of  this  enterprise,  will  be  regulated  conjointly 
with  us  at  some  later  date.  Finally,  we  thank  the  Ambassador  for 
informing  us  that  no  objections  are  raised  in  London  to  English 
capital  participating  in  the  construction  of  the  Russian  lines  in 
North  Persia." 

(657)  The  Russian  Minister  at  Teheran  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram,  March 
19-April  1,  1911.    No.  221. 

The  British  Minister  here  has  been  instructed  officially,  to  re- 
quest the  Persian  Government,  to  grant  England  a  concession  for 
the  construction  of  a  port  in  Ormusieh,  as  well  as  for  a  railway  from 
this  place  to  Khoramabad  and  a  branch  line  to  Mohammerah.  The 
fact  is  emphasized  that  it  is  Itor  the  present  only  a  demand  of  an 
option. 

(658)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  March  ZUApril  3,  1911.    No.  224. 

Continuation  of  my  telegram  No.  221.    Strictly  confidential. 

Immediately  on  receipt  of  the  British  Minister's  note,  the  Per- 
sian Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  requested  him  temporarily  to 
withdraw  the  note,  ostensibly  because  public  opinion  in  Persia  ^ 
would  connect  this  concession  with  England's  endeavours  to  main- 
tain better  relations  with  the  Persian  Government.  Acting  on  in- 
structions received,  the  British  Minister  has  declined  this  request. 

(659)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  April  13-26,  1911. 

The  Persian  Government  has  refused  England's  request  for  a  rail- 
way concession  from  Mohammerah  to  Khoramahad  on  the  pretext 
that  the  railways  in  Persia  must  he  purely  commercial  enterprises.^ 
The  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  verbally  informed  the   British 

*  and  '  Last  resort  of  the  diplomatist. 

*  A  pretext  in  this  case,  perhaps,  though  usually  good  common  sense. 


ENTENTE  VS.  GERMANY  IN  S.  W.  ASIA  569 

Minister  that  the  Persians  see  in  this  line  a  political  aim  inasmuch 
as  the  railway  is  not  to  lead  into  the  Russian  sphere  of  interest, 
whereby  the  partition  of  Persia  into  spheres  of  influence  would,  so 
to  speak,  be  confirmed.  The  Regent  has  expressed  the  opinion  that 
a  concession  for  a  railway  from  the  Russian  frontier  to  Moham- 
merah  would  probably  be  granted  to  an  international  or  an  Anglo- 
Russian-French  syndicate.  This  latter  could  then  divide  the  control 
of  the  different  sections  of  the  line  according  to  the  respective 
spheres  of  interest. 

(660)  Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople.     Telegram, 
April  26-May  9,  1911.    No.  576. 

The  negotiations  on  the  railway  from  Bagdad  to  the  Persian 
Gulf  are  apparently  dragging,  and  I  request  you  to  answer  the 
following  questions: 

1.)  To  what  extent  can  Turkey  again  freely  dispose  of  this  line, 
and  what  rights  has  Germany  reserved  for  herself? 

2.)  Is  the  concession  granted  to  Germany  for  a  railway  from 
;^^  Bagdad  to  Alexandrette,  and  the  construction  of  the  port  there,  a 
compensation  for  the  renunciation  of  the  line  from  Bagdad  to  the 
Persian  Gulf? 

3.)  Have  the  stipulations  relating  thereto  been  embodied  in  a 
document,  and  if  so  in  what  form  and  how  many  documents? 

(661)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram, 
April  2S-May  11,  19U,    No.  229. 

Your  telegram  No.  576  received.  The  hitch  in  the  negotiations 
is  rendering  the  Turks  restless,  and  may  be  explained  by  the  fact, 
that  England  has  not  5set  given  a  reply  to  the  Turkish  proposal  to 
internationalise  the  railway  from  Bagdad  to  the  Persian  Gulf. 

1.)  According  to  informations  of  the  British  and  French  Am- 
bassadors, Germany  has  only  stipulated  the  following  privilege  for 
herself:  Germany's  share  must  be  exactly  as  large  as  that  of  any  other 
Power.  As  to  the  rest,  the  Turks  would  seem  to  be  again  free  to 
dispose  of  this  sector. 

2.)  The  concession  for  the  railway  and  the  harbour  at  Alexan- 
drette was  granted  on  the  occasion  of  the  last  year's  loan  at  Berlin 
and  Vienna.    In  order  definitely  to  secure  this  important  conces- 


570        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

sion  for  herself,  Germany  has  probably  made  far-reaching  con- 
cessions whilst  waiving  all  claims  to  the  Bagdad-Persian  Gulf  line. 
The  formal  part  of  the  agreement  is  secret,  but  I  shall  endeavour 
to  submit  to  you  as  exact  information  as  possible. 


(662)    Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople.     Telegram, 
May  2-15,  1911.    No.  610. 


I 


My  conversation  with  the  German  Ambassador  leads  me  to 
believe,  that  Germany  has  not  yet  definitely  renounced  her  claim 
to  the  Bagdad-Persian  Gulf  line.  A  final  decision  will  only  be  given 
after  various  other  questions  of  interest  to  Germany  have  been 
regulated.  We  should  like  to  know  what  connection  exists  between 
the  Alexandrette  concession  and  Germany's  renunciation  of  the 
Bagdad-Persian  Gulf  line,  and  whether  the  execution  of  the  first 
enterprise  depends  on  the  latter. 

(663)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  to  Sazonoff.    Telegram, 
May  4-17,  1911.    No.  264. 

Sub  No.  265  you  will  receive  the  wording  of  the  Turkish  com- 
munication, made  to  the  British  and  French  Ambassadors  relating 
to  Germany's  renunciation  of  the  Bagdad-Persian  Gulf  line.  The 
wording  of  the  German  declaration  itself  is  unknown  to  the  Ambas- 
sadors. Both  regard  the  declaration  as  being  intentionally  abstruse, 
and,  like  all  German  agreements  with  Turkey,  disadvantageous  to 
the  latter,  bribery  generally  playing  a  part  therein.  The  Alexan- 
drette concession  is  final  and  does  not  depend  on  German  participa- 
tion in  the  Bagdad-Persian  Gulf  Railway.  The  British  Government 
has  still  returned  no  answer. 

(664)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  May  4-17, 1911.    No.  265. 

March  8,  1911.    Declaration. 

"The  Bagdad  Company  is  ready  to  waive  the  concession  for  the 
4  or  500  kilometers  of  railway  from  the  Persian  Gulf,  as  well  as  for 
a  harbour  at  Basra  and  the  Persian  Gulf,  in  favour  of  a  new  Turkish 
Company  in  which  the  Bagdad  Railway  Company  is  willing  to  be  in 
the  minority,  as  regards  the  participation  of  Turkish  capital.  It, 
however,  desires  to  participate  to  the  same  extent,  as  does  th< 


ENTENTE  VS.  GERMANY  IN  S.  W.  ASIA  571 

capital  of  any  third  non-Turkish  Power.  At  the  same  time,  the 
Bagdad  Railway  Company  reserves  to  itself  the  right  to  come  to 
an  understanding  with  the  new  company,  or  the  Turkish  State,  in 
order  to  be  granted  a  compensation  for  the  disadvantages  arising 
from  the  renunciation  to  the  500  kilometers  mentioned  above,  all 
the  more  as  the  construction  of  the  section  in  question  is  less  diffi- 
cult, and  less  expensive,  than  the  remaining  part  of  the  Bagdad 
line." 

This  text  was  communicated  to  both  Embassies  on  March  11-24. 
In  the  copy  handed  to  Lowther,  the  words  "is  ready  to  waive"  were 
altered  by  Rifaat  Pasha  into  "waives,"  and  the  word  "compensa- 
tion" replaces  the  word  "indemnity,"  which  is  crossed  out.  The 
Ambassadors  cannot  explain  this  difference. 

(665)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Neratoff.    Letter,  May  11- 
24,  1911. 

I  received  your  private  letter  of  May  5-18.  Yesterday  morning, 
I  called  on  Sir  Arthur  Nicolson,  who  told  me  Buchanan  had  in- 
formed him  that  I  was  instructed  to  speak  to  him  in  strict  confi- 
dence about  the  Bagdad  Railway  and  the  state  of  our  negotiations 
with  Germany.  He  gave  me  Buchanan's  telegram  to  read,  which 
reproduces  the  contents  of  your  letter  very  closely  and  supplements 
your  interview  with  the  Ambassador. 

Sir  Arthur  immediately  understood  the  difficulties  of  the  whole 
situation.  He  remarked  that  it  was  impossible  to  express  an 
opinion,  without  being  acquainted  with  all  the  counter  proposals 
of  Germany.  He  is  convinced  that  it  would  be  disastrous  if  our  nego- 
tiations with  Germany  were  broken  off.  If  it  be  a  question — as  the 
German  Ambassador  told  you — of  undertaking  an  obligation  "in 
respect  of  the  whole  Bagdad  Railway  system,  including  the  Gulf 
section,  the  construction  of  which  will  have  to  be  discussed  later," 
then,  Nicolson  says,  a  clause  must  be  added  to  this  declaration  which, 
while  excluding  our  opposition  on  principle,  leaves  us  the  possibility  of 
participation  without  making  financial  sacrifices.  The  latter  would  be 
the  case  if,  independently  of  the  other  Powers,  we  were  to  yield 
to  Germany's  wish  and  give  our  consent  to  the  increase  in  the  Turk- 
ish import  duties.  He,  moreover,  told  me  that  this  was  his  personal 
view  and  that  I  should  have  to  apply  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  himself. 


572        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


•% 


I  have  just  spoken  with  the  Minister.  But  before  I  report  t 
on  my  interview  with  him  I  should  like  to  say  something  about  cer- 
tain statements  which   Count  Pourtales   made   to  you.     He  de-^ 
dared  Germany  had  at  her  disposal  sufficient  funds  to  construct  //tifll 
line  from  Koniah  to  Bagdad  without  any  help  whatever.     That  is 
probable,  but  not  proved.    German  official  and  financial  circles  make 
this  assertion.    English  and  French  financial  circles  are  more  scep- 
tical; the  latter  especially  believe  Germany  will  have  to  resort  t< 
the  support  of  the  Paris  Exchange. 

Anyway,  the  calculations  seem  to  be  based  on  the  surplus  profit 
of  the  Turkish  Public  Debt.  But  the  Turkish  Treasury  cannot 
manage  without  this  surplus  profit,  unless  other  sources  of  income 
should  be  at  its  disposal,  and  there  can  be  no  other  than  the  in- 
creased customs  duties.  Count  Pourtales  maintains  that  Germany  is 
so  bent  on  coming  to  an  agreement  with  Russia,  because  all  attempts  to 
come  to  an  understanding  with  England  and  Turkey  have  been  fruitless. 
As  to  Turkey,  it  seems  that  the  relinquishment  of  the  Gulf  sector  by 
the  German  concessionaires  is  an  accomplished  fact.  In  that  respect  the 
negotiations  have  not  been  fruitless ;  on  the  contrary,  Turkey  seems 
to  have  subjected  herself  still  further  to  German  interests.  As  re- 
gards England,  the  expression  "fruitless"  would  be  premature; 
negotiations  are  proceeding  slowly,  just  like  our  own.  Of  course, 
Germany  would  be  greatly  relieved  if  Russia  were  to  separate  her 
interests  from  those  of  England  and  France,  and  were  thus  to  de- 
liver up  her  chief  weapon :  her  consent  to  the  increase  of  the  cus- 
toms duties. 

In  this  connection  we  must  keep  in  mind  our  direct  interests  in 
Persia,  and  we  must  carefully  consider  in  what  way  we  can  protect 
them.  We  should  otherwise  have  parted  with  our  last  and  most 
effective  weapon  and,  at  the  same  time,  have  lost  the  support  of 
England  in  particular,  as  well  as  that  of  France.  England  will  find 
herself  obliged  to  conduct  the  negotiations  in  quite  another  spirit, 
and  since  Germany  desires  to  preserve  peace,  I  think  it  likely  that 
she  will  go  very  far  to  meet  England  when  she  has  only  England  to 
deal  with. 

On  the  other  hand,  Germany  will  be  the  mistress  of  a  vast  railway 
system  equally  important  in  an  economic,  a  political,  and  a  strategic  re- 
spect, spreading  over  the  whole  of  Asia  Minor  and  connecting  all  seas: 


ENTENTE  VS.  GERMANY  IN  S.  W.  ASIA  573 

she  will  be  so  closely  bound  up  with  the  interests  of  Turkey,  that  she 
will  find  herself  obliged  to  protect  Turkish  interests  as  much  as  her  own 
and  it  will  be  difficult,  nay,  I  might  say  impossible,  for  Germany  to  ful- 
fil all  the  obligations  which  she  is  prepared  to  undertake  towards  us. 
The  chief  interest  of  Germany  will  be  the  interests  of  Turkey  and  not 
the  preservation  of  Russian  interests  in  Persia 

I  am  now  coming  to  my  interview  with  Sir  Edward  Grey.  The 
Minister  regards  the  situation  as  serious,  but  remains  calm.  He 
reminds  me  of  his  words  in  Parliament  the  substance  of  which  was 
about  as  follows : 

''As  long  as  Turkey  grants  concessions  for  railways,  the  building  of 
harbours,  or  other  enterprises  on  her  own  territory,  concessions  which 
do  not  presuppose  that  anyone  is  to  renounce  an  acquired  right,  oppo- 
sition on  principle  is  impossible  and  illegal; — on  the  other  hand,  how- 
ever, the  Powers  are  at  liberty  to  facilitate  such  undertakings,  or 
not  to  facilitate  them  if  they  have  legal  means  of  doing  so  at  their 
disposal." 

This  refers,  says  Sir  Edward,  to  the  increase  in  the  customs 
duties.  This,  in  his  opinion,  is  the  very  crux  of  the  whole  question. 
He  says,  it  would  be  preferable  if  our  declaration  were  to  refer  only  to 
the  section  Koniah-Bagdad,  but,  if  that  be  impossible,  we  should  at  least 
not  undertake  any  obligations  in  the  question  of  the  increase  in  the  cus- 
toms duties,  and  so  long  as  this  was  the  case  he  could  not  raise  any 
categorical  objections. 

In  replying  to  my  question,  he  stated  that  the  agreement  of  the 
three  Powers,  regarding  the  Bagdad  Railway,  to  which  the  London 
Cabinet  remained  true,  was  not  intended  unconditionally  to  oppose 
the  construction  of  the  entire  system  of  the  Bagdad  Railway;  its 
only  object  was,  that  consent  should  be  given  conjointly  and  in  full 
agreement  on  the  day  on  which  consent  to  the  increase  in  the  cus- 
toms duties  became  imperative.  When,  therefore,  we  find  ourselves 
in  a  position  in  which  we  must  give  our  consent  to  a  clause  which 
extends  Article  I  of  the  project  of  November  29th  to  the  whole  rail- 
way system,  the  last  sentence  at  least  must  retain  its  meaning,  viz : 
Russia  is  not  more  bound  in  the  question  of  the  increase  of  the  customs 
duties  than  she  ever  was,  because  consent  presupposes  on  her  part  a 
financial  sacrifice.^ 

*  A  splitting  of  hairs — Benckendorff 's  fine  diplomatic  technique. 


574        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

In  the  reverse  case,  the  Minister  said,  the  whole  situation  would 
be  changed. 

(666)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Confidential  Letter,  June  8-21,  1911. 

You  are  right  in  assuming  that  I  shall  not  be  able  to  speak  to 
either  Grey  or  Nicolson  these  days.  But  with  regard  to  the  ques- 
tion raised  in  your  letter  of  June  2nd,  there  is  absolutely  no  need 
of  an  interview.  As  you  are  aware.  Sir  Edward  Grey  has  formulated 
his  standpoint  with  regard  to  the  Khanekin-Teheran  line  with  the 
greatest  precision,  and  this  standpoint  has  since  been  confirmed  in 
an  important  audience  with  the  King.  The  attitude  of  England  in 
this  question  may  be  summed  up  as  follows : 

The  Anglo-Russian  Convention  does  not  afford  any  basis  upon 
which  an  English  protest  against  German  control  of  the  said  line  might 
be  raised;  England,  however,  so  greatly  fears  such  a  control  that, 
should  the  German  control  come  into  effect,  our  Convention  with 
England  would  become  shaken  and  its  political  effect  would  be 
called  into  question,  because,  according  to  the  whole  spirit  of  the  Con- 
vention of  1907,  Russian  influence  in  Northern  Persia  is  intended  to  be 
exclusive,  just  as  English  influence  is  in  the  South. 

A  railway  line,^  under  German  control,  would  give  this  Power 
first-class  political  influence  in  Persia.  Therefore,  England  would 
also  have  to  reckon  with  Germany  at  Teheran,  and  this  would  involve 
negotiations  which,  it  is  believed  here,  would  be  most  welcome  to  Ger- 
many.^ It  is  evident  that  the  whole  situation  would  be  changed  to 
the  detriment  of  our  interests  and  of  our  position  in  Persia.  This 
refers  to  the  exercise  of  the  financial  control  on  the  part  of  Ger- 
many ;  the  consequences  just  explained  would  all  the  more  be  bound 
to  set  in  if  we  gave  up  the  construction  of  the  railway.  Such  a 
renunciation  would — this  must  not  be  doubted — give  the  coup  de 
grace  to  the  Anglo-Russian  policy  in  Persia,  and  an  Anglo-German 
combination  would  supplant  the  Anglo-Russian  Convention  of  1907. 

On  the  strength  of  these  arguments,  the  political  effects  of 

*The  Bagdad  line  entered  Persian  territory  nowhere,  and  the  proposed 
Bagdad-Khanekin  branch  was  a  very  minor  affair,  running  on  Persian  territory 
but  a  short  distance.    The  Germans  were  willing  to  have  Russia  build  the  line. 

'  Rather  improbable,  since  Germany  had  recognized  in  writing  the  "privileged^" 
position  in  Persia  of  Great  Britain  and  Russia  by  documents  here  include  ' 
which  see  in  Chapter  II,  Book  One. 


ENTENTE  VS.  GERMANY  IN  S.  W.  ASIA  575 

which,  by  the  way,  have  never  been  so  clearly  expressed  as  I  have 
done  here.  Sir  Edward  advised  us  to  omit  the  financial  side  of 
things  altogether  for  the  present. 

/  think.  Sir  Edward  emphasises  this  fact,  in  order  to  make  it  impos- 
sihle  for  us  to  declare  that  we  cannot  retain  the  control  of  this  line.  As 
soon  as  the  moment  will  have  arrived,  the  necessary  funds  will  be  offered 
to  us,  and  to  decline  that  loan,  or  to  refuse  the  respective  guarantee, 
would  amount,  not  to  our  being  unable  to  retain  the  control  in  question, 
but  to  our  being  unwilling  to  do  so. 

It  appears  to  me  that  this  purely  financial  consideration  must  be 
solved  in  a  certain  sense  for  political  reasons.  On  the  one  hand,  we 
have  undertaken  the  obligation  towards  Germany  to  construct  this  line; 
on  the  other  hand,  we  cannot  simply  pass  over  the  English  objections  to 
a  renunciation  in  favour  of  Germany  without  thus  bringing  about  a 
radical  change  in  our  relations  to  England.^  . 

Can  we  promise  Germany  to  construct  this  line  at  a  date  to  be 
determined  by  Germany,  and  not  by  Russia,  without  our  having 
received  an  option  on  the  construction  from  the  Persian  Govern- 
ment?   I  shall  mention  this  question  later  to  Sir  A.  Nicol- 

son,  but  entertain  no  doubts  in  this  connection,  because  British  in- 
terests are  involved  by  these  considerations.  When  I  pointed  out 
to  him,  that,  in  case  our  negotiations  were  broken  off,  Germany 
would  demand  such  a  concession  for  herself.  Sir  Arthur  agreed ;  he 
added,  however,  that  in  that  case  nothing  would  be  left  to  Russia  and 
England  but  conjointly  to  oppose  such  a  concession  most  emphatically 
at  Teheran.  I  do  not  think  it  likely  that  the  Persian  Government  would 
maintain  its  refusal.  But  it  is  always  dangerous  to  promise  something 
which  one  has  not  yet  in  hand,  and  it  mdght  be  advisable  to  come  to  an 
understanding  with  Germany  in  order  eventually  to  induce  her  to  inter- 
vene at  Teheran  in  our  favor, 

(667)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Letter,  July  \9'Aug.  1,  1911. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  promised  me,  a  few  days  ago,  to  communicate 
to  me  England's  reply  to  Turkey's  proposal  regarding  the  Bagdad- 
Persian  Gulf  Railway  and  the  Turkish  Customs  increase.  The 
Turkish  proposal,  as  you  know,  propounded  a  new  company  in 

*  A  bad  diplomatic  predicament  due  to  the  meeting  at  Potsdam. 


576         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

which  Turkey  was  to  participate  with  40  and  Germany,  France  and 
England  with  20  per  cent,  each.  Thus,  Germany  would  have  been 
able  indirectly  to  dispose  over  60  per  cent. 

The  English  counter-proposal  substitutes  for  this  combination 
an  equal  participation  of  the  four  Powers  named,  and  a  fifth  share 
for  Russia,  as  we  desired  at  the  time. 

/  do  not  believe  that  Turkey  or  Germany  can  accept  these  new  Eng- 
lish proposals?- 


(668)     Neratoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London. 
Aug.  2SSept.  7,  1911.    No.  643. 


Confidential  Letter. 


By  today's  courier  the  text  of  the  German-Russian  Agreement 
of  August  6-19  is  being  forwarded  to  you. 

For  your  personal  information,  I  add  that  we  have  obtained  Ger- 
many's promise  not  to  construct  any  branch  lines  of  the  Bagdad  Rail- 
way in  the  territory  included  between  it  and  the  Russian  ^  and  Persian  ^ 
boundary  north  of  Khanekin,  nor  to  lend  any  support  to  any  enterprises 
of  that  sort,  with  the  exception  of  those  branch  lines  which  we  already 
know  of  and  for  which  a  concession  has  already  been  granted,  viz:  Mos- 
sul-Erbil,  Diala-Tuskurmatly,  and  Halif-Mardin-Diarbekir-Kharput. 
This  promise  was  given  me  verbally  by  the  German  Ambassador  and  has 
been  submitted  to  the  Emperor  in  the  shape  of  a  report  the  wording 
of  which  was  edited  by  me  in  conjunction  with  Count  Pourtales. 

I  have  confidentially  notified  Sir  G.  Buchanan  of  this  obligation. 
It  has,  at  her  own  request,  not  been  embodied  in  the  text  of  our 
Agreement  with  Germany,  because  the  Berlin  Cabinet  had  officially 
pledged  itself  in  this  respect  to  the  Turkish  Government. 

*They  were  accepted.  The  tone  of  Benckendorff's  last  two  letters  shows  to 
what  extent  he  could  pass  under  English  influence,  when  the  Entente  seemed  in 
danger.  The  Russian  ambassador  must  have  realized  that  a  mountain  was  being 
made  of  a  molehill  by  Sir  Edward  Grey,  whose  objections  to  the  Bagdad  rail- 
road remained  "on  principle,"  despite  all  avowals  to  the  contrary.  In  the  end 
this  was  recognized  and  the  Potsdam  meeting  had  the  effect  desired  by  Germany 
and  Russia. 

'Boundary  of  the  "Russian"  zone  of  influence. 

'Boundary  of  the  "Persian"  neutral  zone;  showing  how  Neratoff's  mind 
worked :   occupied  Persia  seemed  "Russian"  territory  to  him. 


VI 

THE  ENTENTE  AND  THE  MOROCCAN  QUESTION 
(March — November  1911) 

(669)     Iswolsky,  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris,  to  Sasonoff,  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs.    Letter,  March  15-28,  1911. 

I  have  received  your  confidential  telegram  of  March  6,  authoriz- 
ing me  to  assist  the  Spanish  Ambassador  here,  as  far  as  possible, 
in  the  adjustment  of  the  misunderstanding  between  Spain  and 
France  in  regard  to  the  Morocco  affair.  After  the  receipt  of  this 
telegram  Perez  Kaballero  called  on  me  with  the  same  request. 

The  execution  of  these  instructions  has  been  facilitated  for  me 
through  the  fact  that  the  French  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  him- 
self, acquainted  me,  some  time  ago,  with  the  details  of  the  question. 
Therefore,  in  my  conversation  with  Cruppi,^  I  could  easily  revert 
to  this  question  without  creating  the  appearance  of  direct  inter- 
ference. 

Although  the  misunderstandings  between  Spain  and  France  are 
of  no  direct  interest  to  us,  I  consider  it  necessary  to  inform  you 
briefly  in  regard  to  this  question. 

Based  on  the  provisions  of  the  Algeciras  Act,  but  still  more  on 

the  semi-public,  semi-secret  Franco-Spanish  Agreement  of  1904, 

the  Madrid  Cabinet  now  protest  against  the  endeavours  of  France, 

not  only  to  exclude  Spain  from  Moroccan  questions  in  general,  but 

even,  to  a  certain  extent,  to  make  difficulties  for  her  in  her  own 

zone.    These  attempts  make  themselves  chiefly  felt  in  respect  of 

financial  control,  of  military  organization,  and  the  building  of  the 

railway  from  Tangier  to  Fez.    As  the  Spanish  Ambassador  said  to 

me,  France's  endeavours,  to  subjugate  Morocco,  are  becoming  more 

*  French  minister  of  foreign  affairs. 
8T  577 


578        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


I 


and  more  apparent,  in  opposition  to  the  spirit  of  the  Algeciras  Act  and 
to  the  various  separate  Franco-Spanish  Treaties.  France,  on  her  part, 
contends,  that  the  measures  taken  by  her,  are  solely  for  the  purpose 
of  creating  such  conditions  in  Morocco  as  would  be  equally  advan- 
tageous for  all  European  countries,  and  are  thus  absolutely  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  Algeciras  Act.  The  French  Government  is  in- 
clined, as  Cruppi  himself  declares,  to  treat  Spain  like  a  poor  relation, 
even  counter-protests  are  raised  in  France,  accusing  Spain  of  main- 
taining an  unnecessarily  large  number  of  troops  in  the  Spanish  zone, 
and  of  not  observing  the  principle  of  the  open  door.  fli 

It  is  very  difficult  to  say,  who  is  right  and  who  is  wrong.    Notwith- 
standing, in  my  conversation  with  Cruppi,  I  refrained  from  passing       ■, 
judgment  of  any  kind,  merely  pointing  out  that  it  was  very  important,  fll 
for  the  general  political  interests  of  France  and  Russia,  to  satisfy  the  ^^ 
Spanish  demands,  so  as  to  prevent  this  country  from  throwing  itself 
into  the  arms  of  Germany  and  the  Triple  Alliance.    Since  Algeciras, 
Germany's  relations  with  Spain  have  been  very  cold  and  reserved.    The 
Madrid   Cabinet  inclines  at  present  rather   towards   the   Triple  En- 
tente, and  it  would  be  a  pity  were  it  now  to  seek  support  from  Germany. 

Cruppi  said  he  agreed  with  me  and  he  wishes  to  accede,  as  far 
as  possible,  to  the  Spanish  demands.  He  spoke,  however,  only  in 
general  terms,  and,  apparently,  avoided  any  expression  of  opinion 
concerning  the  single  points  of  the  Spanish  Note.  Perez  Kaballero 
complains  of  just  these  generalities,  and  intends  to  have  an  inter- 
view with  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  in  the  next  few  days, 
in  order  to  obtain  from  him  a  positive  answer.  I  shall  inform  you 
as  to  the  result  of  this  interview.  We  have  agreed  with  Perez  Kabal- 
lero that  our  participation  in  the  Franco-Spanish  negotiations  shall  be 
kept  strictly  confidential. 


(670)     The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Berlin  to  Sazonoff.     Confidential 
Report,  March  ZUApril  13,  1911. 

Cambon  has  just  returned  from  Paris,  where  he  went,  as  is  his 
customf,  to  discuss  pending  questions  with  the  leaders  of  French 
policy.  As  he  told  me  confidentially,  another  object  of  his  visit  was 
to  make  the  acquaintance  of  Cruppi,  whom  he  did  not  know  person- 
ally until  then.  The  impression  made  upon  the  Ambassador  by  the 
new  Minister  is  that  of  an  able  lawyer,  desirous  of  becoming  familiar 


ENTENTE  AND  THE  MOROCCAN  QUESTION       579 

as  quickly  as  possible  with  all  the  difficult  questions  of  his  depart- 
ment, but  who  has  not  as  yet  arrived  at  a  definite  opinion. 

Cambon  also  participated  in  the  conferences  regarding  the 
present  situation  in  Morocco,  and  was  authorized  to  obtain  the  con- 
sent of  the  Berlin  Cabinet  to  a  military  intervention  on  the  part  of 
France,  if  Europeans  living  in  Fez  should  be  threatened  with  danger. 
At  his  first  interview  with  the  German  Secretary  of  State,  a  very  un- 
gracious reception  was  accorded  him,  and  he  encountered  a  categorical 
refusal  to  enter  into  any  exchange  of  views  respecting  a  French  mili- 
tary intervention  exceeding  the  limits  of  the  Algeciras  Act.  The  nego- 
tiations lasted  several  days,  and  were  very  difficult;  the  Ambassador 
told  me,  that  he  was  repeatedly  obliged  to  point  out,  how  great  would 
be  the  responsibility  assumed  by  Germany  if  the  Europeans  in  Fez  were 
to  be  massacred. 

After  much  hesitation,  the  German  Secretary  of  State  has 
handed  to  M.  Cambon,  as  the  latter  alleges,  a  reply,  in  accordance 
with  which,  Germany  would  admit,  in  case  of  absolute  necessity, 
a  niilitary  intervention  on  the  part  of  France,  the  occupation  of 
Rabat  and  the  entry  of  French  troops  into  Fez. 

Pan-German  circles  here  are  much  excited,  and  accuse  France 
of  violating  the  Algeciras  Act,  and  of  aspiring  to  a  protectorate  over 
Morocco,  under  the  pretext  of  protecting  the  European  population. 
It  seems  to  me,  that  the  reply  of  the  German  Government  was  not  so 
favorable  as  stated  by  the  French  Ambassador.  The  Acting  Secretary 
of  State,  Under-Secretary  Zimmermann,  told  me  today,  that  Germany 
had  not  given  the  Paris  Cabinet  a  definite  answer  in  regard  to  the  pos- 
sibility of  a  military  intervention,  and  that  in  Berlin  it  was  hoped,  that 
the  improvement  in  the  situation  in  Morocco,  reported  by  the  German 
Ambassador  at  Paris,  and  the  Consul  in  Fez,  would  render  a  violation 
of  the  Algeciras  Act  unnecessary. 

There  is  no  doubt,  if  Germany  should  ever  give  her  consent  to 
such  a  violation,  she  would  demand  a  high  price  from  France. 


(671)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Report,  April  15-28,  1911. 

The  Morocco  question  is  being  strongly  exploited  by  the  news- 
papers of  the  Pan-German  Party,  and  is  threatening  to  imperil 
anew  the  relations  between  France  and  Germany  which,  thanks 


580        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


to  the  efforts  of  the  French  Ambassador,  have  been  improving. 
Although  in  moderate  circles  here  the  Pan-German  newspaper 
articles,  demanding  the  partition  of  Morocco  between  Germany 
and  France,  and  threatening  energetic  measures  in  case  of  refusal 
on  the  part  of  France,  are  rejected,  it  cannot  be  denied  that,  for  the 
time  being,  general  excitement  against  France  prevails  here. 

The  Government  itself  assumes  a  waiting  attitude,  and  avoids  any 
expression  of  opinion  on  the  Morocco  question  in  the  official  press. 
Such  reserve  indicates  plainly  the  dissatisfaction  of  the  Wilhelmstrasse 
with  the  action  of  France. 

I  received  the  same  impression  from  a  conversation  with  Cam- 
bon  who  had  just  spoken  with  the  Imperial  Chancellor. 

The  Ambassador  was  authorized  to  advise  Germany  of  the 
measures  contemplated  by  France ;  at  the  same  time  he  stated  that 
it  was  France's  intention  to  maintain  the  sovereignty  of  the  Shereef, 
and  the  integrity  of  Morocco,  with  due  regard  for  the  principle  of 
the  Open  Door. 

According  to  Cambon,  his  statements  were  received  very  coldly, 
and  he  was  given  to  understand  that  an  occupation  of  Fez  by  the 
French  would  be  regarded  by  Germany  to  be  a  violation  of  the 
Algeciras  Act  and  of  the  Agreement  of  1909,  whereby  the  Berlin 
Cabinet  would,  for  its  part,  obtain  a  free  hand.  Cambon  feels  un- 
easy about  the  feeling  here  and  intends  leaving  for  Paris  tomorrow, 
to  discuss  matters  personally  with  Cruppi.  He  believes,  that 
Kiderlen's  long  absence  is  not  altogether  unconnected  with  the 
desire  to  postpone  as  long  as  possible  official  declarations  in  regard 
to  Morocco. 

At  the  close  of  our  conversation,  Cambon  stated  that,  in  view  of 
the  uncompromising  attitude  of  the  Berlin  Cabinet,  a  favorable  solution 
of  the  Morocco  question  would  depend  on  the  support  which  the  Paris 
Cabinet  in  its  present  difficult  position  received  from  its  friends  at  St. 
Petersburg  and  London.^ 

I  must  also  mention  that,  in  some  of  the  German  papers,  Delcasse 
is  regarded  as  the  true  originator  of  French  Moroccan  policy. 

'  Who  were  just  then  doing  their  best  to  partition  Persia  for  good,  as  shown 
in  these  documents.  For  being  politically  abstinent  in  Persia  and  the  Far  East, 
and  for  her  support  of  England  in  the  Bagdad  railroad  issue,  France  had  been 
given  a  free  hand  in  North  Africa  by  Sir  Edward  Grey  to  an  extent  which  even 
Russia  had  to  guess  at. 


ENTENTE  AND  THE  MOROCCAN  QUESTION       581 

(672)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Neratoff.    Letter,  April  26 
May  9,  1911. 

Sir  Arthur  Nicolson  did  not  conceal  from  me  the  fact,  that  the 
Morocco  question  is  disquieting  the  London  Cabinet.  He  believes  that 
France  will  be  compelled  to  occupy  Fez;  that  the  situation  in  the 
city  appears  to  be  threatening ;  that  a  mere  expedition  for  the  pro- 
tection of  Europeans  would  not  be  a  particularly  alarming  under- 
taking, but  that  the  experience  of  all  European  States,  beginning  with 
England,  shows  that  it  is  easier  to  occupy  a  city  than  to  withdraw  again; 
that,  in  case  the  occupation  of  Fez  should  last  for  any  great  length  of 
time,  political  complications  might  arise;  that  hitherto  the  official 
declarations  of  the  German  Government  had  been  kept  in  a  quiet 
tone,  but  that  it  was  difficult  to  form  an  opinion  as  to  the  future. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Spanish  Ambassador  declares  that  in 
case  of  French  action,  Spain  will  likewise  be  obliged  to  advance 
in  certain  regions. 

Sir  Arthur  told  me,  he  had  pointed  out  to  the  Ambassador  how 
unfounded  such  an  assumption  appeared  to  him;  if  France  de- 
termined on  an  expedition  with  the  fixed  purpose  of  protecting 
Europeans,  this  did  not  justify  Spain  in  proceeding  actively  in  other 
parts  of  Morocco,  where  the  presence  of  her  troops  was  in  no  way 
necessary. 

Sir  Arthur  believes,  that  his  statements  have  produced  a  certain  ef- 
fect in  Madrid,  all  the  more  so,  as  on  this  occasion  he  did  not  disguise 
the  fact  that,  precisely  as  during  the  last  crisis,  the  obligations  under- 
taken by  the  London  Cabinet  had  caused  it  to  maintain  a  friendly  at- 
titude towards  France;  this  attitude  would  remain  the  same  in  the 
present  instance. 

Nicolson  learned,  to  his  great  satisfaction,  that  the  Russian  Govern- 
m^ent  had  expressed  itself  in  similar  terms.  He  sees  in  this  a  guaran- 
tee against  possible  future  entanglements, 

(673)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sasonoff.    Confidential  Report, 
April  2%-May  11,  1911. 

.,.,....  With  regard  to  the  diplomatic  side  of  the  Morocco  affair 
I  fear  that  Cruppi,  who  has  absolutely  no  diplomatic  experience,  is 
indulging  in  a  dangerous  and,  in  no  way  justified,  optimism. 

As  you  have  observed,  he  replies  in  answer  to  all  my  questions,  con- 


582        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

cerning  the  course  of  negotiations  in  Berlin,  that  he  notes  no  inclination 
on  the  part  of  the  German  Government  to  oppose  the  actions  of  France 
or  to  demand  compensations  of  any  kind.  His  attitude  towards  Spain 
is  quite  as  optimistic,  even  if  much  more  discontented.  This  optimism 
seems  to  he  based  on  the  belief,  that,  if  France  determines  not  to  exceed 
the  terms  of  the  Algeciras  Act,  and  not  to  undertake  a  permanent  or  pro- 
tracted occupation  of  Fez,  neither  Germany  nor  Spain  would  have 
grounds  for  protest  or  active  measures.  ^1 

In  reality  the  situation  seenls  to  me  to  be  totally  different :  from  " 
all  I  hear  the  Berlin  Cabinet  has  adopted  a  very  adroit  and  advan- 
tageous position;  without  protesting  for  the  present  against 
France's  action,  it  reserves  to  itself  the  right  to  declare  at  any 
moment  that  the  Algeciras  Act  has  been  violated.  It  is  probable 
that  Spain  is  also  being  incited  by  Germany.  In  this  way  German 
diplomacy  remains  master  of  the  situation  and  can  make  the  ques- 
tion acute  at  any  moment,  in  accordance  with  the  needs  of  its  own 
home  and  foreign  policies.  Here  lies  a  danger,  which  Cruppi  does 
not  sufficiently  take  into  account.  This  danger  is  all  the  greater,  be- 
cause Cruppi,  so  far  as  I  can  judge,  has  no  fixed  programme  in  the 
Morocco  affair,  and  is  influenced  by  various  currents  and  circumstances. 
In  this  respect,  Pichon's  resignation  is  greatly  to  be  regretted;  it 
is  true,  he  is  being  sharply  criticised  at  present,  but  he  knew  ex- 
actly what  he  wanted  in  Morocco,  and  did  not  allow  himself  to  be  in- 
fluenced by  the  chauvinistic  circles,  which  exist  here  as  everywhere. 

In  conclusion,  I  would  say  that  my  fears  are  shared  by  those  Am- 
bassadors here  who  are  most  sincere  with  me,  namely,  the  representa- 
tives of  England  and  Italy.  It  is  worth  noting,  that  Bertie  ^  personally 
believes  Germany  is  only  awaiting  a  favorable  opportunity  to  declare 
the  Algeciras  Act  as  no  longer  existent,  in  order  to  occupy  one  or  two 
ports,  among  them,  Mogador.  A  heavy  blow  would  thus  be  dealt  to 
British  interests ;  the  channels  of  communication  with  South  Africa 
would  be  threatened. 


(674) 


The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Neratoff. 
23.  1911. 


Letter,  May  10- 


Yesterday,  Cambon  gave  me  details  in  regard  to  Emperor  Wil- 
liam's visit  here.    He  confirmed  the  words  of  Sir  Arthur  Nicolson — 
*  Sir  R— ,  British  ambassador  at  Paris. 


ENTENTE  AND  THE  MOROCCAN  QUESTION       583 

namely,  that  His  Majesty  had  refrained  from  all  political  conver- 
sation with  English  statesmen. 

Only  the  German  Ambassador,  Count  Metternich,  went  to  Grey 
and  asked  him  what  the  attitude  of  England,  in  the  Morocco  ques- 
tion, was  and  would  be,  and  what  the  London  Cabinet  thought  of 
the  advance  of  the  French  on  Fez.  Sir  Edward  answered  that  the 
Agreements  between  England  and  France  imposed  on  England  the 
obligation  to  support  France;  that  the  British  Government  was  of 
opinion,  that  France  was  not  only  justified,  but  obliged,  to  pro- 
tect the  interests  of  the  French,  English  and  other  foreigners  in 
the  capital  of  Morocco ;  that  the  situation  in  Fez  was  growing  worse 
daily,  and  that,  consequently,  intervention  on  the  part  of  France 
would  be  of  advantage  to  the  entire  world. 

The  German  Ambassador,  whose  words,  by  the  way,  expressed 
confidence  and  thoroughly  friendly  sentiments,  did  not  oppose  these 
arguments ;  he  confined  his  remarks  exclusively  to  the  contingency 
that  the  French  occupation  of  Fez  might  be  of  considerable  dura- 
tion. Sir  Edward  replied,  that,  even  in  this  case,  the  English  stand- 
point would  remain  unchanged,  and  that  he  did  not  believe  German 
interests  would  be  in  any  way  violated,  for,  according  to  the  Agree- 
ment concluded  between  Germany  and  France,  Germany  had 
renounced  all  political  influence,  under  the  condition  that  her  eco- 
nomic interests  in  Morocco  should  be  protected  against  all  politi- 
cal entanglements.  Hereupon,  Count  Metternich  assured  him  of 
the  conciliatory  and  peaceful  intentions  of  the  German  Govern- 
ment, expressing,  however,  the  fear  that  unexpected  events  might 
jeopardize  the  situation.  Sir  Edward  responded  that  England,  in  any 
case  and  under  all  circumstances,  would  fulfil  her  obligations  to  France. 

Cambon  tells  me  that  after  this  conversation,  Sir  Edward,  who  was 
very  uneasy  for  the  moment  on  account  of  the  Morocco  question,  looks 
more  confidently  into  the  future.  It  ii  needless  to  call  your  attention 
to  the  fact,  that  the  presence  of  the  German  Monarch  in  London  lends 
special  significance  to  the  remarks  of  Count  Metternich. 

The  attitude  of  Spain  has  caused  uneasiness  here  and  in  Paris.  On 
the  one  hand,  one  finds  it  fairly  natural  that  Spanish  public  opinion 
should  be  aroused  by  occurrences  in  Morocco.  Notwithstanding,  people 
are  wondering  whether  the  energetic  attitude  of  the  Madrid  Cabinet, 
which  does  not  exclude  the  possibility  of  complications  with  France,  is 


584        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

an  entirely  independent  one.  The  occupation  of  Fez,  by  the  French, 
and  of  Tetuan,  by  the  Spanish,  would  open  the  door  for  the  dis- 
memberment of  Morocco,  which  might  have  dangerous  conse- 
quences. However,  the  latest  news  from  Madrid  seems  to  be 
better,  and  the  King  himself  has  declared  that  the  Spanish  troops 
will  not  occupy  Tetuan. 

Camhon  told  me,  that  this  conversation  of  the  German  Ambassador 
with  Grey  was  the  only  political  one  that  took  place  between  English  and 
German  statesmen  on  the  occasion  of  the  Emperor's  visit  to  London.  I 
asked  Nicolson  whether  the  Bagdad  question  had  come  under  discussion 
in  any  way.  He  told  me  it  had  not  been  touched  upon  with  a  single  word. 

It  is  true.  Emperor  William  had  a  long  conversation  with 
Asquith.  The  King  asked  the  Premier  about  it  and  was  told  in 
reply  that  the  conversation  had  been  a  very  interesting  one,  but 
rather  from  an  historical  and  scientific  standpoint  than  from  a  poli- 
tical one;  they  had  discussed  the  reciprocal  influence  of  human 
races  upon  one  another  and  the  superiority  of  certain  of  these  races. 

The  press  here  accorded  a  very  warm  welcome  to  the  person 
of  the  Emperor  and  the  Imperial  family,  but  was  reserved  in  respect 
of  political  matters. 

Emperor  William's  visit  to  London  was  decidedly  a  great  suc- 
cess. The  Emperor  understood  better  than  ever  before  how  to 
win  the  sympathy  of  the  English  public,  and,  in  this  respect,  his 
visit  helped  greatly  to  overcome  national  antipathies  and  to  en- 
courage mutual  endeavours  to  restore  good  relations;  as  to  the 
actual  political  questions  of  the  day,  however,  I  do  not  believe  that  any 
positive  results  were  obtained. 

P.  S.  I  spoke  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  after  this  letter  had  already 
been  written.  He  confirmed  what  Cambon  had  told  me  in  regard  to 
Sir  Edward's  conversation  with  the  German  Ambassador,  and  re- 
peated a  word  Cambon  had  used,  but  which  I  hesitated  to  quote  in 
my  letter,  because  I  was  not  sure  whether  Cambon  had  employed  the 
English  expression  correctly;  Count  Metternich  had  asked  what  tlic 
consequences  would  be  if  the  Morocco  Government  came  under  French 
influence,  and  the  Algeciras  Act  were  violated.  Sir  Edward  replied,  tha,, 
in  the  event  of  entanglements,  all  English  obligations  would  become 
"operative."  ^ 

^  Grey  serving  notice  that,  right  or  wrong,  France  would  be  supported  by  him. 


ENTENTE  AND  THE  MOROCCAN  QUESTION       585 

(675)     Neratoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris.     Telegram,  April  22- 
May  5,  1911.    No.  559. 

/  beg  you  to  emphasise  to  the  French  Government  the  fact,  that 
our  friendly  remonstrances  at  Berlin  have  led  to  a  favorable  result  and 
that  we  have  received  a  very  satisfactory  answer  from  Germany.^  Ex- 
press on  this  occasion  the  hope,  that  we  shall  be  supported  if  necessary, 
in  like  fashion  by  France. 


(676)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Neratoff.    Letter,  April  28- 
May  11,  1911. 

Your  telegram  No.  559  received. 

As  Cruppi  is  about  to  leave  for  Brussels,  and  since  our  com- 
munication should  create  the  deepest  possible  impression  on  the 
Paris  Cabinet,  I  decided  to  advise  Cruppi  by  letter  of  the  steps  un- 
dertaken by  us  at  Berlin.  The  Minister  has  just  replied  by  letter 
that  France  fully  appreciates  the  support  rendered  her  by  us. 


(677)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Berlin  to  Neratoff.     Confidential  Let' 
ter.  May  7-20,  1911. 

I  consider  it  necessary  to  send  you  two  articles  from  the 
"Cologne  Gazette,"  May  13-15,  containing  official  communications 
in  regard  to  the  Morocco  question.  The  first  article  was  occasioned 
by  the  endeavours  of  certain  political  circles  at  Paris,  London  and  even 
Vienna,  to  represent  the  exchange  of  views  between  us  and  Berlin,  in 
respect  of  Morocco,  as  if  pressure  had  been  put  on  Germany  by  Rus- 
sia to  prevent  her  from  placing  difficulties  in  the  way  of  French  policy 
in  Morocco. 

These  allusions,  appearing  in  certain  of  the  Vienna  newspapers,  are 
supposed  here  to  be  the  result  of  French  and  English  influence.  Ap- 
parently their  object  is  to  arouse  dissatisfaction  among  the  public, 
especially  in  Pan-German  circles,  and  to  find  fault  with  the  German 
Government  for  having  shown  all  too  much  yielding  weakness  towards 
Russia.  Thus,  through  a  newspaper  controversy,  they  hoped  to 
disturb  the  improving  relations  between  Germany  and  Russia. 

*  In  reply  to  a  communication  asking  the  German  Government  to  give  the 
position  of  France  the  fullest  consideration.    An  effect  of  the  Potsdam  meeting. 


586        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD  1 

The  Pan-German  papers  have  indeed  violently  assailed  th^ 
leaders  of  German  policy  and,  for  the  first  time  since  assuming 
office,  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Kiderlen-Wachter,^  has 
been  exposed  to  vehement  attacks,  not  only  in  regard  to  the 
Morocco  affair,  but  also  in  regard  to  the  Potsdam  Conference  which 
led  to  no  positive  results.^ 

In  the  second  communication,  which  contains  an  answer  to  the 
article  by  the  "Rossia,"  the  Berlin  Cabinet,  not  wishing  to  enter  on 
the  dangerous  path  of  a  press  campaign,  avoided  emphasizing  the 
differences  of  opinion  between  St.  Petersburg  and  Berlin  in  regard 
to  French  policy  in  Morocco.  From  my  conversation  with 
Bethmann-Hollweg,  however,  I  perceived,  that  the  Imperial  Chan- 
cellor takes  a  different  view  respecting  the  declarations  of  our 
official  organ.  He  told  me,  he  had  not  wished  to  reply  to  our  com- 
munication, hut  he  could  not  conceal  from  me  that  the  connection  men- 
tioned in  our  official  communication,  as  existing  between  two  questions, 
which,  like  Morocco  and  our  Persian  negotiations,  have  in  reality  noth- 
ing in  common,  had  made  a  very  unpleasant  impression  upon  him;^ 
it  seemed  to  him,  also,  that  the  mention  of  confidential  negotiations, 
not  yet  concluded  between  two  Governments,  should  not  become 
the  object  of  official  communications,  until  an  understanding,  as  to 
the  kind  of  communication,  had  been  previously  arrived  at. 

It  seems  advisable  to  me  not  to  conceal  from  you  this  personal 
standpoint  of  the  Imperial  Chancellor. 

(678)     Neratoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris,    Telegram,  May  9-22, 
1911.    No.  63$. 

I  fully  share  your  opinion  that  it  is  desirable  to  prevent  Spain  from 
energetic  action  in  the  Morocco  question.  I  consider  it,  however,  better 
for  France  and  Spain  to  come  to  a  direct  understanding,  as  Cruppi  has 
suggested,  and  for  us  to  wait  and  see  the  result  of  the  Franco-Spanish 
negotiations  before  taking  any  definite  steps  on  our  part, 

*A  slip  of  the  pen.  There  was  no  minister  of  foreign  affairs  in  Germany; 
the  official  title  being  "secretary  of  state  for  foreign  affairs." 

'Which  results  are  shown  in  the  correspondence  relative  to  the  railroad 
projects  in  Southwest  Asia.  Such,  however,  was  the  view  of  the  intemperate, 
sabre-rattling  Pan-Germans  and  German  chauvinists. 

"  The    Russian    move    for    harmony    between    Germany    and    France    in    thej 
Morocco  question  served  to  ward  off  a  general  war. 


ENTENTE  AND  THE  MOROCCAN  QUESTION      587 

(679)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Neratoff.     Letter,  May  11- 
24,  1911. 

I  telegraphed  you  this  morning,  that  the  French  troops  under 
General  Mouanier  marched  into  Fez  last  Sunday.  They  met  with 
no  resistance  from  the  Moors  in  Fez,  and  the  European  colonies  are 
unharmed.^ 

I  have  just  spoken  with  Cruppi  and  congratulated  him  on  the 
outcome  of  the  expedition.  I  found  him  in  excellent  spirits;  he 
spoke  enthusiastically  of  the  French  general,  whom  the  press  and 
public  opinion  have  accused  of  being  too  slow,  but  who,  in  reality, 
has  displayed  great  foresight  and  energy. 

In  reply  to  my  question  as  to  what  would  be  the  further  pro- 
gramme of  the  French  Government  in  Morocco,  Cruppi  made  me 
the  following  declaration : 

"The  French  Government  has  declared  to  the  Powers,  that  it 
would  keep  within  the  limits  of  the  Algeciras  Act,  and  that  the 
French  troops  would  occupy  Fez  only  *so  long  as  is  absolutely 
necessary.*  France  will  not  deviate  from  this  declaration.  The  occu- 
pation of  Fez  will  last  only  as  long  as  is  necessary  to  strengthen 
the  position  of  the  Sultan,  Mulei-Hafid,  and  of  the  Maghzen.  For 
the  attainment  of  this  object  France  has  one  means  at  her  disposal 
— namely,  the  French  military  mission  under  Colonel  Mangin 
which  already  exists  under  the  terms  of  former  Agreements  in  Mo- 
rocco. With  the  assistance  of  this  Mission,  a  sufficiently  strong 
Moroccan  Army  can  be  created;  there  can  be  no  doubt,  after  the 
magnificent  French  expedition  to  Fez,  that  the  prestige  of  the 
French  representative,  and  of  the  French  Government,  will  be 
greatly  enhanced,  and  this  is  a  guarantee  for  public  security  and 
order.  As  soon  as  this  object  has  been  attained,  the  French  Gov- 
ernment will  withdraw  the  troops  to  Casablanca,  and  the  Paris 
Cabinet  is  certain,  that  all  the  Powers  without  exception  will  be 
convinced  of  its  sincerity  and  loyalty." 

In  further  conversation,  I  touched  on  Spain,  asking  how  far 
the  negotiations  with  the  Madrid  Government  had  progressed. 
The  Minister  said,  he  had  not  considered  it  necessary  to  reply  to  the 
last  Spanish  proposals,  as  he  did  not  wish  to  emphasise  the  impossibility 
of  their  acceptance.  He  had,  however,  forwarded  instructions  to  the 
*  There  had  been  only  an  alleged  danger  of  their  being  harmed. 


588        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

French  Ambassador  in  Madrid^  which  contained  a  number  of  practice 
concessions  which,  in  his  opinion,  would  satisfy  Spain. 

"I  assure  you,"  said  Cruppi  to  me,  "that  I  am  ready  to  do  every- 
thing possible  and  impossible  for  Spain,  but  one  thing  we  cannot 
do — accept  the  dismemberment  of  Morocco  offered  to  us  in  a  veiled 
form,  as  this  would  also  give  a  third  Power  the  right  to  lay  claim 
to  a  part  of  Morocco.  The  Spanish  have  a  mania  for  imitation. 
Every  action  on  our  part  calls  forth  a  like  action  on  the  part  of 
Spain,  even  where  there  is  not  the  slightest  reason  for  it.  For 
example,  the  Spanish  troops  have  just  taken  up  positions  a  few 
kilometers  distant  from  Tetuan.  Should  they  next  occupy  Tetuan 
itself,  it  would  call  forth  a  protest  from  France,  and  from  the  other 
States  as  well,  chief  among  them,  England.  Nevertheless,  I  am 
convinced  that  we  must  come  to  an  understanding  with  Spain." 

/  have  no  reason  to  doubt  Cruppi's  sincerity,  but  I  am  not  yet  con- 
vinced that  his  optimism  is  justified.  My  question,  as  to  whether  he 
could  tell  me,  even  approximately,  how  long  the  French  would  occupy 
Fez,  he  answered  evasively,  and,  I  believe,  he  does  not  take  into  ac- 
count how  difficult  it  will  be  to  carry  out  the  contemplated  programme. 

Be  that  as  it  may,  the  first  act  of  the  Morocco  ''drama'*  has  been 
happily  brought  to  a  conclusion;  the  second,  and  much  more  dangerous, 
phase  begins  now.  As  I  said  in  my  last  letter,  a  simultaneous  inner 
political  crisis  in  France  would  signify  great  danger. 

(680)     Neratoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.    Telegram,  June  19- 
July  2,  1911.    No.  811. 

Urgent.  The  French  Ambassador  has,  in  the  name  of  his  Govern- 
ment, entered  into  an  exchange  of  views  with  us,  regarding  the  situation 
created  by  the  decision  of  the  German  Government  to  send  a  warship 
to  the  Moroccan  port  Agadir,  to  protect  German  subjects. 

The  French  Government  realizes  the  gravity  of  the  means 
employed,  and  seems  on  this  account  to  hesitate.  I  have  empha- 
sized certain  sides  of  the  question,  which  demand  mature  attention. 
As  Germany  has  advised  all  the  Powers  of  her  decision,  it  can 
hardly  be  expected  that  she  will  not  carry  it  out.  We  have,  there- 
fore, to  reckon  wth  a  fact.  The  military  side  is  of  secondary  impor- 
tance; the  object  is  a  diplomatic  one — the  protection  of  Germany's 
political  interests,  since  the  formal  terms  of  the  Act  of  Algeciras  havt 


ENTENTE  AND  THE  MOROCCAN  QUESTION       589 

already  been  violated?-  Germany  is  probably  desirous  of  conducting 
new  negotiations  with  France  regarding  Morocco,  and  wishes,  in 
this  connection,  to  be  supported  by  a  fait  accompli.  From  statements 
of  the  French  Ambassador  here,  it  is  believed  that  France,  in  all  prob- 
ability will  send  a  warship  to  Mogador,  to  answer  the  Germain  military 
measure  with  a  like  one,  under  the  simple  pretext  of  wishing  to 
strengthen  the  police  force  in  Mogador  in  accordance  with  the  Algeciras 
Act.  As  to  the  diplomatic  side,  the  French  Ambassador  has  ex- 
pressed himself  in  favor  of  international  negotiations,  in  which  I 
agree  with  hin^,  and  not  direct  negotiations  between  France  and 
Germany,  as,  on  the  one  hand,  this  would  render  more  difficult 
a  peaceful  solution,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  would  not  be  advisable 
in  respect  of  our  participation  in  the  negotiations.  Therefore,  we 
must  assume  that  the  French  Government,  in  its  answer  to  the 
Berlin  Cabinet,  will  rely  on  international  Acts  and  will  communi- 
cate these  to  all  participants  of  the  Algeciras  Conference.  The 
French  Ambassador  adopts  a  negative  attitude  towards  the  idea  of  a 
Conference.^ 

As  this  entire  matter  affects  the  London  Cabinet  more  than  us,  we 
should  like  to  conform  our  attitude  to  that  of  England.  For  this  rea- 
son, I  ask  you  to  advise  us  immediately  of  the  views  of  the  British 
Government. 

(681)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Neratoff.     Telegram,  June 
20-July  3,  1911.    No.  135. 

Your  telegram  811  received. 

Have  advised  Nicolson  of  contents.  He  says  the  question  is  of 
such  gravity  that  it  will  be  considered  tomorrow  by  the  Cabinet  Council. 
He  will  inform  me  tomorrow  of  the  result.  He  gave  the  same 
answer  to  Cambon  and  Metternich  as  to  me. 

(682)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  June  20'July  3,  1911.    No.  136. 

Metternich  has  announced  here  the  sending  of  a  German  warship 
to  Agadir  for  the  protection  of  German  interests,   the   Government 

^  By  the  occupation  of  the  Moroccan  capital ;  it  would  seem  that  Neratoff 
took  that  view  of  it. 

^  The  European  Powers,  generally,  were  in  favor  of  "Conferences"  only  when 
an  interest  of  their  own  was  not  placed  in  jeopardy  thereby. 


590        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

having  been  requested  to  do  so  by  German  subjects  in  the  neighbour- 
hood. He  gave  the  assurance  that  the  ship  would  be  withdrawn,  as 
soon  as  security  in  Morocco  was  again  established.  Nicolson  pointed 
out  to  the  Ambassador,  that  Agadir  was  not  an  open  port  and  that  he 
was  not  aware  that  foreigners  lived  in  the  neighbourhood.  Metternich 
says  that  a  like  communication  has  been  sent  to  Paris  and  Madrid 


(683)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  June  20-July  3,  1911.    No.  137. 

In  the  name  of  his  Government,  Metternich  added  to  the  above 
statement  the  following : 

German  reports  do  not  substantiate  the  occurrences  which  have  pro- 
voked the  action  of  France  and  Spain.  The  conduct  of  these  two 
Powers  makes  the  Algeciras  Act  illusory.  The  German  warship  will 
be  withdrawn,  as  soon  as  the  French  and  Spanish  forces  are  recalled.'^ 
Germany  is  prepared  to  enter  into  fresh  negotiations  with  France, 
Spain  and,  also,  England  in  respect  of  Morocco.  The  German 
Government  admits  that  these  negotiations  will  be  difficult,  but  it 
does  not  regard  the  difficulties  as  insurmountable. 

(684)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  June  20-July  3,  1911.    No.  138. 

Owing  to  the  German  supplementary  declaration,  Nicolson 
regards  the  situation,  if  not  disquieting,  at  least  as  very  serious.  The 
entire  London  press  emphasizes  the  gravity  of  the  situation  and  shows 
sympathy  for  France.  Only  the  "Westminster  Gazette"  endeavors  to 
minimize  the  significance  of  the  incident. 

(685)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  June  22-July  5,  1911.    No.  139. 

I  refer  to  my  telegram  No.  135. 

Grey  told  Count  Metternich  personally,  yesterday,  that  under  no 
circumstances  could  England  remain  disinterested  in  the  Morocco  ques- 
tion, as  British  interests  in  Morocco  are  m^re  important  than  those  of 
Germany  and,  in  addition,  England  has  assumed  obligations  towards 
France  which  she  would  fulfil  under  all  circumstances.  The  appear- 
ance of  a  German  warship  at  Agadir  had  created  a  new  situation,  and 
England  could  consent  to  no  solution  in  which  she  herself  had  not  taken 

*  German  diplomacy  was  fully  capable  of  absurdities  as  shown  in  (&2  and  683. 


I 


ENTENTE  AND  THE  MOROCCAN  QUESTION       591 

part.    The  wording  of  the  answer  was  drawn  up  yesterday  by  the 
Cabinet. 

In  reply  to  my  question,  whether,  in  his  opinion,  it  was  prefer- 
able to  put  the  situation  before  all  the  signatory  Powers  of  the 
Algeciras  Act,  or  to  proceed  to  negotiations  between  the  Powers 
most  directly  interested,  Grey  said  that  France  was  the  Power  most 
directly  interested,  that  he  would  leave  the  initiative  to  her,  and  would 
support  the  French  view.  Personally,  he  believes  that  for  the  moment 
direct  negotiations  between  Germany,  France,  Spain  and  England 
would  be  preferable  and  that  a  Conference  should  be  called  only  in 
case  of  necessity.  Grey  asks  you  to  consider  this  statement  as 
strictly  confidential. 

(686)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Letter,  June  22- July  5,  1911. 

I  have  but  little  to  add  to  my  telegram  No.  139.  The  reply  de- 
termined upon  by  the  Cabinet  Council  is  serious  but  does  not  pre- 
clude further  negotiations,  under  the  condition,  however,  that 
England  participates,  with  a  view  to  her  own  interests  as  well  to 
her  Agreement  with  France. 

Grey  is  not  miuch  edified  by  the  German  mode  of  procedure; 
he  does  not  regard  the  matter,  however,  tragically.  He  told  me, 
he  could  not  exactly  understand  what  the  motives  of  Germany 
could  have  been.  The  pretext  of  wishing  to  protect  German  inter- 
ests in  a  closed  port  could  not  be  taken  seriously.  He  emphasized 
this  to  the  German  Ambassador,  and  told  him,  that  English  inter- 
ests were  greater  than  German  interests.  Metternich  did  not  insist 
further  on  this  point.  Besides,  said  the  Minister,  if  it  were  a  ques- 
tion of  protecting  German  interests,  after  the  restoration  of  order, 
the  recall  of  the  French  and  Spanish  troops  would  entail  the  re- 
moval of  the  German  warship — and  then  the  status  quo  ante  would 
be  re-established. 

It  is  possible,  said  the  Minister,  that  Germany  merely  wishes 
to  obtain  something.  In  this  case  it  must  be  seen  whether  the 
compensation  in  question  would  be  one  to  which  neither  France 
nor  England  would  object,  for  the  consent  of  both  would  have  to 
be  obtained,  as  their  interests  are  not  identical.  I  believe,  the 
Minister  alludes  to  the  possibility  of  the  cession  of  a  port  in  favour 


592        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


of  Germany;  this  would  create  difficulties  in  England  and  would 
hardly  be  permitted,  even  if  French  interests  were  not  directly- 
involved.  ^ 

I  asked  Sir  Edward,  what  he  believed  would  be  the  further 
course  of  negotiations.  He  said,  he  would  accept  a  French  pro- 
posal— personally  however,  he  preferred  direct  negotiations  be- 
tween France,  Germany,  Spain  and  England.  Count  Metternich  has 
said  nothing  that  could  signify  a  refusal  to  allow  England  to 
participate  in  these  negotiations.  This  participation  is  a  condition 
clearly  defined  in  the  English  reply.  Mt 

Since  this  incident  occurred,  the  English  press  has  adopted  ?■ 
decisive  but  not  aggressive  attitude.     Only  the  "Daily  News"  is 
openly  anti-French,  and  the  "Westminster  Gazette"  has  published 
an  article  which  appears  to  be  inspired  by  Germany. 


I 


(687)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  June  23'July  6,  1911.    No.  142. 

Pourtales'  statements,  which  you  report  to  me,  confine  them 
selves  to  the  official  communication  made  by  the  Berlin  Cabinet 
to  the  various  Powers.  Pourtales  loses  sight  of  the  second  decla- 
ration made  in  London,  of  which,  perhaps,  he  has  no  knowledge. 
This  second  declaration  represents  the  situation  in  a  very  different 
light.  The  protection  of  German  citizens  is  not  even  mentioned. 
The  sending  of  the  German  warship  to  Agadir  is  justified  by  the  French 
and  Spanish  military  intervention,  which  was  a  violation  of  the 
Algeciras  Act  and  has  made  this  Act  illusory.  Metternich  has 
declared  that  a  return  to  the  status  quo  ante  appears  difficult  to  him. 
The  incomplete  statements  of  Count  Pourtales  are,  perhaps,  in- 
tended to  influence  our  attitude  and  our  diplomatic  action.  Nicol- 
son  requests  us  to  regard  as  strictly  confidential  the  communication 
he  made  to  me.  /  repeat,  the  situation  is  considered  here  as  grave  but 
not  alarming.  The  most  disquieting  feature  is  that  no  news  has 
arrived  concerning  events  in  Agadir. 

(688)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Confidential  Letter,  July  6-19,  1911. 

As  concerns  Morocco,  Berlin  and  Paris  have  more  accurate  in- 
formation than  I.  Nevertheless,  I  would  like  to  emphasize  a  few 
points.  Grey  is  optimistic;  Nicolson  looks  at  everything  rather  darkly. 
Candidly,  Nicolson  never  believed  Germany  would  take  such  a  momei 


ENTENTE  AND  THE  MOROCCAN  QUESTION       593 

tous  and  unexpected  step  without  having  some  great  object  in  view. 
He  also  believes,  and  I  share  his  opinion,  that  Berlin  has  all  too  super- 
ficially judged  the  decrease  in  the  tension  of  English  and  German  public 
opinion?-  Appearances  may  justify  such  an  assumption,  but  if  Berlin 
has  reckoned  with  the  possibility  of  an  almost  neutral  attitude  on  the 
part  of  England,  it  was  a  mistake;  as  a  matter  of  fact,  Grey's  reply 
and  AsquitWs  declaration  have  been  a  surprise.  Following  upon  all  the 
German  visits,  during  the  course  of  which  politics  were  never  discussed 
with  the  exception  of  one  question  put  by  Count  Metternich,  this  Ger- 
man demonstration  has  wiped  out  the  progress  made  by  German  influ- 
ence here. 

But  the  Germain  flag  flies  at  Agadir.  That  it  will  be  withdrawn, 
merely  because  of  some  simple  regulation  of  a  frontier  line,  or  the 
resumption  of  some  form  of  secondary  negotiations,  is  not  very  prob- 
able.   This  would  really  signify  a  defeat. 

Under  the  seal  of  greatest  secrecy,  Nicolson  told  me  that  Metternich, 
who  is  not  fond  of  negotiating  with  him  and  hardly  ever  goes  to  see 
him,  called  on  him,  a  few  days  ago,  about  some  trifling  matter  and  then 
suddenly  (Nicolson  is  convinced  that  the  Ambassador  wished,  so  to 
speak,  to  convey  a  warning  to  him)  made  the  following  speech: 

^'Between  1866  and  1870  Germany  became  a  great  State,  victorious 
over  all  her  enemies,  but  since  then  France,  defeated  though  she  was,  and 
England,  have  divided  the  world  between  them,  whilst  Germany  has 
only  received  a  few  crumbs;  the  time  has  now  come  for  Germany  to 
make  just  demands." 

You  are  certainly  better  aware  than  I  of  the  conversation  be- 
tween Kiderlen  and  Cambon.  According  to  what  Nicolson  and 
the  French  Charge  d' Affaires  here  tell  me,  it  appears  that  Germany 
demands,  if  not  all,  at  least  a  very  large  part,  of  the  French  Congo  f 
in  fact,  the  German  demands  are  so  great  that  a  settlement  does  not 
appear  likely.  I  have  asked  both,  what  the  immediate  conse- 
quences of  a  rupture  in  the  negotiations  would  be.  Both  have 
said  in  reply :  First  of  all,  Germany  will  remain  in  Agadir,  the  end 
she  probably  has  in  view. 

If  this  be  true,  the  situation  might  become  menacing.  No  illu- 
sions ought  to  be  cherished  on  the  subject.    It  is  true,  Germany 

*  Which  was  the  case. 

'  Result  of  border  rectification. 


594        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


shows  her  cards  but  hesitatingly,  and  everything  may  yet  change. 
The  arrival  of  Gwinner  in  Paris  has  aroused  in  many  persons 
the  belief  that  in  reality  Bagdad  is  the  real  point  at  issue.  This  may  be, 
as  a  secondary  consideration,  but  I  do  not  believe,  it  is  the  real 
reason.  By  the  way,  it  appears,  Gwinner's  visit  was  only  of  short 
duration. 


(689)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Letter  July  19'Aug.  1,  1911. 


4 


I  have  sent  a  number  of  telegrams  to  you  during  last  week, 
from  which  you  see  that  the  Berlin  Cabinet  has  made  several  dec- 
larations in  London,  the  last  of  them  being  so  different  from  all 
the  others,  that  one  is  led  to  believe,  the  German  Government  real- 
ized at  the  last  moment,  they  had  gone  too  far,  and  that  only  a 
conciliatory  tone  could  avert  the  danger  of  an  immediate  collision 
with  England.  It  is  true,  the  British  Government,  under  the  im- 
pression of  Count  Metternich's  speech,  regarded  the  situation  as 
very  serious ;  I  have  not  noticed,  however,  the  slightest  vacillation 
in  London.  Still,  the  British  Government,  not  wishing  to  aggra- 
vate a  very  acute  situation,  has  abandoned  its  plan  of  sending 
British  warships  to  the  Atlantic  ports  of  Morocco.  ^1 

On  July  12-25,  Grey  asked  me  to  call  on  him,  and  informed  m^i 
of  the  declaration  made  to  him  the  day  before  by  the  German 
Ambassador.  Your  Excellency  knows  the  wording  of  this  declara- 
tion, which  seemed  to  be  a  veiled  ultimatum  addressed  to  France ; 
being  communicated  in  London,  however,  its  real  object  was  evi- 
dently to  make  the  British  Government  in  one  way  or  the  other 
responsible. 

Sir  Edward  told  me  that  we,  as  the  Allies  of  France,  had  a 
right  to  be  informed  as  to  the  true  situation.  At  first  he  spoke  of 
various,  not  very  friendly,  interviews  with  the  German  Ambas- 
sador, without  giving  details  and  without  saying  more  than  that 
his  own  answers  had  been  adapted  to  conditions  and  the  language 
of  the  German  Ambassador.  Not  until  the  day  after  the  ministerial 
declaration  of  AsquitWs  in  the  House  of  Commons,  did  Sir  Edward 
tell  me  that  the  first  stormy  interview  had  taken  place,  when  Count 
Metternich,  in  exceedingly  blunt  language,  demanded  an  explanatioi 
of  the  speech  made  by  Lloyd  George.    This  time,  I  asked  him  wl 


ENTENTE  AND  THE  MOROCCAN  QUESTION       595 

his  answer  had  been.  After  some  hesitation  he  told  me,  he  did 
not  wish  to  conceal  his  answer  from  me,  but  that  he  did  not  wish  it 
to  become  known,  and  that  it  was  a  secret  he  was  confiding  to  me. 
He  had  told  the  German  Ambassador  that  his,  the  Ambassador's  words, 
had  been  such,  that  his  feeling  of  national  dignity  rendered  it  impossible 
for  him  to  answer  or  make  any  statement.  Hereupon  the  Ambassador 
withdrew. 

Although  on  the  day  of  the  declaration  made  by  Asquith,  I  did 
not  know  of  the  details  I  have  just  described,  I  was  astonished  at 
the  moderation  of  Asquith's  tone. 

England  simplified  the  entire  matter  by  accurately  defining  her 
own  interests,  denying  all  hostile  intentions,  and  expressing  hope 
of  a  peaceful  solution. 

Asquith  spent  the  same  evening  in  my  house.  He  seemed  much 
moved  by  the  approbation  his  statements  had  called  forth  from  all 
parties  in  Parliament.  The  demonstration  in  the  House  of  Com- 
mons had  made  all  the  greater  an  impression,  taking  place  on  the 
day  after  a  sitting  which  in  its  stormy  proceedings  exceeded  any- 
thing that  had  taken  place  in  the  House  of  Commons  during  the 
last  hundred  years. 

Asquith  explained  the  mystery  by  telling  me,  that  the  wording 
of  the  declaration  had  been  formulated  by  the  Cabinet  Council  at 
the  last  moment,  as  a  result,  and  under  the  impression  of  state- 
ments made  to  Grey,  not  by  Count  Metternich,  but  by  Kuhlmann. 

Nothing  could  be  more  amazing,  said  the  Prim,e  Minister,  than 
the  complete  change  of  language  and  attitude. 

Without  reference  of  any  kind  to  former  conversations,  KUhl- 
mann  had  merely  announced  the  conciliatory  and  peaceable  inten* 
tions  of  the  Berlin  Cabinet,  asking  the  British  Government  to 
support  Germany  in  these  endeavours.  Asquith  told  me,  the  British 
Government  was  bound  to  consider  this  request,  and  his  state- 
ments in  Parliament  had  been  the  result.  In  reality,  the  relations 
between  Germany  and  France  had  changed  but  little,  and  England's 
standpoint  had  remained  precisely  the  same,  but  the  sudden  tension 
that  had  sprung  up  between  England  and  Germany  had  vanished. 
For,  there  is  no  use  concealing  the  fact — one  step  further,  and  a  war 
between  England  and  Germany  would  have  broken  out  as  a  result  of 
the  Franco-German  dispute,  although  independent  of  it. 


596        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


i 


This  is  the  position  today:   The  conflict  between  France  am 
Germany  still  exists.  England's  attitude  remains  unchanged,  but  an  h 
mediate  conflict  between  England  and  Germany  has  been  averted  owim 
to  the  declarations  of  Germany.     The  impression  prevails  here,  that 
Germany  has  also  adopted  a  more  conciliatory  attitude  towards  France. 
It  is  believed  that,  even  though  Germany  does  not  intend  to  abandon 
her  claim  to  serious  concessions  from  France,  she^oes  not,  under  anyMA 
circumstances,  desire  war.  ^^ 

It  is  extremely  difficult  to  find  an  explanation  for  the  former 
attitude  of  Germany,  as  well  as  for  the  subsequent  change.  I  con- 
fess, I  can  find  but  one  reason:  Germany  was  entirely  mistaken  in^ 
her  estimate  of  the  English  attitude.  The  increasing  popularity  en- 
joyed by  Germany  in  England,  of  which  there  can  be  no  doubt,  olthougl 
up  to  the  present  it  is  only  superficial,  must  finally  outweigh  the  popu- 
larity of  the  Entente,  as  Berlin  seemed  to  believe. 

Such  an  assumption  might  be  based  on  the  language  of  a  part  of  the 
English  press,  and  of  several  political  personalities,  even  among  the 
Conservatives;  on  the  influence  of  Jewish  high  finance;  on  the  warmth 
of  the  reception  accorded  Emperor  William,,  whose  powers  of  imagina- 
tion may  have  obscured  his  political  judgment;  on  the  fact  that  the 
Liberal  Party,  always  more  peaceably  inclined  than  the  Conservatives, 
are  in  power;  and  even  on  a  certain  split  within  the  Cabinet  itself,         hI 

This  last  hope  was  destroyed  by  the  speech  of  Lloyd  George,       ■ 
the  leader  of  the  Radical  group  in  the  Cabinet.    For  this  reason, 
the  speech  made  such  an  impression  in  Berlin  and  led  to  the 
inquiry  by  Count  Metternich. 

If  this  be  true  then  it  was  all  a  tren^endous  error  of  judgment. 

Apart  from  this  explanation,  the  only  assumption  that  can  be 
made  is,  that  it  was  believed  in  Berlin,  that  England,  under  the 
leadership  of  the  Liberal  Party,  would  renounce  her  position  as 
a  great  Power  in  international  questions  and  remain  passive  where 
her  direct  interests  were  not  concerned. 

So  far  as  I  know  of  Kiderlen-Wachter  from  the  past,  this  may 
to  a  certain  degree  be  the  case. 

In  fact,  Germany  reckoned  with  England  only  as  a  secondary 
factor.  As  the  London  Cabinet  appeared  in  the  foreground,  Berlin 
attempted  threats.  Seeing  that  they  led  to  no  results,  caution  and 
moderation  won  the  upper  hand. 


ENTENTE  AND  THE  MOROCCAN  QUESTION       597 

In  the  course  of  my  conversation,  yesterday,  with  Nicolson,  he 
told  me  that  he  believed  the  tension  was  past;  the  danger  was 
exorcised;  but  the  core  of  the  question  remained  unaltered.  The 
last  interview  between  Kiderlen  and  Cambon  had  not,  according  to 
information  he  had  received,  led  to  the  desired  result;  this  would 
depend  on  the  meeting  which  Cambon  is  to  have  today  with  Kid- 
erlen after  his  return  from  Swinemunde. 


(690)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Berlin  to  Neratoff.     Telegram,  Aug. 
3-16,  1911. 

I  have  just  had  a  long  talk  with  Kiderlen,  the  substance  of  which 
I  will  sum  up.  The  German  Minister  requests  me  to  say  to  you  how 
correct  the  attitude  of  Russia  in  the  Morocco  question  has  been  up  to 
now.  If  England  had  followed  the  Russian  example,  he  said,  our  ne- 
gotiations with  France  would  have  made  further  progress.  The  Sec- 
retary of  State  would  entertain  no  doubt  as  to  the  ultimate  result  of 
these  negotiations,  if  France  would  only  cease  threatening  Germany 
with  her  Alliances,  and  would  be  more  careful  in  preserving  the  stipu- 
lated secrecy  of  the  negotiations.  It  was  desirable  that  France  should 
realize  this,  or  that  her  friends  should  point  it  out  to  her. 

As  concerns  the  actual  state  of  the  negotiations,  I  did  not  neg- 
lect to  convey  your  views  to  Kiderlen.  He  replied,  the  negotia- 
tions were  still  in  the  stage  of  compensations  proposed,  rejected, 
and  proposed  anew.  Yesterday,  Cambon  went  to  him  with  new 
plans.  The  proposal  suggested  by  Your  Excellency ;  that  German 
claims  in  Morocco  be  abandoned  for  concessions  in  the  Congo  has  been 
agreed  to  by  the  Berlin  Cabinet,  in  order  to  put  an  end,  once  for  all, 
to  the  friction  with  France  in  Morocco.  France  seems  to  prefer  the 
system,  of  bargaining,  which,  as  Kiderlen  says,  makes  negotiations  ex- 
tremely unpleasant.  The  danger  lies  in  the  fact,  that  France  is  trying 
to  represent  the  situation  to  the  world  in  such  a  way  as  to  make 
Germany  appear  compelled  to  yield  to  France's  threat  of  appealing  to 
her  Allies  for  help. 

The  Secretary  of  State's  interview  with  the  Emperor  in  Swine- 
miinde  leaves  no  doubt  as  to  the  fact,  that  the  Emperor  is  not 
willing  calmly  to  submit  ta  the  continual  provocations  of  the 
French  press. 


598 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


(691)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Neratoff. 
Letter.    Aug.  3-16,  1911. 


Very  Confidential 


After  we  had  discussed  the  Persian  question,  I  asked  Grey, 
whether  he  had  news,  regarding  the  progress  of  the  Berlin  negotia- 
tions.   He  answered : 

"I  am  not  altogether  satisfied.  The  negotiations  are  dragging  along, 
and  I  do  not  like  this  unnatural  delay."  ^ 

He  added,  much  would  depend  on  what  Berlin  thought  of  th 
possible  attitude  of  Russia  and  asked  me: 

"What  would  you  do  in  case  of  complications?" 

I  told  Sir  Edward,  I  had  not  the  right  to  give  an  official  answer ; 
the  Treaty  Alliance  between  France  and  Russia  existed  in  its  full 
compass;  war  would  certainly  he  a  great  misfortune  for  Russia;  per- 
sonally, however,  I  had  not  the  slightest  doubt  but  that  the  terms  of  the 
Treaty  would  be  strictly  carried  out. 

In  reply  to  my  question  today,  Sir  Edward  said : 

"I  rather  have  the  feeling  that  we  are  coming  a  little  nearer 
together,  but  at  bottom,  there  is  nothing  new  and  no  progress  has 
been  made." 

/  told  him,  I  considered  the  campaign  carried  on  by  a  part  of  the 
German  press  deplorable  and  dangerous,  accusing  Emperor  William, 
as  it  does,  in  shameless  terms  of  excessive  moderation.  Sir  Edward 
said,  he  agreed  with  me,  but  he  hoped,  the  press  feud  would  soon 
find  an  end. 

Then,  he  suddenly  reverted  to  the  question  he  had  asked  me  a 
few  days  ago — what  would  Russia  do  in  case  of  complications? 
I  repeated  my  answer.    Thereupon  Sir  Edward  said : 

''I  will  tell  you  why  I  believe  one  must  know  this.  In  the  event 
of  war  between  Germany  and  France,  England  would  have  to  partici- 
pate. If  this  war  should  involve  Russia,  Austria  would  be  dragged  in 
too,  for,  although  she  has  not  the  slightest  desire  to  interfere  in  this 
matter,^  she  will  be  compelled  by  force  of  circumstances  to  do  so. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  in  such  an  event  the  situation  in  Albania 
will  become  aggravated.  Consequently,  it  would  no  longer  be  a  duel 
between  France  and  Germany — it  would  be  general  war'' 

*  Which  aversion  Grey  never  had  in  the  Bagdad  railroad  and  other  matters  of 
that  sort. 

'An  interesting  statement  in  so  far  as  it  indicates  that  little  team  work  w« 
being  done  by  Vienna  and  Berlin. 


I 


ENTENTE  AND  THE  MOROCCAN  QUESTION       599 

Sir  Edward  then  said  to  me : 

'7  do  not  believe,  Emperor  William  wanted  war,  when  this  incident 
occurred;  I  do  not  believe,  he  wants  war  today.  Even  in  case  of  the 
difficult  situation  mentioned  above,  it  seems  to  me  out  of  the  question 
— if  he  bears  in  mind  the  frightful  consequences  of  the  general  collision 
which  he  would  be  calling  forth — that  he  could  decide  to  go  to  war  on 
account  of  such  a  question." 

I  cannot  deny,  that  this  breadth  of  view  seems  justified  to  me. 
I  would  emphasize  that  this  conversation  was  a  strictly  confidential 
one. 

(692)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Berlin  to  Neratoff.    Letter,  Aug.  5-18,  1911. 

The  enthusiasm  which  was  aroused  in  certain  Pan-German  circles 
through  the  news  of  the  sending  of  a  German  warship  to  Agadir  has 
now  given  way  to  bitter  dissillusion.  The  protracted  negotiations 
with  France,  and  the  possibility  of  obtaining  compensations  for 
Germany  only  outside  of  Morocco,  have  embittered  the  German 
chauvinists.  Several  of  the  Liberal  Conservative  papers,  chief 
among  them  the  "Post,"  simply  cannot  restrain  their  ill  humour. 
Without  wishing  to  admit  that  Kiderlen  could  disappoint  the  hopes 
of  the  Nationalists,  the  "Post"  has  permitted  itself  to  publish  a 
very  sharp  article,  to  the  effect,  that  the  State  Secretary  was  obliged 
to  abandon  his  plans  and  yield  to  the  will  of  the  Emperor,  who  has 
shown  far  too  much  moderation  and  forbearance  in  this  question. 
Notwithstanding  the  immediate  denial  in  the  official  press,  charg- 
ing the  "Post"  not  only  with  tactlessness,  but  with  lack  of  patriot- 
ism as  well,  public  opinion  has  shown  a  certain  amount  of  sym- 
pathy with  the  feeling  of  disappointment  displayed  by  the  "Post." 

Whatever  the  result  of  the  present  negotiations  may  be,  in  the  soul 
of  the  German  people  will  long  remain  the  sting  of  wounded  pride,  be- 
cause Germany  has  again  yielded  to  England's  effectual  protest. 

(693)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Neratoff.    Confidential  Let' 
ter,Aug.  16-29,  1911. 

The  letter  of  our  Berlin  Ambassador  (August  5-18)  seems  to 
illuminate  in  a  particularly  clean  manner  the  influences  at  work 
in  Germany  as  a  result  of  the  Moroccan  crisis.    The  attitude  of 


600        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

mind  described  by  him  might  have  consequences  which  I  regard 
as  dangerous. 

As  our  Ambassador  says,  the  feeling  is  directed  chiefly  against  Eng- 
land. This  feeling  has  been  aroused  through  the  disappointment  in 
chauvinistic  circles,  but,  under  similar  circumstances,  chauvinism  in  all 
countries  usually  retains  the  upper  hand.  The  Berlin  Cabinet  found  it 
advisable  to  inaugurate  a  diplomatic  action  with  a  demonstration 
at  Agadir,  thus  openly  designating  Morocco  as  the  object  of  Ger- 
man diplomacy.  The  disappointment  became  evident  on  the  day 
when,  in  consequence  of  a  number  of  deplorable  indiscretions  in  the 
press,  the  public  realized  that  the  negotiations  had  reference  not  to 
Morocco,  but  to  the  Congo.  This  disappointmient,  which  aggra- 
vates the  entire  situation,  seems  to  me  to  be  the  inevitable  result 
of  the  appearance  of  the  "Panther"  ^  at  Agadir.  The  dispatch  of  the 
German  warship  was  bound  to  have  one  effect,  which  does  not  seem  to 
have  been  foreseen  in  Germany:  An  absolutely  clear  statement  of  the 
English  point  of  view. 

The  London  Cabinet  declared,  that  it  was  not  interested  in  the 
result  of  Franco-German  negotiations,  pertaining  to  African  terri- 
tory outside  of  Morocco,  but  that  England,  possessing  special  inter- 
ests in  Morocco,  could  not  allow  any  decision  in  regard  to  Morocco 
to  be  made  without  her  consent.  This  meant  that  Morocco  would 
be  excluded  from  the  general  colonial  reorganization  desired  by 
Germany. 

I  believe,  this  all  too  unexpected  attitude  on  the  part  of  the 
London  Cabinet,  was  bound  to  stir  up  hostile  feeling  in  Germany 
against  England. 

It  is  not  quite  clear  to  me,  why  Berlin  should  have  believed  that 
France  would  remain  isolated.  As  concerns  the  question  itself  raised 
by  Germany,  she,  undoubtedly,  has  legal  arguments  in  her  favor. 
But  I  cannot  explain,  how  she  could  hope  that  France,  even  if 
diplomatically  isolated,  would  under  threats,  determine  to  give  up 
an  important  colony  in  exchange  for  obligations  assumed  by  Ger- 
many in  Morocco— obligations  which  could  be  much  more  easily 
altered  than  a  territorial  concession 

On  the  day  we  received  the  news  of  the  appearance  of  the 
"Panther"  at  Agadir,  I  met  Kuhlmann  at  the  Foreign  Office.     I 

*  This  oft-quoted  warship  was  a  small  gunboat. 


ENTENTE  AND  THE  MOROCCAN  QUESTION      601 

asked  him,  what  he  thought.  He  replied  that  he  believed  one  would 
have  to  negotiate.  I  asked  him  whether  Morocco  or  a  Moroccan 
port  came  into  question.    He  replied : 

"Neither  the  one  nor  the  other.  In  Germany  a  port  is  looked 
on  as  a  big  expense  and  a  danger.  Compensations  will  probably 
have  to  be  sought  elsewhere  for  the  continuous  advance  of  France 
in  Morocco." 

The  value  of  this  opinion  lies  in  the  fact,  that  it  was  given  to 
me  at  the  very  start,  by  a  clever  and  well-informed  diplomat.  A 
couple  of  days  ago,  I  spent  the  evening  with  Metternich.  We  did 
not  touch  on  this  side  of  the  question.  /  only  wished  to  know  whether 
the  rather  general  impression  was  true,  that  my  German  colleague  had 
badly  informed  his  Government.  I  always  doubted  it  and  I  doubt  it 
today  more  than  ever.  It  appears  to  me  that  Berlin  did  not  listen  to 
his  warning. 

In  reply  to  my  somewhat  persistant  reference  to  the  dangers 
and  inconveniences  of  such  a  demonstrative  procedure,  Metter- 
nich defended  himself,  but  only  feebly.  He  seemed  thoroughly 
convinced  that  Germany  had  the  right  on  her  side  in  this  matter; 
still,  he  did  not  appear  particularly  edified  with  his  Government's 
method  of  diplomatic  action,  although  he  was  not  quite  willing  to 
concede  this  openly.    He  concluded  with  the  words : 

"I  can  only  tell  you,  that  I  have  regarded  the  matter  from  the 
beginning  as  very  dangerous."  ^ 

We  spoke  of  England  rather  than  of  France.  I  asked  him  what 
he  thought  of  England's  role.    He  said : 

"The  British  Government  does  not  want  war,  nor  do  they  be- 
lieve, Germany  wants  war.  In  Morocco,  England  has  been  more 
French  than  France,  but  nowhere  else;  England  is  not  interested 
in  the  Congo,  not  even  in  regions  beyond  the  Congo;  and  she 
would  joyfully  welcome  a  solution  of  the  crisis,  if  it  could  be  found 
in  these  latter  regions." 

/  told  him,  this  was  my  opinion  too,  adding  that  it  would  perhaps 
be  well,  if  Germany  would  speak  out  quite  plainly  in  regard  to  Morocco, 
and  the  role  she  zvould  concede  to  France  in  that  country.  He  con- 
tented himself  with  pointing  out  the  tactical  disadvantages  of 
such  declarations. 

*  It  would  be  interesting  to  know  what  role  Metternich  played  in  documents 
682  and  683. 


602        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


(694)     Neratoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.    Telegram,  Aug.  24 
Sept.  6,  1911.    No.  1180. 

Iswolsky  tells  me  that  Spain  intends  to  occupy  Ifni  in  Southern 
Morocco,  and  that  this  news  has  aroused  great  indignation  in  Paris. 
The  French  Ambassador  here  tells  me  such  action  on  the  part  of 
Spain  was  expected  and  has  not  caused  uneasiness.  We  should 
like  to  know  whether  the  French  Government  was  moved,  by  this 
occasion,  to  appeal  to  the  London  Cabinet,  and  whether  the  latter 
intends  to  take  any  steps  to  induce  Spain  to  postpone  her  plans,  till 
there  has  been  a  general  clearing  up  of  the  situation  in  Morocco. 


(695)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Neratoff.     Telegram,  Aug. 
25-Sept.  7,  1911.    No.  198. 


Your  telegram  Nr.  1180  received. 

After  his  return  from  Paris,  Cambon  told  me,  the  French  could 
not  understand  Spain's  manner  of  procedure,  as  France  was  willing 
to  grant  all  possible  concessions.  Far-reaching  proposals  had  been 
made  to  the  Madrid  Cabinet.  The  Spanish  Ambassador  here  told  me, 
these  proposals  were  regarded  at  Madrid  as  unacceptable.  Owing  to 
English  remonstance,  Spain  had  temporarily  abandoned  the  idea  of 
occupying  Ifni ;  besides,  Spanish  rights  in  this  port  were  secured  by 
treaty.  Grey  told  the  Ambassador,  a  few  days  ago,  that  he  did  not 
consider  negotiations  between  Spain  and  France  as  expedient,  until 
an  understanding  had  been  reached  between  France  and  Germany. 
He  warned  the  Ambassador  more  especially  against  any  rash  steps. 
The  Ambassador,  however,  has  told  me  that  the  occupation  has 
only  been  postponed  a  few  days,  as  in  the  autumn  the  occupation 
would  be  impossible  owing  to  the  unfavorable  conditions  for  navi- 
gation. Cambon  appears  to  me  to  be  rather  uneasy  in  regard  to  the 
policy  of  Spain. 


J 


(696)     Neratoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.    Telegram,  Aug.  25- 
Sept.  7,  1911.    No.  1187. 

Our  Ambassador  at  Madrid  telegraphs : 

"The  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  has  explained  to  me,  that  the 
situation  has  entirely  changed  since  our  conversation  of  yesterday. 


ENTENTE  AND  THE  MOROCCAN  QUESTION      603 

On  behalf  of  his  Government,  the  French  Ambassador  ^  has  made 
the  following  verbal  official  declaration : 

"  'France  declares  to  Spain  that  no  agreement  will  be  possible,  unless 
Spain  renounces,  once  for  all,  the  idea  of  occupying  Ifni  or  any  other 
point  in  the  South/ 

''The  Minister  told  me,  the  King  was  indignant  at  this  demand,  de- 
claring it  was  impossible  for  Spain  to  give  up  Ifni,  this  port  having  been 
ceded  to  Spain  long  ago  by  treaty. 

"A  reply  will  be  sent  to  France,  after  a  Cabinet  Council,  but 
Garcia  Prieto  ^  told  me  confidentially,  it  was  his  personal  opinion, 
that  Spain  might  indemnify  France  by  allowing  her  to  settle  at 
some  point  on  the  Southern  coast,  provided  this  point  were  not  too 
close  to  the  Canary  Islands. 

"The  abrupt  tone  of  the  French  communication  has  given 
offense  here.    The  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  exclaimed : 

"  'But  this  is  really  an  ultimatum !'  whereupon  the  Ambassador  re- 
plied :  'Not  at  all,  we  merely  wish  to  avoid  misunderstandings.' " 

(697)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Neratoff.     Telegram,  Aug, 
26-Sept.  8,  1911.    No.  200. 

I  asked  Grey  what  he  thought  of  the  political  situation  between 
France  and  Spain.  He  replied,  the  King,  and  the  Spanish  Government, 
had  at  first  interpreted  Geoffrey's  declaration  as  an  ultimatum.  This  was 
a  misunderstanding  which  he  hoped  had  been  explained  by  this  time; 
France  was  now  awaiting  the  Spanish  counter-proposals.  Grey  added, 
it  must  be  borne  in  mind,  that  if  the  negotiations  at  Berlin  led  to  no  re- 
sult, France,  even  though  she  obtained  the  consent  of  the  other  Powers, 
would  have  secured  the  recognition  of  her  position  in  Morocco  at  the 
cost  of  very  considerable  concessions  on  her  part;  that,  consequently, 
Spain,  no  matter  what  her  historical  rights  might  be,  could  not  demand 
the  preservation  of  these  rights  without  being  willing  to  make  a  sacri- 
fice.^ Grey  added,  he  believed,  Geoffrey  was  very  peaceably  inclined. 
I  believe,  England's  attitude  in  this  matter  has  been  determined  by  the 
Anglo-French  Entente.'*' 

*M.  Geoffrey. 

'  Spanish  minister  of  foreign  affairs. 

'  A  comfortable,  but  not  highly  moral,  position. 

*  Which  view  seems  reasonable. 


604        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

(698)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Aug.  26'Sept.  8,  1911.    No.  202. 

Cambon  told  me  confidentially,  on  Wednesday,  that  his  broth< 
had  discussed  with  Iswolsky  the  possibility  of  an  Austrian  proposal 
for  mediation.    My  colleague  emphasised  most  decidedly  that,  in  hismu 
opinion,  the  French  Government  could  not  accept  such  a  proposalJ^% 
Today,  Grey  spoke  of  information  he  had  received  on  the  subject 
from  Paris.    Stating  that  his  words  were  his  personal  opinion,  and 
in  no  way  bore  the  character  of  an  official  communication,  he  said 
that  he  would  ultimately  accept  any  proposition  that,  in  the  first 
place,  would  tend  towards  the  preservation  of  peace,  and,  secondly, 
if  necessary,  exonerate  France  from  the  charge  of  conducting  an 
aggressive  policy.    He  was  thinking  of  a  Conference,  but,  in  prin- 
ciple, he  did  not  wish  to  exclude  either  mediation  or  a  court  of  arbi- 
tration.   //  was  too  early  to  speak  of  it  as  yet,  but  he  did  not  believe, 
France  could  accept  the  mediation  of  a  Sovereign  allied  with  GermanyUM 
This  idea  was  not  practicable.  "■ 

I  told  Grey,  I  had  no  information  on  the  subject,  but  that  a  con- 
versation between  our  Ambassadors  at  Paris  seemed  to  indicate 
that  such  a  project  existed.  I  added,  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that 
Russia's  position  in  this  crisis  was  a  particularly  difficult  one. 
On  the  one  hand,  Russia  was  bound  by  a  Treaty  of  Alliance,  from 
which  we,  of  course,  had  no  intention  of  withdrawing ;  on  the  other  hand, 
Russia  would  be  surprised  in  the  midst  of  her  peaceful  work  by  a  war 
in  which  she  would  have  to  take  part,  although  it  scarcely  involved  in- 
terests of  hers;  in  short,  for  reasons  of  high  diplomacy,  Russia  would 
have  to  carry  on  a  war  which  would  be  incomprehensible  to  public 
opinion.  Consequently,  in  this  case,  more  than  in  any  other,  Russia 
must  take  into  consideration  all  possible  proposals,  and  leave  noth- 
ing undone  to  make  possible  the  preservation  of  a  just  peace.  I 
added  that  I  interpreted  the  conversation  at  Paris  in  this  sense. 


(699)    Neratoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.     Telegram,  Aug. 
25'Sept.  7,  1911.    No.  1189. 

Our  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Berlin  telegraphed  on  August  24: 
"Kiderlen  told  me  today,  that  the  French  point  of  view,  in  re- 
spect of  territorial   concessions   in   the   Congo   would   arouse  no^ 
opposition;  as  concerns  Morocco,  the  guarantees,  which  France  il 


ENTENTE  AND  THE  MOROCCAN  QUESTION       605 

willing  to  grant  for  the  future  free  development  of  Gern\any's  eco- 
nomic activity,  must  be  accurately  defined.  The  answer  of  the 
German  Government  will  probably  be  presented  to  the  French 
Ambassador  on  Thursday." 


(700)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Neratoff.     Telegram.  Aug. 
27 -Sept.  9,  1911.    No.  203. 

Cambon  told  me,  Grey*s  opinion  in  regard  to  the  Kiderlen- 
Cambon  conversation  is  that  the  negotiations  will  be  long  and 
tedious,  but  there  is  no  reason,  why  a  peaceful  solution  should  not 
be  finally  reached.  Cambon  hopes,  that,  in  formulating  the  ulti- 
mate text  of  the  German  counter-proposals,  the  previous  exchange 
of  views  will  be  borne  in  mind ;  first  and  foremost,  that  a  number  of 
small  bureaucratic  details  will  be  omitted.  I  am  under  the  impres- 
sion that  a  solution  will  be  found;  still,  I  fear  that  public  opinion 
will  become  impatient  if  the  negotiations  be  excessively  protracted. 
It  is  necessary,  that  our  press  should  also  exercise  moderation  and 
restraint, 

(701)  Neratoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.     Telegram.  Sept. 

1-14.  1911.    No.  1239. 

I  am  telegraphing  to  Paris : 

''The  German  Charge  d' Affaires  has  declared  to  me,  on  behalf  of 
his  Government,  that  the  rumours  circulated  by  the  press,  to  the  effect 
that  Germany,  in  her  reply  to  the  French  proposals,  respecting  Morocco, 
will  endeavor  to  obtain  a  privileged  economic  position,  are  entirely  with- 
out foundation.  Germany  wishes  only  to  obtain  guarantees,  that  German 
trade  and  industry — and  therewith  European  trade  and  industry — will 
occupy  the  same  position  as  that  enjoyed  by  France." 

This  explanation  may  assist  France  in  formulating  her  counter- 
proposals. 

(702)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Sept.  4-17,  1911.    No.  1258. 

Our  Charge  d*Aff aires  at  Berlin  telegraphed  on  September  3: 

"Yesterday  the  French  Ambassador  presented  to  Kiderlen  the 

French  reply.   The  Secretary  of  State  did  not  give  a  definite  answer. 


606        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

saying  that  such  would  be  given  on  Monday.    On  the  whole,  Cam- 
bon  received  a  favourable  impression  from  the  interview.     In  his 
opinion,  one  desires  an  understanding  here,  but  does  not  wisl 
to  yield  without  bargaining.    A  certain  danger  lies  in  the  warlike  ai 
mosphere  prevailing  in  some  political  circles  of  Paris  and  London.' 


(703)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Neratoff.     Telegram,  Sept. 
7-20,  1911.    No.  209. 

Nicolson  tells  me,  that,  according  to  the  last  reports  from  Paris, 
the  interview  between  Kiderlen  and  Cambon  indicates  decided  prog- 
ress, and  gives  reason  for  hope  that  a  favorable  solution  will  be 
found.  Before  seeing  Nicolson,  I  spoke  with  my  French  colleague 
who  expressed  the  same  opinion.  Both,  however,  have  doubts  as 
to  whether  the  contemplated  solution  will  satisfy  public  opinion  in 
Germany  and  France,  and  they  fear  that  a  certain  tension  will  be 
felt  for  some  time. 


(704)     The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Berlin  to    Neratoff.     Telegram, 
Sept.  6-19,  1911. 


I 


Kiderlen  and  Cambon,  both,  told  me  this  morning,  that,  after 
yesterday's  interview,  they  believe  that  an  understanding  has  been 
reached,  on  principle,  as  the  differences  of  opinion  still  existing  ap- 
ply only  to  unimportant  details.  Germany  renounces  her  claim  to  eco- 
nomic privileges  in  Morocco  and  considers  the  guarantees  given  by 
France  as  sufficient.  In  respect  of  the  Congo,  an  understanding  on  prin- 
ciple has  also  been  reached,  and  Cambon  regards  the  German  answer 
given  this  evening  as  thoroughly  satisfactory  and  acceptable. 

In  the  strictest  confidence,  however,  he  expressed  to  me  his  fears  that 
the  Paris  Cabinet,  under  the  influence  of  certain  circles,  holding  special 
interests  in  the  French  Congo,  might,  at  this  critical  moment,  show  an 
uncompromising  spirit,  which  would  bring  to  nought  the  agreement 
reached  after  so  much  difficulty.  This  influence  finds  most  intense 
expression  in  some  of  the  French  papers,  which  point  out  that  it 
would  be  impossible  to  cede  to  Germany  any  part  of  French  ter- 
ritory. Cambon  asked  me,  therefore,  confidentially,  to  use  our  in- 
fluence with  the  Paris  Cabinet,  through  the  French  Ambassador  at  Si 


ENTENTE  AND  THE  MOROCCAN  QUESTION      607 

Petersburg  and  our  Ambassador  at  Paris,  to  persuade  them  to  accept 
the  German  proposals,  which  he  considered  thoroughly  acceptable  and 
in  conformity  with  French  interests.  Cambon  expressed  the  hope 
that  our  measures  would  meet  with  success.  The  German  answer 
has  already  been  presented  to  the  French  Government. 

Kiderlen  expressed  to  me  his  satisfaction  as  to  the  approaching 
conclusion  of  the  long  drawn-out  negotiations,  and  added  that  these 
were  rendered  much  more  difficult  by  the  defiant  tone  of  the 
French  press.  In  the  last  few  days,  several  violent  attacks  on  Germany 
have  been  published,  which  have  aroused  great  excitement  here,  and  may 
cause  the  Government,  at  the  last  moment,  to  withdraw  from  a  conclu- 
sion of  the  agreement  with  France. 

For  my  part,  I  consider  it  very  important  in  the  interest  of  gen- 
eral peace,  that,  at  the  present  stage  of  the  negotiations  between 
France  and  Germany,  everything  be  avoided  which  might  stand  in 
the  way  of  a  favourable  conclusion;  under  this  head  I  include  the 
defiant  newspaper  articles  in  the  French  press,  and,  to  a  certain 
extent,  in  our  own  press,  which  are  devoid  of  all  political  tact. 


(705)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Rome  to  Neratoff.    Confidential  Letter, 
Oct.  11-24,  1911. 

The  events  of  the  past  summer  must  evoke  grave  anxiety  every- 
where. An  apparently  insignificant  incident,^  like  the  appearance  of 
the  "Panther'*  at  Agadir,  was  able  to  call  European  peace  into  question. 
Even  though  Germany  and  France  succeeded  in  maintaining  peace, 
public  opinion  in  Italy  is  stronger  than  the  Government,  and  who 
can  guarantee,  that  in  future  the  appearance  of  a  gunboat  some- 
where, in  disputed  waters  may  not  involve  results  which  all  the 
Powers  are  striving  to  postpone,  though  perhaps  not  always  quite 
honestly. 

Germany's  effort  to  create  for  herself,  in  case  of  war,  as  favorable 
a  terrain  as  possible  is  certainly  deserving  of  emulation.  I  have  talked 
to  Barrere  of  late  on  this  subject.  He  has  informed  me  of  plans  which 
are  being  worked  out  in  the  French  General  Staff,  the  technical  details 

*  Paris  and  London  would  not  have  thanked  the  Russian  ambassador   for 
calling  the  "Panther"  incident  "insignificant." 


608        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


of  which  are  probably  already  known  to  us}    He  says  that  Germany 
lacking  confidence  in  the  "benevolent  neutrality  of  Belgium"  is  tryin 
to  secure  for  herself  a  flanking  of  the  French  right  wing  by  way  of 
Switzerland.    This  attempt  to  draw  Switzerland  into  the  struggle,  shows 
Germany's  disappointment  in  regard  to  the  assistance  to  be  expectet 
from  Italy. 

The  Treaties  concluded  between  Italy  and  France  remain  as  seer 
as  before.    Still  one  is  acquainted  with  their  contents.   It  has  not  e. 
caped  the  attention  of  Italy's  Allies,  that  the  regiments  sent  from  North 
em  Italy  to  Tripoli  have  been  taken  from  the  French,  not  from  the 
Swiss  or  Austrian  frontier.^  .... 


I 


In  order  to  weaken  the  opposing  side,  France  and  England  will 
have  to  find  a  means  of  inducing  Italy  to  enter  into  a  more  active 
understanding.  Both,  Barrere  and  Rodd,  realize  this  necessity, 
and  are  seeking  some  means  for  its  attainment.  The  altered 
strategic  position  of  Italy,  the  care  with  which  the  preparations 
are  being  made  for  the  expedition  to  Tripoli,  public  opinion  which 
is  not  friendly  to  Germany,  the  fears  aroused  by  the  policy  of 
Switzerland — all  these  things  make  it  appear  most  particularly  de- 
sirable to  England  and  France,  that  Italy's  support  be  obtained  in 
case  of  war. 

If,  after  the  end  of  the  Tripolitan  War,  France  and  England 
should  have  arrived  at  the  agreements  mentioned,  we  too  shall 
then  have  to  consider  what  advantages  would  accrue  to  us  from  a 
rapprochement  with  Italy.  The  substance  of  our  agreements  with 
Italy  would  have  to  be  as  follows :  The  attempt  must  be  made  to 
divert  from  our  frontier  a  part  of  the  Austrian  forces  which  other- 
wise would  be  employed  against  us.^ 

As  I  have  already  mentioned  in  m/y  reports,  the  Italy  of  today  no 
longer  represents  that  factor  which  would  m^ke  it  appear  desirable  to 


« 


*  These  plans  concerned  especially  Belgium,  and  provided,  among  other 
features,  for  the  landing  of  British  troops  in  Belgium,  and  the  invasion  by 
French  troops  of  that  country,  in  case  of  war  against  Germany. 

*  A  measure  which  caused  great  excitement  in  Berlin  and  Vienna  government 
circles  at  the  time,  confirming  what  had  been  suspected  and  leading  to  an  agita- 
tion in  Germany  in  favor  of  a  new  international  orientation.  The  abandonment 
of  Austria  was  advocated  more  than  ever,  because  Italy's  attitude  was  due  largely 
to  the  anti- Austrian  sentiments  of  the  Italian  public. 

'  This  very  remarkable  document  contains  every  provision  made  by  the  gene: 
stafifs^of  the  Entente  governments. 


1 


ENTENTE  AND  THE  MOROCCAN  QUESTION      609 

us  that  Italy  remain  in  the  Triple  Alliance  for  the  purpose  of  acting 
as  a  dead  weight  to  her  Allies. 

(706)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Berlin  to  Neratoff.     Letter,  Sept.  30- 
OcL  13,  1911. 

After  three  months  tedious  negotiations,  in  the  course  of  which 
the  situation  several  times  became  so  acute  that  it  almost  brought 
about  a  rupture,  an  agreement  in  regard  to  Morocco  has  at  last 
been  reached.  It  is  to  be  ascribed  mainly  to  two  circum,stances : 
First,  Emperor  William,  at  the  first  outbreak  of  the  crisis,  resolved  not 
to  let  it  come  to  war;  and,  secondly,  the  Ambassador  of  the  French 
Republic  here  has  displayed  unusual  cleverness  and  tact.  He  had  to 
fight  simultaneously  with  an  extremely  strong  opponent  at  Ber- 
lin, the  German  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  a  very  strong 
opponent  at  Paris  ^ — the  influence  of  those  political  circles  whose 
object  was  to  prevent  an  understanding  with  Germany. 

It  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  two  factors  mentioned  above  will  also 
contribute  to  a  satisfactory  solution  ....  regarding  the  Congo. 

(707)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Neratoff.    Telegram,  Oct.  12- 
25,  1911.    No.  153. 

The  negotiations  concerning  the  Congo  are  nearing  an  end. 
In  the  main  points,  an  understanding  has  been  reached.  Thanks  to 
a  very  far-sighted  combination,  Germany  obtains  access  to  the 
Congo  and  Ubangi  Rivers,  without  communications  being  inter- 
rupted between  the  northern  and  southern  territorial  regions  be- 
longing to  France.  A  slight  difference  of  opinion,  in  regard  to  the 
extent  of  the  territory  to  be  ceded  by  Germany  in  the  North,  is 
unimportant  and  will  soon  be  adjusted.  The  French  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  does  justice  to  the  moderation  shown  by  Germany  dur- 
ing the  second  stage  of  the  negotiations. 

(708)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Neratoff.    Letter,  Nov.  8- 
21,  1911. 

If  at  the  time  of  the  Morocco  crisis  it  was  impossible  to  dis- 
cover in  England  even  the  slightest  opposition  to  the  standpoint 

*  Delcasse. 

39 


610 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


ent 

1 


of  the  Government,  namely,  that,  in  a  given  case,  England  would 
support  France  by  force  of  arms,  it  cannot  be  denied  that  since 
quiet  has  been  restored,  a  certain  reaction  is  making  itself  felt  in 
various  circles — pacifist  circles  which  are  to  be  found  scattered 
among  all  parties,  though  chiefly  among  the  left  wing  of  the  Radi- 
cals. 

/  do  not  wish  to  ascribe  any  special  significance  to  this  movement 
I  am  rather  inclined  to  believe,  it  is  a  question  of  a  reaction  after  a 
tremendously  severe  strain,  and  I  do  not  believe  that  this  movement  wUl 
be  permanent.  The  great  Government  parties  represented  in  Parliament 
— the  Conservative  Unionists  and  the  Liberals — give  no  reason  for  sucl 
a  belief. 

The  argument  of  the  above  described  movement  may 
summed  up  as  follows :  Twice  in  two  years,  England  has  been  almost 
compelled  to  resort  to  arms,  in  regard  to  questions  which  did  not 
affect  her  interests.  Two  wars  might  have  been  the  result  of  the 
Entente.    A  political  Isolation  would  have  been  more  advantageous.     MfL 

A  letter  by  Stead,  appearing  in  the  **Standard,"  illumines  thi^" 
question.  I  enclose  a  copy  of  this  letter.  I  report  this  new  orien- 
tation chiefly  for  the  sake  of  completeness,  but  also  because  a 
tendency  exists  here,  from  which  German  diplomacy  will  certainly 
seek  to  derive  an  advantage,  mainly  through  exaggerating  the  im- 
portance of  this  tendency.^  ^1 

/  must  add  that  this  opposition,  based  on  the  theory  that  the  Gov^^ 
ernment  does  not  keep  Parliament  sufficiently  informed  in  regard  to 
foreign  policy,  Is  calculated  to  aggravate  the  attacks  on  Sir  Edward 
Grey's  Persian  policy. 


(709)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  17-30,  1911.    No.  298. 


I 


Despite  the  fact  that,  after  Grey's  last  speech  in  the  House  of 
Commons,  all  serious  opposition  to  his  foreign  policy  seemed  to 
have  been  overcome,  this  opposition  has  now  raised  its  head  again. 
It  is  principally  to  be  found  among  the  extreme  left.  I  have 
learnt,  from  a  reliable  source,  that  a  proposal  has  been  made  from 
this  side  to  the  Conservative  Party  to  overthrow  Grey.    This  pro- 


*A  chronic  failing  of  German  diplomatists  and  statesmen. 


I 


ENTENTE  AND  THE  MOROCCAN  QUESTION       611 

posal  was  categorically  declined,  but  it  is  symptomatic.  This 
opposition  attacked,  first  of  all,  the  speech  which  Lloyd  George 
delivered,  which  was  based  on  information  received  from  the 
French  Government,  which  fact  Grey  could  not  have  communi- 
cated to  Parliament,  without  committing  an  indiscretion.  In  his 
speech,  Grey  emphasised  that  he  was  willing  to  enter  %nto  new  Ententes, 
hut  not  to  the  detriment  of  those  already  existing.  This  utterance  has 
also  been  attacked.  It  appears,  that  the  opposition  of  which  I 
speak  is  mainly  pro-German  and  inclines  towards  Germany.  In  addi- 
tion, there  is  the  opposition  to  the  common  Anglo-Russian  policy  in 
Persia.  It  i$  not  really  dangerous,  taken  as  a  whole,  and  a  Gov- 
ernment crisis  is  not  probable,  but  the  circumstances  I  have  men- 
tioned, compel  Grey  to  exercise  great  prudence.  I  am  telegraphing 
this  to  you,  because  I  know  Grey  is  troubled,  and  also  in  order  to 
enable  you  to  judge  for  yourself  the  situation  which  might  result 
from  every  crisis  in  the  Anglo-Russian  r-slations. 

(710)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Neratoff.    Letter,  Dec.  7-20,  1911. 

(After  a  general  description  of  the  Franco-German  negotia- 
tions, in  regard  to  Morocco,  the  letter  concludes :) 

Finally,  the  occurrences  just  described  have  also  proved  various 
political  truths,  concerning  which  doubt  has  hitherto  existed.  The 
crisis  of  1908,  respecting  Bosnia,  aroused  in  the  public  opinion  of 
Europe  a  certain  lack  of  confidence  in  the  strength  and  efficacy 
of  the  Triple  Entente.  But  now,  this  Alliance,  which  originated  under 
the  influence  of  historical  necessity,  has  not  only  demonstrated  its  inner 
strength,  hut  has  also  shown  that  it  is  in  a  position  to  act  in  favour  of  the 
preservation  of  general  peace.  In  this  respect,  it  is  extremely  note- 
worthy, that,  in  those  critical  summer  days,  England,  without  being 
bound  to  France  by  a  formal  Act,  was  prepared  to  mobilize  not  only 
her  entire  Fleet,  but  also  her  Expeditionary  Army  against  Germany. 
Should  it  not  he  ascribed  to  the  resolute  attitude  of  the  three  Entente 
Powers,  that  Germany  showed  that  compliance  which  finally  led  to  the 
signature  of  the  Agreement  of  November  4? 

In  ascribing  the  preservation  of  the  peace  to  the  common  action 
of  the  three  Powers,  I  do  not  indulge  in  optimism  as  to  the  future. 
After  the  crisis  just  experienced,  the  political  situation  of  Europe  is 


612        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


less  secure  than  ever.    Beyond  all  doubt,  any  local  collision  between  t 
Powers  is  bound  to  lead  to  a  general  European  conflict,  in  which  Rus 
sia,  like  every  other  European  Power,  will  have  to  participate.     With 
God's  help,  the  conflict  may  be  postponed  for  a  while,  but  that  it  may 
come  at  any  moment  we  must  bear  in  mind,  hour  by  hour,  and  we  m 
also  arm  against  it,  hour  by  hour.^ 


*This  document  is  all  the  more  remarkable  because  of  M.  Iswolsky's  fi 
determination  to  create  the  Greater  Russia  by  hook  or  crook,  in  bringing  under 
the  same  political  roof  all  Slavs  in  existence — those  in  the  Balkans,  in  Austria- 
Hungary  and  in  Germany,  and  by  seizing  Constantinople  and  her  straits  and 
laying  all  of  Asia  Minor  under  tribute  to  Russia,  if  annexation  should  have 
proven  inexpedient.  What  Iswolsky  depicted  in  December  of  1911  came  true  to 
a  dot  in  July  and  August  of  1914.  Though  the  Russian  ambassador  at  Paris 
and  former  Russian  minister  of  foreign  affairs  has  been  credited  with  the  state- 
ment that  the  Great  War  was  his  war,  the  more  interesting  fact  is  that  Docu- 
ments Nos.  710  and  712  make  it  perfectly  clear  that,  even  if  there  had  been  no 
men  to  continue  the  Entente  policies  of  that  period,  December,  1911 — February, 
1912,  as  here  outlined,  only  the  most  radical  change  in  foreign  relations  and 
international  tendencies  could  have  prevented  the  great  World  War. 


] 


VII 

THE  ARMAMENT  CRISIS  AND  THE  HALDANE 
MISSION 

(November  1911— May  1912) 

(711)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Neratoff,    Letter,  Nov.  9-22,  1911. 

In  one  of  my  previous  letters,  I  have  informed  Your  Excellency 
that  in  Parliament  the  opposition  to  Sir  Edward  Grey's  policy  is 
growing.  As  I  have  the  fullest  confidence  in  his  ascendency  over 
Parliament,  I  would  not  have  attached  any  special  importance  to 
this  state  of  affairs,  had  I  not  made  observations  in  other  quarters 
about  which  I  will  give  you  some  details.  In  puhlig  opinion,  and  in 
the  press  of  Germany  and  England,  there  exists  the  settled  impression 
that  the  relations  between  the  two  countries  have  never  been  so  strained 
as  lately,  and  that  they  are  still  so. 

I  am  of  the  opinion  that  one  must  not  attach  too  much  impor- 
tance to  this,  at  all  events  as  regards  the  future.  It  is,  however, 
true  that  the  attempts  at  a  rapprochement,  of  which  I  have  spoken 
to  Your  Excellency,  have  suddenly  come  to  a  standstill,  or  rather 
have  been  interrupted.  It  is  true  that  passions  have  been  aroused,  and, 
that  not  only  the  tone  of  the  press,  but,  likewise,  that  of  diplomacy,  has 
assumed  a  sharpness  of  tone  hitherto  unknown.  And  it  is  just  this  fact 
which  gives  me  cause  for  reflection.  For,  if,  on  the  one  hand,  Eng- 
land has  the  fullest  confidence  in  the  future  of  the  mighty  Russian 
realm — a  confidence  which  strengthens  our  position  here — it  is  not  to  be 
denied,  that  England  and  Germany  have  a  certain  respect  for  each 
other,  so  that,  in  certain  matters,  they  follow  each  other's  lead,  and  in 
many  points  admire  each  other.  In  order  to  express  myself  still  clearer — 
neither  the  one,  nor  the  ether  have  the  same  admiration  for  France. 

Latest  events  have  brought  it  about,  that  both  States  have,  of 

613 


614        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


to 

1 


a  sudden,  stood  opposed  one  to  the  other.  It  was  impossible  to  g< 
further.  They  had  taken  each  other's  measures.  That  the  opposi- 
tion was  accentuated  thereby  is  evident,  but  this  might  easily 
change.  Public  life  in  England  is  difficult  to  understand  and  to 
judge,  but  the  full  freedom  of  its  development  implies  that  certain 
currents  develop  more  rapidly  here  than  elsewhere.  /  should  he 
astonished,  if  a  reaction  m  the  spirit  of  a  rapprochement  were  not  to 
develop  out  of  this  crisis,  and  this  might  be  the  case  quicker  than 
generally  believed.  I  think  that  the  parliamentary  opposition,  t< 
which  I  have  alluded,  is  in  a  way  a  sign  of  this.  On  the  other  ham 
attempts  to  effect  a  reconciliation  have  already  been  made  beyond  doubt; 
and  they  come,  moreover,  from  Germany.  I  do  not  wish  to  draw  any  ex- 
aggerated deductions  from  the  above.  As  the  parliamentary  opposition 
supports  the  Entente  policy  of  Sir  Edward  Grey,  to  which  the  King  is 
just  as  attached  as  his  late  father,  there  has  been  created  a  guaranty 
for  the  continuance  of  Grey's  policy.  But  for  me  there  is  no  doubt, 
that,  should  this  policy,  for  one  reason  or  another,  have  to  be  given 
up,  the  isolation  of  England  would  lead  to  her  reconciliation  witlw. 
Germany.  ^\ 

This  is  the  reason,  why  Grey  is  so  anxious  to  be  able  to  answer 
all  interpellations  in  Parliament,  and  to  emphasize  the  success  o£^| 
his  policy  in  the  interests  of  peace.    For  that  reason,  I  regret  thJKI 
incident  in  Persia,  which  has,  unfortunately,  assumed,  in  this  poli- 
tically so  unpropitious  moment,  a  certain  importance.^ 


(712)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Letter,  Jan.  Ze-Feh.  8,  1912. 


I  have  repeatedly  reported  to  Your  Excellency  my  views  on 
English  politics,  though  only  in  fragmentary  form,  and  I  now  beg 
your  permission  to  condense  the  sum  total  of  my  observations  in 
this  letter. 

I  can  find  no  better  starting  point,  than  to  remind  you  of  the 
words  which  Grey  addressed  to  me  a  few  weeks  ago.  After  de- 
veloping the  trend  of  thought  as  to  how  important  it  was,  that  our 
co-operation  in  Persia  should  be  maintained,  the  Minister  added 
almost  verbatim: 

*  The  ruthless  military  measures  of  the  Russians  against  the  unarmed  and 
peaceable  Persians  had  led  to  severe  criticisms  of  Grey's  policy  in  the  British 
House  of  Commons. 


I 


THE  MISSION  OF  VISCOUNT  HALDANE  615 

^*0n  the  day  on  which  our  co-operation,  a  mutual  support,  can  no 
longer  be  maintained,  our  Convention,  too,  would  become  null  and  void. 
The  breach  of  that  Convention  would  signify  the  break-up  of  the  En- 
tente^ And  if  the  Entente  should  disappear,  English  policy  would  have 
to  consider  a  new  orientation,  in  which  case  one  must  not  be  astonished 
by  the  rapid  change  in  the  public  mind. 

**In  that  case  I  should  retire,  for  it  would  not  be  desirable  for  me 
to  remain  in  office." 

Those  last  words  could  only  signify  that,  in  so  far  as  his  own 
person  was  concerned,  he  does  not  approve  of  any  such  change, 
that  he  would  consider  it  harmful  to  English  interests  and  would 
not  support  it. 

With  remarkable  clearness  of  perception,  peculiar  to  him.  Sir 
Edward  Grey  had,  in  a  few  words,  described  a  situation  which, 
however,  at  that  period  had  not  yet  arisen.  We  do  not  as  yet 
have  to  face  such  a  change,  and  the  Convention  and  the  Entente 
may  not  only  be  maintained,  but  may  even  take  still  stronger  roots, 
on  condition  that  the  present  Persian  crisis  be  solved  in  a  manner 
which  accords  with  the  common  interests  of  Russia  and  England, 
and  that  that  solution  be  rapidly  found  in  order  that  the  Entente  be 
maintained. 

But  to-day  I  will  not  write  to  Your  Excellency  about  Persian 
affairs.  I  repeat :  We  do  not  as  yet  have  to  face  the  change  which 
Sir  Edward  feared.  But  one  must  not  blink  a  fact  which  is  all  too 
apparent  here  in  London.  Public  sentiment  is  beginning  to  sum  up 
the  political  balance  sheet  of  the  Entente  policy.  In  spite  of  its  political 
maturity  and  experience,  the  English  public  resembles  all  other  publics — 
its  judgment  is  not  deep — it  remains  on  the  surface.  It  is  not  a  ques- 
tion here  of  a  few  Socialists  and  Radicals,  nor  of  a  steady  influencing 
of  the  press  from  the  other  side  of  the  water?  It  is  a  matter  of  senti- 
ment, which  is  showing  itself  in  qmte  different  circles,  even  amongst 
the  Conservatives. 

One  no  longer  sees  clearly  the  aim  of  our  policy  in  Persia,  our  rela- 
tions towards  Germany  are  also  not  quite  understood.  This  uncertainty 
very  often  revives  the  question  of  the  "Road  to  India/'  ^     One  thinks 

*  Count  Benckendorff  makes  much  mention  elsewhere,  of  the  efficacy  of  Ger- 
man press  propaganda,  but  seems  to  have  changed  his  mind  somewhat. 
'The  political  and  national  nightmare  of  the  British. 


616        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

of  the  Islamic  world  and  fears  are  expressed  concerning  the  impressk 
of  some  of  the  measures  we  have  taken. 

As  regards  France,  conditions  brought  about  by  the  fall  of  the 
laux  Cabinet,  exaggerated  though  they  were,  astonished  English  public 
opinion,  and  have,  to  some  degree,  set  in  doubt  the  hitherto  unshaken^^ 
faith  in  the  loyalty  of  France  to  the  Entente.  f  | 

Above  all,  the  English  public,  now  that  the  European  crises  are  at 
an  end,  and  good  temper  has  been  restored,  is  astonished  at  the  percep- 
tion that  twice  England  has  been  on  the  brink  of  a  terrible  war,  and 
this  for  reasons  which, — in  a  rather  shortsighted  way — it  could  only  indi- 
rectly connect  with  the  interests  of  England,  whilst  the  role  of  France  in 
the  Balkan  crisis  appears  rather  dubious,  and  Russia's  attitude,  during 
the  Morocco  question,  also,  was  not  as  determined  as  that  of  England. 

The  Entente,  which,  up  to  now,  had  been  considered  a  guarantee 
for  peace,  is  this  no  longer  in  the  same  measure  as  at  first  believed.  And 
the  thought  'Would  not  an  agreement  with  Germany  be  more  advan- 
tageous for  England'*  comes  to  me  as  an  echo  from  a  quarter  whence  I 
would  never  have  expected  it,  and  gives  vent  to  an  opinion  which  six 
or  eight  months  ago  would  have  been  impossible.  ^1 

The  words  which  I  have  quoted  are,  however,  beyond  the  in™' 
stinct  of  the  public,  and  above  all  beyond  that  of  public  utterances. 
It  is  true  that  several  important  Committes  have  been  actually  formed, 
and  that  already  the  entire  Liberal,  and  part  of  the  Conservative  press, 
have  openly  entered  the  lists  for  an  improvement  of  Anglo-German 
relations.  This  desirable  improvement  naturally  signifies  a  certain 
understanding,  without  however  discarding  existing  agreements. 
In  this  sense,  Lloyd  George  expressed  himself  in  a  public  speech. 
This,  however,  would  signify  at  the  same  time  that,  should  the 
Entente  with  Russia  or  France  fail  (and  the  Entente  with  Russia 
stands  as  the  decisive  factor),  the  agreement  with  Germany  would 
be  further  widened. 

Permit  me  to  introduce  a  reflection  here.  At  first  sight  it  may 
appear  strange,  that  the  hostility  against  Germany,  which  was  so  strong 
a  few  months  ago,  that  at  the  moment  when  war  threatened  it  was  al- 
most unanimous,  should  now  have  toned  down  so  rapidly.  The  enmity 
remains;  Germany,  if  not  an  enemy,  is  still  a  menace.  Germany  is  held 
responsible  for  the  fact  that  the  navies  must  be  constantly  augmented. 
Feelings  have  been  assuaged  sufficiently  to  admit  of  the  possibility 


THE  MISSION  OF  VISCOUNT  HALDANE  617 

of  a  change,  at  least  in  a  measure,  to  render  the  construction  of  ad- 
ditional Dreadnoughts  unnecessary.  The  reason  why  feelings  have 
calmed  down  more  rapidly  here  than  in  Germany — where  anti-Eng- 
lish sentiment  is  still  at  highest  pitch — is  to  be  sought  in  the  fact, 
that,  here  in  England,  people  feel  to  have  scored  a  success,  whilst 
in  Germany  rather  the  contrary  is  the  case.  England  is  there  accused 
of  having  caused  a  German  failure,  which  has  been  veiled  diplomatically. 
Success  is  calming;  failure  exasperates. 

Apart  from  that,  the  excitement  in  Germany  appears  to  me  to  he 
aroused  by  the  obstinacy  with  which  England  adheres  to  her  ententes 
liHth  Russia  and  France.  When  Austria,  under  the  protection  of  Ger- 
many, threatened  Russian  interests  in  the  Balkans,  England  supported 
us;  and  she  showed  Germany  her  teeth,  when  the  latter,  basing  unjusti- 
fied hopes  on  English  neutrality,  moved  against  French  interests  in 
Morocco.  In  Germany  we  hear  again  and  again:  "England  is  al- 
ways against  us."  They  do  not  wish  to  admit  that  England  has 
her  own  interests  in  Constantinople  and  Saloniki  to  defend,  as  also 
on  the  Moroccan  coasts. 

This  anti-English  spirit  in  Germany,  naturally,  entails  serious 
difficulties,  even  as  regards  a  conditional  understanding  between 
the  two  countries.  But  what  would  happen  should  one  of  the  en- 
tentes, especially  that  with  Russia,  be  dissolved?  The  answer  is 
self-evident.  /  am  convinced  that  the  enmity  against  England  would 
disappear,  and  as  rapidly  transform  itself  into  a  spirit  of  conciliation, 
as  is  already  the  case  to-day  with  a  portion  of  English  public  opinion. 

It  is  stated,  that  the  personal  feelings  of  Emperor  William  have 
been  particularly  hurt.  If  that  be  the  case,  and  I  believe  it  is,  it 
must  be  attributed  to  the  cause  I  have  just  mentioned. 

If  a  breach  should  occur  in  one  of  the  English  ententes,  then, 
Germany's  policy  would  have  to  record  a  striking  success,  for  that 
is  the  goal  which  she  has  kept  in  view  ever  since  the  existence  of 
these  ententes.  Germany  is  looking  for  the  weak  spot  in  the  armor, 
and  I  am  not  disinclined  to  think  that  she  imagines  she  has  found 
it  in  Persia.  If  the  manner,  in  which  the  German  press  makes 
capital  out  of  our  difficulties,  and  the  way  in  which  it  exaggerates 
these,  had  not  already  convinced  me,  it  would  be  proved  to  me  by 
the  conversations  I  have  had  with  Count  Metternich,  and  his 
judgment  concerning  these  difficulties. 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

An  open  breach  between  us  and  England  in  Persia,  an  unfavourabl 
vote  in  the  English  Parliament,  provoked  by  some  incident  in  our  nego- 
tiations, would  put  an  end  to  Sir  Edward  Grey's  career  and  would  at  the 
same  time  assuage  the  bitterness  of  Kaiser  Wilhelm.    He  would  the^Sk 
be  able,  once  more,  to  resume  his  personal  action  in  England,  which  has 
always  outstripped  public  opinion  in  his  own  country,  I  believe,  I  do  not 
err  in  this  assumption.    Is  it  not  the  most  natural  thing  in  the  world? 
Germany  has  been  in  error  about  the  so-called  aggressive  aims  of  the 
Entente  Policy,     The  "Iron  Ring,"  which  has  become  proverbial,  is 
based  upon  a  fallacy.'^    So  far  as  I  am  aware,  the  Russian  Government 
has  not  attempted  to  interfere  with  the  legitimate  interests  of  Germany, 
when  she  has  not  attempted  to  oppose  ours.    On  the  other  hand.  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey,  publicly  as  well  as  to  me  personally,  has  constantly  denied 
that  he  wished  to  isolate  Germany.    He  has  repeated  to  me  that  every 
attempt  to  destroy  the  Triple  Alliance  would  be  a  mistake.    In  his  opin-^ 
ion  the  isolation  of  Germany  would  signify  an  actual  danger  to  ^^ifll 
cause  of  peace. 

It  is,  however,  true,  that  every  time  the  German  Government  strove 
to  advance  its  interests  in  regions  in  which  other  Powers  were  inter- 
ested, it  found  itself  face  to  face,  not  with  one  Power,  but  with  a  group 
of  powers.^   .... 

To  sum  up :  There  is  a  general  desire  to  improve  relations  with- 
out going  further.  The  necessity  for  the  continuance  of  the  En- 
tente is  admitted.  The  entente  with  Russia,  which  is  less  em- 
phasized, is,  nevertheless,  the  actual  basis.  I  believe  that  the 
Entente  with  France  would  not  be  of  the  same  importance  to  Eng- 
land should  our  own  be  dissolved. 

But  it  is  not  to  be  disputed  that  public  opinion  in  general  feels 
that  the  Ententes  have  up  to  the  present  not  led  to  the  results 
which  had  been  hoped  for  and  that,  above  all  things,  they  have  not 
established  sufficient  order  and  full  security. 

If  I  write  at  such  great  length  on  this  subject,  it  is  because  in 
the  end  British  Governments,  no  matter  how  faithful  they  may  be 
to  the  obligations  they  have  assumed — and  I  think  this  was  never 


*  Elsewhere  in  these  documents,  Count  Benckendorff  contradicts  himself;  his 
remarkably  good  judgment  seems  to  have  been  beclouded  on  this  very  essential 
point. 

*  Compare,  this  statement  with  the  one  singled  out  by  the  precedmg  foot  not 


\ 


THE  MISSION  OF  VISCOUNT  HALDANE  619 

more  the  case  than  with  the  present  Cabinet — will  nevertheless  be 
dependent  upon  public  opinion.  The  decision  lies  in  the  hands  of 
the  latter.  Even  though  public  opinion  in  England  places  a  higher  de- 
gree of  confidence  in  the  Government  than  is  usually  the  case  in 
other  countries,  yet  one  must  beware  not  to  stretch  this  point  too  far. 
For  that  reason,  I  have  always  emphasized  the  great  importance  of 
always  giving  Grey  the  possibility  of  publicly  explaining  the  meas- 
ures adopted  by  us,  and  of  proving  that  the  interests  of  England 
have  been  considered.  Naturally  our  own  freedom  of  action  is  thereby 
in  no  wise  impaired,  but  this  is,  in  m.y  opinion,  the  natural  consequence 
of  every  entente  and  every  Convention. 

I  will  not  close  this  letter  without  casting  a  glance  upon  the 
situation,  as  it  would  develop  with  regard  to  Russia  and  our  inter- 
national relations,  if,  contrary  to  all  expectations,  the  agreement 
regarding  Persia  and  the  Entente  with  England  should  be  abro- 
gated. It  seems  to  me  that  not  sufficient  consideration  has  been 
given  this  question  in  Russia.  /  believe  that  we  are  altogether  too 
lightly  disposed  to  assume  that  we  still  have  Germany,  should  England, 
or  even  France,  abandon  us.  I  mmst  not  conceal  from  Your  Excellency 
my  firm  conviction,  that  such  is  not  the  case,  at  least  not  with  regard 
to  the  future.  Germany  would  finally  place  herself  at  the  side  of  Eng- 
land. For  Russia  this  would  mean  isolation  and  re-grouping  of  the 
powers,  the  main  body  of  which  would  be  formed  by  England  and 
Germany,  with  the  inevitable  result  that  Russian  interests  would  no 
longer  be  considered. 

I  do  not  wish  to  exaggerate,  nor  ascribe  Machiavellian  intentions  to 
anyone.  I  have  always  been  of  the  opinion,  that  excessive  suspicious- 
ness is  a  bad  councillor  in  politics.  I  do  not  think  that  England  would 
intentionally  make  her  position  more  difficult,  by  reverting  to  a  policy 
of  constant  friction  with  us.^  Such  was  once  the  special  characteristic 
of  English  policy,  but  it  is  no  longer  such. 

On  the  other  hand,  I  have  faith  in  the  traditional  and  personal 
sentiments  of  Emperor  Wilhelm  towards  ourselves.  If  the  Entente 
should  continue,  and  our  former  relations  with  Germany  be  re- 
established, up  to  a  certain  point,  our  interests  would  certainly  be 
served,  if  a  modus  vivendi  existed  between  Germany  and  England. 
Even  in  the  case  of  a  complete  change  which  would  follow  upon  a 
*  "The  Road  to  India." 


620        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


I 


rts 


breach  between  England  and  Russia,  it  is  my  opinion  that  Em<peror 
Wilhelm  would  strive  to  maintain  his  relations  with  us. 

But  what  would  be  our  actual  position?    I  can  only  vouchsafe 
general  answer  in  this  already  far  too  lengthy  letter. 

England  finds  herself  at  the  head  of  an  immense  colonial  empire 
which  suffices  to  satisfy  her  activities,  her  enterprise  and  her  capital. 
This  empire  is  in  the  midst  of  transformation  and  internal  development, 
which  often  progress  with  extraordinary  swiftness,  as  for  instance,  in 
Canada  and  India.  England  is  satiated  with  land,  so  that  as  soon  as  she 
has  acquired  new  territory, — and  we  know  at  the  price  of  what  efforts 
— she  is  prepared  to  restore  its  autonomy.^   .... 

A  propos  of  the  Morocco  question,  when  the  German  Ambas 
dor  remarked  to  the  English  Minister : 

'*The  world  is  being  divided  up,  we  are  more  hemmed  in  than 
all  others,  we  too  have  a  claim  to  a  share  in  the  booty,"  these 
words  may  be  said  to  have  expressed  a  certain  truth.  It  is  no  mystery 
with  what  success  Germany,  after  her  victories,  and  the  consolidation  of 
her  power  has  developed  her  internal  power.  Though  very  wealthy, 
she  IS  still  more  enterprising  than  wealthy;  she  requires  capital.  Eng- 
land can  only  furnish  her  this  in  insufficient  amounts,  but  France  would 
be  able  to  accomplish  this,  and,  when  England  has  once  acquiesced,  it 
will  not  be  long  before  the  French  market  will  be  open  to  Germany.^ 
Not  without  ambition  to  increase  her  colonial  possessions,  Germany, 
nevertheless,  follows  rather  the  road  of  peaceful  penetration  by  confin- 
ing herself  principally  to  vast  undertakings,  in  which,  however,  she 
always  meets  the  opposition  of  England.  It  is  true  that  Russians 
weight  in  the  scale  is  of  great  importance,  but  in  overseas  undertakings 
England  herself  alone  is  the  greatest  hindrance. 

To  me  the  most  striking  proof  of  this  seems  to  be  the  Bagdad  rail- 
way. In  my  opinion,  the  role,  which  this  undertaking  is  destined  to  play 
in  world  politics,  is  far  more  important  than  one  would  at  first  glance 
imagine.  The  interest  which  it  arouses  in  Germany,  includes  the  whole 
nation.  In  financing  the  project,  almost  the  whole  of  Europe,  even 
England,  had  a  share.  And  yet  it  is  chiefly  England  who  places  obstacles 

*It  would  seem  that  Count  Benckendorff's  remarkable  mind  had  not  suffi- 
ciently analyzed  the  fundamental  principle  of  British  imperialism,  consisting  of 
economic  overlordship  in  all  possible  cases. 

'Extraordinary  as  this  statement  must  seem,  it  identifies  a  fact,  nevertheless. 
See  documents  which  deal  with  the  political  control  of  French  investments. 


THE  MISSION  OF  VISCOUNT  HALDANE  621 

m  the  way.  It  is  often  repeated  in  England — and  this  is  the  opin- 
ion of  her  leading  politicians  of  the  Conservative  as  well  as  the 
Liberal  Party,  of  the  men  at  present  in  power,  as  well  as  the  former 
ones — that  one  of  the  greatest  obstacles  to  the  conclusion  of  an  Anglo- 
German  agreement  lies  in  the  lack  of  a  basis,  in  the  absence  of  concrete 
questions  for  negotiations.  This  appears  to  me  exaggerated.  I  believe 
that  the  Bagdad  railway  might  very  easily  form,  such  a  basis.  Several 
attempts  at  negotiations  have  already  taken  place,  but  the  international 
obligations  of  England,  above  all  her  want  of  good-will,"^  have  never 
allowed  the  negotiations  to  be  continued.  It  would  be  otherwise,  if 
England,  deprived  of  our  support,  should  resolve  to  display  the  neces- 
sary good-will  and  modify  her  present  demands,  should  she  see  in  an 
agreement  with  Germany  one  of  those  safeguards  which  she  believes  to 
be  necessary  to  her. 

That  might  also  come  true,  even  without  a  breach  of  the  Triple 
Entente,  but  under  other  conditions  and  without  the  consequences 
for  ourselves  as  above  described. 

But  should  the  Entente  be  once  broken  up,  this  would  signify 
for  Germany  that  the  one  agreement  would  lead  also  to  others. 
Persia  would  be  opened  to  her  industries  and  commerce,  Asia  Minor 
would  fall  within  her  sphere  of  influence.  Germany  would  naturally 
encounter  Russian  opposition,  but,  on  this  occasion,  Russia  would  be 
isolated  and,  mighty  as  she  is,  we  must  admit  that  she  is  still  poorly 
equipped  for  an  economic  competition.^ 

By  means  of  an  agreement  with  England,  the  influence  of  Ger- 
many in  Constantinople  would  be  augmented.  It  is  true  that 
Germany  would  have  to  share  this  influence  with  England,  but 
the  lion's  share  would  have  fallen  to  the  former,  and  it  would  be 
astonishing  if  Turkey  were  not  to  place  herself  entirely  on  the  German 
side. 

I  should  not  like  to  weary  the  attention  of  Your  Excellency  by 
carrying  this  parallel  further — for  one  may  extend  it  wherever 
English  and  German  enterprise  encounter  one  another,  and  wher- 
ever there  is  room  for  compromises. 

We  must  finally  also  consider  how  important,  in  the  public 

*  Thus  spoke  Count  Benckendorff,  a  man  to  whom  the  Entente  was  a  religion. 
'The  reason  why   Russia,  and   with   her   the  Entente,   resorted   to   political 
means  to  promote  their  commercial  interests. 


622         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD      ^^| 

opinion  of  both  nations,  the  question -of  the  constant  increase  of  the 
navies  is.  True,  it  is  purely  a  financial  question,  hut  it  is  precisely  this 
financial  side,  which  constantly  occupies  the  attention  of  the  German 
and  English  tax-payers  and  calls  their  attention  again  and  again  to  the 
same  point.  I  believe  that  the  naval  question  is  destined  to  exercise  great 
influence.  I  do  not  believe  that  it  can  be  solved  directly  by  means  of 
any  diplomatic  document.  An  improvement  of  the  relations  between 
the  two  nations  would  not  be  sufficient.  I  believe  that  it  can  be  settled 
finally  only  as  the  result  of  a  complete  agreement. 

All  this  would  be  to  the  advantage  of  Germany,  for  England  the 
business  would  be  poor.  And  England  could  be  brought  to  conclude 
such  an  agreement  only  by  force  of  necessity 

(713)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Jan.  26-Feb.  8,  1912.    No.  27.  ^' 

In  consequence  of  an  indisposition,  I  have  only  to-day  been 
able  to  call  on  Sir  E.  Grey,  as  he  had  asked  me  to  do.  He  read 
me  a  telegram,  which  he  had  sent  to  the  British  Ambassador  at 
St.  Petersburg,  concerning  Haldane*s  journey  to  Berlin.  Grey 
added  no  comment.  He  merely  remarked,  that  he  thought  that  a 
relaxation  of  the  tension  between  England  and  Germany  would 
only  serve  the  cause  of  universal  peace;  that  the  great  obstacle  to 
this  was  the  constantly  increasing  naval  armaments;  that  on 
several  occasions  an  exchange  of  views  between  the  two  Govern- 
ments had  taken  place  without  having,  however,  led  to  any  prac-^, 
tical  result.  Hi 

The  last  German  overtures  reached  London  just  before  the 
Agadir  incident,  which  necessarily  entailed  a  long  delay  in  the 
English  reply.  That  answer  was  sent  to  Berlin  only  in  January. 
It  referred  to  subordinate  questions.  But  these  mutual  communi- 
cations mark  such  insignificant  progress,  that  no  material  could 
so  far  be  found  for  diplomatic  negotiations  through  the  Ambassa- 
dors. He,  Grey,  cherished  no  illusions  concerning  the  difficulties  of  a 
settlement;  yet  it  has,  nevertheless,  occurred  to  the  London  Cabinet,  that 
sentiment  in  Berlin  was  in  such  a  mood  that  a  private  exchange  of  views 
with  one  of  the  leading  English  statesmen,  on  the  occasion  of  a  private 
journey,  might  be  useful  and  call  forth  no  objections. 

Grey  said  to  me,  that  Haldane  was  entrusted  with  the  task  of 
informing  Berlin  what  was  thought  in  London  concerning  the 


THE  MISSION  OF  VISCOUNT  HALDANE  623 

armaments  question  and  to  communicate  the  reply  he  received 
ad  referendum  to  London.  I  asked  Grey,  whether  Haldane  would 
touch  upon  that  one  question  only.  Grey  replied  that  if  Bethmann 
brought  up  other  subjects,  Haldane  was  instructed  to  listen  to  what 
the  Chancellor  had  to  say  and  then  to  report.  Grey  added  that  this 
communication  was  to  he  regarded  as  strictly  confidential.  He  had 
spoken  in  the  same  sense  to  Camhon?- 

(714)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Confidential  Letter,  Jan.  27'Feh.  9,  1912. 

Our  Naval  Attache  is  leaving  to-morrow  morning  for  St.  Peters- 
burg. I  have  no  time  to  give  you  a  more  detailed  report,  concerning 
the  contents  of  my  telegrams  of  yesterday.  Among  those  tele- 
grams that  concerning  Lord  Haldane's  journey  to  Berlin  requires 
certain  explanatory  remarks. 

Two  days  in  succession.  Grey  had  asked  me  to  call  upon  him. 
In  consequence  of  an  indisposition  this  was  impossible  and  it  was 
only  yesterday  that  I  was  able  to  speak  to  him. 

The  Minister  at  once  said  that  he  wanted  to  talk  to  me  about  this 
journey,  just  as  he  had  done  two  days  ago  with  Cambon.  He  then 
read  me  his  telegram  to  Buchanan. 

He  then  informed  me  of  various  communications,  which  had  been 
exchanged  at  long  intervals  with  the  Berlin  Cabinet,  regarding  the  naval 
armaments.  The  latest  English  reply,  which  had  been  delayed, 
owing  to  the  Morocco  incident,  was  despatched  two  weeks  ago. 
As  Sir  Arthur  Nicolson  told  me  later,  it  dealt  with  the  question 
of  "Naval  Intelligence."  Sir  Edward  said,  that  the  naval  question 
comes  more  and  more  into  the  foreground,  and  excites  public  opin- 
ion in  England  as  much  as  in  Germany.  The  communications  just 
alluded  to  had  produced  no  results  which  could  form  a  point  of 
departure  for  diplomatic  negotiations.  Moreover,  many  legends  had 
come  into  being  in  Germany,^  concerning  the  real  intentions  of  English 
policy,  as  well  as  concerning  the  measures  which  the  English  Govern- 
ment was  prepared  to  resort  to,  as  for  instance  a  sudden  attack  upon 
the  German  fleet — a  state  of  mind  which  blocked  the  usual  diplomatic 
way. 

*  French  ambassador  at  London. 

'Were  they  legends?     Moreover,  there  was  the  example  of  the  British  raid 
on  Copenhagen. 


624        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Minister  drew  my  attention  to  the  cir- 
cumstance, that,  both  among  the  English  pubUc  and  also  in  Parlia- 
mlent,  there  were  certain  influences  at  work,  which  consider  such  a 
tension  unfounded  and  pernicious.  In  order  to  find  a  way  out,  it 
was  necessary  to  employ  a  qualified  and  competent  mediator,  one 
not  connected  with  ordinary  diplomacy,  who  would  reveal  English 
policy  in  its  true  light  at  Berlin  ^  and  point  out  how  harmful  the  con- 
tinuous growth  of  armaments  could  become. 

The  latest  English  communication  had  met  with  a  very  encouraging 
reception,  and,  on  that  account,  the  British  Cabinet  had  decided  to  send 
Lord  Haldane — who  intended  to  go  to  Berlin  with  his  brother  about 
some  educational  questions — to  see  Bethmann-Hollweg,  to  discuss 
matters  with  him,  and  to  explain  to  him  the  aims  and  motives  of  the 
British  Government,  but  not  in  an  official  manner.  Hi 

Lord  Haldane,  Sir  Edward  told  me,  would  develop  the  point  of  vie^ 
of  the  London  Cabinet  in  the  matter  of  naval  armaments  in 
the  frankest  manner  and  would  report  the  reply  he  would  receive. 
I  asked  Sir  Edward,  whether  no  other  questions  would  be  raised. 
The  Minister  replied  that,  if  the  Chancellor  brought  up  other  sub- 
jects for  discussion,  Lord  Haldane  was  to  listen  to  him  and  to 
transmit  the  German  points  of  view  ad  referendum  to  London. 

Sir  Edward  added,  that,  in  view  of  the  existing  relations  between 
England,  Russia  and  France,  he  would  keep  both  Governments  fully 
informed  about  the  real  condition  of  affairs  in  order  to  clearly  establish 
the  aims  of  the  London  Cabinet — namely  to  attempt  to  remove  the 
harmful  strain  in  the  relations  of  both  countries,  and  further  to 
make  an  effort  to  inaugurate  new  relations  with  Germany,  similar  to 
those  existing  between  Russia  and  Germany,  and  between  France  and 
Germany.^ 


(715)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Personal  Letter,  Jan.  2S'Feb.  10,  1912. 

I  must  not  confine  myself  to  the  official  report  regarding  Hal- 
dane's  mission  which  is  naturally  regarded  as  the  event  of  the  day. 

*  Study  document  No.  716. 

*  Considering  what  these  relations  were  at  that  time,  as  shown  by  these  docu- 
ments, Grey's  plan  could   not  be  called  a  very  comprehensive  one — or  did 
mean  to  be  facetious  ? 


THE  MISSION  OF  VISCOUNT  HALDANE  625 

The  arrival  of  Sir  E.  Goschen  ^  at  London,  hearing  certain  encourag- 
ing communications  on  the  part  of  Germany,  was  the  starting-point, 
even  before  the  King  and  the  Prime  Minister  had  returned  to  town. 
On  the  very  day  on  which  the  King  and  Asquith  returned — last 
Monday — it  became  necessary  to  reach  a  decision.  Grey  invited 
Cambon  and  me  to  call  upon  him  on  Tuesday.  I  do  not  know  the 
contents  of  the  communication  which  Goschen  brought  with  him 
from  Berlin,  hut  the  gist  of  the  matter,  which  is  regarded,  perhaps, 
more  seriously  in  Berlin  than  in  London,  but  which  has  awakened  an 
echo  here,  is  as  follows: 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  for  some  time,  Berlin  and  London  have 
not  been  on  "speaking  terms"  in  a  diplomatic  sense,  particularly 
since  last  June.  Neither  special  nor  general  questions  formed  the 
subject  of  negotiations.  Even  the  Bagdad  question  has  not  given 
rise  to  diplomatic  negotiations  and  has  so  far  been  discussed  only 
by  mediators.  A  tension  of  this  kind  might  have  continued  with- 
out any  immediate  danger,  had  not  two  considerations  come  into 
play — first,  the  anti-English  feeling  in  Germany,  which  might  have 
become  even  more  intense,  chiefly  in  my  opinion,  because  Germany 
suffers  from  the  impression  of  a  failure  for  which  she  holds  England 
responsible.  A  similar  feeling  which  prevailed  here,  had  been  consid- 
erably lessened  under  the  impression  of  having  achieved  a  success. 

But  the  chief,  and  almost  immediate,  consideration  was  that, 
at  the  opening  of  the  parliamentary  sessions  in  London  and  Berlin, 
it  was  necessary  to  bring  up  the  question  of  a  further  increase  in 
the  navies,  whereby  the  danger  of  serious  complications,  in  view 
of  the  present  excited  state  of  mind,  was  by  no  means  excluded. 

/  do  not  know  if  this  is  the  point  of  view  adopted  in  Germany; 
hut  I  am,  on  the  contrary,  certain  that  the  matter  has  been  interpreted 
in  this  way  in  London,  not  otherwise,  and  not  exceeding  this. 
It  is  possible  that  the  new  Reichstag  is  no  longer  so  compliant  an 
instrument  in  the  hands  of  the  German  Government  and  that  it  may 
be,  that,  after  all,  Berlin  has  reckoned  far  too  much  with  an  un- 
limited duration  of  the  Persian  difficulties.  However  that  may  be, 
a  private  exchange  of  opinion  seemed  most  desirable  before  entering 
upon  negotiations,  and  it  was,  perhaps,  even  necessary  in  order  to 
smooth  the  ground.    It  is  a  fact,  that  Berlin  made  use  of  a  still  more 

*  British  ambassador  at  Berlin, 


626 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


direct  way.    I  am  informed,  from  a  reliable  source,  that  it  was  giv 
to  understand  that  Emperor  William  zvould  he  glad  to  see  Lord  Hal- 
dane  in  Berlin.  However  this  choice  may  have  taken  place,  it  cannoi 
be  denied  that  it  is  an  excellent  one. 

No  German  would  have  been  more  the  right  man  in  the  right  place 
in  England  than  Lord  Haldane  in  Berlin.  All  the  political  parties  of 
England  have  confidence  in  him.  This  is  known  m  Berlin,  where  he 
is  also  esteemed  for  his  personal  qualities  which  are  well-known  to 
Emperor  William.  This  advantage  has  apparently  induced  London  to 
rise  superior  to  one  difficulty  which,  after  all,  is  only  of  subordinate 
significance  in  this  instance — it  was  allowed  to  appear  as  if  Londot 
had  taken  the  first  step. 

I  must  add  that  Grey  belongs  to  that  small  number  of  political 
leaders,  who  uphold  the  point  of  view  that  the  question  of  arma- 
ments may  be  regulated  by  a  direct  agreement.  There  remains 
only  the  question:  In  what  manner?  Naturally  I  cannot  foretell 
the  result,  though  ChurchilFs  speech  of  yesterday  may  perhaps 
indicate  a  possibility.  This  speech  means,  that,  if  England  is  to 
negotiate,  she  will  do  this  only  upon  the  basis  of  that  relation 
between  the  two  navies,  which  she  deems  necessary  for  her  security 
— and  upon  no  other  basis.  Once  this  relation  has  been  achieved 
and  recognized,  it  will  not  be  necessary  to  build  more  ships.  Seen 
in  this  light,  the  question  is  an  extraordinarily  complicated  one. 
For  in  this  connection,  England  wishes  neither  to  give  nor  to  take  ''tips." 

There  exists  an  obstacle  of  a  very  serious  nature.  It  is  my  opinion, 
that  the  beginning  of  this  entire  affair  has  been  dragged  too  much  into 
the  glare  of  publicity,  so  that  in  the  event  of  failure,  the  situation 
would  be  worse  than  before.  Should  there  be  some  result — and  m^ 
opinion  is  shared  by  Cambon — I  see  nothing  in  this  which  could  dis- 
quiet us.  Rather  the  contrary — the  world  will  be  quieter.  Should  I 
need  further  proof,  I  would  find  it  in  the  obvious  relief  felt  by 
Grey  and  Nicolson  at  the  restoration  of  the  conformity  of  our  views 
regarding  Persia.  They  told  me  this  without  any  circumlocution, 
and  declared  to  Cambon  that  they  were  extraordinarily  well  satis- 
fied. It  must,  however,  be  said  that  this  was  achieved  not  a  single 
day  too  soon.  We  must  not  cherish  any  illusions.  Public  opinion 
would  vacillate  and  it  is  important  that  things  should  now  develop^ 
normally. 


II 


THE  MISSION  OF  VISCOUNT  HALDANE  627 

In  this  connection,  the  policy  of  opposition  to  the  Government  will 
be  a  mere  trick  and  need  occasion  us  no  further  concern.  Haldane's 
mission  will  reconcile  Grey  with  his  own  party  which  is,  above  all, 
pacifist.  On  the  other  hand,  this  mission  will  call  forth  the  opposi- 
tion of  the  Conservative  Party.  It  is  not  pleased  with  the  mission. 
This  is  expressed  with  moderation,  though  with  clearness,  in  the 
"Times." 

Under  the  prevailing  circumstances,  however,  the  Conservatives 
will  not  bring  about  the  fall  of  the  Government,  even  if  they  could 
do  this.  In  their  decisive  attacks,  they  will  limit  themselves  to 
questions  of  home  policy,  of  which  there  are  far  too  many.  A 
ministerial  crisis,  which  I  do  not  consider  imminent,  save  in  ques- 
tions of  foreign  policy,  signifies  no  danger  for  us. 

The  question  of  naval  armaments  has  been  brought  into  the 
foreground  to  such  an  extent,  that  it  is  not  likely  that  other  ques- 
tions will  be  thoroughly  gone  into  at  Berlin.  I  believe,  however, 
that  there  will  be  discussions  as  to  Bagdad  and  I  see  an  indication 
of  this  in  CasseFs  ^  journey  to  Berlin. 

It  is  extraordinarily  difficult  to  say  whether  the  English  Gov- 
ernment was  right  or  wrong  in  taking  up  this  entire  matter. 
Is  there  any  prospect  of  success?  Almost  everybody  doubts  this.  Pub- 
licity in  such  cases  is  nearly  always  a  disadvantage.  One  is  bound,  in- 
voluntarily, to  think  of  a  peaceful  Agadir,  One  ought,  perhaps,  to  fear 
that  the  whole  affair  will  be  wrongly  interpreted  by  public  opinion,  and 
by  the  press  in  Russia  and  in  France.  Cambon  has  communicated  his 
fears  to  me.    This  would,  of  course,  be  most  untimely. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  might,  perhaps,  be  possible  to  pacify  Ger- 
many, and  to  tear  down,  to  the  extent  desired,  the  Chinese  Wall 
erected  between  England  and  Germany — this  might  also  possibly  ac- 
celerate the  peace  between  Italy  and  Turkey. 


(716)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Jan.  SUFeb.  13,  1912.    No.  35. 

/  learn  through  Cambon,  that  Haldane  told  his  brother,  Jules  Cam^ 
bon,  that,  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  conversation  with  Emperor 
Willium  and  Bethmann,  he  had  declared  that  it  must  be  well  understood, 

*  Influential  banker  who  acted  as  negotiator  in  the  Bagdad  railroad  matter. 


T28         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD      ^W 

that  the  understanding  with  France  and  Russia  would  remain  the  basis 
of  English  policy. 

Hereupon,  Jules  Cambon  had  remarked  to  Haldane: 

*'It  is,  consequently,  a  matter  of  a  detente^  and  not  of  an  Entente, 

Haldane  replied ; 

"Precisely." 

(717)     The  Same  to  Same.    Telegram.    Jan.  SUFeb.  13,  1912.    No.  36. 

Grey  requested  me  to  call  and  see  him  today.  He  told  me  that  Hal- 
dane, as  had  been  agreed  upon,  had  not  entered  into  any  arrangement 
at  Berlin,  and  that  his  conversation  with  Bethm^nn  had  concerned  three 
questions,  which  might  later  on  form  the  subject  of  diplomatic 
negotiations. 

1.  The  naval  armaments.    England  insists  finally  on  that  relatio 
between  the  two  navies  which  was  recently  established  by  ChurchUl  in 

a  public  speech.    If,  in  consequence  of  mutual  declarations,  the  relatio^U 
between   both   countries  should,   however,   have   been   improved,    th^ 
proportional  growth  of  both  navies  might  be  retarded. 

2.  The  Bagdad  Railway.  The  discussion  referred  exclusively  to 
the  line  south  of  Bagdad.  England  is  prepared  to  negotiate,  and 
wishes  to  discuss  a  combination,  which  would  ensure  her  a  par- 
ticipation sufficient  to  secure  to  her  the  control  over  this  line  and 
which  would  recognize  her  point  of  view  in  the  matter  of  Koweit 
and  the  Persian  Gulf. 

It  has  been  expressly  stated,  that,  if  an  agreement  of  this  nature 
be  achieved  between  England  and  Germany,  the  former  is  bound 
in  the  question  of  the  4  per  cent  increase  in  custom  duties,  and 
could  give  her  assent  to  this  increase  only  with  the  consent  of  Rus- 
sia and  France,  so  that  the  objection  of  one  of  the  three  Powers 
might  prevent  both  of  the  others  from  concurring  in  the  matter. 

3.  The  '^ententes''  with  Russia  and  France.  England  confirms  the 
statement  that  neither  of  them  are  of  an  aggressvue  nature  against  Ger- 
many. If,  on  the  other  hand,  an  aggressive  action  of  Germany's  against 
Russia  or  France  should  take  place,  England  reserves  to  herself  her 
freedom  of  action. 

Such  are  the  principles  upon  which,  as  Haldane  has  declared, 
the  relations  of  both  countries  might  undergo  improvement. 

^Detente — stoppage,  detention,  restraint,  withholding,  hair-trigger,  ^^m***^'^"' 


THE  MISSION  OF  VISCOUNT  HALDANE  629 

Haldane  is  satisfied  with  the  reception  accorded  him  by  Beth- 
mann  Hollweg.  He  discussed  political  questions  only  with  him 
and  with  Herr  von  Stumm.    Kiderlen  did  not  participate  directly. 

(718)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Jan.  3\-Feb.  13,  1912.    No.  37. 

Towards  the  close  of  our  conversation,  Grey  remarked  to  me,  that 
he  was  anxious  that  you  should  know  that  the  initiative  for  the  negotia- 
tions had  come  from  Berlin;  after  it  had  been  accepted  on  principle,  the 
Berlin  Cabinet  had  expressed  the  wish  that  Grey  himself  should  come 
to  Berlin,  which,  however,  he  did  not  consider  possible.  The  choice  had 
thereupon  fallen  upon  Haldane. 

(719)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Feb.  4-17,  1912.    No.  44. 

Nicolson  told  me,  that  Grey,  most  particularly,  appreciated  the 
friendly  and  conciliatory  attitude  of  the  Russian  Government  during 
the  last  negotiations  regarding  Persia.  He  gave  me  a  short  synopsis  of 
the  speech  which  Grey  was  to  deliver  the  same  evening  in  Manchester. 
I  made  use  of  this  opportunity,  to  ask  Nicolson  whether  in  his  opinion 
the  situation  created  by  Haldane's  mission  would  have  any  influence 
upon  the  present  relations  between  Russia  and  England. 

In  reply  he  recalled  to  me  the  conversation  which  I  had  had 
with  Grey,  at  which  he  was  present,  and  the  declaration  which 
Asquith  had  made  in  Parliament.  I  remarked  to  him  that  I  was 
speaking  of  public  opinion  in  England.  He  replied,  that  in  spite 
of  general  satisfaction  in  connection  with  the  decrease  of  tension 
in  the  relations  to  Germany,  the  anxiety,  regarding  Persia,  which 
prevailed  here,  had,  apart  from  a  few  irreconcilable  circles,  al- 
ready completely  quieted  down.  The  Foreign  Office  had  received  a 
letter  from  the  Persian  Committee  ^  which  was  couched  in  quite  a 
different  tone  from  heretofore.    This  was  symptomatic. 

Nicolson  spoke  regretfully  of  the  doubts  which  had  found  expres- 
sion in  France.  He  feared  that  the  same  might  be  the  case  in  Russia. 
He  hopes,  however,  that  this  would  be  of  a  merely  transitory  duration, 
and  that  it  would  be  rectified  by  the  public  declarations.  He  added  that 
public  opinion  in  England  believed  in  the  main,  that  the  journey  of 

*  Of  the  British  House  of  Commons. 

40 


630        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

Haldane   to   Berlin  signified  no   modification   of  the  Anglo-Russian 
entente.^ 


•4 


(720)     The  Same  io  the  Same.    Personal  Letter,  Feb.  5-18,  1912. 

I  sent  you,  by  post,  yesterday,  the  text  of  a  speech  which  was 
delivered  by  Sir  Edward  Grey  at  Manchester.  He  delivered  a  sec- 
ond speech  there  yesterday.  These  two  speeches  were  addressed 
to  an  audience  which  is  especially  interested  in  trade  in  South 
Persia,  and  for  whom,  therefore,  Anglo-Russian  relations  possess 
great  significance.  The  two  speeches  are  also  deserving  of  a  cer- 
tain attention  in  that  they  were  couched  in  a  somewhat  freer  tone 
than  IS  possible  in  Parliament.  I  find  both  important,  inasmuch 
as  they  place  Lord  Haldane's  mission  at  Berlin  in  the  proper 
perspective.  Though  I  was  not  directly  alarmed  by  Haldane's  visit  t 
Berlin,  I  was  nevertheless  obliged  to  follow  the  currents  of  public  opin- 
ion in  England  with  increased  attention. 

I  cannot  conceal  from  you,  that  the  first  utterances  in  the  press, 
and  among  the  public,  rather  exceeded  the  limits  of  what  I  had  expected, 
although  I  duly  considered  that  the  constant  and  increasing  tension 
with  Germany  somewhat  depressed  the  general  feeling  here.  I  knew,  as 
I  likewise  took  pains  to  inform  you,  that  this  feeling,  proceeding  paral- 
lel with  a  decrease  of  confidence  in  Russia,  might  become  dangerous 
to  us. 

It  is  true  that  the  reports  from  Persia  have  exercised  a  calming 
influence.  It  is  also  true,  that  the  return  of  the  Court,  and  all 
other  political  or  public  personages  from  India,  has  produced  a 
similar  effect,  since  all  of  them  are  convinced  of  the  advantages  of 
the  agreement  with  Russia.  The  Order  of  the  Garter,  which  was  con- 
ferred upon  Sir  Edward  Grey,  was  intended  to  express,  in  as  clear  a 
manner  as  possible,  that  the  King  wished  to  give  his  assent  to  Grey's 
policy  and  to  his  solidarity  with  the  Cabinet.  It  is  furthermore  true, 
that  during  the  debates  upon  the  speech  from  the  throne,  that  part 
of  Asquith's  speech,  which  referred  to  foreign  policies,  was  received 
with  applause  by  the  overwhelming  majority  of  the  House, 
and  what  he  said,  raising  his  voice,  regarding  the  preservation  of  the 
old  ententes  called  forth  particularly  strong  demonstrations  of  approval. 

*Nicolson  was  anxious  to  have  Benckendorff  know  that  the  Haldane  mission 
had  no  significance. 


r 

1 


THE  MISSION  OF  VISCOUNT  HALDANE  631 

And,  finally,  it  is  also  true,  that  the  declarations  of  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
which  I  have  reported  to  you,  leave  nothing  to  he  desired  in  sincerity 
and  decisiveness. 

But,  in  order  to  be  entirely  frank,  these  declarations  can  be 
of  value  to  us  only  when  they  are  confirmed  by  public  opinion. 
/  could  not  conceal  from  myself  the  fact  that  Haldane's  mission  en- 
countered practically  no  opposition  throughout  the  entire  country.  The 
press  and  the  public  had,  for  some  time,  occupied  themselves  exclusively 
with  this  question,  and,  in  the  session  of  Parliament  which  I  have  just 
mentioned,  Germany  was  discussed  to  a  greater  extent  than  Russia  and 
France.    All  this  caused  a  certain  apprehension. 

In  this  connection,  the  two  speeches  made  by  Sir  Edward  Grey 
are  of  great  import.  They  were  very  simple,  very  clear  and 
very  decisive  and  were  received  with  general  applause.  The 
simple  significance  of  these  speeches  is  as  follows:  Maintenance  of  the 
ententes  and  the  armaments  of  England,  a  relieving  of  the  tension  with 
Germany — in  so  far  as  this  m^ay  he  reconciled  with  the  two  first 
conditions. 

Such  is  the  meaning,  and  such,  too,  is  the  general  impression. 
Even  in  those  newspapers  and  reviews  which  have  most  zealously 
entered  the  lists  for  a  fundamental  change  in  German-English  re- 
lations, the  question  of  the  ententes  is  once  more  occupying  the 
space  it  deserves,  as,  for  example,  in  the  "Westminster  Gazette," 
the  "Daily  Telegraph,"  the  "Spectator"  and  others,  also  the  Sunday 
papers  of  today.  The  same  thing  is  also  repeated  to  me  orally  from 
all  sides.  Sir  Arthur  Nicolson  told  me  absolutely  the  same  thing 
day  before  yesterday,  and  that  with  so  much  emphasis,  that  I  felt 
I  must  send  you  a  telegraphic  report  of  his  utterance. 

/  concede  that  the  rapidity  of  this  veering  round — rather  this  rever- 
sion to  England's  old  policy,  as  expressed  during  recent  years — has  in 
some  degree  astonished  me.  And  yet,  I  do  not  helieve  that  I  err,  in 
declaring,  that  this  change  will  he  a  permanent  one,  hecause  in  reality 
it  is  natural  and  logical.  Reassured  as  to  the  entente  with  Russia,  the 
English  puhlic  is  returning  to  it,  as  also  to  the  entente  with  France.  The 
basis  has  been  re-established  once  m^ore 

There  remains  only  to  explain  the  almost  universal  approval  of 
Haldane's  mission.  This  is  not  particularly  difficult:  Haldane's 
visit  to  Berlin  was  in  accordance  with  the  actual  situation.    Public 


632        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


1 


II 


opinion  in  England  allowed  itself  to  be  influenced  by  two  considera- 
tions :  Clouds,  at  least  in  the  imagination,  hung  over  Russia  and  France, 
and  one  also  had  the  firm  conviction  that  the  bitterness  prevailing  in 
Germany  was  based  upon  a  false  conception  of  English  policy,^  some- 
thing which  might  produce  not  only  dangerous  but  imaginary  and  un^. 
necessary  consequences. 

This  explains  the  moderate  tone  of  the  English  press  towards' 
Germany.  But  it  was  as  impossible  to  go  a  step  farther,  and  to  be  the 
first  to  stretch  out  one's  hand,  as  it  was  impossible  to  reject  a  German  ini- 
tiative. It  was  under  these  conditions  that  Lord  Haldane  went  to 
Berlin  and  there  could  have  been  no  better  basis.  The  publicity 
given  to  this  event  was,  however,  so  great  that  public  opinion  for 
ten  days  occupied  itself  exclusively  with  this  visit  and  lost  the  clear- 
ness of  its  vision.    .    .    .  ^_ 

Permit  me  now  to  revert  to  the  opinion  I  have  once  before  e:^^\ 
pressed — that  the  failure  of  Haldane' s  mission  will  create  a  worse  situa- 
tion than  that  which  existed  before.  I  have  no  ground  for  assuming 
that  the  mission  has  led  to  no  result  whatsoever.  If  the  German  Gov- 
ernment had  the  intention  of  disrupting  England's  ''ententes,"  with  a 
general  Anglo-German  understanding  as  a  consequence — then,  to  be  sure, 
the  failure  has  been  complete.  To  this  extent,  I  share  the  opinion  of  my 
French  Colleague,  for  Cambon  seems  to  believe  that  Haldane's  mission 
will  lead  to  no  result  whatsoever.  This  last  point  of  view  I  consider  o^kj 
exaggerated ^H 

Has  Lord  Haldane  succeeded  in  convincing  Berlin  that  accord- 
ing to  English  opinion,  neither  the  Triple  Entente,  nor  any  other 
English  Entente,  has  an  aggressive  character  directed  against 
Germany?  Has  he  succeeded  in  convincing  the  Germans  that  if 
England  prepared  herself  for  war  during  tjie  preceding  summer, 
this  did  not  happen  with  any  aggressive  intention,  but  merely  to 
defend  her  own  interests  and  those  of  France  in  the  event  of  a 
German  attack?  I  do  not  know  and  cannot  permit  myself  to  in- 
dulge in  any  judgment  from  here.  Taking  all  in  all,  however,  I 
incline  to  the  view  that  the  efforts  of  the  English  statesman  have 
not  been  entirely  without  result. 

There  is  in  addition  another  circumstance  to  consider.     Eng- 
land has  shown  her  readiness — it  is  true  maintaining  all  her  con- 
*The  view  of  Benckendorff  as  diplomatist. 


THE  MISSION  OF  VISCOUNT  HALDANE  633 

ditions    and    her    old    point    of    view — of    again    taking    up    the 
negotiations  with  regard  to  the  Bagdad  Railway 

(721)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sasonoff.    Letter,  Feb,  16-29,  1912. 

Though  Lord  Haldane's  journey  to  Berlin  took  place  rather  sud- 
denly, it  was  not  unexpected  by  the  French  Government,  as  Poin- 
care  ^  informs  me.  It  has  been  known  for  some  time  in  Paris,  that 
some  means  for  diminishing  the  dangerous  tension  in  both  coun- 
tries was  being  sought  for  in  England,  as  well  as  in  Germany.  // 
in  spite  of  this,  a  certain  nervousness  made  itself  felt  here  at  first,  it  has 
been  completely  allayed  by  the  public  declaration  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment— namely,  that  Haldane's  journey  could  in  no  way  weaken  the  close 
relations  of  England  to  France  and  Russia,  and  that  the  Paris  Cabinet, 
as  well  as  that  of  St.  Petersburg,  would  be  precisely  informed  as  to  the 
results  achieved. 

Since  then,  as  I  am  aware,  Poincare  has  received  several  com- 
munications regarding  the  contents  of  the  conversations  between 
Haldane  and  the  German  Ministers.  This  information  coincides  ex- 
actly with  that  which  Count  Benckendorff  has  communicated  to  you  by 
telegraph.  The  naval  armaments,  the  Bagdad  Railway,  certain 
colonial  questions  and  finally  the  general  character  of  England's 
relations  to  Germany,  Russia  and  France  were  discussed.  In  none 
of  these  questions  is  there  a  prospect  of  a  concrete  agreement,  much  less 
has  an  agreement  been  concluded;  the  most  difficult  question,  the  naval 
armaments,  has  apparently  not  advanced  one  step  further.  Neverthe- 
less, both  parties  have  received  a  favourable  impression  from  the 
conversations,  and  consider  it  necessary  and  desirable  to  continue 
the  exchange  of  opinions. 

Poincare  remarked  to  me  that  the  French  Government  could  only 
welcome  the  attempts  of  England  and  Germany  to  establish  more  normal 
relations,  and  that  these  attempts  have  neither  alarmed  France  nor  evoked 
any  doubt  as  to  the  sincerity  of  the  British  Government.  It  was  rather 
to  he  feared,  that  these  negotiations  would  lead  to  a  failure,  and  that, 
as  a  result  Anglo-German  relations  might  become  still  worse  which 
would  signify  a  new  menace  to  European  peace.^    Poincare's  declara- 

^  French  minister  of  foreign  affairs. 

'  Poincare's  mind  must  have  conceived  Great  Britain's  international  conduct 
as  the  keystone  in  the  arch  of  European  peace — if  correctly  reported  here. 


634        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

tions  seem  to  me  to  be  honestly  meant,  and  I,  for  my  part,  am  making 
efforts  to  strengthen  him  in  his  optimistic  view  of  things.  I,  neverthe- 
less, cannot  refrain  from  observing,  that  a  different  opinion  prevails  in 
military  circles  here;  military  men  fear,  that  if  an  agreement  be  reached 
between  England  and  Germany,  regarding  the  cessation,  or,  at  least,  a 
diminishing  of  the  rivalry  in  naval  armaments,  the  German  Government 
would  then  be  able  to  dispose  of  redoubled  means  for  increasing  its 
army — which  would  necessarily  call  forth  countermeasures  on  the  par\ 
of  France  and  Russia} 

As  to  the  French  press,  its  utterances,  now  as  before,  are  kept 
in  a  moderate  and  quiet  tone,  whilst  the  Exchange  has  reacted 
the  negotiations  with  an  upward  tendency. 


II 


(722)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sazonoff.    Telegram,  March 
2-15.  1912.    No.  67. 


I 


No.  1.  Grey  requested  me  to  call  upon  him,  and  told  me,  that  the 
German  Ambassador  had  declared  to  him,  yesterday,  that  the 
eventual  naval  program  would  necessarily  depend  upon  the  policy 
which  England  adopts  towards  Germany,  and  that  public  opinion  ijHI 
Germany  was  still  of  the  view  that  this  policy  had  in  mdnd  an  attack  upo™^ 
Germany.  Grey  replied,  that,  if  the  German  Government  was  in  need 
of  a  confirmation  of  England's  peaceable  intentions,  in  order  to  pacify 
public  opinion,  he  was  prepared  to  give  this,  but  with  the  provision 
that  the  German  Government  would  secure  itself  no  supplementary 
credits  for  subsequent  armaments,  and  that,  in  the  last-named  case,  the 
British  Government  would  be  forced  to  revert  to  the  program  laid  down 
in  Churchill's  speech."^  Thereupon,  Grey  handed  me  a  memorandum, 
which  he  had  given  to  Metternich,  remarking  that  the  memoran- 
dum was  couched  in  a  form  which  would  render  it  possible  for  him 
to  make  use  of  it  in  a  public  speech,  if  no  further  increase  in  the 

*  So  that  an  agreement  between  Great  Britain  and  Germany  on  armaments  on 
sea  would  have  merely  aggravated  friction  on  land;  a  case  of  something  being 
six  of  one  and  half-a-dozen  of  the  other.  As  seen  in  the  light  of  this  statement, 
the  Great  War  was  no  longer  a  mere  possibility  but  an  actual  fact,  though  at  the 
time  that  was  not  apparent.  Within  the  next  twelve  months,  Russia  set  a  new 
pace  in  the  reorganization  and  increase  of  her  army,  France  augmented  her 
military  forces  by  returning  to  the  three-years  term  of  service  for  her  con- 
scripts, and  Germany  raised  a  billion  marks  for  her  own  rnilitary  establishment. 

Grey's  admission,  in  this  case  at  least,  that  Great  Britain  was  setting  the  pace 
in  naval  armament. 


THE  MISSION  OF  VISCOUNT  HALDANE  635 

German  navy  should  take  place.  After  I  had  read  the  memorandum, 
I  told  Grey  that  it  was  a  repetition  of  Haldane's  declarations  in  Berlin. 
Grey  agreed  that  this  was  so,  and  added,  that  Haldane  had  represented 
England's  freedom  of  action  as  something  self-evident,  if  Germany  pur- 
sued an  aggressive  policy  towards  those  powers  with  which  England 
had  concluded  ententes.  These  naturally  remained  in  full  force.  Grey 
m^de  the  same  communication  to  Cambon.  He  requested  us  both  to  em- 
phasize in  our  reports,  that  this  communication  was  strictly  confidential. 

(723)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  March  2-15,  1912.    No.  68. 

No.  2.  Text  of  memorandum  mentioned  in  my  telegram  No.  1. 

''England  will  make  no  unprovoked  attack  upon  Germany  and  pur- 
sue no  aggressive  policy  towards  the  latter.  An  attack  upon  Germany 
is  not  the  purpose,  nor  a  part  of  any  pact,  agreement,  or  understanding 
in  which  England  now  participates,  nor  would  she  participate  in  any 
project  of  this  sort} 

(724)  The  Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Berlin  to  Sasonoff.    Letter,  March 
16-29,  1912. 

The  speech  which  Churchill  delivered  on  March  5-18,  a  propos  of 
the  dissensions  regarding  the  Naval  Budget,  has  aroused  great  ex- 
citement in  Germany.  It  has  caused  a  particularly  unpleasant  impres- 
sion in  those  political  circles  which  had  attached  an  exaggerated  signifi- 
cance to  the  visit  of  Lord  Haldane  and  hoped  for  an  earnest  rapproche- 
ment with  England.  The  aforementioned  speech  of  the  First  Lord  of  the 
Admiralty,  and  the  proposals  for  new  laws,  relative  to  an  increase  in 
the  land  and  naval  forces  of  Germany,  which  have  just  been  accepted 
by  the  Federal  Council,  are  the  best  proof,  that  there  can  be  no  idea, 
at  the  present  moment,  of  a  limitation  of  armaments  either  on  the  part 
of  England  or  Germany. 

Not  only  the  Pan-German  circles,  which,  as  usual,  give  loud 
utterance  to  their  anger  d  propos  of  this  challenging  of  Germany, 
but  also  liberal  papers,  and  even  the  semi-official  "Kolnische  Zeit- 
ung,"  have  in  terms  of  moderation  expressed  their  astonishment  at  the 
speech  of  the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  who  openly  concedes,  that  the 

*  How  sincere  this  formal  declaration  was  is  shown  elsewhere  in  the  documents. 


636        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


navy  is  not  meant  at  all  for  the  defence  of  the  country,  but  is  intended 
wage  battle  with  the  navy  of  a  power  with  whom  England  maintain 
absolutely  friendly  relations. 

The  contents  of  the  First  Lord's  speech  were  made  known  in 
Berlin,  simultaneously  with  the  news,  that  the  departure  of  Em- 
peror William  for  Corfu  had  been  postponed  for  an  indefinite  time. 
In  addition  there  were  rumours,  regarding  the  resignation  of  the 
Imperial  Chancellor  and  Kiderlen-Wachter.  as  well  as  an  alleged 
change  for  the  worse  in  the  relations  of  Russia  and  Turkey.  All 
this  caused  such  excitement  among  the  public,  and  on  the  Ex- 
change that  the  Government  found  it  necessary  to  issue  reassuring 
declarations, — that  the  journey  of  Emperor  William  had  been  post- 
poned only  for  a  few  days,  and  merely  because  it  was  essential  to 
take  the  necessary  steps  relating  to  the  strike  of  the  miners.  And 
the  Kaiser  did,  actually,  leave  for  Vienna  two  days  later,  and  the 
excitement  calmed  down  to  some  degree,  although  the  rumour  per- 
sists that  after  the  return  of  the  Kaiser,  important  changes  in  the 
higher  governmental  circles  will  be  impending  and  those  who  are 
well-informed  are  of  the  opinion,  that  the  positions  of  the  Imperial 
Chancellor  and  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  are  seri- 
ously undermined. 


(725)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  M,  Sazonoff.     Confidential 
Letter,  April  2S-May  8,  1912. 


« 


I  regret  that  I  am  not  as  yet  able  to  give  you  definite  advices 
regarding  the  appointment  of  Baron  Marschall  to  the  post  of  Ger- 
man Ambassador  in  London.  I  know  that  Count  Metternich  spoke 
yesterday  to  Sir  Edward  Grey,  and  was  received  in  audience  by  the 
King  on  the  same  day.  I  do  not  as  yet  know  the  subject  of  the  au- 
dience, but  I  believe  that  a  decision  has  already  been  reached. 

I  would  not  have  reported  to  you  on  this,  had  I  not  been  able  to 
tell  you  that  this  change  of  Ambassadors  is  agreeable  neither  to  the 
Government  nor  to  the  King.  I  have  information  from  a  reliable 
source  to  the  effect  that  the  King  even  intends  to  express  the  wish 
that  Count  Metternich  might  remain  in  London.  A  step  of  this 
kind  must  naturally  be  regarded  as  a  pure  formality, — it  has  never- 
theless a  symptomatic  meaning.  Sir  Arthur  Nicolson,  on  his  part 
informs  me,  that  he  has  as  yet  no  official  confirmation ;   and  adds, 


THE  MISSION  OF  VISCOUNT  HALDANE  637 

that  Sir  Edward  Grey  highly  esteems  the  upright  and  sincere  atti- 
tude of  Count  Metternich  and  would  see  him  leave  London  with 
great  regret.    Sir  Arthur  added  further : 

"If  the  German  Government  imagines,  that  it  is  making  a  great 
coup  by  sending  Baron  Marschall  hither,  it  is  in  error,  and  should  the 
future  Ambassador  assume  the  task  of  separating  England  from  her 
friends,  he  will  find  himself  barking  up  the  wrong  tree." 

I  beg  Your  Excellency  to  regard  this  communication  as  wholly 
confidential. 

(726)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Letter,  May  5-18,  1912. 

/  cannot  recall  that  any  change  In  diplomatic  personalities  has  ever 
so  persistently  occupied  the  press  as  the  appointment  of  Baron  Mar- 
schall, in  place  of  Count  Metternich  as  Germany's  Ambassador  in  Lon- 
don. 

Our  Ambassador  at  Berlin  will  be  better  able  to  report  to  you 
concerning  the  motives  of  this  appointment  than  I.  In  this  re- 
spect, I  know  only  what  Count  Metternich  himself  told  me,  in  a 
private  and  confidential  way,  and  I,  therefore,  beg  you  to  regard 
my  communication  in  this  light. 

I  hasten  to  add,  that  I  have  absolute  faith  in  the  words  of  my 
German  colleague.  For  over  a  year,  he  has  been  thinking  of  with- 
drawing from  diplomatic  activity.  He  has  expressed  this  desire 
for  some  time.  Having  been  retained  here  until  now,  his  request 
for  permission  to  resign  was  granted  upon  the  occasion  of  his  last 
sojourn  in  Berlin.  The  matter  was  to  have  been  kept  secret,  until 
the  appointment  of  Baron  Marschall  had  become  officially  known. 
However,  a  few  days  after  the  decision  in  question  had  been 
reached,  the  official  press  of  Germany  began  to  occupy  itself  with 
the  matter,  and  from  this  moment  on  began  a  press  campaign  which 
was  extremely  painful  for  Count  Metternich.  The  same  thing  hap- 
pened with  this  campaign  as  in  all  similar  contingencies.  It  did  more 
harm  than  good,  and  Baron  Marschall  will  have  great  difficulty  in  prov- 
ing here,  that  he  is  not  coming  to  London  in  order  to  bring  about,  in  the 
face  of  all  opposition,  an  Anglo-German  entente — merely  through  his 
appearance.^ 

This  press  campaign  has  been  supported  in  London  by  the  radical 
*  A  characteristic  failing  of  the  German  press. 


638        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

press  and  by  those  papers  which  are  under  Jewish  influence.  Both 
tendencies  pursue  the  same  object:  a  rupture  of  the  Anglo-Russian 
entente  and  even  of  the  English  entente  with  France. 

I  know  that  one  of  the  reasons  for  the  resignation  of  Count 
Metternich  was  this  constant  and  regrettable  influencing  of  the 
English  press. 

As  always  in  such  instances,  the  national  feeling  of  the  English 
has  been  injured  merely  because  one  has  seen  in  this  an  attempt 
to  foist  upon  England  a  change  of  diplomatic  personnel  and  a  whole 
program,  even  before  the  English  Government  itself  had  been 
asked.  Baron  Marschall  will  not  be  received  without  a  certain 
amount  of  distrust. 

The  King,  as  I  know,  has  privately  expressed  his  greatest  regret 
to  Count  Metternich  regarding  his  resignation.  Sir  Edward  Grey 
spoke  to  me  in  terms  of  the  greatest  sympathy,  regarding  Metter- 
nich*s  personal  character,  and  his  sincere  and  open  attitude;  the 
resignation  of  the  German  Ambassador  caused  a  public  demon- 
stration in  the  House  of  Commons — a  very  unusual  event  in  view 
of  English  customs. 

I  cannot,  however,  conceal  the  fact  that  this  press  campaign, 
however  artificially  it  may  have  been  evoked,  nevertheless  proves 
that  sympathies  for  Germany  have  made  serious  progress  in  Eng- 
land. And  Count  Metternich  was  quite  right  in  remarking  to  me 
some  days  ago : 

"I  am  leaving  to  my  successor  a  situation  more  favourable  than 
it  has  been  for  long  time."  ^ 

(727)     The  Russian  Charge  d*Affaires  at  Berlin  to  Sazonoff.    Report,  May 
11-24,  1912.    No.  27. 

The  noise  which  was  produced  in  the  German  press  by  the  trans- 
ference of  Baron  Marschall  from  Constantinople  to  London,  in 
nowise  accords  with  the  significance  of  this  event,  and  is  merely  a 
proof,  how  greatly  public  opinion  in   Germany  is   interested  in 

*The  last  six  paragraphs  contain  statements  hard  to  reconcile  with  one 
another,  except  we  assume  that  Metternich  was  a  mere  dummy,  whose  words  did 
not  go  very  far  in  the  Berlin  Foreign  Office.  The  fact  is  that  Count  Metternich 
was  too  much  the  Kaiser's  man  and  had  the  habit  of  looking  upon  the  orders  of 
the  Wilhelmstrasse  as  undue  interference.  Thus  it  came  about  that  the  press 
campaign  and  the  ambassador's  views  had  little  in  common. 


THE  MISSION  OF  VISCOUNT  HALDANE  639 

everything,  which  has  even  the  slightest  connection  with  the  rela- 
tiojis  of  Germany  to  England.  There  is  no  doubt,  that  the  Ger- 
man Government  has  weighty  reasons  for  recalling  at  the  present 
difficult  moment  Marschall  from  Constantinople,  where  he  played 
so  great  a  role,  and  where  he  had  created  for  himself  a  position 
quite  out  of  the  common.  It  is  exceedingly  probable,  that  the  gov- 
erning circles  of  Germany  were  herein  actuated  by  the  desire  to 
achieve,  if  not  an  agreement,  then  at  least,  a  certain  rapprochement 
with  England  by  entrusting  these  negotiations  to  a  diplomat  who 
had  proved  so  efficient  at  another  post;  but  it  is  unquestionably 
true  that  everything  which  has  been  published  in  newspapers  of 
every  kind  of  political  tendency  and  colour,  regarding  this  matter, 
and  that  the  hopes  which  were  founded  upon  the  alleged  new  mis- 
sion of  the  German  Ambassador  in  London,  have  lacked  a  solid 
basis,  and  that  they  merely  prove  with  what  concern  the  strained  re- 
lations with  England  are  regarded  in  Germany. 

These  relations,  which  in  our  day  constitute  one  of  the  main,  if 
not  the  main,  features  of  'Weltpolitik,"  arise  from  the  unusual  eco- 
nomic strength  of  Germany,  and  the  corresponding  development  of  her 
land,  and,  above  all,  her  naval  forces.  In  the  latter,  England  sees  a 
threat  not  only  to  her  own  naval  supremacy,  hut  at  the  same  time  to 
her  existence  as  a  world  Power.  The  situation  did  not  originate  at  one 
blow,  and  cannot  be  changed  in  a  day,  however  much  this  may  be  de- 
sired by  the  one,  and  by  both,  and  however  capable  the  states- 
men may  be  who  assume  the  task  of  bringing  about  an  Anglo- 
German  agreement.  A  task  of  this  sort  is  not  easy,  for  in  order  to 
achieve  a  result  of  this  kind,  England  would  be,  for  once  and  for  all 
time,  obliged  to  renounce  the  idea  of  opposing  the  commercial  expan- 
sion of  Germany  in  all  parts  of  the  world,  and  the  incidental  increase 
of  her  merchant  fleet  and  her  navy. 

Baron  Marschall  is  too  clever  not  to  take  into  full  account  the 
difficulty  of  the  problem  which  confronts  him,  and  if,  in  spite  of  his 
•advanced  age,  he  has  been  pleased  to  accept  the  post  of  German 
representative  in  London,  which  has  been  offered  to  him,  then  one 
must  believe,  that  the  program,  which  he  has  in  mind,  is  much 
more  modest  than  that  which  has  been  ascribed  to  him  in  so  per- 
sistent a  manner  by  the  German  Press,  from  the  very  moment 
when  this  appointment  became  known. 


VIII 


FRANCO-RUSSIAN  EFFORTS  TO  PERFECT  TRIPLE 

ENTENTE 


(May- August  1912) 


(728)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sasonoff.    Letter,  May  18-31,  1912. 

I  have  sent  you  lately  various  newspaper  articles,  dealing  with  a 
question  which  is  very  important  in  itself,  but  which,  as  far  as  I 
know,  has  so  far  been  discussed  only  by  the  Press — i.e.,  the  questiorkmm 
of  an  alliance  between  England  and  France.  ^ti 

I  think,  that  this  press  campaign  has  been  the  indirect  result  of 
various  articles  published  in  "The  Times"  and  written  by  its  mili- 
tary correspondent.  Colonel  Repington,  who  is  himself  one  of  the 
most  convinced  adherents  of  the  Entente  of  England  with  France 
and  Russia.  These  articles  referred  to  England's  military  position  in 
the  Mediterranean,  which  has  been  rather  weakened  since  the  with- 
drawal of  the  British  squadron,'^  and  which  is  not,  in  the  belief  of  a 
considerable  part  of  the  British  public,  sufficiently  secured  by  substi- 
tuting a  French  squadron,  as  long  as  the  relation  of  the  two  countries 
are  based  upon  an  entente  and  not  upon  an  alliance.  The  journey  of 
Mr.  Asquith  and  Mr.  Churchill  to  Malta,  their  meeting  with  Lord 
Kitchener,  and  an  intended  visit  to  Bizerta,  have  still  further  enlivened 
these  discussions. 

Whilst  the  journey  aforesaid  is  of  an  entirely  private  nature,  yet 
I  firmly  believe,  that  the  attention  of  these  two  Ministers  has  been 
directed  to  the  situation  which  has  arisen  for  England.  Moreover, 
certain  misgivings  have  lately  been  expressed  by  public  opinion  in 
England  with  regard  to  the  ultimate  intentions  of  Italy  who  has 

*  Incident  to  the  growth  of  the  German  navy,  which  necessitated  a  strengthen-_ 
ing  of  the  British  Home  fleet. 

640 


EFFORTS  TO  PERFECT  TRIPLE  ENTENTE        641 

occupied  various  islands,  among  them  Rhodes.^  I  may  mention, 
in  passing,  that  this  question  of  the  Greek  islands  which  belong  to 
Turkey,  and  which  have  been  occupied  by  Italy,  is  engaging  the 
attention  of  the  British  Government. 

Nicolson  spoke  to  me  on  this  matter  only  very  briefly  and  privately; 
he  is  thinking,  it  would  appear,  of  the  restitution  of  these  islands  to 
Turkey  after  the  conclusion  of  peace.^  He  foresees  difficulties.  Cam- 
bon,  in  a  private  conversation,  went  even  farther ;  according  to  his 
opinion  one  will  have  to  reckon  with  complications ;  a  simple  resti- 
tution, as  demanded  by  logic,  would  immediately  cause  unrest  and 
a  certain  agitation  in  Greece,  for  Turkey  has  always  lost  territory 
inhabited  by  Christians  as  soon  as  it  was  occupied  by  a  Christian 
Power — an  argument  to  which  Greece  will  perhaps  have  recourse, 
and  which  may  find  a  certain  echo  in  Hellenophile  circles  which,  as 
is  wellknown,  have  their  representatives  in  all  countries. 

Cambon  is  of  the  opinion  that  a  simple  restitution  would  not  be 
without  its  dangers.  Some  of  these  islands  formerly  enjoyed  more 
or  less  established  privileges,  which  the  young  Turkish  Party  is 
now  endeavouring,  as  far  as  possible,  to  restrict.  These  islands,  at 
least  to  some  degree,  welcomed  the  Italian  garrisons  as  their  libera- 
tors; the  unconditional  restoration  of  Turkish  authority  might, 
therefore,  give  rise  to  disturbances,  above  all  to  acts  of  revenge  on 
the  part  of  the  Turks,  from  which  serious  international  difficulties 
might  result. 

I  beg  Your  Excellency  to  excuse  this  rather  long  digression, 
but  it  is  directly  connected  with  the  contents  of  this  letter. 

/  called  upon  Sir  Arthur  Nicolson  yesterday,  and  touched  upon 
the  newspaper  articles  dealing  with  an  Anglo-French  alliance.  I  told 
him  frankly,  that  I  m,ust  mention  the  matter  in  my  correspondence 
with  you  and  that  I  should  be  much  obliged  to  him  for  elucidation. 

Sir  Arthur  replied  that  no  exchange  of  views  had  taken  place 
between  the  two  Governments,^  that  neither  of  them  had  taken 
the  initiative  in  that  respect,  and  that  he  did  not  believe  that  that 
would  be  the  case  for  the  present,  since  such  a  step  would,  to  say 

*  Result  of  Turco-Italian  war  in  Tripoli. 

'Though  Great  Britain  used  many  a  "Christian**  argument  why  the  Turk 
should  be  driven  from  Europe. 

'Rather  a  delicate  way  of  circumventing  the  fact  that  Great  Britain  had  a 
Naval  Convention  with  France. 

41 


642         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


the  least,  be  inopportune,  because  the  present  naoment  was  not 
calm  one  and,  in  consequence  of  the  war,^  there  was  actually  a 
crisis  prevailing,  so  that  such  a  step  would,  probably,  be  looke^i 
upon  by  Germany  as  a  regrettable  provocation.  fl 

Sir  Arthur  told  me  this  as  a  personal  opinion  of  his  own.  He 
had  all  the  more  reason  to  lay  weight  upon  this  circumstance,  for 
I  do  not  think  that  I  am  mistaken  in  asserting,  that  he  has  very 
decided  opinions  on  the  question  of  an  Anglo-French  alliance. 
Too  experienced  to  act  otherwise  than  with  the  greatest  caution,  he  ap- 
pears to  me  to  he  at  the  bottom  of  his  heart  not  only  an  adherent  of  an 
Anglo-French  alliance,  but  of  a  new  Triple  Alliance,  whose  task  it  would 
be  to  form  a  counter-balance  against  the  existing  Triple- Alliance,  since 
such  a  combination  would  be  a  surer  safeguard  of  peace  than  any  other. 

I  should  be  much  obliged,  if  Your  Excellency  would  regard 
this  conjecture  as  to  Sir  Arthur's  opinions,  as  strictly  confidential, 
for  his  words  do  not  permit  of  my  ni,aking  any  positive  statement. 
Besides,  great  as  his  influence  is,  it  does  not  extend  so  far  as  that. 


(729)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Letter,  May  20- June  2,  1912. 


I 


I  believe  that  I  ought  to  direct  Your  Excellency's  special  at 
tention  to  the  enclosed  leading  article  which  appeared  to-day  in 
the   "Observer,"  likewise  to  a  rather  important  correspondency, 
from  St.  Petersburg  in  the  same  paper.  ^ 

Both  these  articles  deserve  special  attention,  because  the  point 
of  view  of  public  opinion,  and  the  mood  in  which  these  questions 
are  being  discussed,  are  therein  more  faithfully  reproduced  than  in 
anything  else  I  have  read  up  to  the  present.  /  should  not  like  to 
assert,  that  the  majority  of  the  nation  has  already  been  won  for  an  al- 
liance with  France.  Things  do  not  move  so  fast  in  England,  but, 
roused  by  a  certain  part  of  the  British  public,  which,  from  various 
undefined,  and  not  always  patriotic  reasons,  begins  to  incline  toward 
Germany,  this  majority  is  beginning  to  feel  a  certain  anxiety  and  be- 
lieves that  a  policy  based  exclusively  on  ententes  is  not  wholly  satis- 
factory. 

The  "Observer"  belongs  to  a  group  of  papers  which  have  lately 
been  amalgamated  under  the  direction  of  a  highly  gifted  publicist 


*  Turco-Italian  war  in  Tripoli. 


I 


EFFORTS  TO  PERFECT  TRIPLE  ENTENTE         643 

Mr.  Garvin.  I  know  him  personally  and  /  believe  that  he  sometimes 
receives  directions  from  the  British  Foreign  Office.  It  is  self-evident, 
that  he  gives  a  greater  relief  ^  to  these  suggestions  than  is  actually  ex- 
pressed by  the  real  feelings  of  the  heads  of  British  policy. 

There  is  no  doubt,  that  the  appointment  of  Baron  Marschall, 
as  German  Ambassador  in  London,  has  stimulated  this  agitation. 
The  exaggerated  press  utterances,  which  accompanied  this  appoint- 
ment have  already  lead  to  the  results  foreseen — a  fairly  strong  re- 
action has  set  in  and  finds  expression,  in  the  first  place,  in  the 
numerous  tokens  of  sympathy  received  by  the  retiring  Ambassa- 
dor, Count  Metternich,  from  the  public,  and  even  from  the  Gov- 
ernment. 

(730)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sasonoff.     Letter,  May  24- 
June  6,  1912. 

The  question  raised  by  the  English  Press,  concerning  the  trans- 
formation of  the  Anglo-French  entente  into  a  formal  alliance,  has, 
naturally,  evoked  the  liveliest  interest  in  Government  circles,  as 
well  as  in  the  Press.  Poincare,  in  an  interview  with  me,  in  a  very 
decisive  manner  expressed  his  view  on  thic,  question; 

According  to  his  conviction,  there  was  no  need  for  France  or  Eng- 
land to  desire  any  alteration  in  the  present  relations.  Recent  events 
had  proved  that,  according  to  the  present  European  situation,  the  com- 
munity of  interests  of  France  and  England,  and  the  understanding 
based  thereon,  was  so  great  and  indisputable,  that,  in  case  of  any  serious 
complications,  the  common  policy  of  both  nations  would  thereby  be 
fully  safeguarded.  The  signing  of  any  formal  document — even  sup- 
posing that  that  would  be  compatible  with  the  French  or  British  Con- 
stitution— would  in  no  way  strengthen  this  guarantee.  For  even  if 
such  an  agreement  existed,  Mr.  Asquith*s  recent  public  utterance 
remains  in  full  force,  that,  at  the  critical  moment,  the  British  Gov- 
ernment could  only  act  upon  that  decision  which  the  British  nation 
would  prescribe  to  the  Government.  As  to  the  question  touched 
upon  by  the  Press,  concerning  an  eventual  change  in  the  military  or- 
ganisation of  England,  and  the  introduction  of  universal  military  service, 
Poincare  is  of  opinion  that  it  would  be  very  frivolous  on  the  part  of 

*The  word  "relief"  is  evidently  used  in  the  plastic  sense — making  dearer  or 
more  prominent. 


644        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

France  to  moot  this  question  even  in  the  most  careful  manner,  for  this 
is  a  purely  national  English  affair.  As  far  as  the  French  Press  is 
concerned,  the  principal  papers  had  shown  great  tact  in  this  mat- 
ter, and,  in  the  majority  of  cases,  adopted  the  view,  that  the  ques- 
tion of  an  alliance  and  a  military  reorganisation  of  England  was  a 
question  to  be  decided  by  the  English  themselves,  and  that  the 
French  newspapers  must  refrain  from  exerting  any  pressure  * 
one  direction  or  the  other.^ 


(731) 


The  Russian  Chargi  d*Affa%res  at  Berlin  to  Sasonoff. 
25-June  7,  1912. 


Letter,  May 


The  question  of  transforming  the  friendly  agreement  betweei 
England  and  France  into  an  alliance,  arouses  great  interest  in  Ger- 
many, and  great  anxiety  in  political  circles  here.  Although  the  press 
loudly  asserts  that  this  question  has  no  significance  for  Germany,  since 
events  during  late  years  have  proved  that  in  case  of  a  conflict  between 
Germany  and  France,  England  would  place  herself  at  the  side  of  the 
latter  anyway,  no  matter  whether  she  was  hound  to  France  by  an  al- 
liance or  by  an  agreement,  the  contrary  is,  nevertheless,  established  by 
the  passion  with  which  this  question  is  discussed  and  by  the  space  which 
it  occupies  in  all  newspapers.  Not  the  fact  of  the  conclusion  of  an  aU 
liance  between  England  and  France  makes  itself  felt,  but  rather  the 
circumstance  that  the  Germans  have  been  finally  convinced,  that  E^^^UX 
land  is  now  turning  away  from  the  possibility  of  a  rapprochement  with 
Germany — a  rapprochement,  which  Germany  in  truth  passionately  de- 
sired.  It  has  now  become  common  knowledge  that  the  last  Morocco 
Agreement  between  Germany  and  France  has  not  only  not  led  to  a 
rapprochement  between  the  two  countries,  but  has,  on  the  contrary, 
called  forth  such  a  political  atmosphere,  such  an  excitement,  as  may  at 
any  moment  lead  to  the  most  regrettable  consequences  for  the  preser- 
vation of  European  peace. 

The  question  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  in  which  a  certain  calm  seems  to  have 
made  itself  felt  during  recent  years,  has  once  more  been  acutely  intensi- 
fied and,  pursuant  to  instructions  from  Berlin,  the  local  authorities^ 
there  have  taken  a  number  of  measures  which  are  extremely  incoi 
venient  to  the  population  and  which  call  forth  great  excitement 
France. 

*A  sane  view,  indeed. 


EFFORTS  TO  PERFECT  TRIPLE  ENTENTE         645 

The  attitude  of  chauvinistic  papers  as,  for  instance,  ''La  France 
Militaire,"  which  reproached  Germany  with  every  possible  base- 
ness, has  produced  a  warning,  in  the  semi-official  "Kolnische 
Zeitung/'  to  the  effect,  that,  if  France  wishes  to  cross  swords  with 
Germany,  the  latter  was  ready,  which  was  best  proved  by  the  quick 
acceptance  by  the  representatives  of  the  people  of  the  bill  for  in- 
creasing the  fighting  forces  of  the  Empire. 

Relations  of  such  a  nature,  to  a  neighbouring  state,  naturally,  cause 
Germany  to  follow  with  the  greatest  attention  every  step  of  the  Power 
which  feels  hostile  to  her,  that  is  to  say  England,^  Thus,  for  example, 
the  consultations  of  Churchill  and  Asquith  with  Lord  Kitchener  at 
Malta  are  interpreted  in  the  sense,  that  these  are  a  preparatory  step  to 
the  conclusion  of  an  alliance  with  France,  in  which  the  latter  would  be 
called  upon  to  defend  the  mutual  interests  of  both  in  the  Mediterranean,^ 


(732)     Sasonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.    Telegram,  May  22- 
June  4,  1912.    No.  1062. 

Personal.  In  view  of  the  impending  meeting,  about  the  end  of 
July,  between  our  Monarch  and  Emperor  William  in  Finnish 
Waters,  it  would  be  well  if  you  would  betimes  inform  Sir  Edward 
Grey,  and  explain  to  him,  that  this  event  need  cause  no  anxiety  in  Eng- 
land, since  we  are  firmly  determined  to  maintain  our  cordial  relations 
with  the  London  Cabinet  as  established  during  the  last  few  years. 
If  local  considerations,  in  your  opinion  render  it  necessary  to  pre- 
pare public  opinion  and  the  Press,  I  beg  you  to  take  the  necessary 
measures.    Copy  sent  to  Paris. 


(733)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  May  22'June  4,  1912.    No.  1061. 

I  am  telegraphing  to  Paris : 

''You  may  inform  Poincare,  confidentially,  of  the  proposed  meeting 
between  our  Monarch  and  Emperor  William  in  Finnish  Waters.  Add 
that  the  ties,  which  bind  us  to  France,  are  too  strong  to  make  it  neces- 

*  While  it  is  possible  that  the  views  of  Schebeko  were  influenced  by  his  Berlin 
environments,  it  is,  nevertheless,  noteworthy  that  he  deems  it  proper  to  make  such 
a  statement  to  his  chief,  which,  in  the  case  of  a  charge  d'affaires,  must  be  con- 
sidered as  rather  daring. 

'  For  that  purpose  Great  Britain  had  already  a  naval  convention  with  France. 


646        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

sary  to  point  out,  that  neither  the  French  Government  nor  French 
public  opinion  need  feel  the  slightest  alarm  concerning  this  event. 
As  for  preparing  public  opinion  in  France,  I  request  you  to  entrust 
this  task  to  the  French  Government,  in  order  that  it  might  ex- 
plain to  the  press,  in  the  most  suitable  way,  and  in  accordance  with 
local  requirements,  that  the  meeting  in  question  cannot  injure  our 
relations  with  France." 


(734)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  June  24-July  7,  1912.    No.  1260. 


I 


/       I  am  telegraphing  to  Paris : 

"The  meeting  of  the  two  Emperors  in  Baltischport  took  a  very 
satisfactory  course.  While  there  was  great  cordiality  on  both  sides, 
public  statements,  as  to  political  questions,  have  plainly  proved  that 
there  is  no  intention  of  attempting  any  change  in  the  grouping  of  the 
European  Powers.  Germany,  likewise  made  no  proposals  in  thHl 
question  of  putting  an  end  to  the  Italian-Turkish  War.  This,  to- 
gether with  the  authentic  press  accounts  of  the  proceedings,  fur- 
nishes the  best  proof,  how  right  we  were,  when  we  informed 
France  that  the  fears  she  has  entertained  were  without  foundation. 
I  request  you  to  speak  in  this  sense  to  Poincare." 


(735)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Confidential  Letter,  June  2S-July  8,  1912. 


I 


r  The  meeting  of  the  two  Monarchs  at  Baltischport  was  in  every 
respect  satisfactory.  In  my  conversations  with  Emperor  William, 
and  with  the  Chancellor,  the  most  important  political  questions 
were  naturally  mentioned,  and  I  received  a  favourable  impression 
of  the  attitude  and  intention  of  the  higher  Government  circles  in 
Germany.  The  Emperor,  as  well  as  the  Chancellor,  gave  expression 
to  the  wish  that  the  traditional  relations  between  both  countries  might 
be  strengthened,  since  this  would  serve  not  only  the  welfare  of  both 
countries  but  also  the  maintenance  of  peace  in  Europe.  In  this  con- 
nection, Bethmann-Hollweg  declared,  explicitly,  that,  recognising 
how  useful  the  existing  international  groupings  of  the  Powers  have 
been  for  the  preservation  of  peace,  he  was  nowise  desirous  of  caus- 
ing a  change  in  this  respect,  nor  of  detaching  any  power  from 
\     group  it  had  joined  through  historical  necessity.    He  told  me. 


EFFORTS  TO  PERFECT  TRIPLE  ENTENTE         647 

Germany  only  cherishes  a  desire,  that  the  relations  of  the  powers 
to  one  another  should  not  prevent  them  from  also  maintaining  good 
relations  with  the  powers  of  the  other  group.  Although  he  thus  ad- 
mits, that  the  existing  groups,  which  have  justified  themselves  in 
practice,  satisfy  the  demands  of  our  time,  and  therefore  call  for  no 
change,  Bethmann-Hollweg  regards  it  as  desirable  to  avoid  any- 
thing which,  while  accentuating  the  outward  division  of  the  two 
groups  of  European  Powers,  might  preclude  the  possibility  of  new 
constellations  in  the  future,  in  case  future  events  should  make  the 
latteFlTecessary.  Emperor  William,  and  the  Chancellor,  repeatedly 
pointed  out  that  Germany  needs  peace,  in  order  to  consolidate  the  pre- 
eminently important  results  of  German  industry  and  prosperity  during 
the  last  decade.  I  told  the  Chancellor,  that  I  had  no  doubt  regarding 
the  pacific  intentions  of  the  German  Government,  but  that  I  should 
like  to  know  whether  Germany  was  ready  to  make  her  influence 
felt  in  this  sense  in  those  quarters  where  Germany  might  be  drawn 
into  European  entanglements  against  her  will.^  /  asked  him  in  par- 
ticular, whether  the  Berlin  Cabinet  would,  if  necessary,  use  its  in- 
fluence at  Vienna,  in  order  to  prevent  Austria  from  penetrating  further 
in  the  Balkans.  Bethmann-Hollweg  promised  this  without  hesitation, 
and  pointed  out,  that  he  could  unconditionally  renew  the  assurances  he 
had  already  given  me  at  Potsdam.  He,  on  his  part,  gave  expression 
to  the  hope,  that  we,  too,  would,  as  heretofore,  moderate  the  am- 
bitions of  the  little  Balkan  States,  and  in  particular  give  counsels 
of  prudence  at  Sofia. 

In  regard  to  the  Italian-Turkish  War,  no  proposals  were  made  by 
Germany  as  to  how  to  end  this  war,  contrary  to  the  fears  entertained 
at  Paris  and  London  before  the  meeting.  Contenting  himself  with  a 
reference  to  the  damage  done  to  German  trade  by  the  long  war, 
the  Chancellor  expressed  his  satisfaction,  that  we,  together  with 
the  other  European  Powers,  had  attempted  to  reconcile  the  two 
belligerents,  and  he  assured  me,  that  every  further  step  in  this 
direction  on  our  part  could  be  sure  of  Germany's  entire  approval. 
/  must  add,  however,  that  although  the  German  Government  declared 
itself  ready  to  take  part  in  any  common  step  toward  ending  the  war,  I, 
nevertheless,  received  the  impression,  that  Berlin  would  prefer  if  peace 

^  Austria-Hungary.  Sazonoff  was  perfecting  the  Balkan  League  on  the  basis  of 
Pan- Slavism. 


648         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

/  could  be  brought  about  by  direct  negotiations  between  the  belligeren 
'    without  outside  interference.^  .... 

After  speaking  in  high  terms  of  Lord  Haldane,  the  Chancellor 
>  pointed  out,  that  relations  between  the  two  countries  at  present 
were  less  strained,  but  he  admitted,  that  much  would  still  have  to 
be  done  in  this  respect  in  order  to  reach  a  tangible  result.  In  re- 
gard to  the  Chinese  loan  a  certain  difference  of  opinion  had  become 
apparent  between  Germany  and  us.  This  difference  is  a  natural 
result  of  our  different  points  of  view.  In  China,  Germany  sees  above 
all  a  great  market  for  her  own  goods,  and  is,  naturally,  interested  in 
maintaining  the  purchasing  power  of  this  market,  for  which  reason  she 
must  fear  the  possibility  of  a  disruption  of  the  Chinese  Empire. 
Therefore,  Berlin  desires  the  conclusion  of  a  big  Chinese  loan, 
which  would  enable  that  country  to  get  out  of  its  present  difficult 
situation.  Russia,  on  the  other  hand,  as  a  neighbour  of  China,  with  a 
long  and  insufficiently-guarded  frontier,  cannot  desire  the  strengthening 
of  this  neighbour.  Therefore,  the  failure  of  the  proposed  loan  would 
not  annoy  us,  even  the  aforementioned  collapse  of  the  present 
Chinese  Empire  would  leave  us  indifferent.  I  have  made  this  per- 
fectly plain  to  Emperor  William  and  to  the  Chancellor. 

As  for  the  Dardanelles,  the  Bagdad  Railway  and  Persia,  those 
problems  were  not  discussed.  No  understanding  was  reached  on 
any  of  these  questions  nor  was  any  such  understanding  proposed. 

Consequently,  the  meeting  at  Baltischport  has,  of  course,  improved 
our  relations  with  Berlin,  but  at  the  same  time  effected  no  change  <^H 
our  relations  to  the  other  Powers.    There  is  therefore  not  the  slightest 
cause  for  jealous  anxiety  at  Paris  or  in  London. 

(736)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Neratoff.     Telegram,  June      ^^ 
2%-July  11,  1912.    No.  187. 

I  think  I  ought  to  direct  your  attention  to  the  following  passage 
in  the  speech  of  Mr.  Bonar  Law  in  the  House  of  Commons,  as  be- 
ing important  for  the  future: — 

'*The  Right  Hon.  gentleman  (Sir  Edward  Grey)  said  this  evening, 
that  a  good  understanding  with  France  and  Russia  should  form  tht 

*  A  wise  policy  too  often  ignored  to  the  detriment  of  mankind.  Regardless  of 
what  German  international  policy  was  otherwise,  her  statesmen  stood  traditionally 
for  non-interference. 


EFFORTS  TO  PERFECT  TRIPLE  ENTENTE         649 

starting  point  of  our  policy.  I  prefer  to  declare,  that  it  is  the  basis  of 
our  foreign  policy.  He  read  an  official  statement,  which,  in  my  opin- 
ion, bears  evidence  of  great  statesmanlike  wisdom.  I  shall  read  it  to 
you  again":  .  ...  At  the  close,  Bonar  Law  declares:  "Such  is  the 
policy  of  this  country  and  if  the  party,  in  whose  name  I  speak,  comes 
into  power,  this  will  also  be  the  policy  of  that  party.''  ^ 

Nothing  more  positive  has  been  uttered  since  the  formation  of  the 
Entente. 

(737)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Letter,  July  3-16,  1912. 

I  have  not  much  to  add  to  my  report  of  the  Parliamentary  pro- 
ceedings, which  I  sent  you  by  post.  The  proceedings  were  a  great 
success  for  the  Cabinet,  as  well  as  for  Sir  Edward  Grey  personally. 

As  Your  Excellency  is  aware,  a  certain  opposition  from  various 
directions  made  itself  felt  for  a  time.  Without  going  so  far  as  to 
condemn  the  whole  present  direction  of  policy  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment,  there  were,  nevertheless,  in  the  various  Parliamentary  parties, 
men  who  reproached  the  Foreign  Secretary  with  the  fact,  that  by  his 
all  too  unyielding  attitude,  he  had  rendered  it  impossible  to  improve 
the  strained  relations  with  Germany,  and  that,  in  consequence  of  this, 
such  a  policy  meant  a  menace  to  peace.^  On  the  day  of  the  debate,  no 
such  utterance  was  heard,  for  the  speeches  of  Mr.  Ponsonby  and  of  an 
Irish  M.  P.  are  of  no  importance. 

In  his  very  moderate  speech,  which  was  even  conciliatory  towards 
Germany,  Sir  Edward  Grey  decisively  maintained  the  basis  of  this 
policy.  He  won, — something  that  occurs  but  scarcely — not  only  the 
attention,  but  the  approval  of  the  whole  House,  and  Mr.  Bonar  Law, 
the  Leader  of  the  opposition,  even  amplified  the  arguments  and  conclu- 
sions of  the  Minister. 

I  think  I  ought  to  remark  that  this  session  coincided  in  point 
of  time  with  the  meeting  of  the  Emperors  at  Baltischport,^  the  re- 
sults of  which  were  already  known  through  newspaper  reports. 
The  way  in  which  these  reports  were  dealt  with  by  the  various  speakers 
is  the  best  evidence  that  the  meeting  of  the  two  Monarchs  had  not  given 

*  Of  course,  it  was  rather  hard  after  this  for  the  Germans  to  assume  that 
from  the  British  could  be  expected  acts  at  all  favorable  to  Germany. 
'  As  it  did,  ultimately. 
•William  of  Germany  and  Nicholas  of  Russia. 


650        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

rise  to  any  serious  anxiety,  let  alone  distrust  on  the  part  of  the  Govern 
ment  or  public  opinion. 

I  believe,  I  am  not  mistaken  in  assuming,  that  the  recent  news  t 
the  effect  that  Russia  would  possess,  within  a  few  years,  a  mighty  navy, 
has  largely  contributed  to  the  English  verdict  as  to  the  value  of  a  rap- 
prochement between  England  and  Russia, 


(738)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  July  4-17,  1912.    No.  191. 


oSSP 


Grey  spoke  to  me  of  the  telegram,  in  which  O'Beirne  ^  repo! 
on  his  interview  with  our  Minister  after  the  latter's  return  from 
Baltischport.  He  expressed  to  me  his  great  gratitude,  and  declared 
that  he  very  highly  appreciated  the  frank  statements  of  M.  Sazo- 
noff .  Sir  Edward  said,  that  he  entirely  shared,  above  all,  the  point 
of  view,  that  it  was  necessary  to  have  confidence  in  one  another 
and  that  no  entente  was  possible  without  such  confidence ;  that  his 
confidence  in  our  entente  was  perfect,  and  that  he  had  no  doubt  tha^ 
the  same  might  be  said  of  Paris. 

Grey  told  me  that  Baron  Marschall  ^  had  hitherto,  in  conversa- 
sations  with  him,  dealt  only  with  the  general  situation,  and  had  not 
broached  any  special  question,  with  the  exception  of  certain  mat- 
ters touching  South-Africa.  He  believes  that  Marschall  would,  for  the 
present,  merely  observe  things  and  would  try  to  find  his  way  in  his 
new  surroundings, — an  attitude  which  Sir  Edward  thought  quite  proper. 

(739)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Neratoff.    Letter,  July  5-18,  1912.  f 

After  I  had  already  begun  my  cure  at  Contrexeville,  I  inter- 
rupted it  for  two  days,  in  order  to  have  a  talk  with  Poincare,  and  to 
report  my  impression  to  you  through  the  courier  who  is  leaving 
to-day.  Unfortunately,  a  cousin  of  Poincare's  died  yesterday,  and 
I  could  not  see  the  Minister.  But  I  had  a  long  conversation  with 
Paleologue,  who  is  well  informed  of  all  details  of  pending  political 
questions.    He  told  me  the  following : 

The  French  Government  is  quite  satisfied  with  the  results  at- 
tained at  Baltischport.  The  communication  to  the  Press,  as  well 
as  those  from  our  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  Prime  Minister, 


*  British  charge  d'affaires  at  St.  Petersburg. 
'German  ambassador  at  London. 


EFFORTS  TO  PERFECT  TRIPLE  ENTENTE         651 

to  the  French  Ambassador,  in  particular,  have  convinced  the  French 
Minister  that  the  above-nfentioned  n^eeting  has  reinforced  the  guar- 
antees of  European  peace.  Whilst  in  nowise  disturbing  the  relations 
of  the  Powers  to  one  another.  On  my  part,  I  found  an  opportunity 
to  communicate  to  Paleologue  some  details  from  the  letter  of  M. 
Sazonoff  of  June  25,  choosing  those  which  were  specially  calcu- 
lated to  confirm  the  optimism  of  the  French  Government,  concern- 
ing that  meeting. 

In  general,  I  received  the  impression  that,  thanks  to  the  timely 
explanations  given  to  the  French  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg, 
and  through  me  to  Poincare,  the  first  nervousness  and  suspicions 
of  the  French  Ministers  were  allayed,  and  that  we  need  not  fear  a 
repetition  of  the  misunderstandings  which  made  themselves  felt 
after  the  Potsdam  meeting.  This  time,  we  also  succeeded  in  keeping 
the  French  public  from  getting  a  false  impression  of  what  happened. 
This  result  was  attained  by  my  energetic  personal  influencing  of  the 
principle  French  newspapers,^  while  similar  and,  naturally,  even  more 
effectual  steps,  were  undertaken  by  Poincare.  Our  efforts  in  this  direc- 
tion attained  success  all  the  more  easily,  since  the  first  communique 
published  in  the  newspapers  was  very  cleverly  worded,  and  furnished 
the  Paris  newspapers  with  the  necessary  material  for  their  articles. 
Very  important,  too,  was  the  presence,  at  Paris,  of  the  chiefs  of 
our  General  Staff,  and  of  our  Admiralty  Staff,  at  the  very  time  the 
Emperors  met,  which  circumstance  furnished  a  plain  proof  of  the 
durability  of  the  Russian-French  Alliance. 

(740)     The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Paris  to  Neratoff.     Report,  July 
20'Aug.  2,  1912.    No.  136. 

With  regard  to  the  revelations  of  the  ^'Temps''  concerning  the  Naval 
Convention. 

M.  Paleologue  informed  me,  that,  while  the  affair  was  very  un- 
pleasant to  the  Prime  Minister,  there  was  no  reason  to  be  alarmed 
about  its  consequences.  He  believed  that  here,  as  well  as  abroad, 
people  would  rather  be  astonished  that  such  a  Convention  had  not  been 
concluded  at  an  earlier  date.     The  Prime  Minister  assumes,  that  the 

*  It  would  seem  that  the  activity  at  London  of  the  Germans  in  press  matters, 
of  which  Count  Benckendorff  complains,  did  not  serve  as  a  horrible  example  to 
Iswolsky — nor  to  Benckendorff  himself,  as  is  made  clear  in  these  documents. 


652         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

paper  obtained  its  information  from  the  Government  departments 
various  dates.     The  curiosity  of  journalists  had  long  ago  been  rouse 
by  the  rumour  that  an  agreement,  concerning  the  Mediterranean,  wc 
signed,  and  this  had  led  them  incidentally  on  the  track  of  the  RusSi 
French  Naval  Convention. 


(741)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Report,  July  24-Aug.  6,  1912.    No.  141. 

M.  Paleologue  thinks  the  article  in  the  "Echo  de  Paris"  in  the  highe, 
degree  deplorable,  and  has  published,  through  Havas,  a  communicatio 
in  form  of  a  telegram  from  London.^  On  my  remarking  that  a  refu- 
tation would  surely  carry  more  weight,  if  published  in  form  of  the 
usual  semi-official  communication,  he  declared  that  that  would  have 
led  to  attacks  by  the  whole  Press  on  the  ''Echo  de  Paris,''  which, 
in  its  turn,  would  have  replied  and  opened  an  undesirable  press  con- 
troversy. He  added,  that,  at  his  instance,  the  ''Temps''  and  the  "Jour- 
nal des  Debats"  would  publish  commentaries  zvhich  would  strengthen 
the  impression  of  the  refutation. 


(742) 


Neratoff  to  the  Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  London.     Telegram, 
July  2S'Aug.  10,  1912.    No.  1520. 


I  am  telegraphing  to  Berlin.    Your  telegram  Nr.  80  received. 

"To  an  inquiry,  on  the  part  of  the  German  Ambassador,  J  replied, 
that  our  so-called  Naval  Convention  with  France  was  confined  to  the 
quite  natural  resolve  of  Allies  to  bring  the  chiefs  of  the  Naval  Staffs 
into  direct  contact,  similar  to  that,  which  had  existed  for  a  long  time 
between  the  two  General  Staffs. 

"Do  not  take  the  initiative  in  this  matter,  but  if  questions  are 
addres^d  to  you  in  the  Foreign  Office,  you  may  reply  in  the  above 
sense.** 


I 


(743)   {Memorandum  by  Sasonoff.    {August,  1912.) 

On  the  occasion  of  the  visit  of  M.  Poincare,  the  French  Prime 
Minister  and  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  to  St.  Petersburg,  I  had 
several  conversations  with  him. 

In  the  course  of  one  of  our  first  conversations,  we  expressed 
our  mutual  gratification  as  to  the  fact  that  the  negotiations  carried 

*  Indicating  how  reliable  "Havas"  reports  may  be. 


EFFORTS  TO  PERFECT  TRIPLE  ENTENTE         653 

on  between  our  Admiralty  Staffs  have  led  to  a  favourable  result. 

The  plan  of  a  Naval  Convention,  sighted  in  Paris  by  Admiral  Aubert 
and  Prince  Lieven,  has  been  approved  by  our  Emperor,  and  I  received 
full  authority  to  sign  this  Convention.  The  Military  Convention  con- 
cluded about  twenty  years  ago,  between  Russia  and  France,  having 
been  re-affirmed  by  both  Governments  through  an  exchange  of  notes, 
we  decided  with  M.  Poincare  to  apply  the  same  procedure  to  the  Naval 
Convention.  On  August  2  and  3,  we  exchanged  letters  with  M.  Poin- 
care in  which  the  coming  into  force  of  the  Naval  Convention  is 
confirmed. 

In  touching  upon  the  relations  between  France  and  Italy,  I 
expressed  to  Poincare  my  sincere  gratification  at  the  evident  im,- 
provement  of  these  relations,  which  for  a  time,  appeared  to  be  so 
strained.  The  improvement  was  all  the  more  important  in  view  of  the 
inpending  renewal  of  the  Triple  Alliance.  I  directed  his  attention  to 
the  fact,  that  it  was  particularly  important  for  France,  to  keep  Italy 
within  the  limits  of  her  normal  obligations  towards  her  Allies,  without 
giving  her  cause  to  attach  herself  to  them,  more  closely,  which  would 
be  very  disadvantageous  in  case  of  war  between  Germany  and  France. 

Under  the  provision,  that  friendly  relations  and  mutual  confi- 
dence prevail  between  Italy,  and  the  three  Entente  Powers, 
Italy's  remaining  as  a  dead  weight  in  the  Triple  Alliance  is  of  advantage, 
not  only  to  France  and  Russia,  but  to  Italy  herself,  since  this  is  equiva- 
lent to  a  guarantee  against  an  Austro-Italian  war,  in  which,  by  one 
means  or  another,  the  other  Powers  might  likewise  become  involved. 

Poincare  told  me  that  he  fully  shared  this  view,  and  that  he  did 
all  that  was  possible  to  achieve  this  object.  He  hopes  that  his  efforts 
will  not  be  in  vain,  and  that  he  will  succeed  in  establishing  the  neigh- 
bourly relations  of  France  and  Italy  upon  a  solid  basis.  In  this  respect 
good  results  had  already  been  achieved. 

Poincare  regretted,  that,  in  the  matter  of  the  Italo-Turkish 
War,  he  had  been  unable  to  back  up,  in  the  degree  desired,  our 
attempts  at  a  reconciliation  of  the  belligerents.  A  certain  measure  of 
reserve  on  the  part  of  France  was  to  be  explained  by  the  fact,  that 
regard  must  be  had  for  the  feelings  of  the  Mohammedan  population  of 
her  overseas  possessions,  where  any  pressure  on  Turkey  would  cause  ex- 
citement, which  might,  especially  at  the  present  juncture,  prove  danger- 
ous in  view  of  the  great  difficulties  attendant  upon  the  establishment 


654        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD  U 

of  the  French  Protectorate  over  Morocco^;    furthermore,  the  Paris 
Cabinet  was  induced  to  take  up  an  attitude  of  reserve  in  view  oflU 
the  consideration,  that  neither  Germany  nor,  of  course,  Austria 
would  have  done  anything  to  support  our  demarche  at  Constanti-^ 
nople. 

Poincare  declared  at  the  same  time  that,  more  than  ever,  he* 
ardently  desired  to  see  this  war  terminated,  and  that  he  cherished 
the  hope,  that  Russia  and  France  would  seize  the  first  opportunity 
to  achieve  this  object,  and  for  this  purpose  invite  the  co-operation 
of  the  other  Powers.  An  opportunity  of  this  kind  presented  itself 
in  the  negotiations  carried  on  at  the  present  moment  between  the 
Turks  and  the  Italians  in  Switzerland,  this  opportunity  being  all 
the  more  favourable,  as  the  Turkish  Government,  in  agreement 
with  Italy,  was  about  to  send  a  special  mission  to  Tripoli,  to  pre- 
pare the  transition  to  the  new  regime,  and  to  familiarize  the  Arabs 
with  the  idea  of  a  possible  reconciliation.  In  connection  with  the 
war,  Poincare  also  spoke  of  the  future  destiny  of  the  islands  in 
the  Aegaean  sea  occupied  by  Italy.  This  question  is  causing  most 
extraordinary  anxiety  to  the  French  Government,  which  is  afraid 
that  Italy  would  not  content  herself  with  regarding  them  as  a  pawn 
for  ending  the  war,  but  would  continue  the  occupation  until  Turkey 
had  guaranteed  a  certain  measure  of  autonomy.  France  intends  to 
protest  most  energetically  against  this,  for  she  would  regard  such 
a  state  of  things  a  menace  to  the  political  balance  of  power  io^U 
the  eastern  parts  of  the  Mediterranean.  To  a  question  of  M.  Poin^Kl 
care,  as  to  the  attitude  of  Russia  towards  a  permanent  Italian  occupa- 
tion of  the  Archipelago,  I  replied  that  we,  too,  would  not  be  able  t 
reconcile  ourselves  to  such  an  attempt. 

In  accordance  with  the  wish  of  the  Italian  Charge  d' Affaires  here, 
I  took  the  opportunity  of  sounding  Poincare,  whether  there  was  any 
possibility  to  contract  a  Turkish  loan  in  France  even  before  the  termina- 
tion of  the  war.  Poincare  promptly  replied  in  the  negative,  adding  how- 
ever, that  after  the  conclusion  of  peace,  Turkey  would  be  able,  on 
substantial  securities,  to  obtain  the  necessary  means  from  France  for 
the  purpose  of  liquidating  the  war.  Poincare  believes  that  Italy 
likewise  approach  France  with  a  similar  request. 


*  The  French  government  was  still  denying  that  there  was  such  a  "protectorate. 


I 


EFFORTS  TO  PERFECT  TRIPLE  ENTENTE         655 

With  the  mutual  assurance,  to  watch  closely  the  events  on  the 
Balkans,  and  to  exchange  our  views  and  informations,  we  agreed 
with  Poincare,  that  in  case  of  complications,  we  should  come  to  an 
agreement  as  to  a  common  plan,  according  to  circumstances,  in 
order  to  obviate,  by  diplomatic  means,  a  further  aggravation  of  the 
situation.  Poincare  thought  it  necessary  here  to  declare,  that  French 
public  opinion  would  not  allow  the  French  Government  to  take  up  arms 
on  account  of  purely  Balkan  Questions,  unless  Germany  intervenes  and 
brings  about  the  ''casus  foederis/'  in  which  case  Russia  could,  as  a  mat- 
ter of  fact,  rely  on  the  complete  and  strict  fulfilment  of  the  obligations 
which  bind  France  to  us. 

I,  on  my  part,  intimated  to  the  Minister,  that  we  were  always  pre- 
pared, resolutely  to  range  ourselves  upon  the  side  of  France,  whenever 
those  events,  which  were  provided  for  in  the  Treaty,  should  occur,  but 
that  we,  too,  could  not  justify,  before  Russian  public  opinion,  any  active 
participation  in  a  war  caused  by  extra-European  colonial  questions,  as 
long  as  the  vital  interests  of  France  in  Europe  were  not  thereby 
affected 

To  conclude,  I  should  like  to  remark  that  I  have  been  extremely 
glad  to  have  made  the  acquaintance  of  Poincare,  and  to  have  come 
into  personal  touch  with  him,  all  the  more  so,  as  through  our  ex- 
change of  views  I  gained  the  impression  that  Russia  possesses  in 
Poincare  a  safe  and  reliable  friend,  who  has  at  his  service  extraor- 
dinary statesmanlike  prudence  and  an  inflexible  will.  When  the 
critical  moment  in  international  relations  arrives,  it  would  be  most  de- 
sirable to  have  at  the  head  of  the  Allied  Government,  if  not  Poincare 
him^self,  at  least  a  personality  who  has  the  same  energetic  character  and 
who  has  as  little  fear  of  responsibility  as  the  present  French  Prime 
Minister.^ 

*  The  moment  came  in  1914,  when  M.  Poincare  was  president  of  the  French 
republic.  Without  wishing  to  prejudice  the  case  of  M.  SazonofF,  the  question 
may  be  asked,  was  the  last  sentence  of  his  Memorandum  to  the  Russian  diplo- 
matists merely  a  speculation  on  possibilities,  or  an  inadvertent  reference  to  what 
he  knew  was  coming? 


SETTLEMENT  OF  THE  BAGDAD  RAILROAD  QUESTION 
(December  1911~May  1913) 


(744) 


The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  to  Sazonoff. 
Dec.  16-29,  1911.    No.  762. 


Telegram, 


I 


The  British  Ambassador  informed  me  yesterday,  in  confidence,  that 
he  had  protested  vigorously,  although  not  officially,  against  the  intention 
ascribed  to  the  German  Bagdad  Railway  Company  to  alter  the  direction 
of  the  line  between  Mossul  and  Bagdad  in  such  wise  as  to  approach 
Khanekin.^  Such  an  alteration  of  the  main  line  was  not  permissible, 
so  long  as  negotiations  were  pending  between  London  and  Con- 
stantinople relating  to  the  Bagdad-Persian  Gulf  line,  as  these 
negotiations  were  based  on  the  assumption  that  the  direction  of  the 
remaining  portion  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  will  not  be  altered. 
The  Grand  Vizier  answered  him,  that  he  was  not  aware  of  any  such  in- 
tention on  the  part  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  Company,  but  that  he  never- 
theless admits  the  reasons  put  forward  by  the  Ambassador.  The  Acting 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  likewise,  declared  to  know  nothing 
of  any  such  intention  of  the  German  Company.  He  confirmed  to 
the  Ambassador,  that  the  Turco-Persian  Protocol,  on  the  frontier 
delimitations,  has  been  signed  at  Teheran,  and  that  the  Turkish 
members  of  the  mixed  commission  had  been  already  nominated 
and  were  in  Constantinople.  It  appears  from  the  newspapers  that 
the  Ministerial  Council  has  ordered  the  Turkish  troops  on  Persian 
territory  to  avoid  all  encounters  with  the  Russian  troops. 


*  See  Document  No.  757. 


656 


SETTLEMENT  OF  THE  BAGDAD  QUESTION        657 

(745)  The  Russian  Consul  at  Bagdad  to  the  Russian  Embassy  at  Constan- 
tinople.   Telegram,  Jan.  30-Feb.  12,  1912. 

The  survey  for  the  Mossul-Bagdad  sector  is  terminated  and  will 
be  forwarded  for  confirmation  to  Frankfort  and,  then,  to  Constan- 
tinople. Meisner  says,  a  new  speed  record  has  been  established, 
as  on  an  average  one  kilometer  a  day  has  been  placed  on  the 
survey  map,  despite  numerous  technical  difficulties.  After  a  week's 
rest,  the  engineers  will  begin  work  on  the  Sedidje-Khanekin  sector. 

(746)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  to  Sasonoff.     Telegram, 
April  10-23.  1912.    No.  \77. 

Our  Consul  at  Bagdad  telegraphs : 

The  plans  of  the  line  Bagdad-Mossul  have  been  confirmed  by 
the  Minister  of  Communications.  Meisner  has  gone  to  Basra  to 
establish  depots  there. 

(747)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sasonoff.     Telegram,  May  19- 
June  1,  1912.    No.  92. 

According  to  reliable  information,  the  "Deutsche  Bank"  requires 
further  means  for  the  Bagdad  Railway,  and  has  requested  the  Ot- 
toman Bank  to  pay  the  unredeemable  share  of  the  obligations  of 
about  60  million  francs,  or,  otherwise,  waive  all  claims  to  this  share, 
as  well  as  to  a  participation  in  further  issues.  As  the  Ottoman 
Bank  has  no  available  means  at  its  disposal,  it  has  requested, 
from  the  French  Government,  permission  to  realise  the  above  sum, 
with  the  aid  of  French  banks.  The  French  Government,  on  the 
one  hand,  fears  that  in  case  of  a  refusal,  France  would  be  entirely 
excluded  from  the  Bagdad  undertaking,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  that 
such  a  realisation,  even  if  not  public,  will  be  regarded  as  the  first 
step  towards  permitting  German  securities  to  be  quoted  on  the 
Paris  Bourse.  It  is  intended  to  apply  to  British  banks.  This  ques- 
tion has  been  specially  examined  by  the  Ministerial  Council.  I  shall 
watch  further  developments. 

(748)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sasonoff.     Telegram,  June 
1-14,  1912.    No.  170. 

Nicolson  has  requested  me  to  ask  you,  in  strictest  confidence, 
to  what  extent  the  Russian  Government  is  really  interested  in  parti 


658         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


cipating  with  the  fifth  share  in  the  Gulf  sector  of  the  Bagdad  Rail- 
way. He  says,  he  has  put  the  same  question  to  Cambon.  Until 
now,  negotiations  between  England  and  Turkey  were  based  on  the 
five  powers  receiving  equal  shares,  Germany  having  only  insisted  on 
its  share  being  equal  to  that  of  any  non-Turkish  Power.  Nicolson 
said,  Germany  had  in  reality  demanded  more  at  the  beginning, 
but  that  these  demands  had  met  with  no  success,  and  that  Turkey, 
to-day,  was  opposed  to  five  equal  shares;  on  the  other  hand,  it 
would  now  be  possible  to  find  a  solution  giving  England  50  per  cent, 
should  France  and  Russia  regard  a  participation  on  their  part  a^ 
not  absolutely  necessary. 


(749) 


Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris. 
1912.    No.  1131. 


Telegram,  June  4-17, 


I  refer  to  the  telegram  from  BenckendorfF,  No.  170. 

The  question  of  our  participation  in  the  Southern  sector  of  the 
Bagdad  Railway  is  of  little  importance  to  us,  although,  we  should 
thus  have  a  possibility  of  being  better  informed  on  the  conditions 
prevailing  in  this  sector  of  the  Bagdad  Railway.  We  declared  our 
readiness,  at  the  time,  to  take  upon  ourselves  a  fifth  part,  chiefly  in  order 
to  maintain  the  principle  of  joint  action  in  this  matter,  together  with 
England  and  France,  and  to  be  able  to  give  our  vote  in  favour  of  the, 
two  Powers."^ 

We  are  now  ready  to  withdraw  from  participation,  but  woul 
like  to  have  previously  the  view  of  the  French  Government. 


I 


P 


(750) 


The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sazonoff. 
1912.    No.  113. 


Telegram,  June  7-20, 


Your  telegram  No.  1131  received. 

Poincare  has  received  a  similar  enquiry  from  London,  but  has 
not  as  yet  replied,  as  negotiations  are  taking  place  at  present  at 
Berlin  between  the  "Deutsche  Bank,"  and  the  French  groups  par- 
ticipating in  the  Bagdad  Railway  enterprise.  The  outcome  of  these 
negotiations  will  determine  whether  the  French  remain  in  the  un- 
dertaking, as  Poincare  greatly  desires,  and  this,  on  the  other  hand, 
must  react  on  France's  attitude  in  the  above-mentioned  question. 


I 


*  Position  due  to  lack  of  capital  required  to  take  up  Russia's  part. 


SETTLEMENT  OF  THE  BAGDAD  QUESTION        659 

Poincare  thanks  us  for  our  friendly  enquiry,  but  requests  us  to 
wait  as  yet. 

(751)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  June  13-26,  1912.    No.  122. 

Poincare  told  nije,  that  the  connection  between  the  enquiry  m»ade 
by  the  English,  and  the  French  negotiations  with  the  "Deutsche 
Bank,"  is  of  a  purely  financial  one.  Should  the  Germans  insist  on 
the  realisation  of  a  part  of  the  loan,  which  is  in  the  portefeuille  of 
the  Ottoman  Bank,  then  the  latter  will  most  likely  apply  to  British 
banks,  and  this  might  lead  to  an  agreement  concerning  the  south- 
ern sector  of  the  Bagdad  Railway.^ 

(752)  The  Russian   Charge  d'Affaires  at  Paris   to  Sasonoff.     Telegram, 
Aug.  1-14,  1912.    No.  145. 

The  newspapers  have  paid  no  attention  to  the  information 
published  by  the  "Echo  de  Paris."  Our  financial  agent,  however, 
considers  the  news  of  the  formation  of  a  new  com,pany  to  be  most 
important.  In  his  opinion,  this  would  prove  that  the  Bagdad  Rail- 
way Company  had  resolved  to  commence  the  construction  of  the 
railway  from  Bagdad  and  to  carry  a  line  on  to  Sedidje,  and  a  branch 
line  to  Khanekin,  in  order  to  force  us  by  these  means  to  construct 
the  Khanekin-Teheran  line.  The  paper  does  not  mention,  whether 
the  new  company  has  been  recognised  by  the  Turkish  Government. 

(753)  Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  London.     Telegram, 
Aug.  8-21,  1912.    No.  1591. 

The  French  newspaper  "Echo  de  Paris"  of  August  12,  states 
that  an  arrangement  has  been  arrived  at,  between  L5mch  and  the 
"Deutsche  Bank,"  to  form  a  company  under  the  name  of  "Society 
for  Oriental  River  Transports,"  in  order  to  convey  on  the  Tigris 
and  the  Euphrates  building  material  and  labourers,  as  well  as 
other  goods  for  the  Bagdad  Railway.  The  Turkish  Steamship 
Company  is  also  to  enter  the  concern.  May  I  ask  you  to  telegraph 
us,  whether  the  news  of  the  formation  of  such  a  company  is  cor- 
rect— it  would  be  the  first  Anglo-German  enterprise. 

*The  Russian  government  still  opposed  British  sole  control  of  the  Persian 
Gulf. 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

(754)     The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  London  to  Sazonoff,     Telegram, 
Aug.  10-23,  1912.    No.  214. 

Your  telegram  No.  1591  received. 

I  learned  from  Mallet  that  an  agreement,  between  Lynch  and 
the  "Deutsche  Bank,"  has,  in  fact,  been  signed.  I  have  no  details. 
The  negotiations  were  carried  on  independently  by  Lynch,  and 
only  after  they  were  completed,  he  enquired  whether  the  British 
Government  would  raise  an  objection.  As  this  latter  does  not 
regard  the  enterprise  as  being  of  any  political  importance  it  gav< 
its  consent. 


(755) 


The  Russian   Charge   d'Affaires  at  Paris   to  Sazonoff. 
Aug.  25'Sept.  7,  1912.    No.  186. 


Telegram, 


M.  Rafalowitch,^  who  has  just  returned  from  Switzerland,  r< 
quests  me  to  inform  you  of  the  following : 

On  the  conclusion  of  the  agreement  with  Lynch,  Gwinner  ^  in- 
formed the  Ottoman  Bank  at  Paris,  in  its  capacity  as  representative 
of  the  French  group  of  the  Bagdad  Railway,  that  it  was  intended  to 
build  the  next  section  not  from  the  west,  but  starting  from  Bagdad, 
in  order  thus  to  reach  Khanekin  by  1916.  The  co-operation  of  the 
French  group  is  important,  as  it  has  promised  its  participation  in 
the  realisation  of  the  obligations  for  the  new  section  from  the 
west.  Gwinner  wishes  to  receive  this  assent  for  the  Bagdad-Sedidje 
section  as  well.  The  Ottoman  Bank  gave  the  proposal  a  favourable 
reception.  It  is  absolutely  necessary  to  bring  influence  to  bear  upon 
it  with  the  assistance  of  the  French  Government.  The  best  means 
for  altering  the  attitude  of  the  French  in  this  question  would  be  to 
invite  them  to  take  part  in  the  trans-Persian  Railway,  and  begin 
work  on  the  railway  line  Baku-Teheran  as  quickly  as  possible.  Ap- 
parently, the  French  will  gladly  enter  into  negotiations  with  us,  but 
there  is  no  time  to  be  lost,  as  they  will  sacrifice  their  co-operation 
in  the  Bagdad  Railway  only  for  participation  in  another  paying 
enterprise.  The  last  German  action  is  a  very  decisive  and  success- 
ful one,  and  forces  us  to  take  immediate  steps. 


*  Chief  of  the  Russian  political  police  in  Paris. 
'Of  the  Deutsche  Bank. 


SETTLEMENT  OF  THE  BAGDAD  QUESTION        661 

(756)  Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  London.     Telegram, 
Aug.  28'Sept.  10,  1912.    No.  1790. 

Our  Consul-General  at  Bagdad  telegraphs,  that  the  agreement 
with  the  Turks  was  signed  on  September  3.  Lynch  provides  the 
steamships,  the  ^'Deutsche  Bank,"  the  barges,  the  Turks,  a  third  of 
the  necessary  capital.  As  Lynch  will  manage  the  whole  enterprise, 
the  latter  is  considered  by  public  opinion  as  being  merely  an  exten- 
sion of  the  Lynch  Steamship  Company.  No  details  are  known  here 
as  yet. 

(757)  The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  London  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram, 
Aug.  Zl'Sept.  13,  1912.    No.  230. 

The  project  of  constructing  the  branch  line  Bagdad-Khanekin,  be- 
fore the  main  line  is  finished,  is,  in  Grey's  opinion,  opposed  to  Ger- 
many's interests  and  would  be  of  advantage  only  to  England,  as  this 
country  would  then  gain  control  of  the  entire  trade  over  the  Persian 
Gulf.  Grey,  therefore,  doubts  that  the  Southern  branch  line  will 
be  finished  by  1916,  unless  Khanekin  be  connected  with  the  main 
line  already  constructed. 

(758)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram,  April 
26-May  9,  1913.    No.  433. 

Nicolson  informs  me,  that  the  former  standpoint  of  the  British 
Government  has  changed,  and  that  the  London  Cabinet  would  no 
longer  raise  an  objection  to  the  construction  of  the  Bagdad-Basra 
Railway,  but  upon  the  condition  that  two  of  the  directors  must  be 
Englishmen. 

(759)  Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.     Telegram,  March 

3-16,  1913.    No.  1266. 

The  newspapers  report  the  ratification  of  the  following  Anglo- 
Turkish  agreement : 

Koweit  is  within  the  British  sphere  of  influence.  The  English 
build  a  harbour  at  Basra,  they  take  over  the  management  of  the 
Basra-Koweit  line,  and  grant  a  loan  of  3  million  pounds  sterling  for 
reforms  in  East  Anatolia  and  Syria.  May  I  request  you  to  inform 
us  how  far  these  statements  are  correct.    Should  other  Powers  re- 


662         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

ceive  compensations  in  connection  with  the  solution  of  the  question, 
wie,  too,  must  claim  compensations.  ^ 


(760)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram, 
May  5-18,  1913.    No.  354. 

Your  telegram  No.  1266  received. 

So  far  as  I  know,  the  news  communicated  by  its  corresponden' 
to  the  "Matin"  is  exaggerated.  The  British  Ambassador  declares 
that  he  is  not  au  c  our  ant  with  the  course  of  the  negotiations,  as 
these  take  place  in  London.  The  Grand  Vizier  declared,  that  the 
negotiations  were  proceeding  favourably,  but  that  on  two  points 
an  agreement  had  not  been  reached.  /  presume  that  it  is  not  a  matter 
of  an  official  recognition  of  the  English  protectorate  over  Koweit,  but 
of  the  recognition,  by  Turkey,  of  the  hereditary  rights  of  the  Sheik  of 
Koweit,  whom  the  Sublime  Porte  until  now  regarded  as  an  ordina 
Kaimakam}  Such  a  recognition  naturally  strengthens  British 
fluence. 

As  to  the  conditions  relative  to  the  construction  of  the  Bagdad 
Railway,  these  have  been  made  known  in  my  earlier  reports,  and  I 
have  no  information  that  any  alteration  has  taken  place.  The  three 
million  loan  appears  improbable  to  me,  until  the  Paris  Commission 
will  have  concluded  its  work.  I  presume  that  more  definite  newi 
will  be  obtainable  in  London. 


Of 

1 


I 


(761)     The  Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  London  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram, 
May  6-19,  1913.    No.  452. 

Nicolson  has  confirmed  that  the  account  in  the  "Times"  <^H 
May  4  is  in  accordance  with  facts.  The  negotiations  with  Turkey 
were  conducted  here  with  Hakki  Pasha,^  who,  as  it  now  appears, 
systematically  informed  the  German  Embassy  here  of  the  course 
of  the  negotiations.  After  Lichnowsky's  ^  return,  Gwinner's  arrival 
is  also  expected,  and  then  the  exchange  of  views  with  the  German 
Government  will  in  all  probability  begin.  As  Turkey  will  hardly 
be  successful  in  forming  a  special  company  for  the  construction 

*  Small  official. 

'  Turkish  ambassador  at  London. 

'  German  ambassador  at  London. 


SETTLEMENT  OF  THE  BAGDAD  QUESTION       663 

of  the  final  sector,  Nicolson  believes  that  this  latter  will  eventually 
be  left  to  the  Bagdad  Railway  Company. 

(762)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram,  May 
8-21,  1913.    No.  461. 

Grey  requested  Cambon  and  me,  to  call  on  him,  and  has  informed 
us  that  he  desires  to  speak  to  us  on  the  subject  of  the  Bagdad  Rail- 
way; firstly,  because  England  is  tied  by  the  Russian  and  French 
consent  to  the  4  per  cent  Customs  increase,  and  secondly,  because 
this  question  must  be  discussed  by  the  Paris  Commission.  Grey 
told  us,  the  British  Government  no  longer  believes  it  possible  further  to 
oppose,  in  principle,  the  Bagdad  Railway,  yet  it  must  safeguard  its  own 
interests  in  the  construction  of  the  line  to  the  Persian  Gulf.  Hence  the 
British  Government  is  on  the  point  of  coming  to  an  understanding  with 
Turkey,  which  would  regulate  certain  questions  in  the  Persian  Gulf, 
as  for  instance  Koweit,  the  island  of  Bakhrin  and  shipping,  whilst,  on 
the  other  hand,  Turkey  is  given  the  possibility  of  building  the  railway 
from,  Bagdad  to  Basra,  on  condition  that  it  shall  not  go  beyond  Basra,  in 
any  case  not  without  England's  sanction,  and  that  two  of  the  directors 
of  the  railway  must  be  English,  without  England  otherwise  participating 
m  the  enterprise,  since  all  attempts  to  internationalise  this  railway  line 
have  been  without  avail.  The  above  directors  would  have  no  other 
task,  than  to  represent  British  interests  in  tariff  questions.  These 
two  conditions  are  of  a  preventive  nature,  England  thus  securing 
only  a  negative  right.  Under  these  conditions,  England  would  be 
ready,  in  case  of  Russia  and  France  giving  their  agreement,  to  give 
her  consent  to  the  4  per  cent  Customs  increase.  Grey  asked  Cam- 
bon and  me  to  submit  this  to  our  Governments. 

In  the  mean  time,  Kiihlmann,^  who  is  dealing  with  this  ques- 
tion with  Mr.  Parker,  an  official  at  the  British  Foreign  Office,  has 
declared  that,  although  the  matter  concerns  directly  German  in- 
terests, as  the  German  concession  extends  not  only  to  Basra  but  to 
the  Persian  Gulf  as  well,  Germany  would,  nevertheless,  raise  no  ob- 
jections to  an  Anglo-Turkish  understanding,  on  condition,  however, 
that  an  equivalent  be  found  for  the  financial  means  for  the  con- 
struction of  the  line  to  Bagdad  and  to  Basra,  since  a  part  of  the 
prospective  means  for  this  purpose  comes  from  European  Turkey, 
*  Counselor  of  the  German  embassy  at  London. 


664        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

which  now  no  longer  forms  a  component  part  of  the  Turkish  Em- 
pire.^   This  is  the  state  of  the  negotiations  with  Germany. 

Grey  pointed  out  to  us,  that  England's  consent  to  the  Customs 
increase  had  only  had  the  purpose  of  safeguarding  her  interests,  in 
so  far  as  these  are  rendered  questionable  by  the  Bagdad-Basra  en- 
terprise. These  guarantees  could  be  secured  on  no  other  basis. 
Grey  replied  to  my  question,  whether  the  Bagdad-Khanekin  line 
had  been  mentioned  in  the  course  of  these  negotiations,  that,  apart 
from  unauthorised  financial  circles,  the  question  of  this  line  had  not 
been  touched  on,  and  that  the  British  Government  would  conduct 
no  negotiations  respecting  a  railway  line  in  which  Russia  wi 
directly  interested. 

(763)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sazonoff.    Telegram,  May  13- 
26,  1913.    No.  260. 

With  respect  to  the  Anglo-Turkish  negotiations,  the  information 
available  here  is  about  the  same  as  that  in  the  possession  of  our 
Ambassadors  at  Constantinople  and  in  London.  England  renounces 
the  construction  of  the  Bagdad-Basra  line,  but  appoints  two  mem- 
bers of  the  board.  The  Basra-Koweit  sector  is  not  to  be  built  at  all. 
Turkey  recognises  England's  position  at  Koweit  and  on  the  Persian 
Gulf.^    This  question  has  now  been  definitely  settled.  f  I 

Regarding  England's  negotiations  with  Germany,  Pichon  be- 
lieves the  Germans  to  be  desirous  of  receiving  England's  consent 
to  all  surpluses  of  the  "Public  Debt"  ^  being  used  to  guarantee  the 
Bagdad  enterprise.  Grey  has  promised  to  make  no  decision,  before  ar- 
riving at  an  understanding  with  France.  The  Paris  Cabinet  is  debat- 
ing the  attitude  it  should  take  towards  this  new  situation.  fli 

Connected  herewith  is  the  question  of  the  realisation  of  the  ^^ 
million  francs  which  represent  the  French  share  in  the  two  last  sec- 
tors of  the  Bagdad  Railway.    The  "Deutsche  Bank"  insists  on  this 
realisation,  whilst  the  French  Government  is  still  disinclined  to  ad- 

*  As  the  result  of  annexation  by  the  Balkan  Allies,  following  the  Balkan  War 
of  1912. 

'  This  was  Great  Britain's  great  desideratum ;  control  of  the  southern  rail- 
head of  the  Bagdad  railroad,  the  port  of  Koweit,  and  the  Persian  Gulf — with 
none  of  which  the  Russians  were  pleased. 

'The  international  administration  of  certain  Turkish  debts  and  mortgaged 
revenues. 


SETTLEMENT  OF  THE  BAGDAD  QUESTION        665 

mit  such  an  issue  on  the  French  market.  The  question  will  proba- 
bly be  settled  by  the  establishment  of  an  "Omnium"  ^  for  these 
French  railway  enterprises  in  Turkey.  As  to  the  Bagdad-Basra  line, 
France  will  probably  also  demand  for  herself  two  places  on  the  board. 
In  any  case,  negotiations  with  Turkey,  and  also  with  Germany,  will 
become  necessary  for  France,  and  Germany  will  very  likely  en- 
deavour to  obtain  France's  consent  also  to  the  use  of  the  surplus 
income  of  the  "Public  Debt." 

(764)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  May  17-30,  1913.    No.  264. 

I  refer  to  my  telegram  No.  260. 

/  learn  front  an  interview  with  Pichon,  that  my  communication  to  the 
effect  that  France  claims  two  places  on  the  board  is  erroneous.  Pichon 
declares,  that  the  negotiations  imminent  between  France  and  Germany 
principally  aim  at  securing  for  France  the  construction  and  develop- 
ment of  a  railway-net  in  Syria  and  Anatolia.^  Pichon  intends  to  use  the 
presence  of  the  German  financial  representatives,  who  have  arrived  here 
for  the  Paris  Financial  Conference,  to  begin  an  exchange  of  views  with 
them.  In  any  case,  he  will  keep  us  informed  cls  to  the  course  of  the 
negotiations. 

*  Trust  or  Syndicate. 

'The  railroads  of  Syria,  to  wit:  The  lines  Mersina-Tarsus-Adana,  Rodjo- 
Aleppo,  and  Aleppo-Homs-Ryak-Beyrut-Damascus  were  under  French  control 
at  that  time,  and  no  other  concessions  were  asked  for  by  the  French,  whose 
control  of  the  territory  was  almost  absolute.  The  Bagdad  railroad  issue  was 
thus  settled,  after  Russia  and  Great  Britain  had  exhausted  their  objection-  "on 
principle." 


ENTENTE  PREPARATIONS  FOR  THE  EUROPEAN  WAR 


(765) 


(December  1912— June  1913) 


The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sasonoff. 
23-Dec.  6,  1912.    No.  373. 


Telegram,  Nov. 


I 


Carlin,  the  Swiss  Minister  in  London,  told  me  that  the  Russian 
Minister  in  Bern  had  informed  the  State  Department  at  Bern,  that  the 
speech  of  Bethmann-Hollweg,  and  the  uninterrupted  Austrian  arma-Ui 
ments,  cause  the  political  situation  to  appear  as  very  strained,  and  that  . 
the  Russian  Government  wishes  to  inform  the  Federal  Authorities  of 
this,  with  a  view  to  the  defence  of  Swiss  neutrality.  Carlin  tells  me,9\ 
that  he  has  been  instructed  by  his  Government  to  ask  Grey,  what  atti-  ^ 
tude  England  would  assume  in  case  of  a  conflict.  Grey  replied,  that 
England's  attitude  would  depend  upon  the  circumstances  and  upon  the 
number  of  the  powers  which  took  part  in  the  conflict.  This  means,  that 
Grey  repeated  to  Carlin  the  answer  which  he  had  given  to  me  and 
to  Cambon.  According  to  Carlin,  the  Swiss  Minister  in  Paris  has 
received  the  same  instructions. 


(766)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  2Z-Dec.  6,  1912.    No.  Z72. 


I 


Cambon  told  me,  confidentially,  that,  at  first  in  his  own  name, 
then,  by  order  of  M.  Poincare,  he  had  directed  Grey*s  attention  to 
certain  press  rumours,  according  to  which  a  certain  rapprochement 
had  taken  place  between  England  and  Germany,  with  the  conse- 
quent loosening  of  the  Entente  and  the  Triple-Entente.  Cambon  has 
been  instructed  to  declare,  that  these  rumours  were  very  wide- 
spread in  Paris,  were  making  a  very  bad  impression  there,  and  that 
they  would  result  in  Poincare  having  an  interpellation  addressed 

666 


ENTENTE  PREPARES  FOR  EUROPEAN  WAR      667 

to  him  on  this  matter  in  the  Chamber.  Grey  replied,  that  these 
rumours  had  not  the  slightest  foundation  in  fact,  that  nothing  new  had 
occurred  between  England  and  Germany,  and  that  both  Governments 
had  but  discussed  colonial,  and  other  quite  subordinate,  questions  in  a 
conciliatory  and  amicable  manner.  Cambon  asked,  thereupon,  whether 
he  could  authorize  Poincare  to  repeat  these  words  in  the  Chamber.  Sir 
Edward  gave  his  consent.  Cambon  told  me,  that,  according  to  custom, 
this  part  of  Poincare's  speech  would  be  submitted  to  Grey  for  approval. 
Rumours  of  this  kind  have  been  chiefly  circulated  since  Prince 
Lichnowsky  declared  in  a  public  speech  in  London,  that  the  relations  of 
England  and  Germany  were  excellent  and  had  never  been  better,  and 
since  a  similar  utterance  had  occurred  in  a  speech  of  the  German  Chan- 
cellor. These  assertions  had  remained  without  an  answer,  and  had  im- 
pressed the  public.^ 

(767)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  2&'Dec.  11,  1912.    No.  381. 

I  am  in  receipt  of  the  following  confidential  communication  from 
Cambon. 

The  French  Ambassador  has  been  instructed,  to  submit  to  Grey  the 
text  of  a  speech  on  English  policy,  which  the  French  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs  is  going  to  deliver  in  the  Chamber.  The  contents  of 
the  speech  were  about  as  follows : — 

"Certain  doubts  having  arisen  in  the  public  mind,  concerning  the 
present  orientation  of  British  policy,  Grey  took  the  initiative  to  declare 
to  the  French  Ambassador  in  London  that  no  change  had  occurred  in 
British  policy,  that  no  new  relations  to  other  powers  had  been  entered 
into  and  that  the  close  entente  with  France  continued  to  exist  in  its  full 
scope." 

Grey  at  once  agreed  to  this  text,  and  merely  requested  to  allow  Mr. 
Asquith  to  read  it.  The  latter,  too,  declared  himself  in  full  agree- 
ment with  it,  with  the  exception  of  a  single  alteration :  The  French 
text  read :  "public  mind."  Asquith  preferred  to  have  it  "the  public 
mind  in  France." 

Grey,  furthermore,  declared  to  the  French  Ambassador,  that  the 
British  Government  had  no  designs  upon  Syria.^ 

*  It  was  dangerous  now  to  even  use  the  customary  diplomatic  pleasantries. 
'Another  instance  of  how  little  faith  there  was  within  the  Entente  itself. 


668 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


(768)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Dec.  21,  1912-/an.  3,  1913.    No.  465. 

Personal.  Grey  told  me,  he  would  send  Buchanan  ^  a  telegram  wit) 
reference  to  the  support  of  England,  in  which  the  diplomatic  sup- 
port of  the  London  Cabinet  would  he  assured  to  us.  He  has  now 
sent  to  me  a  copy  of  this  telegram.  I  have  shown  it  to  Cam- 
bon  and  asked  him  his  opinion.  Cambon  believes  that  it  is  not 
necessary  to  generalise;  that  when  special  questions  arise,  which^- 
concern  England,  the  London  Cabinet,  usually,  gives  such  conditionejKk 
assurances ;  that  this  has  been  so  with  him,  Cambon,  during  the  Agadir 
incident  and  even  earlier.  You  will  see  from  my  report,  that  Grey 
expressed  himself  somewhat  differently  to  me.  This  seems  to  con- 
firm the  personal  opinion  of  Cambon.  My  personal  view  remains, 
that  the  military  support  of  England  will  depend  upon  general  circum- 
stances which  cannot  he  determined  beforehand.^ 


(769)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Jan.  27-Feh.  9,  1913.    No.  91. 

The  unexpected  declarations  of  Admiral  Tirpitz,  in  the  Reichstag- 
Commission,  are  understood  here  as  meaning  that  Germany  recognises 
the  supremacy  of  England  at  Sea.  Without  meeting  with  too  great  a 
confidence,  these  declarations  have,  nevertheless,  made  a  great  impres- 
sion upon  the  English  Press.  The  "Times,"  and  the  leading  newspa- 
pers, emphasize  this  event  with  satisfaction,  even  though  not  with- 
out raising  several  points  of  objection. 


I 


(770) 


Sasonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London. 
30-Feb.  12.  1913.    No.  276. 


Telegram,  Jan. 


Personal.  We  are  of  opinion  that  an  alarming  symptom  is  to 
discerned  in  the  last  speech  of  Admiral  Tirpitz,  and  in  the  effort  of  Ger 
man  diplomacy,  to  bring  about  a  rapprochement  with  England.  We 
should  be  glad  to  know,  in  what  degree  machinations  of  that  sort  might 
find  a  favourable  soil  in  London,  and  how  they  would  react  upon  the 
attitude  of  the  English  Government  in  the  present  crisis. 


J 


*  British  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg.  ,   „      .     .  SI 

'British  "freedom  of  action."     Though  attached  to  France  and  Russia  bjim 
political  ententes,  Great  Britain  shunned  definite  terms,  and  by  means  of  this 
policy  elevated  herself  to  the  position  of  arbiter  mundis.     This  document  and 
No.  765  refer  to  the  crisis  following  the  Balkan  war  and  Serbia's  claim  to  a  port 
on  the  Adriatic. 


ENTENTE  PREPARES  FOR  EUROPEAN  WAR      669 

(771)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sasonoff.     Telegram,  Jan. 
ZUFeb.  13,  1913.    No,  105. 

Your  telegram  No.  276  received. 

The  efforts  made  by  German  diplomacy  are  obvious,  but  the  speech 
of  Tirpitz,  which  had  at  first  been  received  with  satisfaction  as  a  recog- 
nition of  the  supremacy  of  England  at  sea,  has,  after  mature  considera- 
tion, made  only  an  ephemeral  impression.  One  is  still  convinced  here, 
that  the  Berlin  Cabinet  is  sincerely  striving  to  preserve  Peace.  This 
has  resulted  in  an  actual  decrease  of  the  tension  which,  as  I  have 
reported,  has  led  to  the  co-operation  of  the  Cabinets  of  London  and 
Berlin.  At  this  moment,  I  consider  this  not  only  not  injurious  to  us, 
but  advantageous,  as  Grey  has  now  the  possibility  of  exerting  in- 
fluence at  Berlin,  and  of  insisting  that  the  Berlin  Cabinet  exert  its 
influence  at  Vienna.^  Grey  believes  that  you  may  do  the  same  with 
advantage,  although  he  is  well  aware  of  the  difficulties.  Such  is  the 
character  of  the  rapprochement  of  which  German  diplomacy  speaks  so 
openly  and  so  loudly.  Its  peaceful  tendency  guarantees  a  certain  suc- 
cess, but  the  solidarity  of  the  Ambassadors  of  the  Triple- Alliance,  dur- 
ing the  deliberations  of  the  London  Ambassadorial  Conference,^  is  in 
reality  not  so  complete,  as  would  appear  from  my  telegraphic  reports 
containing  the  protocols  of  the  meetings. 

(772)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Feb.  15-28,  1913. 

Personal  and  quite  confidential. 

Cambon  informs  me  that  Bethm^nn-Hollweg  informed  his  brother,^ 
privately,  that  the  increase  of  the  German  army  has  no  aggressive  sig- 
nificance, but  was  rendered  necessary  by  the  sudden  creation  of  impor- 
tant military  states  in  the  Balkans,  coupled  with  the  fact  that  Austria, 
considered  as  an  ally,  can  no  longer  be  regarded  so  important  a  factor 
as  heretofore.^ 

*  Austria-Hungary  was  opposing  the  efforts  of  Serbia  to  gain  a  port  on  the 
Adriatic  Sea,  in  which  she  had  the  secret  support  of  the  British  government, 
which  realized  that  a  Serbian  port  on  the  Adriatic  might  easily  become  a  Russian 
naval  base  in  the  Mediterranean,  which  was  also  realized  by  Italy.  Germany 
had  shown  but  little  interest  in  the  question. 

'  Called  together  to  straighten  out  the  tangle  resulting  from  the  war  of  the 
Balkan  League  upon  the  Turks. 

'Jules  Cambon,  French  ambassador  at  Berlin. 

*  Which  was  generally  accepted  throughout  Europe. 


670        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


im) 


The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Berlin  to  Sasonoff. 
March  1-14.  1913. 


Confidential  Report, 


In  my  telegram  No.  37, 


\ formed  you  of  those  extraordinary  _ 
cial  sacrifices,  which  the  German  Government  thought  necessary  to 
impose  upon  the  privileged  classes,  in  order  to  pay  for  the  strengthening 
of  German  military  power;  also,  that  the  projected  single  assessment, 
which  is  to  produce  approximately  a  milliard  marks  will  apparently 
create  no  serious  discontent  here,  H| 

Yesterday,  the  Cabinet  Council  approved  a  new  bill  for  military" 
requirements.  All  the  Prussian  Ministers,  as  well  as  the  Finance 
Ministers  of  all  the  Federal  German  States,  appeared  at  the  Minis- 
terial Council,  with  the  Chancellor  in  the  chair.  The  project  was 
handed  over  to  the  proper  commissions  for  investigation  and  ap- 
proval. The  results  of  this  examination  are  still  kept  a  strict  secret. 

The  "Cologne  Gazette,"  in  an  officially  inspired  telegram  from 
Berlin,  declares  that  these  extraordinary  military  measures  could 
not  be  postponed;  firstly,  because  of  the  bellicose-national  aspirations 
of  the  Slav  countries;  secondly,  because  of  the  elimination  of  the  Turk- 
ish influence  and  military  power  in  the  Balkans  by  those  of  the  Slavs, 
and,  thirdly,  because  of  the  material  numerical  increase  of  the  French 
and  Russian  armies.'^  ^mt 

The  spectre,  or  rather  the  emergency,  of  a  possible  Austro-Russia^J 
conflict  has  produced  a  strong  movement  for  increasing  Russia's  mili- 
tary preparedness.  Even  if  the  Austro-Hungarian  army  still  deserves 
the  same  confidence  as  before,  yet  the  strength  and  power  of  her  pos- 
sible enemies  have  been  materially  augmented.  In  view  of  all  this,  the 
German  Government  has  become  convinced,  that  it  would  be  an  un- 
pardonable omission  on  its  part,  not  to  bring  into  play  all  the  military 
strength  available.  Since  Germany,  in  this  matter,  follows  the  example 
of  France,^  it  is  felt  here  that  the  German  Government's  proposed  mili- 
tary reforms  are  devoid  of  every  aggressive  character.^ 

As  Your  Excellency  is  aware,  in  Germany  only  a  certain  part  of  the 
conscripted  young  men  were  hitherto  drafted  into  actual  military  ser- 
vice, the  remainder — to  the  extent  of  front  fifty  to  sixty  thousand  men—^ 

*  Point  three  was  considered  the  more  urgent  by  Germany,  because  an  acti 
fact. 

'France  had  re-introduced  a  three-year  term  of  military  service,  which  y< 
ago  she  had  discarded  in  favor  of  a  two-year  term. 

*  A  very  complete  statement. 


ENTENTE  PREPARES  FOR  EUROPEAN  WAR      671 

were  turned  over  to  the  so-called  supplementary  reserve,  where  they  were 
not  even  trained.  Henceforth,  the  Government  intends  to  draft  all  con- 
scripted young  men  into  actual  service,  without  exception,  thus  raising 
the  active  strength  of  the  army  annually  by  from  fifty  to  sixty  thousand 
men,  or  by  one-hundred  or  one-hundred-and-twenty-thousand  men,  for 
two  years,  considering  the  two-years  active  service  in  force  here. 

In  one  of  my  friendly  and  confidential  conversations  with  the 
Secretary  of  State,  I  touched  casually  on  the  question  of  the  im- 
mense and  apparently  inexplicable  new  military  m^easures,  the  cost 
of  which  entails  an  expense  of  hundreds  of  millions. 

Jagow  replied,  that  the  annual  increase  of  the  army  by  fifty 
thousand  men  will  cost  so  much  that  the  ordinary,  though  ma- 
terially augmented,  budget  would  not  suffice.  Therefore,  the  Gov- 
ernment, willingly  or  unwillingly,  feels  obliged  to  levy  a  single 
assessment  on  the  richer  classes.  The  Secretary  of  State  added, 
that  such  a  measure  could  not  be  repeated.  According  to  Jagow, 
the  new  annual  credits  for  military  requirements  will  call  for  two- 
hundred  millions,  not  for  two-hundred  and  fifty  millions. 

The  necessity  of  filling  up  the  vacancies  in  the  army,  was  explained 
by  the  Secretary  of  State  by  the  fact  that  the  present  numerical  strength 
of  the  French  Army  is  but  a  trifle  less  than  that  of  the  German  army, 
and  by  the  fact  that  the  unfavourable  geographical  situation  of  Ger- 
many compels  her  to  defend  both  western  and  eastern  frontiers. 

An  additional  reason,  why  the  German  Government  must  feel 
anxiety  about  strengthening  its  military  power,  must,  in  my  opinion, 
also  be  sought  for  in  the  ever-increasing  suspicion  here  of  Austria- 
Hungary,  who  can  hardly  feel  quite  satisfied  with  the  support  given  her 
by  Berlin  in  her  selfish  policy.  This  view  is  shared  by  my  French  col- 
league, who  likewise  inclines  to  the  belief  that  the  relations  between 
Berlin  and  Vienna  are  each  day  growing  cooler,  one  might  even  say, 
more  strained.^ 

France,  surely,  does  not  fall  behind  Germany  in  matters  of  national 
defense.  But  a  further  increase  of  the  French  Army,  apart  from  the  dif- 
ficulties attending  the  introduction  of  a  three  years*  military  service, 
is  rendered  impossible  by  lack  of  men.  It  is  beyond  doubt,  that  Ger- 
many's extraordinary  military  measures  will  also  awaken  a  serious  echo 

*Due  largely  to  the  fact  that  influential  elements  in  Germany  considered  Aus- 
tria-Hungary more  a  liability  than  an  asset  of  the  Triple  Alliance. 


672         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


in  Russia,  all  the  more,  since  we  cannot  he  deterred  by  any  such  argu- 
ment as  the  lack  of  men.  Now  the  question  arises,  what  will  be  the 
position  of  Europe,  armed  from  head  to  foot  in  an  armour  of  steel, 
and  groaning  under  the  insupportable  burden  of  military  taxes.  The 
tension,  it  would  appear,  will  become  such,  that,  at  length,  war  will  &<HI 
come  inevitable.  But  no  matter  how  terrible  may  be  the  consequences 
of  a  general  conflict,  the  advantages,  in  my  opinion,  would  all  be  on  our^ 
side,  especially  if  the  alliance  of  Balkan  States  not  only  survives  tl 
present  crisis  but  grows  stronger,  conscious  of  its  growing  importance 
in  the  matter  of  the  European  balance  of  power,  and  of  the  power 
which  it  m^ay  oppose  to  Austro-Hungarian  aggression.  Should  ^cwl 
succeed  in  bringing  Roumania  into  that  alliance,  then  the  preponderance 
of  our  Entente  over  the  Triple  Alliance  of  the  Central  Powers  would 
become  still  more  apparent. 

One  must  not  forget  the  bitterness,  with  which  many  German 
press  organs  now  point  to  France  as  the  one  guilty  of  provoking 
any  future  armed  conflicts.    The  new  French  armaments  are  attrib- 
uted to  French  hatred  of  Germany  and  to  the  newly  revived  idea  of 
"revanche"  in  France.     Certain  German  newspapers  also  accuse  R^^^m 
sia  of  aggressive  schemes  against  Germany,  but  the  German  GovernmetdUm 
which  holds  itself  wholly  aloof  from  all  such  attacks,  severely  condemns 
them  in  a  strictly  official  article  published  in  yesterday's  "Norddeutscli^ 
Allgemeine  Zeitung''  a  cutting  of  which  is  enclosed.  fli 

Returning  to  the  matter  of  the  single  assessment  of  the  privi- 
leged classes  planned  by  Germany,  for  paying  the  military  re- 
quirements, I  think,  I  cannot  be  wrong,  when  I  point  out  that  this 
kind  of  single  assessment  must  have  very  deleterious  after-effects 
upon  the  whole  economic  and  financial  conditions  of  the  country. 
The  withdrawal  of  a  whole  milliard  of  marks  from  the  national  wealth, 
in  view  of  the  tightness  of  the  money  m>arket,  may  well  lead  to  a  dis- 
turbance of  the  regular  course  of  German  economic  life.^ 

(774)    Sasonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.     Telegram,  March 
2S-April  10.  1913.    No.  906. 

/  beg  you  to  communicate  to  me  the  most  precise  details  it  is  poi 
sible  to  ascertain,  regarding  the  purpose  of  the  journey  of  Prince  Hent 
of  Prussia  to  England. 

'  Germany  had  considerable  reserve  resources  and  no  depression  resulted. 


ENTENTE  PREPARES  FOR  EUROPEAN  WAR      673 

(775)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram,  March 
29-April  11.  1913.    No.  330. 

Your  telegram  906  received. 

One  of  the  reasons,  which,  contrary  to  my  intention,  induced 
me  to  hasten  the  communication  of  your  telegram  894  to  Grey,  was 
the  arrival  of  Prince  Henry .^  This  arrival  was  so  unexpected  that 
the  Foreign  Office  was  advised  of  it  only  yesterday. 

In  reading  the  telegram  in  question  to  Nicolson,  /  remarked  to 
him  that  the  arrival  of  Prince  Henry  seemed  to  make  this  communica- 
tion extremely  timely.  Camhon  made  a  similar  remark  to  Grey. 
Grey,  who  had  as  yet  entered  into  no  relations  with  Prince  Henry, 
or  Lichnowsky,  in  this  matter,  replied  to  Cambon : 

"Should  Prince  Henry  have  come  hither  in  order  to  resume  the  step 
undertaken  last  winter,  he  shall  receive  exactly  the  same  answer."  ^ 

(776)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  April  1-14,  1913.    No.  344. 

Personal.  Nicolson  told  me,  that  Prince  Henry  discussed  no  poli- 
tical questions  with  the  King.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  was  chiefly  the 
Cumberland  wedding,  and  the  journey  of  King  George  to  Berlin,  which 
were  discussed.  The  latter  was  to  he  not  of  an  official,  hut  merely  of 
a  family,  nature.  Prince  Henry  saw  neither  Grey,  nor  any  other  Minis- 
ter. He  left  again  to-day.  Nicolson  tells  me,  that,  this  time,  the  jour- 
ney of  Prince  Henry  concerned  merely  private  affairs,  and  the  placing 
of  orders  for  motorcars.  Saturday  and  Sunday  he  spent  with  Prince 
MUnster.  This  communication  of  Nicolson  confirms  my  personal 
observation, 

(777)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  April  6-19,  1913.    No.  355. 
Nicolson  tells  me  that  the  journey  of  the  King  to  Berlin  was  to  he  a 

family  visit.    His  Majesty  will  not  he  accompanied  hy  any  Minister. 

(778)  Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.    Telegram,  May  3- 

16,  1913.    No.  1263. 

Is  it  true  that  Morley's  journey  to  Berlin  is  a  political  mission,  with 
a  view  to  English-German  negotiations  as  to  their  interests  in  Asia 
Minor? 

'Brother  of  Emperor  William. 

'  The  step  in  question  was  an  attempt  at  reconciliation 


674         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


(779) 


The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  London  to  Sazonoff. 
May  6-19,  1913.    No.  450. 


Telegram, 


Your  telegram  1263  received. 

From  private  information,  and  Nicolson*s  categorical  declaration, 
it  is  clear  that  Morley's  journey  has  no  connection  with  Asia  Minor. 
The  journey  is  of  an  entirely  private  nature,  even  though  our  naval 
agent  asserts  that  the  question  of  naval  armaments  has  been  discussed 
in  Berlin?- 


(780)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram,  June 
14-27,  1913.    No.  S72. 


I 


Grey  asked  me  to  call  on  him.  He  declared  to  me,  that  he  was 
extraordinarily  gratified  with  the  results  of  the  visit  of  Poincare 
and  Pichon  in  London.  The  same  was  said  to  me,  yesterday,  by  Pichon, 
who  declared  that  the  Cabinets  of  London  and  Paris  were  in  every  re- 
spect in  full  agreement.  Grey  related  to  me  that,  apart  from  the 
general  policy,  and  the  entente  between  the  three  Powers,  the  con- 
versations between  him  and  Pichon,  and  later  between  him  and 
Poincare,  in  the  presence  of  Nicolson  and  Cambon,  referred  mainly 
to  current  questions  of  the  day.  As  regards  Albania,  it  was  pointed 
out,  that  it  was  necessary  to  create  a  provisional  organisation,  with- 
out excluding,  for  the  future,  a  definite  settlement,  which,  however, 
was  not  possible  at  the  present  Ambassadorial  Conference.  With 
respect  to  the  southern  boundary  of  Albania,  the  English  and 
French  Ministers  agreed  that  neither  of  the  two  Powers  was  dis- 
posed to  support  by  armed  force  the  transfer  of  Koritza  to  Greece, 
and  that  it  was,  therefore,  necessary  to  revert  to  Grey*s  proposal 
of  an  international  commission;  since  Austria,  however,  has  re- 
jected that  proposal,  the  Vienna  Cabinet  should  be  asked  for  the 
conditions  on  which  it  would  be  inclined  to  accept  this  proposal. 
The  French  view  is,  that  if  Austria  insisted  on  the  cession  of 
Koritza  to  Albania,  the  negotiations  must  proceed  on  that  basis. 
Grey  adopted  that  point  of  view  and  sent  a  corresponding  telegram, 
to  Vienna. 

In  accordance  with  your  wishes.  Grey  and  Pichon  took  counsel 
together  with  regard  to  the  attitude  we  should  take  in  case  of  hos- 
tilities breaking  out  among  the  Balkan  allies.    Neither  of  the  two 
*They  were  discussed. 


ENTENTE  PREPARES  FOR  EUROPEAN  WAR      675 

Powers  sees  any  other  means  of  preventing  a  general  war  than  the 
principle  of  intervention,  if  Austria  agrees  to  that.  Grey  believes 
that  Austria  might  possibly  impose  the  condition,  that  the  decisions 
arrived  at  by  the  Powers,  should,  at  all  events,  be  maintained ;  he 
believes  like  Pichon,  that  such  a  condition  would  be  acceptable 
and  perhaps  even  desirable. 

The  Ministers  also  occupied  themselves  with  Asiatic  Turkey.  They 
agreed  that  a  partition  into  spheres  of  influence  was  not  possible,"^  for 
this  would  first  of  all  lead  to  an  intervention,  on  the  part  of  other  pow- 
ers than  those  of  the  Triple-Entente,  which  must  then  lead  to  a  parti- 
tion of  Turkey,  which  would  bring  about  a  crisis  this  time  without  any 
hope  of  preventing  a  war.  They,  therefore,  agreed  that  it  was  neces- 
sary to  support  Turkey  to  a  certain  degree,  and  by  means,  about 
which  an  agreement  of  all  the  Powers  would  have  to  be  reached. 

Grey  is  extremely  satisfied  with  his  discussions  with  Poincare  and 
Pichon  since  they,  no  less  than  the  reception  accorded  to  the  French 
Ministers  by  the  English  public,  had  greatly  strengthened  the  Entente. 
There  is  no  doubt,  that  the  reception  accorded  to  Poincare  sur- 
passed in  warmth  the  visits  of  Loubet  and  Faillieres.  This  found 
emphatic  expression.  Cambon,  in  a  conversation  with  myself, 
confirmed  everything  Grey  had  told  me,  and  added,  that  your  pro- 
posal, concerning  Argyrokastro,  was  discussed,  but  that  the  con- 
clusion had  been  reached,  that  Greece  could,  on  no  account,  reckon 
upon  Argyrokastro,  and  that  Italy,  backed  up  in  this  respect  by 
Austria  and  Germany,  would  no  more  give  way  than  Austria  with 
regard  to  Koritza.  The  Ministers  spoke,  besides,  about  Morocco 
and  Colonial  questions,  but  I  did  not  further  insist  upon  details. 

*As  had  been  done  with  Persia — ^a  highly  moral  topic  for  Sir  Edward  to 
discuss. 


XI 


THE  ENTENTE  AND  THE  GERMAN  MILITARY  MISSION 

TO  TURKEY 


(November  1913 — ^January  1914) 


(781) 


The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Berlin  to  Sasonoff. 
Nov,  8-21,  1913. 


Confidential  Letter, 


My  telegrams  Nos.  264  and  271  contain  a  brief  report  of  thT 
negotiations  carried  on  here  by  Secretary  of  State  Kokowtzeff  re- 
garding the  mission  of  German  military  instructors  to  Turkey.  I 
venture  to  add  details  which  I  v^as  unable  to  mention  in  my  tele- 
grams. 

Emperor  William  has  described  in  detail,  to  the  Secretary  of 
State,  the  political  situation  in  the  Balkans  arising  from  the  most 
recent  occurrences,  which,  according  to  His  Majesty's  view,  might 
lead  to  still  further  complications,  especially  on  the  part  of  Bul- 
garia— "and  of  Greece,"  the  Secretary  of  State  added.  The  Em- 
peror insisted  on  the  necessity  of  preserving  the  Turkish  Realm  in  its 
present  form,  to  which  both  the  Czar  of  Russia,  as  well  as  the  King 
of  England,  had  agreed  during  their  last  visit  to  Berlin.  Emperor 
William  then  mentioned  the  request  which  the  Turkish  Govern- 
ment had  addressed  to  Germany  and  England,  asking  them  to  send 
the  necessary  officials  and  instructors  to  Turkey  in  order  to  reor- 
ganize the  administration. 

King  George  declined  this  request,  and  merely  consented  to  send 
English  naval  officers  to  Constantinople,  "whilst  I  have  been  com- 
pelled to  give  my  assent  to  the  despatch  of  army  instructors,"  said 
the  Emperor,  "I  was  unable  to  act  otherwise,  even  if  it  were  only 
for  the  reason,  that  our  former  20  years'  activity  has  not  met  with 


676 


I 


THE  GERMAN  MILITARY  MISSION  TO  TURKEY      677 

success,  and  has  resulted  in  many  reproaches  being  levelled  against 
Germany ;  and  no  less  for  the  reason,  that  Turkey  would  have  appealed 
to  another  Power,  which  no  doubt  would  have  granted  the  request  of 
the  Turkish  Government/' 

The  Emperor  added,  that  it  might  possibly  have  been  more 
advantageous  for  Russia  if  French  officers  had  undertaken  this 
task,  but  for  Germany  this  would  have  m^ant  too  distinct  a  moral 
defeat.  Kokowtzeff  replied  to  this,  that  such  a  moral  defeat  of  Ger- 
many would  not  have  corresponded  with  the  interests  of  Russia,  since 
she  is  linked  to  Germany  by  ties  of  traditional  friendship.  The  Em- 
peror expressed  to  him  his  sincere  thanks  for  these  words. 

Thereupon  Secretary  of  State  Kokowtzeff  sought  to  convince 
the  Emperor,  that  the  best  way  out  of  the  present  difficult  situation 
would  be  to  revert  to  the  former  idea  of  ordinary  instructors,  to 
which  the  Emperor  replied  with  animation,  that  this  would  indeed 
be  impossible  for  the  reason  that  this  kind  of  former  experiment 
had  been  entirely  unsuccessful. 

At  the  present  period,  the  instructors  must  have  the  necessary  power 
to  re-educate  the  Turkish  officers,  and  to  drag  them  out  of  the  political 
mire  in  which  they  are  so  engrossed  with  politics  as  to  forget  the  duties 
of  their  service} 

Only  the  power  of  military  command  can  accomplish  this.  You 
are  already  acquainted  with  the  arguments  of  our  Secretary  of 
State  against  the  concentration  of  a  model  troop  detachment  in  Con- 
stantinople, as  well  as  the  perfectly  sincere  explanation  of  the 
Emperor  that  he  had  conceived  the  whole  question  from  a  totally 
different  point  of  view,  and  that  nothing  was  farther  from  his  mind 
than  to  cause  Russia  any  kind  of  difficulties  whatsoever. 

When  Secretary  of  State  Kokowtzeff  mentioned,  that  the  German 
Military  Mission  might  perhaps  take  up  quarters  at  Adrianople,  I  ven- 
tured to  point  out  to  him,  that  this  would  probably  cause  great  excite- 
ment in  Bulgaria,  and  still  further  estrange  this  country  from  us;  for 
this  reason,  Smyrna,  or  any  other  town  in  Asia  Minor,  at  a  certain  dis- 
tance from  the  Armenian  frontier,  would  be  a  suitable  place  for  the 
German  officers. 

*  Was  to  be  attempted  by  placing  the  whole  administration  of  the  Ottoman 
military  establishment  under  a  foreign  Military  Mission — a  German  one  as  things 
developed.  The  Ottoman  navy  and  coast  defenses  were  then  under  the  command 
of  a  British  Naval  Mission,  headed  by  Admiral  Limpus. 


678         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

(782)     Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  London.     Telegram, 
Nov.  12-25,  1913.    No.  3220. 


I 


Since  we  have  received  news  that  Germany  insists  on  the  gener 
military  instructor  obtaining  command  over  an  army  corps  and  a  d 
vision  in  Constantinople,  we  have  called  Germany's  earnest  attention  to 
the  fact,  how  difficult  it  would  he  for  us  to  permit  our  Embassy  to  re- 
main in  a  city  in  which,  so  as  to  speak,  a  German  garrison  was  guar- 
tered.^  At  the  same  time,  we  pointed  out  that  we  should  have  no 
objections  to  German  officers  having  the  power  of  military  com- 
mand in  other  districts  of  Asia  Minor,  not  too  close  to  our  frontier. 
Our  friendly  suggestion  has  so  far  been  answered  evasively  by  the 
Berlin  Cabinet.  Consequently,  we  deem  it  most  desirable  to  ascertain 
whether  the  French  and  British  Governments  consider  such  a  situation 
compatible  with  their  interests.  Mk 

If  it  should  appear  inexpedient  to  raise  further  objections  ii^' 
Berlin,  a  joint  step  could  be  taken  in  Constantinople  to  point  out, 
to  the  Sublime  Porte  that  the  concessions  made  to  Germany  raised  the 
question  of  equivalent  compensations  for  the  other  Powers.' 


(783)     The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  London  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram, 
Nov.  13-26,  1913.    No.  790. 


Your  telegram  No.  3220  received. 

Nicolson,  personally,  is  also  of  the  opinion  that  it  would  not  he  de- 
sirable to  place  the  garrison  of  Constantinople  under  the  command  of  a 
German  general.  The  British  Government's  opinion  will  he  communi- 
cated to  you  to-morrow  after  Grey*s  return. 


I 


n 


(784)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram,  Nov.  13- 
26,  1913.    No.  555. 

Your  telegram  No.  3320  received. 

Have  communicated  its  contents  to  Pichon,  who  is  entirely  of  your 
opinion,  and  who  already  raised  the  necessary  objections  in  Constanti- 
nople.   He  has  informed  Rifaat  Pasha,^  that,  in  case  the  Sublime  Porte 

*  The  Germans  did  not  raise  that  point  when  Russian  and  British  troops  occu- 
pied much  of  Persia  and  threatened  to  garrison  its  capital,  Teheran. 

'Great  Britain  had  the  Naval  Mission,  just  then  under  command  of  Admiral 
Limpus. 

*  Turkish  ambassador  at  Paris. 


•I 


THE  GERMAN  MILITARY  MISSION  TO  TURKEY      679 

should  not  renounce  the  realisation  of  this  plan,  France  would  demand 
special  compensation  of  a  moral  and  political  nature.  In  the  course  of 
the  conversation,  Pichon  emphasised  again,  that  France  could  not  agree 
to  the  Germans  having  the  command  at  Smyrna  or  at  Beirut  and  that 
he  had  mentioned  Adrianople  to  the  Sublime  Porte.  Pichon  says,  that 
his  explanation,  evidently,  made  a  deep  impression  upon  Rifaat, 
who  expressed  his  personal  conviction  that  this  question  could  be 
settled. 

(785)     The  Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  London  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram, 
Nov.  15-28.  1913.    No.  795. 

Your  telegram  3220,  and  that  from  Paris  555,  received. 

Grey  telegraphed  to  O'Beirne  yesterday,  that  he  ts  of  your  opinion, 
that  we  could  not  permit  the  garrison  of  Constantinople  to  be  placed 
under  the  command  of  a  German  general.^  What  Nicolson  and  Cam- 
bon  said,  forced  me  to  come  to  the  conclusion,  that  the  Minister 
concedes  in  principle  the  possibility  of  compensations  for  us,  but 
that  it  might  be  difficult  actually  to  find  such  compensations. 
Pichon' s  first  proposal,  that  officers  of  other  countries  should  also  re- 
ceive such  posts  of  command,  he  deems  impracticable  and  not  in  keeping 
with  our  interests,  for  our  main  object,  the  removal  of  the  Germans 
from  Constantinople,  would  not  thereby  be  attained. 

Besides  this  would  mean  the  first  step  towards  the  partition  of 
Turkey.  Cambon  is  of  the  same  opinion.  Both  doubt  that  pres- 
sure, brought  in  common  to  bear  upon  the  Sublime  Porte,  would 
have  any  result,  for  the  latter  is,  apparently,  tied  by  promises  to  Em- 
peror William  whose  amour  propre  must  be  taken  into  considera- 
tion. Grey  thinks  it  best  to  continue  friendly  negotiations  with  Ger- 
many, in  order  to  move  her  to  change  her  original  plan,  that  is,  to 
appoint  a  German  officer  as  head  of  the  Military  Academy,  to  which 
an  Agency  telegram  from  Berlin  makes  allusion  to-day.  Grey  be- 
lieves, that  Emperor  William,  as  well  as  the  Imperial  Chancellor, 
are  seeking  a  pretext  in  order  to  extricate  themselves  from  this  situa- 
tion, but  that  a  command  outside  of  Constantinople,  as  for  instance 
Adrianople,  would  not  be  a  way  out  of  the  difficulty. 

It  is  feared  here,  that  the  hostile  attitude  of  the  Russian  press, 

*  While  the  British  Naval  Mission  was  in  charge  of  the  coast  fortifications  of 
Turkey,  and  the  Ottoman  fleet,  lying  in,  and  near,  Constantinople. 


680        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

as  for  example,  the  "Novoe  Vremia,"  will  have  the  opposite  effect, 
as  Emperor  William  might  feel  hurt,  and  is  apparently  entertaining 
the  idea  of  defending  himself  against  the  criticism  directed  against 
von  der  Goltz  Pasha.^ 


I 


(786)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  l9'Dec.  2,  1913.    No.  798. 

The  negotiations  between  the  Cabinets  of  London  and  Paris  have 
lead  to  both  Governments  determining  to  instruct  their  representatives 
at  Constantinople  to  address  an  official  enquiry  to  the  Sublime  Porte,^ 
as  to  whether  there  was  an  actual  intention  of  giving  German  officers 
command  over  the  Turkish  troops  in  Constantinople.  Everything  else 
will  depend  upon  the  reply  of  the  Sublime  Porte.  Grey  and  Asquith 
share  Pichon's  opinion,  that  such  a  command  would  put  the  Embassies 
in  an  impossible  situation,  and  that  the  sovereignty  of  the  Sultan,  and 
the  independence  of  Turkey  would  be  involved.^  They  are  of  the 
opinion,  that  Russia  ought  to  confine  herself  to  continue  her  friendly 
negotiations  with  the  German  Government,  more  especially  with 
the  German  Court,  the  amour  propre  and  sensitiveness  of  the  latte^a 
having  to  be  especially  considered.  HI 

In  case  this  should  not  lead  to  any  result,  France  and  England  con- 
cede the  necessity  of  guarantees  for  all  the  Powers,  most  particularly 
for  Russia  with  regard  to  the  Dardanelles,  the  entrance  and  outlet  of 
the  Bosphorus.*  ^1 

It  is  anticipated  here,  that  Germany  will  not  oppose  the  granting' 
of  compensations  to  the  other  Powers,  but  one  deems  it  more  proper 
not  to  broach  this  question  for  the  time  being,  as  it  is  almost  impossible 
to  find  such  compensations, 

(787)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  19-Dec.  2,  1913.    No.  799. 

Continuation  of  my  telegram  No.  798. 

A  misunderstanding  has  arisen  in  the  course  of  the  exchange 
of  telegrams  between  Paris  and  London.  Grey  has  agreed  with 
Pichon,  that  the  enquiry  in  question  is  to  be  addressed  to  the  Sublime 

*  Who  had  been  in  charge  of  Ottoman  military  reforms  hitherto. 
"  The  Ottoman  government — Bab-i-Ali. 
'  Which  independence  had  been  discussed  by  these  gentlemen  in  June,  1913, 

a  manner  made  clear  in  document  No.  780. 

*  Nothing  was  further  from  Grey's  mind,  of  course,  as  is  shown  by  the  t< 
mination  of  this  controversy. 


THE  GERMAN  MILITARY  MISSION  TO  TURKEY      681 

Porte  hy  all  three  Ambassadors  in  Constantinople, — those  of  Russia, 
England  and  France.  Grey  believes  the  notes  must  be  identical,  but 
that  they  must  not  be  handed  in  simultaneously.  Grey  believes  that 
it  would  be  better  if  the  negotiations  in  Berlin  were  for  the  time  being 
conducted  by  us  alone} 

(788)     Sasonoff  to  the  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  London.     Telegram, 
Nov.  24-Dec.  7,  1913.    No.  3309. 

Urgent.     Identical  to  Paris. 

We  consider  it  desirable  that  the  three  Ambassadors  should  at 
once  address  themselves  to  the  Turkish  Government  with  the  fol- 
lowing identical  note,  which  has  been  drawn  up  according  to  the 
English  proposal.  We  have  desisted  from  mentioning  the  Darda- 
nelles, since  it  is  clear  from  the  Irade  ^  that  they  are  not  under  com- 
mand of  the  German  general.^ 

As  to  the  compensations,  we  shall  mention  then>  only  later,  af- 
ter having  agreed  as  to  their  nature.  Please,  ask  the  Minister  to 
send  necessary  instructions  to  the  Ambassador  in  Constantinople. 

Text  of  the  Note : 

"The  fact  that  the  command  over  the  Turkish  Army  Corps  in 
Constantinople  has  been  entrusted  to  a  German  general  would 
create  for  him  a  position  which  hitherto,  neither  a  German,  nor 
any  other,  officer  has  ever  occupied  in  Constantinople.  As  a  result, 
the  whole  diplomatic  Corps  would  be  in  the  power  of  Germany.^  Be- 
sides,  the  German  General  would  be  in  a  position  to  take  military 
measures  which  might  call  the  sovereignty  of  the  Sultan  in  question. 
The  actul  guarantee  of  the  integrity  of  the  Turkish  Realm,  which  con- 
sists in  the  balance  of  Powers,  would  have  vanished.  Indeed,  if  Germany 
should  obtain  such  a  privileged  position  in  Constantinople,  the  other 
Powers  would  be  forced  to  safeguard  their  interests  in  Turkey.^ 

^  While  he  played  his  usual  hide  and  seek. 

^  Proclamation  of  the  Sultan  of  Turkey. 

'  Which  could  not  be,  seeing  that  the  British  Admiral  Limpus  commanded  them. 

*As  it  was  when  Russian  troops  occupied  Persia. 

^  It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  this  note  was  the  result  of  a  British  proposal. 
Rather  blunt — an  ultimatum.  The  note  was  an  ugly  reminder  to  the  Turks  that 
their  government  existed  entirely  by  the  grace  of  the  so-called  "Concert  of 
Europe."  Mention  is  made  of  this  fact  to  draw  attention  to  the  impossible 
situation  of  the  Turkish  government.  Ever  obliged  to  mind  the  interests  of  the 
Powers  in  Turkey  it  had  really  very  little  opportunity  to  occupy  itself  with  its 
internal  affairs,  the  Powers  having  to  be  pleased  with  them  also. 


682 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


(789)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sasonoff. 
26'Dec.  9,  1913.    No.  802. 


Telegram,  Nov. 


Grey  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  note,  proposed  in  your  telegram  3309, 
is  premature  and  that  it  would  entail  certain  disadvantages;  he  believes, 
we  ought  to  revert  to  the  first  draft  without  expressing  any  kind  of 
threats  at  the  close.  The  three  Ambassadors  would  have  to  agree 
upon  a  mutual  declaration,  which  would  express  their  unanimity, 
and,  then,  make  verbal  representations,  one  after  the  other,  in  order 
to  learn  the  contents  of  the  Irade.  On  this  occasion,  they  might 
add  earnest  observations  as  to  the  sovereignty  of  the  Sultan,  the 
regime  of  the  Straits  and  the  whole  situation  in  Constantinople. 
At  first,  however,  they  would  have  to  confine  themselves  to  a  step  which 
would  leave  the  possibility  of  further  negotiations  open. 

Grey  has  promised,  to  communicate  to  me  the  contents  of  such 
a  telegram.  I  have  told  Grey  that  the  Russian  Government  attaches 
the  utmost  importance  to  this  question,  and  that  it  relies  on  Eng- 
land's firm  support;  that,  however,  it  is  its  intention  to  act  with  the 
greatest  caution  in  order  to  avoid  a  cul-de-sac,  thus  rendering  a  retreat 
of  the  German  Government  possible. 


I 


(790)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  26'Dec.  9,  1913.    No.  803. 

Grey  tells  me,  that  Kiihlmann  took  the  initiative  this  morning 
to  explain  to  him,  that  a  German  command  over  the  army  corps  of 
Constantinople  had  been  contemplated  only  because  von  der  Goltz 
Pasha  had  not  had  the  possibility  of  carrying  his  orders  into 
execution,  as  Turkish  indifference  had  brought  all  his  efforts  to 
nought.  According  to  him,  it  is,  above  all,  a  question  of  guarantee- 
ing the  proper  training  of  the  troops,  and  the  Army  Corps  of  Con- 
stantinople has  been  selected,  only  because  all  the  military  academies 
are  situated  in  the  Capital  and  its  environs.  It  was  a  question  of  a  Mis- 
sion which  was  analogous  to  that  of  the  English  Admiral.^  Kiihlmann 
added,  that  he  had  been  instructed  to  clear  up  the  wliole  matter, 
for  the  newspapers  had  misrepresented  the  actual  situation  and  had 
caused  a  very  regrettable  press  campaign.  Grey  replied  that  the 
latter  point  was  not  in  accordance  with  the  facts;  it  was  more  than  al 
press  campaign;  that  the  Powers  were  interested  in  everything  per- 


1 


'  Limpus. 


THE  GERMAN  MILITARY  MISSION  TO  TURKEY      683 

taining  to  Constantinople,  and  that  the  Irade  in  question,  the  details 
of  which  were  not  known  to  him,  infringed  the  sovereign  rights  of  the 
Sultan,  and  might  call  in  question  the  situation  of  the  Straits  and  of 
Constantinople  itself.  As  to  the  British  Admiral,  Grey  declared  this 
to  be  another  question,  since  he  was  a  non-combatant.^  Grey  would 
re-examine  the  contract  between  the  Admiral  and  the  Turkish  Govern- 
ment,^ and  for  that  reason  he  was  unable  to  add  any  more  at  present. 
Grey  told  me,  that  KUhlmann  had  not  been  astonished  at  the  communi- 
cation of  the  intended  step  in  Constantinople,  and  had  merely  added, 
that  he  was  convinced  that  the  German  General  was,  like  the  British 
Admiral,  a  non-combatant. 


(791)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  Id-Dec.  9,  1913.    No.  804. 

Confidential.  Cambon  has  informed  Grey,  that  his  Government  has 
accepted  your  proposal.  Cambon*s  personal  opinion  is,  that  Grey's 
standpoint  is  the  right  one,  since  this  relieves  the  position  of  the 
Turkish  Government,  all  the  more  so,  as  the  German  plan  is  not 
in  the  least  popular  in  Constantinople.  The  Gernitan  plan  had 
originated  in  Berlin  military  circles,  which  consider  a  repetition 
of  the  position  occupied  by  von  der  Goltz  Pasha  to  be  impossible. 
Cambon  fears  the  effect  of  a  threatening  note  at  the  present  moment. 
He  tells  me,  that  the  first  proposal  had  been  made  by  France,  and  had 
then  been  accepted  by  Grey.  The  expression  used  by  the  English 
was  "Communication."  It  seems  to  me,  that  we  should  accept 
Grey's  proposal,  as  it  offers  certain  advantages,  and  Grey  will  not 
decide  to  go  beyond  it  at  present. 


(792)    Paraphrase  of  a  telegram  from  Sir  E.  Grey  to  the  British  Ambassador 
at  Constantinople.    Dec.  9,  1913. 

I  have  seen  the  Russian  Ambassador,  who  informs  me  that 
Sazonoff  is  desirous  of  making  a  communication  to  the  Sublime 
Porte  concerning  the  German  m,ilitary  command.     I  am  of  the 

*  A  very  fine  distinction. 

'  General  von  Sanders  Pasha  also  was  a  contract  officer.  The  entire  question 
was  one  of  an  individual  making  a  contract  with  a  foreign  government;  with 
the  consent  of  his  own  government  since  certain  political  and  military  considera- 
tions were  involved. 


N 


684 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


opinion  that  every  Ambassador  should  make  this  communication 
separately  and  verbally  and  that  this  communication  should  have 
the  following  contents : 

We  have  heard  that  a  German  general  has  been  given  a  very 
effective  and  far-reaching  command  in  Constantinople;  we  hear 
that  this  command  would  create  for  him  a  position  which  hitherto 
has  been  occupied  by  no  foreign  officer  in  Turkey.  We  assume 
that  Turkey  would  do  nothing,  by  which  the  independence  of  the 
Turkish  Government,  or  the  safety  of  the  Straits  and  Constanti- 
nople, would  be  brought  into  question.  Other  Powers,  however,  arc 
very  much  interested  in  this  question,  and  we  should  he  glad  to  have 
the  Sublime  Port  communicate  with  us,  concerning  the  agreement  which 
has  been  concluded  with  the  German  general,  in  order  to  be  able  to 
define  the  function  he  is  to  perform  and  the  position  he  is  to  occupy 


(793)     Sasonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London. 
Dec.  10,  1913.    No.  3334. 


Telegram,  Nov.  27 


J 


Urgent.    Your  telegram  802  received. 

The  British  Charge  d'Affaires  has  informed  us  of  the  new  draft 
which  differs  considerably  from  the  first  English  proposal.  We 
have  made  the  latter  the  basis  of  our  note,  without  mentioning  the 
possibility  of  compensations  and  the  question  of  the  Straits. 
This  change  in  the  attitude  of  England  in  a  question  of  such  importance 
to  us,  affects  us  all  the  more  unpleasantly,  since  it  is  precisely  we, 
who  have  advised  caution}  The  consequence  is  a  very  regrettable 
loss  of  time.  The  proposal  of  an  identical  action,  of  the  three 
Powers  in  Constantinople,  has  also  emanated  from  England. 
In  regard  to  ourselves,  we  cannot  assent  to  the  neiv  English  proposal, 
for,  to  our  mind,  such  an  empty  communication  would  be  rather  harmful 
than  useful. 

Please,  inform  Grey  of  these  considerations,  and  ask  him 
whether  he  is  prepared  to  agree  to  the  following  alterations  in  the 
text  given  in  my  telegram  No.  3309 : 

The  last  sentence  which  begins  with  the  words  "indeed  if  Ger- 
many," would  be  eliminated  and  replaced  by  another  which  is  als 
taken  from  the  first  English  draft: 


*  Having  gone  too 
position. 


far  in  being  illogical,  Grey  had  retreated  from  his  firs 


THE  GERMAN  MILITARY  MISSION  TO  TURKEY      685 

"Turkey  must  concede  the  importance  of  the  above  considera- 
tions in  her  own  interests,  considerations  which,  in  a  greater  or 
lesser  degree,  affect  all  other  Powers  which  possess  interests  in 
the  Turkish  Empire." 

I  request  you  to  state  to  Grey,  that,  in  our  opinion,  such  a  step 
in  Constantinople  cannot  be  considered  as  directed  against  Ger- 
many, since  the  latter  has  been  informed  of  this  and  has  not  raised 
an  objection.  On  the  other  hand,  any  new  delay  would  call  the 
success  of  the  step  in  question,  especially  after  the  text  has  been 
modified. 

(794)  Sasonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople,     Telegram, 
Nov.  27-Dec.  10.  1913.    No.  3335. 

I  refer  to  my  telegram  No.  3334. 

//  the  British  Government  insists  on  preferring  a  verbal  communi- 
cation to  a  written  one,  you  may  accede  to  such  a  step,  and  read  aloud 
the  text  of  the  verbal  declaration  to  Turkey.  It  will  be  desirable  in 
any  case  to  agree  upon  an  identical  text. 

(795)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram,  Nov, 
2S-Dec.  11,  1913.    No.  806. 

Your  telegram  3334  received. 

After  careful  examination  of  the  question,  Grey  told  me  that 
he  would  send  us  his  answer  as  soon  as  possible.  However,  I  do 
not  believe  that  it  will  prove  different.  According  to  his  idea,  a  step 
taken  conjointly  by  three  Powers  would  be  so  important  an  event  and 
would  cause  such  a  sensation,  that,  quite  apart  from  the  text  of  the 
communication,  the  whole  situation  would  be  rendered  most  acute, 
without  the  three  Powers  having  come  to  an  understanding  as  to  what 
their  future  attitude  should  be. 

For  this  reason,  he  insists  that  the  first  step  should  above  all  be  an 
inquiry  intended  to  learn  the  contents  of  the  contract  between  the 
Turkish  Government  and  the  German  general,^  so  that  the  three 
Powers  might,  in  this  way,  take  account  of  the  difference  which 
would  exist  in  the  position  of  this  general  in  the  Turkish  army 
and  the  former  position  of  von  der  Goltz  Pasha.    Grey  believes  that 

*  In  some  plainer  sphere  of  life  this  would  have  been  the  first  step. 


686        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

such  an  enquiry  is  in  itself  a  serious  matter  and  denotes  a  warning. 
According  to  the  answer,  the  three  Cabinets  must  then  resolve  what 
further  action  is  to  he  taken.     Only  a  Turkish  answer  could  furnish  —^ 
the  starting  point  for  further  negotiations.  fli 

This,  moreover  was  entirely  Grey's  first  idea,  as  expressed  in     " 
telegram  Nos.  798  and  799,  and  then  partially  changed  by  the 
French  proposal.    Grey  is  now  reverting  to  this  idea,  and  will  pro- 
ceed no  farther  for  the  present.    Cambon  tells  me  he  is  convinced 
of  this.    France  has  accepted  Grey's  last  proposal. 


J 


(796)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  to  Sazonoff.    Telegram, 
Nov.  27'Dec.  10,  1913.    No.  1039. 

It  is   difficult  to   say  what  compensations   could   satisfy   us7 

for  our  real  purpose  consists  explicitly  in  removing  the  German  general 
from  Constantinople  and  no  compensation  could  make  good  the  damage 
arising  from  a  command  in  the  city.^    In  a  personal  conversation,  the 
German  Ambassador  has  expressed  his  opinion,  that  we  might 
possibly  agree  to  the  German  officer  being  given  comm,and  over 
the  second  Division  outside  of  Constantinople,^  and  not  over  the 
Division    of    the    First    Army    Corps    in    Constantinople    itself.  ^, 
/  believe,  however,  that  this  would  be  of  no  consequence  to  us,  as  the^K^ 
division  in  Constantinople  would  nevertheless  be  under  the  German 
Commander  of  the  Army  Corps.     Wangenheim^    emphasizes  that  it  ^^ 
would  be  unpleasant  for  Germany,  to  remove  the  German  Commander  ^i 
of  an  army  corps  from  the  city,  whilst  a  British  Admiral,  under  whose 
command  the  whole  Turkish  Fleet  is  placed,  is  permitted  to  reside  in 
it.     This,  to  be  sure,  is  a  difficult  circumstance  which  might  perhaps 
be  altered,  if  England  would  agree  to  the  British  Admiral's  being  trans- 
fered  from  Constantinople  to  Ismid,*  where  the  Dock  is  being  built 
at  present,  whereby  this  Admiral  would  remain  at  the  head  of  the 
entire  Turkish  fleet. 

*  There  was  no  question  of  "command  in  the  city,"  so  far  as  the  nationality  of 
the  officer  was  concerned.  Entering  the  service  of  the  Ottoman  government  the 
officer  was  subject  to  Ottoman  military  and  civil  laws  and  exercised  authority 
onlv  to  the  extent  permitted  or  ordered  by  the  Turkish  Ministry  of  War. 

*  In  Thrace ;   headquarters  at  Adrianople. 

*  German  ambassador  at  Constantinople. 
*Very  close  to  Constantinople;   at  the  head  of  the  Gulf  of  Ismid. 


4 


THE  GERMAN  MILITARY  MISSION  TO  TURKEY      687 

(797)     Sasonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.    Telegram,  Nov,  28- 
Dec.  11,  1913.    No.  3346. 

I  refer  to  the  telegram  of  our  Ambassador  in  Constantinople 
No.  1039. 

We  share  our  Ambassador's  opinion  that  England  could  facilitate 
the  solution  of  the  question,  by  explaining,  in  Berlin,  that  she  is  willing 
to  transfer  her  Admiral  from  Constantinople  to  Ismid,  if  Germany, 
on  her  part,  agrees  to  appoint  General  Sanders  to  Adrianople. 

In  this  way,  satisfaction  would  be  done  to  Germany's  amour 
propre.    I  request  you  to  discuss  this  question  with  Grey. 


(798)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Nov.  29'Dec.  12,  1913.    No.  3349. 

Copy  to  Paris.    Very  confidential. 

I  hear,  from  a  very  secret  source,  that  Grey  has  explained  to  the 
French  Ambassador,  that  he  did  not  wish  to  go  too  far  in  Constanti- 
nople, as  he  is  afraid  of  a  change  in  my  attitude,  which  might  lead  to 
a  diplomatic  failure}  I  should  like  to  remark,  that  as  to  the  instructors, 
it  is  not  a  question  of  a  change  in  our  attitude,  but  of  a  regrettable 
change  in  England's  attitude.  For  Grey  will  have  nothing  more 
to  do  with  a  note,  which  had  been  based  on  a  telegram  of  Grey's  to  the 
British  Ambassador. 

Should  we  be  finally  obliged  to  change  our  attitude  in  this  question, 
as  already  in  so  many  others,  this  is  to  be  attributed  only  to  the  lack 
of  confidence  in  the  effectiveness  of  England's  support,  and,  indeed, 
this  confidence  will  only  be  shaken  still  more  by  such  actions  on  the 
part  of  England.^  This  lack  of  homogeneousness  and  solidarity  be- 
tween the  three  Powers  of  the  Entente  arouses  our  serious  apprehen- 
sion, for  it  constitutes  an  organic  fault  of  the  Triple  Entente,  which  will 
always  place  us  at  a  disadvantage  in  face  of  the  firm  block  of  the  Triple 
Alliance. 

Such  a  condition  of  affairs  might  under  certain  circumstances  entail 
grave  consequences,  and  most  seriously  endangers  vital  interests  of 
every  Power  of  the  Triple  Entente. 

*  A  case  of  diplomatic  "trimming  sails,"  of  course. 

'  One  must  sympathize  with  M.  Sazonoff,  but  he  might  have  known  from  the 
very  first  that  the  British  position  was  so  utterly  devoid  of  logic  that  a  "tacking" 
by  the  elusive  Grey  was  inevitable. 


688        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


(799) 


Sasonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople. 
Nov.  29'Dec.  12.  1913.    No.  3353. 


Telegram, 


Since  Grey  has  changed  his  point  of  view,  and  since  we  are  obliged  to 
bring  our  steps  in  harmony  with  the  measure  of  support  which  we  may 
count  upon  on  the  part  of  our  friends  and  allies,  we  must  agree  to  Grey*^\ 
standpoint.    After  you  have  come  to  an  understanding  with  you^' 
French  and  English  colleagues,  I  request  you  to  take  the  step  in 
question. 


(800) 


The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sazonoff. 
29'Dec.  12,  1913.    No.  807. 


Telegram,  Nov. 


Grey  did  not  know  until  now  exact  details  of  the  contract  of  t, 
British  Admiral.^  He  told  me  yesterday,  that  the  contract  had  bee; 
concluded  some  years  ago,  and  that  it  defines  the  position  of  the  various 
British  Admirals,  also  that  of  the  present  one.  He  is,  indeed,  the 
Commander  of  the  whole  fleet,  but  under  the  authority  of  the  Secre- 
tary of  the  Navy;  he  is  also  a  non-combatant.  The  position  of  the 
British  Admiral  really  furnishes  Germany  with  an  argument  which  is 
causing  difficulties  here.  Nicolson  has  spoken  to  me  about  it  several 
times. 


(801) 


The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  to  Sazonoff. 
Nov.  ZQ-Dec.  13,  1913.    No.  1050. 


Telegram, 


I 


At  five  o'clock  this  afternoon,  I  made  the  prescribed  communica- 
tion to  the  Grand  Vizier.  After  some  hesitation,  and  in  the  obvious  en- 
deavour to  represent  the  agreement  with  a  German  general  as  an  internal 
Turkish  affair,^  the  Grand  Vizier  replied  that  he  would  let  me  have  the 
desired  information  on  Monday;  he  could  not  give  an  answer  any 
sooner,  as  he  must  first  have  exact  information  at  his  disposal.  The 
French  and,  then,  the  British  Ambassador  called  upon  the  Grand 
Vizier  after  me. 


(802)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram,  Dec. 
1-14,  1913.    No.  813. 

Personal.    Nicolson  read  me  a  long  telegram,  in  which  O'Beirne 
reports  his  conversation  with  you.    /  believe,  that  this  telegram  ha^SA 

*  Rather  remarkable,  to  be  sure,  since  in  the  assumed  absence  of  the  informa- 
tion, Admiral  Limpus  could  have  been  questioned  by  the  British  ambassador  in 
Constantinople,  considering  that  both  men  belonged  to  the  same  club. 

'At  least  as  internal  as  the  employment  of  Admiral  Limpus. 


THE  GERMAN  MILITARY  MISSION  TO  TURKEY      689 

made  a  very  painful  impression  upon  Grey  and  might  discourage  him  in 
too  great  a  degree.  I  asked  Nicolson,  for  what  reason  Grey  had  changed 
his  original  standpoint.  He  replied,  that  meantime  details  concerning 
the  position  of  the  British  Admiral  in  Constantinople  had  come  to  hand 
from  the  British  Ambassador  in  Constantinople,  which  had  deprived 
Grey  of  every  possibility  of  agreeing  to  the  draft  proposed  by  you.^ 

(803)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Dec.  1-14,  1913.    No.  814. 

Nicolson  has  read  m,e  a  telegram  from  the  British  Ambassador 
at  Constantinople,  on  his  conversation  with   the   Grand   Vizier. 

The  latter  raises  objections  to  our  fear  with  regard  to  the  sovereign 
rights  of  the  Sultan,  the  preservation  of  which  abide  in  his,  the  Grand 
Vizier's  hands.  He  compares  the  position  of  the  German  general,  who  is 
placed  under  the  Turkish  Government,  with  the  position  of  the  British, 
Admiral.  Finally  the  Grand  Vizier  spoke  in  the  same  sense  as  to 
Giers.2 


(804)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram, 
Dec.  1-14,  1913.    No.  1054. 

It  is,  of  course,  absolutely  necessary  for  us  to  be  prepared  at  all 
times  for  an  armed  conflict  with  Turkey,  into  which  we  might  be  drawn 
against  our  will.  However,  I  do  not  deem  it  expedient  at  present  to 
concentrate  our  troops  along  the  frontier,  in  order  to  give  expression 
to  a  threat,  without  being  firmly  resolved  to  adopt  military  measures, 
if  the  threat  alone  be  insufficient.  For,  in  the  contrary  case,  our 
prestige  here  would  be  very  much  shaken.  On  the  other  hand, 
one  cannot  be  sure  of  the  threat  being  sufficient,  for  the  self-con- 
sciousness of  the  Turks  has  greatly  increased  since  the  settlement 
of  the  Adrianople  question  in  their  favour.^  /  see,  however,  no  ob- 
jection to  other  measures  of  a  military  character;  no  declarations  need 
be  made  to  the  Turks,  since  these  might  easily  assume  the  character  of 
such  a  threat.    On  the  other  hand,  I  am  entirely  of  Your  Excellency's 

*  An  almost  unexampled  piece  of  diplomatic  incompetence,  double-dealing  and 
foolhardiness. 

'  Russian  ambassador  at  Constantinople. 

'Bulgaria  had  been  obliged,  owing  to  the  pressure  of  the  Powers,  to  return 
Adrianople  to  the  Turks  after  having  reduced  the  fortress  by  an  expensive  siege 
and  occupied  it.  , 

44 


690        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

opinion,  and  that  of  the  viceroy*s,'^  that  it  is  not  to  our  interest,  to 
give  the  Armenians  the  impression,  that  we  are  helping  them  in  their 
fight  against  the  Turks,  which  would  merely  excite  them.^  For  this 
reason,  it  should  suffice,  if  we  continue  to  transport  arms  across  the 
frontier,  by  means  of  the  legal  institutions,  and  to  have  recourse  to  the 
administrative  method  only,  in  case  the  arms  should  he  brought  across 
in  large  quantities,  and  if  this  could  be  considered  as  a  means  of  pro- 
vocating Turkey.  We  must  hereby  make  it  clear  to  the  leaders  of  the 
Armenian  movement,  that  our  attitude  must  not  be  so  interpreted,  as  if 
we  were  encouraging  them  to  a  revolt,  which  would  be  very  inoppor- 
tune for  us,  and  which  would  merely  serve  the  Turks  as  a  pretext  to 
keep  down  the  Armenians  by  armed  force. 


(805)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Dec.  2-15,  1913.    No.  1055. 


I 


The  Grand  Vizier  has  given  me  the  following  answer  today. 

General  Liman  has  been  appointed  Chief  of  the  Military  Mission,  Mem- 
ber of  the  War  Council,  with  the  right  to  one  voice  only.  Inspector  of 
Schools  and  Commander  of  the  First  Army  Corps.  ^1 

The  First  Army  Corps  has  been  selected,  because  the  Secretary  <^" 
War  intends  to  make  it  a  model  army  corps,  to  which  the  officers  of 
the  other  army  corps  are  to  be  sent.  Under  these  conditions,  it  will  be 
more  convenient  to  concentrate  these  school  sections  in  the  city. 
The  Command  over  the  Army  Corps  will  be  purely  technical.  The 
Straits,  the  Fortifications,  and  the  preservation  of  order  in  the  Capital, 
are  not  within  the  competency  of  the  General.  These,  as  well  as  the 
declaration  of  the  state  of  siege,  are  directly  dependent  upon  the  Sec- 
retary of  War.  In  the  General's  contract,  it  is  not  stated  that  in  case  of  a 
state  of  war  he  will  be  appointed  Commander  of  the  city.  Such  an  ap- 
pointment will  depend  upon  the  Minister  of  War.^ 


(806)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sasonoff.     Telegram,  Dec. 
3-16,  1913.    No.  818. 

Nicolson  spoke  to  me  about  yesterday's  conversation  between 
Grey  and  Lichnowsky,  concerning  which  you  will  learn  deta 


*0f  the  Caucasus. 
*Such  was  Russian  diplomacy. 

'This  detailed  answer  was  given  by  the  Grand  Vizier  in  return  to  detaile 
questions  put  in  the  hope  that  a  "situation,"  if  not  a  "crisis,"  could  be  developed. 


1 


THE  GERMAN  MILITARY  MISSION  TO  TURKEY      691 

from  0*Beirne.  Grey  tried  to  make  clear  to  Lichnowsky  the  import- 
ance of  the  whole  affair.  Since  his  being  in  office,  no  occurrence  had 
made  so  deep  an  impression  in  Russia.  He  reminded  the  Ambassa- 
dor^ of  the  important  part  played  by  Constantinople,  in  the  re- 
lations between  England  and  Russia,  at  a  time  when  these  re- 
lations were  still  bad.  He  emphasized,  how  greatly  England  was 
interested  in  maintaining  the  present  good  relations  with  Russia.^  As 
one  must  proceed  from  the  standpoint,  that  the  contract  had  not  been 
concluded  between  the  Governments  of  Germany  and  Turkey,  but  be- 
tween the  Sublime  Porte  ^  and  the  German  general,  it  devolves  upon 
the  Turkish  Government  to  furnish  the  necessary  explanations,  which 
one  must  know  before  one  can  form  a  judgment  on  the  question. 

(807)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Dec.  3-16,  1913.  No.  819. 

Personal.  The  general  impression  made  by  the  action  of  the  three 
Powers  in  Constantinople  is  so  great  that  the  position  of  the  German 
Government  may  become  difficult.  This  confirms  my  opinion,  that  it 
is  necessary  to  transfer  negotiations  to  Berlin.  After  all,  every- 
thing depends  on  the  German  Government,  and  it  seems  suitable  to  me 
to  let  the  Berlin  Cabinet  have  as  great  a  freedom  of  action  as  possible, 
which  would  be  diminished  if  the  Powers  should  exercise  pressure  on 
the  Turkish  Government.^  The  explanations  which  Grey  gave  Lich- 
nowsky, concerning  the  reason  for  our  action  in  Constantinople, 
seem  to  me  to  facilitate  this  considerably. 

(808)  Sasonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.     Telegram,  Dec. 
4-17,  1913.    No.  3388. 

I  refer  to  the  telegram  from  our  Ambassador  at  Constantinople 
No.  1055. 

/  beg  you,  to  inform  Grey  of  the  Grand  Vizier's  answer,  and  tell  him, 
that  since  we  have  adapted  the  action  in  Constantinople  to  the  wishes  of 
the  British  Government,  we  now  expect  the  latter  to  take  the 
initiative,  as  the  answer  of  the  Turkish  Government  contains  nothing 

*The  Ckrman. 

'At  the  expense  of  the  Germans  and  Turks. 

'  Hard  to  understand,  since  the  "Sublime  Porte"  was  the  Grand  Vizier  and  | 
the  Grand  Vizier,  as  premier,  "the  Turkish  government"  which  is  the  "Sublime  \ 

Porte."  ... 

*  A  peculiar  conception  of  honesty,  to  be  sure. 


692         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

new.  I  beg  you  to  ascertain,  whether  the  British  Government  is  taking 
any  steps  to  come  to  an  understanding  with  Germany  as  to  the  alteratiot 
of  the  Contracts  of  the  British  admiral  and  the  German  general.'^ 

(809)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Dec.  4-17,  1913.    No.  3404. 

Your  telegram  819  received.    Personal. 

I  should  like  to  obtain  a  further  elucidation  of  your  idea,  as  this 
has  probably  been  misrepresented  in  consequence  of  its  being 
conveyed  in  cipher.  With  regard  to  the  proposal  of  transferring 
the  negotiations  to  Berlin,  I  do  not  deem  it  possible  to  continue 
them,  after  all  our  efforts  to  come  to  a  friendly  understanding  have 
remained  unsuccessful.  It  seems  to  me  that  the  British  Governmei 
might  prove  more  successful  in  Berlin. 


(810)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  SazonofF. 
4-17,  1913.    No.  821. 


Telegram,  Dec. 


Your  telegram  No.  3338  received. 

Nicolson  thinks,  that  various  points  of  the  Turkish  answer  are  still 
not  clear,  among  them,  the  difference  between  von  der  Goltz  and  Liman 
and  also  between  the  position  of  General  Liman  and  Admiral  LimpusM 
Nicolson  deems  the  answer,  given  to  the  British  Ambassador,  to  be 
preparatory  in  nature.  Here,  of  course,  it  is  thought  of  modifying^ 
the  position  of  the  British  Admiral  in  order  to  use  this  circumstance  duri 
ing  the  negotiations  in  Berlin.^ 


(811)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Dec.  5-18,  1913.    No.  822. 

Your  telegram  3404  received. 

Grey  and  Nicolson  are  absent  to-day.  I  believe,  like  yourself, 
that  the  British  Government  might  have  more  success  in  Berlin. 
Grey  has  already  entered  into  negotiations  with  Lichnowsky,  and, 
doubtless,  he  intends  to  continue  them,  the  more  so,  as  he  alone 
is  able  to  propose  a  modification  of  the  British  Admiral's  position. 
It  is  only  a  question,  whether  he  can  negotiate  alone,  while  we  stand 
aside.     It  would  be  best  for  you,  to  come  to  an  agreement  with 

*  Sazonoff's  admission  that  the  status  of  the  German  officer  differed  nowise 
from  that  of  the  British  officer. 

'  A  perfectly  absurd  contention, 

*  A  case  of  Machiavelism  d  outrance. 


4 


t" 


THE  GERMAN  MILITARY  MISSION  TO  TURKEY      693 

Buchanan  about  this.  The  latest  action  of  the  three  Powers  in 
Constantinople  has  made  a  deep  impression;  a  repetition  in  Constan- 
tinople would  surely  be  equivalent  to  a  coercion  of  the  German 
Government  which  must  be  avoided  now,  at  the  beginning  of  the 
negotiations. 

(812)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sasonoff.     Telegram,  Dec, 
5-18,  1913.    No.  591. 

Personal.  Hourly,  the  French  Ministers,  the  leaders  of  the  po- 
litical parties,  and  the  representatives  of  the  press  ask  me,  explic- 
itly, what  Russia  intends  to  do  further  in  the  question  of  the 
German  instructors,  in  as  much  as  we  are  considered  to  be  the  most 
interested  in  this  matter. 

The  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  assures  us  of  his  entire  soli- 
darity, and  is  prepared  to  support  us  energetically.  /  have  no  reason 
to  doubt  his  sincerity,  but  the  present  Cabinet  is,  in  accordance  with  its 
nature,  little  disposed  to  an  active  policy,  and  its  activity  must  be  care- 
fully directed  and  inspirited  by  us.  It  is  particularly  feared,  that  we 
adopt  the  standpoint  of  compensations,  as  this  might  easily  lead  to 
the  liquidation  of  Asiatic  Turkey.  On  the  whole,  the  press  is 
favourable  to  us  up  to  the  present;  only  certain  organs,  under  the 
influence  of  financial  groups,  are  opening  a  press  campaign  against  us 
on  account  of  the  incident  with  the  Banque  Perrier  and  our  objections 
to  the  financing  of  Turkey  by  France.  The  newspapers  devoted  to  us, 
such  as  the  ''Matin,"  are  demanding  instructions  from  me,  and  if  we 
are  unable  to  indicate  to  them  a  direction  they  might  follow  a  wrong 
course.  In  consequence  of  this,  it  is  most  particularly  important  to 
me  to  be  informed  of  your  plans  and  intentions,  as  soon  and  as 
explicitly  as  possible. 

(813)  Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  London.     Telegram, 
Dec.  7-20,  1913.    No.  3426. 

Identical  to  Paris.  I  refer  to  the  telegrams  from  our  Ambas- 
sador at  Constantinople  Nos.  1069  and  1072.    Confidential. 

I  request  you,  to  inform  very  confidentially  the  British  Govern- 
ment of  the  contents  of  these  telegrams.  We  think,  that  we  cannot 
be  sure  of  a  favourable  issue  of  this  matter,  before  the  receipt  of 
further  statements  on  the  part  of  the  German  Ambassador  in  Con- 


694        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

stantinople.  At  all  events,  it  is  most  desirable  that  inopportune 
rumours  should  not  get  into  the  press.  Any  kind  of  indiscretion, 
such  as  that  which  has  caused  such  great  dissatisfaction  in  Germany, 
might  spoil  everything. 


(814)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  to  Sasonoff,    Telegram, 
Dec.  7-20,  1913.    No.  1069. 


1 


Wangenheim  told  me,  yesterday,  in  strict  confidence  that  he  had 
enquired  at  Berlin  last  evening,  whether  he  might  make  me  the  following 
proposal.  But  as  he  had  not  received  any  answer  as  yet,  he  would  re- 
quest me  not  to  make  any  use  of  this  communication  for  the  present.  In 
consequence  of  this,  I  earnestly  request  you  to  regard  this  telegram 
as  strictly  personal  and  confidential. 

After  consulting  upon  the  situation  that  has  arisen.  Wangenheim 
and  Liman  have  come  to  the  conclusion,  that  there  is  no  necessity  for 
the  General  to  command  the  Army  Corps,  if  there  are  only  a  sufficient 
number  of  troops  to  give  the  military  schools  an  opportunity  for  practi- 
cal exercises;  a  German  general  would  command  the  army  corps  in 
Adrianople. 

The  technical  details  of  a  compromise  of  this  sort  could  be  arranged 
by  the  Russian  military  agent  in  conjunction  with  his  German  colleague, 
or  with  General  Liman' s  Chief  of  Staff. 

Wangenheim  merely  requests  that  a  certain  time  be  left  him^- 
about  a  month — so  that  public  opinion  in  Germany,  and  in  Turkey, 
does  not  receive  the  impression  that  Germany  was  forced  to  yield 
to  us.  He  asserts,  moreover,  that  he  had  twice  proposed  such  a  com- 
promise to  the  Turks,  but  he  had  met  a  refusal  on  their  part,  and  a 
certain  time  must  elapse,  before  he  would  succeed  in  bringing  them  to 
a  different  frame  of  mind.  I  replied  to  the  German  Ambassador, 
that  one  must  attempt  to  come  to  a  solution  as  quickly  as  possible, 
as,  otherwise,  the  excitement  of  public  opinion  might  increase  still 
further,  and  lead  to  new  complications.  /  do  not  believe  what  the 
Ambassador  says  regarding  the  twofold  refusal  of  the  Turks.  Person- 
ally, I  consider  the  solution  proposed  as  acceptable,  if  the  number  of 
troops  placed  at  the  disposal  of  Liman  will  be  limited  as  much  as  possible. 
Should  Wangenheim  be  empowered  to  make  a  proposal  of  this  sort, 
I  would  deem  it  desirable  that  our  press  should  refrain  from  all  too 
violent  attacks  upon  Germany  during  the  negotiations. 


THE  GERMAN  MILITARY  MISSION  TO  TURKEY      695 

(815)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Dec.  7-20,  1913.    No.  1072. 

Wangenheim  called  on  me  yesterday,  and  informed  me  that  he 
had  received  no  answer  from  his  Government,  but  that  he  consid- 
ered hirr^self  authorized  to  speak  in  the  sense  of  his  declarations  of 
yesterday,  the  more  so  since  the  intentions  of  the  Berlin  Cabinet 
were  well  known  to  him,  the  latter  wishing  to  clear  the  misunder- 
standings which  had  arisen  between  Russia  and  Germany.  He 
read  me  the  two  telegrams  which  he  had  sent  to  Berlin.  In  the 
first  telegram  he  reports  that  after  his  arrival,  Liman  declared  to 
the  Turkish  Minister  of  War  that,  should  his  command  of  the  First 
Army  Corps  provoke  difficulties  for  Turkey,  he  would  be  agreeable  to 
having  a  German  officer  command  the  Army  Corps  of  Adrianople. 
Izzet  Pasha  promised  to  give  an  answer. 

In  the  second  telegram,  Wangenheim  reports  that  Liman,  for 
the  second  time,  addressed  a  similar  question  to  the  Minister  of 
War,  whereby  he  rr^erely  imposed  the  condition,  that  he  must  be 
given  a  sufficient  num.ber  of  troops  of  the  line  in  Constantinople, 
in  order  to  arrange  practical  exercises  for  the  cadets  of  the  military 
schools  and  the  young  officers  of  the  General  Staff.  Izzet  Pasha  de- 
clined this,  and  declared  that  he  would  prefer  that  Liman  should  retain 
the  command  of  the  First  Army  Corps,  as  this  had  been  stipulated  in  the 
contract  signed  by  him.  Wangenheim  requests  his  Government  to 
authorize  him  to  declare  to  me  that  he,  and  Liman,  are  doing  every- 
thing possible  to  induce  the  Turkish  Minister  of  War  to  accept  Li- 
man's  proposal,  but  that  time  will  be  necessary  for  this.  I  assume 
that  the  Turks,  when  they  see  that  an  agreement  has  been  effected 
between  ourselves  and  the  Germans,  will  no  longer  persist  in  their 
refusal.  In  the  meantime,  they  will  most  likely  merely  attempt  to 
exploit  the  misunderstanding  between  us  and  Germany. 

(816)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Dec.  7-20,  1913.    No.  1073. 

I  learn  from  a  private,  but  reliable,  source  that  the  German  Ambas- 
sador has  just  received  news  from  Berlin  to  the  effect  that  Emperor  Wil- 
liam has  approved  of  his  proposal  and  authorized  him  to  discuss  matters 
with  me  in  this  sense,  and  to  come  to  an  agreement.  Wangenheim  will 
very  likely  communicate  the  contents  of  the  telegram  to  me.  I 
urgently  request  you  to  let  me  have  instructions. 


696        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

(817)  Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople.     Telegram, 

Dec.  8-21,  1913.    No.  3436. 

We  consider  it  practicable,  that  our  Military  Agent  ^  should 
get  in  touch  with  the  German  Military  Agent,^  in  order  to  work 
out  a  form  of  agreement.  Should  the  simple  activity  of  the  instruc- 
tors not  suffice,  we  would  be  agreeable  to  having  a  German  officer 
command  an  army  corps  in  Adrianople.  We  do  not  understand, 
why  the  German  general  should  find  it  necessary  to  command  a  cer- 
tain number  of  troops  of  the  line  in  Constantinople.  It  seems  to  us, 
that  the  cadets  of  the  military  schools,  as  well  as  the  officers  of 
the  General  Staff,  could  travel  to  Adrianople  for  camp  exercises.^ 
We,  nevertheless,  leave  it  to  you,  in  conjunction  with  the  Military 
Agents  to  attain  acceptable  conditions  on  the  spot. 

(818)  The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  London  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram, 
Dec.  16-29.  1913.    No.  833. 

Grey  will  not  return  to  London  before  January  5,  so  I  spoke  to- 
day with  Crowe.  Goschen  telegraphed  on  December  27,  that  he  had 
had  a  conversation  with  Jagow,*  at  which  the  latter  expressed  the 
hope  that  it  would  be  possible  to  come  to  a  compromise,  though 
this  would  be  attended  by  considerable  difficulties.  He  added, 
that  he  was  expecting  the  arrival  of  Wangenheim  in  order  to  dis- 
cuss the  matter  more  in  detail  with  him.  Crowe  believes  that  one 
must,  at  all  events,  wait  for  the  results  of  this  conversation,  before 
taking  further  steps  at  Berlin.  As  to  further  steps  at  Constanti- 
nople, Crowe  is  of  opinion  that  Grey  will  consider  it  necessary  first 
to  clear  up  the  following  points : 

1.)  Of  what  will  our  minimum  demands  consist — alteration  o£^| 
the  German-Turkish  Contract  or  compensation?  SI 

2.)  What  coercive  measures  have  we  in  view  should  Turkey  not 
accept  our  demands? 

3.)  To  what  extreme  measures  are  we  prepared  to  resort,  should 
Turkey  stubbornly  refuse,  and  should  she  be  supported  by  Germany? 

Crowe  communicated  this  to  me  quite  personally.  Grey  might 
not  have  expressed  himself  so  clearly,  but  it  is  probable  that  Crowe's 
words  are  in  accordance  with  Grey*s  real  opinion. 

*  and  '  Attaches. 

*  Quite  impracticable—eight  hours'  trip  by  rail. 

*  German  secretary  of  state  for  foreign  affairs. 


THE  GERMAN  MILITARY  MISSION  TO  TURKEY      697 

(819)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris   to   Sazonoff.     Telegram,  Dec. 
17-30,  1913.    No.  607. 

Urgent.  I  communicated  the  contents  of  your  telegram  to  the 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  last  evening,  and  in  order  to  avoid  all 
misunderstanding  gave  him'  the  substance  of  Giers*  telegrams. 
Today,  the  Minister  gave  me  the  following  written  answer: 

"The  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  has  given  his  most  attentive 
consideration  to  the  note  of  the  Russian  Ambassador  under  date  of 
December  29. 

"M.  Doumergue  assures  M.  Iswolsky,  that  the  Government  of  the 
Republic  is  firmly  determined  to  join  in  all  actions  which  the  Russian 
Government  has  undertaken  at  Constantinople  in  connection  with  the 
Mission  of  the  German  General  Sanders.^ 

"It  appears  to  the  French  Government  that  at  the  moment  the 
situation  is  as  follows: 

"From!  the  note  mentioned  in  the  foregoing,  it  appears  that  the 
German  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  is  at  present  in  Berlin, 
in  order  to  point  out  the  necessity  of  yielding  to  the  justifiable  demands 
of  the  Russian  Government,  and  of  Russian  public  opinion.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  appears  from  a  telegram  which  was  received  yester- 
day evening  by  the  French  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  that  M. 
Sazonoff  has  requested  certain  explanations  from  the  German  Gov- 
ernment. 

"Is  the  Russian  Government  not  of  the  opinion  that  it  would  be  more 
expedient  to  wait  until  a  further  estimate  of  the  situation  would  be  pos- 
sible on  the  basis  of  the  explanations  obtained  tn  this  manner f  Does  it 
not  fear  that  an  immediate  intervention  of  the  Entente  Powers 
might,  in  spite  of  its  friendly  character,  harm  the  direct  exchange  of 
opinion  which  is  at  this  moment  taking  place  between  St.  Peters- 
burg and  Berlin?  The  French  Government  is,  nevertheless,  pre- 
pared even  now,  to  consider,  in  conjunction  with  the  Russian 
Government,  the  diplomatic  steps,  upon  which  the  Entente  Powers 
must  ultimately  decide,  in  order  to  carry  their  point  at  Berlin  or 
at  Constantinople. 

'7n  consequence  of  this,  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  begs  the 
Russian  Ambassador,  to  communicate  to  him  the  opinion  of  the  Rus- 
sian Government,  as  to  the  intervention  in  question,  the  claims  to  which 

*  Caring  little,  seemingly,  about  the  facts  in  this  tragic  opera-houffe. 


698        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


the  three  Powers  are  to  refer,  and  finally,  the  decisions  which  Russia 
believes  she  must  propose  to  the  French  and  British  Governments,  in 
case  their  common  action  at  Berlin,  and  at  Constantinople,  should  not 
have  found  the  peaceful  solution  which  they  seek/' 

(820)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Dec.  17-30,  1913.    No.  608. 

Urgent.    Continuation  of  my  telegram  No.  607. 

Doumergue  gave  his  answer,  after  he  had  discussed  the  situa- 
tion with  the  two  brothers  Cambon  ^  who  are  at  present  in  Paris, 
and  after  he  had  received  a  telegram  from  the  French  Charge 
d* Affaires  in  London,  as  to  his  conversation  with  Crowe.  I  was 
able  to  conclude,  from  my  personal  conversations  with  Doumergue, 
that  one  fears  here,  that  an  enquiry  in  Berlin,  on  the  part  of  the 
three  Entente  Powers,  even  though  this  should  be  put  in  a  wholly 
friendly  form,  might  intensify  the  situation  still  more,  and  that,  in 
particular,  the  participation  of  France  in  such  a  step  might  hurt 
the  amour  propre  of  Germany.  With  regard  to  Delcasse's  telegram, 
that  our  Ambassador  at  Berlin  had  been  instructed  to  take  up 
negotiations  with  Jagow  again,  the  opinion  prevails  here,  as  well 
as  in  London,  that  one  must  await  the  result  of  this  exchange  of 
opinion,  and  of  Wangenheim's  report,  after  his  arrival  in  Berlin. 
Doumergue  lays  special  stress  upon  the  necessity  of  St.  Petersburg, 
Paris  and  London  coming  to  an  understanding,  as  to  all  possible  conse- 
quences, and  of  discussing  the  measures  which  one  must  take,  in  case 
the  action  at  Berlin  and  Constantinople  should  lead  to  no  result. 


(821)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Berlin  to  Sasonoff.    Telegram,  Dec.  17- 
30,  1913.    No.  308. 

I  received  a  visit  today  from  Wangenheim,  who  is  here  on  leave 
of  absence ;  in  friendly  intercourse  we  discussed  the  possibility  of  a 
way  out  of  the  present  diffi,cult  situation  in  connection  with  the 
Military  Mission.  The  German  Ambassador,  whom  I  found  peace- 
loving  and  conciliatory,  told  me  that  the  Berlin  Cabinet  sincerely 
desired  to  come  to  an  acceptable  compromise  with  us,  and  was  seek- 
ing a  suitable  means  to  this  end. 

He  himself,  Wangenheim,  is  always  prepared  to  work  in  this 
sense  in  Constantinople.    Russia,  however,  must  facilitate  Germany' 

*  Paul  and  Jules— French  ambassadors  at  London  and  Paris,  respectively. 


THE  GERMAN  MILITARY  MISSION  TO  TURKEY      699 

task  by  not  presenting  an  ultimatum  to  her,  nor  demanding  the  fixing 
of  any  kind  of  time-limit.  In  Wangenhelm's  opinion,  it  is,  furthermore, 
necessary  not  to  bring  the  question  of  Liman*s  command  in  any  relation 
to  the  position  of  the  British  admiral,  since  such  a  treatment  of  the  mat- 
ter, as  well  as  every  form  of  pressure  upon  the  Berlin  Cabinet,  would 
not  only  not  facilitate  a  solution  of  the  question  in  a  sense  favourable 
to  Russia,  but  would,  on  the  contrary,  render  it  most  difficult,  because 
in  this  case,  the  German  Press  would  raise  too  loud  an  outcry,  and  would 
demand  that  Germany  do  not  yield  in  any  way  whatsoever,  and  the 
whole  of  Germany  would  stand  behind  the  press}  The  situation  which 
would  then  arise  Wangenheim  even  compared  with  the  candidacy 
of  the  Hohenzollern  in  the  70*s.  Hereupon,  I  replied,  that  the  Ber- 
lin Cabinet,  must,  nevertheless,  do  something  to  calm  public  opin- 
ion in  our  country,  with  which  he  expressed  himself  as  entirely  in 
agreement.  He  promised  to  propose  a  formula  in  order  to  achieve 
the  result  desired  by  us. 

(822)  The  Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  London  to  Sasonoff.     Telegram, 
Dec.  18-31,  1913.    No.  837. 

Your  telegram  3489  received. 

Grey  has  by  no  means  the  intention  of  breaking  off  negotiations  with 
Berlin,  and  instructed  Goschen  only  yesterday,  to  insist  upon  the  neces- 
sity of  ''coming  to  an  understanding  in  order  to  avoid  serious  complica- 
tions, since  this  question  possessed  a  most  particular  significance  chiefly 
for  Russia.^'  ^ 

(823)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Dec.  18-31, 1913.    No.  838. 

Continuation  of  my  telegram  833.  Grey  confirms  the  contents 
of  my  telegram;,  mentioned  in  the  foregoing,  in  a  letter  directed 
to  Crowe. 

(824)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sasonoff.   Letter,  Dec.  19,  1913- 
Jan.  1,  1914. 

Now,  that  the  new  French  Ministry  has  been  in  power  for  sev- 
eral weeks,  one  may  with  considerable  certainty  conclude  that  the 
Doumergue-Caillaux  Cabinet,  harmful  as  it  n^ay  be  from  the  stand- 

*  A  most  remarkable  concession. 

'  Which  seemed  no  longer  concerned  in  the  status  of  Admiral  Limpus. 


700        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

point  of  French  domestic  policy,  deserves  no  reproach  in  so  far  as 
our  direct  interests  come  into  question.  The  Cabinet  met  us  more  than 
half-way  in  the  railway  question,  which  requires  some  courage,  since 
it  was  precisely  on  this  question,  that  the  opposition  had  attacked  it 
from  the  beginning.  In  the  matter  of  the  Turkish  Treasury  Certi- 
ficates, the  former  Government  was  to  blame,  in  that  it  did  not  pay 
attention  to  the  operations  of  the  Banque  Perrier  in  time:  in  this 
connection,  the  press  brings  charges  against  the  French  Embassy 
in  Constantinople.  One  assures  me,  however,  that  Bompard  had 
reported  upon  this  in  good  time,  but  that  this  report  was  inten- 
tionally mislaid  by  M.  Hou,  before  the  ministerial  crisis, — M.  Hou 
being  known  to  you  since  the  session  of  the  International  Finance 
Commission.  As  to  Caillaux, — he  has  displayed  in  this  matter  an 
energy  which,  to  be  sure,  is  tardy,  but,  nevertheless,  unusual  here. 

Nor  can  I  complain  as  yet  regarding  Doumergue's  attitude  to- 
wards the  most  important  question — that  which  concerns  the  Ger- 
man officers  at  Constantinople ;  he  assures  us,  in  apparently  the  most 
sincere  manner,  of  his  full  support.  For  all  that,  I  foresee  that  in  this 
question,  we  shall  have  to  reckon,  not  only  with  his  inexperience,  and 
lack  of  diplomatic  training,  but  also  with  the  fear  which  the  present 
ministry  has  of  complications.  In  all  my  dealings  with  Doumergue, 
I  have  recourse,  in  order  to  obviate  misunderstandings  and  inac- 
curacies, to  writing;  /  never  receive  an  answer  until  this  has  been 
discussed  in  the  Ministerial  Council,  and,  in  the  majority  of  cases,  first 
communicated  to  London.'^  All  this  impedes  the  negotiations.  Apart 
from  this,  subordinate  offices  of  the  Ministry  in  this  manner  have 
decisive  significance,  and  these  carry  on  their  own  policies,  which  are 
frequently  hostile  to  us.  Finally,  from  personalities  such  as  Doumergue 
and  Caillaux,  one  can  expect  the  preservation  of  diplomatic  secrecy  still 
less  than  from  their  predecessors. 

As  I  telegraphed  you,  Doumergue  expressly  asked  me,  what 
measures  of  coercion  we  intend  to  propose,  should  the  negotiations 
at  Berlin  and  Constantinople  not  lead  to  any  result.  In  connection 
with  this,  I  wish  to  report  to  you  an  interesting  conversation  with 
Paleologue.    Bompard,^  who  is  at  present  in  Paris,  told  him,  as  his 


*  Showing  where  the  policies  of  the  entente  cordiale  were  being  reviewed, 
not  shaped. 

'  French  ambassador  at  Constantinople. 


THE  GERMAN  MILITARY  MISSION  TO  TURKEY      701 

own  personal  opinion,  that,  should  we  not  achieve  our  aim  by  peaceful 
means,  we  should  ask  the  Sultan  for  a  firman  for  the  passage  of  one  of 
the  cruisers  of  our  Black  Sea  Fleet  through  the  Straits,  then,  dispatch 
this  to  the  Bosphorus,  and  declare  that  our  warship  will  not  he  with- 
drawn, until  the  contract  with  General  Liman  and  his  officers  has  been 
altered} 

In  answer  to  my  question,  as  to  whether  I  might  communicate 
this  to  St.  Petersburg,  Paleologue  repHed  that  he  had  nothing 
against  this,  but  that  it  naturally  referred  only  to  a  personal  opinion 
of  Bompard,  and  that  the  initiative  for  such  a  step  should  not  be 
ascribed  to  France,  On  my  remarking,  that  the  Sultan  was  not  likely 
to  grant  a  firman  of  this  kind,  Paleologue  replied  that  the  Russian  war 
vessel  could  also  enter  the  Bosphorus  without  this,  and  that  the  Turkish 
batteries  would  scarcely  dare  to  open  fire. 

I  will  express  no  opinion,  as  to  how  far  we  might  consider  such 
a  point  of  view,  but  it  seems  to  me  significant,  that  in  the  Ministry 
of  Foreign  Affairs  here,  one  should  contemplate  the  possibility  of  such 
an  acute  turn  of  affairs.  I  would  also  add,  that  in  the  event  of  our 
resolving  upon  an  energetic  action  of  this  sort,  public  opinion  in 
France  would  take  our  part,  since  it  is  susceptible  to  everything  which 
touches  national  dignity,  and  feels  most  keenly  the  inadmissibility  of 
German  influence  in  Turkey. 

(825)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Berlin  to  Sazonoff.    Telegram,  Dec.  19, 
1913-/on.  1,  1914.    No.  311. 

I  saw  Wangenheim  a  second  time,  and  had  a  long  conversation 
with  him.  He  is  leaving  to-morrow  for  a  two  weeks'  stay  in  Lon- 
don. It  is  not  likely,  that  I  shall  have  the  possibility  of  discussing 
with  Jagow  my  conversations  with  Wangenheim,  since  the  Minis- 
ter of  Foreign  Affairs  ^  makes  no  decisions  independent  of  the  orders 
of  the  Emperor.  Nor  has  he  seen  the  Emperor,  as  he  declares, 
since  his  return  from  leave  of  absence. 

The  Secretary  of  State  of  Foreign  Affairs  ^  told  me,  as  did  the 
Chancellor,  during  the  New  Year's  reception,  that  he  foresaw  the 

*The  "firman"  was  to  be  sought  on  the  basis  of  having  the  warship  go 
"through  the  Straits"  and  then  it  was  to  stay  in  the  Bosphorus.  Rather  desperate 
and  a  trifle  dishonest. 

'  and  *  The  same  official ;    No.  3  is  the  correct  title. 


702        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


possibility  of  arriving  at  a  satisfactory  solution  with  us.  JagoW 
did  not  touch  upon  any  other  political  question.  I  arranged  to 
meet  him  to-morrow,  before  the  departure  of  the  Courier. 


(826)     Saconoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris. 
19\3-Jan.  2,  1914.    No.  3513. 


Telegram,  Dec.  20, 


We  must  needs  call  the  attention  of  the  French  Government  to 
the  fact,  that  France,  periodically,  gives  financial  support  to  Turkey, 
either  in  the  form  of  advance  payments  of  private  banks,  or  as  loans 
which  are  granted  to  her  through  the  agency  of  the  French  dele- 
gate.   Such  a  procedure  is  at  present  in  no  sense  justified  by  the  plea 
that  Turkey  must  be  saved  from  bankruptcy,  for  the  Sublime  PorteWM 
has  just  bought  an  armoured  cruiser  in  England,  which  might,  in  the^^ 
present  political  situation,  not  only  react  upon  the  question  relating  to       . 
the  islands,  but  also  upon  those  coercive  measures  which  we  must  even- MM 
tually  apply,  if  the  negotiations  at  Berlin  should  remain  without  result. M* 
I  request  you,  to  seise  a  favourable  opportunity,  to  indicate  to  the 
French  Ministers,  without  unnecessarily  exciting  them,  that  the  Sub- 
lime Porte  must  be  granted  no  financial  assistance  at  present,  in  order 
not  further  to  reinforce  the  Turks  in  their  obduracy. 


(827)     Sasonoff  to  the  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  London.     Telegram, 
Dec.  22,  1913-/an.  4,  1914.    No.  3541. 

I  assume  that  Wangenheim's  journey  to  London  is  in  connec-] 
tion  with  the  question  of  the  German  Military  Mission  in  Constan- 
tinople. The  German  Ambassador  is  probably  pursuing  the  object  of 
estranging  England  and  Russia  in  this  question.  Please,  direct  Grey*s 
serious  attention  to  this,  and  make  clear  to  him,  how  harmful  an  in- 
fluence such  efforts  of  German  diplomacy  might  exercise  upon  the 
balance  of  power  in  Europe.^ 


(828)     The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  London  to  Sasonoff.     Telegram, 
Dec.  23,  1913-/a».  5,  1914.    No.  840. 

After  Tyrell  had  put  himself  in  communication  with  Vere,  Arm- 
strong's ^  representative,  he  informs  me,  that  the   Dreadnought 

*  None  whatever,  unless  Sazonoff  had  made  up  his  mind  to  quit  the  entente 
with  Great  Britain — what  this  intimation  amounts  to,  of  course.  It  is  remarkable 
on  how  little  this  "Balance  of  Power"  did  hinge. 

'  The  firm  that  was  building  the  "Rio"  for  the  Chilean  Government. 


THE  GERMAN  MILITARY  MISSION  TO  TURKEY      703 

"Rio"  will  not  be  completed  for  delivery  to  Turkey  before  the  late 
autumn.  He  denies,  in  the  most  decisive  manner,  Turkey's  intention 
of  purchasing  an  armoured  cruiser  from  the  Chilean  Government. 

(829)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Dec.  23,  \9U-Jan.  5,  1914.    No.  841. 

Your  telegram  No.  3541  received. 

Crowe  has  no  knowledge  as  to  Wangenheim's  intention  to  visit 
London.  /,  nevertheless,  expressed  to  him  the  hope,  that  if  he  should 
really  arrive,  the  impression  which  had  been  circulated  by  the  press — 
as  if  a  complete  understanding  did  not  exist  between  Russia,  France 
and  England, — should  not  be  accentuated.  Crowe  will  speak  to  Grey 
in  regard  to  this,  since  Grey  will  pass  through  London  to-morrow. 
In  his  opinion,  a  visit  by  Wangenheim  would  be  an  act  of  tactless- 
ness towards  Lichnowsky,^  and,  he  does  not  believe  that  this  will 
take  place.  At  all  events,  it  would  lead  to  no  result,  neither  with 
reference  to  England's  relations  with  Germany,  nor  with  a  view 
to  a  possible  effect  upon  public  opinion  in  Europe. 

Crowe  has  informed  me  of  the  contents  of  a  telegram  received 
from  Goschen,^  according  to  which  General  Liman  has  the  inten- 
tion of  giving  up  the  command  of  the  First  Army  Corps,  on  the 
pretext  that  this  unit  is  not  in  accordance  with  his  high  personal 
rank.  He  would  then  assume  the  same  position  as  was  formerly 
occupied  by  von  der  Goltz  Pasha. 

Goschen  expresses  the  hope  that  we  will  refrain  from  exerting  any 
pressure  upon  the  sensitive  German  Government,  until  one  is  able  to 
see  to  what  results  the  present  negotiations,  which  are  to  establish  a 
suitable  formula,  will  have  led. 

(830)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Dec.  23, 1913-/an.  5,  1914.    No.  843. 

Continuation  of  my  telegram  No.  841. 

Late  last  evening,  Crowe  telephoned  me  that  it  had  been  ascer- 
tained, that  the  British  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  had  sent  a  pri- 
vate telegram  to  Tyrell,  within  the  last  few  days,  to  inform  him  that 
Wangenheim  was  travelling  to  Ireland  to  buy  horses  for  himself,  and 

*  German  ambassador  at  London. 
"British  ambassador  at  Berlin. 


704 


ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


that  he  had  requested  him  to  give  him  letters  of  introduction  to  persons 
who  have  experience  with  horses.  Crowe  adds  that  the  journey  is  of 
a  purely  private  nature.^  Nicolson  returns  on  Thursday;  I  will 
speak  with  him  concerning  this. 


(831) 


The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Sazonoff. 
\9U'Jan.  5,  1914.    No.  617. 


Telegram,  Dec.  23, 


In  a  long  conversation,  in  connection  with  the  mission  o 
Liman  von  Sanders,  the  President  of  the  Republic  ^  told  me,  that 
Cambon,  after  his  return  to  Berlin,  had  had  a  very  friendly  inter- 
view with  Jagow,  who  told  him,  that  he  frankly  desired  to  do  away 
with  the  incident,  hut  if  the  matter  were  to  he  given  a  "European 
character,"  then  Germany  would  not  he  in  a  position  to  adopt  a  yielding 
xittitude.    Jagow  also  spoke  to  the  British  Ambassador  in  a  similar  sense. 

From  this  Poincare  draws  the  conclusion  that  every  step  made  in 
common  by  Russia,  France  and  England  would  meet  with  strong  resist- 
ance in  Berlin,  and  render  the  situation  considerably  more  acute;  should 
we,  nevertheless,  consider  it  necessary  to  undertake  such  a  step  in  com- 
mon, France  would  naturally  join  us,  but  in  this  case  one  must  foresee 
the  further  progress  of  events  and  come  to  an  understanding  as  to 
further  actions  in  common.^  In  this  connection,  Poincare,  in  the 
most  decisive  terms,  confirmed  Doumergue's  declaration  as  con- 
tained in  my  telegram  No.  607,  namely  that  France  is  firmly  de- 
termined to  act  with  us  in  this  connection.  From  Poincare's  words,  I 
have  been  able  to  conclude,  that  the  expressions,  of  the  reply  mentioned, 
have  been  most  carefully  weighed  by  him,  and  by  his  Ministers  and  that, 
in  spite  of  France's  love  of  peace,  these  words  express,  with  full  and  de- 
liberate intent,  a  quiet  resolution  not  to  withdraw,  under  the  prevailing 
circumstances,  from  those  obligations  imposed  upon  her  by  her  alliance 
with  us.^ 

In  view  of  this  fact,  a  most  particularly  unpleasant  impression  is 
called  forth  here  by  some  of  our  newspapers,  accusing  France  of  pas- 
sivity  in  the  question  of  the  German  military  mission. 


1 


*A  false  alarm,  therefore. 

'  M.  Poincare — the  man  whom  Sazonoff  wanted  in  office  when  the  crisis  camcj 
•  War !— the  ultima  ratio  of  kings  and  such. 
*The  reader  is  requested  to  make  a  review  of  how  this  situation  was  startec 
and  promoted.    Meanwhile,  the  status  of  Admiral  Limpus  remained  the  same. 


THE  GERMAN  MILITARY  MISSION  TO  TURKEY      705 

(832)  The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  London  to  Sazonoff.     Telegram, 
Dec.  2S,  \9U-Jan.  7,  1914.    No.  847. 

Grey  has  received  a  telegram  from  Buchanan,  containing  a  re- 
port of  his  conversation  with  you.  It  was  with  pleasure,  that  the 
Minister  heard  of  your  decision  to  postpone,  for  a  week,  the  project 
of  a  formal  action  of  the  three  Entente  Powers  in  Berlin.  Grey  has 
postponed  his  departure  for  a  day,  in  order  once  more  to  he  able  to  talk 
things  over  earnestly  with  Lichnowsky,  and  to  call  his  attention  to  the 
dangerous  consequences  that  must  ensue,  if  no  understanding  he 
achieved.  In  particular,  he  will  point  out  that  the  hasis  for  such  an 
agreement  must  he  estahlished,  as  soon  as  possible,  in  order  to  calm 
public  opinion.^ 

Since  the  rumour,  that  this  whole  question  had  been  discussed 
by  Emperor  William  in  Berlin  last  May  crops  up  more  and  more 
persistently.  Grey  has  begged  the  King  to  inform  him,  whether  there 
be  any  basis  for  this  rumour,  which  he  personally  doubted,  since  His 
Majesty  had  never  mentioned  such  a  conversation  with  Emperor  Wil- 
liam. Grey  hopes,  that  the  German  General  Staff  will  convince  it- 
self of  the  necessity  of  coming  to  an  agreement  with  Russia.  As 
to  a  financial  pressure  being  exerted  upon  Turkey,  he  doubted 
whether  a  measure  of  that  sort  could  be  put  into  practical  effect 
by  France,  since  this  would  injure  the  great  numbers  of  French  owners 
of  Turkish  securities. 

As  to  Wangenheim's  journey  to  Ireland,  he  had  heard  of  this  only 
through  BucJmnan  and  me,  and  he  does  not  even  believe  that  the  Am- 
bassador will  express  a  desire  to  speak  with  him.  Lichnowsky,  likewise, 
knew  nothing  in  regard  to  this  visit. 

(833)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Dec.  26,  1913-/c».  8,  1914.    No.  849. 

Continuation  of  my  telegram  No.  847. 

In  my  telegram  of  yesterday,  I  made  no  mention  of  Grey's  remark 
that  he  had  formerly  been  prepared  to  direct  a  joint  enquiry  to  the  Sub- 
lime Porte,  for  the  reason  that  he  was  then  convinced  that  Liman  von 
Sanders,  in  his  capacity  as  Commander  of  the  Garrison  of  Constanti- 
nople, also  united  in  his  hands  the  defense  of  the  Bosphorus  and  the 
Dardanelles.    In  his  opinion,  however,  the  entire  situation  had  un- 

*  Inflamed  by  the  chauvinist  and  Jingo  press, 

45 


706        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

dergone  a  change  as  soon  as  it  became  known  that  the  Straits 
not  lie  within  the  competency  of  the  German  officers.^ 

(834)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  Dec.  30,  1913-/o».  12,  1914.    No.  850. 

The  Agency  telegrams  report  that  General  Liman  is  resigning  the 
command  of  the  First  Army  Corps,  and  will  merely  remain  Inspector 
of  the  Army  and  Director  of  the  Military  School.  The  British  Am- 
bassador telegraphs  to  this  effect  from  Constantinople.  I  observe, 
from  Nicolson's  words,  that  one  hopes  here,  that  we  will  content  our- 
selves with  this  concession  which,  at  any  rate,  signifies  a  m^ral  satis- 
faction for  us. 

(835)  Sasonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople.     Telegram, 
Dec.  31,  1913-/an.  13,  1914.    No.  3582. 

/  beg  you  to  inform  me,  whether  we  understand  you  aright,  namely, 
that  the  appointment  of  the  German  General,  as  the  Inspector  of  the 
Army  actually  signifies  that  he  will  become  Chief  Instructor,  and  that, 
for  this  reason,  this  appears  acceptable  to  you,  whereas  his  appointment 
as  Inspector  of  the  First  Military  District  would  practically  place  in 
his  hands  the  command  of  the  Constantinople  troops,  and  therefore 
appears  unacceptable  to  you? 

(836)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Berlin  to  Sasonoff.    Confidential  Letter, 

Jan.  3-16,  1914.  ! 

As  you  may  have  already  seen  from  my  last  telegram,  the  ques- 
tion of  the  German  Military  Mission  is  about  to  be  solved,  and  if 
the  rumour  mentioned  by  the  evening  papers  be  correct :  that  Gen-  ■ 
eral  Sanders  has  been  appointed  a  Turkish  Field  Marshall  and 
Inspector  General  of  the  Turkish  Army,  his  relinquishment  of  the 
command  of  the  First  Army  Corps  is  already  an  accomplished  fact. 
The  point  at  issue  will  now  be,  to  ascertain,  whether  we  are  to  content  ' 
ourselves  with  this  concession. 

I  asked  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  whether  the  di-  \ 
vision  stationed  at  Scutari  ^  was  commanded  by  a  Turkish  General,  j 
and  upon  Jagow's  remarking,  that  he  had  not  occupied  himself  with       j 

*  Being  still  the  sphere  of  almost  absolute  control  of  Admiral  Limpus  and  his        | 

staff  of  British  officers^  which  Grey  must  have  known  all  the  time.  \ 

'A  quarter  of  Constantinople  on  the  Asiatic  shore  of  the  Bosphorus.  \ 


THE  GERMAN  MILITARY  MISSION  TO  TURKEY      707 

this  question,  which  would,  moreover,  signify  a  new  demand  on  the 
part  of  Russia,  I  replied,  that  I  had  already  directed  his  attention, 
previously,  to  the  impossibility  of  leaving  the  command  of  so  important 
a  section  of  an  army  corps  as  a  division,  to  a  German  officer,  and  that  I 
was  surely  not  in  error  in  saying,  that  this  was  also  the  opinion  of  the 
Russian  Government.  The  Secretary  of  State  replied,  with  some  ani- 
mation,  that,  after  the  Berlin  Cabinet  had  so  plainly  shown  that  it  wishes 
to  meet  the  Russian  demands,  and  after  it  had  removed  all  the  dif- 
ficulties that  stood  opposed  to  it,  he,  Jagow,  was  not  in  a  position  to 
m^ke  any  addition  to  the  important  concessions  already  made.  Further- 
more, nothing  was  known  to  him  as  to  the  division  at  Scutari. 

It  is  possible,  that  in  conjunction  with  the  appointment  of  a 
Turkish  Corps  Commandant,  the  division  mentioned  will  also  be 
commanded  by  a  Turkish  officer.  Perhaps,  however,  the  German 
Government  does  not  at  once  wish  to  yield  to  us  in  this  question,  after 
having  already  given  us  satisfaction  in  the  question  of  the  Corps  Com- 
mand. In  any  case,  we  shall  hardly  succeed  in  attaining  more  here  in 
Berlin,  and  should  the  Russian  Government,  nevertheless,  insist  upon 
removing  the  German  Divisional  Commander,  then  I  must  repeat 
my  opinion,  that  we  must,  for  the  time  being,  content  ourselves  with 
the  yielding  attitude  displayed  in  Berlin,  and  might  later  on  attempt 
to  achieve  our  aims  in  Constantinople. 

I  must  needs  declare  that  the  Berlin  Cabinet  has  actually  done  every- 
thing in  its  power  in  order  to  fulfil  our  justifiable  wishes,^  and  this  has 
not  been  easy  for  it,  in  view  of  the  newspaper  campaign  directed  against 
the  Government.  The  appointment  of  General  Sanders,  as  a  General 
of  Cavalry  is,  as  I  was  told  by  the  Secretary  of  State,  a  quite  un- 
usual occurrence,  since  he  had  no  claims  to  an  advance  in  rank  be- 
fore the  expiration  of  a  year.  Jagow  requested  me  to  communicate 
this  to  you  in  strict  confidence,  as  he  does  not  wish  his  statements 
to  get  into  the  press. 

One  must,  however,  not  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  General  Liman's 
relinquishment  of  the  command  of  the  First  Army  Corps  is  only  a 
formal  concession.  The  General  retains  his  decisive  influence  upon  the 
military  questions  of  Turkey.    But  this  was.  clear  from  the  beginning, 

^  Which  were  hardly  justified,  considering  that  the  possible  control  of  the 
Bosphorus  and  Dardanelles,  and  the  Ottoman  fleet,  by  Admiral  Limpus  might 
have  meant  more  to  Russia  the  moment  she  fell  out  with  Great  Britain, 


708         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

for  according  to  my  opinion,  we  have  now  to  deal  with  the  fact, 
that  during  von  der  Goltz  Pasha's  time,  nobody  in  Turkey  desired 
serious  military  reforms, — whereas  now,  after  the  failures  of  the 
last  war,  all  have  recognized  the  necessity  of  re-organizing  the 
Turkish  army,  in  order  to  protect  Turkey  in  the  future  from  fur- 
ther conquests  and  ultimate  collapse. 

If  this,  however,  be  the  real  sentiment  of  Turkey  then,  General 
Liman  will  naturally  succeed,  no  matter  what  position  he  may  oc- 
cupy, in  concentrating  the  entire  military  power  in  his  hands. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  appears  to  me,  that  one  must  reckon  with 
the  unstable  nature  of  the  Turks,  and  their  inborn  hatred  of  Europeans. 
All  Turkish  generals  and  officers  who  are  dissatisfied  with  the  pref- 
erential position  of  the  Germans — and  their  number  has  grown 
considerably  since  the  days  of  Enver  Pasha — will  scarcely  recon- 
cile themselves  to  the  new  order  of  things,  and  it  is  possible,  that, 
in  the  immediate  future,  events  will  occur  in  Turkey,  which  will  not 
only  jeopardize  the  position  of  the  German  Military  Mission,  hut  also 
the  existence  of  the  Turkish  Empire,"*- 

*  Swerbeieff  was  either  a  good  guesser  or  was  well  informed.  For  reasons 
indicated  in  the  documents,  the  efforts  of  General  von  der  Goltz  Pasha  and  his 
aides  had  not  resulted  in  a  betterment  of  either  tactical  organization,  administra- 
tion or  morale  of  the  Ottoman  army,  it  collapsing  completely  during  the  Balkan 
war.  The  objection  of  Sazonoff  and  the  Russian  people,  to  having  the  Turkish 
forces  gain  some  efficiency,  was  based  on  the  fear  that  thereby  the  realization  of 
Russia's  "historic  mission"  at  the  Straits  would  be  frustrated.  Liman  Pasha's 
efforts  proved  of  singular  value,  as  shown  by  the  heroic  conduct  of  the  Ottoman 
troops  in  their  defense  of  GallipoH,  exactly  two  years  later,  to  which  the  editor  of 
these  documents  was  an  eye-witness  for  nine  months  as  war  correspondent. 


11 


XII 

FaRTHER  ENTENTE  PREPARATIONS  FOR  THE 
EUROPEAN  WAR 

(February— July  1914) 

(S37)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Berlin  to  Sazonoff.     Letter.  Jan.  31- 
Feh.  13,  1914. 

In  my  telegram  No.  19,  I  called  the  attention  of  Your  Excel- 
lency to  the  communication  of  the  Russian  Telegraph  Agency  in 
Berlin,  that  Secretary  of  State  von  Jagow  had  declared  in  the  Budget 
Commission  that  Anglo-German  relations  were  steadily  improving.  In 
the  same  telegram,  the  declaration  of  the  German  Naval  Minister,  with 
reference  to  the  mutual  relations  between  the  English  and  the  German 
navies,  was  mentioned. 

As  you  are  aware,  Tirpitz  remarked  that  the  relation  of  the  English 
to  the  German  fleet,  16 :  10,  as  proposed  by  Churchill,  was  entirely  ac- 
ceptable to  Germany.  As  to  the  idea  of  an  ''Exempt  Year,"  this  pro- 
posal could  not  be  accepted.  Jagow  declares,  that  the  Cabinet  of  St. 
James  has  for  the  present  advanced  no  such  propositions.  I  asked  my 
English  colleague,  how  the  constantly  recurring  assurances  of  the  states- 
men here,  to  the  effect,  that  an  improvement  had  occurred  in  Anglo- 
German  relations,  were  to  be  explained,  for  this,  involuntarily,  provoked 
the  thought,  that  constant  negotiations  were  taking  place  between  Lon- 
don and  Berlin,  which  might  finally  lead  to  a  rapprochement  between 
both  countries. 

Goschen's  reply  was  as  usual,  namely,  that  all  assurances  had  ab- 
solutely no  value,  and  that  the  exchange  of  opinions  between  Berlin 
and  London  was  limited  to  mutual  economic  and  railway  interests  in 
Africa.^ 

*  Quite  a  remote  locality  and  one  qiiarter  in  which  Russia  had  no  "historic 
mission"  or  "diplomatic  desires." 

709 


710        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

As  to  ChurchiWs  proposal,  to  establish  a  relation  of  16:  10,  my 
English  colleague  affirmed  my  assumption,  that  the  Canadian  Dread- 
noughts are  excluded  from  this  proportion,  something  to  which  Ger- 
many could  scarcely  agree.  As  to  the  proposal  to  build  no  warships 
for  a  whole  year,  the  explanations  of  the  Secretary  of  State,  as 
Goschen  told  me,  are  not  in  accordance  with  facts,  for  he,  Goschen, 
has  been  instructed  by  London  to  sound  Jagow  who  had,  however, 
given  him  an  evasive  answer.  The  English  Ambassador  is,  however, 
of  the  opinion,  as  he  told  me  in  strict  confidence,  that  this  idea  was 
unreliable,  and  all  the  less  acceptable  to  Germany,  since  all  the  work- 
men of  the  Germain  shipbuilding-yards  would  in  such  a  case  be  thrown 
out  of  employment,  whereas  the  English  workmen  could  easily  be 
taken  over  by  the  private  shipbuilding-yards,  in  order  to  build  the 
numerous  small  ships  which  the  English  Fleet  constantly  requires. 
Apart  from  this,  the  British  Ambassador  added,  it  would  not  suffice 
to  suspend  shipbuilding  in  England  and  Germany — all  other  Great 
Powers  would  also  have  to  do  the  same. 

My  French  colleague,^  whose  opinion  Goschen  had  asked,  regard- 
ing the  "Exempt  Year,"  replied,  that  he  could  in  no  case  approve  of  this 
idea,  since  all  the  savings,  which  Germany  would  make  in  consequence 
of  the  interruption  of  shipbuilding,  would  be  devoted  to  the  strengthen- 
ing of  the  land  arm/y;  and,  in  case  of  future  conflicts,  this  would  be 
directed  chiefly  against  France,^ 

Cambon  is  very  much  worried  by  these  constant  rum^ours  of  an  im- 
provement in  Anglo-German  relations,  since  he  agrees,  that  there  is  a 
possibility  of  rapprochement  between  these  two  countries  in  the  future. 

Although  I  do  not  fully  share  these  fears,  I  cannot  free  myself 
entirely  from  the  thought,  that  Germany  and  England,  once  they  have 
begun  to  regulate  their  economic  interests  in  Africa,  will  in  time,  pro- 
ceed to  more  important  negotiations,  which  might  finally  lead  to  a 
certain  agreement  also  in  political  questions.  From  here,  I  am  able 
to  observe  the  efforts  of  the  German  Government  to  please  the  British, — 
but,  of  course,  I  lack  the  possibility  of  judging  what  impression  these 
efforts  make  upon  leading  circles  in  England.^ 

*  Jules  Cambon. 

'Rather  an  impossible  situation — un  impasse.    Thus  the  much  advertised  dis- 
armament proposals  came  to  nought,  as  reasonable  people  expected. 

*  They  made  very  little  impression. 


FURTHER  ENTENTE  WAR  PREPARATIONS        711 

(838)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Confidential  Report,  Feb.  27-March  12,  1914. 

According  to  wholly  confidential  reports  reaching  me,  the 

growing  military  strength  of  Russia  is  causing  ever  more  serious 
anxiety  at  Berlin.  In  the  opinion  of  German  Government  circles,  the 
new  heavy  siege  artillery  in  Russia  will  be  finished  by  1916,  and  from 
that  moment  Russia  will  step  into  the  lists  as  a  most  formidable  foe, 
with  whom  Germany  will  have  to  cross  arms. 

No  wonder  that  in  view  of  such  considerations,  the  Germans  are 
straining  every  nerve,  to  be  ready  for  war  with  us,  and  no  wonder  that 
they  try  to  intim/idate  us,  so  as  to  avert  the  suspicion  that  Germany  is 
afraid  of  Russia.  Nevertheless,  it  is  my  conviction  that  between  all 
the  lines  printed  about  Russo-German  relations  in  the  German  news- 
papers of  late  one  mjay  always  read  fear  of  Russia.^  In  conclusion, 
let  me  express  the  hope,  that  they  are  not  in  error  about  this  at  Berlin, 
and  that  we  are  actually  taking  all  measures  for  strengthening  our  mili- 
tary power — which  must  compel  Germany  to  hesitate  before  no 
measures  so  as  to  bring  her  preparedness  for  war  to  the  highest  pitch.^ 


(839)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Confidential  Letter,  March  27-April  9,  1914. 

The  unfriendly  attitude  towards  Russia,  which  became  notice- 
able ever  since  the  beginning  of  the  Liman  von  Sanders  episode 
last  winter,  has  much  improved  of  late.  The  Press  has  ceased  its 
daily  attacks  upon  Russia,  although  no  opportunity  is  missed  of  pub- 
lishing this  or  that  fact  unfavourable  to  Russia,  mostly  free  inven- 
tions or  serious  distortions.  This  attitude  of  the  German  Press 
does  not  let  the  excitement  die  down.  This  comparative  quiet,  how- 
ever, so  I  hear  constantly  from  a  reliable  source,  is  only  apparent 
and  public  opinion  in  Germany  is  still  as  aroused  as  ever  against 
Russia,  wherein  the  military  men,  and  the  Prussian  Junkers,  make 
no  secret  of  their  warlike  mood.  This  excitement  and  warlike  feeling 
is  due  manifestly  to  Germany's  fear  of  the  increase  of  our  military  and^ 
economic  power.  They  think,  that  this  is  the  most  favourable  moment 
for  a  conflict  between  Germany  and  her  eastern  neighbour,  since  our 

*  Refers  to  the  cry  of  the  Germans :  Die  russische  Gefahr — ^the  Russian  peril. 

'  Swerbeieff  knowing  that  this  would  bring  on  the  catastrophe,  in  either  a  mili- 
tary or  an  economic  way — the  expression  is  axiomatic  of  the  policy  of  the 
Entente. 


712        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


1 


military  preparations  are  by  no  means  complete.^    That  such  a  conflict 
must  come  sooner  or  later  is,  apparently,  not  doubted  here. 

In  South  Germany,  this  hostility  towards  Russia  is  even  more 
manifest,  probably  due  to  the  influence  of  Austria.  Our  compa- 
triots, who  come  through  here,  have  frequently  reported  this  feel- 
ing to  me.  Of  course,  I  cannot  test  this  personally ;  perhaps  their 
tales  are  much  exaggerated,  but  they  must  contain  some  kernel 
of  truth;  all  the  more  so,  since  even  the  German  Government,  as 
I  reported  in  my  letter  of  Feb.  27-March  12,  is  much  disturbed 
by  the  measures  taken  in  Russia  towards  the  increase  of  our  army, 
and  of  our  military  preparedness.  At  least  such  is  my  conviction. 
There  is  no  doubt,  furthermore,  that  the  renewal  of  our  commer-  , 
cial  treaty  in  1917,  which  may  prove  less  favourable  to  Germany,  is  fll 
preying  upon  the  mind  of  the  Berlin  Cabinet,  which,  probably, 
would  prefer  to  have  the  existing  treaty  remain  in  force  as  long  as 
possible. 

Nevertheless,  I  am  of  the  opinion,  in  which  I  am  confirmed  by 
the  secret  informations  mentioned  above,  that  the  Berlin  Cabinet 
does  not  share  the  views  of  the  bellicose  elements  of  Germany,  which 
profess  to  desire  an  immediate  armed  conflict  with  Russia.  The  Ger- 
men  Government  prefers  to  try  all  peaceful  means  towards  reconcilia- 
tion before  taking  any  decisive  step.  Among  these  means,  one  of  the 
most  important,  is  the  commercial  treaty;  so  they  are  preparing 
here  for  the  incidental  negotiations  with  special  energy  along  the 
lines  of  a  carefully  drafted  plan. 

(840)    Sasonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.     Telegram.    Jan, 
30'Feb.  12,  1914-    No.  252. 

Copy  to  Paris. 

Of  late,  we  have  frequently  been  able  to  convince  ourselves,  that  we 
lack  an  organ  which  would  unite  the  views,  and  the  common  action  of 
the  Powers,  an  organ  such  as  the  Ambassadorial  Conference  in  Lon- 
don  last  year.  The  correspondence  resulting  from  this  lack,  leads 
to  delays,  which  have  an  injurious  effect  on  the  progress  of  affairs. 
As  the  London  Cabinet  does  not  desire  again  to  convene  last  year's 
Conference,  we  shall  not  further  insist  upon  it,  but  Grey,  perhaps, 
will  not  object  to  the  proposal  that,  at  least,  the  three  Powers  of  the 
*  Depending  entirely  on  the  ability  of  the  French  banks  to  make  loans  to  Russia. 


FURTHER  ENTENTE  WAR  PREPARATIONS    713 

Entente  should  through  their  representatives  in  London  establish 
the  community  of  their  views.  For,  while  the  Powers  of  the  opposite 
group  are  acting,  we  are  merely  deliberating,^  and  our  coherence,  weak 
enough  in  itself,  thereby  loses  still  more  of  its  force.  I  beg  you,  to  speak 
to  Grey  in  this  sense,  as  soon  as  your  French  colleague  receives  instruc- 
tions as  to  this  matter. 

(841)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sazonoff.    Telegram,  Feb.  5- 
18,  1914.    No.  39. 

Your  telegram  No.  252  received. 

Cambon  received  the  necessary  instructions  yesterday,  and  I  in- 
formed Grey  today  of  your  proposal.  I  told  him,  that,  considering  the 
want  of  an  adequate  organ,  such  as  last  year's  Ambassadorial  Confer- 
ence, you  thought  it  necessary  to  arrange  for  an  exchange  of  views,  on 
the  pending  questions,  in  order  to  arrive  in  this  way  at  a  preliminary 
agreement  between  the  three  Entente-Powers.  In  this  way  the  delays 
caused  by  telegraphic  correspondence  would  be  avoided,  and  the 
influence  and  weight  of  the  decisions  of  the  three  Powers  would 
be  enhanced. 

I  instanced  the  case  of  Albania,  whither  the  Prince  of  Wied 
was  to  proceed,  before  various  important  questions  had  been  solved. 
Grey  replied,  that  in  the  case  mentioned  by  me,  the  Triple- Alliance  had 
the  advantage  of  being  able  to  act,  while  the  Triple-Entente  could  only 
defend  itself  against  encroachments.  However,  Grey  raised  no  objection 
to  your  proposal,  and  told  me,  that  he  was  pleased  to  accept  it,  and  sug- 
gested that  I  should  meet  him  to-morrow,  Thursday.  He  has  already  in- 
formed Cambon  of  this,  who  has  made  a  similar  statement  to  him  this 
morning. 

(842)  Sazonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris.    Confidential  Letter, 
March  20-April  2,  1914.    No.  23. 

In  your  letter  of  March  5-18,  you  mentioned  the  question  of  a  closer 
union  between  Russia  and  England,  and  expressed  the  wish  to  ascertain 
my  views  upon  this  subject,^  the  more  so  since  there  was  a  possibility 
that  this  question  would  be  touched  upon  by  the  leaders  of  French  and 
English  foreign  policy  during  the  impending  visit  of  King  George  to 

*  At  least  a  slight  exaggeration. 

'Iswolsky's  inquiry  was  probably  the  result  of  French  reaction  to  Sazonoflf's 
regret  that  there  was  "lack"  of  an  organ  facilitating  intercourse  of  the  Entente. 


714         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

Paris.  I  therefore  consider  it  my  duty,  to  inform  you,  that  a  further 
reinforcement  and  development  of  the  so-called  Triple-Entente,  and 
if  possible,  its  transformation  into  a  new  Triple- Alliance,  appears  to 
me  to  he  a  demand  of  the  present  hour.  Whilst  thoroughly  ensuring  the 
international  position  of  France,  Russia  and  England,  an  alliance  of  this 
nature  would,  because  of  its  lack  of  any  thought  of  conquest,  on  the  part 
of  the  powers  mentioned,  threaten  no  one,  hut  signify  the  best  guarantee 
for  the  preservation  of  the  peace  of  Europe? 

Certain  steps  have  already  been  undertaken  by  France  and  England 
with  regard  to  working  out  a  plan  for  the  most  uniform  action  possible^ 
and  for  a  more  precise  definition  of  mutual  obligations.  Obviously,  we 
too  must  work  in  the  same  direction,  whereby  a  nunt,ber  of  inciden- 
tal questions  might  be  joined  to  a  whole  series  of  subjects  which 
are  ripe  for  discussion, — subjects  which  impinge  heavily  upon  Rus- 
sian and  English  interests  in  numerous  fields. 

As  you  are  aware,  the  inner  situation  of  England  is  at  present  such, 
that  it  wholly  absorbs  the  attention  of  the  Royal  Government  and  of 
the  public.^  Under  these  circumstances,  the  soil  for  international  agree- 
ments, concerning  which  the  English,  in  accordance  with  their  nature, 
are  so  sensitive,  is  most  unfavourable,  and  we  must,  therefore,  nolens 
volens,  pursue  this  object  with  the  greatest  caution. 

In  spite  of  this,  I  share  your  opinion  that  it  would  not  prove  inex- 
pedient if  Foincare  and  Doumergue,^  on  the  occasion  of  the  meeting  with 
King  George  and  his  Minister,*  would  in  confidence  indicate  to  them, 
that  a  closer  agreement  between  Russia  and  England  would  also  be 
hailed  in  France  as  an  auspicious  event,  which  would  prove  equally 
desirable  to  all  three  partners  in  the  Triple-Entente.  The  establishing 
of  the  conditions,  upon  which  a  political  convention  of  this  sort 
might  be  concluded,  would,  naturally,  have  to  be  the  subject  of 
direct  negotiations  between  St.  Petersburg  and  London;  hut  it  is 
possible,  that  the  French  Government  would  consider  it  useful,  to  pro- 
pose to  Grey  to  communicate  to  us  in  common  the  contents  of  the 
political  convention,  which  you  speak  of  as  having  been  concluded  be- 

*  Would  have  done  that  by  stabilizing  international  relations.  At  the  same 
time  Sazonoff's  solicitude  for  the  peace  of  Europe  could  not  be  taken  seriously — 
it  had  its  arrihe  pensee. 

'  Disturbances  m  Ireland  and  Labor  questions. 

*  French  minister  of  foreign  affairs. 

*  Sir  Edward  Grey. 


FURTHER  ENTENTE  WAR  PREPARATIONS   715 

tween  England  and  France}    This  might  then  serve  as  a  basis  for. 
working  out  a  similar  convention  between  Russia  and  England. 

(843)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  lo  Sazonoff.     Letter.  March  27- 
April  9;  1914. 

After  the  receipt  of  your  letter  of  March  20-April  2,  No.  23,  I 
made  use  of  the  first  opportunity,  once  more  to  engage  Doumergue 
in  conversation  in  regard  to  the  question  of  a  closer  understanding 
between  Russia  and  England,  Doumergue  confirmed  to  me  tn  the 
most  decisive  manner  his  intention  of  speaking  to  Grey,  during  the  im- 
pending meeting,  to  the  effect,  that  an  agreement  of  this  nature  was 
highly  desirable.  He  believes,  that  it  will  prove  very  easy,  to  bring  forth 
convincing  arguments  m  favour  of  this  thought,  because  it  is  most 
obvious  that,  inasmuch  as  France  has  special  military  and  naval  under- 
standings with  Russia  and  England,  this  system  must  be  co-ordinated 
and  complemented  by  corresponding  understandings  betiveen  Russia  and 
England.  Doumergue  believes,  that  the  Russo-English  agreement  would 
have  to  be  in  the  form  of  a  naval  convention,  and  that  this  would 
render  necessary  technical  consultations  between  the  three  Staffs  of 
Admiralty.^ 

With  regard  to  the  political  compact  between  England  and  France, 
which  is  to  be  communicated  to  us  after  consultation  with  Grey,  Dou- 
mergue assured  me  that  France  and  England  were  not  bound  by  positive 
political  obligations,  but  that,  should  the  course  of  events  lead  to  com- 
mon action  on  the  part  of  both  Powers,  they  would  adhere  to  the 
technical  arrangements  worked  out  by  the  General  Staffs.^  Doumergue 
added,  that  he  did  not  remember,  whether  the  foregoing  was  expressed 
in  a  definite  formula,  but  he  promised  to  look  up  the  documents  in  the 
archives  of  the  Ministry,  and  to  bear  in  mind  the  wishes  which  we 
have  expressed. 

Up  to  the  present,  I  have  not  had  the  possibility  of  renewing 
my  conversation  with  Poincare  upon  this  subject ;  he  is  still  at  Eze. 

'The  British  government  has  consistently  denied  that  there  was  a  political 
convention,  or  treaty. 

'Russian,  French  and  British. 

*  Quite  the  worst  form  of  "alliance*'  there  is.  because  it  conveys  no  warning 
to  the  adversary  and  leaves  the  casus  foederis  determinable  by  circumstances  the 
political  opponent  can  not  define  to  himself,  as  he  can  easily  do  in  case  of  "de- 
fensive" alliances. 


716        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

But  I  shall  make  an  effort  to  see  him  at  once,  after  his  return, 
and  to  discuss  with  him  the  contents  of  your  letter. 

(844)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sazonoff.    Letter,  April  29- 
May  12,  1914. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  requested  me  to  call  upon  him,  and,  upon  re- 
ceiving m/5,  told  me,  that,  since  his  return  from  Paris,  he  had  had 
no  other  opportunity  of  seeing  me,  save  in  the  presence  of  the 
French  Ambassador,  which  had  not  permitted  him  to  describe  to 
nxe,  in  a  veritable  manner,  how  profound  had  been  the  impression 
which  he  had  received  on  his  visit.  He  told  me,  that  he  did  not 
think  he  was  merely  giving  his  own  personal  impressions,  but  also 
those  of  the  King,  and  of  all  those  who  had  taken  part  in  the  visit. 

Grey  told  me,  that  these  impressions  had  exceeded  his  expectations 
by  far,  and  that  he  could  not  sufficiently  congratulate  himself  upon  the 
reception  by  the  President  of  the  Republic  and  by  Doumergue,  with 
whom  a  perfect  understanding  had  been  achieved  regarding  all 
current  questions  and  the  general  political  situation:  ^  that,  in  ad- 
dition to  this,  the  reception  accorded  Their  Majesties  on  all  occa- 
sions, and  wherever  they  appeared,  bore  the  stamp  of  sincere 
sympathy.  From  this,  the  British  Government  had  drawn  the  con- 
clusion, that  the  fundam,ental  idea  of  the  Entente  had  taken  root 
as  deeply  in  France  as  in  England,  and  that  in  consequence  of 
this,  it  rested  upon  a  particularly  firm  and  enduring  basis. 

On  this  occasion,  Grey  spoke  with  a  warmth,  which  is  not  usual  with 
him,  and  which  proved  that  he  made  his  deductions  from  firmly- 
grounded  judgment.  The  intention  by  which  he  was  governed  in  asking 
me  to  come  and  see  him,  in  order  to  make  such  a  communication  to  me, 
is  entirely  clear.  He  wished  to  announce  to  me  the  beginning  of  a  phase 
of  a  still  closer  rapprochement  to  France.  This  intention  became  still 
m^ore  obvious  to  me  upon  his  remarking  to  me,  without  any  prelimi-* 
naries,  that  I  was  doubtlessly  informed  about  the  conversation  which 
he  had  had  with  Doumergue  on  the  subject  of  Russia.  He  told  me  that 
it  had  been  impossible  for  him  in  Paris,  being  at  a  distance  from  his 
colleagues,  to  do  more  than  express  his  personal  assent  to  the  plan,  ac- 
cording  to  which  the  Governments  of  England  and  France  were  to 

*It  so  happened  that  just  then  there  was  no  "crisis"  of  any  sort  in  Europe; 
shortly  afterwards,  Poincare  went  to  Russia. 


i 


FURTHER  ENTENTE  WAR  PREPARATIONS   717 

inform  the  Russian  Government  of  all  military  conventions  existing  be- 
tween England  and  France} 

He  zvas  able  to  inform  me  to-day  that  he  had  spoken  of  this  to  the 
Prime  Minister,  immediately  upon  his  return  to  London;  the  latter  shared 
his  opinion,  and  had  no  objections  to  make  against  the  plan  proposed; 
the  whole  affair  was,  however,  essentially  of  such  importance  that  it 
could  not  be  decided  upon  without  the  assent  of  the  Cabinet-Council. 

Grey  told  me,  that  to  his  great  regret,  it  had  not  been  possible 
for  him  to  convene  the  Cabinet  for  this  purpose  during  this  first 
week;  the  Ulster  Question  and  the  Budget  demanded  the  entire 
attention  of  the  Ministers. 

/  said  only  a  few  words  in  reply.  I  thanked  Sir  Edward  Grey  for 
his  communication,  and  told  him  that  I  knew  how  to  appreciate  its 
significance  to  its  full  extent.^  I  summed  up  the  situation  to  the  effect 
that,  if  the  two  governments  should  communicate  to  us  their  military 
conventions,^  the  Russian  Government  would  reserve  the  privilege  of 
making  a  corresponding  proposal  upon  an  analogous  basis  to  the  British 
Government.  I  told  him  that  I  assumed  he  knew  the  views  Your  Excel- 
lency entertained,  regarding  the  necessity  of  a  still  closer  union  between 
the  Triple  Entente,  according  to  which  even  an  alliance  after  the  pattern 
of  the  three  other  Powers  was  not  excluded. 

Sir  Edward  replied  that  he  did  not  consider  an  alliance  as  pos- 
sible. I  returned,  that  I  personally  also  conceded  the  difficulties 
of  such  an  alliance.    He  added : 

"As  you  see,  we  have  no  alliance  to-day  even  with  France.* 

*  The  Russian  government  had  desired  that  on  former  occasions — without  suc- 
cess, however. 

^  Benckendorff  realized  that  a  naval  or  military  convention  with  Great  Britain, 
or  both  of  these,  would  have  far-reaching  effects  upon  the  international  situa- 
tion. Besides,  the  making  of  such  agreements  would  have  been  a  most  satis- 
factory culmination  of  his  own  efforts.  We  find,  then,  that  this  sane  man  loses 
his  balance  a  little  in  gladsome  anticipation  of  the  promised  state  of  affairs 
whenever  he  writes  of  it. 

'  Going  a  step  further,  Benckendorff  wanted  not  only  a  Naval  but  also  a  Milt' 
tary  convention. 

*  French  and  Russian  statesmen  had  failed  to  realize  that  British  imperialism 
was  too  large  an  institution  to  be  tied  down  by  definite  agreements;  that,  in- 
deed, there  were  too  many  hostile  points  of  contact  between  Great  Britain,  France 
and  Russia  to  make  an  alliance  of  definite  terms  possible,  as  in  Persia,  China, 
Turkey,  the  Balkans  and  North  Africa.  A  definite  alliance  between  Russia  and 
France  was  possible  because  of  their  common  aversion  to  Germany,  an  almost  total 
absence  of  colliding  colonial  interests  and  the  necessity,  of  Russia  to  find  capital, 
and  of  France  to  find  profitable  investments.  None  of  these  factors  were  evident 
in  Anglo-Russian  relations. 


718        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

(845)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Letter,  May  3-16,  1914. 

The  French  Ambassador  informs  me,  that  Grey  last  evening  gave 
him  to  understand,  that  he  had  submitted  to  the  ministerial  Coun- 
cil the  answer  which  he  had  given  M.  Doumergue  in  Paris  in  his 
ow;n  name,  after  the  French  Minister  had  made  clear  to  him  the 
expediency  of  informing  the  Russian  Government  of  the  correspon- 
dence which  had  taken  place  between  the  French  and  the  English 
Governments,  in  order  that  the  St.  Petersburg  Cabinet  might  begin 
negotiations,  to  conclude  an  agreement  on  the  same  basis,  regarding  the 
eventual  co-operation  of  the  Russian  and  English  navies.  Sir  Edward 
had  remarked  in  addition,  that  the  Ministerial  Council  had  approved  of 
this  answer.  He  ^  reserved  the  right  of  informing  me  of  this;  but  a.^ 
the  proposal  had  originated  with  Doumergue,  he  considered  it  necessary 
first  to  inform  him  of  the  decision  of  the  British  Cabinet. 

According  to  Sir  Edward's  view,  the  course  of  the  proceedings 
m4ght  be  as  follows ; 

After  authorisation  by  his  Government,  Cambon  would  inform  me 
of  the  exchange  of  notes,  whilst  at  the  same  time.  Sir  Edward,  on  his 
part,  would  communicate  the  same  to  me,  in  order  that  I  may  inform 
the  Russian  Government.  Just  as  the  agreements  entered  into  with 
France,  provide  in  the  event  of  a  casus  belli  first  of  all  for  the  co-opera- 
tion of  the  armies,  so,  according  to  Sir  Edward  Grey,  the  nature  of  things 
demands  that  the  eventual  agreements  with  Russia  should  relate  to  the 
navy.  The  negotiations  would,  in  consequence,  have  to  be  carried  on 
between  the  Russian  and  English  staffs  of  Admiralty.  The  negotia- 
tions with  France  took  place  at  the  time  in  London,  and  the  French  mili- 
tary and  naval  attaches  in  London  travelled  to  Paris,  in  order  to  obtain 
the  instructions  which  occasion  rendered  necessary.  Finally,  Prince 
Louis  of  Baitenberg  went  to  Paris  quite  unofficially  in  order  to  co-ordi- 
nate the  agreements.^ 

Cambon  was  of  the  opinion,  that  after  the  correspondence  had 
been  communicated,  it  would  be  necessary  to  determine  the  further 
proceedings.  He  told  me,  that  according  to  the  opinion  of  Sir 
Edward  Grey,  the  negotiations  might  be  conducted  precisely  as  in 
the  case  of  France,  i.  e.,  that  our  Naval  Attache  in  London  would  be 

*  Grey. 

'First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  but  by  no  means  a  naval  expert,  so  that  the 
co-ordination  in  question  was  probably  of  a  political  character. 


FURTHER  ENTENTE  WAR  PREPARATIONS    719 

empowered  to  enter  into  negotiations  with  the  British  Admiralty  Staff, 
after  he  had  been  given  instructions  in  St.  Petersburg,  for  even  re- 
peated journeys  on  the  part  of  the  Naval  Attache  would  in  no  wise  arouse 
public  attention,  whereas  the  arrival  of  more  prominent  Russian  naval 
officers  in  London  would  surely  become  known  and  might  lead  to  unde- 
sirable comments} 

(846)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Letter,  May  5-18,  1914. 

Upon  my  return  to  London  from  Paris,  Cambon  informed  me, 
that  Grey  had  confirmed  to  him  what  he  had  told  Poincare  and 
Doumergue  in  his  own  name.  Grey  added,  that  since  his  return  the 
Cabinet  had  met  daily,  because  of  the  difficulties  in  Ireland  and  the 
Budget,  so  that  he  had  not  yet  found  it  possible  to  take  up  with  his 
colleagues  the  important  questions  of  the  day,  which  referred  to 
foreign  affairs  and  the  Paris  conversations.  He  had  been  obliged 
to  postpone  these  questions  for  8  or  10  days.  Grey,  however,  had 
reported  to  Asquith  on  his  journey.  Without  binding  the  Cabinet 
to  the  present,  Asquith  had  answered  that  he  saw  no  insurmountable 
difficulties  against  carrying  out  the  plan  proposed  in  Paris.  Since  then 
Asquith  has  repeated  this  to  Cambon  himself.  The  latter  has  been  able 
to  establish  the  fact  that  the  Prime  Minister  is  very  favourably  disposed 
to  plans  of  that  kind.  These  refer,  consequently,  to  eventual  military 
conventions  between  Russia  and  England  analogous  to  those  which  exist 
between  France  and  England.  The  latter  would  be  communicated  to  us 
in  confidence,  whereupon  the  Russian  Government  would  have  to  make 
analogous  proposals  to  the  British  Government,  which,  according  to  the 
nature  of  things,  would  refer  more  to  the  navy  than  to  the  army. 

It  is  not  to  be  assumed,  that  all  members  of  the  Cabinet  will  give 
their  sanction  to  this  beforehand  and  without  opposition.^  Nevertheless, 
the  firm  determination  of  the  real  leaders  of  the  Cabinet  will  carry  the 
day,  as  I  do  not  doubt  in  the  least,  and  then  the  real  negotiations  may 
begin. 

After  the  results  which  have  just  been  described  will  have  been 
achieved,  we,  as  I  believe,  will  have  attained  the  main  object  in  view, 

*  And  thus  inform  the  members  of  the  Triple  Alliance. 

'Feeling  that,  so  long  delayed,  a  convention  with  Russia  had  a  definite  object 
in  view.  The  sounding  of  Grey  by  Benckendorflf  had  been  a  continuous  per- 
formance, so  that  an  emergency  would  be  detected  behind  Grey's  willingness  to 
approach  Russia  closer  in  a  military  sense. 


720        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


n 


namely,  to  substitute  for  the  hitherto  far  too  theoretical  and  peaceable 
basic  idea  of  the  Entente  something  more  tangible.  My  sojourn  in 
Paris,  and  the  spectacle  which  I  there  witnessed,  have  anew  substantiated 
my  opinion,  that  an  alliance  or  any  other  form  of  public  agreement 
is  impossible,  and  that,  even  if  the  British  Government  should  permit 
itself  to  agree  to  this,  the  results  would  be  quite  different  from  those 
expected.  The  reception  which  was  accorded  the  King  and  the 
Queen  was  no  doubt  an  extraordinarily  hearty  one,  niuch  heartier, 
I  was  told  there,  than  was  the  case  with  former  English  visits. 
//,  in  spite  of  this,  the  impossibility  of  concluding  a  formal  alliance  be- 
tween England  and  France  has  been  recognized,  then  this  will,  in  a  still 
greater  degree,  be  the  case  between  Russia  and  England} 

I  doubt,  whether  a  more  powerful  guarantee  for  common  military 
operations  could  be  found  in  the  event  of  war^  than  this  spirit  of  the 
Entente,  as  it  reveals  itself  at  present,  reinforced  by  the  existent  military 
conventions. 

If  we  review  the  various  phases  of  the  Entente,  it  cannot  be  denied 
that  England  has  never  hesitated,  in  threatening  moments,  to  place  her- 
self on  the  side  of  France;  the  same  holds  good  for  Russia  on  every 
occasion  on  which  English  and  Russian  interests  were  simultaneously 
affected,  and  this,  despite  the  difficulty  of  reconciling  the  policies  of  both 
countries  in  questions  that  arise  day  after  day,  and  despite  those  reasons, 
which  it  would  lead  too  far  to  discuss  here,  but  which  explain  clearly, 
why  the  entente  between  Russia  and  England  has  not  taken  root  so 
deeply  as  that  between  France  and  England.^ 

The  reason  for  this  is  to  be  sought  in  the  fact,  that  even  a  most  care- 
ful, but  public,  alliance  would  meet  with  strong  and  undisguised  opposi- 
tion in  England,  and  that  not  only  on  the  part  of  the  Liberal  Party,  and 
that  a  great  part  of  the  political  effect  intended  would  be  frustrated  by  it. 
I  believe,  that  under  such  circumstances  an  alliance  would  not  be  worth 
much.  It  would  merely,  in  a  very  slight  degree,  increase  the  guarantees 
which  are  offered  to  France  and  Russia  by  England,  and  it  would,  on 

*  Naturally.  Great  Britain's  reasons  for  not  making  a  definite  alliance  with 
France  were  identical  to  those  that  argued  against  a  definite  alliance  with  Russia. 
The  British  government  was  at  least  true  with  itself.  Its  world  politics — as  those 
of  any  other  empire — were  such  that  it  became  necessary  to  play  all  states  against 
one  another,  in  which  none  were  really  friends  while  all  were  potential  enemies. 

'  All  too  true. 

'These  policies  and  reasons  are  outlined  in  the  footnotes  explaining  why 
Great  Britain  was  averse  to  "alliances." 


I 


FURTHER  ENTENTE  WAR  PREPARATIONS    721 

the  other  hand,  offer  a  far  more  fertile  soil  for  agitation  in  favour  of 
Germany,  something  upon  which  Germany  places  more  weight  than 
ever} 

To  recapitulate  in  brief,  I  would  like  to  say,  that  even  those  English- 
men, who  are  firmly  convinced  that,  sooner  or  later,  a  conflict  with  Ger- 
many will  prove  inevitable,  would  be  frightened  by  the  idea  of  bind- 
ing England  by  means  of  decisive  treaties  of  alliance  which  would 
in^pose  obligations  upon  her,  the  conditions  and  consequences  of 
which  cannot  as  yet  be  foreseen. 

(847)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Letter,  May  10-23,  1914. 

Sir  Edward,  yesterday,  requested  that  Cambon  and  I  call  upon 
hin^.  As  my  French  colleague  had  already  informed  me,  the  Sec- 
retary of  State  confirmed  to  me  the  fact,  that  the  English  Ministerial 
Council  had  approved  of  the  answer  which  he  had  given  to  Dou- 
mergue  in  Paris  in  his  own  name,^  after  the  French  Minister  had 
spoken  of  the  relations  between  Russia  and  England,  and  had  indicated 
how  useful,  under  certain  contingencies,  previous  military  conventions 
between  the  governments  would  prove. 

The  first  step  to  be  considered  was  to  communicate  to  the  Russian 
Government,  on  the  part  of  France  and  England,  the  two  confidential 
and  secret  documents,  which  had  been  exchanged  between  the  French 
and  British  Governments  in  the  year  1912. 

Sir  Edward  laid  special  stress  upon  the  point,  that  the  text  of 
these  documents  showed  that  no  alliance  was  concluded  between 
the  two  Powers.  They  fulfilled  the  purpose  rather  of  putting  the  sub- 
stance of  the  military  agreements  in  the  proper  light,  agreements  which 
had  been  entered  into,  between  the  army  and  navy  authorities,  for  the 
eventuality  that  it  should  become  necessary  for  the  British  and  French 
naval  and  land  forces  to  co-operate  actively.^ 

Sir  Edward  emphasised  the  fact,  that,  without  some  such  previous 

'Somewhat  far-fetched.  What  an  alliance  would  have  done  is:  Germany 
would  have  known  just  what  to  expect,  and  it  is  precisely  this  which  Grey  wanted 
to  avoid  as  is  shown  by  the  documents. 

'  To  wit :  Without  the  consent  of  the  Cabinet  Council. 

*  The  eventuality  differs  from  the  regular  casus  foederis  of  defensive  alliances 
in  so  far  as  it  makes  co-operation  of  the  armed  forces  contingent  upon  the  mutual 
selective-consent  of  the  subscribing  governments,  instead  of  fixing  the  point  and 
conditions  of  "operativeness"  of  the  alliance  in  a  definite  and  precise  manner. 

46 


722         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 


% 


agreement,  an  immediate  co-operation,  even  with  the  best  of  wills  and 
in  spite  of  the  close  political  entente  between  both  Governments,  would 
encounter  serious  technical  difficulties.^ 

He  added,  that  England  had  no  objections  to  an  agreement,  in 
the  same  spirit  as  expressed  in  the  correspondence  between  Cambon 
and  himself,  being  entered  into  and  concluded  between  the  Rus- 
sian and  the  English  Staffs  of  Admiralty.  In  a  convention  of  this 
kind,  he  saw  the  same  practical  advantages,  which  result  from  the  con- 
vention with  France.  He  told  us,  that  he  was  thinking  of  a  naval  con- 
vention, because  this,  in  view  of  the  circumstances,  was  the  most  suitable, 
and  because  he  was,  moreover,  disposed  to  believe,  that  this  would  also  be 
in  accordance  with  the  wishes  of  the  Imperial  Government. 

Hereupon,  Sir  Edward  Grey  gave  me  a  copy  of  the  document, 
which  he  had  handed  to  the  French  Ambassador  on  November  22, 
1912,  and  Cambon  on  his  part  gave  me,  on  the  authority  of  his 
Government,  a  copy  of  the  reply  which  he  had  directed  to  Sir 
Edward  Grey  on  the  following  day. 

In  response  to  my  question  Sir  Edward  declared,  that  the  most 
expedient  thing  to  do  would  be  to  authorize  our  Naval  Attache  in 
London,  to  place  himself  in  communication  with  the  British  Staff  of 
Admiralty.  The  First  Lord  of  Admiralty,  as  well  as  the  British  Min- 
isters, were  instructed  as  to  our  plan.  The  British  Staff  of  Admiralty 
is  in  possession  of  the  conventions,  regarding  the  navy,  which  were 
worked  out  in  common  by  France  and  England.  As  to  the  remaining 
agreements,  France  who  was  allied  with  us,  might  use  them  as  she 
deemed  necessary. 

In  thanking  Sir  Edward  for  his  friendly  sentiments,  I  confined 
myself  to  remarking  that  I  would  at  once  transmit  the  copies  of 
both  documents  to  Your  Excellency  and  report  to  you  exactly  wha 
he  had  told  me  when  handing  the  copy. 

*  Hardly  the  case.  The  British  government  would  have  either  accepted,  or  re- 
jected, an  alliance.  No  technical  difficulties  were  involved.  It  was  all  a  matter 
of  whether  or  not  an  alliance  or  a  convention  was  desired  and  desirable.  From 
an  alliance  retreat  was  impossible  without  perjury;  a  convention  left  it  to  the 
British  government  to  recognize  the  "necessity"  for  participation.  One  cannot 
escape  being  struck  by  the  fact  that  Russia  and  France  in  thus  bowing  to  the 
whim  of  the  British  government,  must  have  valued  their  ententes  with  Great 
Britain  far  beyond  the  limits  ordinarily  set  by  "national  honor"  and  sovereignty. 
Grey  was  willing  to  go  so  far  and  no  further,  and  the  French  and  Russian  gov- 
ernments accepted  his  views  without  so  much  as  oflfering  a  good  argument  for 
what  they  really  did  want— treaties  of  alliance  with  Great  Britain. 


4 


FURTHER  ENTENTE  WAR  PREPARATIONS   723 

(848)     Letter  from  Sir  Edward  Grey  to  M.  Paul  Cambon,  the  French  Am- 
bassador at  London.    Nov.  22,  1912.^ 

"From  time  to  time,  during  the  course  of  the  last  few  years,^  the 
experts  of  the  French  and  English  military  and  naval  authorities  have 
consulted  with  one  another.  It  was  constantly  agreed,  that  such  discus- 
sions were  not  to  restrict  the  freedom  of  decision  of  the  two  govern- 
ments, as  to  whether  the  one  was  to  support  the  other  with  arms  or  not. 
We  assumed  in  this,  that  such  consultations  by  experts  represented  no 
agreement,  and  could  not  be  regarded  as  one,  whereby  the  one  govern- 
ment, or  the  other,  would  be  pledged  to  intercede  in  an  eventuality  which 
had  not  yet  taken  place  and  which  might  never  take  place.  Thus,  for 
instance,  the  present  division  of  the  fleets  of  France  and  England  is  not 
based  upon  an  obligation  to  operate  in  common  in  the  event  of  war.  -V 

"You  have  in  the  meantime  pointed  out,  that,  if  the  one  government, 
or  the  other,  should  have  weighty  reasons  to  fear  an  unprovoked  attack 
on  the  part  of  a  third  power,  it  would  be  necessary  to  know  if  it  might, 
in  such  a  case,  count  upon  the  armed  assistance  of  the  other.  I  am  en- 
tirely of  the  opinion  that,  if  the  one  government,  or  the  other,  should 
have  weighty  reasons  to  fear  an  unprovoked  attack  on  the  part  of  a  third 
power,  or  any  other  threatened  disturbance  of  peace,  this  government 
ought  at  once  to  come  to  an  understanding  with  the  other,  as  to  whether 
both  governments  are  to  proceed  in  common,  in  order  to  ward  off  the 
attack,  and  to  preserve  peace,  and  to  consider  what  measures  are  to  he 
mutually  taken.  If  these  measures  comprise  a  military  action,  then, 
the  plans  of  the  General  Staffs  are  to  he  considered  at  once,  and  it 
would  he  the  duty  of  the  governments  to  decide  as  to  how  far  these  were 
to  he  followed." 

*This  text  differs  slightly  from  the  version  of  the  letter  in  the  British  "Blue 
Book,"  due,  no  doubt,  to  subsequent  editing  of  the  "Blue  Book"  text. 

'We  seem  to  deal  here  with  an  inconsistency.  The  correspondence  between 
Cambon  and  Grey  is  dated  November  22  and  23,  1912,  but  says  that  "from  time 
to  time,  during  the  course  of  the  last  few  years,  the  experts  of  the  French  and 
British  military  and  naval  authorities  have  consulted  with  one  another" — in  other 
words,  the  convention  was  in  existence,  and  very  broad  in  scope,  as  will  be 
shown  further  on.  Since  the  period  of  this  activity  by  French  and  British  mili- 
tary and  naval  agents,  was  anterior  to  the  exchange  of  the  letters  between  Grey 
and  Cambon,  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  the  Franco-Russian  convention  con- 
tained in  its  proper  text  certain  stipulations  and  conditions  as  to  the  question 
of  effectiveness  of  the  understanding.  The  Russians  were  never  informed  of  this, 
and,  in  their  case,  a  writ  of  non-responsibility,  for  the  benefit  of  the  British,  was 
exacted  as  the  very  beginning  of  the  negotiations.  In  the  light  of  these  facts,  the 
value  of  the  Grey-Cambon  letters  is  no  great  one,  being  simply  a  screen  for  the 
actual  understanding  that  made  such  military  and  naval  co-operation  with 
France  possible. 


724         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

(849)  Letter  from  M.  Paul  Camhon,  the  French  Ambassador  at  London,  to  Str 
Edward  Grey,  Nov.  23,  1912.1 

"You  reminded  me,  through  your  letter  of  yesterday,  the  22nd  of 
November,  that,  from  time  to  time,  during  the  course  of  the  last  fezv 
years,  the  experts  of  the  military  and  naval  authorities  of  France  and 
England  have  consulted  with  one  another,  that  it  was  constantly  agreed 
that  these  discussions  were  not  to  restrict  the  freedom  of  any  govern- 
ment  in  deciding  in  the  future  whether  it  wished  to  grant  the  other  armed 
assistance  or  not,  that  these  consultations  between  the  experts  formed  no 
obligation  on  either  side,  and  were  not  to  be  regarded  as  any  which 
would  compel  the  two  governments  to  intervene  in  certain  eventualties, 
and  that  you  have  in  the  meantime  pointed  out,  that,  if  one  or  the  other 
government  should  have  weighty  reasons  to  fear  an  unprovoked  attack 
on  the  part  of  a  third  power,  it  would  be  important  to  know  whether  it 
might  count  upon  the  armed  assistance  of  the  other, 

"Your  letter  gives  the  answer  to  this  point,  and  I  am  empowered  to 
state,  that  in  the  event  of  one  of  the  two  governments  having  weighty 
grounds  for  fearing  an  attack  by  a  third  power  or  a  disturbance  of  gen- 
eral peace,  the  government  in  question  ought  at  once  to  decide  in  conjunc- 
tion with  the  other,  whether  a  procedure  in  common,  by  the  two  gov- 
ernments, would  be  feasible  to  prevent  the  attack  or  to  preserve  peace. 
In  this  case,  the  two  governments  would  discuss  the  measures  which 
were  to  be  taken  conjointly;  should  these  measures  make  a  military 
action  necessary,  the  two  governments  would  at  once  consider  the  plans 
of  their  General  Staffs,  and  a  decision  would  be  made  as  to  how  far 
these  plans  were  to  be  followed" 

(850)  Sasonoff  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.    Confidential  Letter, 

May  15-28,  1914.    No.  47. 

The  readiness  of  the  British  Government  to  begin,  without  delay, '^ 
negotiations,  regarding  the  conclusion  of  an  agreement  between  Russia 
and  England,  which  would  concern  joint  operations  of  our  naval  forces 
in  the  event  of  a  common  military  action,  has  been  received  on  our  part 
with  a  feeling  of  the  greatest  satisfaction.    Quite  apart  from  the  fact, 


*  See  first  footnote  to  preceding  document. 

'  The  British  government  was  m  no  hurry,  according  to  Prince  Louis  of  Bat 
tenberg,  which  is  to  be  explained  largely  by  the  fact  that,  the  Russian  fleet  being 
a  negligible  quantity  just  then,  Great  Britam  assumed  most  of  the  liabilities 


I 


FURTHER  ENTENTE  WAR  PREPARATIONS        725 

that  such  an  agreement  is  desirable  from  a  special  military  standpoint, 
we  attach  great  importance  to  it  in  a  general  political  sense. 

In  the  conclusion  of  such  an  agreement,  we  see  an  important  step 
towards  bringing  England  into  closer  union  with  the  Franco-Russian 
alliance,  and  an  effective  means  of  reinforcing  the  recognition  of  the 
common  interests  of  England  and  Russia,  which,  we  are  convinced,  will 
favourably  influence  all  the  questions  which  affect  British  and  Russian 
interests.  I  have  called  the  attention  of  our  Ministry  of  the  Navy,  in 
particular  of  our  Naval  Agent  in  London,  most  specially  to  the  great 
political  significance  of  the  impending  negotiations  which  the  latter  will 
have  to  carry  on  with  the  English  Staff  of  Admiralty.^  The  proposal 
made  by  the  British  Government,  respecting  the  form  in  which  the  con- 
vention is  to  be  concluded,  is  recognized  by  us  as  in  every  way  suited  to 
the  purpose,"^  and  Captain  Volkoff  has  been  instructed  to  enter  into  ne- 
gotiations with  the  British  Government.  The  principles  which  are  to  be 
considered  during  the  impending  negotiations,  have  been  the  object 
of  a  consultation  which  took  place,  on  May  13-26,  in  the  office  of  the 
Chief  of  the  Staff  of  Admiralty. 

For  your  personal  information,  I  append  a  copy  of  the  resolu- 
tions passed  at  this  conference. 

''On  May  13-26,  1914,  a  consultation  took  place  in  the  office  of  the 
Chief  of  Naval  Staff,  for  the  purpose  of  an  exchange  of  opinions,  respect- 
ing the  impending  negotiations,  as  to  a  convention  between  Russia  and 
England,  which  concerns  the  active  co-operations  of  their  naval  fighting 
forces,  should  warlike  operations,  agreed  upon  by  Russia  and  England, 
take  place  with  the  participation  of  France.  After  it  had  been  primarily 
remarked  how  desirable  such  a  convention  would  be,  from  a  specific 
naval  standpoint,  and,  above  all,  with  regard  to  general  political  consid- 
erations, the  members  of  the  Conference,  after  a  comprehensive  exami- 
nation of  the  question,  came  to  the  following  decisions: 

"It  was  first  of  all  recognised,  that  our  naval  convention  with  Eng- 
land, like  the  Franco-Russian  naval  convention,  would  have  to  bear  in 
mind  actions  of  our  navy  in  conjunction  with  the  English  navy  which, 

*  According  to  Grey,  they  were  not  to  have  "great  political  significance"  and 
there  was  no  mention  in  the  Cambon  letters  of  "active  co-operation  of  their 
naval  fighting  forces,"  which  term,  however,  Sazonoflf  may  have  considered  as 
merely  circumscribed.  Be  this  as  it  may,  Sazonoflf  evinces  an  eagerness  hardly 
compatible  with  the  dignity  of  the  Imperial  Russian  Government. 

'  Showing  that  the  Russian  government  was  not  very  particular  as  to  quality. 


ma 


726        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

while  constituting  actions  agreed  upon,  would,  nevertheless,  he  separate. 

'*As  to  the  strategic  aims,  which,  from  our  standpoint,  are  to  become 
operative  tn  the  event  of  a  war  between  the  Powers  of  the  Triple-En- 
tente and  the  Powers  of  the  Triple- Alliance'^  one  must  distinguish:  on 
the  one  hand,  between  the  operations  in  the  region  of  the  Baltic,  and  the 
North  Sea;  on  the  other  hand,  the  Mediterranean.  In  both,  we  must 
seek  to  obtain  compensation  from  England  for  diverting  a  part  of  ti 
German  fleet  upon  ourselves.^ 

''In  the  northern  theatre  of  war,  our  interests  demand,  that  Englani 
should  fetter  as  great  a  portion  of  the  German  fleet  as  possible  in  the 
North  Sea.  By  this  means,  the  vast  preponderance  of  the  German  fleet 
over  our  own  would  be  equalized,  and,  perhaps,  permit  in  the  most  fav- 
ourable circumstances,  a  landing  in  Pomerania  being  made.  Should  it  be 
possible,  to  undertake  this  operation,  its  execution  would  be  rendered 
extraordinarily  difficult,  owing  to  the  lack  of  transport  vessels  in  the 
Baltic,  The  British  Government  might,  therefore,  assist  us  considerably 
by  rendering  it  possible  that  a  certain  number  of  merchant  vessels  should 
be  sent  to  our  Baltic  ports,  before  the  beginning  of  warlike  operations, 
so  that  the  lack  of  transport  vessels  might  be  made  good  in  this  way.^ 

''The  situation  in  the  Mediterranean  also  concerns  our  interests  most 
essentially,  since  in  the  event  of  the  Austro-Italian  forces,  in  this  sea, 
having  the  upper  hand,  an  attack  by  the  Austrian  fleet  in  the  Black  Sea 
would  be  possible,  which  would  mean  a  serious  blow  to  us.  It  is,  there- 
fore, from  our  point  of  view,  extremely  important,  that  a  safe  prepon- 
derance of  the  fighting-forces  of  the  Entente,  over  the  Austro-Italian 
fleet  in  the  Mediterranean,  be  established.  Since  the  Austro-Italian  naval 
forces  are  superior  to  the  French,  it  is  desirable,  that  England,  by  station- 
ing the  requisite  number  of  vessels  in  the  Mediterranean,  secure  the  pre- 
ponderance of  the  Entente  Powers,  at  least  so  long  as  the  development  of 
our  own  fleet  does  not  permit  us  to  assume  this  duty.  It  would  also  be 
desirable,  that  England's  consent  to  our  ships  using  the  English  ports 
in  the  eastern  Mediterranean  as  bases  be  secured,  similar  to  what  is 
granted  to  us  by  the  French  naval  convention,  which  permits  us  to 
make  use  of  the  French  ports  in  the  western  Mediterranean.  ^^^ 

*  A  very  dangerous  and  undiplomatic  admission.  ^81 
'  The  Russians  wanted  "compensation"  even  when  they  were  the  beneficiaries. 

•  This  should  remove  all  doubt  as  against  whom  the  convention  was  directed. 
The  casus  foederis  may  have  been  absent,  but  the  objective  at  least  was  plainly 
identified. 


FURTHER  ENTENTE  WAR  PREPARATIONS    727 

''Should  the  question  of  the  Straits  (the  Bosphorus  and  the  Dar- 
danelles) be  discussed  in  connection  with  the  situation  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean, then  political  questions  were  not  to  he  touched  upon;  hut  only 
temporary  operations  m  the  Straits,  06  one  of  our  strategic  measures  in 
the  event  of  war,  were  to  he  home  in  mind. 

"In  addition,  the  conference  recognised  that  it  was  desirahle,  that  all 
details  of  the  relations,  hetween  the  Russian  and  the  British  navies,  in 
the  projected  naval  convention,  hetween  ourselves  and  England,  should 
he  estahlished.  For  this  purpose,  tt  will  he  necessary  to  come  to  an 
understanding  as  to  signals  and  special  ciphers,  wireless  messages,  and 
the  relations  between  the  British  and  the  Russian  naval  staffs. 

"It  is,  moreover,  necessary  that  information  regarding  the  navies 
of  other  powers,  as  well  as  one's  own  navy,  and  in  particular  with  re- 
gard to  technical  details,  instruments  and  inventions,  be  exchanged  be- 
tween the  two  naval  departments. 

*'In  the  opinion  of  the  Conference,  it  would  also  he  necessary  to 
arrange  for  a  periodic  exchange  of  opinion,  hetween  the  heads  of  the 
Russian  and  the  English  Admiralty  staffs,  according  to  the  example  of 
the  Franco-Russian  naval  convention.''  ^ 

(851)     The  Russian  Naval  Agent  in  London  to  the  Chief  of  the  Russian  Staff 
of  Admiralty.     Secret  Report   May  24-Iune  6,  1914.     No.  182. 

I  have  the  honour  of  reporting  to  Your  Excellency,  regarding 
the  purchase  of  the  Dreadnought  ''■  belonging  to  Chile,  as  well  as  the 
prospective  conditional  agreement  with  England. 

Before  my  departure  from  St.  Petersburg,  it  appeared  to  be 
certain,  that  the  Government  of  Chile  had  finally  agreed  to  the 
sale,  and  that  this  might  hence  be  concluded  in  the  near  future. 

After  my  return  here,  and  after  a  conversation  with  the  firm  of 
Armstrong,  T  have  the  following  results  to  report:  Although  the 
Naval  Council  in  Chile  has  approved  of  the  sale  of  the  two  Dread- 
noughts, the  Government  has  not  found  it  possible  to  confirm  this 

*  A  rather  accurate  transcript  of  the  above  document  passed  into  the  hands  of 
the  German  government.  The  dementis  of  the  British  and  Russian  governments 
did  not  and  naturally  could  not  remove  the  deep  impression  made  by  the  terms 
of  the  above  communication.  Despite  that,  Emperor  William  went  on  a  trip  into 
Scandinavian  waters,  even  after  the  assassination  of  Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand. 

'  Both,  Russia  and  Turkey,  were  in  the  market  for  these  ships,  the  population 
of  the  latter  having  raised  the  necessary  funds  by  popular  subscription. 


728         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

decision,  even  though  no  final  negative  answer  has  been  given  on 
its  part.    This  change  of  front  is  to  be  attributed  entirely  to  the  Chileammt 
Minister  here.  9| 

The  latter  once  remarked,  even  before  the  beginning  of  our  nego- 
tiations, that  he  considered  it  possible  to  sell  the  ships  only  to  England. 
Since  Armstrong  is  aware  of  this,  he  believes  that  the  only  means  of 
securing  us  at  least  one  ship,  is  to  have  our  Ambassador  request  Grey 
to  indicate  to  the  Chilean  Minister,  that  England  would  be  pleased  with 
this  sale.  It  is  still  doubtful,  whether  Grey  will  determine  upon 
such  a  step.  Should  this  be  the  case,  we  might  count  upon  being 
able  to  purchase  at  least  one  vessel,  if  not  both.  After  Grey  has 
returned  to  London,  I  shall  submit  these  considerations  to  our  Am- 
bassador and  request  his  support.  JU 

As  to  the  prospective  Naval  Convention  with  England,  I  have 
been  able  to  establish  the  following,  after  my  conversation  with  the 
Prince  of  Battenberg :  ^ 

The  British  Government  is  in  no  haste,  and  it  is  the  French  Govern- 
ment which  insists  upon  expediting  this  matter.^  The  Prince  intends  to 
travel  to  Russia  with  his  wife  during  the  coming  August  and  he  is 
authorised  to  discuss  this  question  with  the  Naval  Minister,  and  with 
you.  Before  his  departure,  he  will  ask  me  to  see  him,  with  regard 
to  an  exchange  of  opinion,  in  order  to  prepare  himself  for  the  further 
negotiations,  which  are  then  to  take  place  in  St.  Petersburg.  His 
Highness  is  quite  in  agreement  with  these  negotiations. 

(852)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sasonoff.    Letter,  May  29- 
June  11,  1914. 

I  notified  Grey,  yesterday,  that  Captain  Volkoff  had  returned 
from  St.  Petersburg,  and  had  been  instructed  to  enter  into  negotia- 
tions with  the  Admiralty.  Grey  replied,  that  he  zvould  at  once  acquaint 
the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty  of  this.  On  this  occasion,  Grey  re- 
marked that  certain  indiscretions  had  regrettably  been  committed  in 
this  matter,  and  that,  first  German,  and,  then,  other,  newspapers  had  oc- 
cupied themselves  with  this  question.  He  regretted  this  the  more,  since 

'  Louis,  who  had  co-ordinated  the  Franco-British  agreements. 

'  There  was  no  need  for  haste  so  far  as  the  British  were  concerned.  The  Rus- 
sian fleet  was  a  wholly  negligible  quantity  and  landing  troops  in  Pomerania  a  quite 
impossible  plan  so  long  as  the  Entente  fleet  was  not  in  control  of  the  Baltic. 


FURTHER  ENTENTE  WAR  PREPARATIONS        729 

he  will  be  obliged  to  reply  to  a  question  relative  to  this  which  will  be 
put  to  him  in  the  Commons. 

I  replied,  that  1,  on  my  part,  extremely  regretted  these  indiscretions, 
which  repeated  themselves  all  too  frequently;  I  was  convinced  that  Your 
Excellency  shared  this  point  of  view,  and  I  told  him,  that  the  *'Novoe 
Vremia"  had  published  a  dementia  Grey  was  not  aware  of  this,  and 
was  very  well  satisfied,*  He  asked  me  to  send  htm  the  text.  He,  then, 
told  me  m  general  outlines,  the  answer  which  he  thought  of  returning  in 
Parliament,  and  which  would  cover  our  negotiations,  as  well  as  those 
which  had  taken  place  with  France.^  I  replied,  that  it  seemed  exped- 
ient to  me  to  treat  the  matter  from  this  point  of  view. 

(853)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  May  SO-June  12,  1914.    No.  149. 

Grey  told  me,  that  he  highly  appreciated  your  frank  and  friendly 
declarations  regarding  the  Turkish  navy.  Had  the  British  Govern- 
ment believed  that  the  development  of  the  Turkish  navy  signified  a 
danger  for  Russia,  the  British  officers  would  not  have  been  permitted 
to  enter  Turkish  service.^  Since  this  permission,  however,  has  only 
been  granted  to  enable  the  Turkish  navy  to  defend  the  independence  of 
Turkey,  every  deviation  from  this  aim  would  meet  with  the  disapproval 
of  the  Government.  Grey  added,  that  a  refusal  would  have  resulted  in 
the  Turkish  Government  turning  to  Germany,  which  would  have  been 
contrary  to  the  interests  both  of  Russia  and  England.^  As  to  the  order- 
ing, and  the  sale  of  ships  in  England,  the  Government  had  no  legal  means 
at  its  disposal  to  oppose  these.  Nevertheless,  the  British  Ambassador  in 
Constantinople  has  been  instructed  to  make  representations  to  the  Sub- 

"Showing  what  the  value  of  governmental  dementis— denidils — is. 

'The  virtuous  Sir  Edward. 

•Indicating  to  what  extent  the  British  parliament  enjoyed  the  confidence  of 
Grey  and  the  government. 

*This  document  shows  diplomacy  in  its  dull  moments. 

'Not  a  sound  argument,  since  Great  Britain  and  Russia  succeeded  in  making 
the  German  military  mission  in  Turkey  almost  entirely  impossible.  The  presence 
in  Turkey  of  the  British  naval  mission  was  the  only  reason  why  the  Turkish 
government  was  permitted  to  retain  the  services  of  Liman  von  Sanders  Pasha,  so 
that  there  was  no  danger  at  all  that  the  development  of  the  Ottoman  fleet  would 
have  been  left  to  the  Germans.  There  were  times,  when  Sir  Edward  Grey  had 
a  poor  opinion  of  the  intelligence  of  the  Russians,  and  this  was  one  of  them. 
The  astute  Benckendorff  had  fallen  under  the  sway  of  the  "closer  relations"  pro- 
moted by  the  proposed  naval  convention,  and  once  more  lost  his  splendid  per- 
ception and  fine  judgment. 


730        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

lime  Porte,  and  the  British  officers  in  Constantinople  are  to  express 
themselves  in  the  same  sense,  though  more  indirectly. 

These  declarations  have,  however,  brought  about  the  result,  that 
without  any  previous  notification  of  the  British  Government,  and 
without  any  co-operation  with  the  naval  mission,  direct  contracts 
have  been  signed  between  the  Turkish  Government  and  English 
shipbuilding  yards  which  lie  quite  beyond  the  influence  of  the  Gov- 
ernment. Grey  is  of  your  opinion,  that  complications  with  Greece 
are  to  be  feared,  if  Turkey  should  increase  her  armaments ;  he  trusts, 
however,  that  prudence  will  keep  the  upper  hand  in  Constantinople. 
Should  the  crisis  grow  acute,  the  Government  at  London  is  prepared  to 
come  to  an  understanding  with  us,  without  delay,  and  to  confer  as  to 
the  attitude  which  is  to  he  adopted?- 

(854)  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sazonoff.    Telegram,  May  31- 
June  13,  1914.    No.  150. 

Your  telegram  No.  1137  received.  I  have  repeatedly  discussed 
this  question  with  the  Foreign  Office,  during  the  last  few  days. 

The  difficulty  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  Chilean  Minister  is  opposed  not 
only  to  a  sale  to  Russia,  hut  to  any  sale  whatsoever.  Grey  told  me  the 
day  hefore  yesterday,  that  he  would  make  use  of  a  favourable  oppor- 
tunity to  prevail  as  much  as  possible  on  the  Minister, 

(855)  The  Same  to  the  Same.    Telegram,  June  12-25,  1914.    No.  167. 

Grey  told  me  to-day,  that  he  was  greatly  alarmed  by  the  false  ru- 
mours which  were  circulating  in  the  German  press  concerning  the  con- 
tents of  the  alleged  Naval  Convention  between  England  and  Russia  in 
connection  with  the  question  of  the  Straits;  he  had  deemed  it  necessary 
to  speak  of  this  in  confidence  to  Lichnowsky,  who  is  going  to  Kiel,  where 
he  is  to  see  the  Emperor.  Grey  assured  the  German  Ambassador,  that 
the  question  of  the  Straits  had  not  been  discussed  between  England  and 
Russia  for  5  years;  ^  he  assured  him,  that  between  England  on  the  one 
hand,  and  France  and  Russia  there  existed  neither  an  alliance  nor  a 

*  Turkey  was  augmenting  her  naval  forces,  because  Greece  was  negotiating, 
through  a  Fred  J.  Gauntlett,  for  the  purchase  of  the  U.  S.  battleships  "Idaho" 
and  "Mississippi,"  which  the  U.  S.  Congress  knocked  down  at  the  bargain- 
counter  figure  of  exactly  $12,535,276.98. 

'  Hardly  true. 


FURTHER  ENTENTE  WAR  PREPARATIONS    731 

Convention.^  He,  nevertheless,  told  him  that  he  did  not  wish  in  any  way 
to  conceal  from  Inm,  tJiat  the  intitnary  between  the  titree  governments 
had  growm  so  great  during  these  last  years,  that  they  Jiad,  on  all  occasions, 
come  to  an  understanding  upon  all  questions,  just  as  though  they  were 
allies.  On  tfie  other  hand,  he  affirmed,  that,  during  the  course  of  these 
years  such  negotiations  Itad  never  assumed  a  character  directed  against 
Germany,^  nor  had  tliey  any  reference  to  the  so-called  "encircling 
policy."  » 

(856)     Sazonotf  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London.    Confidential  Letter, 
June  12-25,  1914. 

Immediately  before  the  departure  of  our  courier  I  hasten  to  in- 
form you,  tliat  I  had  another  long  conversation,  yesterday,  with  the 
British  Ambassador,  whose  attention  I  called  to  the  serious  danger  of  a 
cooling  of  our  relations  to  England  on  account  of  the  Persian  question. 
I  assumed  that  the  perturbation  and  excitement,  which  Jiad  been  notice- 
able of  late  in  England,  were  most  likely  to  be  traced  back  to  the  fact, 
tliat  fears,  as  to  the  position  of  England  in  India,  were  once  more  be- 

*  "And  Brutus  is  an  honorable  man." 

•A  falsehood. 

'  In  this  connection,  the  answer  given  by  Sir  Edward  Grey,  to  the  questions 

rto  him  in  the  House  of  Commons  by  Mr.  King,  M.  P.,  and  by  Sir  W.  Byles, 
P.,  in  Jime,  1914.  deserves  to  be  cited : 

"3.  Mr.  King  asked,  whether  any  naval  agreement  has  been  recently  entered 
into  between  Russia  and  Great  Britain;  and  whether  any  negotiations,  with  a 
view  to  a  naval  agreement,  have  recently  taken  place,  or  are  now  pending,  be- 
tween Russia  and  Great  Britain  ? 

"5.  Sir  William  Byles  asked  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
whether  he  can  make  any  statement  with  regard  to  an  alleged  new  naval  agree- 
ment between  Great  Britain  and  Russia;  how  far  such  agreement  would  affect 
our  relations  with  Germany ;  and  will  he  lay  papers  ? 

*'Sir  E.  Grey : 

"  The  Hon.  Member  for  North  Somerset  asked  a  similar  question  last  year 
with  regard  to  military  forces,  and  the  Hon.  Member  for  North  Sal  ford  asked 
a  similar  question  also  on  the  same  day,  as  he  has  again  done  today.  The  Prime 
Minister  then  replied,  that,  if  war  arose  between  European  Powers,  there  were 
no  unpublished  agreements,  which  would  restrict,  or  hamper,  the  freedom  of  the 
Government,  or  of  Parliament,  to  decide,  whether  or  not.  Great  Britain  should 
participate  in  a  war.  That  answer  covers  both  the  questions  on  the  paper.  It 
remains  as  true  to-day  as  it  was  a  year  ago.  No  negotiations  have  since  been 
concluded  with  any  Power  that  would  make  the  statement  less  true.  No  such 
n^otiations  are  in  progress,  and  none  are  likely  to  be  entered  upon,  so  far  as  I 
can  judge.  But,  if  any  agreement  were  to  be  concluded  that  made  it  necessary 
to  withdraw  or  modify  the  Prime  Minister's  statement  of  last  year,  which  I 
have  quoted,  it  ought,  in  my  opinion,  to  be,  and  I  suppose  that  it  would  be,  laid 
before  Parliament.' " 

Another  falsehood — flavored  with  a  grain  of  truth. 


732        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

coming  manifest.  Sir  George  Buchanan  conceded  that  my  assumption 
was  for  the  greater  part  correct.  In  consequence,  I  once  more  repeated 
to  him  all  the  arguments  which  prove  how  unfounded  all  such  fears  are, 
and  I  even  hinted  that,  should  it  he  desired,  we  could  give  to  the  British 
Government,  and  to  public  opinion  there,  reassuring  declarations  in  re- 
gard to  this  in  the  most  decisive  form. 

I  have  for  the  present  contented  myself  with  these  hints;  yet  it  seems 
to  me  quite  possible,  that,  later  on,  in  connection  with  our  further  negoti- 
ations, we  might  propose  to  England  to  give  her  a  guarantee  of  her 
Indian  possessions,  as  effective  as  that,  given  her  by  Japan  in  1902. 

At  the  present  time,  it  appears  to  me  necessary  to  conclude  the  pro- 
posed Naval  Conference  as  quickly  as  possible.^  It  is  important  not  to 
postpone  the  conclusion  of  this  agreement,  and  His  Majesty  Was  grac- 
iously pleased,  to  express  himself  in  this  sense  to  the  British  Ambassador 
in  wy  presence.  To  close,  I  will  mention,  that  Sir  George  Buchanan  was 
received  yesterday  in  special  audience  by  the  Czar  in  order  to  hand 
him  an  autograph  letter  from  King  George.  This  letter  is  couched  in 
very  friendly  terms,  and  expresses  the  hope  of  His  Majesty,  that  the 
relations  between  Russia  and  England  might  not  be  troubled  on  account 
of  the  Persian  question. 

(857)     The  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Sazonoff.    Letter,  June  19- 
July  2,  1914. 

I  have  received  your  very  confidential  letter  of  June  12-25. 
The  answer  which  was  given  to  you,  by  Sir  George  Buchanan,  in 
reply  to  your  statement,  that  in  England  there  was  a  revival  of  the 
old  fears  as  to  India,  is  undoubtedly  correct;  it  must,  however,  be 
supplemented  by  a  few  additional  words. 

Inasmuch  as  the  security  of  India  is  a  consequence  of  the  political 
entente  between  Russia  and  England,  it  follows  that  public  opinion  in 
England,  as  well  as  the  British  Government,  in  full  confidence  as  to  our 
intentions,  have  no  fears,  so  long  as  this  entente  exists.    Should  this 

*  A  rather  interesting  statement  in  the  light  of  the  "open  secret"  making  the 
rounds  in  Europe  at  that  time,  that  in  the  course  of  that  summer  the  Archduke 
Francis  Ferdinand  of  Austria  was  to  be  put  out  of  the  way,  because  of  his  alleged 
anti-Slav  tendencies,  as  he  was  three  days  after  the  writing  of  this  letter.  There 
had  never  been  much  antipathy  against  Austria-Hungary  in  England,  and  Saz- 
onoff needed  some  assurance  that  he  would  have  the  support  of  the  British  gov- 
ernment, when  the  work  of  the  Crown  Prince  Alexander  and  the  Serbian 
Narodna  Odbrana  should  have  produced  the  next  Balkan  crisis. 


I 


II 


FURTHER  ENTENTE  WAR  PREPARATIONS    733 

entente  come  to  an  end,  there  would  he  a  revival  of  the  fear  in  ques- 
tion. We  have  to  deal  therefore  with  an  hypothesis,  which,  however, 
arises  only  if  the  entente  appears  to  be  threatened  by  the  events  in 
Persia.  It  seems  to  me  important  to  lay  stress  upon  this  difference, 
for  the  fears  of  the  English  do  not  go  further  than  I  have  just 
indicated. 

This  does  not,  however,  preclude  the  possibility  of  finding,  in  con- 
nection with  certain  modifications  of  our  present  agreements,  a  formula 
which  would  give  expression  to  the  security  of  India  in  a  still  more 
direct  manner;  this  would  merely  make  our  entente  still  closer. 

The  conversations,  which  I  have  had  with  Grey  during  the  last 
few  days,  prove  this  in  a  manner  which  is  as  clear  as  it  is  convincing. 
/  shall  do  all  that  lies  in  my  power  to  expedite  the  negotiations  between 
Captain  Volkoff  and  the  British  Admiralty.  I  see  no  indication,  that 
the  British  Government  hesitates,  in  any  way,  to  carry  out  the  plan 
agreed  upon  in  Paris.  I  believe,  on  the  contrary,  that  this  question  has 
assumed  a  still  greater  importance  in  the  eyes  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment: it  sees  in  this  a  practical  necessity,  and  a  natural  result  of  the 
Entente.  If  the  matter  has  dragged  up  to  the  present,  this  is  to  be 
attributed  to  the  circumstance,  of  which  I  was,  moreover,  informed  from 
the  very  beginning, — that  the  Government  wishes  to  instruct  Prince 
Louis  of  Battenberg  to  bring  the  negotiations  in  St.  Petersburg  to  a 
close.  The  exact  date  of  this  quite  private  visit,  concerning  which, 
nothing  is  to  penetrate  into  the  public,  has  not  yet  been  fixed.  Natur- 
ally, the  date  of  this  visit  depends  only  in  a  slight  degree  upon  Prince 
Louis  himself. 

One  circumstance,  which  at  first  glance  is  of  m^erely  subordinate 
importance,  but  which  is  in  reality  much  more  important  than  one 
is  disposed  to  assume,  has  up  to  the  present  adversely  influenced 
the  preparatory  negotiations  of  Captain  Volkoff.  /  allude  to  the 
indiscretions  which  have  been  committed.  It  is  true  that  these,  having 
very  likely  been  committed  in  Paris,  cause  no  particular  surprise.  Not- 
withstanding, it  must  be  remarked,  that  nothing  has  ever  become  known 
as  to  the  Anglo-French  convention.^ 

There  seems  to  be  no  doubt  that  this  time  the  alarm  in  Berlin  has 
been  very  great.^    Perhaps,  Sir  Edward  Grey  desires,  that  this  should 

'  The  existence  of  which  Grey  denied  in  parliament. 

'  Resulting  from  the  assassination  of  the  Austrian  heir-presumptive. 


734        ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

be  somewhat  allayed  before  he  enters  upon  further  negotiations.  It  is. 
indeed,  true,  that  he  would  find  it  difficult  to  issue  a  dementi,  and  to  go 
on  negotiating  at  the  same  time — a  role  which  he  would  be  obliged  to 
play  towards  Germany,  as  well  as  towards  a  considerable  portion  of  his 
own  party,  and  the  English  Press. 

It  is  evident  that  your  conversation  with  the  British  Ambassa- 
dor will  exercise  a  good  influence. 

(858)     The  Same  to  the  Same.    Confidential  Letter,  July  3-16,  1914. 

I  have  but  very  little  that  is  of  interest  to  report  to  you  to-day. 
Grey  told  me  yesterday,  that  he  had  received  no  further  dis- 
quieting news  from  Vienna  and  Berlin  during  the  last  few  days. 

Nevertheless,  he  did  not  seem  to  be  very  reassured.  He  considers  the 
outbreak  of  national  passions  as  very  dangerous,  the  more  so  since 
there  are  but  very  few  elements  which  would  be  able  to  restrain  them. 
He  says  that  we  can  no  longer  count  upon  Germany  being  the  peace- 
maker under  all  circumstances.  Nicolson  is  less  uneasy.  His  standpoint 
is  based  upon  the  idea,  that  Emperor  Francis  Josef  could  desire  warlike 
complications  this  year  less  even,  than  during  the  preceding  year,  now 
that  the  Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand,  who  was  to  be  the  leader  of  the 
Party  of  Action,  was  no  longer  there.  I  have  no  doubt  that  Grey  has 
used  very  plain  language  in  Berlin  and  Vienna, 


\ 


CHRONOLOGICAL  ORDER 
OF  DOCUMENTS 


735 


I 
I 


I 


CHRONOLOGICAL  ORDER  OF  DOCUMENTS 

(Indexed  by  Political  Issues) 

While  lengthy  remarks  as  to  indices  are  not  usual,  an  exception  is  made  here  for 
the  purpose  of  facilitating  the  study  of  the  documents.  Quite  complete  in  themselves 
and  the  last  word  on  the  subjects  they  deal  with,  the  papers-of-state  herein  repro- 
duced pay  but  little  attention  to  conditions  anterior  to  the  affairs  that  are  described, 
nor  do  they  throw  much  light  on  the  political  philosophy  of  the  men  that  wrote  them. 
Yet  some  inkling  must  be  had  of  both  if  the  character  of  the  correspondence  herein 
published  is  to  be  understood  in  its  totality. 

The  table  appended  makes  it  possible  to  locate  easily  every  reference  in  the  docu- 
ments to  the  main  currents  that  shaped  the  political  history  of  Europe  and  Asia  during 
the  period  covered.  Such,  however,  is  not  the  prime  purpose.  A  division  of  any 
complex  of  international  relations,  as  done  in  the  chapters  of  the  book,  is  of  necessity 
somewhat  arbitrary,  because  little  or  no  attention  can  be  paid  to  what  may  be  called 
the  background  of  the  particular  situation  dealt  with. 

Though  all  care  was  exercised  in  grouping  related  documents,  it  was  of  course 
impossible  to  effect  a  satisfactory  division  in  every  instance.  The  elements  and 
phases  of  international  relations  are  interdependent,  and  diplomatists  and  statesmen 
are  usually  obliged  to  pay  regard  to  this  fact,  even  when  occupied  with  new  and  urgent 
phases  of  affairs-of -state.  In  international  relations,  as  in  other  departments  of  life, 
there  is  nothing  entirely  new — ^nothing  without  precedent;  older  conditions  engender 
new  conditions. 

Dealing  with  vital  questions,  international  relations  of  peoples  and  governments 
are  an  organism — a  thing  that  grows,  taking  its  nourishment  and  vitalizing  irritation 
from  the  hour,  as  it  were,  but  having  its  origin  and  roots  in  history  and  tradition — in 
the  events  of  yesterday,  be  these  the  late  wars,  the  more  recent  peace  treaties,  the 
last  international  crisis  or  the  latest  alliances  and  conventions.  International  rela- 
tions, like  any  other  form  or  expression  of  life,  are  subject  to  never-ceasing 
modification,  therefore.  To  this  is  due  the  fact  that  the  foreign  affairs  of  govern- 
ments manifest  definite  tendencies  in  determinable  directions,  the  isolation  and 
classification  of  which,  as  indicated  by  the  doctmients  and  established  by  the  course 
of  events,  must  be  undertaken  before  the  major  aspect  of  the  case  is  understood. 

Hostile  contact  in  international  relations  is  the  outcome  of  the  struggle  for  self- 
preservation,  and  though  much  effort  has  been  made  to  invest  this  with  certain  supe- 
rior motives — ideals — the  fact  remains  that  well  defined  biological  laws  form  the  real 

737 


k 


738         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

basis  of  the  foreign  affairs  of  governments  and  peoples.  The  propositions  placed 
before  the  governed  with  the  label,  "  cause  of  the  war  "  upon  them,  are,  in  the  major- 
ity of  cases  nothing  more  than  pretexts.  In  the  actual  cause  of  any  war  the  conduct 
of  its  foreign  affairs  of  any  government  is  usually  involved  in  a  manner  that  would 
bring  little  credit  to  it.  There  is  always  a  great  deal  to  hide,  and  the  restdt  is  that  the 
pretext  is  resorted  to,  such  pretext  being  generally  a  minor  phase  of  the  difficulty  so 
groomed  and  enlarged  that  it  will  serve  to  promote  a  warlike  spirit,  and  confidence  « 
in  the  government  at  the  same  time.  fll 

The  docimients  deal  with  the  struggle  between  Triple  Alliance  and  Triple  Entente.  ™" 
That  struggle,  it  will  be  remembered,  moved  on  the  open  stage,  as  it  were.  It  had  its 
origin  in  the  "  necessities  of  empire  "  and  the  more  legitimate  needs  of  states.  Self- 
preservation  was  its  cause  and  purpose.  But  it  was  plainly  to  be  seen  that  the  play 
and  its  by-plays  had  prompters — secret  treaties  and  private  understandings^  un- 
written policies  and  sequestered  ambitions.  We  find  that  Russia  had  not  only 
alliances  and  understandings,  but  had  "  historic  missions,  "  also.  Great  Britain 
wanted  to  not  only  preserve  her  vast  colonial  realm,  but  wished  to  enlarge  it,  driven, 
subconsciously  perhaps,  by  the  law  that  the  thing  which  no  longer  grows  is  dying  or 
dead.  France  was  in  much  the  same  position.  Prevented  from  having  producing 
colonies,  Germany  sought  further  means  of  sustenance  in  an  empire  of  trade,  while 
Austria-Himgary  was  constantly  occupied  with  efforts  intended  to  hold  her  remark- 
able conglomerate  of  peoples  together.  All  these  were  expressions  of  the  desire  and 
will  to  live. 

There  were  several  major  treaties  in  existence  at  the  time  the  first  of  these  docu- 
ments was  written.  The  oldest  was  the  Triple  Alliance,  a  treaty  which  bound  to- 
gether Germany,  Austria-Himgary  and  Italy.  Next  in  importance  and  in  point  of 
time  was  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance,  while  the  entente  cordiale  between  Great 
Britain  and  France  was  of  more  recent  origin. 

The  Triple  Alliance  was  to  some  extent  the  successor  to  the  older  Drei-Kaiser- 
Btmd — ^League  of  the  Three  Emperors,  composed  of  the  monarchs  of  Russia,  Ger- 
many and  Austria-Hungary.  The  league  was  still  in  existence  when  the  alliance  was 
concluded,  but  did  not  survive  it  for  long.  Russia  withdrew  for  the  reason  that  Ger- 
many was  not,  and  never  had  been  a  dependable  ally  of  hers  as  against  Great  Britain, 
while  Austria-Hungary  paid  little  attention  to  the  "  historic  mission  "  of  Russia  in 
the  Balkans  and  in  and  near  Constantinople. 

For  several  years  Russia  remained  unattached,  having  a  certain  guarantee  in  the 
close  personal  relations  between  Emperor  William  I  and  the  Russian  Czars.  But  it 
was  foimd  that  this  would  not  stiffice.  The  personal  relations  of  the  British}  and  Ger- 
man courts  were  the  closest  and  best  during  the  life  of  Queen  Victoria.  William  n 
did  many  things  that  weaned  Russia  away  from  Germany  completely — the  term 
wean  is  in  order,  because  great  as  the  Russian  state  was  it  looked  upon  Germany 
more  or  less  as  its  political  impresario  in  the  Occident  proper. 

The  Franco-Russian  Alliance  came  into  being.  The  objective  of  this  combina- 
tion was  not  directly  anti-German.  The  alliance  was  formed  for  the  express  purpose 
of  keeping  Great  Britain  in  check.  Out  in  Asia,  Russian  and  British  imperialism 
clashed,  and  in  North  Africa,  from  the  pillars  of  Hercules  to  the  banks  of  the  Nile, 
French  and  British  imperialism  were  constantly  in  hostile  contact. 


CHRONOLOGICAL  ORDER  OF  DOCUMENTS   739 

Such,  then,  was  the  setting  of  the  stage. 

For  a  good  many  years,  the  statesmen  of  the  opposing  camp*!  did  their  best  to 
arrive  at  accurate  conclusions  as  to  the  terms  of  these  treaties.  It  is  characteristic  of  all 
such  cases  that  those  who  feel  that  a  treaty  is  directed  against  them  imagine  that  there 
is  much  more  in  such  a  document  than  in  any  similar  instrument  they  themselves 
have  drawn.  They  may  realize  that  the  conditions  making  the  casus  foederis  effective 
must  be  general  in  order  to  serve  their  purpose,  but,  human  nature  being  what  it  is, 
itds  taken  for  granted  that  the  offending  treaty  contains  all  sorts  of  special  provisions 
aimed  at  the  state  that  feels  itself  the  objective  of  the  agreement. 

The  statesmen  of  the  Triple  Alliance  pondered  over  the  possible  terms  of  the 
Franco-Russian  Alliance  and  the  entente  cordiale,  and  indulged  in  vain  speculations 
as  to  fixed  designs  and  special  desiderata.  The  tendencies  of  govermnents  being 
manifested  by  their  conduct,  there  is  no  doubt  that  many  of  these  guesses  were  accu- 
rate enough,  but  they  were  of  no  avail  whatsoever  for  the  reason  that  by  means  of 
thenLno  knowledge  could  be  gained  as  to  what  the  governments  of  Russia  and  France, 
and  later  Great  Britain,  might  do  in  any  particular  set  of  circimistances.  The  same 
was  true  in  the  reverse  order. 

The  operative  diplomatist  overlooks  too  often  that  it  is  not  the  treaty — ^the  scrap 
of  paper — that  counts,  but  that  it  is  the  condition  olE  which  the  treaty  or  convention  is 
an  expression  that  determines  the  quality  and  direction  of  foreign  policy.  Treaties 
have  value  only  so  long  as  there  is  a  necessity  for  the  provisions  they  contain,  and  so 
long  as  this  necessity  finds  mutual  recognition  by  the  high-contracting  parties.  But 
such  necessity  remains  never  in  status  quo;  it  is  never  the  same  from  one  day  to 
another,  with  the  result  that  the  terms  of  the  treaty,  though  definite  enough  on  paper, 
are  subject  to  interpretation  in  the  light  of  altered  conditions.  The  Franco-Russian 
Alliance  is  a  striking  example  of  this.  Though  directed  at  first  entirely  against  Great 
Britain,  while  Germany  was  the  traditional  friend  of  that  country,  it  finally  operated 
against  Germany,  when  Great  Britdin  was  her  enemy. 

In  all  this,  the  statesmen  of  Europe,  with  the  possible  exception  of  Sir  Edward 
Grey  and  British  leaders  generally,  made  the  mistake  of  looking  upon  alliances  and 
conventions  as  dynamic  factors,  when,  in  reality,  they  were  but  a  diagnosis  of  the 
needs  of  states  at  the  time  when  the  treaty  was  drawn.  They  seemed  to  be  in  igno- 
rance of  the  fact  that  the  best  of  treaties  are  but  historic  incidents — political  land- 
marks. Since  all  history  is  static — dead — the  language  of  any  treaty  is  lifeless,  no 
matter  what  its  intent  may  be.  Recording  conditions  and  incidents  of  the  past,  a 
treaty  is  at  best  a  guide  in  conduct — the  evidence  of  a  moral  obligation,  and  as  such 
worthless  if  a  change  in  conditions  necessitate  different  conduct  or  substitute  new 
moral  obligations  for  old  ones.  The  conduct  of  Italy  and  the  change  in  her  obliga- 
tions, as  shown  in  the  documents,  offer  a  telling  example. 

To  be  guided  by  the  tenns  of  a  treaty  is  dangerous,  because,  instead  of  occupying 
himself  with  the  conditions  of  which  the  treaty  is  but  the  manifestation,  the  states- 
man keeps  his  eye  on  written  terms  that  are  static,  and  in  this  manner  contributes 
toward  the  reproduction  of  the  state  of  affairs  out  of  which  grew  the  terms  of  the 
treaty.  He  is  then  likely  to  make  "  operative,  "  as  Sir  Edward  Grey  expressed  it, 
what  otherwise  would  remain  a  dead  letter. 

The  statesmen  of  the  Triple  Alliance  especially  lived  in  the  contemplation  of  such 


740         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

political  corpses.  Their  striving  proceeded  from  them  and  was  directed  toward  them. 
The  result  was  that  they  continued  swinging  about  dead  centers.  Sight  was  lost  by 
them  of  the  fact  that  the  treaty  in  question  did  not  matter,  and  could  be  rendered  null 
and  void  by  siifficiently  modifying  the  conditions  from  which  the  treaty  sprang. 

The  Great  War  was  inevitable  only  becaus-e  it  was  thought  inevitable.  And  those 
who  thought  that  it  could  not  be  avoided  did  the  least  to  prevent  its  coming. 

For  instance,  had  Germany  decided  to  play  a  role  in  naval  armament  subordinate 
to  that  of  Great  Britain,  her  marvelous  expansion  and  s.uccess  in  the  commercial  field 
would  have  been  overlooked  for  many  years  to  come — to  a  period,  perhaps,  in  which 
the  British  would  not  have  been  able  to  destroy  her  foreign  market.  German  states- 
men did  not  pay  sufficient  attention  to  the  actual  backgroimd  of  Great  Britain's  atti- 
tude in  this  matter  imtil  it  was  too  late.  They  were  wholly  out  of  sympathy  with  the 
position  of  the  British  tax-payer,  who  might  not  go  to  war  because  he  foimd  German 
commercial  competition  irksome,  but  who,  in  self-defense,  would  have  to  go  to  war  if 
to  this  commercial  rivalry  was  coupled  a  race  in  naval  armament.  And  his  going  to 
war  under  such  conditions  deserves  a  certain  amount  of  S3mipathy.  Great  Britain 
depended,  and  still  depends,  upon  two  things:  Her  foreign  and  colonial  markets  and 
her  fleet-of-war.  The  men  in  Berlin  expected  too  much  in  their  hope  that  Great 
Britain  would  stand  idly  by  when  both  seemed  threatened,  as  the  British  public 
viewed  it. 

Coxmt  Benckendorff  had  reason  to  fear  that  a  meeting  of  minds  between  Berlin 
and  London  would  be  the  end  of  the  Entente.  With  the  new  orientation  that  would 
have  been  necessary  in  that  case,  the  World  War  would  have  been  indefinitely  post- 
poned, because  Russia  and  France  could  not  win  such  a  war  without  the  available 
and  latent  resources  of  Great  Britain  and  her  empire— her  great  influence  in  the 
United  States  included.  But  German  statesmen  remained  obdurate  before  the  many 
indications  they  had.  When  finally  they  realized  that  the  case  was  desperate,  the 
British  leaders,  especially  Sir  Edward  Grey,  had  made  up  their  minds  to  use  radical 
means. 

In  Germany  too  much  emphasis  was  laid  upon  the  point  of  honor  that  seemed 
involved.  The  empire  could  not  afford  to  be  dictated  to  in  any  respect,  it  was  argued. 
It  was  a  sovereign  right  of  Germany's  to  have  as  large  a  fieet-of-war  as  she  could 
afford.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  Germany  had  already  the  best  army,  it  seems  a  little 
childish  now  that  her  leaders  should  have  insisted  upon  having  as  good  a  fleet.  Of 
course,  theoretically  these  men  were  right,  but  practically  they  were  entirely  wrong. 
To  exercise  within  the  state  an  absolutism  is  one  thing;  to  apply  it  in  foreign  relations 
is  quite  another.  Internal  conditions  of  any  state  are  largely  the  natural  develop- 
ment of  the  relations  of  governors  to  governed;  of  external  relations  that  cannot  be 
said,  because  in  this  case  one's  own  effort  impinges  upon  an  aggregate  with  charac- 
teristics of  its  own,  with  the  result  that,  generally,  there  is  a  collision.  Germany 
foimd  it  necessary  to  maintain  the  best  land  forces,  but  was  at  first  not  willing  to 
recognize  that  Great  Britain,  for  like  or  similar  reasons,  had  to  protect  herself  by 
means  of  a  navy  second  to  none.    Out  of  this  came  the  Great  War. 

A  great  deal  has  been  heard  in  recent  years  in  regard  to  moral  issues  and  moral 
obligations  in  international  relations.  Nothing  can  be  gained  by  delving  into  matters 
as  abstract  and  elastic  as  these.    The  one  moral  obligation  that  is  easily  recognized  j 


CHRONOLOGICAL  ORDER  OF  DOCUMENTS   741 

is  the  one  incumbent  upon  him  who  has  the  necessary  power  to  do  a  thing  or  not  to 
do  it.  He  is  the  only  one  who  can  give  the  struggle  for  self-preservation  a  tinge  of 
generosity.  Though  we  do  not  generally  see  this  set  forth,  it  is  an  expression  of 
natural  law  that  the  weaker  fight  his  battles  with  any  means  at  his  disposal.  The 
documents  show  that  Sir  Edward  Grey  and  his  government  actually  held  the  peace  of 
Europe  in  their  hands.  They  show  further  that  Sir  Edward,  driven  by  prejudices 
perhaps,  did  little  or  nothing  to  bring  Germany  to  a  full  realization  of  her  own  position 
and  that  of  Europe.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  he  misled  the  German  government — in  the 
hope  of  being  able  to  dispose  of  Germany  as  commercial  competitor  and  naval  rival 
at  the  same  time.  While  the  "  Iron  Ring  "  about  Germany  was  indeed  of  paper — a 
series  of  treaties.  Sir  Edward  and  the  British  government  do  not  seem  to  have  ever 
done  an3^thing  that  cotild  open  the  eyes  of  the  German  statesmen  to  the  fallacy 
they  were  piursuing  in  looking  only  at  treaties  and  conventions  without  doing  any- 
thing to  influence  conditions.  Indeed,  we  find  Sir  Edward  in  a  most  despicable 
double  role.  He  misled  his  own  parliament  and  Berlin  at  the  same  time — ever  in  the 
hope  that  Germany  would  take  the  step  that  would  lead  to  her  destruction. 

The  docvunents  show  that  Sir  Edward  shunned  purposely  whatever  could  have 
cleared  the  situation.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  British  government  refrained 
studiously  from  placing  itself  squarely  on  record  under  what  conditions  international 
relations  could  be  improved,  the  critic  will  do  well  in  not  forming  hasty  judgments  as 
to  what  the  response  of  the  German  government  might  have  been.  There  is  no 
doubt  that  the  men  in  Berlin  were  extremely  "  sensitive  "  and  irritable.  They  had 
good  cause  for  this,  and  while  Sir  Edward  expected  the  Germans  not  to  annoy  him 
with  their  idiosyncracies,  he  might  have  taken  it  for  granted  that  to  the  Germans  he 
could  be  just  as  offensive.  Sir  Edward  is  shown  in  the  documents  as  a  most  un- 
worthy sort  of  persion — an  arrogant  master  of  men  who  feared  but  one  thing:  An 
interpellation  in  the  House  of  Commons;  pilot  of  an  empire,  who  cringed  before  the 
necessities  of  the  state. 

In  Iswolsky  and  Sazonoff,  and  Poincare,  Grey  had  able  lieutenants;  in  Bencken- 
dorfl  and  Cambon,  Imperiali,  Mensdorff,  Mettemich  and  Lichnowsky  obedient 
servants.  Grey  was  the  master  of  them  all — simply  for  the  reason  that  ethical  con- 
cepts had  no  meaning  to  him.  He  occupied  himself  solely  with  the  needs  of  his  em- 
pire, while  most  of  the  others  tinged  their  plans  at  least  with  some  regard  for  their 
friends. 

Sir  Edward  had  his  understandings,  but  of  them  only  one  had  a  paper  base,  so 
far  as  known,  and  what  sort  of  base  that  was  has  been  seen.  His  exchange  of  letters 
with  Paul  Cambon  amoimted  to  very  little,  when  viewed  in  the  light  of  the  alliance- 
treaties.  The  British  secretary  for  foreign  affairs  sought  no  casus  foederis  and  recog- 
nized none.  To  follow  another  policy  would  have  meant  assmning  a  definite  obliga- 
tion. It  was  his  aim  to  either  fashion  or  accept  a  casus  belli.  On  the  part  of  the 
British  government  that  was  a  commendable  saneness,  but  in  the  hands  of  Sir  Ed- 
ward this  fine  policy  became  a  terrible  weapon  of  destruction. 

It  must  be  doubted  that  the  Powers  on  the  Continent  of  Europe  would  have  gone 
to  war,  had  they  been  obliged  to  live  on  in  the  contemplation  of  dead  political  issues, 
as  preserved  in  the  several  treaties  of  alliance.  Static  bodies  do  not  collide  without 
force  moving  them.  It  was  necessary  to  upset  the  political  equilibritun  before  a  single 


742         ENTENTE  DIPLOMACY  AND  THE  WORLD 

one  of  the  treaty  terms  could  be  given  life — and  that  was  presently  done  under  the 
aegis  of  the  British  government. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  and  the  leaders  of  the  Liberal  and  Conservative  parties  had 
decided  that  checks  should  be  placed  upon  Germany.  The  entente  cordiale,  promoted 
by  King  Edward  in  full  imderstanding  with  the  Cabinet,  did  not  suffice  British  needs. 
Public  opinion  in  France  was  apathetic  toward  Great  Britain  long  after  the  entente 
had  become  a  fact.  Moreover,  the  imderstanding  with  France  bettered  but  slightly 
the  relations  between  Russia  and  Great  Britain,  and  did  not  at  first  materially  modify 
the  position  of  Germany.  An  attack  on  the  solidarity  of  the  Triple  Alliance  had  to  be 
made  in  order  that  this  be  accomplished,  and  this  we  find  in  i)  the  Franco-Italian 
Agreement  of  1902,  an  incidental  phase  of  the  entente  cordiale.  That  agreement, 
however,  remained  rather  lifeless.  Its  terms  were  of  a  decidedly  local  character,  and 
their  ultimate  purpose  could  not  be  realized  except  as  an  incident  to  a  major  fact  in 
Europe's  political  constellation. 

For  an  effective  rapprochement  with  Russia  a  means  had  to  be  foimd.  The  Anglo- 
Russian  Convention  2)  gave  both  countries  certain  immediate  advantages,  but,  more 
important  than  all,  established  the  contact  necessary  if  Great  Britain  was  to  free  "  the 
road  to  India  "  of  danger  and  keep  Russia  in  rein  at  the  Turkish  Straits.  It  was  the 
sole  basis  of  the  Anglo-Russian  entente,  and  developed  into  the  principal  djmamic 
element  that  brought  on  the  Great  War. 

The  Russo-Italian  Agreement  of  Racconigi,  1909  (3)  was  the  coimterpart  of  the 
Franco-Italian  Agreement,  and  the  first  direct  attempt  to  make  Italy  even  less  than  a 
"  dead  weight "  in  the  Triple  Alliance — an  element  of  danger. 

By  now,  there  was  close  contact  between  London,  Paris,  St.  Petersburg  and 
Rome.  Though  relations  were  a  little  clouded  at  times,  they  remained  always  clear 
enough  for  the  purpose  in  hand*  The  "  Mechanism  of  the  Entente,  **  4)  as  Lord 
Northcliffe  has  so  aptly  described  it,  began  to  work  with  imerring  precision.  Iswol- 
sky  and  Sazonofl,  driven  by  many  desires  and  urged  on  by  the  "  historic  missions" 
of  Russia,  supplied  most  of  the  motive  power,  as  did  Poincare,  and,  to  a  lesser  degree, 
Pichon.  Grey  kept  the  throttle  in  hand,  and  when  that  failed,  he  applied  the  brake 
in  Persia.  If  it  was  not  Sir  Edward,  the  master  mechanician,  who  checked  the  em- 
pire-mad, mission-ridden  and  impulsive  Muscovite,  it  was  Grey,  the  disgruntled, 
chagrined,  disappointed  and  disillusioned  super-man,  who  played  on  the  feelings  of 
Count  Benckendorfl  and  kept  the  Russian  minister  of  foreign  affairs  in  line.  More 
astute  than  the  Russians,  the  French  statesmen  confined  themselves  to  egging  on 
their  Allies,  to  assist  Grey  later  in  reining  them. 

Naturally,  some  compensation  had  to  be  made  to  Russia.  Grey  adopted  a  con- 
venient attitude  in  the  Balkan  Question  5)  and  even  flirted  with  Pan-Slavism,  which 
ten  years  before  would  have  been  the  political  death  of  any  British  statesman. 

While  Sir  Edward  was  willing  to  please  Russia  in  the  Balkan,  he  had  to  draw  the 
line  at  the  Dardanelles  and  Bosphorus  6).  The  manner  in  which  he  did  this  shows 
Grey  up  as  an  imprincipled  trickster  of  a  particularly  unlovely  type,  and  the  same 
must  be  said  in  regard  to  his  attitude  on  7)  the  Bagdad  raihoad  question,  and  in  8) 
the  Open  Door  issue.  His  stand  was  hardly  better  in  9)  the  Morocco  imbroglio,  and 
in  10)  the  Armament  problem  he  showed  his  true  colors.  Haldane's  mission  to 
Berlin,  aa  well  as  the  Churchill  proposals  are  pictured  in  the  docimients  as  being 


CHRONOLOGICAL  ORDER  OF  DOCUMENTS   743 

without  sincerity,  and,  as  Iswolsky,  then  Russian  ambassador  at  Paris  remarked, 
these  negotiations  and  settlements  postponed  merely  what  he  thought  was  due — the 
Great  War.  Already  in  December  of  191 1  the  former  Russian  minister  of  foreign 
affairs  had  no  longer  the  least  doubt  as  to  that.  In  that  respect  he  was  a  most  per- 
sistent and  consistent  diplomatist. 

We  can  have  a  new  era  in  international  relations  only  if  a  sufficient  number  of 
men  and  women,  in  all  countries,  will  come  to  realize  what  the  defects  and  dangers  of 
the  old  system  are.  To  see  these  defects  in  all  their  hideousness,  it  is  not  only  neces- 
sary to  read  this  book  from  cover  to  cover,  but  to  study  it  backward,  as  it  were.  The 
chapters  of  the  book  tell  the  story  from  the  angle  of  incident;  the  index  here  provided 
mirrors  the  system  by  bringing  all  dociunents  into  their  proper  relative  position.  The 
chronological  order,  moreover,  renders  futile  all  possible  allegations  to  the  effect 
that  giving  the  dociunents  in  the  order  of  incident  contains  elements  or  considerations 
designed  to  favor  any  particular  political  camp.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  read  in  the  order 
of  time,  the  documents  gain  additional  force,  conveying,  in  all  its  awe-inspiring  total- 
ity, full  knowledge  of  the  actual  cause  of  the  Great  War. 

To  use  the  list,  read  down,  and  then  look  to  the  left  for  the  number  of  the  page  on 
which  the  docimient  can  be  found.  The  serial  nimibers  in  the  first  colimin  have  no 
bearing  upon  the  documents,  serving  entirely  the  convenience  of  the  reader. 

Editor. 


744   CHRONOLOGICAL  ORDER  OF  DOCUMENTS 


6 

Date 

Document 

Page 

(3 

.2 

II 

il 

J 

pi 

g 

o 

a 

^ 

1907 

No. 

No. 

66 

6  c 
§8 

II 

II 

•a 

Q 

i 

1 

*g 

tl 

1§ 

fe^ 

SS 

S"? 

cd 

0. 

o 

S 

^ 

fe< 

<o 

<rt 

_    ^ 

p:s 

« 

o 

s 

^ 

1 

February       1, 

548 

474 

2 

4 

7 

8 

9 

2 

December  19, 
1908 

549 

477 

2 

4 

7 

3 

June             18, 

550 

478 

2 

4 

0 

4 

October        9, 

551 

480 

2 

4 

7 

5 

November    5, 

255 

229 

1 

4 

5 

0 

6 

November  25, 

552 

481 

2 

4 

0 

7 

December     3, 
1909 

553 

482 

2 

4 

5 

9 

0 

8 

January      28, 

256 

231 

4 

5 

0 

9 

February      3, 

554 

484 

2 

4 

5 

9 

0 

10 

February    10, 

555 

486 

4 

7 

0 

11 

February     10, 

556 

487 

4 

7 

9 

0 

12 

February     15, 

557 

489 

2 

4 

5 

6 

0 

13 

February    16, 

558 

489 

5 

7 

9 

0 

14 

February    19, 

559 

491 

2 

4 

5 

7 

9 

0 

15 

February    24, 

258 

233 

4 

5 

16 

February    26, 

276 

248 

4 

5 

0 

17 

February    26, 

257 

231 

4 

5 

0 

18 

February    27, 

259 

233 

4 

5 

19 

February    27, 

260 

234 

4 

5 

20 

February    27, 

261 

235 

5 

21 

February    27, 

262 

236 

5 

22 

February    28, 

263 

236 

4 

5 

23 

February    28, 

264 

236 

4 

5 

24 

March           2, 

267 

241 

4 

5 

25 

March           2, 

265 

237 

4 

5 

26 

March           3, 

266 

238 

4 

5 

0 

27 

March           3, 

268 

242 

4 

5 

28 

March           3, 

269 

243 

5 

29 

March           5, 

270 

244 

5 

30 

March           5, 

271 

245 

5 

31 

March           6, 

272 

245 

4 

5 

32 

March           7, 

273 

245 

5 

33 

March           7, 

274 

247 

5 

34 

March            8, 

275 

247 

4 

5 

36 

March           9, 

277 

248 

4 

5 

0 

36 

March          11, 

278 

248 

4 

5 

37 

March         11, 

279 

248 

4 

5 

38 

March         12, 

280 

249 

4 

5 

39 

March          13, 

307 

273 

5 

40 

March          13, 

281 

249 

4 

5 

41 

March          15, 

282 

251 

4 

5 

42 

March          16, 

283 

251 

4 

5 

43 

March         17, 

284 

252 

4 

5 

0 

44 

March         17, 

285 

254 

■ 

4 

5 

CHRONOLOGICAL  ORDER  OF  DOCUMENTS    745 


o 

Date 

Document 

Page 

c 
.2 

21 

ii 

o 

m 

•^ 

(^ 

§ 

o 

^ 

1909 

No. 

No. 

66 

S'S 

§8 

II 

II 

•3 

•a 

Q 

o 

a 

CIS 

1 

C  O 

II 

?l 

5 

& 

bo 

1 

1 

<3 

45 

March 

17, 

286 

255 

4 

46 

March 

17, 

287 

255 

4 

5 

0 

47 

March 

17, 

288 

256 

5 

0 

48 

March 

17, 

289 

256 

4 

5 

49 

March 

17, 

290 

257 

4 

5 

60 

March 

19; 

291 

258 

4 

5 

0 

51 

March 

22, 

292 

258 

4 

5 

0 

52 

March 

23, 

293 

259 

4 

5 

53 

March 

23, 

294 

260 

4 

5 

0 

54 

March 

24, 

295 

261 

4 

5 

55 

March 

26, 

296 

262 

4 

5 

56 

March 

26, 

297 

262 

4 

5 

57 

March 

26, 

298 

263 

4 

5 

58 

March 

27, 

299 

263 

4 

5 

59 

April 

1, 

302 

265 

1 

4 

5 

9 

0 

60 

April 

1, 

303 

267 

2 

4 

5 

6 

0 

61 

April 

1, 

304 

268 

4 

5 

6 

0 

62 

April 

2, 

560 

492 

5 

9 

0 

63 

April 

4, 

300 

264 

4 

5 

64 

April 

6, 

301 

264 

2 

4 

5 

0 

65 

April 

8, 

305 

270 

1 

2 

4 

5 

66 

April 

15, 

306 

271 

4 

5 

6 

0 

67 

April 

16, 

308 

273 

5 

68 

April 

18, 

309 

274 

5 

69 

April 

18, 

310 

274 

5 

70 

April 

27, 

311 

275 

5 

71 

May 

4, 

312 

275 

5 

72 

May 

12, 

313 

276 

5 

73 

May 

22, 

53 

49 

2 

4 

74 

May 

25, 

314 

276 

5 

75 

May 

28, 

561 

493 

2 

4 

0 

76 

June 

3, 

54 

50 

2 

4 

77 

June 

5, 

55 

51 

2 

4 

78 

June 

7, 

56 

53 

2 

4 

79 

June 

8, 

315 

276 

5 

80 

June 

22, 

171 

146 

3 

4 

5 

0 

81 

June 

25, 

562 

494 

0 

§2 

June 

30, 

57 

53 

2 

4 

83,    July 

2, 

563 

495 

2 

5 

6 

9 

0 

84 

July 

2, 

58 

54 

2 

4 

85 

July 

3, 

59 

55 

2 

4 

86 

July 

13, 

60 

56 

2 

4 

87 

July 

13, 

61 

57 

2 

4 

88 

July 

14, 

62 

57 

2 

89 

July 

20, 

63 

58 

2 

4 

9vl 

August 

16, 

64 

59 

4 

6 

91 

August 

16, 

316 

277 

5 

746   CHRONOLOGICAL  ORDER  OF  DOCUMENTS 


6 

Date 

Document 

Page 

(—1   4) 

It 

•0 

.1 

•5" 

=3 

pi 
ei 

, 

0 

1 

52; 

1909 

No. 

No. 

66 

(U  0 

la 

-13 

c 

S 

1 

1 

II 

00  c 
c  0 

S  0 

?l 

5 

00 

0 

1 

< 

92 

October       12, 

2 

8 

8 

93 

October       15, 

1 

8 

8 

94 

October       18, 

3 

9 

8 

95 

October       27, 

172 

148 

3 

4 

96 

October       27, 

173 

148 

3 

4 

5 

0 

97 

October       29, 

174 

149 

3 

4 

0 

98 

October       30, 

175 

150 

3 

4 

5 

0 

99 

November    3, 

317 

278 

3 

4 

5 

100 

November    4, 

178 

150 

3 

4 

5 

6 

0 

101 

November    4, 

179 

152 

3 

4 

5 

6 

102 

November    6, 

180 

154 

3 

4 

5 

6 

1 

103 

November    7, 

181 

155 

1 

3 

4 

tf 

104 

November  10, 

564 

497 

4 

0 

105 

November  12, 

176 

150 

3 

4 

5 

0 

106 

November  12, 

565 

498 

< 

107 

November  12, 

566 

499 

4 

108 

November  14, 

177 

150 

3 

4 

5 

109 

November  15, 

318 

279 

3 

4 

5 

110 

November  18, 

568 

501 

4 

7 

111 

November  19, 

569 

502 

4 

7 

112 

November  22, 

319 

279 

5 

113 

November  23, 

570 

503 

7 

114 

November  24, 

571 

504 

4 

7 

115 

November  26, 

573 

506 

4 

7 

116 

November  27, 

572 

505 

4 

7 

117 

November  27, 

574 

509 

4 

7 

118 

December     1, 

575 

509 

4 

7 

119 

December     8, 

576 

510 

2 

4 

7 

120 

December     9, 

577 

512 

4 

7 

121 

December  15, 

4 

9 

8 

122 

December  19, 

579 

513 

4 

7 

123 

December  20, 

5 

10 

8 

124 

December  21, 

580 

514 

4 

7 

125 

December  22, 

578 

513 

4 

7 

126 

December  24, 

581 

514 

4 

7 

127 

December  24, 

582 

515 

4 

7 

0 

128 

December  24, 

6 

10 

8 

129 

December  28, 
1910 

7 

10 

8 

130 

January       13, 

8 

11 

8 

131 

January       13, 

9 

12 

4 

8 

132 

January       13, 

10 

12 

8 

133 

January       13, 

11 

13 

4 

8 

134 

January      20, 

583 

516 

4 

7 

135 

January      21, 

65 

61 

2 

4 

136 

January      26, 

66 

62 

2 

4 

137 

January      27, 

321 

282 

5 

CHRONOLOGICAL  ORDER  OF  DOCUMENTS   747 


6 

Date 

Document 

Page 

Is 

3.2 

g-s, 

is 

a 

CI 

s 

o 

a 

1910 

No. 

No. 

6a 

O  U 

n 

II 

^1 

c« 

§ 

0 

1 

II 

2 

II 

4 

II 

w 
^ 

o 

o 

1 

138 

January 

31, 

67 

64 

139 

January 

31, 

68 

64 

2 

4 

140 

February 

2, 

584 

516 

4 

7 

141 

February 

2, 

69 

65 

2 

4 

142 

February 

2, 

324 

285 

5 

143 

February 

3, 

322 

282 

3 

5 

6 

0 

144 

February 

4, 

^ 

285 

5 

145 

February 

4, 

285 

3 

5 

6 

146 

February 

5, 

323 

283 

5 

6 

147 

February 

6, 

327 

286 

5 

6 

148 

February 

9, 

328 

286 

3 

4 

5 

6 

149 

February 

12, 

332 

289 

3 

4 

5 

150 

February 

12, 

333 

289 

3 

4 

5 

6 

151 

February 

17, 

334 

289 

3 

4 

5 

152 

February 

24, 

329 

287 

4 

5 

153 

February 

26, 

330 

288 

4 

5 

154 

February 

26, 

335 

291 

3 

4 

5 

155 

February 

26, 

336 

291 

4 

5 

156 

February 

27, 

331 

288 

4 

5 

157 

February 

27, 

337 

291 

4 

5 

158 

March 

1, 

338 

291 

4 

5 

159 

March 

1, 

339 

292 

4 

5 

160 

March 

1, 

340 

293 

3 

4 

5 

161 

March 

2, 

341 

294 

3 

4 

5 

162 

March 

3, 

342 

294 

4 

5 

163 

March 

8, 

12 

15 

8 

164 

March 

lo; 

343 

295 

5 

6 

165 

March 

10, 

70 

66 

2 

4 

8 

166 

March 

15, 

71 

67 

2 

4 

7 

167 

March 

16, 

72 

68 

2 

4 

168 

March 

16, 

73 

68 

2 

4 

8 

169 

March 

16, 

74 

70 

2 

4 

7 

170 

March 

16, 

75 

71 

2 

4 

7 

171 

March 

16, 

76 

72 

2 

4 

7 

172 

March 

18 

77 

73 

2 

4 

7 

9 

173 

March 

18, 

78 

73 

2 

4 

7 

8 

174 

March 

18, 

79 

74 

2 

4 

175 

March 

18, 

567 

499 

2 

3 

4 

5 

176 

March 

19, 

344 

295 

5 

177 

March 

20, 

345 

296 

4 

5 

6 

178 

March 

2o; 

80 

75 

2 

4 

179 

March 

21, 

81 

75 

2 

4 

7 

8 

180 

March 

21, 

82 

76 

2 

4 

7 

8 

181 
182 
183 

184 

March 
March 
March 
March 

22, 
22, 
23, 
23, 

83 
346 

84 
88 

76 
296 

77 
79 

2 

2 
2 

4 
4 
4 
4 

5 

7 

8 

748   CHRONOLOGICAL  ORDER  OF  DOCUMENTS 


1 

^ 

c 

°. 

^ 

6 

Date 

Document 

Page 

1^ 

(-1  (U 

a 

3.2 
o  ^ 

"o 

Is 

Ji 

1 

P^ 
(^ 

§ 

o 

g 

1910 

No. 

No. 

AS 

U 

•a 

1 

c 

1 

k 

1§ 

II 

fi 

ii 

(3 

o 

o 

< 

185 

March 

24, 

85 

78 

2 

0 

186 

March 

24, 

86 

78 

2 

4 

187 

March 

26 

87 

78 

2 

4 

7 

8 

^ 

188 

April 

Q, 

585 

517 

4 

7 

1 

189 

April 

8, 

586 

518 

4 

7 

190 

April 

9, 

587 

518 

4 

7 

191 

April 

14, 

94 

84 

2 

8 

192 

April 

16, 

89 

80 

2 

4 

8 

« 

193 

April 

16, 

90 

80 

2 

7 

8 

1 

194 

April 

16, 

91 

81 

2 

4 

7 

0 

195 

April 

19, 

588 

519 

4 

7 

196 

April 

21 

347 

297 

2 

5 

6 

0 

197 

April 

21, 

589 

519 

4 

7 

198 

April 

22, 

590 

520 

7 

199 

April 

23, 

591 

520 

4 

7 

200 

April 

23, 

92 

82 

2 

0 

201 

April 

25, 

96 

85 

4 

8 

202 

April 

25, 

592 

521 

7 

203 

April 

26 

593 

521 

7 

204 

April 

26; 

93 

83 

2 

4 

8 

0 

205 

April 

26, 

182 

156 

2 

3 

4 

206 

April 

27, 

348 

297 

5 

6 

0 

207 

April 

28, 

97 

86 

2 

4 

208 

May 

4, 

594 

521 

2 

7 

209 

May 

7, 

13 

15 

8 

210 

May 

10, 

598 

524 

4 

211 

May 

11, 

595 

522 

7 

212 

May 

12, 

14 

16 

8 

213 

May 

12, 

95 

85 

2 

8 

0 

214 

May 

13, 

98 

86 

2 

4 

215 

May 

18, 

99 

87 

2 

4 

7 

0 

216 

May 

18, 

596 

523 

7 

217 

May 

21, 

100 

87 

2 

4 

7 

218 

May 

22, 

101 

88 

2 

4 

219 

May 

24, 

102 

89 

2 

4 

7 

9 

220 

May 

26, 

103 

89 

2 

4 

221 

May 

31, 

104 

90 

2 

4 

8 

9 

0 

222 

June 

7, 

597 

523 

7 

223 

June 

11, 

599 

525 

4 

224 

June 

15, 

600 

525 

4 

225 

June 

24, 

15 

16 

2 

4 

8 

226 

June 

24, 

16 

17 

4 

8 

227 

June 

24, 

17 

17 

4 

8 

228 

June 

25, 

18 

18 

4 

8 

229 

June 

28, 

19 

18 

4 

8 

230 

June 

28, 

20 

19 

4 

8 

231 

June 

28, 

349 

298 

4 

6 

7 

0 

« 


CHRONOLOGICAL  ORDER  OF  DOCUMENTS   749 


d 

Date 

Document 

Page 

(3 

0^ 

o 

g 

1910 

No. 

No. 

66 

II 

la 

P 
a 

§ 

a 

cU 

II 

bo  C 

c  o 

fl 

II 

(3 

1 

o 

B 
< 

232 

June             29, 

21 

20 

4 

8 

233 

June             30, 

350 

299 

4 

6 

7 

0 

234 

July                7, 

351 

300 

4 

6 

235 

July                8, 

601 

525 

4 

236 

July              14, 

22 

19 

8 

0 

237 

August          3, 

352 

300 

4 

5 

6 

0 

238 

August          5, 

602 

526 

5 

239 

August         17, 

106 

92 

2 

3 

4 

8 

0 

240 

August         18, 

107 

95 

2 

241 

September    6, 

108 

95 

2 

4 

242 

September    7, 

183 

156 

4 

5 

243 

September    8, 

109 

95 

2 

4 

244 

September  10, 

110 

96 

2 

0 

245 
246 

September  26, 
September  26, 

112 
354 

97 
302 

2 

4 
4 

6 

247 
248 
249 
250 
251 

September  28, 
September  28, 
September  29, 
October         1, 
October         3, 

356 
113 
114 
115 
111 

304 
97 
98 
98 
96 

2 
2 
2 
2 

4 
4 
4 
4 
4 

5 

6 

0 
0 

252 

October         8, 

116 

98 

2 

4 

8 

0 

253 

October       23, 

355 

302 

4 

6 

7 

254 

October       24, 

353 

301 

4 

6 

7 

0 

255 

October       26, 

117 

102 

2 

4 

256 

November    8, 

357 

304 

5 

0 

257 

November  11, 

603 

526 

0 

258 

November  19, 

23 

21 

8 

259 

November  23, 

24 

22 

4 

8 

260 

November  26, 

320 

280 

4 

5 

261 

December     2, 

26 

24 

8 

0 

262 

December  10, 

25 

23 

4 

8 

263 

December  10, 

27 

27 

8 

0 

264 

December  15, 

604 

527 

2 

4 

7 

0 

265 

December  17, 

28 

28 

4 

8 

0 

266 

December  20, 

605 

528 

4 

7 

267 
268 
269 

270 

December  21, 
December  23, 
December  24, 

1911 
January         3, 

606 
29 
30 

608 

529 
29 
29 

531 

1 

2 

4 
4 

7 

8 
8 

0 

271 

January         5, 

607 

529 

0 

272 

January         7, 

610 

532 

2 

7 

273 

January         9, 

609 

532 

4 

0 

274 

January       10, 

611 

532 

4 

275 

January       11, 

612 

533 

4 

276 
277 

January       15, 
January       15, 

358 
613 

305 
533 

4 

5 

750   CHRONOLOGICAL  ORDER  OF  DOCUMENTS 


6 

Date 

Document 

Page 

0 

1-4  0) 

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1:3. 

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1 

00 

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5 
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278 

January 

15, 

614 

534 

2 

4 

7 

0 

279 

January 

17, 

615 

536 

2 

4 

7 

0 

280 

January 

21, 

616 

539 

2 

4 

281 

January 

27, 

617 

539 

2 

4 

282 

January 

27, 

618 

539 

2 

4 

7 

0 

283 

January 

28, 

118 

104 

2 

4 

284 

February 

1, 

119 

104 

2 

285 

February 

2, 

620 

545 

4 

0 

286 

February 

4, 

621 

547 

4 

7 

287 

February 

4, 

622 

547 

4 

7 

288 

February 

4, 

623 

548 

4 

,7 

289 

February 

6, 

31 

29 

8 

0 

290 

February 

6, 

624 

548 

4 

7 

291 

February 

6, 

625 

549 

2 

4 

7 

292 

February 

7, 

626 

549 

4 

0 

293 

February 

7, 

627 

549 

2 

4 

7 

294 

February 

9, 

628 

550 

2 

4 

5 

7 

0 

295 

February 

10, 

629 

551 

4 

7 

296 

February 

11, 

630 

551 

4 

7 

297 

February 

11, 

631 

552 

4 

7 

298 

February 

12, 

632 

552 

7 

299 

February 

13, 

633 

553 

4 

7 

300 

February 

14, 

619 

542 

2 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

0 

301 

February 

15, 

359 

306 

4 

5 

6 

0 

302 

February 

15, 

634 

553 

7 

303 

February 

17, 

635 

553 

2 

4 

7 

304 

February 

17, 

636 

554 

4 

7 

305 

February 

17, 

637 

555 

4 

7 

306 

February 

18, 

638 

555 

4 

7 

307 

February 

18, 

639 

555 

7 

308 

February 

20, 

32 

30 

4 

8 

309 

February 

21, 

33 

30 

8 

0 

310 

February 

23, 

640 

556 

7 

311 

February 

26, 

641 

556 

2 

4 

7 

8 

312 

February 

28, 

360 

307 

2 

4 

5 

6 

7 

313 

March 

3, 

643 

558 

4 

0 

314 

March 

3, 

645 

560 

4 

0 

315 

March 

11, 

362 

309 

5 

316 

March 

14, 

642 

557 

4 

7 

317 

March 

14 

644 

559 

4 

0 

318 

March 

14; 

650 

563 

2 

4 

7 

9 

0 

319 

March 

16, 

646 

560 

4 

7 

320 

March 

16, 

653 

566 

2 

4 

7 

321 

March 

21, 

654 

567 

4 

7 

322 

March 

22, 

647 

561 

4 

7 

323 

March 

23 

648 

562 

4 

7 

324 

March 

24, 

655 

567 

2 

7 

CHRONOLOGICAL  ORDER  OF  DOCUMENTS   751 


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i 

Date 

Document 

Page 

a 

Is 

1.1 

IS 

c 

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March 

26, 

649 

562 

4 

7 

326 

March 

2?; 

656 

567 

2 

7 

327 

March 

28, 

651 

564 

2 

4 

6 

7 

8 

0 

328 

March 

28, 

669 

577 

4 

8 

9 

329 

March 

31, 

652 

566 

4 

0 

330 

April 

1, 

34 

30 

4 

8 

0 

331 

April 

1, 

365 

314 

5 

6 

332 

April 

1, 

657 

568 

2 

7 

333 

April 

2, 

366 

314 

5 

334 

April 

3, 

658 

568 

2 

7 

335 

April 

8, 

367 

314 

5 

336 

April 

13, 

670 

578 

4 

9 

0 

337 

April 

15, 

361 

308 

6 

0 

338 
339 
340 
341 
342 
343 

April 
April 
April 
April 
May 
May 

25, 
26, 
28, 
29, 
5, 
9, 

363 
659 
671 
35 
675 
660 

310 
568 
579 
31 
585 
569 

2 

4 
4 
4 

4 

5 

7 
7 

7 

8 

8 
8 

9 
9 

0 
0 

344 

May 

9, 

672 

581 

4 

9 

0 

345 

May 

11, 

661 

569 

4 

7 

346 

May 

11, 

673 

581 

1 

2 

3 

4 

9 

0 

347 

May 

11, 

676 

585 

4 

9 

348 

May 

15, 

662 

570 

7 

349 

May 

17, 

663 

570 

4 

7 

350 

May 

17, 

664 

570 

4 

7 

351 

May 

20, 

677 

585 

4 

9 

352 

May 

22, 

678 

586 

9 

353 

May 

23, 

674 

582 

4 

7 

8 

9 

0 

354 

May 

24, 

679 

587 

4 

9 

355 

May 

24, 

665 

571 

2 

4 

7 

0 

356 

May 

27, 

368 

315 

5 

357 

June 

21, 

666 

574 

2 

4 

7 

8 

358 

July 

2, 

680 

588 

4 

9 

359 

July 

3, 

681 

589 

4 

9 

360 

July 

3, 

682 

589 

9 

361 

July 

3, 

683 

590 

9 

362 

July 

3, 

684 

590 

4 

9 

363 

July 

5, 

685 

590 

4 

9 

0 

364 

July 

5, 

686 

591 

9 

365 

July 

6, 

687 

592 

9 

366 

July 

8, 

369 

315 

5 

0 

367 

July 

11, 

120 

105 

2 

368 

July 

17, 

121 

105 

2 

369 

July 

17, 

122 

105 

2 

370 

July 

17, 

123 

106 

2 

371 

July 

17, 

36 

32 

2 

4 

0 

752   CHRONOLOGICAL  ORDER  OF  DOCUMENTS 


n 


6 

Date 

Document 

Page 

ll 

a 

pi 
Pi 

o        O 

1911 

No. 

No. 

II 

is 

II 

II 

t3 

t3 

•3 

^  i 

•c 

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i^ 

^S 

^ 

S.      o 

g 

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m 

o 

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< 

372 

July              19, 

688 

592 

4 

7 

9 

0 

373 

July              22, 

184 

157 

3 

4 

5 

374 

July              26, 

124 

106 

2 

i 

375 

August          1, 

667 

575 

4 

7 

1 

376 

August           1, 

689 

594 

4 

9 

0 

377 

August         16, 

690 

597 

4 

9 

378 

August         16, 

691 

598 

2 

4 

5 

9 

0 

379 

August         17, 

125 

106 

2 

380 

August         18, 

692 

599 

9 

0 

381 

August         19, 

126 

107 

2 

382 

August        22, 

127 

107 

2 

383 

August        23, 

128 

109 

2 

384 

August        26, 

186 

158 

1 

3 

4 

5 

6 

0 

385 

August        29, 

693 

599 

4 

9 

0 

386 

September    6, 

694 

602 

4 

9 

387 

September    7, 

668 

576 

4 

7 

388 

September    7, 

695 

602 

4 

9 

389 

September    7, 

696 

602 

4 

9 

0 

390 

September    7, 

699 

604 

9 

391 

September    8, 

697 

603 

4 

9 

0 

392 

September    8, 

698 

604 

4 

9 

0 

393 

September    9, 

700 

605 

4 

9 

394 

September  12, 

187 

159 

3 

4 

5 

395 

September  13, 

188 

159 

3 

396 

September  14, 

701 

605 

4 

8 

9 

397 

September  17, 

702 

605 

4 

9 

0 

398 

September  19, 

704 

606 

4 

8 

9 

399 

September  20, 

703 

606 

4 

9 

400 

September  26, 

189 

159 

3 

5 

6 

401 

September  27, 

190 

161 

1 

3 

4 

6 

9 

402 

September  30, 

192 

162 

3 

4 

403 

October         1, 

191 

162 

4 

6 

404 

October         8, 

193 

162 

4 

6 

405 

October         8, 

371 

316 

1 

4 

5 

6 

406 

October       13, 

706 

609 

9 

0 

407 

October       14, 

373 

317 

6 

408 

October       15, 

374 

318 

5 

6 

409 

October       20, 

129 

109 

2 

9 

0 

410 

October       22, 

194 

163 

4 

5 

6 

411 

October       23, 

376 

319 

4 

5 

6 

412 

October       23, 

377 

320 

2 

4 

5 

6 

0 

413 

October       24, 

130 

112 

2 

0 

414 

October       24, 

131 

113 

2 

7 

0 

415 

October       24, 

378 

323 

4 

6 

0 

416 

October       24, 

705 

607 

1 

3 

4 

9 

0 

417 

October       25, 

707 

609 

9 

418 

October       25, 

379 

324 

4 

6 

CHRONOLOGICAL  ORDER  OF  DOCUMENTS   753 


6 

Date 

Document 

Page 

0 

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IS 

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to 
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1911 

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No. 

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October       25, 

380 

324 

3 

4 

5 

6 

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October       26, 

381 

325 

4 

6 

421 

November    1, 

196 

165 

1 

4 

6 

422 

November    2, 

382 

325 

' 

4 

6 

423 

November    3, 

375 

318 

4 

6 

7 

424 

November    4, 

197 

165 

1 

3 

4 

6 

0 

425 

November    6, 

195 

164 

1 

3 

4 

5 

6 

9 

0 

426 

November    7, 

185 

157 

3 

4 

5 

6 

427 

November    8, 

132 

114 

2 

428 

November    8, 

133 

114 

2 

0 

429 

November    8, 

383 

325 

3 

4 

6 

430 

November    8, 

384 

328 

2 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

0 

431 

November  11, 

134 

115 

2 

4 

432 

November  11, 

136 

117 

2 

0 

433 

November  16, 

135 

116 

2 

0 

434 

November  18, 

137 

120 

2 

4 

435 

November  19, 

138 

121 

2 

436 

November  20, 

139 

121 

2 

7 

437 

November  21, 

140 

122 

2 

4 

438 

November  21, 

141 

123 

1 

2 

3 

4 

9 

439 

November  21, 

708 

609 

2 

4 

9 

0 

440 

November  22, 

711 

613 

2 

4 

0 

441 

November  23, 

142 

124 

2 

4 

0 

442 

November  23, 

143 

124 

2 

4 

0 

443 

November  23, 

144 

125 

2 

4 

444 

November  24, 

145 

125 

2 

4 

445 

November  24, 

146 

126 

2 

4 

446 

November  24, 

385 

330 

6 

447 

November  26, 

147 

126 

2 

4 

448 

November  26, 

148 

127 

2 

0 

449 

November  29, 

149 

128 

2 

450 

November  30, 

155 

133 

2 

451 

November  30, 

709 

610 

2 

4 

0 

452 

December     1, 

150 

128 

2 

4 

453 

December     1, 

156 

134 

2 

0 

454 

December     2, 

151 

128 

1 

2 

3 

4 

455 

December     2, 

152 

129 

2 

4 

0 

456 

December     3, 

157 

134 

2 

0 

457 

December     4, 

153 

131 

2 

4 

0 

458 

December     4, 

158 

134 

2 

4 

0 

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December     6, 

154 

133 

2 

460 

December     8, 

159 

135 

2 

461 

December  10, 

160 

135 

2 

462 

December  12, 

372 

316 

4 

5 

0 

463 

December  20, 

710 

611 

4 

5 

9 

0 

464 

December  22, 

161 

135 

2 

0 

465 

December  23, 

162 

136 

2 

0 

754   CHRONOLOGICAL  ORDER  OF  DOCUMENTS 


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December  24, 

163 

137 

2 

0 

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December  24, 

164 

137 

2 

0 

468 

December  27, 

39 

36 

4 

8 

469 

December  29, 
1912 

744 

656 

4 

7 

470 

January         1, 

165 

137 

2 

471 

January         3, 

166 

138 

2 

472 

January         5, 

167 

138 

2 

473 

January         6, 

168 

139 

2 

474 

January       15, 

386 

330 

2 

5 

6 

8 

0 

475 

January       18, 

169 

139 

2 

476 

January       23, 

38 

33 

4 

8 

0 

477 

January       25, 

37 

33 

4 

8 

478 

January       28, 

170 

139 

1 

2 

3 

4 

0 

479 

February       8, 

712 

614 

2 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

0 

480 

February       8, 

713 

622 

4 

9 

0 

481 

February       9, 

714 

623 

4 

9 

0 

482 

February       9, 

387 

332 

4 

6 

483 

February     10, 

715 

624 

2 

4 

7 

9 

0 

484 

February    12, 

745 

657 

7 

485 

February     13, 

388 

333 

4 

6 

7 

486 

February     13, 

716 

627 

4 

0 

487 

February     13, 

717 

628 

4 

7 

0 

488 

February     13, 

718 

629 

4 

0 

489 

February    16, 

389 

334 

6 

7 

490 

February     17, 

719 

629 

2 

4 

0 

491 

February     18, 

720 

630 

2 

4 

7 

0 

492 

February     19, 

390 

334 

4 

6 

7 

493 

February    20, 

391 

335 

2 

6 

7 

8 

494 

February    21, 

392 

335 

4 

6 

7 

495 

February    29, 

721 

633 

4 

7 

0 

496 

March           6, 

394 

336 

4 

6 

7 

8 

497 

March          15, 

722 

634 

4 

0 

498 

March          15, 

723 

635 

4 

0 

499 

March          18, 

40 

37 

4 

8 

0 

600 

March         22, 

41 

37 

4 

8 

0 

501 

March          23, 

393 

336 

4 

6 

7 

502 

March          25, 

198 

166 

1 

3 

4 

5 

0 

503 

March          25, 

239 

192 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

8 

0 

504 

March          29, 

724 

635 

6 

0 

505 

March         30, 

396 

339 

4 

5 

0 

506 

April               1, 

397 

339 

4 

5 

507 

April              4, 

398 

340 

4 

5 

508 

April            16, 

399 

340 

4 

5 

509 

April             20, 

42 

38 

4 

8 

510 

April            23, 

746 

657 

7 

511 

April             30, 

199 

167 

4 

6 

CHRONOLOGICAL  ORDER  OF  DOCUMENTS   755 


Date 
1912 


April 
April 
May 
May 
May 
May 
May 
May 
May 
May 
May 
May 
May 
May 
May 
May 
May 
May 
May 
May 
May 
May 
May 
May 
May 
May 
June 
June 
June 
June 
June 
June 
June 
June 
June 
June 
June 
June 
June 
June 
June 
June 
June 
June 
June 
June 
June 


30, 

30, 

1, 

2, 

2, 

8, 

9, 

11, 

11, 

14, 

15, 

18, 

18, 

21, 

23, 

24, 

28, 

28, 

29, 

30, 

30, 

30, 

30, 

31, 

31, 

31, 

1, 

2, 

4, 

4, 

4, 

4, 

6, 

6, 

6, 

6, 

7, 

9, 

9, 

10, 

11, 
13, 
14, 
14, 
17, 
17, 
17. 


Docvument 

No. 


200 
395 
201 
202 
203 
725 
204 
206 
401 
43 
205 
208 
726 
207 
209 
727 
210 
211 
212 
213 
214 
215 
405 
728 
219 
220 
747 
729 
732 
733 
216 
248 
217 
221 
730 
406 
731 
222 
223 
224 
225 
226 
227 
748 
749 
228 
229 


Page 

No. 

a 

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to 

a 
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168 

4 

6 

337 

6 

7 

8 

169 

3 

4 

6 

169 

4 

6 

169 

4 

6 

636 

4 

170 

4 

6 

171 

4 

341 

5 

6 

38 

4 

8 

171 

4 

6 

173 

4 

6 

637 

4 

172 

1 

3 

4 

6 

7 

174 

1 

4 

5 

6 

638 

175 

3 

4 

6 

175 

4 

175 

4 

176 

4 

176 

4 

6 

178 

1 

3 

4 

6 

343 

4 

5 

6 

640 

4 

6 

183 

4 

183 

1 

3 

4 

6 

9 

657 

4 

7 

642 

4 

645 

2 

4 

645 

4 

179 

1 

4 

200 

3 

4 

5 

6 

180 

1 

4 

183 

4 

5 

6 

643 

4 

346 

3 

4 

5 

6 

644 

4 

9 

184 

4 

6 

184 

4 

6 

185 

4 

6 

185 

1 

3 

4 

6 

186 

4 

187 

4 

657 

4 

7 

658 

4 

7 

187 

4 

188 

4 

756   CHRONOLOGICAL  ORDER  OF  DOCUMENTS 


6 

Date 

Document 

Page 

0^ 

1:^ 

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pi 

. 

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No. 

No. 

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d  0 

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559 

June 

18, 

230 

188 

4 

5 

560 

June 

18, 

241 

193 

1 

3 

4 

5 

0 

561 

June 

20, 

240 

193 

1 

3 

4 

562 

June 

20, 

400 

340 

5 

563 

June 

20, 

407 

347 

4 

5 

0 

564 

June 

20 

750 

658 

4 

7 

565 

June 

23; 

231 

189 

4 

5 

566 

June 

24, 

232 

189 

4 

567 

June 

24, 

233 

189 

4 

6 

568 

June 

26, 

751 

659 

4 

7 

569 

July 

2, 

44 

39 

4 

8 

570 

July 

2, 

45 

39 

4 

8 

571 

July 

2, 

242 

194 

1 

3 

4 

5 

572 

July 

7, 

734 

646 

4 

573 

July 

8, 

408 

348 

4 

5 

574 

July 

8, 

409 

348 

5 

6 

575 

July 

8, 

735 

646 

2 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

0 

576 

July 

11, 

243 

195 

3 

6 

577 

July 

11, 

736 

648 

2 

4 

0 

578 

July 

13, 

234 

190 

4 

579 

July 

16, 

737 

649 

2 

4 

0 

580 

July 

17, 

738 

650 

4 

581 

July 

17, 

419 

352 

5 

6 

582 

July 

18, 

218 

182 

1 

4 

6 

9 

0 

583 

July 

18, 

739 

650 

4 

584 

July 

20, 

411 

349 

4 

5 

6 

585 

July 

21, 

412 

349 

4 

5 

6 

586 

July 

23, 

413 

350 

5 

587 

July 

29, 

414 

350 

5 

588 

July 

30, 

244 

196 

3 

5 

589 

August 

2, 

740 

651 

0 

590 

August 

6, 

741 

652 

4 

0 

591 

August 

6, 

402 

341 

5 

6 

592 

August 

10, 

742 

652 

4 

0 

593 

August 

743 

652 

1 

4 

5 

6 

9 

0 

594 

August 

13, 

245 

197 

1 

3 

0 

695 

August 

13, 

246 

197 

1 

3 

4 

5 

6 

0 

696 

August 

14, 

752 

659 

7 

597 

August 

15, 

423 

355 

6 

6 

698 

August 

18, 

235 

191 

4 

6 

599 

August 

18, 

420 

353 

4 

5 

6 

600 

August 

18, 

421 

354 

4 

5 

6 

601 

August 

19, 

403 

342 

5 

6 

602 

August 

20, 

415 

350 

5 

603 

August 

21, 

425 

356 

4 

5 

6 

604 

August 

21, 

753 

659 

4 

7 

605 

August 

23, 

754 

660 

4 

7 

CHRONOLOGICAL  ORDER  OF  DOCUMENTS   757 


6 

Date 

Document 

Page 

•53  a 

"o 

"o 

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No. 

No. 

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August        23, 

422 

355 

4 

5 

6 

607 

August        29, 

424 

356 

4 

5 

6 

608 

August         29, 

427 

357 

5 

6 

609 

August         31, 

46 

40 

8 

0 

610 

September    1, 

426 

357 

4 

5 

611 

September    2, 

236 

191 

4 

5 

6 

612 

September    7, 

755 

660 

4 

7 

613 

September  11, 

756 

661 

7 

614 

September  13, 

757 

661 

4 

7 

615 

September  20, 

237 

191 

4 

616 

September  20, 

410 

348 

5 

617 

September  20, 

428 

358 

5 

6 

618 

September  27, 

416 

351 

5 

6 

619 

September  30, 

417 

351 

4 

5 

6 

620 

September  30, 

418 

352 

4 

5 

6 

621 

October 

105 

91 

2 

7 

8 

622 

October 

431 

366 

2 

4 

5 

6 

8 

0 

623 

October         8, 

404 

343 

5 

6 

624 

October       14, 

238 

192 

4 

6 

9 

625 

October       21, 

432 

370 

4 

5 

6 

0 

626 

October       21, 

433 

371 

4 

5 

6 

627 

October       21, 

434 

371 

4 

5 

6 

628 

October       21, 

435 

372 

2 

4 

5 

6 

0 

629 

October       22, 

436 

373 

2 

4 

5 

6 

0 

630 

October       23, 

429 

360 

3 

4 

5 

6 

0 

631 

October       23, 

430 

362 

4 

5 

6 

0 

632 

October       24, 

437 

375 

4 

5 

6 

633 

October       24, 

438 

375 

3 

4 

5 

6 

634 

October       28, 

439 

376 

4 

5 

6 

635 

October       29, 

440 

376 

4 

5 

6 

636 

October       30, 

441 

378 

4 

5 

6 

0 

637 

October       31, 

249 

200 

I 

3 

4 

5 

638 

October       31, 

442 

379 

4 

5 

6 

639 

October       31, 

443 

381 

4 

5 

6 

640 

October       31, 

444 

382 

4 

5 

6 

641 

November    1, 

445 

382 

4 

5 

6 

642 

November    2, 

446 

382 

4 

5 

6 

643 

November    2, 

447 

383 

4 

5 

6 

0 

644 

November    2, 

448 

384 

4 

5 

6 

645 

November    4, 

449 

385 

4 

5 

6 

0 

646 

November    4, 

450 

386 

4 

5 

6 

647 

November    4, 

451 

387 

4 

5 

6 

648 

November    4, 

461 

394 

3 

4 

5 

6 

0 

649 

November    5, 

456 

390 

4 

5 

6 

650 

November    6, 

452 

387 

4 

5 

6 

0 

651 

November    6, 

457 

391 

4 

5 

6 

0 

652 

November    7, 

453 

388 

4 

5 

6 

0 

758   CHRONOLOGICAL  ORDER  OF  DOCUMENTS 


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November    7, 

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November    8, 

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392 

3 

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November    9, 

455 

389 

5 

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November    9, 

247 

199 

1 

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0 

659 

November    9, 

462 

395 

5 

0 

660 

November  11, 

463 

396 

4 

5 

0 

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November  11, 

464 

397 

4 

5 

0 

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November  11, 

465 

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4 

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November  12, 

466 

398 

4 

5 

0 

664 

November  14, 

467 

398 

4 

5 

0 

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November  14, 

468 

399 

4 

5 

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666 

November  14, 

469 

399 

4 

5 

0 

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November  14, 

470 

400 

4 

5 

0 

668 

November  14, 

471 

401 

4 

5 

0 

669 

November  16, 

472 

401 

4 

5 

670 

November  17 

474 

403 

4 

5 

0 

671 

November  18, 

473 

402 

4 

5 

0 

672 

November  18, 

475 

404 

4 

5 

0 

673 

November  20 

476 

404 

4 

5 

6 

7 

0 

674 

November  20 

477 

406 

1 

3 

4 

5 

0 

675 

November  22 

848 

723 

4 

0 

676 

November  23 

849 

724 

4 

0 

677 

November  23 

478 

407 

4 

5 

0 

678 

November  23 

479 

408 

4 

5 

679 

November  23 

480 

409 

4 

5 

0 

680 

November  24 

481 

409 

3 

4 

5 

0 

681 

November  25 

482 

411 

4 

5 

682 

November  25 

483 

411 

3 

4 

5 

0 

683 

November  25 

484 

412 

4 

5 

684 

November  26 

485 

412 

4 

5 

685 

November  26 

486 

413 

4 

5 

686 

November  26 

487 

413 

4 

5 

687 

November  26 

489 

414 

4 

6 

0 

688 

November  26 

495 

422 

4 

5 

689 

November  26 

496 

422 

4 

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690 

November  27 

488 

413 

5 

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November  28 

491 

415 

4 

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6 

0 

692 

November  28 

497 

423 

4 

5 

0 

693 

November  28 

498 

423 

4 

5 

694 

November  28 

499 

424 

4 

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695 

November  29 

500 

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4 

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0 

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November  30 

490 

414 

4 

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November  30 

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425 

4 

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698 

December     1 

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4 

5 

0 

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December     2 

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December     4, 

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December     5, 

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December     6, 

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December     6, 

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December     6, 

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December     6, 

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4 

5 

0 

709 

December     8, 

510 

430 

4 

5 

710 

December     9, 

511 

430 

4 

5 

0 

711 

December     9, 

512 

431 

4 

5 

712 

December     9, 

513 

431 

4 

5 

713 

December  10, 

514 

432 

4 

5 

0 

714 

December  10, 

515 

433 

4 

5 

715 

December  10, 

516 

434 

4 

5 

716 

December  11, 

767 

667 

4 

5 

0 

717 

December  11, 

517 

434 

4 

5 

718 

December  12, 

518 

435 

4 

5 

719 

December  14, 
1913 

519 

435 

4 

5 

720 

January         3, 

768 

668 

4 

5 

0 

721 

January      29, 

370 

315 

4 

5 

0 

722 

February       9, 

769 

668 

5 

0 

723 

February     12, 

770 

668 

5 

0 

724 

February     13, 

771 

669 

4 

5 

0 

725 

February    28, 

772 

669 

4 

5 

0 

726 

March          14, 

773 

670 

5 

0 

727 

March         16, 

759 

661 

7 

728 

April            10, 

774 

672 

0 

729 

April            11, 

775 

673 

4 

0 

730 

April            14, 

776 

673 

4 

0 

731 

April            19, 

777 

673 

0 

732 

May               1, 

493 

418 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

733 

May               9, 

758 

661 

7 

734 

May             10, 

494 

421 

4 

6 

7 

735 

May             16, 

778 

673 

0 

736 

May             18, 

760 

662 

7 

737 

May             19, 

761 

662 

7 

738 

May             19, 

779 

674 

0 

739 

May             21, 

762 

663 

4 

7 

740 

May             26, 

763 

664 

4 

7 

741 

May             30, 

764 

665 

4 

7 

742 

June             27, 

780 

674 

4 

5 

6 

9 

0 

743 

November  20, 

250 

201 

1 

4 

5 

0 

744 

November  21, 

47 

40 

8 

745 

November  21, 

781 

676 

5 

6 

760   CHRONOLOGICAL  ORDER  OF  DOCUMENTS 


1 

Date 

Document 

Page 

.2 

a 

c  o 

It 

1 

(^ 

^ 

, 

o 

^ 

^ 

1913 

No. 

No. 

6S 

6  S 

is 

II 

I 

o 

1 

< 

746 

November  25, 

782 

678 

4 

6 

747 

November  26, 

783 

678 

4 

6 

748 

November  26, 

784 

678 

4 

6 

749 

November  28, 

785 

679 

4 

6 

750 

December     2, 

786 

680 

4 

6 

751 

December     2, 

787 

680 

4 

6 

752 

December     4, 

251 

203 

1 

3 

4 

0 

753 

December     7, 

788 

681 

4 

6 

754 

December     9, 

48 

40 

4 

8 

0 

755 

December     9, 

789 

682 

4 

6 

756 

December     9, 

790 

682 

6 

757 

December     9, 

791 

683 

4 

6 

758 

December     9, 

792 

683 

4 

6 

759 

December  10, 

793 

684 

4 

6 

760 

December  10, 

794 

685 

4 

6 

761 

December  10, 

796 

686 

6 

762 

December  11, 

795 

685 

4 

6 

0 

763 

December  11, 

797 

687 

6 

764 

December  12, 

798 

687 

4 

6 

765 

December  12, 

799 

688 

4 

6 

766 

December  12, 

800 

688 

4 

6 

767 

December  13, 

801 

688 

4 

6 

768 

December  14, 

802 

688 

4 

6 

769 

December  14, 

803 

689 

6 

770 

December  14, 

804 

689 

6 

0 

771 

December  15, 

805 

690 

6 

772 

December  16, 

806 

690 

6 

773 

December  16, 

807 

691 

6 

774 

December  17, 

808 

691 

6 

775 

December  17, 

809 

692 

6 

776 

December  17, 

810 

692 

6 

777 

December  18, 

811 

692 

4 

6 

778 

December  18, 

812 

693 

4 

6 

779 

December  20, 

813 

693 

4 

6 

780 

December  20, 

814 

694 

6 

781 

December  20, 

815 

695 

6 

782 

December  20, 

816 

695 

6 

783 

December  21, 

817 

696 

6 

784 

December  29, 

818 

696 

6 

785 

December  30, 

819 

697 

4 

6 

0 

786 

December  30, 

820 

698 

4 

6 

0 

787 

December  30, 

821 

698 

6 

788 

December  31, 

822 

699 

4 

6 

789 

December  31, 
1914 

823 

699 

4 

6 

790 

January         1, 

824 

699 

4 

6 

7 

0 

791 

January         1, 

825 

701 

6 

CHRONOLOGICAL  ORDER  OF  DOCUMENTS   761 


d 

Date 

Document 

Page 

a 
.2 

IS 

ii 

d 

rt 

, 

o 

'f 

z 

rt 

1914 

No. 

No. 

6S 

O   4) 
C    4) 

n 

5  o 

CO   4^ 

^  a 

c 

i 

2  & 

^c3 

II 

?i 

(§ 

00 

1 

o 

< 

792 

January 

2, 

826 

702 

4 

6 

0 

793 

January 

4, 

827 

702 

4 

6 

794 

January 

5, 

828 

702 

6 

0 

795 

January 

5, 

829 

703 

4 

6 

796 

January 

5, 

830 

703 

6 

797 

January 

5, 

831 

704 

4 

6 

0 

798 

January 

7, 

832 

705 

4 

6 

0 

799 

January 

8, 

833 

705 

4 

6 

800 

January 

12, 

834 

706 

6 

801 

January 

13, 

835 

706 

6 

802 

January 

16, 

836 

706 

6 

0 

803 

January 

24, 

520 

436 

4 

5 

804 

February 

12, 

840 

712 

4 

0 

805 

February 

13, 

837 

709 

4 

0 

806 

February 

17, 

521 

439 

5 

6 

807 

February 

18, 

841 

713 

4 

5 

0 

808 

February 

24, 

253 

206 

3 

4 

5 

6 

0 

809 

February 

24, 

522 

440 

5 

6 

810 

March 

2, 

523 

441 

4 

5 

811 

March 

5, 

530 

446 

5 

812 

March 

9, 

49 

41 

4 

8 

813 

March 

ll! 

50 

42 

4 

8 

814 

March 

12, 

838 

711 

4 

0 

815 

March 

14, 

51 

42 

8 

816 

March 

16, 

52 

43 

8 

817 

March 

26, 

525 

444 

5 

818 

March 

26, 

526 

444 

5 

819 

March 

29, 

527 

445 

5 

820 

March 

30, 

528 

445 

5 

821 

March 

30, 

529 

445 

5 

822 

April 

2, 

842 

713 

2 

4 

5 

6 

8 

0 

823 

April 

3, 

524 

442 

4 

5 

6 

0 

824 

April 

7, 

531 

448 

5 

825 

April 

9, 

839 

711 

0 

826 

April 

9, 

843 

715 

4 

0 

827 

April 

21, 

252 

204 

1 

3 

4 

9 

0 

828 

April 

22, 

534 

450 

5 

829 

April 

26, 

535 

450 

4 

5 

830 

April 

28, 

536 

451 

4 

5 

831 

May 

7, 

537 

451 

4 

5 

832 

May 

12, 

844 

716 

4 

0 

833 

May 

13, 

538 

451 

4 

5 

0 

834 

May 

14, 

364 

312 

4 

5 

8 

0 

835 

May 

16, 

845 

718 

4 

0 

836 

May 

18, 

846 

719 

2 

4 

0 

0 

837 

May 

18, 

850 

724 

4 

6 

0 

838 

May 

18, 

539 

453 

4 

5 

762   CHRONOLOGICAL  ORDER  OF  DOCUMENTS 


Date 

c 
.2 

Ig 

"o 

d 

1 

ei 

1 

6 

Document 

Page 

4^  C 

3.2 

1% 

s:a 

gs 

>« 

"S 

Qd, 

§ 

c 

1914 

No. 

No. 

11 

is 

CO  0) 

a 

1 

1 

§ 

1 

^ 

&< 

<o 

-  ^ 

p:§ 

^ 

pq 

O 

:^ 

< 

839 

May 

19, 

532 

448 

5 

~i 

840 

May 

23, 

847 

721 

4 

1 

841 

May 

23, 

540 

453 

4 

5 

1 

842 

May 

25; 

541 

453 

4 

5 

1 

843 

May 

30, 

542 

454 

4 

5 

1 

844 

May 

30, 

543 

455 

4 

5 

845 

June 

6, 

544 

455 

4 

5 

846 

June 

6, 

851 

727 

4 

0 

847 

June 

11, 

852 

728 

4 

0 

848 

June 

12, 

853 

729 

4 

0 

849 

June 

13, 

854 

730 

4 

0 

850 

June 

19 

545 

455 

4 

5 

851 

June 

25; 

855 

730 

4 

0 

852 

June 

25, 

856 

731 

2 

4 

8 

0 

853 

June 

29, 

546 

456 

5 

854 

June 

30, 

547 

456 

5 

855 

July 

2, 

254 

208 

3 

4 

5 

856 

July 

2, 

857 

732 

2 

4 

0 

857 

July 

7, 

533 

450 

5 

858 

July 

16, 

858 

734 

4 

5 

0 

<SI 


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